From Rahni.Ennor@anu.edu.au Sat Jan 6 20:21:29 1996 Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 13:24:16 +0800 To: REVS@csf.colorado.edu From: Rahni.Ennor@anu.edu.au (rahni ennor) Subject: general request any thoughts on the separation or lack thereof between church and state would be welcome.I'm (beginning) writing my thesis on religion and politics, and as I am of the heathen/secularist bent,I'd be interested to hear any comments from the "opposition" .I'm focussing on South Asia for my thesis,but am interested in the world scene in general. Thanks! Rahni From JBATES@macollamh.ucd.ie Tue Jan 9 07:48:04 1996 From: JBATES@macollamh.ucd.ie Tue, 9 Jan 96 14:46:52 +0000 (GMT) Tue, 9 Jan 96 14:45:31 +0000 (GMT) To: REVS@csf.colorado.edu Date: 9 Jan 1996 15:48:32 +0000 (GMT) Subject: World Congress on Violence Apologies for any cross-postings. I hope group members find this interesting and want to participate. Yours sincerely Jessica Bates ___CONGRESS ANNOUNCEMENT___ *World Congress on Violence and Human Coexistence* *17-21 August 1997* *Dublin, Ireland* --Theme-- Violence and the Future of Society --Place-- University College Dublin, Ireland and Dublin Castle -- Announcement -- The organisers cordially invite everyone concerned with violence in contemporary society and its implications for the future to take part in this World Congress. A sample list of specialists expected to participate are: concerned organisations, laypersons, theoreticians, clinicians, practitioners, researchers, and teachers in fields of psychology, medicine, criminology, anthropology, biology, ecology, history, sociology, education, and economics. As we move into the next millennium, the World Congress proposes to provide an interdisciplinary, multicultural forum for expression, research, exchange, and problem-solving on the conditions required for the fullness of human coexistence, with a view to achieving a more global and deep understanding of the many eruptions of violence in human life and history. -- Programme -- The World Congress will take place over a period of five days. Plenary sessions and concurrent regular and special sessions are scheduled for August 17, 18, 20, 21. Participating groups and societies may, if they so desire, hold their own meetings on Tuesday August 19. A post-congress meeting will take place on August 23 and 24 in Belfast. Delegates who attend the World Congress in Dublin may register for this. The purpose of the post-congress event will be to develop the themes which are discussed at the World Congress and to form working groups around prominent issues. Further details of the post-congress meeting will be given at a future date. -- Suggested Sections -- GLOBAL AND STRUCTURAL EXAMINATIONS OF VIOLENCE AND NON VIOLENCE 14 Inequality, class, and violence 15 Violence and civilizations 17 Population growth and density and human coexistence 18 Socioeconomic disparities between North and South and within countries 34 Marketing and production of the instruments of violence 35 Decentralization and the social future 36 Violence in history and its impact on the future: E.g. colonialism, imperialism, totalitarianism 54 Eliasian and figurational analyses of violence EXPLANATIONS OF VIOLENCE 13 Foucauldian analyses of violence 16 Universe of discourse, doxa, and non-violence 25 The psychology of violence 26 Personality theory and violence 27 Cognitive disorders and violence 28 Anxiety and mood disorders and violence 43 The nature of enmity 52 Biological approaches to explaining violence 61 Alienation and social disharmony VIOLENT AND NON VIOLENT BEHAVIOUR 12 Sport, violence, and coexistence 23 Violence against the elderly; violence against the handicapped 29 The psychology of caring individuals 32 Recidivist violence 33 Violence and juvenile imprisonment 39 Torture and torturers 45 Existentialist contributions to the understanding of violence 50 Gratuitous violence 51 Violence by the very young 53 Drug-related violence 55 Youth gang violence 56 Domestic violence HUMAN RIGHTS, MINORITY RIGHTS AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 2 Exploitation and violence 10 Ethnicity and non-violence 40 Official and state violence 42 Human rights violations 48 Regionalism, secession, and political coexistence 57 Child soldiers 59 Invisible aspects of violence against women 60 The organized violent control of women and children SPECIFIC REGIONS 7 The situation in former Yugoslavia and the European future 8 Lessons from the violence in Irish history 9 Route to peace in Ireland 38 The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the future of peace 58 Terrorism and nationality in South Asia CULTURE AND VIOLENCE 1 Postmodern culture and violence 3 Language and violence 4 Masculinity, non-violence, and the reinvention of men 6 Religion, fundamentalism, and violence 19 Violence in the media 20 Representations of violence in the arts: cinema, literature, fine arts THE FUTURE OF SOCIETY 5 Education for non-violence 11 Strategies for non-violent outcomes 21 Informal groups and the control of violence 22 Citizen autonomy and healthy communities 24 Citizen action and public safety 30 Solving the problem of rape 31 Organized crime in our times and in the future 37 Darwinian approaches to the future of society 41 Resistances to structural and organized violence 44 A feminist future 46 The future of authenticity and inauthenticity 47 Living in harmony with the natural environment and with other animal species 49 Egoism, rational choice, and social harmony 62 Other --Round table and special sessions -- Special session projects may be proposed to the Chairman of the Congress Organisation by persons and groups. If the projects are approved, the proposers agree to organise the session, designate the chairperson and speakers, and ensure their presence at the Congress. -- Plenary Sessions -- There will also be all-Congress sessions, some with featured speakers, around the conference's main themes. -- Congress languages -- English, French, Spanish, German, depending on sufficient numbers of participants belonging to the respective communities. Rental of multilingual receivers: #10 (before April 30, 1997). --Publication of Proceedings -- The Proceedings of this World Congress will be published. Final papers should be with the Congress Organisers for final approval by October 31 1997. *We do not claim exclusive right to publish papers from this World Congress nor do we guarantee that every paper presented will be published. --Abstracts-- If you are intending to present a paper would you kindly submit your abstract before September 30 1996. Format: 1 page (200 words) maximum. To be received either by email (preferred), by post; on paper or Macintosh disc. -- Registration Details -- Regular participants until 31-05-1996 #IR 80 until 31-05-1997 #IR 90 after 31-05-1997 #IR 100 Accompanying person #IR 35 Accompanying a regular participant Students #IR 15 with valid student card Multilingual receiver #IR 10 Cheque or money order payable to World Coexistence. N.B.: Payment of registration fees is required of all participants. Cancellation Reimbursement of fees prior to 31-05-1996 less #IR 10 prior to 31-05-1997 less #IR 20 after 31-05 1997 no reimbursement -- Lodging -- Student room: Approximately #IR 20 per person per night Hotel with breakfast (three price ratings): (i) Approximately #IR 35 (per person per night) (ii) Approximately #IR 47 (per person per night) (iii) Approximately #IR 52 (per person per night) N.B.: Prices subject to change with inflation. There is limited hotel accommodation available. These prices are on a first come first served basis. A deposit of #50 per person will be necessary to secure hotel accommodation. The social programme (Receptions, concerts, excursions) will be announced in a second circular. Only those persons having returned the attached registration form are assured of receiving the second circular. ************************ --Further Information-- Contact: Jessica Bates, Congress Secretary, Dept Sociology, University College Dublin, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland. Email: jess.bates@ucd.ie Fax: (353) 1 7061125 Chairman of the Congress: Dr Don Bennett, Dept Sociology, University College Dublin, Ireland. Email: don.bennett@ucd.ie ************************* -- Registration Form -- To be sent to Congress Secretary NAME:______________________________ (Block letters) ADDRESS:_________________________________________________ _________________________________________________ _________________________________________________ _________________________________________________ _________________________________________________ TEL.: _______________________________ ACCOMPANYING PERSON: Yes / No (Delete as applicable) Name: __________________________ If you propose to submit a paper, please specify Section No: __________ Title of paper: __________________________________________________________ ACCOMMODATION: HOTEL: Single / Double HOTEL: #IR35 pppn / #IR47 pppn / #IR52 pppn STUDENT RESIDENCE: Yes / No NUMBER OF NIGHTS: __________ ARRIVAL DATE: ________________________ DEPARTURE DATE: _______________________ REGISTRATION FEES: #IR _______ ACCOMPANYING PERSON: #IR _______ STUDENT: #IR ________ INTERPRET. RECEIVER #IR 10 X = #IR __________ TOTAL __________ For any of the above, a cheque or money order will be accepted, made payable to 'World Coexistence' in #IR, #STG, or equivalent in $US or $CAN dollars or EC currencies. SIGNATURE: DATE: From smks@look1.apmaths.uwo.ca Tue Jan 16 12:10:24 1996 From: smks@look1.apmaths.uwo.ca (Sultan Sial) To: Rahni.Ennor@anu.edu.au smks@look1.apmaths.uwo.ca Subject: Re: general request In-Reply-To: (Your message of Sun, 07 Jan 96 13:24:16 U.) Date: Tue, 16 Jan 96 14:08:37 -0500 > : any thoughts on the separation or lack thereof between church and state would be welcome.I'm (beginning) writing my thesis on religion an d politics, and as I am of the heathen/secularist bent,I'd be inter ested to hear any comments from the "opposition" .I'm focussing on South A sia for my thesis,but am interested in the world scene in general. Thanks! Rahni I am not necessarily of the opposition (and not necessarily a heathen) but if you are interested in how "church" and state interact you might want to take a look at chapter 6 of the book "Pakistan:1995" by Charles. H. Kennedy and Rasul Baksh Rais. Chapter 6 is Protecting Religious Minorites: The Courts; Abdication Tayyab Mahmud, Associate Professor of Law Cleveland State University The chapter traces the original gaurantees of religious freedom within Pakistani law and the consitution and the steady erosion of those freedoms through successive pieces of legislation. Sultan Sial smks@look1.apmaths.uwo.ca http://look1.apmaths.uwo.ca/sultan/ From coatesrd@casmail.muohio.edu Wed Jan 17 11:45:01 1996 Date: Wed, 17 Jan 96 13:41:13 EST From: coatesrd@casmail.muohio.edu (Rodney Coates) Reply-To: coatesrd@casmail.muohio.edu (Rodney Coates) To: ABSLST-L@CMUVM.CSV.CMICH.EDU, African-American Research , Racial-Religious-EthnoNationalist Violence Studies , abfas@lib.muohio.edu, AFROAM-L , PROGRESSIVE SOCIOLOGISTS NETWORK Subject: A new Threat on the Horizen -Post Tenure Review Just when you thought it was safe to come into the office (you know just after you've been granted tenure) bureaucratic specialists (b.s'ers for short) find a way to screw up your day. In a not too distant place (UK-Lexington, KY), not to long ago (hell its happening now) Richard Edwards (Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences) stated that he felt like "Daniel in the lion;'s den" when a panel of AAUP opposed his proposal for post-tenure review. Edwads plan, if approved would allow for the review of tenured faculty members who have received two consequtive below-average reviews. After the post-tenure review, a plan for improvement would be initiated to bring the faculty member back into full productivity. In five yers the faculty member would be reassessed, and if the evaluation is not better, dismissal procedures would begin. Edwards insisted that the review proosal is a sign of institutional failure, and he insisted that it was a needed step to ensure that all faculty members were working at full capacity. Now is there any one out there who has any doubts who will be deemed not "working at full capacity".. This is a not so subtle ploy to hold a knife over the heads of those who have spent the better part of their academic career trying to reach the point of job security. And consider, that blacks and women have only recently began to make an entry into the tenured ranks, will this not become another "last hired.,..first fired" situation...concern needs to be raised...it starts in Kentucky, where will it end...later...and I still be me...rodney c... From coatesrd@casmail.muohio.edu Wed Jan 17 14:00:31 1996 Date: Wed, 17 Jan 96 15:56:46 EST From: coatesrd@casmail.muohio.edu (Rodney Coates) Reply-To: coatesrd@casmail.muohio.edu (Rodney Coates) To: ABSLST-L@CMUVM.CSV.CMICH.EDU, abfas@lib.muohio.edu, AFROAM-L , Racial-Religious-EthnoNationalist Violence Studies bsimcock@miamiu.acs.muohio.edu, jhamill@miamiu.acs.muohio.edu, jmlynch@miavx3.bitnet@miamiu.acs.muohio.edu, jsubedi@miamiu.acs.muohio.edu, lgroger@miamiu.acs.muohio.edu, lynchjm@miamiu.acs.muohio.edu, marchant@miamiu.acs.muohio.edu, marty , phillips_kay2@msmail.muohio.edu, rapple@miamiu.acs.muohio.edu, ratchley@miamiu.acs.muohio.edu, rdcoates@miamiu.acs.muohio.edu, @miamiu.acs.muohio.edu:rlseufer@miavx3.bitnet, satchley@miamiu.acs.muohio.edu, srkunkel@miamiu.acs.muohio.edu, @miamiu.acs.muohio.edu:ssubedi@miavx2.bitnet, tcwagena@miamiu.acs.muohio.edu Subject: CBS and Racism: fyi from another list: =========BEGIN FORWARDED MESSAGE========= >Received: from nova.unix.portal.com (nova.unix.portal.com [156.151.1.101]) by X-Info: Accepted by bay-drum distribution list at Wed Jan 17 09:54:40 PST 1996 From: "Jackson, Brian" To: Talib Karim Subject: Mr. Pike Date: Wed, 17 Jan 96 09:59:00 PST Encoding: 88 TEXT Here is the article from 1/16/96 CBS Studies Racism Charge By LAWRIE MIFFLIN c.1996 N.Y. Times News Service NEW YORK - CBS began an internal investigation Tuesday to determine whether a high-level executive in its entertainment division made racist remarks at a meeting with a comedy troupe called the State, as asserted in an article in Details magazine. John Pike, the senior vice president of late-night and non-network programming for CBS, met with the 10-member comedy troupe and two producers late last summer to discuss a comedy special they were taping for CBS. There, according to the article, he told them that African-Americans were an important segment of viewers to attract because they had no jobs and could stay up to watch late-night television; because they could not follow hourlong dramas and enjoyed comedy sketches, and because network television, unlike cable, is free. David Lipsky, a freelance writer whose assignment for Details was to cover the State for six weeks as they worked to develop their show for CBS, reported the remarks, in paraphrase, in an article for the February issue of Details. The article also includes a disclaimer by Pike: ``I would never have said any of those things.'' The article, written in the present tense, notes that Lipsky was not in the room at the meeting. Reached by telephone Tuesday, Lipsky said he had been told about Pike's remarks by troupe members. ``I heard it from several sources,'' he said, ``and reconfirmed it myself, and the magazine's fact-checkers reconfirmed it again.'' Pike could not be reached for comment Tuesday, but he is quoted in this week's Variety, where he calls Lipsky's article ``a totally unfair characterization.'' According to Variety, Pike said he had told the comedy troupe that the late-night audience has a significant African-American component, and that ``the minority community was a voracious consumer of comedy material,'' as well as ``voracious consumers of free television.'' CBS Entertainment president Leslie Moonves issued a statement saying the allegations were serious and would be promptly investigated. 00:19 EST JANUARY 17, 1996 NYT-01-16-96 2250EST NYTviaNewsEDGE :TICKER: WX :SUBJECT: BCST LIFE PA INDG Copyright (c) 1996 The New York Times Co. Received by NewsEDGE/LAN: 1/16/96 11:21 PM ---------------------------------------------------------------------- --------- Bay Drum - An African American E-mail Network Serving the SF Bay Area To make a posting, send a message to bay-drum@tomato.com To subscribe to Bay Drum, send a message to bay-drum-admin@tomato.com To contact the administrator, send a message to bay-drum-admin@tomato.com ---------------------------------------------------------------------- --------- For the Community Information Pages (a listing of African American businesses and services in the SF Bay Area), send a message to cip@love.corp.hp.com ---------------------------------------------------------------------- --------- Bay Drum World Wide Web Site - http://www.tomato.com/~baydrum/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- --------- ----- End Included Message ----- =========END FORWARDED MESSAGE========= "Only when lions have Historians will hunters cease being heroes." African Proverb UMOJA, Still in the struggle Rodney D. Coates Director of Black World Studies Associate Professor of Sociology Miami University Oxford, Ohio - 45056 PH: 513-5291235 From mail.usa.net@usa.net Fri Jan 19 15:51:11 1996 Date: Fri, 19 Jan 1996 15:51:00 -0700 Reply-To: Mark Weigand From: mail.usa.net@usa.net Subject: Re: CBS and Racism: To: coatesrd@casmail.muohio.edu, Racial-Religious-EthnoNationalist Violence Studies Regarding the CBS executive's alleged remarks-- I have often considered the ideological nature of television network programming as an "opiate FOR the masses", particularly for minority Americans. The mindless sitcoms trivialize social problems and help prevent the formation of class consciousness, etc. I have not monitored many of the newer programs, and would be interested in any comments from other PSN members. Of course, the biggest opiate of the masses today (other than religious broadcasting) is televised sports. -=MW=- From ha2957ja@uscolo.edu Fri Jan 19 21:50:03 1996 Date: Fri, 19 Jan 1996 21:52:25 -0700 (MST) From: jammer To: REVS@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Islamic Fundamentalism!!!!! This is an article that might interest some people. Magazine: Current History Issue: January 1994 Title: Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace Author: John L. Esposito "To equate Islam and Islamic fundamentalism uncritically with extremism is to judge Islam only by those who wreak havoc--a standard not applied to Judaism and Christianity... There are lessons to be learned from a past in which fear of a monolithic Soviet threat often blinded the United States to the Soviet bloc's diversity, led to uncritical support for [anti-Communist] dictator-ships, and enabled the "free world" to tolerate the suppression of legitimate dissent and massive human rights violations by governments that labeled the opposition 'Communist' or 'socialist.' '' It is the mightiest power in the Levant and North Africa. Governments tremble before it. Arabs everywhere turn to it for salvation from their various miseries. This power is not Egypt, Iraq,or indeed any nation, but the humble mosque (1). From Ayatollah Khomeini to Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, from Iran to the World Trade Center, government leaders and opinion makers in the West and in the Middle East have warned of the dangers of militant Islam. If the 1980s were dominated by images of embassies under siege, American hostages, and hijackings, the 1990s bring prophecies of insurgent movements wielding nuclear weapons and employing urban terrorism. Headlines announce the possibility of a worldwide Islamic uprising and a clash of civilizations in which Islam may overwhelm the West. Television viewers see the bodies of Coptic Christians and tourists killed by Egyptian extremists and take in reports of Algerian militants' pitched battles with police. All fuel alarmist concerns reflected in publications and conferences with titles like "Roots of Muslim Rage," "Islam: Deadly Duel with Zealots," and "Awaiting God's Wrath: Islamic Fundamentalism and the West." For more than four decades governments formulated policy in the midst of a superpower rivalry that defined the globe and the future in terms of the visible ideological and military threat posed by the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the cold war, the fall of the Soviet Union and the discrediting of communism have created a "threat vacuum" that has given rise to a search for new enemies. For some Americans the enemy is the economic challenge the Japanese or the European Community represent. For others it is an Islamic world whose 1 billion Muslims form a majority in more than 48 countries and a rapidly growing minority in Europe and America. Some view Islam as the only ideological alternative to the West that can cut across national boundaries, and perceiving it as politically and culturally at odds with Western society, fear it; others consider it more a basic demographic threat (2). The 1990s, however, reveal the diversity and complexity of political Islam and point to a twenty-first century that will shake the assumptions of many. While some Islamic organizations engage in terrorism, seeking to topple governments, others spread their message through preaching and social services and demand the right to gain legitimate power with ballots rather than bullets. But what of militant Islam? Is there an international Islamic threat? Will humanity witness the rise of a "new Comintern" led by "religious Stalinists" poised to challenge the free world and impose Iranian-style Islamic republics through violence, or through an electoral process that enables Islamic movements to "hijack democracy''? FAITH, FUNDAMENTALISM, AND FACT Muslims vary as much in their interpretations of Islam as followers of other faiths with theirs. For the vast majority of believers, Islam, like other world religions, is a faith of peace and social justice, moving its adherents to worship God, obey His laws, and be socially responsible. Indiscriminate use of the term "Islamic fundamentalism" and its identification with governments and movements have contributed to the sense of a monolithic menace when in actuality political Islam is far more diverse. Saudi Arabia, Libya, Pakistan, and Iran have been called fundamentalist states, but this tells us nothing about their nature: Saudi Arabia is a conservative monarchy, Libya a populist socialist state headed by a military dictator. Moreover, the label says nothing about the state's Islamic character or orientation. Pakistan under General Muhammad Zia ul- Haq embodied a conservative Islam, and Saudi Arabia still does; Islam in Libya is radical and revisionist; clerics dominate in Iran. Finally, although fundamentalism is popularly equated with anti-Americanism and extremism, and Libya and Iran have indeed often denounced America, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have been close allies of the United States and the mujahideen that resisted the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan received support from Washington for years. The Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 called attention to a reassertion of Islam in Muslim personal and public life that subsequently came to be referred to by many names: Islamic resurgence, Islamic revivalism, political Islam, and more commonly, Islamic fundamentalism. The totally unexpected ousting of the Shah of Iran by an Islamic revolution led by the charismatic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the creation of an Islamic republic under the mullahs stunned the world. Fear that Iran would export Islamic revolution to other countries of the Middle East became the lens through which events in the Muslim world were viewed. When Khomeini spoke, the world listened--supporters with admiration, detractors with disdain and disgust or, often, anxiety. The 1979 takeover of the United States embassy in Teheran and Khomeini's expansionist designs, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi's posturing and promotion of a third world revolution, and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's 1981 assassination by Muslim extremists supported the projection of a militant Islamic fundamentalism. Hostage- taking, hijackings, and attacks on foreign and government installations by groups such as the Islamic Liberation Organization, Jihad, and Takfir wal Hijra (Excommunication and Flight) in Egypt and by the Iranian-funded Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad in Lebanon received enormous publicity. In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s the prevailing picture of the Islamic world in the West was of militants bent on undermining countries' stability, overthrowing governments, and imposing their version of an Islamic state. The result was the facile equation: Islam = fundamentalism = terrorism and extremism. THE ROOTS OF RESURGENCE The reality is that Islamic revivalism was not the product of the Iranian revolution but of a global reassertion of Islam that had already been under way and that extended from Libya to Malaysia. The causes of the resurgence are many and differ from country to country, but common catalysts and concerns are identifiable. Secular nationalism (whether in the form of liberal nationalism, Arab nationalism, or socialism) has not provided a sense of national identity or produced strong and prosperous societies. The governments in Muslim countries-- mostly nonelected, authoritarian, and dependent on security forces--have been unable to establish their political legitimacy. They have been blamed for the failure to achieve economic self-sufficiency, to stem the widening gap between rich and poor, to halt widespread corruption, to liberate Palestine, to resist Western political and cultural hegemony. Both the political and the religious establishments have come under criticism, the former as a westernized, secular elite overly concerned with power and privilege, and the latter (in Sunni Muslim nations) as leaders of the faithful who have been co-opted by governments that often control mosques and religious universities and other institutions. The disastrous defeat of Arab forces by Israel in the 1967 war discredited Arab nationalism and triggered soul-searching in the Arab world. In South Asia, the 1971 civil war in Pakistan leading to the creation of Bangladesh undermined the idea that Islam and Muslim nationalism could act as the glue to hold together an ethnically and linguistically diverse Muslim population. One finds similar catalytic events or conditions in Lebanon, Iran, Malaysia (the riots of 1969), and many other countries. Islamic revivalism is in many ways the successor to failed nationalist programs. The founders of many Islamic movements were formerly participants in nationalist movements: Hasan al-Banna of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Rashid Ghannoushi of Tunisia's Renaissance party, and Abbasi Madani of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria. Islamic movements have offered an Islamic alternative or solution, a third way distinct from capitalism and communism. Islamists argue that secularism, a modern bias toward the West, and dependence on Western models of development have proved politically inadequate and socially corrosive, undermining the identity and moral fabric of Muslim societies. Asserting that Islam is not just a collection of beliefs and ritual actions but a comprehensive ideology embracing public as well as personal life, they call for the implementation of Sharia, or Islamic law, as a social blueprint. While the majority within the Muslim world seek to work within the system, a small but significant minority believes that the rulers in their countries are anti-Islamic and that they have a divine mandate to unseat them and impose their vision. In general, the movements are urban-based, drawing heavily from the lower middle and middle classes. They have gained particular support among recent university graduates and young professionals, male and female. The movements recruit from the mosques and on campuses where, contrary to popular assumptions, their strength is not so much in the religious faculties and the humanities as in science, engineering, education, law, and medicine. Organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan as well as South Asia's Jamaat-i- Islami consist in great part of university graduates and professionals. The Islamic Salvation Front's Abbasi Madani, for example, earned his doctorate in education from a British university, while his younger colleague Abdelqader Hachani is a petrochemical engineer and a doctoral candidate at a French university. Seventy-six percent of the Front's candidates in municipal and parliamentary elections in 1990 and 1991 held postgraduate degrees, and a significant portion of the leadership and membership can be described as middle-class professionals. In many Muslim countries an alternative elite exists, its members with modern educations but self-consciously oriented toward Islam and committed to social and political activism as a means of bringing about a more Islamic society or system of government. This phenomenon is reflected in the presence--and often dominance--of Islamists in professional associations of lawyers, engineers, professors, and physicians. Where permitted to participate in society, Islamists are found in all sectors, including government and even the military. FROM PERIPHERY TO CENTER Demonization of Islam proceeded throughout the 1980s, but by late in the decade a more nuanced, broad-based, diverse Islamic world was increasingly evident. Beneath the radical faade, apart from the small, marginalized extremist groups, a quiet revolution had taken place. While a rejectionist minority had sought to impose change from above through holy wars, many others reaffirmed their faith and pursued a bottom-up approach, seeking a gradual Islamization of society through words, preaching, and social and political activity. In many Muslim countries Islamic organizations had become energetic in social reform, establishing much-needed schools, hospitals, clinics, legal societies, family assistance programs, Islamic banks and insurance companies, and publishing houses. These Islamically oriented groups offered social welfare services cheaply and constituted an implicit critique of the failure of the regimes in the countries to provide adequate services. Along with social activism went increased political participation. In the late 1980s economic failures led to mass demonstrations and food riots in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and Jordan. Moreover, the demand for democratization that accompanied the fall of the Soviet Union and the liberation of Eastern Europe touched the Middle East as well. Throughout the decade many governments in the Muslim world charged that the Islamic activists were merely violent revolutionaries whose lack of popular support would be evident if elections were held, but few governments showed themselves willing to put this claim to the test. When political systems were opened up and Islamic organizations were able to participate in elections, the results stunned many in the Muslim world and in the West. Although Islamists were not allowed to organize separate official political parties, in Egypt and Tunisia they emerged as the leading opposition. In the November 1989 elections in Jordan they captured 32 of 80 seats in the lower house of parliament and held five cabinet-level positions and the office of speaker of the lower house. Algeria, however, was the turning point. Algeria had been dominated for decades by a one-party dictatorship under the National Liberation Front (FLN). Because the FLN was socialist and had a strong secular elite and feminist movement, few took the Islamic movement seriously; moreover, the movement had been among the least well known of the country's groups outside its borders, even among Islamists. The stunning victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), an umbrella group, in 1990 municipal elections sent a shock wave around the globe. Despite the arrest of front leaders Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhadj; the cutoff of state funds to municipalities, often crippling FIS officials' ability to provide services; and gerrymandering to create districts more favorable to itself, the ruling party failed to prevent an even more stunning sweep by the FIS in parliamentary elections held in December 1991. As Islamists at home and across the Muslim world celebrated, the military intervened, forcing the resignation of Algeria's president, arresting FIS leaders, imprisoning more than 10,000 people in desert camps, and outlawing the front, and seizing its assets. In the face of the repression much of the world stood silent. The conventional wisdom had been blind-sided. While most feared and were on their guard against "other Irans," the Islamic Salvation Front's victory in Algeria raised the specter of an Islamic movement coming to power through democratic elections and ballots worried many world leaders even more than bullets. The justification for accepting the Algerian military's seizure of power was the charge that the FIS really only believed in "One man, one vote, one time." The perceived threat from revolutionary Islam was intensified by the fear that it would capture power from within the political system by democratic means. THE TRIPLE THREAT In contrast to other parts of the world, calls for greater political participation and democratization in the Middle East have been met by empty rhetoric and repression at home and by ambivalence or silence in the West. Middle Eastern governments have used the danger posed by Islamic fundamentalism as the excuse for increasing authoritarianism and violations of human rights and the indiscriminate suppression of Islamic opposition, as well as for the West's silence about these actions. Fear of fundamentalism, like fear of communism, has made strange bedfellows. Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt join Israel in warning of a regional and international Islamic threat in their bids to win Western aid and justify their repression of Islamists. "Israel, which for years won American and European backing as a bulwark against the spread of communism through the Middle East, is now projecting itself as the West's defense against militant Islam, a movement it is portraying as an even greater danger'' (3). Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin justified the expulsion of 415 Palestinians in December 1992 by saying that "Our struggle against murderous Islamic terror is also meant to awaken the world, which is lying in slumber... We call on all nations, all peoples to devote their attention to the greater danger inherent in Islamic fundamentalism[, which]...threatens world peace in future years... [W]e stand on the line of fire against the danger of fundamentalist Islam." Israel and its Arab neighbors have warned that a resurgent Iran is exporting revolution throughout much of the Muslim world, including Sudan, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Algeria, and Central Asia, as well as to Europe and America; indeed, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has urged the formation of a "global alliance" against this menace. Islam is often portrayed as a triple threat: political, civilizational, and demographic. The fear in the 1980s that Iran would export its revolution has been superseded by the larger fear of an international pan- Islamic movement with Iran and Sudan at its heart. In this decade, despite Iran's relative failure in fomenting revolution abroad, visions of a global Islamic threat have proliferated, combining fear of violent revolution and of Algerian-style electoral victories. French writer Raymond Aron's warning of an Islamic revolutionary wave generated by the fanaticism of the Prophet and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's concern over the possibility of an Islamic-Western war have been succeeded by columnist Charles Krauthammer's assertion of a global Islamic threat of "fundamentalist Koran-waving Khomeniism" led by Iran. The Ayatollah Khomeini's condemning of novelist Salman Rushdie to death for blasphemy for his Satanic Verses, combined with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's call for a holy war against the West during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, reinforce fears of a political and cultural confrontation. This is magnified by some who, like Krauthammer, reduce contemporary realities to the playing out of ancient rivalries: "It should now be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations--a perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judaeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both." (4) Muslim-Western relations are placed in the context of a confrontation in which Islam is again pitted against the West--"our Judaeo-Christian and secular West"--rather than specific political and socioeconomic grievances. Thus the assault on the West is seen as "irrational," mounted by peoples peculiarly driven by their passions and hatred; how can Western countries really respond to this? The politics of the Middle East refutes theories of a monolithic threat. Despite a common "Islamic" orientation, the governments of the region reveal little unity of purpose in interstate or international relations because of conflicting national interests and priorities. Qaddafi was a bitter enemy of Anwar Sadat and Sudanese leader Gaafar Nimeiry at the very time that all were projecting their "Islamic images." Khomeini's Islamic republic consistently called for the overthrow of Saudi Arabia's Islamic state on Islamic grounds. Islamically identified governments also differ in their stance toward the West. Libya's and Iran's relationships with the West, and the United States in particular, were often confrontational; at the same time, the United States has had strong allies in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Pakistan, and Bahrain. National interest and regional politics rather than ideology or religion remain the major determinants in the formulation of foreign policy. The World Trade Center bombing last year gave impetus to a third current, the portrayal of Islam as a demographic threat. The growth of Muslim populations in Europe and the United States has made Islam the second-largest religion in Germany and France and the third-largest in Britain and America. Disputes over Muslim minority rights, demonstrations and clashes during the Salman Rushdie affair, and the Trade Center bombing have been exploited by strident voices of the right-- politicians such as France's Jean-Marie LePen, neo-Nazi youth in Germany, and right-wing political commentators in the United States. NO DEMOCRACY WITHOUT RISKS For Western leaders, democracy in the Middle East raises the prospect of old and reliable friends or client states transformed into more independent and less predictable nations, which generates worries that Western access to oil could become less secure. Thus stability in the Middle East has often been defined in terms of preserving the status quo. Lack of enthusiasm for political liberalization in the region has been rationalized by the assertion that Arab culture and Islam are antidemocratic (an issue never raised to a comparable degree with regard to the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, or Africa). The proof offered is the lack of a democratic tradition, and more specifically, the glaring absence of democracies in the Muslim world. The history of that world has not been conducive to the development of democratic traditions and institutions. European colonial rule and postindependence governments headed by military officers, ex-military men, and monarchs have contributed to a legacy in which political participation and the building of strong democratic institutions are of little concern. National unity and stability as well as the political legitimacy of governments have been undermined by the artificial nature of modern states whose national boundaries were often determined by colonial powers and whose rulers were either put in place by Europe or simply seized power. Weak economies, illiteracy, and high unemployment, especially among the younger generation, aggravate the situation, undermining confidence in governments and increasing the appeal of "Islamic fundamentalism.'' Experts and policymakers who question whether Islamic movements will use electoral politics to "hijack democracy" often do not appear equally disturbed that few rulers in the region have been democratically elected and that many who speak of democracy believe only in the risk- free variety: political liberalization so long as there is no danger of a strong opposition (secular or religious) and loss of power. Failure to appreciate that the issue of hijacking democracy is a two-way street was reflected in the West's responses to the Algerian military's intervention and cancellation of the election results. Perception of a global Islamic threat can contribute to support for repressive governments in the Muslim world, and thus to the creation of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thwarting participatory politics by canceling elections or repressing populist Islamic movements fosters radicalization. Many of the Islamists harassed, imprisoned, or tortured by the regime, will conclude that seeking democracy is a dead end and become convinced that force is their only recourse. Official silence or economic and political backing for regimes by the United States and other Western powers is read as complicity and a sign that there is a double standard for the implementation of democracy. This can create the conditions that lead to political violence that seemingly validates contentions that Islamic movements are inherently violent, antidemocratic, and a threat to national and regional stability. More constructive and democratic strategies are possible. The strength of Islamic organizations and parties is also due to the fact that they constitute the only viable voice and vehicle for opposition in relatively closed political systems. The strength at the polls of Tunisia's Renaissance party, the Islamic Salvation Front, and Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood derived not only from a hard core of dedicated followers who backed the groups' Islamic agendas but from the many who wished simply to cast their vote against the government. Opening up the political system could foster competing opposition groups and thus weaken the monopoly Islamic parties have on opposition voters. (It must be remembered that the membership of Islamic organizations does not generally constitute a majority of the population.) Finally, the realities of a more open political marketplace--having to compete for votes, and once gaining power having to govern amid diverse interests--could force Islamic groups to adapt or broaden their ideology and programs. The United States should not in principle object to the involvement of Islamic activists in government if they have been duly elected. Islamically oriented politicians and groups should be evaluated by the same criteria as any other potential leaders or opposition parties. While some are rejectionists, most will be critical and selective in their relations with the United States, generally operating on the basis of national interests and showing a flexibility that reflects understanding of the globally interdependent world. The United States should demonstrate by word and action its belief that the right to self-determination and representative government extends to an Islamically oriented state and society, if these reflect the popular will and do not directly threaten United States interests. American policy should accept the ideological differences between the West and Islam to the greatest extent possible, or at least tolerate them. All should bear in mind that democratization in the Muslim world proceeds by experimentation, and necessarily involves both success and failure. The transformation of Western feudal monarchies to democratic nation states took time, and trial and error, and was accompanied by political as well as intellectual revolutions that rocked state and church. It was a long, drawn-out process among contending factions with competing interests and visions. Today we are witnessing a historic transformation in the Muslim world. Risks exist, for there can be no risk-free democracy. Those who fear the unknown, wondering how specific Islamic movements will act once in power, have legitimate reasons to do so. However, if one worries that these movements might suppress opposition, lack tolerance, deny pluralism, and violate human rights, the same concern must apply equally to the plight of those Islamists who have shown a willingness to participate in the political process in Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria. Governments in the Muslim world that espouse political liberalization and democracy are challenged to promote the development of civil society--the institutions, values, and culture that are the foundation of true participatory government. Islamic movements, for their part, are challenged to move beyond slogans to programs. They must become more self-critical, and speak out not only against local government abuses but against those of Islamic regimes in Iran and Sudan, for example, as well as acts of terrorism by extremists. They are urged to present an Islamic rationale and policy that extend to their opposition and to minorities the principles of pluralism and political participation they demand for themselves. The extent to which the growth of Islamic revivalism has been accompanied in some countries by attempts to restrict women's rights and public roles; the record of discrimination against the Bahai in Iran, the Ahmadi in Pakistan, and Christians in Sudan; and sectarian conflict between Muslims and Christians in Egypt, Sudan, and Nigeria pose serious questions about religious pluralism, respect for human rights, and tolerance in general. Islamic revivalism has run counter to many of the presuppositions of Western liberal secularism and development theory, among them the belief that modernization means the inexorable or progressive secularization and Westernization of society. Too often analysis and policymaking have been shaped by a liberal secularism that fails to recognize it too represents a world view, not the paradigm for modern society, and can easily degenerate into a "secularist fundamentalism" that treats alternative views as irrational, extremist, and deviant. A focus on "Islamic fundamentalism" as a global threat has reinforced the tendency to equate violence with Islam, to fail to distinguish between illegitimate use of religion by individuals and the faith and practice of the majority of the world's Muslims who, like adherents of other religious traditions, wish to live in peace. To equate Islam and Islamic fundamentalism uncritically with extremism is to judge Islam only by those who wreak havoc--a standard not applied to Judaism and Christianity. The danger is that heinous actions may be attributed to Islam rather than to a twisted or distorted interpretation of Islam. Thus despite the track record of Christianity and Western countries when it comes to making war, developing weapons of mass destruction, and imposing their imperialist designs, Islam and Muslim culture are portrayed as somehow peculiarly and inherently expansionist and prone to violence and warfare. There are lessons to be learned from a past in which fear of a monolithic Soviet threat often blinded the United States to the Soviet bloc's diversity, led to uncritical support for (anti-Communist) dictatorships, and enabled the "free world" to tolerate the suppression of legitimate dissent and massive human rights violations by governments that labeled the opposition "Communist" or "socialist." The risk today is that exaggerated fears will lead to a double standard in the promotion of democracy and human rights in the Muslim world as can be witnessed by the Western concern about and action to support democracy in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe but the muted or ineffective response to the promotion of democracy in the Middle East and the defense of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Support for democracy and human rights is more effective if it is consistent around the world. Treating Islamic experiences as exceptional is an invitation to long-term conflict. John L. Esposito is a professor of religion and international affairs and director of the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Among his books are The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), Islam: The Straight Path (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), and Islam and Politics (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1991). 1 "The Islamic Threat," _The Economist_, March 13, 1993, p. 25. 2 See John L. Esposito, _The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?_ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), which I have drawn on for this study. 3 Emad El Din Shahid, "The Limits of Democracy," _Middle East Insight_, vol. 8, no. 6 (1992), p. 12. 4 Charles Krauthammer, "The New Crescent of Crisis: Global Intifada," _Washington Post_, January 1, 1993. -end- ------------------------------------------------------------ The contents of this file are copyright 1993 by the publisher in whose directory this file appeared. Unauthorized copying of this information is strictly forbidden. Please read the general notice at the top menu of the Gopher Server for the Electronic Newsstand. For information regarding reprints, please send mail to REPRINTS@Enews.Com ------------------------------------------------------------ .. ********************************************************** .' / | \\ __ / / * / ____ / | \`\.__/-~~ ~~\ _/' * /-'~ ~~~~~---__ | ~-/~ \ * \_| / _)-<--\) * '~~--_/ _->---<--\ * --Jamal Hashmi {\__--_/} / \_>---<__\ * /' (_/ _-~ | |__>--<__* e-mail address: | _/O )-~ | |__>--<__* ha2957ja@uscolo.edu / /~ ,_/ / /__>---<__* *****************************o-o _//********************** (^(~ ,/| ,//('( ( ( ')) From united@antenna.nl Fri Jan 26 04:57:21 1996 To: united3.list@antenna.nl Subject: Info Leaflet - Through the Borders From: united@antenna.nl (United Int. Action) Date: Fri, 26 Jan 96 12:22:06 GMT Organization: Mailed via Antenna, APC Service for the Netherlands UNITED for Intercultural Action European Network Against Nationalism, Racism, Fascism and in support of Migrants and Refugees Postbus 413, NL-1000 AK Amsterdam, Netherlands Telephone +31 20 683 4778 / Fax +31 20 683 4582 e-mail united@antenna.nl INFO RMATION LEAFLET NO. 7 THROUGH THE BORDERS: HOW TO AVOID BUREAUCRATIC HURDLES WHEN APPLYING FOR A VISA This leaflet offers advice on how to more easily get visas for travel around Europe to meetings and conferences. The information inside is intended for organisations rather than individuals and is particularly aimed at people from Central and Eastern Europe who want to travel to Western Europe. Western Europeans will also find it useful, especially if they wish to invite delegates from Central and Eastern Europe to a meeting, when they will need to issue an official invitation. We have not included information about holiday or private visas. REMEMBER! The situation changes very quickly - it can be different each time an application for a visa is made. UNITED advises you that laws and requirements can change and the information we offer in this leaflet is intended to give guidelines only. Please check with the relevant authorities before planning your travel. UNITED welcomes receiving your corrections and supplementary information. Contents: Information on applying for non-private visas Sample invitation letter Matrix of European embassies (printed version only) Visa status of all countries for entering the European Union (printed version only) DO YOU NEED A VISA? Europe can generally be divided in three sections: A: Western Europe all EU countries plus Norway, Switzerland.... Citizens of these countries do not need visas for A and B but will need visas for C B: Central Europe Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia.... Citizens of these countries may need visas for A and B and may need vouchers for C C: Eastern Europe Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine.... Citizens of these countries will need visas for A and B, and vouchers for C These tables assume that you are a citizen of a European country and holding a European passport. People living in Europe but with a non-European passport should check their visa requirements very carefully. * Some states of the former Yugoslavia are not listed here. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Macedonia are not recognised by all member states of the EU. Citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina may need a visa to enter some EU states. APPLYING FOR NON-PRIVATE VISAS - Apply for your visa at least 4 weeks in advance. For some countries, you may need about 7-8 weeks to obtain the visa. - Telephone the embassy in advance to find out: - opening hours of the embassy (especially if it is not in your city) - how much the visa will cost - how long it will take to process your application - if you have to apply personally. For a EU-visa, you must apply in person at the embassy - which documents are needed (take care that your documents are valid): application form (you get it usually in the embassy) your international passport (sometimes the national one too), valid for at least 3 months (sometimes longer) after expiry date of the visa photographs - usually 2, sometimes 3 or 4 invitation letter from the inviting organisation a 'guarantee declaration' (at least for the EU) (see below) medical insurance (not always necessary) the fee (proof of return ticket) - Remember, the embassy official who deals with your application decides if you will get the visa. A first impression can be important. Dress well and be polite. The official may make a short interview to get to know you better (often they ask where you or your parents live, what you are studying etc.). They want to be sure that you will return. Sometimes women are asked if they are going abroad to marry. - EU countries are now very strict to those who want to enter their territory. They want to ensure that all visitors are able to pay for their accommodation and food, or at least that somebody will guarantee it, and that everybody who enters also leaves the country again. Embassies demand proof of a return ticket with a fixed date of return - but airlines won't sell tickets without the visa! - Are you travelling to Eastern Europe? Some embassies will speed up the application process if you are in a hurry, but they will charge more (up to double the price). You may authorise somebody to deposit your application in the embassy and to pick up your passport with the visa. Applications by mail can take several weeks longer. TRANSIT VISAS If you need to cross a country which requires a visa, you need special permission. Transit countries often cause more problems then the receiving country. Check the regulations for transit visas with the countries concerned, and note the following points: - Transit visas must be bought in advance before you leave your country. They are cheaper than ordinary visas and are usually easy to get, if you can show the (transit) embassy the visa for your destination-country. Allow plenty of time to apply for them. - If there is no definitive need to give you transit permission, you will be refused. For example if you are Romanian and are going to Germany, there is no reason to go via Austria, because you can easily travel via the Czech Republic (no visa required). So Austria will probably refuse a transit-visa. VOUCHERS Voucher agreements exist between eastern European countries and between eastern European and central European countries. If your country has an agreement with another country that a voucher is sufficient for crossing the border, you don't need a visa to enter. You can just buy a voucher (but you may still need an invitation). - You can buy vouchers in railway or bus stations, in travel agencies and sometimes directly at the border. - If you have a visa for a western country, you do not need vouchers for the countries you have to cross (but you may need transit visas). For example, if you are from Ukraine and you cross Poland on your way to Germany, you only need your German visa. THE SCHENGEN TREATY The Schengen Treaty is an agreement between Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain (EU-members) and permits since 26 March 1995 free movement for everybody between these countries. Schengen makes travel in these countries easier for everybody - including foreigners. If you have a visa for one country, it will usually include automatic permission to cross all Schengen-borders. But check that a Schengen country really is opening its borders. Don't forget that border controls still take place. The national application processes remain the same. But the Schengen countries have already focused on an adjustment of national differences to a European standard. This means: - Entry requirements will be standardised. - Visa costs will be fixed at a standardised level . - You must stay at home at least as long as you stayed last time in a Schengen country (up to a maximum of 3 months), before you can apply again for a common Schengen visa. ISSUING OFFICIAL INVITATIONS - The invitation must be a formal letter written in your own language. Explain briefly the purpose of your organisation and your event. Type the invitation clearly on your organisation's official writing paper. The invitation should convince that there is a powerful organisation behind the project with a noble aim, especially if sponsored by politicians, your government or an important institution. - Invitations must include all the following information: - name of delegate's organisation and telefax number - name of delegate - nationality - passport number - private address - date and place of birth and information on the conference, including title, place, dates and sponsors. - Delegates should inform the hosting organisation as early as possible what their visa requirements or problems could be, particularly if they hold a non-European passport. Delegates should also send quickly the telefax number of the embassy where they will apply for the visa. - The invitation must come from the country where an event takes place and not from the country where the organisers are based. Invitations carry more weight if issued by the Ministry of Youth or Interior Ministry of a country on behalf of your organisation. If this is not possible, then invitations are always better from a NGO or institution rather than a private individual. - Issue the invitation as early as possible as a visa application takes on average about 1 month to process the paperwork. Fax a copy of the invitation, with a letter of urgency to facilitate the process, to the relevant embassy and send the invitation and letter directly by express mail to your guest also. You may also wish to send the embassy some information about your organisation. Remember that delegates may still need to queue daily at the embassy, which is difficult for the delegate if they are working. Also, delegates may have to prove they have paid their rent and bills etc before they can go to the embassy, or get official permission to leave the country. - You may find it useful to contact the embassy representative after issuing the invitation to ask them for the administration number of the visa application by the participant. This will help speed up any enquiries if there are any problems with issuing the visa. - Different embassies of a particular country can have different attitudes to giving out info on requirements. Often an embassy can give conflicting or inaccurate information. Contact the Interior Ministry of the country and ask for written information on entry requirements rather than the embassy. The Ministry will provide up to date information on the legal situation. THE GUARANTEE DECLARATION - A 'guarantee declaration' is an official letter by the hosting organisation which promises to take care of all medical and living expenses (and maybe return travel costs) and should be included with an invitation. It is almost always necessary if you are inviting someone to visit a country belonging to the European Union. - The guarantee declaration must be written on the official writing paper of your organisation, it must assure the official status of your organisation and its capability of financing the stay of the delegate. Western Europeans going east only need an invitation. Eastern Europeans (especially from Bulgaria, Romania, ex-Soviet Union) going west need an invitation plus a guarantee declaration. This is only valid if it is an original document, so it must be sent by express mail. - Central and East Europeans risk being stopped at the border if they do not have enough cash. This may not be necessary if there is a guarantee declaration. Sometimes the receiving country will insist on a sum of money that can represent many months' wages in Central and Eastern Europe. Conversely, there may be currency restrictions in the country of departure, which limits the amount to be taken out to $100 or similar. REMEMBER.... - To allow plenty of time to issue the invitation and apply for the visa (at least 4 weeks). - To provide all necessary information and documents to embassy officials. AND FINALLY............ GOOD LUCK! SAMPLE OF INVITATION LETTER 6/12/95 Dutch Embassy visa section Red Square 47 Moscow via fax +7-987-6543 Dear Sirs, Visa application Ms. Anna Leninova United for Intercultural Action, Europe's biggest anti-racist network with 350 supporting organisations, is organising from 13 to 20 January 1996, a big European conference: European Youth - United actions against racism and nationalism. The conference is supported by Helmut Schmidt MEP, and will take place at the Anywhere conference hall, Amsterdam. Ms. Anna Leninova (born 25/05/65, Russian nationality) of the organisation Anti Racist Committee of Moscow has been accepted by us to participate in this conference. Ms Anna Leninova Anti Racist Committee of Moscow fax no. +7-123-4567 Private address: Ulitsa Pasternak 16, RUS-123456 Moscow, Russia Passport no. DX 057368 Date of Birth: 25.05.65 Place of Birth: Moscow Nationality: Russian All costs for board and lodging and travel will be paid for by UNITED. Could you therefore please facilitate her entrance in the Netherlands by issuing a visa for the Netherlands . She will apply for this visa in the next weeks. For any questions relating to the conference in Amsterdam, please do not hesitate to contact us. Thanking you in advance, Piet Janssen - Director UNITED for Intercultural Action, Postbus 413, NL-1000 AK Amsterdam phone +31-20-6834778, fax +31-20-6834582, e.mail united@antenna.nl UNITED is supported by: more than 350 organisations from all European countries, the European Commission, the European Youth Foundation of the Council of Europe, the Barrow Cadbury Trust, Buntstift, many prominent individuals and many private supporters and volunteers. From pedescobar@bitmailer.net Mon Jan 29 08:35:37 1996 (Smail3.1.29.1 #110) id m0tgvbv-000bshC; Mon, 29 Jan 96 16:35 MET Date: Mon, 29 Jan 96 16:35 MET To: revs@csf.colorado.edu From: pedescobar@bitmailer.net (Pedro Escobar Fernandez) Subject: Bibliography about discriminatory messages in newspapers I=B4m pedro escobar,M.A. (Contemporary History;University of Granada,Spain) and i trainig doctorate (Social Anthropology)and research at the Laboratory of Social and Cultural Anthropology (University of Almeria, Spain) with dr. Francisco Checa. I search some bibliography about the foreigners workers images in the media, specially in newspapers. You can aid me. Tank you (you write me in english, french or spanish) pedro escobar fernandez pedescobar@bitmailer.net From slein@e1m147.mpibpc.gwdg.de Wed Jan 31 04:23:17 1996 Date: Wed, 31 Jan 1996 12:23:42 +0100 To: revs@csf.colorado.edu From: slein@e1m147.mpibpc.gwdg.de (Stephan Leineweber) Subject: Remark on Ausschwitz anniversary Numerous regional ceremonies around Germany on Saturday, the 27th of January 1996 comemorated the liberation of the concentration camp Auschwitz 51 years ago. Several weeks earlier the President of the Federal Republic, Roman Herzog, had first decreed this date as a nation-wide memorial to the victims of nazi persecution. There was critisism about the fact that the German Bundestag held its memorial session 9 days in advance of the actual date. This was explained as being due to the fact, that many members of the Bundestag would be out of Bonn on a weekend. The President himself was also out of town. The critics warn, that the Ausschwitz anniversary should not be degraded to an arbitrary date. S.L.