Because MIM organized anonymously for 25 years, it is not surprising that MIM's enemies have adopted "counter-terrorist" and "counter-espionage" tactics taken from the Cold War. In broad outlines, MIM's opponents adopt the strategy for dealing with "deep penetration agents."

Deep penetration agents can do the most damage. Unlike a situation of cover created by diplomats, the situation with deep penetration agents requires that the counter-strategist go public. In most diplomatic situations, there is no point except for temporary political gain for going public. If one diplomat is exposed as a spy, another will surely come along to replace him or her.

In addition to going public, the counter-strategist must also raise doubts about the deep penetration agent for having been undercover so long. Among other doubts are what side the deep penetration agent is playing after being undercover so much and so long.

In these aspects, anti-MIM counter-strategy is similar to what happened in the Cold War.

Unfortunately for MIM's enemies historically, the analogy only holds so far. MIM or ex-MIM and enemies can ape the back and forth of spy vs. spy intrigue only so far.

Many have pointed out the furor over domestic spying. That is one political factor in why Cold War outlines do not really work.

Dialectically, the real reason the anti-MIM strategy does not work is a little thing called the Intelligence Identities Protection Act. The law against U.S. citizens' exposing U.S. spies' identity ends up being a double-edged sword in attacking MIM or ex-MIM.

In the Cold War, the whole object of the game might be for Soviet spies to transmit home the identities of other spies. There is no obstacle of a law called the Intelligence Identities Protection Act placed by the Soviet Union on Soviet spies. To think so is ridiculous and a failure of analogous reasoning.

So what is not analogous between the Cold War type spy vs. spy tactics and history is that the U.S. Government admits there is widespread domestic surveillance of all kinds. At the same time, but not analogously, the U.S. Government makes it illegal to expose covert intelligence identities. It certainly would not have made it illegal to expose Soviet identities.

Hence, the burden can only be placed on the U.S. Government itself when it comes to exposing covert identities. MIM has done that by among other things filing a FOIA for DIA activities against MIM--which has still gone unanswered. MIM has laid down an open-ended challenge for the government to expose its own activities--so much for any attempt to name MIM in cahoots.

In spy vs. spy struggles, it often appears that one side supports the other, for reasons of trickery. The counter-strategy for deep penetration does not apply very well in MIM tactics, because the government cannot really obtain the political benefit of saying MIM is in cahoots with it when it is illegal not to be.

Having been around a long time, MIM and ex-MIM's enemies have often been around a long time too. There is a real sense in which Prince Cheney is MIM's sponsor historically. That can make it tiresome to hear about MIM's and ex-MIM's struggles. Nonetheless, becoming tired of MIM's and ex-MIM's struggles should not force one outside reasonable bounds. MIM's challenge to the government stands. It can repeal the Intelligence Identities Protection Act or it will have to do without counter-tactics saying that its enemies are in cahoots with it. The U.S. Government can have one, but not both.

Checkmate.