6 Prehistoric Chiefdoms on the American Midcontin- ent: A World-System Based on Prestige Goods Peter Peregrine Cultural evolution in the eastern United States reached its pinnacle with the emergence of Mississippian societies in the major river valleys of the Midwest and Southeast around A.D. 900 (Smith, 1978:480). Mississippian societies were differentiated from their predecessors because of their reliance on maize horticulture for subsistence, the con- centration of population at major riverine centers, often palisaded and containing large, flat-topped mounds, and the presence of an elite social strata (Steponaitis, 1986:387- 93). Indeed, Mississippian societies repre- sent the first true chiefdoms in eastern North America (Peebles and Kus, 1977). Some of these Mississippian chiefdoms grew to enormous proportions. It is estimated that Cahokia and its environs, the largest of the Mississippian centers, was inhabited by at least 10,000 people at the height of its occupation (circa A.D. 1150), and perhaps by as many as 40,000 people (Fowler, 1974:25; cf. Milner, 1990). At least 100 mounds were constructed at Cahokia; the largest, Monks Mound, is estimated to contain over 600,000 cubic meters of earth, and is the largest prehistoric structure north of Mexico (Fowler, 1974:6). Other Mississippian centers were built on a smaller scale, but still demon- strate the political power Mississippian chiefs must have possessed in order to procure the labor necessary to build mounds and pali- sades, and to keep order within these large communities (Reed, 1973; also see DePratter, 1983:162-170). I suggest that Mississippian societies operated in the framework of a type of precap- italist world-system that I call a "prestige- good system," and that the extraordinary political power of Mississippian chiefs de- rived largely from their control over the manufacture and trade of prestige-goods (Pere- grine, 1990). The concept of prestige-good systems is not new, and is indeed based large- ly upon the ideas of Claude Meillassoux (par- ticularly 1978). But viewing prestige-good systems as world-systems is a rather different concept, as I will discuss in a moment. Prestige-good systems themselves have been well documented in the ethnographic litera- ture, and can be described in some detail (Ekholm, 1972; Frankenstein and Rowlands, 1978; Friedman, 1982; Friedman and Rowlands, 1977; Peregrine, 1990; Welch, 1986). Prestige-Good Systems Political power in prestige-good systems is based upon the control of objects needed by members of the society to pay social debts such as bridewealth, initiation and funerary fees, punitive fines, and the like (Peregrine, 1990:16). Because political leaders in pres- tige-good systems control these goods, they are able to control individuals' abilities to pay social debts, and in turn, to socially reproduce themselves. This is the most funda- mental aspect of prestige-good systems: those with power control the abilities of others to socially reproduce by controlling the means of social reproduction -- prestige-goods. Prestige-good systems appear to evolve out of lineage-based societies in situations where lineage elders are unable to control the means of production (Peregrine, 1990:116-19). An alternate strategy for these elders to gain political power is to foster the use of lin- eage symbols they control in ceremonies of social reproduction. In this way, they come to control the means of social reproduction (Meillassoux, 1978:138-39; also see Brumfiel and Earle, 1987:3). Friedman (1982:184) suggests that all prestige-good systems share four elements in common: (a) generalized exchange; (b) monopoly over prestige-good imports that are necessary for marriage and other crucial payments, i.e., for the social reproduc- tion of local kin groups; (c) bilineal tendency in the kinship structure (asym- metrical); and (d) tendency to asymmet- rical political dualism: religious-po- litical chiefs, original peoplenew-- comers, etc. Friedman's notions about prestige-good systems are, however, based largely upon theoretical conceptions of how these types of societies may have operated prehistorically (developed by Friedman and Rowlands [1977]), and only marginally on the way extant systems operate. Certainly the first two elements are present in all prestige-good systems -- they are defining elements. The other two may be present in some systems, but not in all; and Friedman leaves out some elements, most impor- tantly the reproduction of the smallest social unit in the political structure and an empha- sis on elder/ younger relations, which appear to be central features of prestige-good sys- tems I have studied (Peregrine, 1990:24-120). In order to discuss the basic nature of prestige-good systems in more detail, and I hope with more accuracy, I will compare and contrast three well-documented systems of varying political centralization, subsistence patterns, and geographic location. The first is the Kongo Kingdom of west Africa (Ekholm, 1972). The second is the Tongan chiefdom in extreme western Polynesia between Fiji and Samoa (Gailey, 1987; Gifford, 1929; Goldman, 1970; Kirch, 1984). The third is the Karava- ran big-manship located on Karavar Island between New Britain and New Ireland, off the coast of Papua New Guinea (Errington, 1974, 1977). In all prestige-good systems generalized exchange of prestige-goods occurs. In both Kongo and Tonga foreign trade and the goods that come from it are controlled at the high- est level of the political hierarchy (Ekholm, 1972:100-101,133; Kirch, 1984:238,241). These are distributed down the hierarchy in return for service and tribute, but the distribution is certainly general and not reciprocal. In Karavar, although all do have some divara (shell "money"), big men control amounts beyond the potential of most individuals (Errington, 1977:36). This divara is given out for specific work done, to subordinates in order for them to enter ritual grades, and at funerary rituals such as matamatam (Errington, 1977:27). Distribution of divara by big men is also generalized -- in most cases all the big men get in return is prestige and the knowledge that they have strengthened their political position. Monopoly over goods needed for marriage, initiation, and other crucial payments at the highest level of the political hierarchy is also present in all prestige-good systems. In Kongo, shell beads, raffia cloth, and other imported preciosities are needed to make bridewealth payments, and these can only be obtained from the king (although they flow down the political hierarchy so that most individuals get them from local chiefs or lineage heads [Ekholm, 1972:86,111]). In Tonga, red feathers, fine painted cloth and mats, beaded baskets, and other items needed by Tongans to make extravagant marriage pay- ments in order to arrange status-maintaining or enhancing marriages are traded from Fiji by the Tui's (pre-eminent chiefs) and are only obtainable from them (although, as in Kongo, these goods flow down the hierarchy, and are obtained by most people through local chiefs [Kirch, 1984:239,241]). Finally, in Karavar, divara is needed to enter the ritual grades necessary for a youth to become a man, and to be eligible for marriage. Again, although anyone can acquire divara, the amounts neces- sary to enter the final ritual grades can only be obtained from a sponsor, often a big man (Errington, 1974:91-97). A bilineal tendency in kinship is also present, to some extent, in all prestige-good systems I have investigated. In Kongo, matri- lineal lineages are contrasted with the patri- lineal nature of the political structure (Ekholm, 1972:40-51). In Tonga, the matrilin- eal line carries status, while the patrilineal line carries political power (Goldman, 1970:- 289-90). In Karavar, society is organized into matrilineal moieties, while the basic political units are men's groups organized around a big man (Errington, 1977:25-26). It is clear that in all these prestige-good systems there is some tendency for bilineal relationships to occur, but those relation- ships are highly varied between the three. There seems to be no clear-cut bilineal kin- ship system at work in these three prestige- good systems, and therefore bilineality may not be as important an element of prestige- good systems as Friedman states. Rather than focusing on bilineal kinship in prestige-good systems, I believe it is more important to consider the reproduction of a society's basic kinship structures in its political hierarchy. Indeed, it may be this tendency to reproduce kinship structures in the political structure that gives rise to the apparent bilineality Friedman perceives. In Kongo, the basic relationship between elder males and younger males within localized matrilineages is reproduced as a hierarchy of chiefs (Ekholm, 1972:25). Each chief is subordinate to an "elder" chief (except, of course, the king), and superordinate to a "younger" chief. These subordi- nate/superordinate relationships are designat- ed by kinship terms, such as father/son and grandfather/grandson (Ekholm, 1972:50-51). In Tonga, a similar situation is present, with even the taboos placed upon relationships within the lineage being reproduced in rela- tionships within the political hierarchy (Gifford, 1929:18). In Karavar, one can compare big men with fathers: sponsoring younger males as fathers are supposed to if they can; teaching younger males dukduk and tubuan magic, again as fathers are supposed to do if they can. Indeed, sponsorship often leads to the ritual adoption of a young man (Errington, 1974:92-98). Karavaran big men, in a sense, are a recreation of the father/son relationship in a political form. This father / son, elder male / younger male emphasis is another important element in the prestige-good systems I have studied. Political power is directly associated with social elders, and the legitimation of politi- cal power lies in possessing elder status. Youths are excluded from political power and prestige, and are exploited by elders to enhance their own power and prestige. To reiterate, in both Kongo and Tonga political superiors are considered to be the social elders of their political subordinates (Ek- holm, 1972:37-38, 55). These relationships take on the kinship terms for elder/ younger such as father/son and grandfather/grandson (Gifford, 1929:28). In Karavar, although there is no political hierarchy, there is a hierarchy of ritual grades. Those who have entered more of the grades are social elders to those who have not, and only the eldest socially (those who have bought a tubuan) are eligible to be big men (Errington, 1974:91). In these prestige-good systems, political power is directly linked to, and legitimated by, being eldest socially. Finally, Friedman's statement that pres- tige-good systems tend to have asymmetrical political dualism is not well supported in the prestige-good systems I have investigated. Certainly Tonga has asymmetrical political dualism between the Tui Tonga, the spiritu- al/religious head, and the Tui Kanokupolu, the social head (Kirch, 1984:224-25), but neither Kongo nor Karavar exhibit this dualism. Indeed, both have leaders who act as combined religious/political heads. The Kongan king is the closest to the ancestors of all Kongans, yet he is also the political leader (Ekholm, 1972:23-24). A defining feature of the Karav- aran big man is the control of the tubuan spirit (Errington, 1974:118). Asymmetrical political dualism only occurs in a few of the prestige-good systems I have studied, and may not be an important element of prestige-good systems in general. Four major elements seem to characterize prestige-good systems: (1) generalized ex- change of prestige-goods; (2) monopoly over prestige-goods at the highest political level; (3) the reproduction of basic kinship struc- tures in the political structure; and (4) political power held by the socially eldest members of society. Prestige-good systems can be viewed as world-systems when there is competition be- tween localized political leaders for access to foreign prestige-goods. As explained by Frankenstein and Rowlands (1978:76): The specific economic characteristics of a prestige-good system are dominated by the political advantage gained through exercising control over access to re- sources that can only be obtained through external trade...Groups are linked to each other through the compet- itive exchange of wealth objects as gifts and feasting in continuous cycles of status rivalry. Descent groups repro- duce themselves in opposition to each other as their leaders compete for domi- nance through differential access to resources and labour power. One of the fundamental aspects of world-sys- tems, competition between localized polities for advantageous economic position (Schneider, Chapter 2), is therefore inherent in prestige- good systems. The other major aspect of world-systems, differentiation and division of labor between localized polities (Schnei- der, Chapter 2), is inherent in the prestige- goods themselves. By definition, prestige- goods must be exotic or of high labor invest- ment. They embody esoteric knowledge about the world outside of the local group or knowl- edge of special manufacturing techniques (Helms, 1979, 1988). Because prestige-goods are traded from outside the local group or commissioned from artisans with specialized skills, there is an inherent division of labor in prestige-good systems, as Brumfiel and Earle (1987:7) make clear: Interacting regional elites can agree to exchange their stores of domestic wealth, each supplying the other with what becomes a stock of exotic wealth. Exotic wealth then supplements or sup- plants domestic wealth as the customary means of social payment (since elders control the statuses to which young men aspire, they can define the qualifying criteria as best suits them). Clients come to depend on patrons to supply wealth which they no longer manufacture for themselves. Prestige-good systems, therefore, appear to be an unusual form of a precapitalist world- system. They are unusual in that they are founded specifically upon a lineage-based social structure which, although modified as the system becomes more politically central- ized, maintains its basic lineage form even in the political hierarchy. They are also unusu- al because they are based upon a division of labor in exotic goods, a division of labor which some world-system theorists might argue has little impact on the societies involved (Wallerstein, 1974:42, 333, also 1989:130-32). The important thing to recognize here, howev- er, is that these exotic goods are not "luxu- ry" items in prestige-good systems, but are necessary for social reproduction. The Mississippian Prestige-Good System There is sound evidence to support the idea that Mississippian societies were participants in some form of a prestige-good system. There was extensive interregional trade in exotica in Mississippian societies: such as marine shell from the Gulf coast, copper from Lake Superior, obsidian, bauxite, and minerals from as far west as the Rockies, and various other minerals and cherts from localized sources scattered across the eastern United States (Griffin, 1967:156). During the height of Mississippian centralization, specific design motifs and unusual artifact types of what has been called the "Southeastern Ceremonial Complex" circulated between centers in a truly pan-Mississippian exchange network of exotica (Waring and Holder, 1945; Galloway, 1989). More importantly, however, the distribution of these exotic raw materials and the objects made from them appears to be consistent with that expected from a prestige-good system. Evidence to support this idea has been pre- sented in detail elsewhere and need not be repeated at length here (Welch, 1986; Pere- grine, 1990). A study I conducted recently showed that the distribution of prestige-goods found in Mississippian burials (giving a per- capita measure of their distribution) paral- leled that expected from a prestige-good system, both within and between communities (Peregrine, 1990:179-222). In a study that is somewhat the inverse of mine, Welch (1986) tested four models of chiefdom political economy against the material record for the Mississippian chiefdom at Moundville, Alabama, and found that the model most consistent with the archaeological data was that of a pres- tige-good system (although his conception of prestige-good systems differs somewhat from mine, particularly as it is not based in a world-system framework). In both studies it was clear that the Mississippian societies being analyzed were participants in some form of a prestige-good system. Viewing Mississippian societies as partici- pants in this unique type of pre-capitalist world-system is not really helpful unless it increases our understanding of their social structures and evolution. I argue this per- spective is able to do both. First, because prestige-good systems are rooted in a lineage- based social system (and indeed, foster spe- cific developments in that social system), probable social structures of Mississippian societies can be inferred readily by viewing the archaeological record through this theo- retical lens. In terms of political organization, the implications of the Mississippian prestige- good system should be clear. Political power was based upon the ability to control pres- tige-goods, legitimated through a lineage structure (Peregrine, 1990:63-69). Since Mississippian societies were apparently orga- nized as chiefdoms (Peebles and Kus, 1977), a hierarchy of chiefs was likely, similar per- haps to Kongo or Tonga, with the pre-eminent chief located at a major center, and lower level chiefs located at minor centers and in outlying hamlets. This hierarchy seems to be reflected in the Mississippian settlement system (Fowler, 1978; cf. Milner, 1990). The hierarchy was probably organized like a lin- eage, with individuals in each level both superior and socially "elder" to individuals in levels below them (DePratter, 1983:100- 110). At the lowest level in the political hierarchy were localized lineages, with elder males as their heads. Localized lineages would have formed the basic social structure in Mississippian soci- eties as well, and are represented archaeolog- ically in the organization of Mississippian cemeteries (Goldstein, 1980:136-37) Lineage leaders were the "socially" eldest members of the lineage. Social age was likely a dual product of one's ancestry and one's ability to create alliances with elder lineage members from whom one could obtain both the knowledge and the prestige-goods needed to be initiated into various ritual grades (Meillassoux, 1978). There were probably a number of ritual grades in Mississippian societies, some of which were necessary to simply be recognized as an adult or as a member of the society, and some in which membership brought prestige and political power (Hudson, 1976:325-27, 336-40). In terms of economic organization, local- ized lineages may have also been the basic production units. Some individuals apparently served as craftsmen for pre-eminent chiefs, manufacturing prestige-goods at chiefdom centers (Welch, 1986:171-72). Although horti- culture was practiced in order to produce enough to both support artisans and political leaders and allow them to remain in the same location, there was probably little systematic trade between centers and outlying hamlets in maize or other agricultural products (Welch, 1986:130-32; cf. O'Brien, 1990). The logis- tics of bulk trade in the Mississippian period would have been formidable, and major centers were located on rich soils, certainly capable of producing enough to support the inhabitants (Peebles, 1978). Finally, in terms of ideology, ancestry would have been all-important. A "cult of the ancestors" in some form was a probable feature of Mississippian societies, and may be repre- sented in the unique stone figurines, charnel structures, and elaborate burial ceremonialism characteristic of Mississippian culture (De- Pratter, 1983:111-54). The pre-eminent chief himself was probably both the social and spiritual "father" of the chiefdom. He was seen as a contact between the ancestors and the people, as he was the social elder of the people, and so the closest to the ancestors (DePratter, 1983:68). This reverts to politi- cal power, as the pre-eminent chief's close- ness to the ancestors probably reinforced his political position (Shils, 1971). Hence power, social structure, and ideology were all intermeshed in the processes of the Mississip- pian world-system. Perhaps more importantly, the prestige-good system model provides a unique theory of Mississippian evolution, one that ties the origins of social stratification to processes beginning more than a thousand years earlier (Peregrine, 1990:278-86). During the late Archaic period, burial mounds began to be constructed, apparently to mark territories controlled by corporate lineages (Charles and Buikstra, 1983). At about the same time systematic interregional trade in exotic goods began (Winters, 1968). The implications are that the Archaic period saw the initiation of lineages in the Eastern Woodlands and the beginnings of elder control and manipulation of imported preciosities (Bender, 1985a). The control and manipulation of exotic goods by lineage elders apparently became more intense during the Woodland period, culminat- ing in the "Hopewell interaction sphere" through which exotic goods from distant sourc- es were moved across midcontinental North America (Struever and Houart, 1972). These goods were apparently being used to arrange marriages between localized groups (Bender, 1985b), and it is likely that lineage elders were fostering the use of prestige-goods in other ceremonies of social reproduction (- Brose, 1979). As these goods came to be in greater demand, the lineage elder's power grew in direct proportion (Peregrine, 1990:75-86). Certainly fostered by population growth which increased the demand for prestige-goods during the Woodland period (Buikstra, 1977:76-77, 81), and perhaps spurred further by an appar- ent re-organization of society at a lower hierarchical level during the Late Woodland period (Tainter, 1975), lineage elders during the formative Mississippian period gained enough power to differentiate themselves from other lineage members, and became an emergent elite. Conflict, perhaps over access to advanta- geous trade routes, may have played a role in the emergence of Mississippian elites. Many Mississippian centers occupy relatively cir- cumscribed riverine environments and are often surrounded by defensive palisades. Larson (1972) and Green (1977) argue that a need to defend these prime riverine locations was critical to the evolution of Mississippian societies. Although conflict has probably never been the sole factor behind the emer- gence of social stratification (Wenke, 1984:- 215-18), the need to coordinate labor for defense (or conquest) could have provided lineage elders in the emergent Mississippian period additional control over junior lineage members, and fostered the development of new social forms legitimating increased levels of political power held by specific individuals (Carneiro, 1970; Johnson and Earle, 1987). In considering the emergence of social stratification, one must also consider the intensification of production necessary to sustain elites. Indeed Renfrew (1982:263) has argued that "all development towards more complex society implies intensification, permitting the support of administrative and other central activities." Intensification for the support of Mississippian elites was apparently accomplished by increasing labor dedicated to maize horticulture, which had been present in the prehistoric East since at least Middle Woodland times, but was never heavily relied upon for subsistence (Griffin, 1985:61). Individuals apparently increased production to support their elites in competi- tive exchanges with others so that they would have more access to prestige-goods, and hence a better opportunity to socially reproduce themselves (Peregrine, 1990:19-20). As elites competed for exotic goods in the emergent Mississippian prestige-good system, elites located at nodal points on trade routes, and who had a supportive population, were able to control those routes and the goods flowing through them (Peregrine, 1990:- 247-69). Elites less fortunately located grew dependent on elites controlling trade routes, and may have been undermined by them. Popula- tion was attracted to elites who offered greater access to prestige-goods, and hence better opportunities to socially reproduce. In this way Mississippian centers with dense populations emerged in the central riverine valleys of the midcontinent, where riverine trade could be controlled, and where intensi- fied production through maize horticulture was possible (Peregrine, n.d., 1990:269-73). Beginning about A.D. 1250, Mississippian societies went into a decline that lasted until the coming of Europeans (Tainter, 1988- :15-16). The prestige-good system model provides insight into this decline as well, for these systems appear to be relatively unstable (Friedman and Rowlands, 1977:228, 232). The items that constitute prestige- goods are socially defined, and subordinate elites, disgruntled with a particular leader or group of leaders, have the potential to undermine their power base by promoting the use of alternate prestige-goods (Ekholm, 1972:128-44), or by simply no longer recogniz- ing the need for these goods in ceremonies of social reproduction. Since many prestige- goods are obtained through foreign trade, the disruption of trade routes or alliances can also bring about rapid alterations in pres- tigegood systems. Peebles (1987) argues that one of the major factors correlated with the collapse of the Moundville chiefdom is the sudden suspension of interregional trade in exotic goods. The prestige-good system model, then, has the potential to explain both the rise and decline of Mississippian societies within a unified framework. The concept of Mississippian social evolu- tion based on the processes of a prestige-good system also avoids some of the problems pres- ent in many theories for the evolution of political complexity (Peregrine, 1990:2-8). Chiefs emerge because of their ability to control prestige-goods, and perhaps from personal ambition, but not from some desire or need to manage their society altruistically. Social evolution grows out of the systemic interaction of independent polities within the prestige-good system, not from simple migra- tion or diffusion. Intensified production through agriculture is not a "prime mover" behind social evolution, but emerges out of the evolutionary process itself. Decline, too, is linked to the processes of social interaction and conflict. In addition, this perspective links the evolution of Mississip- pian societies to the longue duree of North American prehistory, providing a unity of theory that has never been possible before. Conclusions Regardless of the impact this perspective might have on our understanding of North American prehistory, I think it carries with it some important ramifications for world- systems theory in general. First, it re- emphasizes and indeed expands the point made by Abu-Lughod (1989:364) that "the principles of organization of world-systems can have considerable variability." In the Mississip- pian case, the world-system's organization is rooted in the kinship structure of the inter- acting societies, for the basic economic units of prestigegood systems are localized lineag- es, and political power is legitimated through the lineage hierarchy. The intimate link that exists between political economy and kinship in stateless societies is one that must be incorporated into world-systems theory if we hope to apply the world-system perspective to the study of these societies and how they change. It is perhaps because many world- system theorists lack a thorough grounding in the study of kinship systems and their rela- tion to political economy that they have been slow to apply the world-system perspective to stateless societies; indeed, since most of these theorists come from disciplines outside of anthropology, they may not even recognize that this crucial link exists. Second, this study demonstrates that in some circumstances world-systems can be based upon the trade and manufacture of exotica. Again, the lack of understanding among many world-system theorists about the important role exotic goods play in the political econo- my of many stateless societies has made the application of this perspective to the study of stateless societies very difficult. The simple fact is that systematic trade in food- stuffs, clothing, ordinary raw materials, and other "bulk" goods is rare in stateless soci- eties. Trade in exotica, on the other hand, is common, and as this study demonstrates, can have systemic impact on the societies involved. I hope the reader is left with an awareness of two basic ideas: first, that stateless societies can be studied using a world-system perspective, and that this perspective can increase our understanding of these societies and how they change; and second, that precapi- talist world-systems are often quite different than the ones envisioned by Wallerstein, Abu- Lughod, or even Schneider. Many precapitalist world-systems must be studied with an emphasis not only on economic processes, but also on social ones, for the political economies of these world-systems are intimately linked to their social structures; one cannot be under- stood in the absence of the other. NOTES