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(Corporate)
Transnationalism and Red Internationalism: Globality and Class
Struggle Today
Amrohini Sahay
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Orthodox Marxism and the Contemporary What
is Orthodox Marxism? (D)evolutionary
Socialism Class,
Labor and the "Cyber": A Red Critique of the
"Post-Work" Ideologies Eclipsing
Exploitation: Transnational Feminism, Sex Work and the State Haven't
you realized that workers have it pretty good today Revolution
as Seduction, Pedagogy as Therapy and The Subject is Always Me
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One Theories
of globalization are also theories of capitalism today, and therefore also
of how to transform it (which is the objective of the struggle for
socialist revolution), or how to preserve it. The question of
globalization is thus of particular urgency for the left—if the left is
to be a force for social transformation of capitalism. Yet the dominant
"left" theories of globalization are articulations of what
Teresa Ebert calls "transnationalism," a corporate theory
"whose purpose is to legitimate monopoly capital" (2) by
focusing on cultural and political issues and thus blocking any systematic
knowledge of the labor relations—that is, the relations of
production—constituting "globalization." At
the core of the ruling class transnationalist theory of globalization is
the thesis of "postcapitalism"—the idea that we are now in
what Peter Drucker calls a new, "post" age in which
"post" is above all a marker that capitalism has superceded its
basic contradictions—"basic" in the sense explained by
orthodox Marxism of stemming from the exploitation of wage-labor. The
markers of this supposedly "post" moment of globality which are
repetitively rehearsed at all levels of the knowledge and culture industry
is the view that we now live in an information and services society where
knowledge has displaced labor as the main source of social wealth, where
"consumption" has displaced "production" as the
primary axis of social life and identity, and that therefore class is also
displaced and class struggle is no longer the main dynamics of social
change. Left transnationalist theories—using the diverse languages of
the left and via deployment of its various idioms—are the (re)circulation
of these corporate views—especially on class and class struggle—to
block any transformative understanding of globality: they are thus—in
effect, if not in intention—an annex of capital. Opposed to corporate
transnationalism (in all its forms) is red internationalism: the
historical materialist theory of capitalist globality which shows how what
is called "globalization" is nothing other than an
intensification of the contradictions of wage-labor as explained by
orthodox Marxism, and which provides the basis for class struggle praxis
on an international level to end capitalism. To
frame what follows, it is necessary to reiterate what I have already
mentioned: left-transnationalism—like transnationalist theory in
general—is articulated in many voices and rhetorics, in
cross-disciplinary languages and at multiple sites, a fact which is
central to its ideological effectivity. The aim of my discussion here is
thus not to "summarize" or provide a comprehensive overview of
it but to broadly capture what is at stake in the singular logic behind
its diverse discursive mediations and put it into contestation with the
Marxist theory of globality. In
its "culturalist" form, left-transnationalism is advanced by
writers such as Stuart Hall in his work on "identity."
Elaborating on the logic of what Anthony McGrew calls "the [recent]
intensification of global interconnectedness" (467) as a force of
transnational integration, Hall writes: "though powered in many ways
by the West, globalization may turn out to be part of that slow and uneven
but continuing story of the decentering of the West" (632). Hall's
argument is of course put forward both to depoliticize the concept of
globalization by placing it on the continuum of an
"evolutionary" modernity as well as to counter the view of
globalization as "cultural homogenization." It is the claim for
the "progressiveness" of globality as the harbinger of new
transnational cultures and postnational identities and thus an end to the
"hegemony" of the "national" which is then posited as
the basis of transition to a new "cross-border civilization" and
an "enlightened" world-community of consumers. This
representation of globalization as a "progressive" decentering
of the national is also put forward by Bruce Robbins in his argument for
the new "cosmopolitanism" as a form of "cultural
internationalism" (17) which forms the only
"realistic"—what he calls "worldly"— alternative
to the dead "utopian ideals" of socialist internationalism
(7-8). Cosmopolitanism for Robbins, is the new "humanitarian"
"style of solidarity" (21), a form of "global feeling"
(6)—as a "natural" evolution beyond the "national."
As he thus says: "National print capitalism having given way to
global electronic and digital capitalism, the same forces that stretched
culture to the scale of the nation are stretching it beyond the scale of
the nation" (21). Robbins here of course is simply repeating the
conservative "new economy" theories of globalization as the
effect of "new information technologies," the aim of which is to
posit social change as an effect of the "agency" not of what
Marx calls the "collective worker," but of what bourgeois
managers call the "technologist," which is a relay of the
bourgeois view that it is the "inventiveness" of the
entrepreneur and not the labor of the proletariat which makes history. Yet
perhaps what is at stake in Robbins' new "global feeling" is
made most clear in what he takes as the exemplary test case of the
cosmopolitan "style of solidarity": the US-led NATO imperialist
intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo aimed at ensuring that Eastern Europe is
"liberated" as a market and source of cheap labor for
transnational capital. Displacing any analysis of the class interests
shaping the political—that is, the core of socialist
internationalism—Robbins' "humanitarian" cosmopolitanism of
"feeling" is a thin device to manufacture consent for the
policies of international imperialism. Thus as he says: "transnationally
shaped and educated sentiment is a necessary means of winning democratic
consent for a particular set of policies" (16). If this is
internationalism, it—like Derrida's spectral "New
International"—should more properly be seen as an
"internationalism" of the bourgeois. As
I have already suggested, Hall's "decentering" and Robbins'
cosmopolitanism, are themselves not "originary" but instances of
the corporate theory which Malcolm Waters calls "cultural
globalization." On the terms of this theory, it is culture which is
the "driving force for global integration" (10) and the arrival
of "an economy of signs and symbols" (124) marks the triumph of
"symbolic exchanges" over the material relations of class
exploitation. The logic of the argument is made more clear by Waters when
he suggests that in the "culturalized global economy" (95)—a
version of McLuhan's "global village" of face-to-face electronic
exchanges—"world class is displaced by a world status system based
on consumption, lifestyle, and value commitment" (95).
"Politics" in the "global village" is then, following
Robbins, reduced to "the pursuit of lifestyle" (156), to
"style" and "feeling," which is to say it becomes an
extension of consumption. Of
course not all articulations of left-transnationalism accept this version
of corporate globalism. Gayatri Spivak's essay "Cultural Talks in the
Hot Peace," for example, is aimed precisely as a critique of this
representation. The globality of the McLuhanesque/Lyotardian "global
village" for her is transparently "invoked in the interests of
the financialization of the globe" (320); it is part of what she
terms the "cultural politics" of transnational capital's
expansion into the periphery. Yet for all her astute critique of the
cultural politics of imperialism, Spivak ultimately reproduces its class
politics. By focusing almost exclusively on "Development"
practices instituted by transnational policy institutions such as the
World Bank and WTO, Spivak displaces the focus away from the global
systematicity of capitalist relations of production to its locally enacted
"policies"; she thus reproduces the ideology of what Akash Kapur
terms, in his discussion of Amartya Sen's neo-developmentalism, "A
Third Way for the Third World." On the terms of this "third
way" approach, Spivak—like Sen—arrives at the post-class solution
of a more "ethical" capitalism. What is needed in order to
address the system of exploitation, is thus, as she says, not
"grabbing state power" (339) but participatory support of
"alternative development" as part of the strategy of the
"globe girdling" grassroots new social movements—a strategy
which is at best a buffer zone to minimize class contradictions within the
existing system. Moreover, the very language of what Spivak represents as
"committed" politics marks it as simply the other side of the
new upper-middle class cosmopolitanism: this time in the form of a thickly
mediated spiritualism which substitutes the sentimental pleasures of an
"ethics" advanced in the name of "contact" with the
subaltern for revolutionary struggle. In fact, the material interests
behind Spivak's representation of the "subaltern" have as much
to do with her desire for a "mind-changing one-on-one responsible
contact" (340) with the "other" as with the new
metropolitan discourses of (“affective”) legitimation of imperialism:
the identity of the two is an articulation of the connective logic of
exploitation. The
underlying logic of the (not-so) "new social movements"—that
is, to clarify, the cross-class alliances of "transnational civil
society" which are supposed to have displaced the proletariat as the
agents of change—is further surfaced in the writings of Roger Burbach,
Orlando Núńez and Boris Kagarlitsky. In their book, Globalization and
Its Discontents they demonstrate with stunning clarity that the role
of the new social movements is not what they call "revitalizing the
left" (48) so much as it is a revitalizing and updating of classical
bourgeois liberalism for transnationalism. As Burbach, Núńez and
Kagarlitsky thus clarify, basic to the new social movements is their
rootedness in "'the new individuality' that is questioning the
culture of domination and Western civilization itself" (50). I leave
aside here the bankrupt idealism of the position that it "is the
values of domination and exploitation" (38) that are at issue in the
constitution of the social. I also leave aside here that what they think
is "new" about the "new individuality"—the fact that
it now goes "far beyond the economic sphere [to] the effort to define
one's very being in relation to one's sexuality, to a particular social or
ethnic group, or even in relation to other species and the
environment" (51)—is in fact nothing but a relay of global
commodification and extension of the logic of the economic to all areas of
social existence. Rather, what is fundamentally at stake in the "new
individuality" underpinning the "new social movements" is
precisely what it shares with the "old" individualism: like all
"individual" rights under capitalism it is an articulation of
the right to private property, the right to exploitation of the labor of
the other, the non-property holder. It is, in short, nothing other than
the preservation of this class right to property holding that is
legitimated by Burbach, Núńez's and Kagarlitsky's advocation of the
"new postmodern actors in the social movements who fight against the
excesses of globalized capitalism" (61) and thus undertake the
program of what they term "[r]adical reformism" (166). In doing
so they of course forget the lesson of history that there is no such thing
as "radical" reformism—since as Marx writes, "to be
radical is to grasp things by the root" ("Contribution"
251)—in this case the root of private property—which is exactly what
reformism rejects. And
yet, what is also clear is that if there is no such thing as "radical
reformism," reformism is precisely what is at issue in left-transnationalist
theories of globalization, from the cultural to the political theories.
And what is fundamentally at stake in this reformism is the future of
capitalism. That
this is the case is perhaps shown with the greater clarity the closer the
discourses of the writers approach globalization on the terrain of
political economy. Exemplary, for instance, is William Robinson's recent
essay "Towards a Global Ruling Class" co-authored with Jerry
Harris. Here Robinson and Harris advance their claim that orthodox Marxism
is "outdated" as an effective analysis of contemporary
capitalism on the basis of the demise of the sovereignty of the
nation-state. For them, in other words, the end of national sovereignty is
not a further articulation of what Lenin theorized as
"imperialism" and domination of monopoly capital (Imperialism:
The Highest Stage of Capitalism) but the beginning of a "new
epoch" marked by the emergence of a "transnational capitalist
class" in the process of instituting its worldwide hegemony.1
What differentiates Robinson and Harris' essay from other texts dealing
with the issues is the fact that unlike the standard literature with its
focus on the phenomenon of circulation and exchange—in particular, on
financial speculation, currency movements, trade, and other market
phenomenon—they focus their attention on an analysis of
"production"—which thus places class in the foreground. And
yet, their understanding of production is a formal one, and therefore
their notion of class is also idealist. Thus, ultimately, Robinson and
Harris's claim of globalization as a "new epoch" marks it as a
"break" in history so that now it is the "power" of
the transnational capitalist class and its "capture of the
'commanding heights' of state policymaking" (23)—and not the
historical continuity of the objective dialectics of labor—that is
determining of the economic: which is to say that they displace economics
with politics, and thus end up privileging not production but such
idealist views (following E.P. Thompson and other New Leftists) as that
"the existence of a class [is] conditional upon its capacity to forge
a collective political and/or cultural. . . 'self-representation'"
(21). The end result is yet another left-accented version of what amounts
to the reformist argument for "compassionate markets"—since if
the "problem" is not capitalism and its objective laws of
motion, but the hegemonic "policies" of the transnational class
fraction of the bourgeoisie—then there is still a long-term possibility
for what Ulrich Beck calls "responsible globalization" (128).
"Responsible globalization" is of course what is most recently
instituted as the Blair/Clinton/Schroeder "Third Way" under the
guidance of Anthony Giddens, Beck himself, David Held and Danielle
Archibugi2 along with other policy gurus and intellectual
crisis managers for capital as a strategy for sustaining capitalism in the
face of the daily manifestations of its systemic crisis, above all the
mounting tensions of worldwide class polarization which are symptomatized
in the growing anti-globalization backlash. The historical stake in such
reformist crisis management is also effectively clarified by Beck when he
sounds the warning bell to the bourgeois: Thus as he says in his What
Is Globalization?, "What is at issue today. . . is not 'only' the
millions of unemployed, nor only the future of the welfare state, the
struggle against poverty or the possibility of greater social justice.
Everything we have is at stake. Political freedom and democracy in Europe
are at stake" (62). Two As
I have been arguing, left-transnationalist theories deploy the cultural
and the political to claim that globality inaugurates a new
"epochal" moment which no longer needs international class
struggle in order to change it. I leave aside here that what is posited as
an emerging postnational and cosmopolitan "global culture" and
inclusive world-community are such practices as the fact that, as a recent
review in Time Magazine's "Asia Buzz" section marks,
"marketing types" in Singapore can now eat "smallish
portions" of little known Umbrian cuisine made with ingredients
imported from Italy and France, the reified commodity-logic of which is
symptomatically captured in the title of the article, "Culture on
Demand." "Culture on demand" is the allegory of freedom of
consumption for a few which is then naturalized as "global
culture" in order to mystify the un-freedom of class inequality for
the many. The
emergence of "culture on demand" cosmopolitanism is the result
not of an epochal shift, nor of a new transformative moment in which
lifestyle, feeling, and symbolic exchanges displace relations of
exploitation as the basis of "identity." It is a secondary
mediation of the internationalization of the productive forces which is
itself produced in the relations of exploitation. In the Manifesto of
the Communist Party, which remains not only the first but also the
most historically dynamic account of globalization, Marx and Engels of
course already foreground this relationship between the productive forces
and the cultural and political changes involved in the expansion of
capitalism. As they write: "The
bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the
instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and
with them the whole relations of society. . . Constant revolutionising of
production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions,
everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from
all earlier ones. . . .The need of a constantly expanding market for its
products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It
must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions
everywhere. The
bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a
cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To
the great chagrin of the Reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of
industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established
national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They
are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and
death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer
work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest
zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in
every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the
productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their
satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old
local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in
every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations." (38-39) Far from being "undone" by new relays of mediations of the market, the Marxist theory of globalization has always provided the most effective materialist explanation for them. And yet, while acknowledging them it has never lost sight of what these mediations are mediations of: the relations of production at the basis of capitalism, relations which produce, as Marx and Engels write, on the one side the bourgeoisie, i.e. capital, and, "in the same proportion. . . the proletariat, the modern working class…—a class of laborers who live only so long as they find work, and who find work only so long as their labour increases capital. . . These labourers who must sell themselves piecemeal, are [like every other article of commerce] a commodity. . . " (41).
At their basis then, transnationalist theories of globalization are a denial of the following: that at the foundation of the system of capitalist production is the commodification of labor power—the fact that the laborer cannot live without ("freely") exchanging her labor power for wages which is the historically determined ground for her exploitation by the capitalist—and that this historical relationship is not "arbitrary," it is not the result of "policy" or political "power" which can then be "reformed" but is a systemic one governed by determinate laws which requires transformation. The historico-economic elaboration and theorization of these determinate laws is at the core of the Marxist theory.
As Marx explains in Capital v.1 in his discussion of the prerequisites of capitalist production: "The capitalist system presupposes the complete separation of the laborers from all property in the means by which they can realize their labor." And moreover, "As soon as capitalist production is once on its own legs it not only maintains this separation but reproduces it on a continually extending scale" (874).
Here Marx is pointing to the fact that, not only is the productive exchange of wages for labor power at the basis of capitalist production—a situation which in turn presupposes that a property-less worker confronts an owner of property, but, as he also indicates, capitalism entails its own globalization, which is nothing other than the extension of the capital-wage labor relation on an international scale. Globalization in short, begins not with the onset of "modernity" and time-space compression, the ending of fixed exchange-rates, the emergence of multinational corporations, the collapse of the Eastern bloc, or the demise of national sovereignty and rise of the "hegemony" of the "transnational class fraction"—which are all explainable as secondary phenomena of capitalist development; Globalization begins, rather, with the separation of the producers from the means of production, the separation which prevents them from realizing the product of their own labor and thus makes them subject to exploitation by the capitalist, the owner of the means of production.
Like all class societies, capitalism is based on the exploitative extraction of surplus labor by a ruling class from the producing class. As Marx shows in great detail in Capital v.1 in his discussion of the structure of the Working Day, under capitalism this takes the form of "surplus value," the difference between the paid and unpaid labor of the worker, which forms the sole basis of capitalist profits. As capitalism is an inherently self-expanding system, however, it must accumulate profits (i.e. the surplus value produced by exploiting workers) at an ever higher rate. That is, in order simply to maintain itself, it must continually increase the rate of exploitation of the working class. And yet, far from this process of accumulation being a "smooth" process, as Marx demonstrates in his extensive discussion of the rate of profit in Capital v. 3, the pursuit of the globally competitive rates of profit without which capital cannot survive is marked by a profound and unsupercedable contradiction.
As Marx shows, in the long term, the very processes through which capital assures its competitive self-expansion and achieves an ever higher rate of accumulation of profits—that is, by raising the rate of exploitation primarily by investing in machinery rather than labor and thus raising productivity and lowering its costs of production—leads to its increasing self-negation. Broadly, as the ratio of machines to living labor, or of fixed to variable capital grows, and since living labor is the sole source of profit, as it is excluded from the production process, a progressive tendency of the rate of profit to fall manifests itself. The attempt of capital to counter this fall in the rate of profit is then undertaken by expanding the rate of appropriation of surplus value from the working class, firstly by introducing cost-cutting technologies which further raises the productivity of labor (a move which however, merely compounds the initial problem of substitution of machines for living labor), and secondly, by organizing production—first at the national and then at the international scale—so as to take advantage of the cheapest sources of labor available. The integrative logic of capitalist globalization—or, to put it another way, the internationalization of the capitalist relations of production—is shaped by this process of access to cheap labor. The intensification of the current phase of globalization, far from signaling the end of capital's reliance on productive wage labor, is in fact an effect of its complete dependence on it. As the inherent limits of the process of expanding surplus value by simultaneously excluding living labor from production surface, the force of integration behind globalization, both historically and more than ever today, is a manifestation of capital's need for "preserv[ing] and multiply[ing] itself by exchange with direct, living labour-power" (Wage-Labour 30). More specifically, today it is the contradictions of this double process—on the one hand the substitution of living labor by machines, leading to ineradicable poverty, unemployment, and falling rates of profit wherever the ratio of machines to living labor is high; and, on the other hand, the extension of capitalist relations of exploitation to every corner of the globe in search of competitive rates of profit through access to cheap labor, it is these contradictions that are at stake in the debate over globalization. And these contradictions—which sharpen and extend the fundamental class antagonism of wage labor-capital on a global scale—are insoluble, they are simply non-reformable under the capitalist system of production for profit.
Transnationalist theories of globalization are apologies for global capitalism which, as a result of its inherent economic laws of motion, is deepening class inequality all over the world even as the social productivity of labor—and with it the ability to meet the historic needs of all people—grows. At best in their call for "reforms" and the institution of a responsible "redistributionist" globalization the transnational left acts to delay the full development of these inherent contradictions—the logic of which, above all, progressively
produces not a "complexification of social differentiation" as
the reformists all claim, but, on the contrary, as Marx and Engels write,
a "simplification of the class antagonisms."
In the contemporary moment of hybrid and hybridizing social and cultural theory, it is necessary to repeat this point: globalization is the other name of "the simplification the of class antagonisms" and thus the only effective politics capable of dealing with its contradictions is one which places this antagonism at the forefront. Yet here I need to re-state what I mean since at the current moment even the concepts of "class struggle" and "class antagonism" have been appropriated by left-transnationalism as a ruse of political reformism. It is after all in the name of an effective politics of "class struggle" that paramarxist "leftists" like Frederic Jameson and Slavoj Zizek, have dematerialized "class antagonism" in order to turn the struggle for a socialist society into a dematerialized "utopian" negativity: that is, into a neoHegelian fictive universality without any positive basis in labor relations. It is thus that Zizek for example, following Jameson's theorization of it as a "utopian moment," rewrites "socialism" as a mode of "an ethico-political enthusiasm for which there is no place in 'normal' capitalism" (35). That is, from a materialist and revolutionary praxis to end economic equality Zizek transmutes socialism into an ethical norm and an excess-ive desire: an "Ideal. . . which remains an unconditional excess, setting in motion permanent insurrection against the existing order" and which can never "be included" within it (40). Yet—while it certainly sounds "radical," even "revolutionary"—to make the struggle for economic equality into an unrealizable Ideal is in fact not only to romanticize it (and thus, by way of an epistemological detour, to provide an aesthetic legitimation of exploitation) but to justify the existing inequality as a permanent state of things. It is—in the name of class struggle—a left alibi for establishing the permanence of global (anti)capitalism and blocking determinate transformation. On the contrary, the Orthodox Marxist understanding of politics not only bases class struggle on class antagonism, but, as I have argued, understands class antagonism as itself having a positive basis in the objective dialectics of wage labor-capital. It is not simply the politically “outlawed” but a material opposition founded in the economics of private property: that is, the congealed, appropriated surplus labor of the world-proletariat. As such a material opposition, it is open to material (economic) transformation.
Globalization is the logic of the simplification of the class antagonisms: the splitting of the whole world into "two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat" (Manifesto 36). Part of this logic and one of its dialectical effects is that, as the Manifesto also states, as globalization advances, producing a "uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto" (51) in the same degree are "national differences and antagonisms between peoples daily more and more vanishing" (48). Thus, along with the globalization of capitalism and the phenomenon which accompany it, there arises also the basis of its supercession in an internationally class conscious proletariat. The emergence of class consciousness, however, has never been the result of a "mechanical" or a "spontaneous" process—it has always been a question of struggle. Red internationalism is the struggle for this revolutionary class consciousness as the basis of united, class struggle praxis for socialism by the "workers who have no country."
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