TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword (by Tony Benn) 1 Preface 5 Chapter 1, The Chamberlain-Hitler Deal 9 An early case of appeasement 11 Vansittart&s warning 24 Free hand and the Foreign Office 26 The opinion of the military 29 Bilingual talk "Knowese" and plain English 33 What Chamberlain knew at Munich 38 The smoking gun 39 Munich&s epilogue 52 Chapter 2, The nature of the Bolshevik threat 53 The disintegration of the Russian army 53 Caring for democracy in Russia 55 Did the Bolsheviks have a German connection 59 Recreating a Russian eastern front against Germany 60 Terror in Russia 63 Transportation of the Czech troops to France 68 Military intervention in Russia. Why? 73 Chapter 3, Hating the Soviet Union 77 Chapter 4, The fear of Communism 83 Chapter 5, The fear of war in the West 101 Chapter 6, The East: fair game for Germany; The British Establishment&s view 115 Chapter 7, Military considerations 135 Strategic dilemma 135 British disinterest from the east 137 Awareness of the meaning of a strong German army 141 Trusting pre-Hitler Germany to move Eastward exclusively 143 Trusting Hitler 145 Silences 150 No countermeasures 151 No real opposition to Germany&s rearmament 158 French military strategy 165 Chapter 8, The League of Nation, A British Conservative perspective 169 Why a League 169 What kind of League 170 The League as a reality 173 League and security 175 Business and diplomacy as usual 178 To each his own 180 Preventing the League from flying 181 Being nice to the great powers 186 Chapter 9, The Spanish Civil War 203 Introduction 203 An European political microcosm 208 The stand taken by the western democracies 211 The stand of the United States 219 Conclusion 220 Chapter 10, The diplomacy of a free hand. Part 1 (pre-Chamberlain) 223 Introduction 223 The Locarno agreements 227 After the advent of Nazism in Germany 232 Stressa and the Anglo-German Naval Treaty 233 A minute by O. Sargent 240 The remilitarisation of the Rhineland 247 Chapter 11, The diplomacy of a free hand. Part 2 (The Chamberlain era, up to Munich) 251 Centres of power in Foreign Affairs 251 Foreign Office versus Cabinet 253 The Baldwin-Hitler meeting that never was 254 Chamberlain and the Foreign Office 258 Discovering Germany&s ultimate aims 261 The Foreign Office at cross purpose with Chamberlain&s policy 269 Halifax's visit to Hitler 272 The invasion and annexation of Austria 281 Chapter 12, The diplomacy of a free hand. Part 3 (towards Munich) 295 The stage 295 The options, their handling 297 Pressuring France and Czechoslovakia 316 First heroic moment 322 Runciman's mission 325 The second heroic moment 327 The French front (part 1) 334 The German Front 343 The French front (part 2) 352 The home front 353 The Russian factor 358 Chapter 13, The diplomacy of a free hand. Part 4. (from Munich to Prague's occupation) 365 The post-Munich atmosphere 365 Plotting with Germany the manipulation of the British public opinion 366 Britain proposes to Germany a military alliance 372 Free hand to Germany: more than just a policy of weakness 375 France abandons Central and Eastern Europe 383 Clouds over the spirit of Munich 391 Trying to save the Munich spirit 395 Chamberlain warns Germany 406 Chapter 14, The diplomacy of a free hand. Part 5 (From Prague to war) 417 A reversal of policy 417 An optimistic mood 417 March 15 and 16 1939 422 Ruthenia 426 Crossing the Rubicon 432 Slowly progressing towards collective security 435 The unilateral guarantee to Poland 438 Chamberlain still hopes for a general settlement with Germany 453 Negotiations with the Soviet Union 480 War and a general settlement with Germany 494 Appendix I (The British Case) 499 The British case 501 The historic perspective of National independance 506 Appendix II (Not seeing the writing on the wall) 517 Not wanting to see the writing on the wall 518 Annex 522