…meanwhile, in South Africa, the bloody capitalist-apartheid regime remains…

A warning about these articles on Southern Africa. They contain almost no new information. They contain a lot of old news which seems to be ignored in the present discussion of the “changing” South Africa. In one of them I credit Leon Sullivan with beginning the campaign of “corporate camouflage” with his infamous principles, developed to mask the complicity of General Motors with the apartheid regime (well, hell GM produced military vehicles for Hitler’s government, too, some of them in plants in — you guessed it — South Africa. Sorry. Cheap shot. Although du Pont, also a heavy business partner with South Africa, invested in I.G. Farben, which ran the facility at Auschwitz…). In March,1985, just before he announced that his principles had been a failure, the Rev. Sullivan delivered the keynote address at a conference attended by chairmen or CEO’s of GM, Mobil, Shell, British Petroleum, Barclays, Caltex and various other US and British corporations whose reputations were suffering due to their ties with South Africa. The one-day closed conference, at Leeds Castle, U.K., discussed a public relations policy to oppose the growing divestment movement in the US and Europe. South Africa set up s special department within its Ministry of Foreign Affairs to plan, coordinate and execute a counter divestment campaign. Stephen Bisenius, a former US consular official, established the American Association for Trade and Investment. That organization established a coalition of investors and trading partners sympathetic to apartheid policies. The expressed goal, as reported by the Financial Times of London, to “coordinate an aggressive policy” to forestall the divestment movement (United States Anti- Apartheid Newsletter, Volume 1, number 1, Spring 1985).

As we read of the changes in Southern Africa in the coming months, we should be on the watch for one thing: constitutional changes. Until the constitutional pillars of apartheid are amended, there is quite simply no reason to trust any news of change. As long as it is illegal to oppose the government, as long as people can be jailed without charge or trial, the fact the the UDF or the ANC is no longer “banned” seems less than significant. As long as it is illegal for US corporations to tell the truth about sales to the South African government, their rosy public relations comments about working for change ring hollow.

In August, 1962, Donald Rickard, the American counsel in Durban, who was working for the CIA, fingered Nelson Mandela for the South African police. For over 30 years the US has supported South Africa’s ongoing reign of terror throughout Southern Africa. US corporate money has fueled the apartheid regime, and the media has dutifully ignored most of the story. So as you read about a new day dawning in South Africa, wait to be convinced. Don’t believe the hype.

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The following have not been affected by the recent “winds of change” in South Africa:

— The National Key Points Act;

— The National Supplies Procurement Act;

— The Armaments Development and Production Act (about these three more below;

— The Terrorism Act, which makes it illegal to call for the overthrow of the apartheid government: it is this act which makes it illegal for any South African publicly to support economic sanctions against South Africa; under this act, although the ANC is no longer a banned organization and membership in the ANC is now legal, it is still illegal to profess support for the ANC charter, since that charter calls for the dismantling of the existing government.

— The Internal Securities Act, which allows detention without trial, banning of groups, putting people under house arrest;

— The Group Areas Act, which prohibits people of different races from living in the same area;

— The Land Acts, which establish the Bantustans, or “homelands” (such as Buthelezi’s KwaZulu) which are the only areas in which Blacks are allowed to reside without specific government permission: these lands comprise 13% of the land area in South Africa, while the remaining 87% is officially for whites only.

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What seems to have been continually ignored in the discussions the US media of the South Africa question is that it is in fact the Southern Africa question. The US is intent on propping up the apartheid regime because it represents political and economic control of the entire surrounding area.

The Republic of South Africa has carried on a war of destabilization against pretty much each of its neighbors since the 1970’s. Sometimes this has taken the form of bona fide invasions: air strikes have been launched against Botswana, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe — basically, every neighboring country — in each case without provocation. Most often, South Africa’s wars are carried out through terrorist attacks intended to impair the ability of elected governments to maintain order.

The economy of Southern Africa is controlled by the Republic of South Africa: Zimbabwe and Botswana send three quarters of their exports through South Africa; the major banks and corporations of the region tend to be based there; Lesotho buys 97% of its imports from South Africa, Swaziland 85% (trade figures as of 1986).

South Africa dominates the transportation network of the entire region, and in order to maintain this dominance has launched attacks against alternative outlets to ports in Mozambique and Angola. In 1981, South Africa deliberately delayed oil and fertilizer shipments to Lesotho, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana to hinder production and marketing of crops; this served to maintain the region’s dependence on South Africa for food supplies. These ongoing destabilization campaigns have put the CIA in an odd position: South Africa’s energy monopoly is somewhat threatened by Angola’s increasing ability to produce and refine petroleum. Thus CIA-supported UNITA and SADF forces have frequently attacked US-owned refineries — Gulf, Texaco, Exxon — in Angola, which some might argue to be a conflict of interest for the US government.

Besides the war on Angola recounted elsewhere in these pages, South Africa has carried on almost constant terrorist wars against Namibia and Mozambique, its immediate neighbors to the East and West.

South Africa seized Namibia from Germany during World War I and eventually instituted a system of apartheid similar to the one now existing in South Africa. Namibia’s resources came under the control of white settlers and of foreign corporations. In 1966, the United Nations declared the South African presence in Namibia to be illegal and ordered South African troops to vacate the area. However, successive South African governments have refused, claiming that the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) harbors and supports ANC “terrorists”. In response to this threat, 90,000 South African troops are stationed in Namibia to keep the peace. As you will recall, Angola purportedly harbors SWAPO “terrorists” in Angola, which explains the South African attacks on that country.

A secret South African intelligence study indicated that if free elections were to be held in Namibia, SWAPO would win over 80% of the votes (The New Statesman, August 21, 1980). Since 1978 the United Nations has promoted a plan for free elections in Namibia; however, the Reagan administration demanded that such elections and South African withdrawal be linked to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola (which of course wouldn’t have been there if South Africa and the US weren’t carrying on the war against the MPLA). For this reason the US and Britain have consistently vetoed stronger UN action against South Africa for its violation of International Law in Namibia. “We question whether your government cares about the people of this country,” said Bishop James Kauluma, head of the Namibian Council of Churches. “Mr. Reagan seems more interested in using us as a bargaining chip with the Soviets.”

On the other side of the continent, South Africa is the sole support behind the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR — better known as RENAMO). Probably all that most of us need to know about this organization is that Jesse Helms and Robert Dole urged support for them as warriors against communism. RENAMO has no real political program: it blows up bridges, dams, pipelines, attacks villages, kills, rapes, steals. According to the US Agency for International Development, its attacks “have disrupted agricultural production, severed lines of communication and destroyed government installations in all of Mozambique’s 10 provinces. Hundreds have been killed… tens of thousands have fled their homes…” (National Catholic Reporter, 5-31-85).

The MNR was established by the government of Rhodesia in 1976 to destabilize the newly independent government established by the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). When majority rule was established and Rhodesia became Zimbabwe, control of the MNR passed to the South Africa Department of Military Intelligence. In response to terrorist attacks like the one on the village of Homoine in 1987 (in which 424 peasants were slaughtered), Mozambique was soon devoting 42% of its budget to defense, money a starving country could ill afford.

To be honest, those defense costs weren’t all the fault of RENAMO: the South African military has carried out several direct attacks on Mozambique as well, sending in air strikes and ground forces ostensibly to go after South African exiles. The generally conservative British business journal The Economist called on the west to aid FRELIMO: “What it needs first is an end to South African disruption: preferably by a peaceful regional settlement; if not, then by the military equipment and training to defend itself (“Mozambique: a ruined state” 3-11-86).

Unfortunately the US has for 12 years carried out the policy strangely called “Constructive Engagement” by its architect, Chester Crocker. This policy apparently has two prime components: increased arms sales to South Africa (US commercial arms sales to South Africa during the first three years of the Reagan administration exceeded those of the previous thirty years), and the blocking of punitive measures in the UN. After the US vetoed UN condemnation of South African raids against Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana in 1986, Zambian President Kenneth evaluated the policy: “I hope President Reagan has got his message right and proper. This is his constructive engagement. It’s very constructive indeed, killing children, very constructive.” (New York Times, 7-6-86, p. 4).

[see Kevin Danaher, The Political Economy of U.S. Policy Toward South Africa, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985; Danaher, “Hunger As A Weapon”,

Food First, 1987; John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, New York: W.W. Norton, 1978]

Corporate Complicitors

Once upon a time there was a company called GM South Africa, and as you can probably guess it was associated with General Motors and it was working in South Africa. GM South Africa dealt extensively with the South African government — its government sales included police and military vehicles — and reaped a tidy profit, which was funneled back to its parent corporation.

In 1977 it was revealed that GM South Africa had been declared a National Key Point industry. Under the National Key Points Act, the South African Ministry of Defence reserves the right in time of national emergency to take over a given company’s facilities and to convert them to military production. Secret memoranda between GM South Africa and its US parent (which were leaked in 1977) pointed out that, not only was it likely that the Ministry of Defence might someday take over the plant, but that GM (and other Key Point industries) were expected to participate in a Citizen Force Commando system. The corporation that is, was encouraged “by the authorities”, according to the memo, to recruit white employees with military training to join the Citizens Force Commando, in order to protect the facilities and the white employees from any Black employees who might get out of hand.

There are estimated to be over 600 key point industries in South Africa. No one can be certain either of the number or of the specific companies involved, since the information is secret under South African law. Indeed, it is illegal even for the companies themselves to make public the information that they are key point industries: such an admission is legal grounds for the government to expel the corporation from South Africa. Under the National Supplies Procurement Act ( no. 89,passed in 1970) and the Armaments Development and Procurement Act (no. 57, 1968), the government is empowered to order any corporation operating in South Africa to sell its products to the government. Again, such transactions are kept secret by law, and cannot be reveled even to the stockholders of the companies involved. It is illegal for any US corporation, then, to reveal its dealings with the South African government: in addition to possible expulsion from South Africa, the penalties for doing so range up to 10-year prison terms.

We learned about GM’s key point status only because the memoranda in question were leaked to the public. This caused some embarrassment for GM, since neither they nor GM South Africa had protested the designation of key point status, but had dutifully set to work establishing the commando force as ordered. The revelation came during a period of renewed strong public demand for US disinvestment form South Africa, rekindled after the slaughter by South African police of innocent children during the 1976 Soweto uprisings.

GM responded to public outcry by firing what was probably the first salvo in the campaign of corporate camouflage which continues to this day. The Reverend Leon Sullivan, a board member of General Motors, produced the Sullivan Principles, guidelines for corporate involvement in South Africa. These guidelines focused on high-sounding positions such as equal pay for equal work , desegregated lunch areas, scholarships for black employees of US firms. The guidelines ignored more pressing issues of corporate complicity with South African invasions of neighboring countries, with terrorist campaigns against opponents of apartheid within South Africa and in other countries, or corporate acceptance of the National Key Points Act.

Rev. Sullivan’s Joke

The Sullivan Principles were a joke, and one in poor taste, but they played well in print. Dozens of corporations signed documents saying that they supported the principles (the implication being that they therefore had every right to do business with South Africa). US universities and churches under pressure to disinvest from corporations doing business in or with South Africa solemnly promised that they would invest only in corporations signatory to the Sullivan Principles (SU was one of these institutions; in the late 1970’s Joseph Julian put articles about the principles on reserve in the library so that disgruntled student could be reassured that the university had a conscience after all). By 1986, the Reverend Sullivan himself finally got the joke. He stated that he could no longer in good conscience endorse his own principles, and urged total disinvestment. At that time, the SU administration’s public response was that even if the principles weren’t good enough for their author, they were good enough for SU.

[E. Schmidt, Decoding Corporate Camouflage, Institute for Policy Studies, 1985; Divinski et alii, 1986, Seidman, Danaher; Ninth Report on the Signatory Companies to the Sullivan Principles, Arthur D. Little, 10-25-1985; Lawrence Litvak, Robert DeGrasse and Kathleen McTigue, South Africa: Foreign Investment and Apartheid, Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1985; Jonathan Leape, Bo Baskin and Stefan Underhill, eds., Business in the Shadow of Apartheid, Lexington Books, 1985; IRRC, Proxy Issues Report, “Corporate Activity in South Africa: Ford Motor Co.”, 1985 Analysis C, Supplement No. 2, 4-17-85; David Hauck, “U.S. Companies and Support for the South African Government: The Legal Requirements”, IRRC report for a consortium of colleges and universities, 2-22- 85]

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Presumably IBM was another key point industry (and its descendant ISM, most likely is, as well). No public information was ever released to support (or deny) this supposition; however, in light of IBM’s heavy business involvement with the apartheid government it seems likely IBM has been a major supplier of computers to the South African government for over 20 years. Their computers were used by the Departments of Defence, Prisons and Interior, and by the Atomic Energy Board. IBM helped to coordinate the “Book of Life” passbook system used to control the movements of South African couloureds (any non-white found in a white area was had to show a passbook on demand or be removed back to a legal non-white zone. IBM also bid for the contract on the passbooks used for Blacks, but was underbid on that contract (R.J.Divinski, Blaine De Lancey, Cheryl Carpenter, Rick Coughlin and Doug Margolis, “Divest Now”, Equal Time, April 1986, pp. 6-8).

Testimony before the Africa Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1976 and 1977 illuminated IBM’s South African connections with the military. IBM computers leased to the South African government in 1976 were of the sort useful in conducting radar-directed bombing raids; for this reason such computers were at the time illegal to export to the Soviet Union. Since that time, of course, South Africa has conducted bombing raids against Angola, Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia. In 1980 one third of IBM’s computer sales were to the government. In 1981 an advertisement appeared in the South African media for the “IBM Law Enforcement Software Package.” IBM officials denied any involvement, calling the ad’s source “a mystery” (Jack Anderson, Washington Post, 5-30-81; taken from a press release prepared by the above miscreants).

IBM, GM and Coca-Cola were also among those US corporations to practice what came to be known as “sham divestment.” As the public appeal of the Sullivan principles dwindled, some US corporations took to the idea of changing the names of their South African offices so that they could claim not to be doing any business with the Republic of South Africa.

IBM announced its withdrawal from South Africa in October, 1986. It sold its South African subsidiary to its employees; Jack Clarke, former manager of IBM South Africa, took over as new manager of Information Services Management (ISM). In a letter to former IBM customers, he wrote, “The new company will hold the sole franchise for IBM in South Africa, and has a supply and service contract with IBM…. There will be no change in the supply of IBM products.” Except, of course, that IBM could now claim divestment while still reaping the profits of its $200 million annual sales in South Africa. Coca-Cola established a marketing agreement with Amalgamated Beverage Industries, to whom it sells its syrup and maintains a licensing agreement in South Africa and Namibia. General Motors not only set up a shadow company in South Africa, but invested an additional $1000 million dollars in it in 1986 and reserved the right in the condition of sale to buy back the company at any future date.

uuu

In 1978 the Board of Trustees announced, in response to pressure from the SU community, that SU would not invest in any corporation doing business in or with South Africa, with the exception of corporations signatory to the Sullivan Principles. As of 1980, Carrier Corporation had not signed the Principles; however, SU maintained its investment in Carrier. In 1984, members of Divest Now! announced that Baxter, Travenol Laboratories, Inc. and Esmark, Inc. had not signed the Principles, but that SU still held investments in these companies. Vice President Joseph Julian responded that SU reserved the right to ignore its own investment guidelines “if it feels those companies follow the intent of those principles.” (Daily Orange, 4-20-84). In the Spring of 1985, two additional non-signatories were uncovered among corporations in which SU held investments: Emery Air Freight and Boeing. The university claimed that this was merely an oversight; however, it maintained its investment in Emery for at least a year after the “oversight” was discovered.

By 1990 SU had apparently divested itself of almost all of its South Africa-tainted holdings (the holdings had dwindled from over $19 million in 1985 to about $250,000, although the administration had become increasingly less willing to release endowment information to the public). Also, unlike dozens of institutions, SU never claimed “partial divestment” as the result of its Sullivan Principle guidelines. Chancellor Eggers told me in 1989 that to have done so, in his eyes, would simply not have been honest.

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“After nearly three decades of war, economic hardship and political strife, Angolans will go to the polls next week to elect a government freely for the first time,” writes Kenneth B. Noble in the New York Times. “While the election could be viewed as a triumph of democracy, cynicism is widespread.

“Many Angolans are not convinced that Western-style democracy can work here. Their doubts have not been lessened by sporadic incidents of violence, much of it stemming from a mix of ethnic differences and old vendettas.”

“More than 500,000 Angolans died during a generation of bloodshed, two-thirds of them children, leaving virtually no family untouched,” Noble reports. He later adds, “The decision now facing Angolan voters is who should bear the blame for such misery, a judgment that has overshadowed debate about future policies.” He provides two possible answers: “the governing party, the once avowedly Marxist-Leninist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola” or UNITA and its leader, Savimbi.

He manages, remarkably, to write 28 paragraphs about Angola without ever mentioning the CIA, which was directly responsible for the collapse of the Alvor Accord in 1975. He also finds it unnecessary to discuss the South African Defence Force which, along with Jonas Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, carried out a terrorist campaign of destabilization against Angola since 1975. By leaving out two of the key players in the horror that has been Angolan life for 30 years, Noble reinforces the myth of an unfortunate civil war between the Marxist MPLA and Savimbi’s UNITA forces. In the interest of reality we offer the following brief history of how Angola reached this point.

Angola lies in one of the areas most devastated by the slave trade after the Portuguese settled on the west coast 500 years ago. By the beginning of this century the Portuguese had also conquered the peoples living in the interior of what is now Angola. A war with Portugal for Angolan independence began in 1961. In the early stages of the war for independence the key opponents to the Portuguese were the movement which would become the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the rival Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The FNLA, led by Holden Roberto, was backed by the government of the Congo and received funding from the CIA. Jonas Savimbi joined the FNLA in 1961, and later became its Foreign Minister.

Savimbi broke with the FNLA in July, 1964, criticizing Holden Roberto for his tribalism, the group’s inefficiency, and Roberto’s ties to the CIA (Noble, by the way, quotes Roberto in the article cited above, mentioning him only as “a presidential candidate who led the old National Front for the Liberation of Angola.” No mention is made of Roberto’s CIA connections). Savimbi approached Moscow for aid in establishing a rival movement to MPLA; he was unsuccessful. He established UNITA in 1966 as an anti-colonial guerrilla movement, with support form the Chinese government. However, his organization soon proved weaker than the MPLA. The Portuguese military embarked in 1971 on a covert alliance, “Operation Timber”, to use UNITA against the MPLA. Initially this alliance also included the government of Zambia; unfortunately Savimbi’s terrorist attacks extended into that country, and the Zambian government expelled him in 1967.

By 1971, according to General Costa Gomes, Portuguese commander in Angola 1970-72, Savimbi had signed a secret accord with the Portuguese military, agreeing to cooperate with the Portuguese against the MPLA. At the same time, Savimbi was courting US and European leftists with revolutionary rhetoric, calling UNITA the authentic black nationalist movement and condemning the MPLA as white- and mestico- dominated.

In 1974 the Portuguese army overthrew the fascist government in Lisbon. A major factor in this overthrow was the military’s disinclination to continue the 13-year-old war to maintain Portuguese control of Angola. The previous government had refused negotiations for independence. The new rulers entered into negotiations with the three movements vying for power in Angola: the MPLA, UNITA, and the FNLA. In January 1975, an agreement was reached at Alvor, Portugal, which established the date and arrangement for independence. Under the agreement, the three movements agreed to share power with Portugal in a transitional government, with elections set for November 11, 1975.

Within days of the agreement, the National Security Council’s 40 Committee approved $300,000 in covert CIA military aid to the FNLA. The 40 Committee’s deliberations were presided over by Henry Kissinger, National Security Adviser to President Gerald Ford. John Stockwell ran the war in Angola for the CIA: he reports that the US encouraged the FNLA to attack the MPLA without provocation in order to destroy the Alvor Accord. The agreement collapsed and open warfare broke out.

The MPLA, with some of its arms supplied by eastern European countries, and with the aid of a few Cuban advisors, pushed back the FNLA forces and the Zairean troops aiding them. While the MPLA maintained control of the North and West, UNITA forces took control in the South and East, slaughtering hundreds of Ovimbundu who supported the MPLA.

UNITA raised money from conservative white settlers in these regions and joined Roberto on the CIA payroll: the Ford administration sent an additional $30 million in covert aid to the FNLA and UNITA.

At the same time, Savimbi appealed to South Africa for support, declaring himself opposed to guerrilla warfare against white-minority regimes (Johannesburg Star, May 3, 1975). South African advisers began training UNITA forces in early 1975.

In October 1975, South Africa invaded Angola; South African troops, along with mercenaries, UNITA and FNLA forces, aimed an assault at Luanda. Stockwell reports that there was a close liaison between the CIA and South African forces. This invasion by the militarily superior South African forces led the MPLA to call for international assistance, particularly from Cuba. Cuba airlifted thousands of troops to Angola, and Cuban and MPLA forces repelled the South African invasion and the forces of the FNLA and UNITA. On November 11, 1975, the MPLA government declared Angola’s independence.

Within a year most countries had recognized the new nation; The US and South Africa are the only nations in the world never to extend diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of Angola.

Having been defeated in its invasion, UNITA and South Africa regrouped. Many of Savimbi’s followers fled to South African training camps, as South Africa created the “32 Battalion” with ex-FNLA members, mercenaries and UNITA members. The “32 Battalion” embarked on a campaign of destabilization of Angola (a tactic which comes straight out of the CIA manual on “limited engagement” : the “hearts and minds” tactic which was used in Nicaragua).

In 1981, deserters from the “32 Battalion” described how their unit, working in parallel with UNITA, swept through villages killing women and children. Said one, “The ‘32’ and UNITA had separate spheres of operation, but the same boss — South Africa.” (Africa News, March 23, 1981) In the late 1980’s the “32 Battalion” continued to operate, basing its operations in Namibia, the territory south of Angola illegally occupied by South Africa. UNITA and the South African government have carried on a long war against the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), the Namibian liberation movement. South Africa has explained its repeated attacks on Southern Angola’s people and infrastructure as “hot pursuit of SWAPO.” Without South African and CIA support, UNITA’s military successes would never have been possible.The South African Defence Force has continued to supply the logistical base for UNITA and the “32 battalion. South African commandos carry out sabotage missions, and SADF troops regularly aid in UNITA attacks on Angola.

In May, 1985, South African commando Wynand du Toit was captured in an attempt to blow up Gulf Oil installations in Cabinda. He admitted at a news conference that UNITA was also involved. In February, 1986, UNITA attacked the village of Camabatela, massacring over 100 civilians (Washington Post, 7-29-1986). On January 21, 1987, UNITA forces killed 133 civilians in an attack on Huambo province (Post, 3-15-87). A favorite UNITA tactic has been the laying of land mines in fields and on paths used by peasants; Angola has the highest per capita percentage of amputees in the world (the Red Cross estimated over 200,000 as of 1987), with 50 land mine victims per month. . The mines, supplied by the CIA, also lead to severe food shortages. A 1987 UNICEF study indicated that the South African war on Angola was responsible for the deaths of 50,000 Angolan children per year. This situation is worsened by the fact that UNITA attacks regularly target hospitals and health facilities.

In 1984 Savimbi was the only Black African guest at the inauguration of President P. W. Botha. In a 1986 60 Minutes interview he said,

“I can see the Executive President of South Africa as my friend … I consider him my friend.” South African Defence Minister Magnus Malan said that Savimbi “stands for the same norms and values in which we believe.” (London Guardian, 9-21-1985)

In 1986 the European Parliament in Strasbourg passed a resolution calling UNITA a “terrorist group” and condemning US support for UNITA. “Any American covert or overt involvements” in Angola, according to the Organization of African Unity, “will be considered a hostile act against the OAU.” The OAU called Savimbi “a known agent of Apartheid South Africa… responsible for the wanton killing of civilians …” The Clark Amendment, passed as the result of CIA involvement in Angola in the early 1970’s, barred US military involvement in Angola from 1976-1985. It was repealed in 1986, at which time the Reagan administration sent more than $15 million in covert CIA military aid to Savimbi, including Stinger missiles. This level of support has been maintained fairly consistently since.

[see William Minter, principal author, “Savimbi and South Africa: No Casual Affair”, Washington Office on Africa Educational Fund, August, 1987; Costa Gomes, Sobre Portugal, Lisbon, 1979; OAU declaration, Addis Ababa, July 18-20, 1985.]

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