TRADE NETWORKS, TRADE BLOCS, AND HEGEMONIC CONFLICT Abstract Most structural analyses of the world system have focused on distinguishing the core from the periphery and semi-periphery. The analysis in this article extends the structural approach by focusing on the world market and the interstate system. A network analysis of trade among the 102 countries with 1990 trade of $2 billion or more finds that the United States, Japan, and Germany are by far the most important countries in the trade network. The U.S. and Japanese trade blocs are highly overlapped, while the German trade bloc is largely separate. The 1990 trade patterns are very similar to those discussed by the Council on Foreign Relations during World War II and suggest the potential for, and possible shape of, increased trade conflict between rival world powers. In the 1930s the world developed a number of well-defined trading blocs, often under-girded by formal mechanisms such as differing exchange rates for countries inside and outside the bloc. These trading blocs were a response to the world-wide depression, but they also exacerbated international tensions and contributed to the emergence of World War II in the transition from one hegemon to another. (Arndt, 1944/1972; Chase-Dunn, 1989; Condliffe, 1950; Domhoff, 1990; Gilpin, 1987; Kindleberger, 1973; Shoup and Minter, 1977; Wallerstein, 1991) World trade today is clearly enormously more open. Colonialism and colonial empires have been abolished or drastically restricted, the world market is as free as perhaps it has ever been, multi-national corporations operate around the world, a wide range of goods are produced from parts originating in many different countries. A variety of structural mechanisms (GATT, the IMF, etc.) work to keep markets open. At the same time, common markets and "most favored nation" status continue to influence trade. The European Economic Community and the North American Free Trade Zone are just two examples of state arrangements that facilitate trade within some areas and thus make trade outside those areas comparatively speaking less attractive. To what extent do trading blocs exist in the world today? If such blocs indicate potential fault lines for possible future economic, political, or military conflicts, what alignments or areas of conflict do they suggest? Do these correspond to past blocs and conflict groupings? To address these questions this paper uses a quantitative and systematic network analysis of trade patterns between the 102 countries with total annual trade volumes exceeding 2 billion U.S. dollars in 1990. In recent years significant progress has been made in developing World System theory based on structural analysis. Snyder and Kick (1979), for example, present a blockmodel (White, Boorman and Breiger, 1976) of the world system based on trade flows, military interventions, diplomatic relations, and treaty memberships. In their model, if two countries had $100,000 or more of trade (the smallest amount reported in International Monetary Fund data) in two out of five years, this constituted the presence of a trade tie between these countries. Their blockmodel confirmed the existence of a core-periphery-semi- periphery structure, and location in one as opposed to another of these sectors helped explain economic growth. Smith and White (1992) provide a blockmodel based on a different algorithm. Their principal finding is again that countries can be classified as core, periphery, and semi-periphery, though they also report sub-divisions within these broad areas, and do their analysis for three points in time, analyzing the dynamics of the system. A number of other structuralist empirical studies (Breiger, 1981; Chase-Dunn, 1989; Nemeth and Smith, 1985) also tend to focus primarily on the core-periphery hierarchy. While this is clearly one key focus for analysis, Chase-Dunn argues that there are four main structures of the world economy: the world class system, the core/periphery hierarchy, the interstate system, and the world market. The analysis in this article extends the structural approach by focusing on the world market and the interstate system. The "interstate system" in the world system paradigm is a "multicentric interstate system of unequally powerful and competing states..." which is "the main political structure behind the reproduction of capitalist relations of production." (Chase-Dunn, 1989:4) According to Chase-Dunn, the major difference between the "interstate system" in world system theory and "international relations" in the statecentric paradigm is that while the statecentric theory emphasizes state autonomy in international relations (Modelski, 1978; Skocpol, 1977, 1979; Zolberg, 1981; Waltz, 1979), the "interstate system" theory argues for the inseparability of geopolitics and international commodity production. "Geopolitics and commodity production are interdependent forms of competition which reproduce one another" (Chase-Dunn, 1989:4) Gilpin (1971) also argues for the close relationship between geopolitics and economic relations, although in his paradigm the causal direction is from geopolitics to economic relations: "... the thesis ... is that transnational actors and processes are dependent upon particular patterns of interstate relations. Whether one is talking about the merchant adventurers of the sixteenth century, nineteenth-century finance capitalists, or twentieth- century multinational corporations, transnational actors have been able to play an important role in world affairs because it has been in the interest of the predominant power(s) for them to do so. As political circumstances have changed due to the rise and decline of nation-states, transnational processes have also been altered or ceased altogether." (Gilpin, 1971) Examining the character of trade networks today is particularly interesting because there is reason to believe that in the 1930s well defined trading blocs contributed to structural conflict and thus the emergence of general war. According to Condliffe: "This development of trading blocs led by great powers was the most significant economic development of the years immediately preceding the Second World War." (1950:502, quoted in Gilpin, 1971; also see Arndt, 1944/1972) In this paper we examine whether the structural conditions for conflict still persist today. Data and Method The criterion for inclusion in this study was that the country have a total annual trade volume exceeding 2 billion U.S. dollars in 1990. This yielded a population of 102 countries which collectively account for 98.88% of 1990 world trade. A focus on country by country trade flows produces a 102 by 102 symmetric matrix, with each cell containing the dollar volume of the trade between the two countries. The next step was to percentage this matrix, creating a new matrix. This new matrix is asymmetric because for each trade relationship between two countries there are two ratios. For example, the trade in 1990 between the United States and Malaysia accounts for 16.67% of Malaysia's foreign trade while it only accounts for 1.14% of American foreign trade. And that between Japan and Malaysia is 19.91% on the part of Malaysia and only 2.30% on the part of Japan. A high percentage on either side may suggest an important relationship. Although the respective trade between Malaysia, Japan and the U.S. only accounts for a relatively small share of either Japan's or America's foreign trade, the high percentages on the part of Malaysia not only suggest Malaysia's dependency on the trade but also indicate Japanese and American respective market share and the extent of their political-economic leverage. This new matrix is analyzed using two different network techniques, clique detection and structural equivalence. The techniques have a similar aim, to uncover underlying groupings in the data, but look for differing patterns and therefore can yield different outcomes. A clique is a group where every member of the group is tied to every other member of the group by whatever criterion is selected. More technically, a clique is a maximal complete sub- graph. The clique approach has been most commonly used in various sorts of small group analysis, and the criterion for inclusion in a clique has generally been some form of direct face-to-face interaction, but the mathematical concept is more generally applicable, and any criterion can be used to define a connection between two actors (Neustadtl and Clawson, 1988; see also Stokman, Ziegler, and Scott 1985). In this case, the criterion used is the significance of the trade between the two countries. Since there are 102 countries, the random trade level would be slightly under 1%. The analysis is performed for two different levels, 5% indicating a moderate trade engagement, and 10% indicating a high trade engagement. An advantage of the clique detection technique is that the results are easily interpretable -- the countries in a clique each have 5 (or 10) percent of their trade with each of the other countries in the clique. A weakness of the clique technique is the need to set arbitrary cut-off levels as criteria defining a connection, which loses some data. However, it should be noted that these criteria are set in advance, before beginning the analysis, and therefore the researcher is not able to manipulate the outcomes by adjusting the dividing lines between groups as in some multivariate classification analyses such as factor and cluster analyses. This weakness is also inherent in a number of network techniques, including many forms of blockmodeling, the most commonly used technique in network studies of the world system. The primary emphasis is on the clique detection method, primarily because its results are more easily comprehensible and interpretable, but these results may leave out some structural features of the network. To comprehensively explore the network, we will also use a structural equivalent approach. In the strict definition of structural equivalence, two actors A and B are structurally equivalent if they each have relations with exactly the same set of other actors. Thus, even if A and B do not have relations with each other, they are structurally equivalent if they each have relations with X, Y, and Z (and only with X, Y, and Z). To use a small group example, even if A and B have never met each other, if they have exactly the same set of friends, it seems a good hypothesis that they will behave in similar ways. Findings World trade in 1990 was heavily concentrated. Network density is a measure of the actual compared to the potential number of countries satisfying the stated criterion for grouping. In this case the criterion for a moderate trade engagement level is 5% of a country's trade, and the criterion for a high trade engagement level is 10% of the country's trade. By these criteria, density at the moderate (5%) level is 4.5% and at the high (10%) level is 2.0%. Which countries are most central to trade flows? This can be determined by using a measure in network analysis called centrality. The U.S., Japan and Germany occupy the most central positions in the world trade structure. As indicated in Table 1, these three powers have the highest centrality scores across the board, at both 5% and 10% levels. In all but one comparison their score is at least 50% higher than the next most central country. The next three highest are the United Kingdom, France and Italy and their centrality scores are listed in the bottom half of the table. As a comparison, the centrality scores of the former Soviet Union are listed at the very bottom of the table. As is shown, it was much less central to trade relations. These aggregate analyses by using density and centrality confirm that the United States, Japan, and Germany are the three economic powers that dominate the world trade structure -- not a surprise. What is the structure of world trade in terms of relations between various countries? What are the relations between Japan, Germany, and the United States, and what are their relations with other countries? The aggregate analyses can not answer these questions, and thus we turn to the results of the network analyses of trade structure. A clique detection procedure finds a relatively large number of cliques -- 157 at the 5% level and 68 at the 10% level. The overwhelming majority of these cliques involve the U.S., Japan, or Germany. (See Table 2) Of the total of 157 cliques at the 5% trade level, the U.S. was involved in 104 of these and Germany in 109, with Japan trailing at 61. In fact, at the 10% trade level, there was only one regional group that did not involve the presence of any of these three countries. (This group involved France, Italy and Algeria.) The involvement of these three countries in a large number of cliques is substantially greater than that of the three next most highly involved powers, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. France is involved in almost as many 5% level cliques as Japan, but is involved in less than one-third as many 10% level cliques. Compared to Japan, Britain is involved in almost as many of the relatively intense 10% level cliques (especially with its former colonies), but has a substantially narrower base at the 5% level. Also presented in Table 2 as a comparison is the Soviet Union, which has a much more limited involvement in cliques, a fact that is especially noticeable at the 5% level. The dominance of these three countries is remarkable but perhaps not surprising, given their dominance in the world economy and world trade. The next step is to consider the pattern of relations among the three major countries. At the 5% trade level the United States is involved in more cliques with Germany than with Japan, and Japan is involved in almost as many with Germany as with the United States. Apparently all three countries have low levels of trade with a wide network of countries, and at this low level their trade frequently overlaps. A very different picture emerges at the high (10%) trade level. The U.S. and Japan were in many cliques together: more than half (16 of 29, or 55%) of the cliques that included the U.S. also included Japan; these were 73% of Japan's cliques. Germany was involved in more cliques than any other country, but none of its cliques included either the U.S. or Japan. Though we do not report these results in our tables, we repeated this analysis using the 1987 trade data and the results were virtually identical: there were roughly the same number of cliques, the United States, Japan, and Germany were in far more cliques than any other countries, and at the 10% level there was a high degree of overlap between the United States and Japan, with virtually no overlap between Germany and either the United States or Japan. These results, however, indicate one of the limitations of an analysis based exclusively on clique detection. None of Germany's cliques included the U.S. or Japan simply because Germany's trade with the United States and Japan is less than the 10 percent needed to qualify as a connection. The absence of the Germany-Japan link and the Germany-U.S. link means these countries cannot be in cliques together at the 10 percent trade level. It is, however, possible for Germany to have clique relations with the same countries as the United States or Japan. Thus, for example, if Germany, France, and Belgium constitute one clique, the United States, France, and Belgium might constitute another. In this example, France and Belgium are "structurally equivalent", as defined by their relations with Germany and the United States. This is only one example of the limits of a strict clique approach. Other structurally equivalent situations need to be discovered. For example, Canada is heavily dependent on its trade with the U.S. Its trade relation is "dyadic" because only one major trade partner is involved. Our network method should reveal this relationship, but if we rely exclusively on a clique approach, Canada's relationship to the U.S. is not captured by our method. Hence our next task is to detect all other bloc members which occupy structural equivalent positions with particular emphasis on relations with the U.S., Japan and Germany, the three bloc centers. Using Burt's STRUTURE program, we find fourteen structurally equivalent groups. (See Appendix B) In general, this analysis is less revealing, involving fewer countries and identifying fewer relationships. This is because strict structural equivalence is even more demanding than clique detection, requiring that countries have exactly the same ties in order to be considered structurally equivalent. For example, if countries A, B, and C each have 10% trade relations with each other, then they are in a clique together, no matter what additional relations each might have. However, if country A also had relations with country D, then it would not be structurally equivalent to B and C (because it had one additional tie they did not have). Therefore, the more relations country A has (in practice, the larger and more important its economy is), the less likely it is that it will be exactly structurally equivalent to any other country. On the other hand, a structural equivalence analysis does identify one additional potentially important form of relationship not captured by clique detection -- dyadic trade relations. For example, one such group includes all the countries which are heavily dependent on trade with the U.S. There are ten such countries, most of them in north and central America (Canada, Mexico, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Trinidad and Tobago, but also India and Sri Lanka). The other groups based on dyadic relations are small. They include a group with relations only with Japan (Zambia, Qator, and United Arab Emirates), a French group (Cameroon, Cote D'Ivoire, and Morocco) and a West German group (Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria). TRADE BLOCS A trade bloc can be defined as the sphere of economic influence of a major power. Operationally, for our purposes, a trade bloc includes all those countries involved in 10 percent level trade cliques with that country, along with all countries that have 10% level dyadic relations with that country. We can then compare the size of the bloc for each of the three major powers and its degree of overlap with other blocs. Using this definition, the U.S. trade bloc has 46 countries, Germany's has 35, and Japan's has 30. Two countries are in the trade blocs of all three of these countries -- South Africa and Zimbabwe, both white colonial settler states in Southern Africa. There are no other overlaps between the Japanese and German trade blocs, a remarkable degree of economic separation. On the other hand, 21 of the 30 countries in the Japanese trade bloc are also in the U.S. bloc. Most countries that are only in the Japanese trade bloc are economically marginal (Brunei, Liberia, North Korea, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qator, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, Zambia). The U.S. trade bloc has a large degree of overlap with the Japanese trade bloc (21 out of the 46 countries in the U.S. bloc), and a smaller but still significant degree of overlap with the German trade bloc (7 countries). Twenty countries are only in the U.S. trade bloc. For some of them, primarily in North and Central America, the U.S. is the only major trade partner (Canada, Mexico, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Trinidad and Tobago, but also India and Sri Lanka). Others are in trade cliques with the U.S. These are mostly in the Americas (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, Jamaica, and the Netherlands Antilles) with a couple in the Middle East (Iraq and Jordan) and one Asian country (Macao). The German trade bloc is by far the most separate -- 28 of the 35 countries in the German bloc are in neither the U.S. nor Japanese trade blocs, and many of these are economically powerful countries, particularly in Europe. (See Appendix C) Because the main finding is the relation between the trade blocs of the three economic super-powers (the United States, Japan, and Germany), it is worth considering the geography of each of their trade relations. The German trade bloc contains essentially all of Europe (West, North, Central, and East, including the Soviet Union); the Mediterranean countries of Israel, Syria, Tunisia, Algeria, Turkey, and Libya; and five countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana, Kenya, Zaire, Zimbabwe, and South Africa) -- but nothing in North America, South America, or Asia. Japan's 10% trade level cliques cover virtually all the countries of Asia (including Australia and New Zealand) except for India and some small countries; the countries along the Pacific edge of South America (Peru and Chile); the United States; almost all of the oil producing countries such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates in the Middle East; Liberia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa in Africa. Japan's trade network relations (both the clique and structurally equivalent relations), however, include none of Europe, none of the South American countries facing the Atlantic, and only the limited parts of Africa previously listed. The United States's set of 10% trade level cliques looks very similar to Japan's, but is more extensive, overlapping the Atlantic edge of the German bloc and adding a dominance of the Americas. The United States set includes most of Asia; almost all of the Americas -- North, Central, and South; the European Atlantic island countries of Iceland, Ireland, and the United Kingdom; and a scattering of Africa and the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Algeria, Ghana, and the ubiquitous Zimbabwe and South Africa). The United States's coverage is the most global, but does not include any countries on the European continent itself (as opposed to the island countries adjoining Europe). Discussion and Conclusion The most striking finding to emerge from the network analysis of 1990 trade relations is the dominance of three major blocs: the American Bloc, the Japan Bloc and the German Bloc, with a large degree of overlap between the U.S. and Japanese blocs, while the German bloc has very little overlap with either of the others. To make sense of these results, and to place them in a meaningful context, we need to step back from our own data for a moment and discuss two kinds of background -- first, world systems theory on hegemonic powers and war, and second, the United States' World War II analysis of the relation of trade blocs to war aims. World systems theorists, and a variety of others, emphasize the connection between economic relations and war. Early statements of this connection came from Polanyi and Arndt. Thus Polanyi (1944) stressed that the century of peace from 1815 to 1914 was based on British economic and political hegemony. World War I was the result of declining British hegemony and the emergence of competing powers, especially Germany. (See also Block, 1977) H.W. Arndt (1944/1972) discussed the specific steps leading to World War II, arguing that both economic collapse and war were the results of Britain's lack of the economic ability, and the United States's lack of the political will, to take world economic-political leadership. (See also Kindelberger 1973) World systems theorists have developed and examined these ideas much more systematically. (For a review of historical- structural approaches, see Thompson 1983 and 1988.) Albert Bergesen (1985), for example, has shown that wars occur in cycles. He distinguishes A and B phases of the world system. Phase A is characterized by peace, economic expansion, free trade, decolonization, a hegemonic power, and internal growth by firms. Phase B is characterized by firm growth through mergers, competing core powers, colonization, trade wars, economic contraction, and war. There is a widespread recognition, by no means confined to world systems theorists, that the United States is in decline. For a quarter century after World War II its economic and political hegemony was virtually unquestioned. While it continues to be the single most powerful world actor (both economically and politically), the U.S.'s power has been greatly reduced, and the economic importance and leverage of Germany and Japan have increased concomitantly. (Among a great many others, see Frank, 1983; Wallerstein 1987; Bergesen, Fernandez, and Sahoo 1987; Paul Kennedy, 1987) If the world system is moving away from an A phase of peace, free trade, and a hegemonic power, and toward a B phase of trade wars, trade blocs, competing core powers, and war, it is important not only to examine the character of existing trade relations with a special emphasis on the current economic superpowers, the United States, Germany, and Japan, but also to place these in some historical context. A remarkable study by Laurence Shoup and William Minter (1977) provides unprecedented insight into the way world trade was viewed in 1940 by the Council on Foreign Relations, the leading U.S. business group concerned with foreign policy. According to Shoup and Minter, as soon as World War II broke out in Europe, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) organized a study group, working with the U.S. State Department, to plan what the world should be like after the war was over. The CFR analysis explicitly considered the relative self-sufficiency of the German bloc as compared to the U.S. bloc. The question they posed was: As the Western Hemisphere is endowed with abundant resources, if the U.S. were confined to the Western Hemisphere would it be able to compete with the German Bloc? They decided that Germany was in better shape than the United States because it could get a higher proportion of the materials it needed to dominate the world from within the countries it controlled. In order to match Germany, the U.S. needed to control the Asia-Pacific area as well. Accordingly, the Council on Foreign Relations, in conjunction with the State Department, started planning a "life space" called the "Grand Area", which initially included the western hemisphere and Asia-Pacific area and later incorporated the United Kingdom as well. Some years before, Japanese military and industrial circles had also designed their own life space for self- sufficiency called the "Co-prosperity Sphere", after they decided that their colonies in Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria were not enough to sustain a Japanese war economy (Barnhart, 1987). The design of the "Co-prosperity Sphere" very much overlapped with that of the Grand Area and their interests inevitably clashed in this area. The conflict escalated into a full-scale Pacific War after the U.S. imposed an economic blockade to check Japanese expansion in the area. That was half a century ago, but compare the 1990 trading relations uncovered by our analysis with the Council on Foreign Relations analysis of 1940. The Asia-Pacific, Latin American countries and United Kingdom were part of the American Bloc in the CFR 1940 analysis, and are still part of the US bloc in our analysis of 1990. The bloc we discovered empirically largely duplicates the "Grand Area" designed by CFR planners in the early 1940s. If we compare the Japan Bloc of 1990, as discussed in the previous section, with the "Co-prosperity Sphere", we find that this is very similar to that "old" idea, with the notable change that the 1990 bloc includes a Middle Eastern source of oil. Oil supplies were perhaps the key factor in both the 1941 U.S. belief that an embargo could influence Japanese behavior, and in the Japanese decision to launch a war with the United States (Shoup and Minter 1977). The 1990 German Bloc is very similar to the German Bloc of 1940. The overlapping of the American Bloc and Japan Bloc largely occurred in the Asia-Pacific area. That's where the design of the "Grand Area" clashed with that of the "Co-prosperity Sphere" and the Pacific War started. Based on our empirical findings, we conclude that half a century after the beginning of the Second World War, the "German Bloc", the "Grand Area", and the "Co-prosperity Sphere" still exist today, though of course in a dramatically transformed economic, political, and military context. At present both Japan and Germany are U.S. allies. But so was Iraq during the Iran- Iraq War, and not long ago the Soviet Union was the U.S.'s main opponent on the world stage, the "Evil Empire." Political relations and arrangements can evidently change much more dramatically than underlying trade and economic relations. The trade patterns of 1990 uncovered by our analysis are very similar to those described by the Council on Foreign Relations study of 1940; in certain ways not much has changed in 50 years. The trade patterns demonstrated in our analysis of 1990 trade indicate why the U.S. and Japan experience more economic conflicts than the U.S. and Germany, or Germany and Japan. It is this which leads "realist" analysts to sound warnings like the following: "In retrospect, the Pacific War of 1941-1945 looks like a Japanese national Kamikaze project. There was no imaginable way in which Japan could have defeated the United States in that war. Japanese manufacturing output was only 13 percent of America's, and its war-making potential was only 8 percent. Yet that war occurred. By the year 2000, Japan's manufacturing capacity will be six times more powerful vis-a-vis the United States than it was in December 1941. This is a nation with whom our policies should be thoughtfully pursued." (Bergner 1992:208) In Japan as well, the so-called realists of the National Security Study Group argued that South-East Asia and the Middle East were the most strategically important countries for Japan's economic security, and that Japan should be prepared to make extra efforts to secure political stability in those areas. In the near term the economic tensions between the United States and Japan are likely to generate the most conflict, but in the long run a separate German led bloc also holds the potential for economic difference to lead to political and military conflict. This study focused exclusively on the trade networks of 1990; it was only the remarkable character of the 1990 trade blocs that led us to consider their similarities to the World War II situation. Our results here suggest that one promising direction for future research is an examination of trade networks at earlier periods, preferably one period shortly before World War II and one period at the height of U.S. hegemony. This dynamic analysis would make possible a more systematic evaluation of the relationship between trade networks, the rise and fall of hegemonic powers, and military-political conflicts. ENDNOTES REFERENCES Alba, R. and C. Kadushin. (1976). "The intersection of social circles," Sociological Methods and Research. 5:77-102. Alba, Richard. (1973). "A Graph-Theoretic Definition of a Sociometric Clique," Journal of Mathematical Sociology. 3:113-126. Arndt, H.W. 1944/1972. The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen- Thirties. London: Frank Cass. Baldwin, Robert E., Ingersoll and Woo-choong Kim, (1988). "U.S. and Foreign Competition in the Developing Countries of the Asian Pacific Rim." in The United States in the World Economy edited by Martin Feldstein. 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USSR 10 6 Table 3 Structurally Equivalent Relations in 1990 (at 10% level) Clique Dyadic Total relations relations U.S. and Japanese Involvement 22* 22 U.S. and German Involvement 4 2 6 Japan and German Involvement 0 0 0 U.S., Japan and German Involvement 2 0 2 (Countries in a Bloc only) US 11 10 21 Japan 6 3 9 Germany 27** 3 30 ------------------------------------------------------ Subtotal 72 18 90 Others 12 ------------------------------------------------------- Total 102 ------------------------------------------------------- * The number includes U.S. and Japan. ** The number includes Germany. Appendix A Multilateral (10% clique) and Dyadic (10% structural equivelant) Trade Relations of the Three Major Powers in 1990 Country U.S. Japan Germany Clique Dyad. Clique Dyad. Clique Dyad. UNITED STATES 29 0 16 0 0 0 CANADA 0 1 0 0 0 0 AUSTRALIA 1 0 2 0 0 0 JAPAN 16 0 22 0 0 0 NEW ZEALAND 1 0 1 0 0 0 AUSTRIA 0 0 0 0 0 1 BELGIUM 0 0 0 0 4 0 DENMARK 0 0 0 0 1 0 FINLAND 0 0 0 0 2 0 FRANCE 0 0 0 0 5 0 GERMANY 0 0 0 0 32 0 GREECE 0 0 0 0 1 0 ICELAND 1 0 0 0 1 0 IRELAND 1 0 0 0 1 0 ITALY 0 0 0 0 8 0 NETHERLANDS 0 0 0 0 2 0 NORWAY 0 0 0 0 2 0 PORTUGAL 0 0 0 0 1 0 SPAIN 0 0 0 0 2 0 SWEDEN 0 0 0 0 3 0 SWITZERLAND 0 0 0 0 1 0 UK 7 0 0 0 9 0 ALGERIA 1 0 0 0 0 0 ANGOLA 0 0 0 0 0 0 CAMEROON 0 0 0 0 0 0 COTE D'IVOIRE 0 0 0 0 0 0 GHANA 1 0 0 0 1 0 KENYA 0 0 0 0 1 0 LIBERIA 0 0 1 0 0 0 MAURITIUS 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOROCCO 0 0 0 0 0 0 NIGERIA 0 1 0 0 0 1 SOUTH AFRICA 2 0 1 0 2 0 TUNISIA 0 0 0 0 1 0 ZAIRE 0 0 0 0 1 0 ZAMBIA 0 0 0 1 0 0 ZIMBABWE 2 0 1 0 1 0 AFGHANISTAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 BANGLADESH 1 0 1 0 0 0 BRUNEI 0 0 1 0 0 0 CHINA 2 0 2 0 0 0 HONGKONG 2 0 2 0 0 0 INDIA 0 1 0 0 0 0 INDONESIA 1 0 1 0 0 0 KOREA 1 0 3 0 0 0 NORTH KOREA 0 0 1 0 0 0 MACAO 1 0 0 0 0 0 MALAYSIA 1 0 1 0 0 0 PAKISTAN 1 0 1 0 0 0 PAPUA N.GUINEA 0 0 1 0 0 0 PHILIPPINES 1 0 1 0 0 0 SINGAPORE 1 0 2 0 0 0 SRI LANKA 0 1 0 0 0 0 TAIWAN 1 0 1 0 0 0 THAILAND 1 0 1 0 0 0 VIET NAM 0 0 1 0 0 0 CYPRUS 0 0 0 0 0 0 MALTA 0 0 0 0 2 0 POLAND 0 0 0 0 1 0 ROMANIA 0 0 0 0 1 0 TURKEY 0 0 0 0 0 1 YUGOSLAVIA 0 0 0 0 2 0 BAHRAIN 1 0 1 0 0 0 EGYPT 0 0 0 0 0 0 IRAN, I.R. OF 0 0 0 0 0 0 IRAQ 1 0 0 0 0 0 ISRAEL 0 0 0 0 1 0 JORDAN 1 0 0 0 0 0 KUWAIT 0 0 0 0 0 0 LEBANON 0 0 0 0 0 0 LIBYA 0 0 0 0 1 0 OMAN 0 0 1 0 0 0 QATQR 0 0 0 1 0 0 SAUDI ARABIA 2 0 2 0 0 0 SYRIAN 0 0 0 0 1 0 UNITED ARAB 0 0 0 1 0 0 YEMEN ARAB R. 0 1 0 0 0 1 ARGENTINA 1 0 0 0 0 0 BAHAMAS THE 1 0 1 0 0 0 BRAZIL 3 0 0 0 0 0 CHILE 1 0 1 0 0 0 MEXICO 0 1 0 0 0 0 COLUMBIA 0 1 0 0 0 0 COSTA RICA 0 1 0 0 0 0 ECUADOR 0 1 0 0 0 0 GUATEMALA 0 1 0 0 0 0 HONDURAS 0 1 0 0 0 0 TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 0 1 0 0 0 0 DOMINICAN R. 0 0 0 0 0 0 JAMAICA 1 0 0 0 0 0 NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 1 0 0 0 0 0 PANAMA 0 0 0 0 0 0 PARAGUAY 1 0 0 0 0 0 PERU 1 0 1 0 0 0 URUGUAY 1 0 0 0 0 0 VENEZUELA 1 0 0 0 0 0 BULGARIA 0 0 0 0 0 1 CUBA 0 0 0 0 0 0 CZECHOSLOVAKIA 0 0 0 0 1 0 E.GERMAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 HUNGARY 0 0 0 0 1 0 SOVIET UNION 0 0 0 0 6 0 Appendix B 10% Level Cliques (n=68) in 1990 CLIQUE 1: UNITED STATES JAPAN BAHRAIN SAUDI ARABIA CLIQUE 2: UNITED STATES JAPAN SAUDI ARABIA BAHAMAS THE CLIQUE 3: UNITED STATES AUSTRALIA JAPAN NEW ZEALAND CLIQUE 4: UNITED STATES JAPAN SOUTH AFRICA CLIQUE 5: UNITED STATES JAPAN ZIMBABWE CLIQUE 6: UNITED STATES JAPAN BANGLADESH CLIQUE 7: UNITED STATES JAPAN CHINA HONGKONG CLIQUE 8: UNITED STATES JAPAN INDONESIA CLIQUE 9: UNITED STATES JAPAN KOREA CLIQUE 10: UNITED STATES JAPAN MALAYSIA SINGAPORE CLIQUE 11: UNITED STATES JAPAN PAKISTAN CLIQUE 12: UNITED STATES JAPAN PHILIPPINES CLIQUE 13: UNITED STATES JAPAN TAIWAN CLIQUE 14: UNITED STATES JAPAN THAILAND CLIQUE 15: UNITED STATES JAPAN CHILE CLIQUE 16: UNITED STATES JAPAN PERU CLIQUE 17: UNITED STATES ICELAND UK CLIQUE 18: UNITED STATES IRELAND UK CLIQUE 19: UNITED STATES UK ALGERIA CLIQUE 20: UNITED STATES UK GHANA CLIQUE 21: UNITED STATES UK SOUTH AFRICA CLIQUE 22: UNITED STATES UK ZIMBABWE CLIQUE 23: UNITED STATES UK JAMAICA CLIQUE 24: UNITED STATES CHINA HONGKONG MACAO CLIQUE 25: UNITED STATES IRAQ JORDAN CLIQUE 26: UNITED STATES ARGENTINA BRAZIL CLIQUE 27: UNITED STATES BRAZIL PARAGUAY CLIQUE 28: UNITED STATES BRAZIL URUGUAY CLIQUE 29: UNITED STATES NETHERLANDS ANTILLES VENEZUELA CLIQUE 30: BELGIUM FRANCE W. GERMAN CLIQUE 31: BELGIUM W. GERMAN NETHERLANDS CLIQUE 32: BELGIUM W. GERMAN ZAIRE CLIQUE 33: BELGIUM W. GERMAN ISRAEL CLIQUE 34: DENMARK W. GERMAN SWEDEN CLIQUE 35: FINLAND W. GERMAN SWEDEN CLIQUE 36: FINLAND W. GERMAN SOVIET UNION CLIQUE 37: FRANCE W. GERMAN ITALY SPAIN CLIQUE 38: FRANCE W. GERMAN ITALY TUNISIA CLIQUE 39: FRANCE W. GERMAN PORTUGAL SPAIN CLIQUE 40: FRANCE W. GERMAN SYRIAN CLIQUE 41: FRANCE ITALY ALGERIA CLIQUE 42: W. GERMAN ICELAND UK CLIQUE 43: W. GERMAN IRELAND UK CLIQUE 44: W. GERMAN NETHERLANDS UK CLIQUE 45: W. GERMAN NORWAY UK CLIQUE 46: W. GERMAN UK GHANA CLIQUE 47: W. GERMAN UK KENYA CLIQUE 48: W. GERMAN UK SOUTH AFRICA CLIQUE 49: W. GERMAN UK ZIMBABWE CLIQUE 50: W. GERMAN UK MALTA CLIQUE 51: W. GERMAN ITALY LIBYA CLIQUE 52: W. GERMAN ITALY SWITZERLAND CLIQUE 53: W. GERMAN GREECE ITALY CLIQUE 54: W. GERMAN ITALY SOUTH AFRICA CLIQUE 55: W. GERMAN ITALY MALTA CLIQUE 56: W. GERMAN ITALY YUGOSLAVIA CLIQUE 57: W. GERMAN NORWAY SWEDEN CLIQUE 58: W. GERMAN HUNGARY SOVIET UNION CLIQUE 59: W. GERMAN POLAND SOVIET UNION CLIQUE 60: W. GERMAN ROMANIA SOVIET UNION CLIQUE 61: W. GERMAN YUGOSLAVIA SOVIET UNION CLIQUE 62: W. GERMAN CZECHOSLOVAKIA SOVIET UNION CLIQUE 63: JAPAN LIBERIA KOREA CLIQUE 64: JAPAN BRUNEI SINGAPORE CLIQUE 65: AUSTRALIA JAPAN PAPUA N.GUINEA CLIQUE 66: JAPAN HONGKONG VIET NAM CLIQUE 67: JAPAN KOREA OMAN CLIQUE 68: JAPAN CHINA NORTH KOREA Appendix C 10% level structual equivelant groups (n=14) in 1990 GROUP 1: ICELAND, IRELAND, GHANA GROUP 2: ZAIRE, ISRAEL GROUP 3: NIGERIA, YEMEN ARAB R. GROUP 4: BAHRAIN, BAHAMAS THE GROUP 5: BANGLADESH, INDONESIA, PAKISTAN, PHILIPPINES, TAIWAN, THAILAND, CHILE, PERU GROUP 6: IRAQ, JORDAN GROUP 7: CANADA, INDIA, SRI LANKA, COLUMBIA, COSTA RICA, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, MEXICO, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO GROUP 8: ARGENTINA, PARAGUAY, URUGUAY GROUP 9: ZAMBIA, QATQR, UNITED ARAB GROUP 10: CAMEROON, COTE D'IVOIRE, MOROCCO GROUP 11: GREECE, SWITZERLAND, LIBYA GROUP 12: HUNGARY, POLAND GROUP 13: AUSTRIA, TURKEY, BULGARIA GROUP 14: ROMANIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA