The Politics of Personal Transformation and the Limits of “Experience”
Adam Katz
| Revision History | ||
|---|---|---|
| • December 1991-January 1992 | Newspaper: Funded by Syracuse University students. | |
| The Alternative Orange: Vol. 1, No. 3 (pp. 3,6-7) | ||
| • August 28, 2000 | Webpage:  . | |
| DocBook XML (DocBk XML V3.1.3) from original. | ||
Under the pressures generated by the crisis in late capitalist social relations, a decisive shift in the ideological configurations of American culture has taken place. As opposed to more "classical" liberal/bourgeois ideologies, which demand the subordination of the individual to certain "eternal" moral absolutes, the dominant contemporary ideologies proclaim that "experience" is the ultimate test of the correctness of behaviors and judgements. In this article, I will attempt to explain the origins and effects of this ideological formation, from a critical and revolutionary standpoint.
Contemporary discourses are almost without exception united in their privileging of "experience" over "theory" and, especially, "ideology." In these discourses, "experience" stands for whatever is most tangible, whatever is closest to us -- whatever makes us "unique" and "irreplaceable," and could not be duplicated in the life of any other person. "Ideology," on the other hand, is taken to mean "coercive" attempts to "impose" some common abstract set of norms and principles upon the irreducibility and inviolability of personal "experience." A "respect" for experience, for the specific "truths" and inclinations which can be derived from it, is taken to be a mark of the individual's freedom; "ideology," and "theory," on the other hand, are seen as distant and "artificial," and as a trampling uon the rights of experience -- in short, to be a form of totalitarian domination.
It is first of all necessary to point to the pervasiveness of these discourses. One can, for example, recall the recent Thomas hearings, at which it was asserted that Thomas' "experience" of such things as poverty and racism constituted his qualifications as a prospective Supreme Court justice. Another example, within the mass cultural mainstream, would be such television shows as "Donahue" and "Oprah," which treat social issues such as violence against women as a question of "validating" the "experience" of the victims of such violence through a kind of confessional and therapeutic process carried out under the supervision of an "expert" and in which the audience is invited to participate vicariously.
Somewhat closer to home, in the most recent issue of the Alternative Orange, Chris Koliba's "Ecology in Mind" column proposes as a solution to the problem of transforming ideas into actions that "one [be] placed in the position of a 'listener' of other people's real experience." Later, Koliba suggests that, in opposition to reproducing the "manipulative stench" of "rigorous dogma" (i.e., theories and ideologies), the prospective revolutionary "[e]xperience the burden of the hypnotic trance of modern civilization and realize that we are culturally unable to envision a world without war or exploitation." Finally, and more revealingly, advocates of a "multiculturalist" curriculum (often regarded as "progressive" or "left-wing" reforms -- by some, even "dangerously" so), rather than demand an education focused on the necessity to struggle for the economic rights and political power of oppressed people, simply request that the "experience" of the oppressed be recognized as "legitimate" and worthy of attention. In accord with the same logic, many feminists now call not for a politics of the economic, political and cultural emancipation of women (transforming society), but for a politics of creating a "space" in which the "experience" of women will no longer be subject to masculinist domination and suppression.
The basis for the common ideological structure underlying all of these discourses is to be found in the contradictions of the late capitalist social system. Capitalism is based upon private property in the means of production; at the same time as the means of production are in private hands, though, these means become increasingly social. This means that they involve the mobilization of masses of people who are connected through a complex set of interdependencies. Thus, at the same time as the system of private property assumes -- as reflected in liberal political ideologies such as those articulated in the U.S. Declaration of Independence -- that every individual is by nature at least a potential property owner (and therefore in control of his/her own capacities and "destiny"), individuals are increasingly confronted with "collective" institutions and imperatives which are out of their control and appear as violations of their "individuality."
In other words, the (ideo)logic of private property insists upon the sanctity of the freedom of the individual to possess and use his/her abilities in accord with his/her own interests and inclinations. At the same time, especially with the development of monopoly and late corporate capitalism, such "freedom" becomes, in reality, more and more irrelevant as individuals are ruthlessly subordinated to market and bureaucratic "laws" and their interests and inclinations become more and more unrealizable. Under such conditions, it can very easily seem that the very possession of such inclinations, desires and interests is all that stands between the individual and obliteration, and must therefore be protected (or "recovered") at all costs. From here, it is a very short step to a valorization and celebration of the very existence of such elements of "experience," especially for oppressed people who have historically been disempowered. The fact that the specific, "unique," experience in question is a product of precisely this history of oppression becomes secondary, or is lost sight of altogether.
However, this is precisely the problem, and the reason for the highly conservative effects of "experiential" discourses. If one valorizes all that has been accumulated in the form of experience, and sees this store of experience as an end in itself, then one precludes the possibility of radically transforming the historically-produced relations (of exploitation and oppression) which are sedimented in the experience of social subjects. This is because such transformation requires an understanding of the contradictions of such relations, and therefore of the "experiences" they produce; experiential discourses close off the historical possibilities which follow from a critique of these contradictions, and an attempt to resolve them in an emancipatory way. Experience in capitalist societies necessarily reflects the norms and values produced by capitalist relations,k since it is a result of one's everyday participation in institutions and situations governed by those norms and values. For this reason, even resistance to specific institutions and specific forms of oppression generally adopts the terms of the institution or situation itself, and merely "reverses" them or points to their contradiction to reality. For example, a worker's complaint that she does not receive a "fair" day's wage simply reproduces the capitalist ideology which claims that exchanges under capitalism should and can be fair. The effect of this is that the worker is led to believe that the "unfairness" she experiences is not a result of the systematic exploitation of the working class by the capitalist class, but a local "imbalance" that can be corrected. Thus, the "experience" of being treated unfairly conceals the real relations of capitalist society and make it impossible to contest them.
This process -- i.e., the reflection of dominant structures in immediate "experience" -- inevitably leads to an idealization of the conditions of oppression along with the local resistances to them. So, for example, if we praise the worker's resistance to "unfair" terms, we also reproduce the capitalist ideal of "free and fair" exchange (which is now, of course, a bulwark of American imperialism's attempt to "open" up the world's markets for more efficient exploitation). Such ideals and the relations they support then appear permanent and natural. Arguments that claim that a recognition of the experience of the oppressed is itself emancipatory exclude the need to critique and explain experience -- to show that its apparent spontaneity, obviousness and naturalness are in fact an effect of the systematic reproduction of relations of exploitation. In fact, such critique and explanation are taken by the discourses of experience to be instances of domination, since they claim to possess knowledges of oppression which are "outside" of the experience of the oppressed, and therefore an imposition upon that experience, its reduction to some "abstract" "theory."
In this way, the most essential elements of social change are excluded from the ideology and politics of experience. That is, systematic understandings of the social and historical roots of oppression, and the practices required to eliminate it, are delegitimized. For example, one of the most "compelling" arguments among many on the left is that since white males have no access to the experience of oppressed groups (that is, they don't know how women or people of color think and feel), their responsibility is to simply accept as legitimate the experience of these groups and not intervene in a pedagogical way or as part of a political vanguard which proposes agendas for struggle. The effect of this is, on the one hand, to separate oppressed peoples from emancipatory knowledges; on the other hand, it places white males (who, due to their privileges, have also been disproportionately represented among intellectuals and radicals) in the convenient position of merely "appreciating," in a voyeuristic, paternalistic way, the experience of the oppressed. At the same time, radical intellectuals and leaders from oppressed groups themselves can use the discourses of "experience" as a way of subordinating mass movements to reformist agendas which place these leaders in the role of distributing and controlling the limited resources allocated by the ruling class as a way of fending off more substantial change. This is because the discourses of experience insist that people be given "what they want," rather than challenging them to "want" more; also, since they assume that only members of oppressed groups can speak for and address their needs (since no one else has "shared" their experience), they also tend to assume that members of these groups automatically do speak for and address these needs.
The ideology of "experience" reduces all transformation to the local and the personal; that is, to what can actually be "experienced" on an individual level.The reactionary effects of this are all too clear -- for example, liberal (and even "radical") environmentalists encourage us to change our "lifestyle" (by recycling, for example, or perhaps more drastic measures), rather than mount a sustained attack upon the irrationality and destructiveness of the profit-driven capitalist mode of production. In Berkeley, for example, The Whole Foods Market, a counter-cultural natural foods store, has attracted a "progressive" clientele which has crossed the picket line of its striking workers (The Whole Foods Market is adamantly anti-union) not in spite of but because of their politics which, with its emphasis on the "personal" and "consumption" as modes of effecting social change, finds the "collectivist," "confrontational," and "old-fashioned" tactics of working class struggle "offensive."
Two recent, highly acclaimed movies also help to illustrate this point. First, "Thelma and Louise," a supposedly "feminist" film, contends that the most authentic mode of struggling against a male-dominated society is not to contest the structures of that society but to undergo an experience which leads to a personal transformation -- that is, the acquisition of "skills" which enable one to reverse in local instances one's relation to the oppressor (while leaving the system of oppression intact), to control and enjoy one's sexual relations, and to liberate oneself for a time from oppressive institutional norms and practices by situating oneself "outside" of the bounds of those institutions. Not only do these methods leave those institutions which support specific instances of domination intact, but furthermore they legitimate them by demonstrating the "impossibility" of opposing them -- that is, they allow those institutions to set the terms of what counts for "liberation" and therefore place resistance on the "fringes" of those institutions. "Boyz N the Hood," meanwhile, use a combination of the discourses of the family (patriarchy), a diluted black nationalism (reduced to an anemic separatism and a call for "black capitalism"), and a version of sensationalized media understandings of inner city life to assert that the solution to the problems facing African Americans is precisely the one that conservatives have supported all along -- blacks must depend solely upon their own individual and familial resources (the emptiness of the film's evocation of a black community, or even nation, is made clear by the end of the film, as we learn only those -- very, very few -- are "saved" who learn to "look out for themselves"), and, through a sheer act of will and moral regeneration, "pull themselves up by their bootstraps" (like Clarence Thomas).
The notion of "experience" I am discussing here should be contrasted with a term which is often confused with experience -- practice. Practice involves some effective control over an object or process; it refers to a subject who introduces a transformation into an already-existing situation. In the evaluation and critique of practices, the court of last appeal is not, as in the ideology of experience, the subject (his/her "feelings," "desires," "intentions," etc.), but rather the material effects brought about by that practice. The point then, becomes less subjects' experience of their conditions and activity, but the actual significance of those conditions and activities. In this case, we are dealing not with the intangible data of unique subjective experience, but with material effects which support specific interest in contestation with other ones.
The problem, then, is not, as it is for neo-liberal experientialists, whether one can "identify" or "sympathize" with the oppression and struggles of subordinate groups and individuals. In place of this kind of touristic attitude, the problem becomes whether our practices contest or support those structures of oppression. However, this assumes that we are working with a theory, which enables us to make the often indirect and complicated connections between practices and their effects, and an ideology, which posits a specific goal (social transformation) toward which we direct our practices. Such theoretical work and ideological struggle necessarily requires a high degree of generalization and abstraction from one's immediate, everyday "experience," in order to attain a comprehension of the causes of that experience and the modes of transforming it.
This does not mean, as some experientialists would have it, that those who base their politics on theoretical analyses and ideological principles simply want to tell the members of oppressed groups "what to do." This posits a false alternative between uncritical support of all actions claiming to be emancipatory and paternalism. As opposed to this understanding of the possibilities of oppositional politics, I would advance the concept of "self-determination" as a way of guiding the relations between intellectuals and leaders and those whose struggles they attempt to intervene in. Self-determination does not refer to a "feeling" of freedom or autonomy, but to the real, collective control over institutions and social and cultural resources.
A support of self-determination for oppressed peoples means the following. First, unconditional support for all forms of independent organization, in which oppressed peoples can work out strategies for struggle, propose solutions to their problems, and accumulate the material resources required for them to wage their struggles on their own terms. Second, unconditional support for all politics and actions on which there is demonstrably the agreement of a vast majority of the members of the oppressed group; or which are indispensable to the effective exercise of their rights. Third, critical solidarity with the movements and organizations established by the oppressed. This means that one is to contribute one's analyses, knowledges, and critiques, and make them available to those engaging in the internal debates and struggles of those organizations and movements, while at the same time supporting their right to have effective control over all of the institutional means which will ensure that the decisions, in the end, will be those of the organization.
This does not mean the experience of the oppressed (or anyone else, for that matter), is insignificant. Nor does it mean that we need to reject the notion of personal transformation. A recognition of the experience of oppression is the point of departure both for the victims of oppression and for those who align themselves with the struggles of the oppressed. In fact, the central contradiction informing the "experience" of the oppressed is that they are compelled, through their practices, to support existing relations (through their objective dependence upon existing institutions) while simultaneously attempting to resist them. My critique, then, is not directed at the spontaneous groping for emancipation which characterizes the early period of any struggle; rather, it is directed at those ideologists and leaders who fetishize this starting point, who see it as the most pristine and therefore authentic expression of subalternity and who therefore seek to freeze the struggle at this point. Such practices on the part of the reformist leaders and ideologists serve to increase their own power, since a lack of access of theoretical knowledges and advanced understandings of their conditions increases the dependence of the oppressed upon those who manage the organizations and institutions they are situated within.
At the same time, social transformation is more than the sum total of the "personal transformation" of all the members of a given society -- it is the transformation of specific social structures and power relations. The transformation of individuals depends upon the transformation in the practices in which they participate, and the relations they enter into with others -- it is not a purely internal or psychological process. The role of revolutionary intellectuals, the, is not to apologize for their privileges, or to worship the richness and inviolability of the experiences of the oppressed, but to support those practices of the oppressed in which, in defense of their rights or even existence, they set themselves in opposition to the agenda of their oppressors; and to support these practices, furthermore, by critiquing their limitations and contradictions and providing knowledges which will make it possible to extend and connect these struggles in order to give them a revolutionary dynamic. Changed social conditions produce changed individuals, and individuals revolutionize their own understandings and "experience" not passively but in the process of revolutionizing those conditions, of discovering new possibilities and new modes of collective and thereby individual empowerment.
What I am calling the ideology of experience is a product of the crisis in late capitalist relations of production. Late (post WW II) capitalism has involved a massive (if still inadequate) transfer of social resources to the public sphere (to things such as education, social welfare programs, etc.) as well as an extension of social planning throughout society. However, these tendencies, no matter how necessary they are to the reproduction of increasingly global capitalist order, come into contradiction with the interests and profits of the capitalist ruling class. This is especially the case when oppressed groups struggle to extend the limits of public responsibility for all citizens, and to pressure institutions to organize themselves so as to meet the needs of all people and ultimately to institute popular control over those institutions (the goals of the movements of the 1960s). The last decade and a half, therefore, has seen a massive capitalist backlash against these processes. This backlash has taken the form of a wholesale program of privatization, of the evacuation of the accountability of the public sphere.
Experiential discourses are the results of the defeat of the movements of the 60's; they represent the retraction of demands for social transformation (made by women, blacks, anti-imperialist movements, students...) -- which now seem "impossible" and "unreasonable" - in favor of a plea for "tolerance," for "respect" for differences, for the right to "own" one's personal experiences (however horrific) and to have one's resistance "recognized." They are, that is, the extension of the logic of privatization into the subjectivity of the oppressed themselves. In other words, with the collapse of liberal ideologies of piecemeal social reform, experiential discourses and the practices they support have taken upon themselves the "responsibility" to crisis-manage late capitalism on behalf of the capitalist class -- not, as previously, by providing greater (if limited) access to the total social product of exploited labor, but (in accord with the "austerity" programs of the right), by extending to them enlarged rights of ownership over their own "experience." It is for this reason that such discourses need to be contested -- that is, they block the formation of the kinds of knowledges (such as revolutionary understandings of the global connections of capitalism, imperialism, patriarchy and white supremacy) required to support collective practices aimed at abolishing (rather than modifying) exploitation and domination. Instead of a system of exchange of experiences (which implies an abstention from contesting institutional structures), the oppressed need to be enabled to undertake the actions which will result in the collective and conscious appropriation of all social institutions and resources by and on behalf of those who are currently oppressed by them. For this reason it is necessary to critique those actions and ideologies which delay or prevent this process by reproducing the very modes of subjectivity (thinking, acting and feeling) which idealize and therefore legitimate the conditions of the oppressed.
