Draft paper for IPSA Congress, Berlin, Aug. 1994 ETHNONATIONAL REBELLIONS AND VIABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM by Fred W. Riggs, University of Hawaii Modern Nationalism. Integral Interdependence. PART I. TRANSITION: FROM THE OLD TO THE NEW WORLD Pre-Modern Ethnicity. Bourgeois Power. PART II. THE THREE TSUNAMIS: UNIFICATION, LIBERATION, SELF- DETERMINATION The First Tsunami: From National States to Modern Empires, The Imperial Dream. The Internal Contradictions of Modern Empires The Second Tsunami: From Liberation Movements to Quasi-States. Bureau Power. The Third Tsunami: Self-Determination and Ethnonationalism Ideological Blinders. Secondary Issues. PART III. PREVENTION OR TREATMENT: STRATEGIC DEMOCRATIZATION Global Concern. External Intervention. Democracy and Ethnic Conflict. Ethnonationalism in Democracies. The Non-Democratic Alternative. Strategic Democratization. Benign Futility. The Rationale for Democratization. CONFIDENTIAL: Please send comments to the author Copyright, 1994 FRED W. RIGGS, Professor Emeritus Political Science Department, University of Hawaii 2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822, U.S.A. Phone: (808) 956-8123 Fax: (808) 956-6877 e-mail: FREDR@UHUNIX.UHCC.HAWAII.EDU ABSTRACT The eruption of ethnonationalist movements in multi-ethnic states is a modern and growing phenomenon. It reflects both the widespread acceptance of self-determination as a democratic ideal and the availability of contemporary communications technology, organizational skills, and weapons of mass violence. The brutal realities of authoritarianism and anarchy in many countries contradict the hopes raised by modern dreams of democracy and economic prosperity. In this context, we need to understand that viable systems of constitutional government--where power is exercised responsibly and effectively--offer the only hope that ethnonational violence can be replaced by the non- violent politics of ethnic competition. External interventions designed to resolve violent communal conflicts are less likely to succeed than are systemic transformations that replace authoritarianism with constitutional governance--but both pose a huge challenge to the will and capabilities of the more advanced industrial democracies. Modern Nationalism. Repressions and rebellions leading to terrorism, civil-war and international intervention promise a long-term continuation of the escalating domestic violence and international interventions that we have recently witnessed in Bosnia and Burundi, Somalia and Iraq, Sri Lanka and Haiti. These diverse phenomena cannot be understood as epiphenomenal consequences of the end of the Cold War nor as manifestations of the "clash of civilizations," the growing pains of a "new world order," or evidence of the "end of history" (Huntington, 1993; Fukuyama, 1989), though a plausible case can be made for each of these scenarios. A critical assessment of these and other futuristic scenarios can be found in Tehranian (1994). Such interpretations obscure the underlying dynamics of modern nationalism, a long-term movement in which the Western democracies have been centrally involved. It is more complacently self-gratifying to assume that the rising tsunami (tidal wave) of ethnonational violence currently afflicting many new states in the second and third worlds results from "tribalism," "backwardness," or "ignorance" which can somehow be overcome by technical cooperation, good will, scientific know-how, economic assistance and humanitarian aid. In fact, I believe, what we now see is only the beginning of the end of a long-term nationalistic and industrial transformation of the world that arose during the 18th and 19th centuries in Western Europe, spread as the modern empires conquered of the world and the gigantic inter-state struggles which that transformation induced in the 20th century, followed inescapably by the liberation movements born of modern imperialism which have exploded during the last few generations. The seeds of ethnonational violence generated by these movements have led, in rapid succession, to the emergence of more than a hundred quasi-states (Jackson, 1990) in which arbitrary but flimsy governments-- supported artificially by global political forces--face growing anarchy and struggle, with little success, to maintain their fragile authority by means of terror and the oppression of marginalized minorities. They are unwilling or unable to submit themselves to democratic tests whereby they could win popular support in exchange for policies that are responsive to public needs and sensitive to the aspirations of marginalized communities. The demands for self-determination by frustrated and persecuted communal minorities which this sequence of compelling forces has released is a rising tide that threatens to drown the world during the 21st century. Integral Interdependence. It is always easier to project the complex problems of a reactive world on to the others who are its apparent initiators rather than on to oneself or one's own community. Radical critics of Western imperialism have long blamed a ruling bourgeois class for the troubles of an interdependent world, but they exclude themselves and the "working class" from complicity in the schemes that have brought ruin to dependent peoples. To my mind, however, the virtues and the vices of triumphant industrial democracies; modern imperialism and liberation movements; democracy, authoritarianism and anarchy, are so commingled that we cannot distinguish enemies from heroes in their midst. We are all part of a complex and integral system which explains both the origins and the consequences of the world today. Our global system has social, political and economic aspects that reflect a single whole in which nationalistic aspirations constitute a driving force. This paper is divided into three parts: (1) an extended introduction stating its main thesis and providing some historical background; (2) an exploration of the dynamics of three tsunamis (tidal waves) of modern nationalism; and (3) a discussion of the relation of strategic democratization to the treatment and cure of proliferating ethnonational conflicts in the third tsunami. In order to untangle the complex interdependencies and internal contradictions that mark this system, we need to track its historical background and reflect on its long-term future implications. Part One, therefore, contains some reflections on pre-modern ethnic phenomena and how they were transformed by the rise of modern nationalism. A perspective on the past is needed in order to understand the rise of modern nationalism and its contemporary consequences. Part Two looks at the rise of national states in the context of emergent democracy, industrialization, modern imperialism, inter-state warfare and the emergence of today's world system. These developments culminated in the 19th century and led, ineluctably, during the 20th century, to liberation movements in the conquered territories and the collapse of imperialism, followed by authoritarianism, anarchy, minority domination and genocide in many of the new states. We can already see the predictable rise of ethnonational conflict based on demands for self- determination in the new quasi-states of the second and third world. Its long-term consequences for the 21st century may well include the end of inter-state wars, increasingly powerful regional and global organizations, and ubiquitous internal violence in many of the new states of the world. Part Three deals with the relation between viable constitutional democracy and ethnonational conflicts. Strategic democratization is viewed as a global priority, not based on sentimental liberalism and humanitarianism, or on economic self-interest, but rather as a life-or- death struggle designed to replace the rising tide of violent self- determination movements throughout the world with non-violent strategies for self-realization. Violent ethnonational conflicts in many countries are a likely but not inevitable future. Efforts to prevent them need to receive top priority attention. PART I. TRANSITION: FROM THE OLD TO THE NEW WORLD Ted Gurr's magisterial compilation of data on 233 ethnonational rebellions and protest movements, as of 1990, provides an empirical foundation for understanding the extent of a major problem now confronting the world. His data offers a detailed analysis of the contemporary scene (Gurr, Ted Robert, 1993. Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press.) Historical perspective needs to be added, however. One might start by asking whether ethnonational aspirations and violent protests have prevailed throughout history or whether their contemporary manifestations are truly different from all that has gone before. PRE-MODERN ETHNICITY Ethnicity, of course, has existed for thousands of years in the sense that people with different cultures have encountered each other and interacted, leading to endless re-enactments of "we/they" dramas in which, typically, a dominant community has exploited and distanced itself from outsiders in their midst. Typically, however, mutual benefits have sustained a high level of ambivalence in these relationships. Perhaps the most stable and persistent of these inter-cultural encounters have occurred when peripatetic traders have ventured abroad to exchange goods, often covering vast distances by caravans and ships to offer manufactured treasures to privileged elites in exchange for precious metals or other valued objects that could be returned or exchanged along the trade routes. (Curtin, 1984). These "diaspora traders" often entered into client/patron relationships which offered them some security and even autonomy within small niches (such as an urban ghetto or city state) in which to carry on their business, but they never gained political power over large domains. Nor, of course, could such ethnic minorities every hope to seize power or dominate land- based populations (Polanyi, 1957).1 Another such ambivalent relationships existed between ethnic soldiers and their masters. The French Foreign Legion is a contemporary counterpart, but for centuries kings, emperors, and dominant elites (land-holding nobles or royal officials) have used the services of culturally distinct peoples to help them maintain control over subordinated populations or to fight external enemies. (Enloe, 1980). Although trained for warfare, ethnic soldiers were viewed by subject populations as allies of the ruling power and, in fact, their dependence on their patrons precluded their support for rebellions. The most characteristic manifestations of pre-modern ethnicity involved the dependency of marginalized minorities on the patronage of rulers and never gave them either the motives or the means to stage effective rebellions. The situation was quite different with respect to subordinated non- ethnic populations, by which I mean lower class peoples belonging to the same cultural community as the rulers. No doubt such peoples, ranging from serfs and peasants to artisans and urban laborers, were often oppressed and had good reasons to rebel, as they did from time to time. An account of some such rebellions and their changing characteristics in classical Hellenic and Roman times is offered in Ashworth (1994). Normally, their aim was to replace oppressive rulers but not, as in contemporary nationalist movements, to secure political independence or autonomy. In exceptional cases, no doubt, conquered peoples did resist their conquerors. The Biblical record tells us about the exodus of the Jewish people from Egypt, and their revolts against Babylonian and Roman conquerors. Quite often, of course, rival communities waged war against each other, as did the Jews and the Philistines, or the nomads and the agriculturalists wherever arable and non-arable lands were juxtaposed (Lattimore, 1962) Typically, however, we may conclude that ethnic minorities were rarely if ever involved in rebellions designed to secure political goals. If modern ethnonational rebellions are unprecedented in world history, their number and violence is surely exceptional. At least, we ought not to assume that contemporary ethnonational rebellions repeat an age-old phenomenon. A much stronger case can be made, I think, for the proposition that what we see today in these rebellions is, actually, a relatively new thing and, indeed, just the first phase of what will, surely, become more violent and pervasive in the coming decades (or century). BOURGEOIS POWER No doubt modern nationalism has roots that reach back to Medieval Europe and subsequent movements like the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. The most important of these roots, however, involved the rise of the European bourgeoisie, a merchant or trading class that was able to secure political power and dominate states. Unlike the long-established diaspora traders who retained their ancient cultural heritages and survived only as clients of elites whose power rested on land ownership, sacred myths, bureaucratic and military power, the bourgeoisie based its power on many supra-ethnic business communities. Their secular pecuniary values prevailed over the sacred, land-based myths that had given diaspora traders their own sense of identity and purpose in life. By contrast, although the burghers typically lived close to fortified burgs headed by Catholic bishops who sheltered them from the rival power of agriculturally based feudal lords, their economic interests increasingly came to dominate their behavior and even came to be understood as the essence of rationality. They easily understood that rational economic (i.e. profit-oriented or capitalistic) behavior would be possible only if their property could be protected under a rule of law that would apply with equal justice to everyone. But such protection could be secured only if the bourgeoisie shared power with traditional elites and, eventually, could universalize its own non-hierarchic institutions by replacing the hierarchic structures prevailing in both the sacred and secular branches of the Feudal order. By playing off these rival powers against each other and, gradually, throwing their support to ambitious kings who sought their support to overcome the parochial power of feudal estates or principalities, the bourgeoisie became a dominant social class (Pirenne, 1956). The institutions of self-government which had evolved among the burghers, outside the prevailing hierarchical structures of Medieval Europe, provided the context in which democratic principles of popular sovereignty and majority rule eventually prevailed in the modern state. No doubt this short account greatly oversimplifies a complex historical process. It omits, for example, the effects of Islamic power in the Mediterranean which sealed Europe off from the primary sources of contemporary civilization and its luxury goods--India and China. The epic voyages of Columbus and Vasco de Gama at the end of the 15th century reflected the urgent quest of Europeans to find routes to these lands that would by-pass the Mediterranean by sailing across the great oceans. It neglects, also, the role of the rising bourgeoisie in the expansion of literacy and communications and the Protestant Reformation. Reading, writing and printing helped to empower the bourgeoisie and undermine the monopolistic authority of the Church over its believers. Books have been written about all these far-reaching transformations. They need to be seen as the context for the subsequent rise of nationalism, imperialism, democracy, and today's ethnonationalist rebellions. PART II. THE THREE TSUNAMIS: UNIFICATION, LIBERATION, SELF-DETERMINATION The word, tsunami, is used in Japanese to refer to a tidal wave. It is a useful metaphor for processes that have generated vast and violent consequences for the whole world. Every tsunami has a beginning and an end: it starts with an event, like a great earthquake, which launches the tidal wave, followed by a stretch of apparent calm while it crosses the ocean. It ends, however, with massive violence when it breaks against one or more land-masses, causing immense destruction. In our metaphoric use, similarly, we can look for the dynamic forces which launch a tsunami and then, after a pause, examine its violent consequences. A major limitation in the metaphor needs to be recognized, however. Oceanic tsunamis disappear and quiet returns to the ocean, but the historic tsunamis of modern nationalism have provoke new tsunamis in predictable succession: thus the first led to the second by the end of the 19th century, and the second has launched the third at the end of the 20th century. The third tsunami will probably continue for many decades, if not throughout the 21st century, provoking untold human suffering and an unforeseeable end. Perhaps, however, it can be aborted. The primary aim of this paper is to identify the real threat and to consider how it might be terminated. THE FIRST TSUNAMI: FROM NATIONAL STATES TO MODERN EMPIRES Nationalism, as a genuine political force is, a modern phenomenon. It arose, I think, out of alliances between ambitious kings and bourgeois interests localized in many small city states that arose dear the burgs belonging to Catholic bishops. The royal power could triumph only by subordinating feudal lords and building an economic basis for costly wars and administrative systems. Rival kings then competed with each other to expand their domain. Business (burgher) communities helped to fund both of these continuing enterprises, funding the bureaucratic expansion and military conquests which, ultimately, enhanced their markets and protected their investments. The relation between English kings and a burgess-dominated Parliament in which financial support and military prowess were linked is an often-told story. The outcome involved the gradual emergence of democratic governance and national unification. The eventual triumph of nationalism in Europe came in the nineteenth century. It involved not only the unification of Great Britain (England, Wales and Scotland), but also the emergence of France as a national state, and the unification of Germany (Prussia) and Italy. Although we think of the American Revolution primarily as a revolt against British rule, the Federal Constitution accomplished the unification of the American states, perhaps an even more decisive historic event. More slowly, the Russian and Japanese empires also evolved and moved, however precariously, toward the formation of powerful modern states. No doubt, the ideal of a national state--one in which all citizens share a common cultural heritage and all members of a cultural community are citizens of a single state--has never been achieved. Nevertheless, some states approached this ideal more closely than others. The empires of the period that failed to consolidate their power on the basis of a more or less culturally homogeneous population, supported by a thriving bourgeois community, were the first victims of imperial collapse in the 20th century: primarily the Ottoman Empire, and secondarily, the Austro-Hungarian Empire. These counter- examples demonstrate the generative force of nationalism in the modern history of Europe, America and Japan. The symbiotic linkage with entrepreneurial power was decisive. Bourgeois power replaced imperial power as the economic and social basis for modern states in which popular sovereignty displaced the authority of hereditary rulers as the basis for political legitimacy. In such states governments found themselves constrained to promote policies that supported entrepreneurial property at the expense of land-based and sacred authority. Merchants, evolving into industrialists, found that national unification provided growing but increasingly inadequate markets and sources of raw materials. Eventually, political and military ambitions reinforced and supported by economic interests drove expansionist campaigns that turned national states into empires. Traditional empires were based on the ability of ruling families to consolidate their authority, typically on the basis of supernatural claims and military prowess, often with the help of ethnic soldiers recruited from conquered or marginalized communities. In such empires, traders or merchants were always marginalized--they may have become wealthy but they never gained political power, and their own inter-ethnic conflicts kept them from organizing as a class to promote their own interests. Their survival depended on the patronage of rulers who always made sure that they would remain politically impotent (Curtin, 1984). Thus state policies were driven by the ambitions of rulers rather than by the economic interests of entrepreneurs. All this changed with the rise of national states empowered by a bourgeois class and its economic interests. The emergence of bourgeois power in Europe--a truly unique historical transformation--of course, played a decisive role in these events. An interesting explanation of this phenomenon can be found in Pirenne (1956). Merchants can survive in an atmosphere of insecurity, but they thrive only when state power protects property, a condition that also permits industrialization to occur. Industrial property is inherently much more vulnerable than the property of traders. It requires both secuity of investments, especially in factories and expensive equipment, and access to raw materials and markets. Thus the industrial revolution itself linked, symbiotically, to the development of the modern national state. In the newly born national states political legitimacy rested on constitutional processes anchored to popular elections and representative government based on acceptance of a myth of popular sovereignty and majority rule. Although the founders of the American constitution worried about the risks entailed by a "tyranny of the majority," they ultimately accepted a formula in which complex "checks and balances" would, they hoped, protect minority rights--especially those of property owners. May we not generalize this case to argue, more broadly, that in every contemporary national state an increasingly powerful and numerous middle class could expect its economic interests to coincide with and win the support of most citizens, both rich and poor. The industrial revolution was both a result and cause of the rise of modern states where popular sovereignty, property rights, and ethnonational homogeneity largely coincided with each other. The Imperial Dream. Unfortunately, as the industrial revolution evolved, no national state could provide all the raw materials and markets that its entrepreneurs required, leading to economic protectionism and imperial conquests. The history of this period is widely known and scarcely needs further comment here. Ultimately, it entangled the whole world in a complex interactive and internally contradictory system. Paradoxically, the most democratic states became undemocratic empires, both by overseas and overland expansion. Moreover, the process of empire building that began with extra- European conquests led, eventually, to violent confrontations between rival states. Initially, many of these inter-state wars occurred at the periphery, where the each growing empire encountered another, but they also broke out in the heartland of Europe itself. Many efforts to stop these wars, or to impose restraint on the competition for empires, had limited success, culminating during the 20th century in two very hot World Wars and a long-sustained Cold War. To summarize, both the industrial revolution and the evolution of modern democratic states rested on the relative cultural homogeneity of national states powered by a bourgeois class. In these countries, state nationalism rooted in the acceptance by citizens of patriotic loyalty as the primary basis for self identification gradually replaced various kinds of ethnic nationalism rooted in a sense of common ancestry, religion, language, or race. It was possible to achieve such a sense of state nationalism in Europe wherever members of an ethnic nation-- especially its bourgeois class--could gain power by unifying a domain previously sub-divided, as a result of feudalism, into many mini-states. In the Americas, where immigrants were given opportunities and incentives to assimilate as "naturalized" citizens, new state nations were also created by acculturation rather than by the unification of petty states. The federal constitution which linked the thirteen American states into a single political union fulfilled a function analogous to that played by the unification of the major European national states. The unification of modern national states2 in Europe, America, Russia and Japan launched the first historic tsunami of nationalism in our world. Modern nationalism has deep historical roots in what we now arrogantly call the "first world" (including Japan), but they were not replicated in the "third" world, and in most of the "second." I cannot examine these roots here, but I have discussed them in a preliminary way in Riggs (1994c). They culminated during the nineteenth century in a system of national states--France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, America, Russia, Japan--that led, inexorably, to their self-transformation into modern empires. Unlike traditional empires, modern empires have been cursed from their inception with deeply self- contradictory tensions that generated their own self-destruction. These tensions also led, during the twentieth century, to the mutually reinforcing traumas of violent, large-scale inter-state warfare and the liberation movements that spawned a host of successor states in the "second" and "third" world. Inter-state warfare (culminating in the Cold War) is so recent, traumatic and threatening, that we cannot put it out of our minds. As a persistent nightmare, it blinds us to the likelihood that inter-state warfare will probably be replaced by violent intra-state conflicts, accompanied by largely futile external interventions designed to achieve peaceful reconciliations. To explain this transformation, we need to understand the origins and consequences of the second tsunami, to which I shall now turn. The Internal Contradictions of Modern Empires. Internal contradictions within all modern empires doomed them to collapse during the twentieth century. Similar contradictions did not afflict the long-lived empires of the past. They were legitimized by supernatural and hierarchic myths that vested sovereign authority in their rulers, and gave conquered subjects no legitimate basis for resistance--instead, they promised peace, order, and fruitfulness based on rituals designed to invoke supernatural powers (Hocart, 1927, 1936). Contemporary visitors to Beijing must all be impressed by the stately Temple of Heaven where emperors, traditionally, conducted such rituals and legitimized their power. All subjects of a traditional emperor, as subjects, had no choice but to recognize their sovereign's authority-- moreover, they assumed that obedience to such authority would assure many benefits whereas unruly resistance would generate catastrophes. In short, widely accepted myths could not legitimize liberation struggles. Although rival kings, emperors and war lords fought each other, and popular movements to overthrow and replace tyrannical rulers sometimes occurred, there was no legitimate basis for national liberation movements. In our times, by contrast, liberation movements gained legitimacy from the myths of democracy and nationalism that prevailed among their conquerors. Indeed, these myths were deliberately taught to the future leaders of independence movements. Missionaries and philanthropists established schools and invited their best graduates to come to the metropoles for an advanced education. Modern means of communication and transportation, made possible by the new industrial technology, supported the widespread dissemination of democratic ideals and nationalist aspirations. Modern empires, unlike their predecessors, were committed in their homelands to popular sovereignty and state nationalism. The internal contradictions of empires rooted in these values made them inherently unstable. How could any people committed to state nationalism and popular sovereignty at home indefinitely impose external domination and exploitation over conquered peoples? Even if they could somehow swallow the ideological incompatibility of democracy and imperialism, they might have anticipated that it would become a self-defeating enterprise. Predictably, therefore, the national and equalitarian aspirations spawned by the modern state produced the second tidal wave (tsunami) that has re-transformed the world during the last half of the 20th century. Liberation movements in all the conquered territories of the European, American, Japanese and Russian empires have finally succeeded in launching many multi-ethnic successor states committed, in principle, to the re-creation of national states legitimized by the principles of popular sovereignty and human rights. Liberation movements were as intensely felt under Communism as under Capitalist domination but they took longer to succeed because regimes dominated by a single party can suppress liberation movements more effectively than can those where multi-party democracy prevails at home. Western liberals have difficulty accepting the fact that conquered peoples under single-party rule experienced the same passion for liberation as those conquered by democratic empires. In both cases, however, lip-service for human rights and equal opportunity contradicted the experience of domination. Liberation movements could not succeed so long as the imperial powers were able to support the military and administrative costs involved in maintaining effective control over conquered peoples, but when that power eroded, the demands for liberation became irresistable. Their own inter-state wars finally weakened them so much that the conquered peoples could slip away from their control. THE SECOND TSUNAMI: FROM LIBERATION MOVEMENTS TO QUASI-STATES Quite naturally, the subjects of modern empires embraced the ethnonational objectives that had inspired the first stage (tsunami.) Tragically, most of the new governments created by or for these states, typically with constitutional designs modeled on those of their former metropoles, proved incapable of coping successfully with a host of serious problems or crises that soon faced them--they certainly had almost no chance of becoming national states. Robert Jackson (1990) has aptly referred to them as quasi-states: "...very few new states are 'nations' either by long history or common ethnicity or successful constitutional integration. Instead, it is the negative right of ex- European colonies--which usually contain different peoples but are not peoples themselves--to constitutional independence under an indigenous government regardless of conditions or circumstances" (p. 41). Quasi-states are perpetuated by international law and external aid but they could scarcely survive without such external support. Admittedly, not all of the new states of the third world are quasi-states. Some, especially in Asia, inherit ancient state traditions and widely shared cultural patterns, permitting them to join the contemporary world system as national states--for some of them, notably China and Korea--the challenge of nationalism mainly (though not exclusively) involves a struggle for unification, recreating the first tsunami, rather than a drive for self-determination by minorities. In some of these states, small groups of ambitious elites have been able to defeat their rivals and seize control by means of violence and authoritarian methods. In other cases, continuing competition among such groups and their inability to establish or implement relevant public policies has led to anarchy, a generalized condition of lawlessness and disorder in which everyone suffers.3 We think of authoritarianism/anarchy as polar opposites, yet in quasi- states they are typically commingled because rulers are unable to impose their arbitrary authority throughout a country: anarchic conditions provoke them to treat protesters and dissidents as enemies to be suppressed or killed. They engage in prismatic behavior (Riggs 1964), by which I mean conduct that simultaneously accommodates contradictory norms, such as respect for law and universalistic rules that promise equal treatment for everyone, combined with corruption and favoritism designed to please friends, supporters and co-ethnics, while penalizing perceived enemies, many of whom belong to different ethnic communities.4 Such behavior involves a great deal of formalism, in other words, a large discrepancy or contradiction between officially promulgated standards and actual practice--usually the former is largely based on imports from the West, via imperial conquest or modernization programs, whereas the latter reflects the survival of inherited and incompatible cultural norms and practices (Riggs, 1964). In a context where norms, laws, and constitutional charters are taken at face value, it is difficult to see and understand situations where public and private standards of conduct radically contradict each other. Bureau Power. In modern democracies we normally assume that political power is exercised through a complex political structure that includes an elected legislature, political parties, an electoral system, and an accountable head of government. Bureaucracies are viewed as instrumental--appointed civil servants and military officers able and willing to implement public policies formulated by non-bureaucrats. The administrative function is viewed, therefore, as essentially non- political and instrumental. In fact, however, in all countries appointed bureaucrats (military and civil) exercise significant influence in the formation of public policy and if they administer badly--i.e. partially (without impartiality), corruptly, and ineffectively--they discredit the state and provoke both revolutionary movements and seizure of power by disgruntled officials, always under the leadership of military officers who proclaim their intention to run the government efficiently, honestly and impartially.5 Whenever appointed officials become not only top administrators but also the rulers of a country, no institutional or legal safeguards against corruption and incompetence prove effective--bureau power leads both to bad administration and, typically, both to authoritarianism and anarchy. In response, new coup groups formed by younger or disadvantaged officers often displace established military regimes. Sometimes, when a regime is sufficiently discredited or external pressures mount, an authoritarian regime will surrender power and support the return to constitutional democracy, usually with preconditions that protect those who have abused their power. The apparatus of colonial administration in modern empires has had a powerful influence in shaping the internal politics of liberated territories. In most dependencies, only the top echelons of the bureaucracy consisted of expatriates coming from the metropole--most government employees were local people serving under the authority of foreign administrators. Movements for independence were often driven, at first, by campaigns for the indigenization of the bureaucracy, for the elevation of local personnel to higher level posts. Eventually, however, such demands escalated into movements to gain more power by ousting the foreign rulers.6 The founders of the new republics were rarely grass-roots politicians responsive to popular needs and aspirations. When charters designed to establish democratic governments were created on the eve of independence, they involved the launching of new political institutions for self-government at a particularly difficult moment in the life of the new states. Moreover, many of the most politically active and ambitious people in these countries were already in the bureaucracy and their services were urgently needed to deal with a flood of emergency situations. You would not expect them to abandon the apparent security and prestige of appointive public office in favor of the precarious prospects of seeking election. Rather, why not hold back until newly elected assemblies and politicians discovered that they really could not govern effectively, at which time the bureaucrats could step in, take power, and promise to save the country from its inept politicians. THE THIRD TSUNAMI: SELF-DETERMINATION AND ETHNONATIONALISM All of this would be true without ethnic complications. In any quasi- state that is ethnically (culturally) homogeneous, bureaucratic interests and power struggles would no doubt generate authoritarianism and anarchy. However, in most of the new states liberated by the collapse of modern empires, the population is multi-ethnic, providing the context within which the third tsunami of ethnonational conflicts proved inescapable. At least, it seems reasonable to suppose that as ethnic communities within the new quasi-states became mobilized, self- conscious, able to organize themselves and to acquire modern weapons, they should also start to rebel against the repressive and ineffective rule of dominant elites who were frequently drawn mainly from the members of a single minority group. Since imperial conquerors ignored the ethnic identity of their subjects--drawing boundaries where imperial conquests and rivalries dictated--many ethnonations are, today, divided by inter-state boundaries: the Kurds living in four different countries provide a striking example. Their ethnonational aspirations are necessarily split between irredentist demands for cross-border unification and domestic demands for independence or autonomy. Moreover, divided ethnonations enjoy opportunities for mutual assistance that often help them organize: leaders can easily cross borders to take refuge or mobilize followers. In such contexts, ethnic favoritism by a bureaucracy intent on favoring fellow ethnics at the expense of rival or dissident communities can be expected. When the public laws and policies of a regime are also biased against marginalized minorities, we must expect their sense of oppression and anger to be inflamed. In practice, bureaucratic domination also implies domination by class and ethnic minorities. This may be because bureaucratic elites in the new states often trace their origins to the preference of imperial administrators for members of communal minorities who were willing to collaborate with them. By taking posts within the colonial administration, they could enhance their own status and privileges. After independence, they naturally had more experience and better qualifications than members of other communities. This enabled them to enhance their status in the bureaucracy and their power in the liberated country at the expense of rival communities.7 By contrast, previously dominant communities in a conquered domain, having lost the most, were reluctant to collaborate with their conquerors and, after independence, were angry to find the new governments dominated by members of previously subordinated communities. Clearly there are great differences between the states, not only because the composition and cultural traits of their populations vary a great deal, but also because of striking differences between the imperial powers in the way they tried to handle and exploit those whom they had conquered. Nevertheless, some broad generalizations seem to be valid. Many--though not all--of the new states born of liberation movements against the "democratic national states" that had conquered them now have authoritarian governments that are corrupt, ineffectual, oppressive and often dominated by an ethnonational minority. In fact, they are the internationally recognized quasi-states in which widespread anarchy typically also prevails.8 This is, indeed, an explosive mixture. Its ingredients include growing unrest, poverty and anger among dominated communities in the authoritarian states, and among the victims of anarchy where state power is ineffectual. Contemporary warlords and rebel leaders can command resources that were unavailable to their predecessors of an earlier period. The potential for rebellion has been enhanced by the spread of mass communications, the widespread distribution of weapons of mass violence, a growing capacity to organize and a sense of injustice driven by the myth of national self-determination. This myth, as noted above, is integrally related to the emergence of constitutional democracy as a form of government rooted in the notion of popular sovereignty and majority rule rather than the notions of divine or royal sovereignty implicit in traditional monarchies and empires. The third tsunami, born out of the successes of liberation movements against domination by modern empires, has inevitably produced its own aftermath. Civil wars and inter-group violence, often augmented by the genocidal efforts of dominant minorities to repress resistance, produce floods of refugees and, inadvertently, arm opposing groups. Although grateful refugees often integrate readily into the democracies that shelter them, they also retain strong ties to their original homelands and support revolutionary movements or ethnonational rebellions in them. This whole complex of linked consequences for the third tsunami are already clearly visible. Yet, somehow, we fail to see them in context. Recently a TV commentator on the Bosnian crisis asked if it might be viewed as the "Third Balkan War," as though this ethnonational conflict merely reflected an idiosyncratic pugnaciousness among "Balkan" peoples. Ideological Blinders. Our understanding of this process as a natural consequence of a long-term historic movement based on nationalism and originating in Western Europe has been obscured by our preoccupation with the Cold War and its ideological concerns, as though the peasant masses everywhere could be deeply committed to communism or capitalism as a way of life. For most of them, surely, these were alien and unintelligible notions. Faced with the struggle to survive in an increasingly hostile world, some of their leaders found that by accepting Cold War slogans they could get substantial help from the superpowers, either to maintain or to overthrow established state elites. Suddenly this external blanket has dissolved. Authoritarian elites find themselves nakedly exposed: without superpower allies, they must handle rebellious communities on their own. Ethnic nationalism and its quest for self-determination has moved to center stage as the primary motivator of political action in many quasi-states (including the Balkans) where both authoritarianism and anarchy prevail.9 If we cannot see what is happening, it is partly because of our preoccupation with the inter-state conflicts that exploded during the last century because of fierce competition between the rival national states. It has been a century of total wars. They were total not only because the new technologies of violence put everyone at risk, but also because the rise of state nationalism made every citizen a potential soldier. In pre- modern wars, armored knights or ethnic soldiers and mercenaries fought for rival kings, emperors or princes, leaving the peasant masses virtually untouched. Suddenly, with the collapse of all the empires, the driving motive for inter-state wars has also vanished. The existing states of the world-- including the quasi-states--know that they cannot conquer new domains, but they share a vested interest in protecting their current boundaries. This will compel them to band together, however reluctantly, to stabilize current boundaries and preserve the status quo, even when they have become mythical lines on a map rather than genuine political borders between neighboring states. The driving force behind inter-state wars arose during the first tsunami of national unification movements. The outcome of those wars triggered the second tsunami of national liberation movements. As we now enter the third tsunami of ethnonational self-determination movements, the era of major inter-state warfare has ended. A new kind of communal violence and internal wars confronts the "new world order" of self-protecting states. state power is ineffectual. Contemporary warlords and rebel leaders can command resources that were unavailable to their predecessors of an earlier period. The potential for rebellion has been enhanced by the spread of mass communications, the widespread distribution of weapons of mass violence, a growing capacity to organize and a sense of injustice driven by the myth of national self-determination. This myth, as noted above, is integrally related to the emergence of constitutional democracy as a form of government rooted in the notion of popular sovereignty and majority rule rather than the notions of divine or royal sovereignty implicit in traditional monarchies and empires. The third tsunami, born out of the successes of liberation movements against domination by modern empires, has inevitably produced its own aftermath. Civil wars and inter-group violence, often augmented by the genocidal efforts of dominant minorities to repress resistance, produce floods of refugees and, inadvertently, arm opposing groups. Although grateful refugees often integrate readily into the democracies that shelter them, they also retain strong ties to their original homelands and support revolutionary movements or ethnonational rebellions in them. This whole complex of linked consequences for the third tsunami are already clearly visible. Yet, somehow, we fail to see them in context. Recently a TV commentator on the Bosnian crisis asked if it might be viewed as the "Third Balkan War," as though this ethnonational conflict merely reflected an idiosyncratic pugnaciousness among "Balkan" peoples. Ideological Blinders. Our understanding of this process as a natural consequence of a long-term historic movement based on nationalism and originating in Western Europe has been obscured by our preoccupation with the Cold War and its ideological concerns, as though the peasant masses everywhere could be deeply committed to communism or capitalism as a way of life. For most of them, surely, these were alien and unintelligible notions. Faced with the struggle to survive in an increasingly hostile world, some of their leaders found that by accepting Cold War slogans they could get substantial help from the superpowers, either to maintain or to overthrow established state elites. Suddenly this external blanket has dissolved. Authoritarian elites find themselves nakedly exposed: without superpower allies, they must handle rebellious communities on their own. Ethnic nationalism and its quest for self-determination has moved to center stage as the primary motivator of political action in many quasi-states (including the Balkans) where both authoritarianism and anarchy prevail.9 If we cannot see what is happening, it is partly because of our preoccupation with the inter-state conflicts that exploded during the last century because of fierce competition between the rival national states. It has been a century of total wars. They were total not only because the new technologies of violence put everyone at risk, but also because the rise of state nationalism made every citizen a potential soldier. In pre- modern wars, armored knights or ethnic soldiers and mercenaries fought for rival kings, emperors or princes, leaving the peasant masses virtually untouched. Suddenly, with the collapse of all the empires, the driving motive for inter-state wars has also vanished. The existing states of the world-- including the quasi-states--know that they cannot conquer new domains, but they share a vested interest in protecting their current boundaries. This will compel them to band together, however reluctantly, to stabilize current boundaries and preserve the status quo, even when they have become mythical lines on a map rather than genuine political borders between neighboring states. The driving force behind inter-state wars arose during the first tsunami of national unification movements. The outcome of those wars triggered the second tsunami of national liberation movements. As we now enter the third tsunami of ethnonational self-determination movements, the era of major inter-state warfare has ended. A new kind of communal violence and internal wars confronts the "new world order" of self-protecting states. Secondary Issues. The true import of an unanticipated and most unwelcome development rooted in the Western traditions of nationalism and democracy is masked by our preoccupation with inter- state warfare and our reluctance to take major intra-state conflicts seriously. Various other forms of conflict have emerged as a preoccupation. Admittedly, all of them are important and can escalate, but they will eventually, I believe, be recognized as having secondary importance by comparison with the growing violence and global disruptiveness of ethnonational conflicts--the final stage of the three tsunamis of modern nationalism. Following the end of the Cold War and its preoccupation with the secular ideology of Marxism, we look for new kinds of quasi-ideological conflicts around which the world's states can array themselves into rival camps. Samuel Huntington offers just such a prospectus in "Clash of Civilizations" (1993). He warns of future alignments in which the Western, Islamic and Confucian worlds will battle each other. At best, this is surely a great oversimplification. At the intra-state level we are stunned by the expansion of violence in many forms, but we tend to view it as a domestic problem that each state must handle by itself, and we do not see them as linked phenomena--rather, each type of violence tends to be seen as an independent phenomenon. An especially poignant and frightening scenario is offered by Robert D. Kaplan in "The Coming Anarchy (1994). Amidst widespread anomie and disorder, where poverty, disease, and crime prevail amidst rapid population growth and environmental degradation, and where governments are unable to provide the basic infrastructures needed for economic development or social order, Kaplan foresees growing anarchy, violence and disorder. Even in the most ordered democracies, concern about crime, drug addiction, inner city violence, and ethnic intolerance has been rising. Admittedly, many forms of violence have no ethnic or ethnonational connections--but many do. Inter-ethnic conflict aggravates many non- ethnic conflicts, and such conflicts contribute, in turn, to the rise of ethnonationalism. In this connection, the growing power of neo- traditionalism in competition with modernism is an especially dangerous trend--it needs to be seen as an aspect of intra-civilizational strife rather than as a clash between civilizations. In my opinion, there is almost no danger that new inter-state wars will erupt based on rivalry between major civilizations (Christian, Islamic, Muslim, etc.). However, within each of these civilizations, and especially within the quasi-states of the world, intra-civilizational and cross-cultural conflicts involving neo- traditional resistance to the spread of secular modernism will be far more pervasive. This subject is so complex and important that it merits a separate paper. I cannot deal with it here, but I intend to write more about it in the future. Meanwhile, however, I think we need to recognize the third tsunami of ethnonational conflicts as, inherently, the most dangerous escalating type of violence in the world today. It is, potentially, linked with all the other forms of violence and a better understanding of it true dimensions will, I think, help us understand and cope with the rising tide of non- ethnic violence as well. PART III. PREVENTION OR TREATMENT: STRATEGIC DEMOCRATIZATION Although we can already see the early stages of the third tsunami of ethnonationalism, we cannot know definitely what lies ahead. Among alternative futures, the most pessimistic and probable, in my opinion, is indeed devastating. Yet by concerted global action, based on long-term thinking and planning, we might be able to avert this scenario, notably by facilitating the transformation of authoritarian/anarchic quasi-states into viable constitutional democracies. Some hints of this preferred scenario can, indeed, be found in current developments, but we cannot count on them--their materialization will take great energy and cooperation based on a far more profound understanding of causal linkages than we now have, including fuller recognition of its historic momentum and implications. Global Concern Preventive actions designed to achieve the strategic democratization of anarchic/authoritarian quasi-regimes might change the course of history. How difficult it is achieve this goal can be seen in the current Haiti situation: even when a military group controls a tiny island country close to the shores of the U.S. and a democratically elected president is waiting in the wings, it seems almost impossible to induce viable constitutional government from outside the country. Yet, short of such action on a global scale, a growing swarm of ethnonationalist rebellions followed by largely ineffective inter-state interventions intended to limit the violence can be predicted. The dynamism of the third tsunami is precisely the opposite of the first. Instead of unification, the goal is partition. Instead of merging small feudal domains into large national states, the existing pseudo- states will be partitioned into smaller and smaller ones. Instead of enhancing the security and enlarging the domain within which productive enterprise can be organized, insecurity and miniaturization will seriously dampen the forces of economic growth and promote increased poverty, in tandem with unrestrained population growth, environmental degradation, and spreading violence. The first tsunami had largely run its course before the second began, even though early signs of the second might have been seen, for example, in the Greek war of liberation of the 1830s. Its triumphant finale has now hit us with stunning force during the second half of the 20th century. The third tsunami has already begun well before the second tsunami has run its course: its grand finale produced the successor states of the former Communist world in which self- determination movements among national minorities began almost immediately. The liberation of Georgia, for example, was promptly followed by self-determination movements for the Abkhazians and South Ossetians living in that new republic.10 Another contrast is apparent. The liberation movements of the second tsunami were bound to succeed--modern empires (rooted in democratic norms and nationalism) simply could not maintain themselves, especially when inter-state warfare undermined their resources and will to power. By contrast, the self-determination movements of today and the decades ahead may fail or succeed. What can be done to prevent or deal with the rising tsunami of ethnonational self-determination movements? Responses organized after they have broken into open conflict--as we now see in Bosnia and Rwanda--are unlikely to succeed, or they will succeed only at great cost after much violence has occurred and many refugees have escaped to neighboring countries. Prevention would be much more effective if the outbreak of such conflicts could be averted by providing non-violent means to handle pressures for self-determination among ethnonational communities. That can be done, I believe, only if anarchic/authoritarian quasi-states can be transformed into effective democracies. However, this is unlikely to occur spontaneously in response to domestic forces--external inducements are needed to promote strategic democratization. The next section deals with the reasons why the established states of the world will necessarily seek to overcome ethnonational conflicts. In the following section I shall discuss why these efforts are bound to fail and, ultimately, they must support democratization as the only viable solution for these problems. External Intervention. The main reason, as noted above, why virtually all the recognized states of the world today--as members of the UN, NATO, SEATO, and other regional organizations--want to solve ethnonational conflicts arises from their need protect existing boundaries. All the grievances these states have against each other will give way to the common fear that, if boundary changes are legitimized, then every state will face even greater dangers. This is why, for example, we are willing to accept an autonomous Serbian zone within Croatia, but not the unification of that zone with Serbia; or why the Russians supported Georgia to maintain the boundary between North and South Ossetia in response to a rebellion designed to unify the two parts of that ethnonation. A three-way settlement inside Bosnia will be preferred to a boundary change resembling the partition of Poland in the late eighteenth century. The confusion in Macedonia, if it erupts, will disrupt many states and provoke fierce international responses. We would rather protect our myths than face unacceptable realities. In this context there is talk of an "early warning system" for ethnic conflicts, alerting the world alliance of states to intervene and to mediate. The effort resembles that of a plan to warn persons already infected HIV that they are vulnerable to AIDS. When communal violence based on ethnonational rebellions breaks out, it will already be too late. Eventually, millions will die and the exhausted protagonists will settle for whatever compromise settlements each can secure for themselves--so long as they remain within the established boundaries. Almost no one tries to stop the bloodshed in Burma, Sudan, Chad, Yemen, Sri Lanka, the Punjab. Since the antagonists in each of these cases do not threaten established boundaries, the outside world remains aloof and the world's media close their eyes. When boundaries are threatened, however, intervening coalitions offer to mediate and to send "peace-keeping" troops, the conflict attracts a swarm of reporters, and frustrated mediators are shown to be essentially helpless to resolve these disputes. A more drastic remedy is clearly needed. It involves what may be called strategic democratization. Democratic constitutional governments evolved in the past in response to domestic forces, notably the unification of nations responding to the rising power of a bourgeois class. Of course, other forces were also operative. The main point is that domestic forces drove the movement from royal autocracy to democratic self-government within the context of national states, a process that might we termed evolutionary democratization. By contrast, strategic democratization involves external pressures and it may well be impossible. Nevertheless, we need to ask whether or it is possible for for the established democracies of the world, in their own self-interest, to support from outside those forces or processes that might transform authoritarian regimes where dominant minorities oppress marginalized minorities into viable constitutional democracies? Montgomery argues that Japan and Germany, under U.S. military occupation, were compelled by external forces to become democratic (1957). Without arguing the merits of this exceptional case, we need, I think, to pose the issue in a somewhat different way. The question is not whether the forms of constitutional democracy that have evolved and worked in the national states of the West where majority rule seemed reasonable can be exported. Rather, the question is how, in a multi- ethnic society rent by deep internal cleavages, governments can be transformed so as to abort rebellions by oppressed ethnonational communities, transforming them into non-violent political campaigns for social justice and human rights. The emphasis, it would seems, needs to be placed on the non-violent resolution of conflicts and the protection of minority rights rather than on "majority rule" and electoral procedures. Ethnonationalist rebellions cannot, I believe, be averted by external interventions, even when backed by the unified force of global or regional military power. The only true solution involves preventive action through democratic "consociational" politics--to borrow Arend Lijphart's trenchant term (Lijphart, 1984). By contrast with majoritarian democracy in which the will of a popular majority is thought to determine government policy, consociational democracy depends on the protection of minority rights. How such a regime can be institutionalized should provide a major focus for research by students of viable constitutional democracy. A linked theme of equal importance involves questions about how strategic democratization can be accomplished by means of externally motivated transformations. Evolutionary democratization cannot occur soon enough to prevent the explosions of ethnonational violence that appear to be so imminent. The peace and order of the our world system during the coming century can be established only, I believe, if we can discover the secret of strategic democratization. All other arguments for promoting democratization in the world today seem trivial by comparison. Democracy and Ethnic Conflict. Before confronting this theme directly, however, we need to be clear about how the industrialized democracies have resolved disputes involving their own ethnic minorities in a non- violent way. To answer this question we need to recognize two kinds of ethnicity and the profound differences between them with respect to the problems they create. Most importantly, most ethnic grievances in the industrialized democracies do not involve ethnonationalism. Rather, they require governments to deal with civil ethnicity In a pluralistic democracy, many citizens are immigrants or the descendents of immigrants who aspire to become citizens of their new homeland. They seek integration within the framework of a state nation, a country where national identity based on citizenship prevails over ethnic identities rooted primarily in ancestry, race, religion or language--i.e. where civic nationalism is stronger than ethnic nationalism. In these situations, calls for civil rights and equal opportunities are salient, whereas claims for a separate homeland, political independence, or boundary changes are secondary. Demands that reflect inter-ethnic conflict can usually be met by non-violent political action and inter- cultural cooperation insofar as all parties accept their membership in a single state nation as an underlying premise. Most research on ethnic problems in the United States and other democracies relates to the problems of immigrants and their descendents: they all want to become citizens of their hostland. Problems involving the integration of civil ethnics are, I believe, dissimilar from those involving ethnonationalism. By lumping civil ethnicity and ethnonationalism together under the single heading of ethnicity we mask the basic difference between two quite different kinds of phenomena.11 ETHNONATIONALISM IN DEMOCRACIES All ethnic minorities in a democracy are not necessarily civil ethnics. Increasingly, today, indigenous peoples in these countries are mobilizing to proclaim their separate identity and to make demands that could lead, if sternly resisted, to ethnonational rebellions. The World Council of Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations have helped these unrepresented minorities in different countries communicate and make common cause with each other. Their social mobilization reflects their growing self-awareness as peoples who lost their independence and cultural integrity when foreign settlers occupied their lands and, eventually, conquered them. Until recently, the indigenous peoples in democratic countries have not resorted to violence and rebellion--previously, of course, they had often resisted conquest by violence. Now, however, they rely mainly on non-violent politics to achieve their cultural autonomy. The strategies adopted in democratic regimes to deal with such ethnonational protests provide examples that could be widely relevant to the solution of ethnonational conflicts in the new states, provided their governments could be democratized. The strategies followed in democratic states to handle ethnonational conflicts typically rely on two complementary strategies: they include cooptation and autonomy. These strategies respond to the competing claims within any ethnic community of neo-traditionalism and modernism. The modernizers--"herodians" in Toynbee's terms (Toynbee, 1958, p.172)--are willing to surrender their separatist aspirations in exchange for acceptable roles in the dominant society. Through "affirmative action," efforts can be made to help such people acquire the education, experience and positions required to help them feel comfortable as members of a larger state nation in which they also become full citizens. For any democratic state, this is clearly the preferable option. If those involved can simultaneously preserve their cultural identity and values while living, concurrently, in two world, they may become integrated without assimilating into the modern world. In many ethnonations, however, (including those outside as well as inside Western countries) there are many who refuse to compromise that much with the modern world. A second option responds to the demands of these neo-traditionalists (Toynbee called them "zealots") who refuse to be coopted, arguing that accepting modernization involves betrayal of deeply held cultural values. A second policy option designed to meet their concerns involves grants of autonomy at two levels: personal and territorial. Territorial autonomy permits self-government within a bounded domain, such as the reservations set aside for American "Indians" in the United States, or the "Commonwealth" status enjoyed by Puerto Rico. Comparable arrangements under other names can be found in various countries. Frequently, however, members of an ethnonation are not concentrated territorially--they may be scattered throughout a domain. For them territorial autonomy is impractical, but policies assuring personal autonomy may prove acceptable. These include measures designed to protect cultural practices and institutions by means of religious centers, schools, newspapers, radio and television stations, language rights, legal safeguards and special sources of income and political representation. No doubt, disputes about the extent and character of such autonomous rights are unavoidable, including arguments between rival organizations created by members of the same ethnonational community. Such arguments may involve deeply felt ideological differences or, sometimes, merely the rival ambitions of competing leaders. The important point, however, is simply that, contentious as these issues may be, they can be confronted and resolved by non-violent means in a viable democracy.12 Viability is stressed here because it is not enough for a regime to be democratically responsive to popular demands. In addition, it needs to be able to develop, coordinate and administer appropriate public policies. Without a responsible and effective bureaucracy, no state can secure the advantages of democratic governance. The Non-Democratic Alternative. The situation is quite different under authoritarian rule and in conditions of anarchy. When both anarchy and authoritarianism are combined in quasi-states, the explosiveness of ethnonationalist demands is compounded. When dominant elites are drawn from one or more ethnic minority within a country, and these minorities view other minorities as enemies who should be suppressed or even killed, violent conflict seems unavoidable. If an authoritarian regimes is also ineffective, the resulting anarchy provides many opportunities for enraged ethnic communities to organize zones of resistance and wage guerrilla warfare, including involvement in formally illegal activities that generate the income needed to support their rebellions. The internal dynamics of change and mobilization within ethnonations needs to be understood in this context. Let us assume that most members of any ethnonation are primarily interested in satisfying their own basic needs--water, food, clothing, housing, etc.--as Maslow explained them. However, as social mobilization occurs in response to the pressures of modernization, they begin to think about higher level needs, including their self-identity, social status, cultural values, etc. At this stage they may be asked to choose between the modernizers and neo-traditional leaders who promise happiness to those who join in efforts to restore a sacred or golden age that has been destroyed by secularization and modernizing forces. In a democracy, we may assume that many of these late bloomers will cast their lot with the modernizers and seek to join the main socio- political streams of the country where they live. However, they may also reject this option and, instead, join forces with those who demand, without compromise, a return to neo-traditional values and life-styles. I believe that democratic regimes are more likely to offer conditions that favor the option supported by the modernizers in an ethnonation, and that in authoritarian/anarchic circumstances, the neo-traditional alternative will seem more attractive to waverers. If this supposition is valid, then we would also understand why ethnonational rebellions under authoritarian/anarchic regimes are so often led by neo- traditionalists (zealots or hard-liners) and why, in the democracies, they are less popular within their own communities. From the opposite point of view of ruling groups rather than of marginalized communities, we can also see that neither modernization nor autonomy can be accepted or implemented effectively in quasi- states. These rulers are unwilling or unable to offer attractive roles to the herodians of a hostile and neo-traditionalist ethnonational community for fear that their own precarious monopoly of power will be undermined, nor can they offer autonomy to a community whose members would exploit the opportunity it offered to organize more effective rebellions. Thus the nominal rulers of a quasi-state find themselves trapped by their own fears and disabilities: they cannot acceptance the policies that are most likely to satisfy members of an ethnonation in their midst. To the degree that anarchy, authoritarianism and minority domination prevail in pseudo-states created by the collapse of modern empires, their ethnonational communities may, therefore, be expected to become mobilized and, eventually, rebel again the weak regimes that are viewed not only as oppressive, but also as incapable of providing the security and services required for the maintenance of any viable state. The mobilizing members of such communities will increasingly follow neo- traditionalist rather than modernizing leaders. A leading example is the Iranian revolution of 1979, under the leadership of the neo-traditionalist, Ayatollah Khomeini. He destroyed the embattled modernizing regime of the Shah Pahlavi. Since foreign powers, especially the United States, had strongly supported the Shah's policies, they attracted the extreme hostility of this country's new rulers. Knowing that they cannot achieve their goals by non-violent political means, neo-traditionalist ethnonations will assuredly resort to violence in all quasi-states. I believe we are not yet sufficiently aware of this long-term danger because many communities are not yet well enough organized and mobilized for rebellion, but during the coming decades, they will assuredly reach this level, especially if most of their members opt for a neo-traditionalist strategy. Concurrently, authoritarian and ineffective regimes, unable to accept or implement non-violent strategies for dealing with ethnonational unrest, will also resort increasingly to repressive strategies, relying on violence and, in extreme cases, on genocide. Because of their inherent weaknesses, these regimes will increasingly discover that they cannot succeed, and their strategies will only accelerate the political mobilization and hostility of oppressed ethnonational communities and the growing anarchy within their domains. In earlier ages, such regimes would have soon collapsed, but the organized states of the contemporary world community will do their best to protect and perpetuate these fragile regimes. Alternatively, if they do decide to impose sanctions or intervene to impose strategic democratization, they may unintentionally only enrich a ruling group and reinforce its determination to retain the authoritarian powers they have already captured. Strategic Democratization. Facing these inherent dangers, the democratic countries of the world--who, after all, are also economically and politically the most powerful--need to coordinate their energies and resources to promote strategic democratization in the world's quasi- states. If they could convince the dominant elites in these countries that they face a truly grim future unless they agree to democratizing reforms, and that such reforms will not necessarily destroy them, they might, perhaps, be willing to support political transformations in the direction of viable constitutional democracy. It is surely a very long shot, but one that needs to be considered very carefully. No doubt in the short run, greed and fear, augmented by shrewd calculations that the world community will, in fact, sustain their power position, induces many of these rulers to persist in their present policies. They believe that the oppressive policies and corrupt practices which have secured special privileges and wealth for them in the past will continue. Moreover, official recognition gives them votes in the United Nations and various regional organizations and their experiences during the Cold War have led them to expect external aid from one or the other antagonist in great power rivalries. After the Cold War, the U.S. has withdrawn aid from some of its former protege states but this may not be enough to induce authoritarian rulers to abandon power. Furthermore, as the experiences of Burundi and Rwanda demonstrate, whenever a dominant minority is displaced by democratic elections that bring a previously marginalized majority to power, the new rulers may seek revenge for past wrongs by persecuting their former masters. This may be an extreme case, but it dramatizes a widely held fear that will surely make some ruling minorities desperate to hold on to their power. Perhaps the constitutional transformation that has so recently occurred in South Africa may show that, under some conditions at least, a displaced dominant minority can be also be protected. In fact, authoritarian rulers have good reasons to fear states that may want to oust them from power. They also know that the refugees who have escaped from their control are likely to organize and support rebellions against them, and even to influence the foreign policy of other states so as to injure them. Predictably, therefore, authoritarian and ineffectual rulers will desperately resort to the repression and intimidation of potential rebels within their domains, while suspiciously striving to defend themselves from external intervention. BENIGN FUTILITY Democratic governments in all the industrialized states pay lip service to the value of democracy vs. authoritarian rule and support efforts to induce authoritarian governments to accept political transformations in favor of open constitutional democracy and improved administrative capabilities designed both to overcome authoritarianism and anarchy. Unfortunately, such efforts are typically based on unrealistic expectations or romantic idealism--they manifest benign futility.. Moreover, they are often suspect when when rationalized as a means to enhance trade opportunities, or to safeguard the gains that can be made from foreign investments. We are also victimized by the myth that economic growth is an easy panacea: it assumes that everyone will benefit, including entrenched authoritarian rulers, and that a rising standard of living will enable people everywhere to accomplish democratic transformations by their own efforts. Some of the richest countries in the world, like Saudi Arabia and Brunei, are still dominated by ruling monarchies. Government leaders in the United States, and especially those involved in foreign aid programs, universally support the goal of democratization but, I believe, lack any real understanding of how desperately important it is in relation to the rising threat of ethnonational rebellions. Nor do they have any solid strategy for promoting democratization and effective governance in fragile quasi- states. The current U.S. dilemma about how to democratize a military dictatorship in Haiti illustrate the benign futility of contemporary efforts to transform an authoritarian/anarchic quasi-state into a viable constitutional democracy. We need to re-think the issues involved in all international projects to transform authoritarian regimes into democracies. Such a reassessment should, I believe, rest on the following premises: 1. The increasing violence entailed by the escalating incidence of ethnonational rebellions is an inescapable manifestation of the third tsunami of modern nationalism. 2. This phenomenon threatens all countries in the world. The rulers of authoritarian and anarchic quasi-states where the risks are greatest need to realize that they are already in great jeopardy--they will probably be overthrown and destroyed after great loss of life and property, or their countries will be partitioned. 3. All established states in the world today have reached a stage where, even though they may want to revise their boundaries at some places, they know they have an even greater stake in the preservation of existing boundaries. If boundary changes are legitimized, they are more likely to experience adverse than favorable revisions. Consequently, I believe, virtually all states will band together to resist any threats to their existing boundaries and earnestly avoid inter-state wars. There are, of course, a few exceptions like North Korea and South Korea where each country would favor ethnonational unification at the expense of the rival state, but even here, I believe the dominant elites in both states know they will lose much more than they can possibly gain should they seek to resolve this problem by violence. 4. Global and regional inter-state organizations will pool their resources and efforts to terminate intra-state conflicts that threaten existing boundaries. For the most part they will ignore any such conflicts when they do not threaten boundaries, but when borders are at risk, inter-state organizations will intervene, as they did in the Gulf War. Iraq's occupation of Kuweit destroyed such a boundary and also, of course, raised serious problems involving the world's oil supply. Post- war interventions in Iraq reflect concerns about that country's borders with neighboring states as related to ethnonational rebellions by that country's Shia and Kurdish minorities. Older crises such as those involving Cyprus and Kashmir come to mind. 5. External interventions will scarcely ever, perhaps never, resolve internal wars generated by ethnonational rebellions. Vain efforts to induce negotiations, to impose embargoes, and to send peace-keeping troops will, ultimately, prove futile. Only after the protagonists have conquered enough land, destroyed enough property, and killed enough people to convince themselves that continued fighting will not improve their lot will they make peace by sub-dividing their country, even if the outside world refuses to legitimize the partitioned domains. In 1947, the United Nations did approve the establishment of an Arab and a Jewish state in partitioned Palestine, leading to a long-continued conflict which still provokes global concern, despite the ray of hope struck by the recent Arab/Israeli peace accord. In Cyprus, which was granted independence in 1960, clashes between Greek and Turkish citizens, aggravated by foreign interventions, has led to de-facto partitioning of the country, but no international recognition for the "Turkish Republic" which, in fact, dominates the northern part of the island. Similarly, in divided Iraq, Sri Lanka, Burma and Sudan, fighting between governments and territorially entrenched but unrecognized ethnonational regimes persists. Peaceful settlements or recognition of minority domains remain out of reach. The Rationale for Democratization. If and when the states of the world realize that only the spread of democracy in currently authoritarian regimes can truly transform violent strife into non-violent politics will the prospects for peace and order in our troubled world become a reality. Such a realization needs to start from recognition of its fundamental strategic importance--democratization is not just an idealistic dream or a prize for entrepreneurs. It is a necessity for the world and its troubled peoples. The empirical data collected by Gurr (1993a, b) demonstrates that, in democratic countries, ethnonational communities rely primarily on non- violent protests to achieve their goals, whereas under authoritarian rule, violent rebellions frequently arise. It is easy enough to see why, under authoritarianism, peaceful protest is ineffective: it may even provoke massive genocidal attacks by a ruling community, fearful of losing its power and suffering revenge attacks--as we see in Rwanda today. Rudy Rummel's forthcoming book, Death by Government: Genocide and Mass Murder since 1900 will provide ample documentation. Uganda under Idi Amin (1971-79) provides an extreme case. With some fairly obvious exceptions, we may conclude that authoritarianism provokes ethnonational rebellions, while democracy encourages marginalized communities to seek justice by political means. Nevertheless, as Gurr has also pointed out (Gurr, 1993), the period of transition to democracy is a dangerous one: "In democratizing autocracies," he wrote, "the opportunities for communal groups to mobilize are substantial, but states usually lack the resources or institutional means to reach the kinds of accommodations that typify the established democracies." The weakening or collapse of authoritarianism followed by blundering and ineffectual efforts to create democracy creates an interim period of relative anarchy or uncertainty during which ethnonational leaders may organize rebellions rather than wait for incipient democracy to give them the security, prosperity and status they dream of. Moreover, strong authoritarian regimes under single-party domination (by contrast with quasi-states, under military-bureaucratic rule where anarchy also prevails) are able to impose their will on restive minorities so effectively that they can repress incipient ethnonational rebellions before they get started. They can also close their borders so as to keep outsiders away and also to prevent refugees from leaving. The practice or threat of genocide in such curtained states has restrained ethnonationalism until the regime's collapse suddenly releases it--as the recent experiences of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union demonstrate. On the practice of genocide during the past century see Rummel (1993, 94). We must, therefore, understand the risks involved in democratization and the reasons why ethnonational movements can be suppressed under strong single-party authoritarianism. Such a realization calls for serious analysis of the costs involved in projects designed to promote strategic democratization in authoritarian countries. We have not, I think, really learned how to induce authoritarians to relinquish their power and accept democratizing reforms. Nor, I believe, have we thought through issues concerning the appropriate institutions and practices required to make democratic constitutional government viable, especially during the first stages of their institutionalization. Many Americans blithely assume that the presidentialist system installed in the United States two hundred years ago is the most appropriate institutional form for any democracy to take. A discussion of the inherent risks involved in the presidentialist design for a constitutional democracy, and the reasons why, despite these risks, the U.S. regime has survived for over 200 years, can be found in Riggs (1994a, b). I believe, however, that any country following this model is asking for disaster--in a short time the fundamental inability of a regime based on the separation of powers and majority rule will be unable to cope with major crises. It will then collapse in favor of a new authoritarianism, typically led by military officers who have conspired to seize power in order to "save the country." An underlying premise of democratic constitutions in national states involves the assumption that the will of a popular majority, as reflected in a representative assembly, provides the basis for viable democracy. However well this premise served the needs of Western states where most citizens were members of a single dominant community, it will surely not work well in countries whose members are divided among mutually hostile ethnonations. More weight needs to be given to the protection of minority rights, including the members of ruling groups and dominant minorities who have lost power. A heavy emphasis on preconditions for the effective establishment both of the rule of law and of legal pluralism is needed. A strategy for promoting democratization, therefore, requires at least two parallel types of inquiry: one involves questions about the design of viable democratic constitutions in countries rent by deep cleavages between mutually hostile ethnonations, and the other issue requires us to think about the motivations of authoritarian rulers and how they can be re-shaped so that they will understand the advantages of cooperating in efforts to establish and sustain constitutional democracy in their own countries. Only after we find ways to safeguard their interests while they surrender power, and also discover how they can benefit from the peace, prosperity and environmental improvements that democratic government might assure, will they agree to step down rather than await the self-destructive finale their efforts to retain power will guarantee. Neither hostility nor external aid are likely to achieve these ends. A more complex carrot-and-stick approach linked with deeper understanding of the conditions and rules that make viable constitutionalism possible holds, I believe, any promise of success in dealing with the mounting third tsunami of ethnonational rebellions. citizens were members of a single dominant community, it will surely not work well in countries whose members are divided among mutually hostile ethnonations. More weight needs to be given to the protection of minority rights, including the members of ruling groups and dominant minorities who have lost power. A heavy emphasis on preconditions for the effective establishment both of the rule of law and of legal pluralism is needed. A strategy for promoting democratization, therefore, requires at least two parallel types of inquiry: one involves questions about the design of viable democratic constitutions in countries rent by deep cleavages between mutually hostile ethnonations, and the other issue requires us to think about the motivations of authoritarian rulers and how they can be re-shaped so that they will understand the advantages of cooperating in efforts to establish and sustain constitutional democracy in their own countries. Only after we find ways to safeguard their interests while they surrender power, and also discover how they can benefit from the peace, prosperity and environmental improvements that democratic government might assure, will they agree to step down rather than await the self-destructive finale their efforts to retain power will guarantee. Neither hostility nor external aid are likely to achieve these ends. A more complex carrot-and-stick approach linked with deeper understanding of the conditions and rules that make viable constitutionalism possible holds, I believe, any promise of success in dealing with the mounting third tsunami of ethnonational rebellions. ENDNOTES 1. My impressions about the role of ethnicity in past centuries were reinforced by Ashworth (1994). He reports that although insurrections against unpopular rulers by disaffected members of the dominant community were fairly common in Hellenic and Roman times, communal minorities typically supported these rulers. Often they were ethnic soldiers--a phenomenon well described by Cynthia Enloe (1980). Even more often, they were diaspora traders whose commercial activities succeeded only with the cooperation of ruling elites in polities where they were politically marginalized outsiders--for more details see Curtin (1984). Since they could operate only with the support of ruling elites, their cooperation was assured. I believe that ethnic support for established regimes prevailed throughout the ancient world, not just in the Western domains described by Ashworth. 2. National states are those in which a single nationality is both politically dominant and demographically ubiquitous. By contrast, although nation-state may signify the same concept, this term is also used for the different notion of a recognized state in contemporary international law--thus all members of the UN are viewed as "nation states" even though most of them are multi-national states, and the dominant community may be a demographic minority. I use nation-state only for the latter concept, not for the former which I call a national state. 3. For Westerners, the most familiar case of wide-spread anarchy is that of European Feudalism, following the disintegration of the Roman Empire. However, similar phenomena have occurred elsewhere (Coulborn, 1956). The collapse of empires has, normally, been followed by anarchy--chaotic periods of disorder between Chinese imperial dynasties offer excellent examples (Eisenstadt, 1963; Lattimore, 1962). Anarchy as it evolved in pre-modern societies may have involved some inter-ethnic conflict, but this was not its most salient feature. For example, in China, during the period following the collapse of the Ch'ing (Manchu) Empire in 1911, anarchy prevailed for almost two decades. Rival Chinese warlords gained power in many localities. They often started as leaders of bandit gangs who successfully extended their precarious control over fluid domains. The average Chinese had to endure terror, impoverishment, and insecurity or respond by joining the followers of one of the contending warlords. Because of the relative cultural homogeneity of the Chinese people, however, it is possible to view this type of anarchy as a non-ethnic phenomenon. The warlords did not represent ethnonational minorities. They all belonged to a single Chinese ethnonation--of course there were marginal zones and minority communities, but conflict with them was endemic in China, during as well as between dynasties, and they involved peripheral zones, not the Chinese heartland. In Lebanon, by contrast, during the anarchy that prevailed from the mid-70's until 1990, rival warlords established their power bases in a wide range of competing ethnic communities. In 1981 it was estimated that some 43 "private armies" were fighting each other throughout the country. Anarchy leads uniformly to contending gangs, bandits, pirates, and the rise of warlords, but the degree of ethnonational commitment of rival groups varies significantly from country to country, depending on its cultural composition. 4. Robert D. Kaplan (1994) paints a vivid picture of contemporary disorder, "an anarchic implosion of criminal violence," border upheavals, ethnic and regional splits, linked to poverty, disease, and demoralization. Starting with some West African countries as examples, he describes "a nighmarish Dickensian spectacle to which Dickens himself would never have given credence. The corrugated metal shacks and scabrous walls were coated with black slime... The streets were one long puddle of floating garbage. Mosquitoes and flies were everywhere. Children, many of whom had protruding bellies, seemed as numerous as ants" (p.54.) In Kaplan's scenario, the anarchic decay and violence found in West Africa today is already replicated in other parts of the Third World and will undoubtedly spread even more widely in the decades ahead. Kaplan's image of total anarchy omits the element of political formalism that distinguishes this kind of chaos from the forms of anarchy that followed the collapse of traditional empires. In those cases, no benign foreign powers offered any assistance. Successful war lords had to sustain their small domains without foreign assistance. Today, the formal structures of government in quasi-states typically receive international recognition and support that actually encourages their authoritarianism without overcoming anarchy. It permits ruling groups to maintain a facade of government while they milk the foreign powers and international organizations who subsidize their survival. To maintain these benefits, however, the rulers rely increasingly on violence and corruption at home. Because of their inability to govern effectively, they aggravate the growing prevalence of anarchy. It would be useful to have a new term to characterize this combination of anarchy and internationally sustained authoritarianism. I am tempted to propose a neologism like anarchianism but experience teaches caution and so I shall refrain, using phrases like anarchic authoritarianism instead. 5. Despite a popular notion that equates these regimes with military rule, the fact is that some civil servants, especially more highly qualified technocrats, typically join the military: without their support, no military group could sustain its rule. Civil servants may or may not participate in an actual coup, but all appointed officials (military and civil) in any contemporary polity share a common interest in the salary, security, and perquisites that bureaucratic office provides. When these advantages are seriously undermined, few will resist efforts to overthrow the regime in power. Moreover, those who support the new regime are likely to prosper and those who resist will be marginalized. Unfortunately, bureaucratic domination under military leadership usually produces corrupt and ineffective governments that are as fragile as those they replace, often leading to further coups and counter-coups and continuing anarchy and violence. Only by establishing a viable constitutional democracy can stable government be created in these polities (Riggs, 1993). 6. Admittedly there have been other, though less common, scenarios. In some cases genuinely revolutionary movements against imperial rule emerged and fought for independence over extended periods of time. When, after the Bolshevik Revolution, these movements were led by well trained professional revolutionaries, they were able to establish single party authoritarian regimes when independence came and the bureaucracies in these countries came under fairly effective control, leading to authoritarianism without anarchy, but often with violence and genocide. The former states of French Indo-China may be viewed as prototypical for this scenario. A completely different fate awaited former dependencies in which the imperial power made minimal use of indigenous personnel in its colonial administration. They were among the last to abandon power and then as much in response to external economic and political forces as to pressures for liberation from within. In these dependencies almost no local people were prepared to assume any kind of political or administrative responsibility: Zaire, the former Belgian Congo, may be the leading example. Only extended intervention by the United Nations preserved this country from prompt fragmentation. The resulting anarchy has been presided over since 1965 by Field Marshal (President) Mobutu, perhaps the world's richest kleptarch. His wealth, needless to say, does not derive from the exploitation of his subjects but, rather, from the misuse of foreign aid, primarily from the United States. 7. This is, of course, a gross oversimplification, and there are many variations between countries, both because each local situation is unique, and also because of great variations among the empires in their style of colonial administration. Sometimes missionaries influenced the power equation because of their greater ability to make converts among marginalized peoples. The Western-style education they offered in mission-sponsored schools prepared these people for roles in government and politics that they were eager to accept. Sometimes marginalized trading communities in a pre-conquest society flourished under the protection of the imperial authorities and they became relatively rich and powerful after independence. A disproportionate number of colonial administrators were men whose liaisons with local women produced children of mixed ancestry: their subsequent careers in government marked them as a semi-privileged ethnic minority. The preference in colonial administration for recruits drawn from marginalized local communities has become very significant since independence. It is stressed here because of its relevance for an understanding of post-independence ethnonational conflicts. 8. Please remember that these generalizations apply to many but not all of the new states--in some of them, governments are relatively effective and democratic. They provide show how ethnonational conflicts can be handled non-violently. India and some of the insular states of the Pacific and Caribbean are leading examples. 9. As Jackson (1990) has pointed out, ineffectual governments in many states have lost control of territories within their borders where ethnonational communities that were never recognized as "nations" by the imperial powers already exercise de facto control. His list of examples includes: "Eritrea, Baluchis, Biafrans, Eritreans, Tigreans, Ewes, Gandans, Karens, Katchins, Kurds, Moros, Pathans, Sikhs, Tamils, and many other ethnonationalities are the abandoned peoples of the contemporary community of states." (p.41). Since Jackson compiled that list, Eritrea gained its full independence in 1993; the Kurds in northern Iraq, with international protection, are virtually autonomous; and the northwest portion of Somalia (formerly British Somaliland) effectively seceded from Somalia in 1991 and established a government, even though it has not yet secured formal international recognition. 10. In much of Africa and Asia similar struggles began on the morrow of liberation. Consider the cases of Burundi and Rwanda that are now so visible. Four years after its independence in 1962, the Kingdom of Burundi succumbed to a military coup, but Tutsi domination seemed secure until Hutu revolts that very year and in 1972 led to massive reprisals and the death of some 100,000 Hutus accompanied by the flight of thousands of refugees. During the succeeding years, the 15% Tutsi minority remained politically dominant through a succession of coups and clashes with the Hutu majority (85%). Finally, in 1991, a popular referendum based on the government party's campaign for ethnic reconciliation, led to the promulgation of a democratic constitution in 1992, and multi-party elections in 1993 that brought opposition (Hutu) leader, Ndadaya, to power as president. After surviving a coup attempt in July, he named a Tutsi woman to the post of prime minister. Even this conciliatory gesture failed to achieve ethnic harmony and, as we all know, the President was subsequently killed followed by extreme violence between the rival communities of Burundi. Meanwhile, in neighboring Rwanda, well before its independence in 1962, the Tutsi dominated monarchy, under Belgian trusteeship, was overthrown in 1959 after a bloody civil war. Following a UN-supervised election in 1961, the Hutu majority (some 85% of the population) predictably won, promulgating a republic which gained its formal independence the next year. It promptly faced unsuccessful efforts by emigre Tutsi rebels to re-establish the monarchy. Reprisals against the Tutsi population resulted to numerous deaths and the exodus of one to two hundred thousand Tutsis. Finally, however, the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) launched a more powerful rebellion in 1990 and gained control of the country's northern region. Cease-fire talks in 1993 led to agreement on a multi-party government from which, however, the FPR later withdrew and hostilities were renewed, followed again by peace talks in 1993 and another compromise agreement. However, the recent assassination of President Habarimana led to extreme inter- communal violence and the apparent return to power of the Tutsi minority. The persistent unwillingness of this formerly dominant minority to remain marginalized has led to an enthnonational rebellion with massive killings on both sides. 11. No doubt some immigrants--especially those who migrated as refugees to escape terror and oppression in their homelands--are ambivalent about their identities. In their new hostlands, they are eager to work and compete as citizens of the democracy where they have sought refuge. However, they also want to support relatives and friends in their former homelands when they rebel and strive for justice and security. Vivid contrasts between the opportunities open to them in a democracy and their bitter experiences under authoritarian rule easily produce a special kind of dual identity: they participate as civil ethnics in their democratic hostlands and simultaneously support ethnonationalist rebellions in their authoritarian homelands. Although, at an analytic level the two kinds of ethnicity are basically different, at the level of individual identity and conduct, one person may well be simultaneously involved in both. Great ambiguity also affects minorities who suffered involuntary immigration as slaves--African Americans provide the leading example. Mutual hostility and resistance to integration led observers to view them as a racial rather than an ethnic community. The substitution of African-American for Black, may symbolize a transformation of this stereotype. 12. According to Gurr (1993, p. 138) "...institutionalized democracy facilitates nonviolent communal protest and inhibits communal rebellion (p.138)." Moreover, "Communal leaders and political entrepreneurs in democracies also are relatively free to build political movements and to use a wide repertoire of techniques of conventional and unconventional action to pursue their material interests." Nevertheless, he adds, some of them demand greater autonomy or separatism (p.144). Admittedly, then, even democracies can face acute difficulties in their efforts to cope with ethnonational protests. The long-continuing crisis in Northern Ireland provides an extreme case, as does the persistence of serious ethnic conflict in India despite that country's remarkable record of coping with ethnonational unrest. We cannot, therefore, assume that just because democratic regimes have been instituted, they will automatically be able to resolve ethnonational conflicts. Moreover, secure democracies have collapsed in the past. Consequently, our focus should not only be on how to transform authoritarianism into democracy but also how to sustain or consolidate democracies that already exist, and how to enhance their efforts to deal with ethnonational protests (by contrast with problems that merely involve civil ethnicity). REFERENCES Ashworth, Lucian, 1994. "Ancient World Systems: Cities, Riots and Violence in the Hellenic World." Halifax, NS: Dalhousie University. (unpublished paper) Coulborn, Rushton, ed., 1956. Feudalism in History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. 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Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. Kaplan, Robert D., 1994. "The Coming Anarchy." Atlantic Monthly. February, pp.44-76. Lattimore, Owen, 1962. Inner Asian Frontiers of China. Boston: Beacon Press. Lijphart, Arend, 1984. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Montgomery, John D. 1957. Forced to be Free: The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pirenne, Henri, 1956. Medieval Cities. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co. Polanyi, Michael, et al, eds. 1957. Trade and Market in the Early Empires. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Riggs, Fred W., 1964. Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Riggs, Fred W., 1993. "Fragility of the Third World's Regimes." International Social Science Journal. no.136, pp. 199-243. Riggs, Fred W., 1994a. "Bureaucracy and the Constitution." Public Administration Review. vol.54:1, pp. 65-72. Riggs, Fred W., 1994b. "Conceptual Homogenization of a Heterogeneous Field: Presidentialism in Comparative Perspective." Comparing Nations: Concepts, Strategies, Substance. Mattei Dogan and Ali Kazancigil, eds. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 72-152. Riggs, Fred W., 1994c. "Ethnonationalism, Industrialism, and the Modern State." Honolulu: University of Hawaii. (unpublished paper) Rummel, R. J., 1993. "Genocide and Mass Murder: The Black Hole in Peace Research." (unpublished paper) Rummel, R. J., 1994. Death by Government: Genocide and Mass Murder since 1900. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Tehranian, Majid, 1994. "Where is the New World Order: At the End of History or Clash of Civilizations?" Honolulu: University of Hawaii. (unpublished paper) Toynbee, Arnold, 1958. Civilization on Trial, and The World and the West. New York: Meridian Books. END FRED W. RIGGS, Professor Emeritus Political Science Department, University of Hawaii 2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822, U.S.A. Phone: (808) 956-8123 Fax: (808) 956-6877 e-mail: FREDR@UHUNIX.UHCC.HAWAII.EDU June 17, 1994