From p34d3611@jhu.edu Sat May 2 00:52:32 1998 by jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (950413.SGI.8.6.12/950213.SGI.AUTOCF) Date: Sat, 02 May 1998 02:52:05 -0400 (EDT) From: Peter Grimes Subject: Marxism as commodity To: WSN The following article appeared in SALON magazine today. Enjoy. --Peter Grimes BY BARBARA EHRENREICH Ah, Karl! You thought those frantic scratchings and snortings were the sounds of capitalism digging its own grave, but all it was doing was preparing a nice niche for you -- a market niche, in fact. The leftish British press Verso has seized upon the 150th anniversary of "The Communist Manifesto" to re-issue that rousing old tract in an upscale version, suitable for display at the cash register. "It's very chic and looks like something for the sybaritic classes," Verso's PR person observes proudly, adding that it should "get us some great displays in the book chains." Adding impenetrable levels of irony, the cover has been designed by those playful ex-Soviet artists Komar and Melamid, whose gorgeously rippling red banner against a black background should be readily accessorizable with the cashmeres in primary tones coming to us for fall. Why didn't Marx, or his co-author, Friedrich Engels, who knew a thing or two about running a business himself, think of this long ago? As Eric Hobsbawm tells us in his introduction to the Verso edition, sales of the original manifesto were pathetically sub-mid- list for decades after it was written. As for foreign rights, forget about it until well into the 1860s, when the International Working Men's Association began to take off. One can imagine their editor taking the authors to lunch and saying, "Karl, Fred, you've got some great stuff in here. That part about 'nothing to lose but your chains' just blew me away. I mean, the prose rocks. But we have to think packaging too. Like what about a pop-up version? A collectible bourgeois-piggie figures tie-in with Taco Bell? Or the movie version with Kate Winslet as the factory gal and Anthony Hopkins as the specter-that-is-haunting-Europe?" But of course back in those days it would have been at least unwise for members of the "sybaritic classes" to go mincing about with their designer copies of "The Communist Manifesto" in hand. In the mid-19th century, fat cats could still recall the whistle of the guillotine blade as it headed for an overprivileged neck; they had seen the delirious, underfed masses rise up -- in Germany, Italy, France and the Austrian Empire -- in 1848. So there's no use blaming Karl and Fred for their lack of entrepreneurial initiative. One hundred fifty years ago, the conditions -- both "objective" and "subjective," as they would have put it -- were not yet ripe for the commodification of revolution itself. First the world had to be made safe for irony on this scale and complexity. Communism -- or at least something superficially resembling the manifesto's prescription -- had to be attempted, road-tested and rejected worldwide. "Centralization of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State": Been there, done that. "Centralization of credit in the hands of the State": No danger that that's going to catch on among America's gun-bearing blue- collar class. In its naive faith that "the State" could be commandeered overnight to serve the workers as loyally as it normally serves the rich, "The Communist Manifesto" is as much an antique as those darling little Lenin pins that are available by the fistful at the flea markets in Berlin today. Post 1989, the manifesto bears the implicit warning label: Fun as it may sound, you don't want to try this at home. But it was not enough for communism to fail. Before it could contemplate marketing Marx, capitalism itself had to change: It had to evolve to the point where it fully conformed to its own description in the manifesto. For a sizable stretch of the 20th century, in at least the "advanced" parts of the globe, only crackpots and subscribers to Monthly Review believed that the workers were being ground down to pauperdom. Anyone could see that machinists and truck drivers were buying houses in Levittown, second cars and college educations for their kids. "In rapidly changing modern urban America," a 1964 sociology text triumphantly declared, "traditional social classes are nonexistent." As for the destruction of "all old-established national industries," as predicted in the manifesto, and their replacement by a global system of production and consumption: Sure, but you had to wait until the 1990s to find Benneton in Beijing or Kentucky Fried Chicken in New Delhi. So for a while there, in the golden age after World War II, capitalism sought to spite communism by treating the workers as if they might be useful as consumers too, and hence worthy of a living wage. It was not until some time in the 1970s that capitalism decided to take "The Communist Manifesto" as its personal self- improvement guide -- going global with a vengeance, treating the workers (including increasing numbers of doctors, teachers, scientists and writers as well as the old-fashioned heavy-lifting and lug-turning proles) like so many disposable "factors of production." The Great Polarization between rich and poor, predicted so long ago in the manifesto, now dominates the social contours of the world, from Los Angeles to Johannesburg, from London to Santiago. And it is of course this deepening polarization and "immiserization" that gives the up-market new manifesto its delightfully up-to-date frisson and leads book dealers to believe that stockbrokers will want to display it in their corner offices as a sign of terminal cockiness. They can buy it on their lunch hour just a few blocks from Wall Street, at the World Trade Center Borders, for example, which is planning a colorful window display, and where the workers ($7 an hour) exist in what one of them described to me as a "culture of absolute hopelessness," thanks to management's obsessive wage-busting campaign. Or they can take it home to the coffee table and insist that the maid ($8 an hour and zero benefits) dust it daily so that the red banner on the cover maintains its high gleam. Commie chic is no end of fun once the commies are dead and the workers of the world have been beaten into submission. So, thanks to the inner Hegelian workings of capitalism, "The Communist Manifesto" finally works as an accessory, a stocking- stuffer, a badge of consummate capitalist cool. But what about its "use value," as Karl himself might have asked? Does it work, in other words, as a manifesto? Well, there are a few problems, and not just the obvious one that real-and-existing communism let Marx and Engels down so unkindly. The other disappointment is capitalism. There is not and has never been a social system as brilliantly dynamic and relentlessly all-consuming as the capitalism of "The Communist Manifesto." It was, according to its authors, slated to destroy every vestige of the feudal and patriarchal past and, with one big steam-powered whoosh, propel humankind into the bleak cold world of the Modern, where our true options -- socialism or barbarism -- would finally be disclosed: "All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind." Faced with the capitalist leviathan, religion was supposed to wither away, gender differences disappear and nationalism -- the most successful religion of all -- was supposed to be smashed by globalization, along with its peculiar object of worship, the nation-state. Then and only then, without the distractions of jingoism, superstition and patriarchy, would the working class be ready to address itself full time to the business of class war. So we must note with sorrow that the manifesto greatly overestimated the power and brilliance of capitalism. As we near 2000, religions are as febrile as ever, patriarchy lingers on and nationalism -- well, it was nationalism that blew the infant socialist-international movement out of the water at the outbreak of World War I in 1914, clearing the way for the hideously un- Marxist possibility of socialism-in-one-nation, that being the Soviet Union. As for the nation-state, it continues to do what it has done best since Carthage and Rome, which is not feeding the hungry or running the steel mills, but mustering the troops for war. Still, "The Communist Manifesto" is well worth the $12 that Verso is asking. Despite the hype, its message is a timeless one that bears repeating every century or so: The meek shall triumph and the mighty shall fall; the hungry and exhausted will get restless and someday -- someday! -- rise up against their oppressors. The prophet Isaiah said something like this, and so, a little more recently, did Jesus. At a mere 96 pages, you can think of it as a greeting card, or even a kind of wake-up call, for that special person in your life -- such as, for example, your boss. SALON | April 30, 1998 "Where the wealth's displayed, thieves and sycophants parade and where it's made, the slaves will be taken. Some are treated well in these games of buy and sell And some like poor beasts are burdened down to breaking." ---Joni Mitchell From kpmoseley@juno.com Sat May 2 16:45:22 1998 From: kpmoseley@juno.com To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Sat, 2 May 1998 16:57:35 -0700 Subject: Jacques Agboton : Fwd: How the Net killed the MAI (fwd) X-Juno-Line-Breaks: 0-41,43-68,70-83,85-87,89-93,95-98,100-103,105-108, 110-113,115,117-128,130-139,141-148,150,152,154-157,159-166, 168-180,182-192,194-218 See this! kpm --------- Begin forwarded message ---------- From: Jacques Agboton To: LEONENET@MITVMA.MIT.EDU Subject: Fwd: How the Net killed the MAI (fwd) Date: Fri, 1 May 1998 22:09:19 -0400 --WebTV-Mail-1582693893-3741 African Brothers and Sisters, Even when you have "given one ear" to this subject, here is a development to know. --WebTV-Mail-1582693893-3741 From: "Chris Gethin" To: GKD@tristram.edc.org Date: Thu, 30 Apr 1998 17:01:46 +0000 Subject: How the Net killed the MAI (fwd) Sender: owner-gkd@tristram.edc.org Reply-To: gkd@tristram.edc.org Thought this example would be of interest and demonstrate some of the power of ICT for movements such as the consumer movement. Consumers International will be launching an internet lobbying and information campaign next week aimed at influencing the decision on the labelling Genetically Modified Foods at the International Standards making body Codex Alimentarius late in May. For more information please contact me. ----------------- From: Chantell Taylor Subject: How the Net killed the MAI How the Net killed the MAI Grassroots groups used their own globalization to derail deal Wednesday, April 29, 1998 By Madelaine Drohan PARIS -- High-powered politicians had reams of statistics and analysis on why a set of international investing rules would make the world a better place. They were no match, however, for a global band of grassroots organizations, which, with little more than computers and access to the Internet, helped derail a deal. Indeed, international negotiations have been transformed after this week's successful rout of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) by opposition groups, which -- alarmed by the trend toward economic globalization -- used some globalization of their own to fight back. Using the Internet's capability to broadcast information instantly worldwide, groups such as the Council of Canadians and Malaysia-based the Third World Network have been able to keep each other informed of the latest developments and supply information gleaned in one country that may prove embarrassing to a government in another. By pooling their information they have broken through the wall of secrecy that traditionally surrounds international negotiations, forcing governments to deal with their complaints. "We are in constant contact with our allies in other countries," said Maude Barlow, the Council of Canadians' chairwoman. "If a negotiator says something to someone over a glass of wine, we'll have it on the Internet within an hour, all over the world." The success of that networking was clear this week when ministers from the 29 countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development admitted that the global wave of protest had swamped the deal. "This is the first successful Internet campaign by non-governmental organizations," said one diplomat involved in the negotiations. "It's been very effective." The OECD, which represents largely the major industrial economies, yesterday halted the negotiations aimed at developing international rules for foreign investment, similar to those for trade in goods. It is unclear when, or even if, the OECD will try again. The irony in this outcome is that the OECD, which has been an ardent advocate of globalization and has done much research into its effects, did not recognize that advocacy groups would use cyber-globalization to further their own ends. OECD secretary-general Donald Johnston conceded that the OECD was caught flat-footed: "It's clear we needed a strategy on information, communication and explication," he told a press conference. The OECD's efforts to harness the Internet have not caught up in colour, content and consumer friendliness to those of the advocacy groups. For example, the OECD report released this week on the benefits of opening markets to trade and investment is a compilation of statistics and analysis written in language more readily understood by economists than by the average person. Instead of finding examples of real people who have benefited from globalization to help trade ministers make this case, the report repeats many of the same statistics on economic growth, investment and the dangers of protectionism. By comparison, hundreds of advocacy groups, in attempting to galvanize opposition to the MAI, used terms and examples that brought their message home to the public. Their sites on the Internet's Worldwide Web are colourful and easy to use, offering primers on the MAI that anyone could understand. Canadian Trade Minister Sergio Marchi has taken the OECD to task for its poor communications effort, although he agrees some of the blame must be shared by the member governments. He said the lesson he has learned is that "civil society" -- meaning public interest groups -- should be engaged much sooner in a negotiating process, instead of governments trying to negotiate around them. Ms. Barlow of the Council of Canadians, which says it has more than 100,000 members, called the OECD report on the benefits of globalization "pathetic." In an interview in Paris, where she was taking part in a protest against the MAI, Ms. Barlow said the immediacy of the Internet has changed the dynamics of advocacy campaigns. She is a veteran of the campaigns against the Canada-U.S. free-trade agreement and the North American free-trade agreement. The Internet was not in widespread use when those campaigns were conducted. Today, however, advocacy groups make sure useful information ends up in the right hands right away. "If we know something that is sensitive to one government, we get it to our ally in that country instantly," she said. "I don't think governments will ever be able to do these kind of secret trade negotiations again." For example, when the Council of Canadians got its hands on a draft version of the MAI last year, it immediately posted it on its Web site and made sure allies around the world knew it was there through E-mail correspondence. The Internet also provides a low-cost way for groups in the Third World to get their message out and keep on top of developments. "All they need is one computer," Ms. Barlow said. The major Internet sites of these advocacy groups provide hyperlinks to others involved in the campaign, as well as phone numbers and E-mail addresses, and often bibliographies of relevant books. It adds up to a powerful tool that the advocacy groups are using to better effect than governments and the OECD at the moment. Ms. Barlow predicts that this advantage may not last now that the OECD members have seen its potential. "They'll be revving up their PR machines." But so are the advocacy groups. The next stage, she said, is to start making suggestions about what should be in trade agreements, rather than just opposing what the negotiators propose. The groups are already trading ideas on solutions, and another aspect of globalization -- the growing spread of English -- is easing their way. "Pretty well everybody speaks English," said Ms. Barlow. "It's the universal language." Tony Clarke, director of the Canadian Polaris Institute, stresses that anti-MAI groups such as his are not against all aspects of globalization -- their use of the Internet itself is proof of that. "We're against this model of economic globalization," he said, referring to the MAI. "But the global village, the idea of coming together and working together, is a great dream." Related Web sites The Council of Canadians and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development: www.canadians.org http://www.oecd.org Chris Gethin (Mr) Development Manager Consumers International 24 Highbury Crescent London N5 1RX Tel: +44 171 226 6663 x202 Fax: +44 171 354 0607 email: cgethin@consint.org Website: http://www.consumersinternational.org --WebTV-Mail-1582693893-3741-- --------- End forwarded message ---------- _____________________________________________________________________ You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail. Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com Or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866] From 6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu Sun May 3 11:05:18 1998 Sun, 3 May 1998 10:05:13 -0700 (PDT) Date: Sun, 3 May 1998 10:05:11 -0700 (PDT) From: Judi Kessler <6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> To: WSN@csf.colorado.edu Subject: PLEASE... ....Here comes the "euro" - Now is the opportunity to generate some great 1998, down-to-earth, concrete, political-economy discussion. For those of you who are still bound up in counting capitalism's years (or centuries), use some restraint and back off. Same goes for those of you who are tempted to argue ad nauseum which "long cycle" (circa "the first appearance of homo homo sapien") is been responsible for the European monetary union. Come out, all you Euro WS people who follow events in THIS century. Who am *I*? No one. Just a very informed doctoral student, bored to tears with the WSN. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Judi A. Kessler University of California, Santa Barbara Department of Sociology Santa Barbara, California 93106 (805) 893-3751 fax (805) 893-3324 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From dredmond@gladstone.uoregon.edu Sun May 3 15:48:03 1998 Date: Sun, 3 May 1998 14:48:00 -0700 (PDT) From: Dennis R Redmond To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: Re: PLEASE... In-Reply-To: On Sun, 3 May 1998, Judi Kessler wrote: > ...Here comes the "euro" - Now is the opportunity to generate some great > 1998, down-to-earth, concrete, political-economy discussion. Well, for starters, it helps to remember that the euro is just the most obvious and leading-edge symptom of the EU's emergence as a global superpower (and, conversely, the decline of the US to an ex-hegemon). Whether the thing succeeds or fails, one thing should be obvious: the EU countries and their satellites comprise roughly a quarter of the world economy, and are largely self-financing and self-supporting in trade, finance, industry and what have you. The EU is a net global creditor, along with Japan; America is the world's biggest debtor. But the US dollar is still the world reserve currency; meaning, the debtor still has some leeway over the creditor (we could inflate away the value of our currency). The euro is all about taking away this last of our Imperial privileges, and providing the financial sinews for the further development of the Eurostate. The euro in its present form may well fail, i.e. Spain and Italy may drop out of the common currency, leaving instead a mini-euro comprised of the Benelux countries, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Austria, Ireland and Finland. But the drive towards economic integration and the rise of EU multinationals in the face of stiff US competition is going to continue. The politics of the EU are the politics of integration, so Left alternatives to the current global market mayhem have to deal with this seriously. For one thing, who gets to run the European Central Bank? The Maastricht treaty says, a coven of bankers, with no oversight from any elected body or parliament (even more undemocratic than the US Federal Reserve, if such a thing were possible). And if the euro arrives, it'll bring a common banking and financial system in its wake. How are countries like Italy and Spain going to compete head-on with German firms without some serious EU-wide subsidies? Instead of kowtowing to the demolition of the national welfare state, why can't the Euroleft call for a truly European-wide expansion of the welfare state, plus emergency programs for jobs and ecological reconstruction, to be financed by soaking the numerous Eurorich? -- Dennis From aaustin@utkux.utcc.utk.edu Sun May 3 16:25:21 1998 Date: Sun, 3 May 1998 18:25:15 -0400 (EDT) From: Andrew Wayne Austin To: Dennis R Redmond Subject: Re: PLEASE... In-Reply-To: On Sun, 3 May 1998, Dennis R Redmond wrote: > On Sun, 3 May 1998, Judi Kessler wrote: > > > ...Here comes the "euro" - Now is the opportunity to generate some great > > 1998, down-to-earth, concrete, political-economy discussion. > > Well, for starters, it helps to remember that the euro is just the most > obvious and leading-edge symptom of the EU's emergence as a global > superpower (and, conversely, the decline of the US to an ex-hegemon). Ex-hegemon in what sense? The sense that we have shifted from imperialism and neoimperialist domination to hegemonic domination via polyarchy is really only a change in formal tactic. But there is a deeper implication. US machinery is the weapon for global capitalism, America coming to play this role with the Americanization of the world economy, or put otherwise the globalization of Americanism (major facet of the dialectic of current world-history). In this sense the US has not declined at all but has increased its hegemonic power, through the spread of culture-ideology, particular economic structurings and political model of elite rule. The sphere of influence of the Americanized global bourgeoisie is being totalized as capital is becoming deterritorialized. Americanism is an organic phenomenon. The nation-state is the face on capital, and to the extent that capital eclipses its own front by transnationalization then one may speak of the US hegemon declining. But to speak of other such fronts eclipsing the US hegemon is to miss this central issue. A restatement of the problem is in order. Andy > Whether the thing succeeds or fails, one thing should be > obvious: the EU countries and their satellites comprise > roughly a quarter of the world economy, and are largely self-financing and > self-supporting in trade, finance, industry and what have you. The EU is a > net global creditor, along with Japan; America is the world's biggest > debtor. But the US dollar is still the world reserve currency; meaning, > the debtor still has some leeway over the creditor (we could inflate away > the value of our currency). The euro is all about taking away this > last of our Imperial privileges, and providing the financial sinews for > the further development of the Eurostate. > > The euro in its present form may well fail, i.e. Spain and Italy may drop > out of the common currency, leaving instead a mini-euro comprised of the > Benelux countries, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Austria, Ireland and > Finland. But the drive towards economic integration and the rise of EU > multinationals in the face of stiff US competition is going to continue. > The politics of the EU are the politics of integration, so Left > alternatives to the current global market mayhem have to deal with this > seriously. For one thing, who gets to run the European Central Bank? The > Maastricht treaty says, a coven of bankers, with no oversight from any > elected body or parliament (even more undemocratic than the US Federal > Reserve, if such a thing were possible). And if the euro arrives, it'll > bring a common banking and financial system in its wake. How are countries > like Italy and Spain going to compete head-on with German firms without > some serious EU-wide subsidies? Instead of kowtowing to the demolition > of the national welfare state, why can't the Euroleft call for a truly > European-wide expansion of the welfare state, plus emergency programs for > jobs and ecological reconstruction, to be financed by soaking the numerous > Eurorich? > > -- Dennis > > From 6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu Sun May 3 18:12:07 1998 Sun, 3 May 1998 17:11:59 -0700 (PDT) Date: Sun, 3 May 1998 17:11:59 -0700 (PDT) From: Judi Kessler <6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> To: Andrew Wayne Austin Subject: Re: PLEASE... In-Reply-To: Dennis - nice, informative, thought-provoking response. However it looks like the dialogue is deteriorating into the same old "samo old" I guess we all can fall back on the "delete" key. On Sun, 3 May 1998, Andrew Wayne Austin wrote: > On Sun, 3 May 1998, Dennis R Redmond wrote: > > > On Sun, 3 May 1998, Judi Kessler wrote: > > > > > ...Here comes the "euro" - Now is the opportunity to generate some great > > > 1998, down-to-earth, concrete, political-economy discussion. > > > > Well, for starters, it helps to remember that the euro is just the most > > obvious and leading-edge symptom of the EU's emergence as a global > > superpower (and, conversely, the decline of the US to an ex-hegemon). > > Ex-hegemon in what sense? The sense that we have shifted from imperialism > and neoimperialist domination to hegemonic domination via polyarchy is > really only a change in formal tactic. But there is a deeper implication. > US machinery is the weapon for global capitalism, America coming to play > this role with the Americanization of the world economy, or put otherwise > the globalization of Americanism (major facet of the dialectic of current > world-history). In this sense the US has not declined at all but has > increased its hegemonic power, through the spread of culture-ideology, > particular economic structurings and political model of elite rule. The > sphere of influence of the Americanized global bourgeoisie is being > totalized as capital is becoming deterritorialized. Americanism is an > organic phenomenon. The nation-state is the face on capital, and to the > extent that capital eclipses its own front by transnationalization then > one may speak of the US hegemon declining. But to speak of other such > fronts eclipsing the US hegemon is to miss this central issue. A > restatement of the problem is in order. > > Andy > > > Whether the thing succeeds or fails, one thing should be > > obvious: the EU countries and their satellites comprise > > roughly a quarter of the world economy, and are largely self-financing and > > self-supporting in trade, finance, industry and what have you. The EU is a > > net global creditor, along with Japan; America is the world's biggest > > debtor. But the US dollar is still the world reserve currency; meaning, > > the debtor still has some leeway over the creditor (we could inflate away > > the value of our currency). The euro is all about taking away this > > last of our Imperial privileges, and providing the financial sinews for > > the further development of the Eurostate. > > > > The euro in its present form may well fail, i.e. Spain and Italy may drop > > out of the common currency, leaving instead a mini-euro comprised of the > > Benelux countries, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Austria, Ireland and > > Finland. But the drive towards economic integration and the rise of EU > > multinationals in the face of stiff US competition is going to continue. > > The politics of the EU are the politics of integration, so Left > > alternatives to the current global market mayhem have to deal with this > > seriously. For one thing, who gets to run the European Central Bank? The > > Maastricht treaty says, a coven of bankers, with no oversight from any > > elected body or parliament (even more undemocratic than the US Federal > > Reserve, if such a thing were possible). And if the euro arrives, it'll > > bring a common banking and financial system in its wake. How are countries > > like Italy and Spain going to compete head-on with German firms without > > some serious EU-wide subsidies? Instead of kowtowing to the demolition > > of the national welfare state, why can't the Euroleft call for a truly > > European-wide expansion of the welfare state, plus emergency programs for > > jobs and ecological reconstruction, to be financed by soaking the numerous > > Eurorich? > > > > -- Dennis > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Judi A. Kessler University of California, Santa Barbara Department of Sociology Santa Barbara, California 93106 (805) 893-3751 fax (805) 893-3324 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From aaustin@utkux.utcc.utk.edu Sun May 3 18:19:54 1998 Date: Sun, 3 May 1998 20:19:47 -0400 (EDT) From: Andrew Wayne Austin To: Judi Kessler <6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> Subject: Re: PLEASE... In-Reply-To: Judy, What is "samo old"? I have never heard that phrase before. Andy On Sun, 3 May 1998, Judi Kessler wrote: > Dennis - nice, informative, thought-provoking response. > However it looks like the dialogue is deteriorating into the same old "samo > old" > I guess we all can fall back on the "delete" key. > > On Sun, 3 May 1998, Andrew Wayne Austin wrote: > > > On Sun, 3 May 1998, Dennis R Redmond wrote: > > > > > On Sun, 3 May 1998, Judi Kessler wrote: > > > > > > > ...Here comes the "euro" - Now is the opportunity to generate some great > > > > 1998, down-to-earth, concrete, political-economy discussion. > > > > > > Well, for starters, it helps to remember that the euro is just the most > > > obvious and leading-edge symptom of the EU's emergence as a global > > > superpower (and, conversely, the decline of the US to an ex-hegemon). > > > > Ex-hegemon in what sense? The sense that we have shifted from imperialism > > and neoimperialist domination to hegemonic domination via polyarchy is > > really only a change in formal tactic. But there is a deeper implication. > > US machinery is the weapon for global capitalism, America coming to play > > this role with the Americanization of the world economy, or put otherwise > > the globalization of Americanism (major facet of the dialectic of current > > world-history). In this sense the US has not declined at all but has > > increased its hegemonic power, through the spread of culture-ideology, > > particular economic structurings and political model of elite rule. The > > sphere of influence of the Americanized global bourgeoisie is being > > totalized as capital is becoming deterritorialized. Americanism is an > > organic phenomenon. The nation-state is the face on capital, and to the > > extent that capital eclipses its own front by transnationalization then > > one may speak of the US hegemon declining. But to speak of other such > > fronts eclipsing the US hegemon is to miss this central issue. A > > restatement of the problem is in order. > > > > Andy > > > > > Whether the thing succeeds or fails, one thing should be > > > obvious: the EU countries and their satellites comprise > > > roughly a quarter of the world economy, and are largely self-financing and > > > self-supporting in trade, finance, industry and what have you. The EU is a > > > net global creditor, along with Japan; America is the world's biggest > > > debtor. But the US dollar is still the world reserve currency; meaning, > > > the debtor still has some leeway over the creditor (we could inflate away > > > the value of our currency). The euro is all about taking away this > > > last of our Imperial privileges, and providing the financial sinews for > > > the further development of the Eurostate. > > > > > > The euro in its present form may well fail, i.e. Spain and Italy may drop > > > out of the common currency, leaving instead a mini-euro comprised of the > > > Benelux countries, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Austria, Ireland and > > > Finland. But the drive towards economic integration and the rise of EU > > > multinationals in the face of stiff US competition is going to continue. > > > The politics of the EU are the politics of integration, so Left > > > alternatives to the current global market mayhem have to deal with this > > > seriously. For one thing, who gets to run the European Central Bank? The > > > Maastricht treaty says, a coven of bankers, with no oversight from any > > > elected body or parliament (even more undemocratic than the US Federal > > > Reserve, if such a thing were possible). And if the euro arrives, it'll > > > bring a common banking and financial system in its wake. How are countries > > > like Italy and Spain going to compete head-on with German firms without > > > some serious EU-wide subsidies? Instead of kowtowing to the demolition > > > of the national welfare state, why can't the Euroleft call for a truly > > > European-wide expansion of the welfare state, plus emergency programs for > > > jobs and ecological reconstruction, to be financed by soaking the numerous > > > Eurorich? > > > > > > -- Dennis > > > > > > > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > Judi A. Kessler > University of California, Santa Barbara > Department of Sociology > Santa Barbara, California 93106 > (805) 893-3751 > fax (805) 893-3324 > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > From 6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu Sun May 3 20:43:44 1998 Sun, 3 May 1998 19:43:31 -0700 (PDT) Date: Sun, 3 May 1998 19:43:31 -0700 (PDT) From: Judi Kessler <6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> To: Andrew Wayne Austin Subject: Re: PLEASE... In-Reply-To: Sometimes it's phrased as same ole' same ole' - it means beating a very dead horse to death. On Sun, 3 May 1998, Andrew Wayne Austin wrote: > Judy, > > What is "samo old"? I have never heard that phrase before. > > Andy > > On Sun, 3 May 1998, Judi Kessler wrote: > > > Dennis - nice, informative, thought-provoking response. > > However it looks like the dialogue is deteriorating into the same old "samo > > old" > > I guess we all can fall back on the "delete" key. > > > > On Sun, 3 May 1998, Andrew Wayne Austin wrote: > > > > > On Sun, 3 May 1998, Dennis R Redmond wrote: > > > > > > > On Sun, 3 May 1998, Judi Kessler wrote: > > > > > > > > > ...Here comes the "euro" - Now is the opportunity to generate some great > > > > > 1998, down-to-earth, concrete, political-economy discussion. > > > > > > > > Well, for starters, it helps to remember that the euro is just the most > > > > obvious and leading-edge symptom of the EU's emergence as a global > > > > superpower (and, conversely, the decline of the US to an ex-hegemon). > > > > > > Ex-hegemon in what sense? The sense that we have shifted from imperialism > > > and neoimperialist domination to hegemonic domination via polyarchy is > > > really only a change in formal tactic. But there is a deeper implication. > > > US machinery is the weapon for global capitalism, America coming to play > > > this role with the Americanization of the world economy, or put otherwise > > > the globalization of Americanism (major facet of the dialectic of current > > > world-history). In this sense the US has not declined at all but has > > > increased its hegemonic power, through the spread of culture-ideology, > > > particular economic structurings and political model of elite rule. The > > > sphere of influence of the Americanized global bourgeoisie is being > > > totalized as capital is becoming deterritorialized. Americanism is an > > > organic phenomenon. The nation-state is the face on capital, and to the > > > extent that capital eclipses its own front by transnationalization then > > > one may speak of the US hegemon declining. But to speak of other such > > > fronts eclipsing the US hegemon is to miss this central issue. A > > > restatement of the problem is in order. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > Whether the thing succeeds or fails, one thing should be > > > > obvious: the EU countries and their satellites comprise > > > > roughly a quarter of the world economy, and are largely self-financing and > > > > self-supporting in trade, finance, industry and what have you. The EU is a > > > > net global creditor, along with Japan; America is the world's biggest > > > > debtor. But the US dollar is still the world reserve currency; meaning, > > > > the debtor still has some leeway over the creditor (we could inflate away > > > > the value of our currency). The euro is all about taking away this > > > > last of our Imperial privileges, and providing the financial sinews for > > > > the further development of the Eurostate. > > > > > > > > The euro in its present form may well fail, i.e. Spain and Italy may drop > > > > out of the common currency, leaving instead a mini-euro comprised of the > > > > Benelux countries, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Austria, Ireland and > > > > Finland. But the drive towards economic integration and the rise of EU > > > > multinationals in the face of stiff US competition is going to continue. > > > > The politics of the EU are the politics of integration, so Left > > > > alternatives to the current global market mayhem have to deal with this > > > > seriously. For one thing, who gets to run the European Central Bank? The > > > > Maastricht treaty says, a coven of bankers, with no oversight from any > > > > elected body or parliament (even more undemocratic than the US Federal > > > > Reserve, if such a thing were possible). And if the euro arrives, it'll > > > > bring a common banking and financial system in its wake. How are countries > > > > like Italy and Spain going to compete head-on with German firms without > > > > some serious EU-wide subsidies? Instead of kowtowing to the demolition > > > > of the national welfare state, why can't the Euroleft call for a truly > > > > European-wide expansion of the welfare state, plus emergency programs for > > > > jobs and ecological reconstruction, to be financed by soaking the numerous > > > > Eurorich? > > > > > > > > -- Dennis > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > Judi A. Kessler > > University of California, Santa Barbara > > Department of Sociology > > Santa Barbara, California 93106 > > (805) 893-3751 > > fax (805) 893-3324 > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Judi A. Kessler University of California, Santa Barbara Department of Sociology Santa Barbara, California 93106 (805) 893-3751 fax (805) 893-3324 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From chriscd@jhu.edu Mon May 4 08:03:11 1998 Date: Mon, 04 May 1998 10:04:31 -0400 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: San Francisco is a MAI Free Zone! (fwd)] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu This is a multi-part message in MIME format. Date: Fri, 24 Apr 1998 11:36:33 -1000 From: Michael Sysiuk Subject: San Francisco is a MAI Free Zone! (fwd) To: UH Department of Political Science List , Gulbenkian Report Discourse And they resistence is futile. mike ++++++ -----Original Message----- From: Julietbeck (by way of Michael Eisenscher ) To: Recipient list suppressed Date: Friday, April 24, 1998 11:32 AM Subject: San Francisco is a MAI Free Zone! On Monday, April 20, 1998, the campaign against the MAI and corporate globalization scored a big victory when the San Francisco Board of Supervisors voted unanimously to approve a resolution to oppose the MAI and "similar international agreements that could restrict San Francisco's ability to regulate within its jurisdiction, decide how to spend its procurement funds and support local economic development." With this resolution, which was drafted in part by the city attorney's office, San Francisco has taken a hard line not only against the MAI but also future economic pacts that give more powers to international investors while attempting to tie the hands of local government to regulate them. This proactive stance sends free-traders and the White House a much needed reality check: what's good for multinational corporations is not necessarily what's best for our communities, working people, the environment and human rights. We have not only staked out San Francisco as an MAI-free zone, but in thinking globally and acting locally, have reclaimed some of the power being lost to the corporations driving the global economy, and now you can too! Getting a resolution passed is fun and meaningful. It is about educating decision makers, the media and the public about the real corporate agenda behind these undemocratic agreements like the MAI. If every city, county and state followed suit - we could redefine the terms of the globalization debate by truly returning economic-decision making to the local realm, a place where values and people matter. This is grassroots democracy at work, folks! Globalization from the bottom up! Below I have included the following: - an account of how the MAI resolution was passed - a sample press release - a San Francisco Chronicle article illustrating local impacts - a copy of the SF resolution, which you can use as a model Please contact me if you are considering this process and would like a more detailed "how to pass a resolution" emailed to you. I'd be happy to answer any questions, and provide hard copies of these materials and any additional info and advice. Good luck and have fun! Juliette Beck, julietbeck@aol.com 415 986-3585, ext. 231. Coordinator of the California Fair Trade Campaign So how did we do it? A small, dedicated group followed the tenets of effective organizing: educate, advocate and activate. The resolution process got started when two people marched down to the city hall one day and started talking to staff members of the Board of Supervisors. The key to getting the attention of the elected officials was doing homework to determine the local laws and policies that would be threatened by the MAI. Our initial co-sponsor, Supervisor Tom Ammiano, was so incensed that the MAI would endanger San Francisco's selective purchasing ordinance against Burma and a law requiring corporations to pay domestic partners equal benefits that he introduced the resolution that very same day. Identifying the local impacts makes the MAI hit home. Once the resolution was introduced, we started a broader education process and sent out a press release, followed up with calls to the media to explain what this treaty was about, and reached out to other groups- including small business owners- to enlist their support in getting the resolution passed. One of the most important things we did was to focus on educating the city attorney's office. City lawyers attended our public forum, we talked on the phone, and followed up by sending a big packet of information to them. A city attorney provided the testimony at a committee meeting that was quoted extensively by the media (see article below) and helped rewrite the resolution to cite the particularly harmful MAI provisions and any future economic agreements that contains these elements, which is what makes this resolution so far-reaching. At the third meeting of our MAI task force held a week before the vote, only a few people showed up. But these four people helped generate enough pressure (phone calls from constituents, letters/faxes, visits) that all of the Board of Supervisors voted in favor of the resolution. By Friday before the vote, we had nailed down enough co-sponsors to ensure passage. On the day it passed, we held a press conference with people holding 'Make San Francisco a MAI Free Zone' and 'MAI will Handcuff Democracy' signs and stickers. Some of our local coalition partners - Victor Menotti from the International Forum on Globalization, Henry Holmes of Sustainable Alternatives to the Global Economy, and representatives from Global Exchange, Alliance for Democracy, Sierra Club, SF Labor Council and other labor unions, and San Franciscans for Tax Justice were all there to voice support. We didn't have much press, but later on inside the city chambers, we spoke with the press and helped them craft their stories. During the supervisors' meeting, the vote took place with no debate. Supervisor Ammiano thanked the local coalition for bringing this important issue to bare and then one by one, all of the others chimed in their support for the resolution. The unanimous vote signifies that even the most pro- business elected officials realized that the MAI and the trend of giving international investors more "rights without responsibilities" could hamper local economic development. All in all, this was a tremendously rewarding endeavor in grassroots democracy and moved our city one more step along the path of economic justice! Sample Press Release California Fair Trade Campaign 417 Montgomery St, Ste 300, San Francisco, CA 94104 (415) 986-3585x231 FAX (415) 392-8505 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE APRIL 20, 1998 S.F. Supervisors Vote Against International Investment Pact MAI is a threat to local government, local businesses San Francisco - On Monday, April 20, 1998 the San Francisco Board of Supervisors voted unanimously on a resolution to oppose a far-reaching new economic pact, the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). An increasing number of public officials and citizens' groups oppose the MAI because it will limit lawmakers' ability to design economic development policies that favor local, small, or minority owned businesses, while granting foreign investors new powers to challenge domestic laws and sue for damages in international tribunals. A recent San Francisco Chronicle article stated, "If it (the MAI) became law in the United States, the treaty would bind local, state and federal governments to treat foreign investors the same as domestic companies. That means foreigners could challenge a whole host of San Francisco laws," (Page A22, Friday, April 10, 1998). For example, a new S.F. ordinance requiring uniforms used by city employees to be purchased from local garment manufacturers would be illegal under the MAI. "The MAI would effectively outlaw policies that protect local businesses, workers, human rights, the environment, and regulate foreign corporations operating in our communities. Under the MAI, local governments' ability to ensure corporate accountability is severely handcuffed," said Supervisor Tom Ammiano. The vote signifies a growing resistance to global economic policies that grant more rights to multinational corporations without enforceable social and environmental standards and respect for local autonomy. Juliette Beck, coordinator of the California Fair Trade Campaign, helped galvanize support for the anti-MAI resolution as part of a nationwide, grassroots effort to inform the public and decision makers about the undemocratic nature of the proposed treaty. "The MAI-- an agreement written by and for multinational corporations- is clearly at odds with local economic development policies. Cities and counties everywhere, like San Francisco, should become 'MAI-free zones,'" she said. The U.S. and 28 industrialized countries are currently negotiating the MAI at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris, France. The deadline for completing the MAI has been set for April 27 and 28, the date of the OECD's annual meeting, but with growing political opposition, the outcome of the April meeting is uncertain. More information on the MAI can be found at the following web sites: www.citizen.org; www.rtk.net/preamble; www.westgov.org/wga/publicat/maiweb.htm www.appletonlaw.com/MAI/MAI-municipal.htm ### Trade Treaty Opposed by S.F. Supervisors Panel Edward Epstein, Chronicle Staff Writer Friday, April 10, 1998 c1998 San Francisco Chronicle A San Francisco supervisors committee voted yesterday to weigh in against a proposed international treaty that critics say would sweep away a host of local laws on the environment, labor and contracting and hiring preferences for city residents. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) is being negotiated by 29 members of the Paris- based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a group of the world's wealthiest countries that includes the United States. Treaty proponents say it would eliminate a host of barriers to trade and investment that hinder economic growth. But critics call it ``NAFTA on steroids'' and are scrambling to get its terms changed before the treaty is presented to the U.S. Senate for ratification. They are trying to get cities like San Francisco to express their concern about the treaty and try to get it changed. ``I found a lot to be alarmed by in the terms of the MAI,'' said Christiane Hayashi, a deputy city attorney who studied the draft treaty at the request of Supervisor Tom Ammiano. If it became law in the United States, the treaty would bind local, state and federal governments to treat foreign investors the same as domestic companies. That means foreigners could challenge a host of San Francisco laws. These could include the city's domestic partners law, its program for giving local small businesses preference in opening shops at the airport or its ordinance suggesting the city not do business with companies that do business in Burma. It could also doom Supervisor Mabel Teng's proposal to have all uniforms of city workers made in the city. If a foreign company sued, San Francisco might not get to defend itself. Under the draft treaty, cases could go directly to an arbitration panel in which the federal government would represent the city. ``So a company could claim that our domestic partners law impedes them doing business here, and we could not defend ourselves?'' Ammiano asked. ``If it's before the international tribunal, San Francisco's participation would be at the mercy of the State Department,'' Hayashi said. The United States has already said it plans to make numerous exceptions to the treaty, including programs for helping minorities and some environmental measures. The economic cooperation group says that is allowable. ``Nonconforming measures can be maintained if specific reservations or exceptions are lodged,'' a statement from the organization said. It also said the treaty is not aimed at doing away with current U.S. laws. ``Governments will remain free to regulate in most fields, provided the nondiscrimination rule (for foreign investors) is respected,'' the statement read. But Ammiano wasn't buying it. ``The MAI is pernicious to any local sovereignty,'' he said. c1998 San Francisco Chronicle Page A22 SF ANTI MAI RESOLUTION Below is a copy of the San Francisco anti-MAI resolution. It was agendized before the regular meeting of the Health, Family and Environment Committee of the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of San Francisco on 4/9/98. The agenda item was listed as follows: "File 98-242. [Supporting San Francisco Oversight] Resolution expressing San Francisco's opposition to International, Federal, and State agreements that restrict local government's ability to impose sanctions on organizations and entities that do not comply with San Francisco's human rights requirements." The item was moved out of committee unanimously by Supervisors Sue Bierman, Leslie Katz, and Tom Ammiano, who introduced the item. It is expected that the full San Francisco Board of Supervisor's will vote on the matter on Monday, April 20, 1998, at their regular board meeting. Passage is likely. Multilateral Agreement on Investment EXPRESSING SAN FRANCISCO'S OPPOSITION TO PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT OR SIMILAR INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS THAT COULD RESTRICT SAN FRANCISCO'S ABILITY TO REGULATE WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION, DECIDE HOW TO SPEND ITS PROCUREMENT FUNDS AND SUPPORT LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. WHEREAS, The United States government, through the Organization for Economic Development (OECD) has been participating in the negotiation of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI); and WHEREAS, The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution allows public entities to place restrictions on the use of public funds when the public entity is acting as a market participant; and WHEREAS, San Francisco has utilized the "market participant exception" to the Commerce Clause in enacting the Burma and Equal Benefits ordinances in order to condition receipt of public procurement dollars on compliance with local, federal and international human rights laws; and WHEREAS, The "Expropriation" and "General Treatment" provisions of the MAI draft text could prohibit public entities from conditioning the receipt of public funds on compliance with human rights laws or other criteria reflecting community values; and WHEREAS, The MAI, if adopted in its current form, could restrict the ability of state, county and city governments to condition new major investments within their jurisdictions from performance requirements, such as local hiring requirements and requirements to support local economic development; and WHEREAS, Government entities are currently allowed to regulate within their jurisdiction, without causing a compensable taking of private property, to the extent specified under existing interpretations of the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution; and WHEREAS, The MAI, if adopted in its current form, could supersede existing constitutional interpretations of a government's regulatory rights under the Fifth Amendment and restrict new regulation by state and local governments; and WHEREAS, The "National Treatment" provisions of the MAI draft text could prohibit the use of domestic procurement preferences and subsidies and other benefits to local businesses for the purpose of encouraging local economic development; and WHEREAS, The "Most Favored Nation" provisions of the MAI draft text could prohibit state and local governments from prohibiting contracts with entities that violate international human rights, labor and environmental laws; and WHEREAS, The MAI, if adopted in its current form, could bar Congress, state legislatures, boards of supervisors and city councils from using trade sanctions to punish nations for human rights violations or other violations of international law; and WHEREAS, The MAI, if adopted in its current form, could create a dispute resolution mechanism for investors against governments that is external to the United States federal court system and could be unrestricted by existing judicial interpretations of U.S. constitutional principles; now, therefore, be it RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of San Francisco hereby urges its state and federally elected officials and lobbyists to actively protest any provision in the MAI draft text or similar provision of any international agreement that would restrict San Francisco's ability to regulate within its jurisdiction, decide how to use its public procurement dollars, and extend benefits to encourage local economic development in a manner consistent with the U.S. Constitution. SUPERVISOR AMMIANO BOARD OF SUPERVISORS From dgreen@UDel.Edu Mon May 4 08:15:39 1998 Mon, 4 May 1998 10:15:34 -0400 (EDT) Date: Mon, 4 May 1998 10:15:34 -0400 (EDT) From: Daniel M Green To: Judi Kessler <6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> Subject: Euro in Braudelian Perspective In-Reply-To: Resolved: The Euro will mark a watershed in the eclipse of the American economy, reducing the USA to the status of just another large economy and causing a major political crisis in this country within the next 4-5 years. Daniel Green University of Delaware On Sun, 3 May 1998, Judi Kessler wrote: > ...Here comes the "euro" - Now is the opportunity to generate some great > 1998, down-to-earth, concrete, political-economy discussion. > For those of you who are still bound up in counting capitalism's years (or > centuries), use some restraint and back off. Same goes for those of you > who are tempted to argue ad nauseum which "long cycle" (circa "the first > appearance of homo homo sapien") is been responsible for the European > monetary union. > Come out, all you Euro WS people who follow events in THIS century. > Who am *I*? No one. Just a very informed doctoral student, bored to tears > with the WSN. > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > Judi A. Kessler > University of California, Santa Barbara > Department of Sociology > Santa Barbara, California 93106 > (805) 893-3751 > fax (805) 893-3324 > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > From bill.schell@murraystate.edu Mon May 4 09:07:45 1998 X-Internal-ID: 35352CB700025D62 Date: Mon, 04 May 1998 09:51:52 -0500 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: Bill Schell Subject: euro The Euro will not prove workable. A number of European nations are reluctant participants (that is, the measure was barely approved) while others (Belgium and Italy) may not meet the stringent requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact necessary to participate. The centralization of reserves by participating nations will lead the Union to dispose of "excess reserves: (ie dollars and gold) which may well do great harm to global financial stability. Moreover, as Europe continues to expand to include more of the former Soviet empire, there will be increasingly serious policy divergences over monetary policy. The whole thing is a house of cards -- smoke and mirrors. A question in parting -- whu did the proponents of this brain-dead scheme always speak of the cost of currency exchange when the potential for profitable arbitarge must always coexist? From 6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu Mon May 4 09:28:14 1998 Mon, 4 May 1998 08:28:05 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 4 May 1998 08:28:04 -0700 (PDT) From: Judi Kessler <6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> To: Bill Schell Subject: Re: euro In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19980504095152.006a764c@murraystate.edu> Could be. But keep in mind, a united Europe ("It's good to be king" - and that's as true for currencies as for people - (plagarized!)), IF it happens, with its investments, debt securities, and commodity prices suddenly denominated in a single currency, will become an easier place to channel significant sums of money. If outsiders were to decide, even gradually, to shift capital away from the US and to Europe, the results, among others, would be an upward pressure on our interest rates, which bodes ill for the US stock market (home buyers, purchasers of large non-durables, etc) As you point out, however, all this depends on whether the monetary union will work in Europe. The opposite could happen. Can Europe'sdiverse countries survive under a single central bank (witness the nasty battle between Germany and France over the first director) that may simultaneously be too restrictive for some countries and too loose for others? But...I would not go so far as to dismiss it as a "house of cards." Better to wait, watch, pay close attention... On Mon, 4 May 1998, Bill Schell wrote: > The Euro will not prove workable. A number of European nations are > reluctant participants (that is, the measure was barely approved) while > others (Belgium and Italy) may not meet the stringent requirements of the > Stability and Growth Pact necessary to participate. The centralization of > reserves by participating nations will lead the Union to dispose of "excess > reserves: (ie dollars and gold) which may well do great harm to global > financial stability. Moreover, as Europe continues to expand to include > more of the former Soviet empire, there will be increasingly serious policy > divergences over monetary policy. The whole thing is a house of cards -- > smoke and mirrors. A question in parting -- whu did the proponents of this > brain-dead scheme always speak of the cost of currency exchange when the > potential for profitable arbitarge must always coexist? > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Judi A. Kessler University of California, Santa Barbara Department of Sociology Santa Barbara, California 93106 (805) 893-3751 fax (805) 893-3324 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From gderlug@nwu.edu Mon May 4 09:55:09 1998 Mon, 4 May 1998 10:54:58 -0500 (CDT) In-Reply-To: Date: Mon, 4 May 1998 10:55:11 -0500 To: 6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu, WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: "Georgi M. Derluguian" Subject: Ms. Kessler's voice Sounds like we've got another enfant terrible, demanding and capricious. Any nannies around? Georgi M. Derluguian Assistant Professor Department of Sociology Northwestern University 1812 Chicago Avenue Evanston, Illinois 60208-1330 (847) 491-2741 (rabota) From austria@it.com.pl Mon May 4 10:28:55 1998 Reply-To: From: "Austrian Embassy" To: Subject: Tausch: private personal opinions on facts and fantasies about the EURO Date: Mon, 4 May 1998 18:34:46 +0200 >From my recent analysis: Globalization and European Integration For a quick fix, I did no bother about the colorful EXCEL graphs in the original manuscript There is the danger, that Euro-monetarism will accelerate the tendency of the world system on its path towards financial speculation, narco-capitalism, and the shifting of resources away from the Atlantic region towards the Pacific. On the other hand, it is evident that Europe's long-term ascent from the Long 16th Century onwards from the state of a former periphery of the world system to a center (Arrighi, 1995; Amin, 1975), which was based on agrarian reform and mass demand, is now threatening to be reversed by the application of monetary orthodoxy. The Maastricht debate is characterized by the following basic fallacies: Fallacy number one: by high unemployment you can control inflation. At the outset of this technical appendix, we would thus like to state that unemployment, first of all, is an enormous waste of economic resources. For 18 western democracies with complete UNDP (or Federal Ministry of Labor of the Republic of Austria) data for 1995, we have: Graph 9.13: Unemployment is a waste of resources Thus, only at very small and at very high levels of already existing unemployment, a 'shock therapy' might work to flatten out budget deficits. But else, there is an across the board negative correlation between unemployment and budget surplus, i.e. increasing unemployment still increases deficits. Saving has limits. And here, the sad story of Euro-'monetarism' begins (the hyphens are to indicate, that the relationship between real monetarist theory of the Milton Friedman type to contemporary European applications is far from certain; see also Friedman's excellent essay on the EURO, 1997). And here, we start: 'Jacques Rueff, fierce 1950s critic of American monetary hegemony, once said: 'Europe will be built through a currency or it will not be built at all'. What the ERM story shows is quite the opposite: trying to lock countries like France and Germany together via their currencies does not forge one nation; instead it turns domestic monetary questions into international political conflicts' (Connolly, 1995: 1995) It is time to stress the fundamental weaknesses of the EMU project from the viewpoint of world system theory. Up to now, Europe does not form an integrated economic region with truly European transnational corporations; Europe forms only a preferential market (Amin, 1997). Secondly, Europe does not have a continental societal project, that would integrate such areas as research and development, public markets, and would have a joint commercial and corporate law, and as yet does not integrate the vital sectors of film and TV production. Trade union and other social law would have to be integrated, and Europe does not have as yet a joint project of external relations with the other regions of the world economy (Amin, 1997; Friedman, 1997). The EMU project should facilitate a truly common market, the free movement of capital and stable external exchange rates. As the critics of the project have shown all along, the project could only function if there is a parallel economic and social policy in the member states of EMU; that means harmonization of tax and expenditure systems, the integration at the level of corporate policy, and the harmonization of trade union policy at the European level. There would have to be a coordinated European policy not only of the internal, but also of the external opening of markets - especially regarding foreign investment and capital inflows from third countries (Amin, 1997). I would even dare to say that neomarxists like Samir Amin and neo-liberals like Vaclav Klaus agree on the 'constructivist' approach of EMU - running counter to the world economic tendencies of contemporary capitalism. We all know by today the Maastricht criteria (Rothschild, 1997): a) in the examination year an inflation rate no more than 1.5 percent above the average of the three EU states with the lowest price rises b) a long-term rate of interest within two percentage points of the average of the three 'best' countries c) a national budget deficit (covering national, federal and local governments) less than 3 percent of GDP d) a public debt ratio which does not exceed 60 percent of GDP e) a currency for two years within the normal band of EMS Fallacy number two now arises: that economic theory supports the EURO. Academic economists found 24 main arguments against the EURO: (i) external changes and shocks will not be answered anymore by changes in the external exchange rate. Since the exchange rate is not anymore a factor of economic policy regulation, either migration, wage flexibility, fiscal policy or economic transfers from other countries will become the main regulatory mechanisms in the new, monetarily united Union (Friedman, 1997; see also Klaus, 1997; Beirat 1996; Stephen Roach from Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Neue Zuercher Zeitung, Monday, 16th of June, 1997: 16) (ii) but labor is not that flexible; so the result will be - in all probability - economic transfers within the EMU countries. Economic transfers are the inevitable result of monetary union (a contradiction, perhaps spelt out most clearly by the neo-liberal former acting Czech Premier and neo-liberal economist Vaclav Klaus, 1997). This scenario will lead to the inevitable result of a loss of autonomy of national fiscal policies (Klaus, 1997). Such a scenario is all the more likely since there is no convergence in the productivity of labor in the EMU countries themselves. Without a financial transfer system from the rich to the poor regions, EMU will prove to be not operational, anywhere up to $bn 1000 DM will have to be transferred (Borchert, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 1st March, 1997: 25; Watzal, 1997), thus repeating the experience of the integration of the New Laender into the Federal Republic (iii) the problems of the classic 'euro-monetarist' Maastricht package are compounded by the fact that not governments, but parliaments decide on fiscal policy in European democracies - thus making the signatures of heads of governments or foreign ministers under treaties of stability liable to parliamentary control - or worse - Maastricht would have led to the gradual erosion of the role of the national parliaments in favor of the executive branch (iv) according to the textbooks, the function of financial markets is the transfer of savings into the financing of real economic investments (Beirat, 1996). On a global scale, European and Atlantic region savings in general will be transferred to real economic investments in East Asia, formerly the most dynamic region of the capitalist world economy (Arrighi, 1995), to be succeeded today possibly by China, and or India. Gross domestic savings in the European Union are only 20%, and gross domestic investment only 19% of GDP. In the US, savings (15%) and investments (16%) are even lower. For the moment, the international system seems to work in a very simple way: international debts finance the Asian/US economic compound. On a global scale, East Asia achieved an investment boom (37% investments per GDP), followed by South-East Asia and the Pacific region (33%), while Eastern Europe and the CIS stand at 22% savings and investments each (UNDP, 1996). Only Sub-Saharan Africa has a lower savings and investments rate than the EU and the USA. At the heart of the 'euro-monetarist' Maastricht prescriptions against the European ills now lies the assumption, that monetary policy will influence only prices, but not output and employment. The EMU-optimists hope that the single currency will be an ideal instrument for Europe to sustain in international economic competition. But a 'hard' EURO will be of a negative influence on trade-, and hence, on European current account balances with the rest of the world, since European exports will become more expensive and European imports will become cheaper internationally. Until now, de-valuations were a proper economic policy instrument of the weaker European economies to balance their negative current accounts, as the example of Spain and Italy over the last years amply demonstrates. This instrument would now be absent; only migration, the wage rate, transfers and or unemployment would be the only options left for the European mezzogiorno under EMU (see above, and Boyer, 1996, Friedman, 1997). A sinister argument could even be, that the motives for the EMU project could be rather inner-European competition. A 'hard' EURO comprising the European mezzogiorno, would ruin exporters in the South (that made important headways against the dominance of German TNCs in Europe over recent years) while cementing the position of German and a few other multinationals - banks and companies - on an increasingly protected European home market. Then, indeed, the European Union would become what Samir Amin has contemptuously called 'The Fourth Reich' (Amin, 1997). Germany, far away from being Europe's 'growth locomotive', is on its 'best' way to become an economy, typically characterized by double deficits: total debts of the public sector exploding since the 1970s (now reaching DEMbn 2133.3); subventions now standing at DEMbn 116.2; the current account balance deficit 0.6% of GDP, unemployment, for years cosmetically 'polished up' by excluding the German East from the country's international statistics, now at 11.2% and reaching the highest levels since the end of the Weimar Republic (v) on the other hand, the 'euro-monetarist' package against future inflation under EMU, that solely relies on 5 monetary criteria, overlooks the very plausible role of encompassing trade unions in combating inflation - an argument, originally also conceded by neo-liberal economic theory. Furthermore, the 'euro-monetarist' Maastricht strategy, as envisaged by around 1995-1997, would have brought about a monetary union between precisely those EU countries that already are in the upper 1/4 or 1/3 of stability on the European continent - with uncertain implications for the unfortunate rest (Beirat, 1996). The election victory of the French left on June 1st 1997 is inseparable from the strains that the original 'euro-monetarist' interpretation of the Maastricht project brought about. The annual rate of inflation in EU-Europe is the minor problem: the real problem is massive European unemployment and the massive social disintegration of the European cities. Don't be surprised if there are severe riots in countries like France over the next years (vi) you cannot exclude an entire region from the project of European Monetary Union. The Kohl/Waigel strategy would have relied on the European North, and not on the South. The political backlash against Euro-monetarism, Frankfurt (Franc fort?)-style, is only too well understandable, considering the high social costs that French society in particular would have had to bear. Dramatic words are being used by European politicians nowadays: the EURO should guarantee peace on the European continent et cetera. But the reality is different: it creates the very conflicts between a 'hard' and a 'soft' European economic zone. But a 'weak' Euro' would, most probably, also be no alternative: restructuring of ailing European enterprises will be postponed; with capital markets most probably reacting by pushing up interest rates (Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 16th of June, 1997: 9), thus prolonging the vicious downward cycle of the European political economy. The only real alternative would be to follow a socio-liberal flexible growth path (vii) currency speculations against the Italian Lira as the weakest part in the European currency chain are very likely in spring, summer and fall 1998 (Beirat, 1996). The 10 countries which fulfilled two, three or four Maastricht criteria by 1996 (Belgium, Germany, Finland, Netherlands, France, Austria, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom) would have had 55 votes on the EU council, while the 'outs' (Sweden and the European 'mezzogiorno') would have had enough votes (32) to block voting in the Council, so it was decided to take on board the 'weaklings' except Greece (Beirat, 1996; our own calculations from Weixner and Wimmer, 1997). This perspective could have also blocked the project of extending Europe eastward; but the price will be a more vulnerable Euro. The calculation is simple: take sufficient Lira credits in spring 1998, change them into Deutschmarks, spread the rumors, that the Lira will be devaluated, and pay back calmly your credits with enormous profits, while the Lira goes down the river Tiber (viii) all this will lead to a 'deficit' of democracy in the Union; in accordance with the liberal doctrine that the weakening of democracy is - inter alia - the result of the geographical distance between the locality, where decisions are taken, and the citizens, who are the subject of these decisions (Klaus, 1997) (ix) 1996, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece did not meet any of the first four criteria; Sweden missed three criteria; Germany and Austria two; and the rest of the Union at least one of the criteria (Weixner and Wimmer, 1997). Only Luxembourg met all the five Maastricht criteria (Weixner and Wimmer, 1997; Rothschild, 1997) (x) international financial speculation will prove to be a formidable factor in the line-up for the realization of the whole project. On 'Black Friday', July 30th 1993, the Bundesbank had to buy foreign currencies to the tune of $bn 30 DM under the old EMS (Weixner and Wimmer, 1997). Now, the political conflict lines in Europe would suggest: either a 'weaker' EURO against the Dollar and the Yen, which is good for the European export industries and the European South on the world markets; an option, probably supported by the new left wing governments around Europe; with the inevitable flight into real estate and the Dollar by the accumulated wealth in Germany (and, to a minor extent in the other countries) to the tune of over DMbn 4000 to DMbn 5000 as the immediate consequence; or Maastricht is realized at the cost of transforming the European East and South into a mirror-picture of the process of the integration of the New Laender into Germany after 1989. The vast size of accumulated savings in Germany, together with the savings of the European shadow economy, are an immense pool of potential speculative money, should the EURO project get into real trouble. Anything can happen: transfers into US $, real estate, Yen, Swiss Francs, Swedish Crones. Remember in this context, that - compared to these huge amounts of accumulated legal and illegal wealth - the German currency reserves are 'only' $bn 80.2: a sustained speculation against the Deutschmark on the international financial markets could trigger-off a panic reaction on the part of German wealth-holders, which could mean the end of the EMU project. Hardly observed is the fact, that German currency reserves amounted $bn 85.3 in 1996 and melted down to 80.2 in March 1997. International currency reserves could melt further under such circumstances like an atomic reactor during a greatest possible accident. Seen in such a way, the political class that rules Germany knew well enough, why it insisted all along on a 'hard EURO' - to the detriment of European export industries. But you cannot expect banking capital to rule against banking capital. In a real battle over international finances, the European strategic currency reserves are small compared to the Asian reserves, brought about by the enormous accumulated current account balances over the years. In 1997, Taiwan alone had currency reserves to the tune of $bn 88.0; Japan 218.2; China 114.0; Hong Kong 69.6, Singapore 77.3; while Switzerland had 35.3; and the USA only 56.2, with the big European economies like France, Spain, the Netherlands and Italy holding reserves to the tune of around 25 to 60 billion $ each. Well-established German financial institutes already more and more propagate Dollar savings accounts - a clear sign how real the re-transfer of German savings into US $ already has become, only temporarily halted by the currency crisis in Asia. It is significant, that the European mezzogiorno states Spain (60.6) and Italy (45.4) have increased their foreign currency reserves by about $bn 30 last year, and together already have larger reserves than the Federal Republic of Germany (xi) public opinion in the richer countries of the Union is mostly against the whole project, with rejection rates in 1996 already ranging from 46% in Austria to 64% in Denmark (Weixner and Wimmer, 1997) (xii) the erosion of the EMU-project finds it's counterpart in the erosion of the state of public finances in the Federal Republic of Germany. The economic consequences of Mr. Theo Waigel are very clear to judge: he presided over the doubling of Germany's public sector debt to $bn 1259 during his record tenure as Germany's longest-serving finance minister. His 'defiant alchemism' in his bitter dispute with the Bundesbank over German gold reserves is but the last straw in a long chain of events (Financial Times, Weekend, May 31st, June 1st, 1997) (xiii) the shadow economy will partially have to come out from the darkness, most probably increasing the already existing capital flight into the Dollar, the Yen, and into real estate. Indeed, considering the volatile character of international finances, a real avalanche could ensue, making the EMU-project impossible in the long run after a calm start (xiv) the Maastricht criteria will prove to be an instrument of anti-Keynesian global governance (Raffer, 1997). But the reception of neo-liberal economics by the EU-Commission and the Maastricht heads of governments was highly selective: while they seem to imply the importance of 5 monetary criteria, the Union overlooks day by day other neo-liberal prescriptions in important policy areas - from human capital policy over trade policy to agriculture (xv) if General Motors, AT & T, and individual households had been required to balance their budgets in the manner applied to the Federal Government (which in the US is under similar pressures as the governments in Europe), there would be no corporate bonds, no bank loans, and many fewer automobiles, telephones and houses (Vickrey, 1996). The Maastricht criteria are part and parcel of the 15 fatal fallacies of financial fundamentalism (xvi) a more useful arrangement than Maastricht would have been to achieve first a certain degree of political cohesion in order to arrive at a more consensual democratic and better enforceable economic framework (Rothschild, 1997; Amin, 1997) (xvii) there are fundamental differences between the 'freedoms' for capital and labor - the first can be moved without having to learn a language and without leaving behind friends and a familiar environment - labor even when organized in a union cannot threaten to transfer as to another firm or country. The freedom of labor does not present a countervailing power to the bargaining power obtained by business through the complete liberalization of capital movements; on the contrary; that bargaining power is strengthened by the uninhibited possibility of attracting workers from low-wage EU countries (Rothschild, 1997). The basic policy approach of Maastricht and the Commission overlooks this important fact (xviii) real outcomes in economic life, such as growth, employment, productivity, development, income distribution, do not figure at all in the so-called convergence criteria (Rothschild, 1997) (xix) full employment is a good precondition against inflation (xx) the harmonization of social conditions in the Union by the Social Charta remains one of the most important tasks for an effective, real monetary union, because this would lay down the conditions for a convergence in the real welfare conditions of the countries concerned (Rothschild, 1997) (xxi) with the Maastricht criteria, Kalecki's prediction, dated 1943, about a political business cycle with the entrepreneurs losing any real interest in full employment would come true (Rothschild, 1997; Raffer, 1997) (xxii) the institutionalized acceptance of neo-classical economics, inherent in the Maastricht criteria, is only one-sided. The Free Market optimism which had been developed on the assumptions of atomistic competition between powerless firms is transferred to a world of oligolopolies and mammoth corporations (Rothschild, 1997). (xxiii) the negative attitude to special protective treatment for the poorer regions and their development is the more astonishing in view of the fact that the Union is not opening it's own economic frontiers world-wide (Rothschild, 1997) (xxiv) the conflict between the 'ins' and the 'outs' would increase instead of decrease under a scenario of a strict implementation of the Maastricht criteria. Eastward extension of the Union would be more important than monetary union (Amin, 1997). Maastricht-style monetary union would, especially for the new members of the Union in the East, mean a two-class type of European integration Fallacy number three now consists in the assumption, that you can exclude the shadow economy and its accumulated savings from the EURO debate. A new currency will mean for the gangsters: open the money suitcases and try to exchange or place any bill that is not yet placed. But for many members of the huge and growing criminal underworld (there were 87 prisoners per 100000 population in the EU alone in 1993; i.e. a rise against the 77 per 100000 in 1987) the question of EMU is also a fundamental one: emerge with the cash? Place it somewhere? Exchange it for $ bills? To give an impression of the size of the criminal underworld, it might suffice here to state that in EU countries alone, there is a prison population of about 320000 people. Extending the Union eastwards and including the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Poland, would mean adding another 153000 people to this entire army. Just to give an imagination about the size of the problem, it might suffice here to state that by comparison, the entire armed forces of the European Union are only 2068000 people (all data calculated from UNDP, 1997). The battle over the EMU-project now unfolds on the international financial markets. Our prediction for Germany in this context is very dire. Germany's curency reserves and current account balances were pointing in downward directions for many years, only to recover slightly by now. This process was also inexorably linked to the phenomenon of the wealth transfer in Germany into foreign currency holdings. On paper, the USA face the same current account balance trends - to be weighted at any rate by the role of the $ in international transactions. Until recently, 'their' American-Asian-Pacific economic space attracted - mainly via the Japanese bank - a large percentage of the surplus capital of the world, partly also, because both legal and illegal funds, in anticipation of the EURO, flowed to that region. Japan's high official current account balance also pointed in a downward direction, but currency reserves go up - a clear indicator for the hypothesis, that both legal and illegal world surplus capital flows into Japan. Only experience will be able to tell us, how the recent currency crisis in East Asia is connected to major possible 'tectonical shifts' in international crime, international finance and surplus flows. It is entirely possible that a briefer strength period of the European currencies in the run-up to the EURO, will be followed months or years later, by a renewed Asian-oriented flow. Let us not underestimate especially the economic power of the Japanese Yakuza, the richest criminal organization in the world. The profit opportunities for the international speculators are enormous - 1997: rock the boat in Asia, jump in profits number one. Method: lending of local overvalued currencies, selling it into $ or European currencies. Pay back calmly your credits in local currencies, which are severely down. Now, 1998: rock the boat in Europe. Method: lending of Lira, selling it into $ or Asian currencies. Pay back calmly your Lira credits, which are worth nothing anymore. Now, 1999: rock the boat in America: Method: lending of $, selling it into Asian currencies. Pay back calmly your $ credits, which are worth nothing anymore as Asia recovers and the Arrighi cycle of financial transfers from the Atlantic to the Pacific nears its finish; America then stumbles, because its current account. On a world level, it is also absolutely unrealistic to overlook the power of international drug cartels and other criminal groups. 20 'narco states' (soft on drugs, according to the US State Department terminology, US State Department, 1996) had a considerable power over international reserves. The leading 'drug countries' with comparable data (see list at the end of the graph) control already $bn 324.137 currency reserves, while the 10 leading western industrial democracies and financial places (Japan, USA, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden) still control $bn 739.707. After the three-fold rock the boat strategy around the globe is finished, the gangsters and speculators will have been able to shift then this relationship decisively, to perhaps $bn 500 to 500 or even worse. Already today, an alarming proportion of OECD country currency reserves at any rate also stem from the proceeds of money laundering, as the comparison between current account balances and international reserves suggests: Graph 9.14: International reserves of 20 narco states and 10 leading western democracies Legend: reserves - bars, left-hand scale; current accounts - dotted line, right-hand scale. The currency reserves of the narco states are the following: 20 narco states 324137 Definition: A narco state is understood here as a country, figuring on the list of statements of explanation by the US Department of State International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1996 Even the most powerful capitalist nations are - due to the mechanisms of international financial markets, practically at the mercy of the currency reserves accumulated in the 20 leading narco states of the South (international reserves): Graph 9.15: The share of narco states in international reserves of the main world financial centers In the direct comparison between Japan, the US and Germany, we also see the basic weakness of the Deutschmark against the main contenders: Graph 9.16: currency reserves and current account balances since 1990 in the world system - Germany, Japan and the USA compared Legend: the following original data from Fischer Weltalmanach and Economist were used: Maastricht tries to achieve a stability that it can never achieve. The real reasons of financial instability on a global scale are to be found in the ever-larger share of drug money in international reserves and savings. $85 billion in drug profits are laundered through the financial markets each year, with an upward tendency. With total world savings at 22% of world GNP (25385 US$ billions), these profits are 1.5% of world savings. The volume of the drugs trade - at least $bn 500 - is 9% of world savings and approximately double the size of the largest single currency holdings of any country in the world system, Japan. The drug lords could ruin the international financial system. Maastricht walks another path - that of financial austerity, to bring about financial stability. Another fallacy, fallacy four, of the Maastricht process is that it excludes the option of full employment. UNDP-data 1996 show that labor force participation rates and inflation rates in the highly developed countries had quite a negative correlation with each other which flattens off only at very high levels of employment, thus indicating certain limits of the 'NAIRU' debate ('non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment')(Beirat, 1996). Maastricht policy brings about not only short-term, but also middle range and long-term unemployment; which - in the long run - is a very costly strategy, even increasing the very inflation process. Graph 9.17: unemployment, labor force participation rate and inflation in developed capitalism Since official unemployment statistics tell us only half the story about unemployment, the negative influence of labor force participation rates on inflation are telling indeed: Fallacy five consists in overlooking what a 'hard' EURO will mean for the European exporter. Like in the former GDR, it will mean an enormous upward push in the price of export goods on world markets. This analysis maintains all along, that factors, like the position in the world economy, are far more important variables than mere monetary aggregates. So why should Germany push so hard for a 'hard EURO'? The hypothesis, that German corporations and banks, by a policy of a hard EURO, rather tend towards eliminating present and future unwelcome competitors from the closed European home market, instead of providing the European backbone in the trilateral competition between Asia, America, and Europe, finds further support by a look at the current account balances of the world's leading industrial nations, in comparison with the EU, by around end 1996: Graph 9.18: European current account balances by international comparison Proponents of EMU maintain, especially in Germany, that, if the project should not be realized, an immediate upward re-valuation pressure would develop against the Deutschmark. We think however, that this hypothesis rather belongs to the reign of fantasy; rather, down-ward corrections of the exchange rates of the Lira, the Peseta and the Franc over the last decade are to 'blame', that today, France, Spain and Italy have very high current account surpluses and comparably large foreign currency holdings at their central banks. Faced with an ever stiffer competitive pressure from the world markets, Germany and her northern European partners indeed seem to be inclined to a policy of monetarily regulating, if not dominating, the chances for export of the European continent. Only a 'hard' EURO would prevent profoundly enough the unwelcome low-value-currency-driven competition from the European mezzogiorno countries, a competition, which is, nota bene, partly the result of the run-away of German (and other Northern European) productive capital abroad under present-day social and policy regulations. A closer look at the trade-weighted exchange rates of major European and world currencies also shows us that the myth of an upward pressure on the Deutschmark, should the EMU project fail, will not be maintainable in the long-run, a short and desperate attempt to create a mini-EMU after a possible failure of the large EMU project notwithstanding. A third path would be to 'recycle' German and other northern European savings into real transfers towards the Mediterranean EU countries, and later, the East. But it would be politically unthinkable in the long run and would create enormous pressures on the labor markets and for the export industries. The story of exchange rates over 1996/97 is quite different from what politicians sometimes pretend. The strength of the Deutschmark is a myth: Graph 9.19: trade-weighted exchange rates since 1990 Fallacy six consists in overlooking the real weakness of the D-Mark over recent months, and it also consists in overlooking that this trend will continue. Short of direct speculation, the following swings could be tentatively interpreted, without maintaining any rigor from that first inspection of the empirical data: Graph 9.20: The projected rise of the $ and the fall of major currencies Already, in more analytical terms, the following cross-national analyses from the ups and downs of the exchange rates are possible, using the data base of the 'Economist' newsmagazine (Economic Indicators, comprising GDP growth, unemployment, inflation, current account balance per GDP, growth rate of broad money supply (M2), interest rates (banks prime rate), foreign reserves) for 12 leading economies in the world over 1996/97. Available data series also show, that the obsession with inflation should give way to an obsession with economic growth. The ups and downs of the exchange rate are determined primarily by economic growth, and not by monetary aggregates. Since I am not a monetary economist, such a heterodoxy does not bother me at all. Thus, we expect an underlying, basic strength of the US $ for 1997 and 1998, since America will have a stronger growth than Europe: Table 9.12: the determinants of the 1996/97 exchange rate rise or fall The case for reflating Europe's economies can even be stated in a provocative fashion: Graph 9.21: growth, consumer price rises (1997 in %) and changes in the trade-weighted exchange rate, 1996/97 Legend: inflation and exchange rate dynamism Post-hoc predictions from an anti-shock-strategy model for the real observable data 1996-97 show, that the Graph above strikingly corresponds to realities: dyn exchange rate trend dyn exchange rate 1997 One consequence of this empirical relationship between inflation and upward movements in the trade-weighted exchange rates is a prediction of the behavior of the major currencies on the world markets in 1998. The prediction is based on the Economist's prediction of inflation in Europe and in the major other economies of the world in 1998 Economist predictions of inflation for 1998 predicted inflation 98 2,9 Australia 2,3 Austria 2,1 Belgium 3,2 Britain 2,1 CND 2,7 DK 1,9 France 2,1 Germany 2,6 Italy 1,2 Japan 2,6 NL 2,6 Spain 1,7 Sweden 1,4 CH 3,1 USA The consequence of this assumption then would be the prediction of the exchange rate dynamics for 1998: trend dyn er 1998 -3,896702 Australia -2,60315 Austria -1,848608 Belgium 6,774112 Britain -1,022222 CND -1,022222 DK -5,621678 France -3,285848 Germany -1,848608 Italy 0,846082 Japan -0,123992 NL -1,022222 Spain -4,438232 Sweden -6,161048 CH 8,17525 USA If you want to invest your money in Sterlings or US $, do it. Do not go in for Swiss Franks, Deutschmarks, Swedish crowns, or French Francs, or Lira (even worse): Graph 9.22: $ and Sterling - superstars 1998. Predicted exchange rate dynamics, 1998 in % Fallacy seven is equally important as the six previous ones. It consists in overlooking the effects of illegal money on Europe's poorer East. A hard EURO would attract an enormous amount of illegal Eastern capital to Western Europe, while the crooks will not hesitate to change their partially existing D-Mark wealth into $ or other non-EURO currencies, should the need arise. Market imperfections and the peripheral position of Eastern Europe in the world economy cause a tendency towards a secular current account balance deficit in most of the new democracies (at least those with historical records of big landholding and a weak national state), that can practically only be closed by the shadow economy, including illegal migration and money laundering: Table 9.13: economic performance in Central and Eastern Europe, 1997: GDP budget unemployment inflation current acc reserves debt GDP, current account, reserves and debt are given in $bn, budget is given as percent of GDP, unemployment and inflation are the usual percent rates Strict financial discipline indeed brings about less unemployment and not more, by international cross-national comparison. But rising unemployment pushes inflation up, and not down. Graph 9.23: stability criteria and economic performance in the transformation countries Graph 9.24: unemployment and inflation - the evidence from Eastern Europe and the former USSR Thirdly, current account balances determine only to a certain extent international reserves, and indeed, excess reserves are a good signal for money-laundering processes taking place in the economy, but such excess reserves dampen inflation. The transformation economy, successor to peripheral socialism 1945 - 1989, Nazi occupation 1938/39 - 1945 and peripheral capitalism 1450 - 1939, is characterized, as Amin teaches us, by a secular current account balance deficit, that has to be closed by almost any means - including imports of 'illegal savings'. Like all wealth-owning capitalist classes, the crooks of Eastern Europe become very interested in financial stability and the canon of 'property rights', once their illegal money is parked. The right-hand upper outlayers in our following graph - the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, all have nowadays a much higher proportion of foreign currency reserves to their GDP as one might expect from the current account balance. Only the first, rising parts of our curves - or the straight fitting line - correspond to economic wisdom, while much of the rest is due to the global casino of money laundering and capital flight: Graph 9.25: reserves and current account balances in the world system Eastern Europe developed western democracies developing countries Eastern European inflation, to a great part, is also linked to the problem of illegal capital inflows that boost reserves in excess of the available current account balances, contributing to a dampening of the inflation process in the semi-periphery: Graph 9.26: 'excess reserves' (money-laundering) and inflation Thus, one might say, that the stability of the East European exchange rates depends on these very same huge semi-legal and illegal reserves, that were accumulated by the opening of the twin Pandora's boxes of open borders and liberalized world financial markets: Table 9.14: stability conditions of Eastern currencies inflation current acc reserves debt growth constant But dependency becomes decisive, when long-term growth perspectives of East and Central European economies are being determined. There is indeed 'the balance of payments constraints' on economic growth: not only the stability of the Eastern currency, but also Eastern economic growth becomes largely dependent on the import of 'narco' and other laundered money, that neatly shows up in the international reserves statistic: Table 9.15: the balance of payments constraint on economic growth in the transformation states budget unemployment inflation current acc reserves constant Fallacy eight is to overlook that in the long run, the stability of the capitalist system needs labor as an organized, countervailing power, that the very EURO process, as it is now underway, is about to put into question. In the developed capitalist countries, the following relationships suggest a new, labor-oriented approach to stabilization policy. Our Aristotelean message of a middle course thus is: at least a medium-level unionization rate and earnings growth rate will be necessary to stabilize capitalism, while at the same time the empirical support for a shortening of the weekly working hours as a way out of the crisis is rather weak. From 6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu Mon May 4 11:30:42 1998 Mon, 4 May 1998 10:30:29 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 4 May 1998 10:30:27 -0700 (PDT) From: Judi Kessler <6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> To: "Georgi M. Derluguian" Subject: "just say no" to flaming In-Reply-To: Below is a good example of 1) how flaming gets started on this network, and 2) how I was sucked into it via my response to Derluguian. Flaming is a waste of time and cyberspace! I witnessed what seemed to be a great discussion in the makings re. the new European monetary system (example: Greene), then along came Georgi, which provoked be to respond in kind. I can't speak for him, but I was at my worst. I don't know about all you "seasoned" WS scholars, but those of us who are ABD, working on serious global research, and are at the threshhold of moving into the "paying" academic world could gain much by reading and occasionally contributing to a positive cyber-discussion of this potentially historical event. Remember, we are the ones who will replace you "oldies" (but goodies) when you are molding in your coffins. Let's all "JUST SAY NO" (I hate to coin a Nancy Reagan phrase, but...) to flaming, and get on with productive exchange. On Mon, 4 May 1998, Judi Kessler wrote: > I can recommend a number of nannies to you. We have lots of grad students > looking for extra money. Just let me know, Geoooorgi... > > On Mon, 4 May 1998, Georgi M. Derluguian wrote: > > > Sounds like we've got another enfant terrible, demanding and capricious. > > Any nannies around? > > > > Georgi M. Derluguian > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Sociology > > Northwestern University > > 1812 Chicago Avenue > > Evanston, Illinois 60208-1330 > > (847) 491-2741 (rabota) > > > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > Judi A. Kessler > University of California, Santa Barbara > Department of Sociology > Santa Barbara, California 93106 > (805) 893-3751 > fax (805) 893-3324 > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Judi A. Kessler University of California, Santa Barbara Department of Sociology Santa Barbara, California 93106 (805) 893-3751 fax (805) 893-3324 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From chewitt@uga.cc.uga.edu Mon May 4 12:46:08 1998 Date: Mon, 04 May 1998 14:38:54 -0700 From: "Cynthia M. Hewitt" Reply-To: chewitt@uga.cc.uga.edu To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Some thoughts on the Euro Regarding the Euro launch: 1) The main endangered species with this monetary union is the European worker. This process will first result in cutting the level of benefits and allowing down-sizing with more impunity. I think the European worker is the front line; their response will set the agenda for mankind. 2) The second endangered species is all the world who is not white--the rise of neo-facist groups in Germany and their tolerance in France, etc., shows the possiblity of a facist and racist solution to recession and economic turmoil among European heritage people, if a demagogic campaign is successfully waged among them. 3) On a clearer note, I think the struggle for economic prosperity will be turning around market share, and around advanced products. Europe is not a major growth area for the U.S. in this matter, with the exception of the former USSR countries. The market battle will lay out there (East), and should be affected by the greater capacity of the Euro (over individual Euro. countries). The last great frontier is Africa, which Europe seems to have a resounding lead with, and which explains the frenzy with which U.S. business is seeking to partner with South Africa. I think the question for both Europe and the U.S. in the coming phase of economic competition is which will achieve INTERNAL UNITY most effectively and fastest: destabilization due to unemployment and political turmoil would leave either vulnerable to second rate power status. For the U.S., this involves solving its race questions--both black and hispanic, esp. if it is to have any chance of effectively integrating the Americas. For the Europeans, exclusionary violence against non-Europeans may be effective if they can create the infrastructure of exploitation effectively in Eastern Europe and former USSR--these could provide the surplus labor needed for cost effectiveness. (This would allow the ugly European core-beliefs of supremacy another showing on the world-stage--if those beliefs are in the grave, we need to re-visit the grave regularly and make sure). Returning to the issue of market share, profits are made in the advanced product sector, this sector is sensitive to "fashion" or subjective criteria, so creativity and chance play a role, and above all ideology. Whoever can peddle the best ideology of what is "good" may win (at least in the short-run--10 years or so)--and Americanism and free-markets have peaked, thus it appears the U.S. is looking at a downslide. But the U.S. has a masterful world ideology machine, from education to movies, so I don't see it falling out of the running. Regarding cheap labor and united nation-state, the U.S. access to Latin Amer. is a fall-back for any labor problems in Asia, and the U.S. Pacific is better positioned for Asia than Euro territory. So I think the Euro unity will be somewhat tied down for now with its challenge to solve (1) its needs for a cheap labor force (anywhere) and (2) acceptance by workers in Europe of the dismal dog-eat-dog existence that the U.S. has been weaned on. So I don't think the Euro is set to rock the U.S. economy, ending in political crisis here. Cynthia Hewitt Daniel M Green wrote: > > Resolved: The Euro will mark a watershed in the eclipse of the American > economy, reducing the USA to the status of just another large economy and > causing a major political crisis in this country within the next 4-5 > years. > > Daniel Green > University of Delaware > > On Sun, 3 May 1998, Judi Kessler wrote: > > > ...Here comes the "euro" - Now is the opportunity to generate some great > > 1998, down-to-earth, concrete, political-economy discussion. > > For those of you who are still bound up in counting capitalism's years (or > > centuries), use some restraint and back off. Same goes for those of you > > who are tempted to argue ad nauseum which "long cycle" (circa "the first > > appearance of homo homo sapien") is been responsible for the European > > monetary union. > > Come out, all you Euro WS people who follow events in THIS century. > > Who am *I*? No one. Just a very informed doctoral student, bored to tears > > with the WSN. > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > Judi A. Kessler > > University of California, Santa Barbara > > Department of Sociology > > Santa Barbara, California 93106 > > (805) 893-3751 > > fax (805) 893-3324 > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > From villav@mail.wsu.edu Mon May 4 13:15:58 1998 Date: Mon, 4 May 1998 12:14:39 -0700 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: victor villanueva this is a message on behalf of carol villanueva: "i am considering a move to chicago. can anyone tell me the opportunities for study and conversation on world-system matters in the chicago area and universities. and does anyone have a sense of the university of illinois chicago history department. is it especially hostile using a lens that can see beyond national borders and beyond traditional academic fields and pastures? thanks for any forthcoming responses. carol villanueva." Victor Villanueva, Jr. |Associate Chair and Director of Composition |1998 Program Chair Department of English |Conference on College Washington State University |Composition and Communication Pullman, WA 99164-5020 | (509) 335-2680/2581 | fax (509) 335-2582 | victorv@wsu.edu | From ba05105@binghamton.edu Mon May 4 13:21:34 1998 From: ba05105@binghamton.edu Date: Mon, 4 May 1998 15:21:22 -0400 (EDT) To: Daniel M Green Subject: Re: Euro in Braudelian Perspective In-Reply-To: Of course, the tricky phrase is 'a major political crisis' which is... the return of the republicans to the executive? the revival of the left wing of the democrats? the return of ross perot? Or a new constitutional convention? I think almost anything short of the last, and we would have to consider your prediction inadequate. Steve Sherman Binghamton U. On Mon, 4 May 1998, Daniel M Green wrote: > Resolved: The Euro will mark a watershed in the eclipse of the American > economy, reducing the USA to the status of just another large economy and > causing a major political crisis in this country within the next 4-5 > years. > > Daniel Green > University of Delaware > > On Sun, 3 May 1998, Judi Kessler wrote: > > > ...Here comes the "euro" - Now is the opportunity to generate some great > > 1998, down-to-earth, concrete, political-economy discussion. > > For those of you who are still bound up in counting capitalism's years (or > > centuries), use some restraint and back off. Same goes for those of you > > who are tempted to argue ad nauseum which "long cycle" (circa "the first > > appearance of homo homo sapien") is been responsible for the European > > monetary union. > > Come out, all you Euro WS people who follow events in THIS century. > > Who am *I*? No one. Just a very informed doctoral student, bored to tears > > with the WSN. > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > Judi A. Kessler > > University of California, Santa Barbara > > Department of Sociology > > Santa Barbara, California 93106 > > (805) 893-3751 > > fax (805) 893-3324 > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > > > From dredmond@gladstone.uoregon.edu Mon May 4 14:13:10 1998 Date: Mon, 4 May 1998 13:13:06 -0700 (PDT) From: Dennis R Redmond To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: Re: Some thoughts on the Euro In-Reply-To: <354E356D.1F07@uga.cc.uga.edu> On Mon, 4 May 1998, Cynthia M. Hewitt wrote: > So I think > the Euro unity will be somewhat tied down for now with its challenge to > solve (1) its needs for a cheap labor force (anywhere) and (2) > acceptance by workers in Europe of the dismal dog-eat-dog existence that > the U.S. has been weaned on. The EU already has a cheap labor force: Eastern Europe. Of course, cheap is a relative phenomenon -- we're talking an exploitable, learning-oriented workforce which will provide adequate services, transportation, etc. and be governed by a strong work ethic. The Visegrad countries fit the bill nicely, and EU multis have been investing a fair amount in the region. Second, the world-system has a slight problem called "declining effective demand", i.e. too many Asian factories exporting to overindebted American consumers. If the EU really does follow the US model and razes its welfare state, we're in for a world Depression of galactic proportions, because Japanese and American consumers are not going to pick up the global slack. But if the EU instead follows the euro with some serious monetary stimulus/redistribution, this would indeed have major effects on the US: the EU would start growing quickly again, and catch up with and surpass the USA in per capita GDP terms, just like West Germany passed the UK some time in the early Sixties. In other words, the long US decline would noticeably accelerate, to the point where we'd end up where Britain is today vis-a-vis Continental Europe -- an archaic, backward appendage of more efficient and effective capitalisms. That's bound to create some serious political tensions in a country whose ruling class still likes to imagine it reigns as the Supreme Warlord and Currency-Giver of the planet, and regularly bombs the hell out of other countries to prove it; not necessarily Left tensions, either -- it could push us still further to the barbaric neo-nationalist Right. -- Dennis From calzugaray@minrex.gov.cu Tue May 5 03:42:52 1998 From: Carlos Alzugaray Treto To: "'WSN@csf.colorado.edu'" Subject: RE: PLEASE... Date: Tue, 5 May 1998 05:43:48 -0400 charset="iso-8859-1" > I think Judy Kessler must be commended for bringing up the subject of the > euro. It is probably the most important single development in the world > system in the years that have passed since 1989 and for several years to > come, barring a world financial crash - in my opinion, a very unlikely > development. > > European Monetary Union is bound to have substantial repercussions in > several fields: on the European integration process itself, the most > interesting and successful initiative taken by capitalist nation-states in > the last 50 years; on the questions of democracy and social justice in one > of the largest and most advanced regions in the world; on the whole > restructuring of the architecture of the system of international > relations. > > In my modest opinion, the euro is going to be successful. It is a > political decision based on historical precedents with a clear-cut > economic rationality. It is supported not only by the elites, but also by > broad sections of European populations, with the exception of the three > countries who are staying out and Germany (although the tendency in the > last one has recently turned in favor). It will reinforce the > supranational tendencies still struggling to overcome the > government-centric tendencies inside the European Union by the creation of > a powerful supranational and autonomous institution, the European Central > Bank. In this sense, it might be the model for all future integration > processes and for new forms of political organization, transcending the > nation-state. > > It will reinforce the single European market and bring benefits to > European enterprises, both transnational and medium and small size ones. > If this will in turn benefit other sectors of European societies will > depend on the way the social and political organizations react towards it. > But since the convergence process has placed very harsh conditions on the > lowest level sectors of European societies, my guess is that we will see, > as we have seen already in Amsterdam during last year's summit and in the > British and French elections, a resurgence of democratic and social > democratic forces which will endeavor to protect the European welfare > state and its accomplishments. Democracy could be reinforced by this > process. > > The monetary union will make it more difficult for the East European > states to enter the Union. The accession negotiation process can indeed > become a very protracted one. > > Europe's role in the world will be enhanced both by the economic benefits > that monetary union will mean for its enterprises and by the fact that its > integration process will be followed and taken as a model for other > regionalization processes. > > The main loser in the monetary union project will be the US, because it > will have to deal with a new foreign currency which will challenge the > hegemony of the dollar, while the European Central Bank will become a > counterweight to the Fed. With this gained financial autonomy, Europe will > feel more free to adopt its own foreign policy initiatives, like, for > example, the Euro-Latin American summit planned for 1999, with the > participation of Cuba, by the way. This will be in stark contrast to the > II Summit of the Americas in Santiago last month, from which Cuba was > unjustly excluded, basically because the United States did not want it. > > For Latin America and the Caribbean, which suffers from the imperialistic > tendencies of the US, the news is welcome. We would like to see a European > superpower counterbalancing the unipolar environment we have to deal with. > Will Europe finally have a common foreign and security policy clearly > differentiated from the American one? That is a difficult question, but > the euro will certainly help the process. > > Carlos Alzugaray > Assistant Professor, > Instituto Superior de Relaciones Internacionales, > La Habana, Cuba. > Telephone: (53-7) 22-2571 & 23-5097. > Fax: (53-7) 29-0683. > Email: calzugaray@minrex.gov.cu > From calzugaray@minrex.gov.cu Tue May 5 04:14:58 1998 From: Carlos Alzugaray Treto To: "'WSN@csf.colorado.edu'" Subject: RV: PLEASE... Date: Tue, 5 May 1998 06:15:59 -0400 charset="iso-8859-1" > I think Judy Kessler must be commended for bringing up the subject of the > euro. It is probably the most important single development in the world > system in the years that have passed since 1989 and for several years to > come, barring a world financial crash - in my opinion, a very unlikely > development. > > European Monetary Union is bound to have substantial repercussions in > several fields: on the European integration process itself, the most > interesting and successful initiative taken by capitalist nation-states in > the last 50 years; on the questions of democracy and social justice in one > of the largest and most advanced regions in the world; on the whole > restructuring of the architecture of the system of international > relations. > > In my modest opinion, the euro is going to be successful. It is a > political decision based on historical precedents with a clear-cut > economic rationality. It is supported not only by the elites, but also by > broad sections of European populations, with the exception of the three > countries who are staying out and Germany (although the tendency in the > last one has recently turned in favor). It will reinforce the > supranational tendencies still struggling to overcome the > government-centric tendencies inside the European Union by the creation of > a powerful supranational and autonomous institution, the European Central > Bank. In this sense, it might be the model for all future integration > processes and for new forms of political organization, transcending the > nation-state. > > It will reinforce the single European market and bring benefits to > European enterprises, both transnational and medium and small size ones. > If this will in turn benefit other sectors of European societies will > depend on the way the social and political organizations react towards it. > But since the convergence process has placed very harsh conditions on the > lowest level sectors of European societies, my guess is that we will see, > as we have seen already in Amsterdam during last year's summit and in the > British and French elections, a resurgence of democratic and social > democratic forces which will endeavor to protect the European welfare > state and its accomplishments. Democracy could be reinforced by this > process. > > The monetary union will make it more difficult for the East European > states to enter the Union. The accession negotiation process can indeed > become a very protracted one. > > Europe's role in the world will be enhanced both by the economic benefits > that monetary union will mean for its enterprises and by the fact that its > integration process will be followed and taken as a model for other > regionalization processes. > > The main loser in the monetary union project will be the US, because it > will have to deal with a new foreign currency which will challenge the > hegemony of the dollar, while the European Central Bank will become a > counterweight to the Fed. With this gained financial autonomy, Europe will > feel more free to adopt its own foreign policy initiatives, like, for > example, the Euro-Latin American summit planned for 1999, with the > participation of Cuba, by the way. This will be in stark contrast to the > II Summit of the Americas in Santiago last month, from which Cuba was > unjustly excluded, basically because the United States did not want it. > > For Latin America and the Caribbean, which suffers from the imperialistic > tendencies of the US, the news is welcome. We would like to see a European > superpower counterbalancing the unipolar environment we have to deal with. > Will Europe finally have a common foreign and security policy clearly > differentiated from the American one? That is a difficult question, but > the euro will certainly help the process. > > Carlos Alzugaray > Assistant Professor, > Instituto Superior de Relaciones Internacionales, > La Habana, Cuba. > Telephone: (53-7) 22-2571 & 23-5097. > Fax: (53-7) 29-0683. > Email: calzugaray@minrex.gov.cu > > From chriscd@jhu.edu Tue May 5 08:55:25 1998 Date: Tue, 05 May 1998 10:56:35 -0400 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: assasination of =?UNKNOWN?Q?Monse=F1or?= Gerardi To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------4AB18E4839DE8260120A6AFD --------------4AB18E4839DE8260120A6AFD 03 May 1998 18:32:18 -0400 (EDT) 03 May 1998 18:32:17 -0400 (EDT) Date: Sun, 03 May 1998 18:27:46 +0000 From: "Kay B. Warren" To: Abigail Adams , arramos@guarany.cpd.unb.br, Antfabri@aol.com, aescobar@anthro.umass.edu, bmanz@socrates.berkeley.edu, clutz@igc.apc.org, Professor Chris Chase-Dunn , dmato@reacciun.ve, dmyhre@princeton.edu, nelson@lclark.edu, hsiebers@pi.net, jschirm@fas.harvard.edu, John.M.Watanabe@dartmouth.edu, jpaley@ssc.upenn.edu, koizumi@hus.osaka-u.ac.jp, lesfield@unm.edu, lbg5@columbia.edu, eapearce@princeton.edu, stephen@neu.edu, Mmoorsgsn@gcnet.net, kearney@ucracl.ucr.edu, Quetzil@UH.EDU (Quetzil Castaneda), sab09196@fuentes.csh.udg.mx, soniaa@cats.ucsc.edu, Steve Reifenberg , sjonas@igc.apc.org, edward.f.fischer@vanderbilt.edu, tlittle@ecology.coa.edu, vmontejo@ucdavis.edu, weiss@BINAH.CC.BRANDEIS.EDU ora Light Version 3.0.5 (32) Date: Thu, 30 Apr 1998 18:18:59 -0600 To: (= see end of body) From: Santiago Bastos Subj= ect: NUNCA M=C1S!!! > >=A1NUNCA MAS!=09 =09=A1NUNCA MAS!=09 =09=A1NUNCA MAS! > > > >Instancias de Coordinaci=F3n, organizaciones, y grupos de la Socieda= d Civil Guatemalteca (Ver Comunicado) que nos unimos por el cruel asesinato d= e Monse=F1or Juan Gerardi -el pasado domingo 26 de abril-, hacemos un l= lamado de Solidaridad a la Comunidad Internacional para unirse a la campa= =F1a guatemalteca =A1=A1NUNCA MAS!!. > >El cruel asesinato de Monse=F1or Gerardi, dos d=EDas despu=E9s de la= entrega del informe del Proyecto de Recuperaci=F3n de la Memoria Hist=F3rica -de= la Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado-, oscurece el camino de esclarecimiento de la verdad. Adem=E1s, pone en riesgo los incipient= es logros alcanzados en el proceso de paz en Guatemala. > >A los miembros, organizaciones e instituciones de la Comunidad Internacional, pedimos lo siguiente: > >1. =09Que reproduzcan y multipliquen la informaci=F3n que aqu=ED env= iamos, a trav=E9s de sus redes de comunicaci=F3n (Ver comunicados). Si quieren= conseguir m=E1s informaci=F3n al respecto, consultar la p=E1gina de Internet= =A0: http ://www.guateconnect.com/odhagua > >2. =09Que manden cartas (preferiblemente por fax) exigiendo al gobie= rno de Guatemala que esclarezca el hecho (Ver acci=F3n urgente). Pueden dir= igirlas a: Presidencia de la Rep=FAblica de Guatemala: Telefax: 2214537 E.mail: arzu@guate.net Ministerio de Gobernaci=F3n: Fax: 2321207 = y 2515368 Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores: mint@mieno.gt Secretar= =EDa de la Paz (SEPAZ): Fax: 2301731 2301711 y 2301713 > >3. =09Que se dirijan a sus gobiernos (Organismos Ejecutivo, Legislat= ivo y/o Parlamentos), a las instituciones financieras y a otros organismos relevantes para que ellos a su vez presionen al gobierno de Guatemala= para que este hecho se esclarezca lo m=E1s pronto posible y para que el pr= oceso de Paz en Guatemala se consolide. El esclarecimiento de este hecho es indispensable para hacer cambios profundos en materia de Derechos Hum= anos. > >Agradecemos la solidaridad y el acompa=F1amiento de la Comunidad Internacional y al mismo tiempo les pedimos se unan a la campa=F1a de= la Sociedad Civil Guatemalteca: > >=A1NUNCA MAS! =09=A1NUNCA MAS! =09=A1NUNCA MAS! > > > > > >%%% overflow headers %%% To: mgamboa@cariari.ucr.ac.cr, ael@prc.utexas.edu, ahualde@colef.mx, ecastel@arrakis.es, allenc@cariari.ucr.ac.cr, anmst39+@pitt.edu, bcamus@fhic.cr.uclm.es, ch@marlboro.edu, cid@iep.org.pe, cristina.vidal@uv.es, cosmegm@greentek.com, charlesre@iadb.org, jazpeitia@carrotnet.com, mus@mx2.redestb.es, hershber@ssrc.org, fleal@udgserv.cencar.udg.mx, fipi@ubera.net, pfortuny@stmarytx.edu, arredoi@splava.cc.plattsburgh.= edu, alcorelegua@comcadiz.es, Jose_Itzigsohn@brown.edu, juan@carrotnet.com= , :@fuentes.csh.udg.mx %%% end overflow headers %%% > > > Prof. Kay B. Warren, 100 Aaron Burr Hall, Princeton University, Princ= eton, N.J. 08544-1011 Office: 609-258-3189; Dept'l= fax: 609-258-1032; Administrator: 8-4537, 8-5535. NB--AFTER AUGUST 1, 1998, MY NEW ADDRESS WILL BE:=20 Prof. Kay B. Warren, Department of Anthropology, William James Hall, Harvard University, 33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, Mass. 02138 Dept'l fax: 617-496-8355 --------------4AB18E4839DE8260120A6AFD-- From chriscd@jhu.edu Tue May 5 12:34:41 1998 Date: Tue, 05 May 1998 14:35:33 -0400 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: [Fwd: Toronto Globe and Mail 4/29: Internet vs MAI]] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------D1BD58772EE4F33E6041F122 --------------D1BD58772EE4F33E6041F122 05 May 1998 03:09:03 -0400 (EDT) Date: Tue, 05 May 1998 03:08:14 -0400 From: Barbara Larcom Subject: [Fwd: Toronto Globe and Mail 4/29: Internet vs MAI] To: Carl Chatzky , Charles Petersen , Chris Chase-Dunn , Dave Schott , Denis Nikitin , Dick Ochs , Frida Berrigan , Howard Ehrlich , Howdy Burns , Jim Lunday , Joe Duncan , John Dickson , Jon Kerr , Leslie Bilchick , Lynn Yellott , Max Obuszewski , Mike Bardoff , Nan McCurdy , Rafi Sharif , SLAC , Sue Hunt This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------FBC56704B55B86713105E250 --------------FBC56704B55B86713105E250 Sat, 2 May 1998 14:12:48 -0700 (PDT) Sat, 2 May 1998 14:12:15 -0700 (PDT) Date: Sat, 2 May 1998 14:10:58 -0700 (PDT) From: Joel Rubinstein Sender: owner-50-years@igc.apc.org Subject: Toronto Globe and Mail 4/29: Internet vs MAI To: 50-years@igc.org Toronto GLOBE and MAIL How the Net killed the MAI Grassroots groups used their own globalization to derail deal Wednesday, April 29, 1998, Page 1 By Madelaine Drohan PARIS -- High-powered politicians had reams of statistics and analysis on why a set of international investing rules would make the world a better place. They were no match, however, for a global band of grassroots organizations, which, with little more than computers and access to the Internet, helped derail a deal. Indeed, international negotiations have been transformed after this week's successful rout of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) by opposition groups, which -- alarmed by the trend toward economic globalization -- used some globalization of their own to fight back. Using the Internet's capability to broadcast information instantly worldwide, groups such as the Council of Canadians and Malaysia-based the Third World Network have been able to keep each other informed of the latest developments and supply information gleaned in one country that may prove embarrassing to a government in another. By pooling their information they have broken through the wall of secrecy that traditionally surrounds international negotiations, forcing governments to deal with their complaints. "We are in constant contact with our allies in other countries," said Maude Barlow, the Council of Canadians' chairwoman. "If a negotiator says something to someone over a glass of wine, we'll have it on the Internet within an hour, all over the world." The success of that networking was clear this week when ministers from the 29 countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development admitted that the global wave of protest had swamped the deal. "This is the first successful Internet campaign by non-governmental organizations," said one diplomat involved in the negotiations. "It's been very effective." The OECD, which represents largely the major industrial economies, yesterday halted the negotiations aimed at developing international rules for foreign investment, similar to those for trade in goods. It is unclear when, or even if, the OECD will try again. The irony in this outcome is that the OECD, which has been an ardent advocate of globalization and has done much research into its effects, did not recognize that advocacy groups would use cyber-globalization to further their own ends. OECD secretary-general Donald Johnston conceded that the OECD was caught flat-footed: "It's clear we needed a strategy on information, communication and explication," he told a press conference. The OECD's efforts to harness the Internet have not caught up in colour, content and consumer friendliness to those of the advocacy groups. For example, the OECD report released this week on the benefits of opening markets to trade and investment is a compilation of statistics and analysis written in language more readily understood by economists than by the average person. Instead of finding examples of real people who have benefited from globalization to help trade ministers make this case, the report repeats many of the same statistics on economic growth, investment and the dangers of protectionism. By comparison, hundreds of advocacy groups, in attempting to galvanize opposition to the MAI, used terms and examples that brought their message home to the public. Their sites on the Internet's Worldwide Web are colourful and easy to use, offering primers on the MAI that anyone could understand. Canadian Trade Minister Sergio Marchi has taken the OECD to task for its poor communications effort, although he agrees some of the blame must be shared by the member governments. He said the lesson he has learned is that "civil society" -- meaning public interest groups -- should be engaged much sooner in a negotiating process, instead of governments trying to negotiate around them. Ms. Barlow of the Council of Canadians, which says it has more than 100,000 members, called the OECD report on the benefits of globalization "pathetic." In an interview in Paris, where she was taking part in a protest against the MAI, Ms. Barlow said the immediacy of the Internet has changed the dynamics of advocacy campaigns. She is a veteran of the campaigns against the Canada-U.S. free-trade agreement and the North American free-trade agreement. The Internet was not in widespread use when those campaigns were conducted. Today, however, advocacy groups make sure useful information ends up in the right hands right away. "If we know something that is sensitive to one government, we get it to our ally in that country instantly," she said. "I don't think governments will ever be able to do these kind of secret trade negotiations again." For example, when the Council of Canadians got its hands on a draft version of the MAI last year, it immediately posted it on its Web site and made sure allies around the world knew it was there through E-mail correspondence. The Internet also provides a low-cost way for groups in the Third World to get their message out and keep on top of developments. "All they need is one computer," Ms. Barlow said. The major Internet sites of these advocacy groups provide hyperlinks to others involved in the campaign, as well as phone numbers and E-mail addresses, and often bibliographies of relevant books. It adds up to a powerful tool that the advocacy groups are using to better effect than governments and the OECD at the moment. Ms. Barlow predicts that this advantage may not last now that the OECD members have seen its potential. "They'll be revving up their PR machines." But so are the advocacy groups. The next stage, she said, is to start making suggestions about what should be in trade agreements, rather than just opposing what the negotiators propose. The groups are already trading ideas on solutions, and another aspect of globalization -- the growing spread of English -- is easing their way. "Pretty well everybody speaks English," said Ms. Barlow. "It's the universal language." Tony Clarke, director of the Canadian Polaris Institute, stresses that anti-MAI groups such as his are not against all aspects of globalization -- their use of the Internet itself is proof of that. "We're against this model of economic globalization," he said, referring to the MAI. "But the global village, the idea of coming together and working together, is a great dream." Related Web sites The Council of Canadians and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development: www.canadians.org http://www.oecd.org --------------FBC56704B55B86713105E250-- --------------D1BD58772EE4F33E6041F122-- From chriscd@jhu.edu Tue May 5 13:08:48 1998 Date: Tue, 05 May 1998 15:10:17 -0400 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: Job announcement] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------7E01B2913B11BC428AF2C116 --------------7E01B2913B11BC428AF2C116 05 May 1998 17:03:48 +0200 (MET) Date: Tue, 05 May 1998 17:03:35 +0200 From: isa@sis.ucm.es (International Sociological Association) Subject: Job announcement Apparently-to: chriscd@jhu.edu To: chriscd@jhu.edu Reply-to: isa@sis.ucm.es To: Members of the International Sociological Association VACANCY: CIVIL SOCIETY ANALYST The Professional Development Program (PDP), Food Industries Division, International Cooperation and Development, Foreign Agricultural Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture designs and manages diversified short- and long-term international training, education and technical assistance programs in agriculture, agribusiness, rural development and related areas. These training andtechnical assistance programs are developed and implemented in collaboration with sponsoring organizations such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). PDP is seeking a Civil Society Analyst to assist the USAID Africa Bureau, Office of Sustainable Development. The individual will provide senior-level expertise and technical assistance in support of broad-based rural development through the analysis and understanding of food security policies and issues as related to rural voluntary associations (civil societies), decentralization of central state-led policies/practices and the impact on the majority of rural-based governance practices; and other factors that affect the long-term process of democratizing Sub-Saharan African countries. The position is based in Washington, DC but requires some domestic and international travel. To apply, send (1) a cover letter that directly addresses the Required Skills listed below, and (2) a current resume to the contact listed below by May 15, 1998. Required Skills: 1. Advanced academic training and/or experience in political science as related to agriculture and rural development (international experience preferred). 2. In-depth knowledge of policies, concepts, principles, and practices governing the development, management, and evaluation of democracy and governance programs. 3. Ability to analyze and evaluate highly complex cross-cultural, cross-national human interactions in order to reach decisions and agreements for further action. 4. Ability to conceptualize and articulate, both in written form and orally, innovative programs and activities. 5. Knowledge of Africa, living and working conditions, constraints and supportive factors, and political conditions which apply to development activities. Contact: Kimberly Hoffstrom Professional Development Program USDA/FAS/ICD/FID/AG STOP 1085 1400 Independence Avenue, SW Washington, DC 20250-1085 Telephone: 202/690-0707; Fax: 202/690-3982 E-mail: hoffstrom@fas.usda.gov ------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------7E01B2913B11BC428AF2C116-- From bertil.haggman@helsingborg.se Wed May 6 08:39:27 1998 Date: Wed, 06 May 1998 15:25:44 -0700 From: Bertil Haggman Reply-To: bertil.haggman@helsingborg.se To: dgreen@UDel.Edu Subject: Euro and EU Daniel M Green wrote: > > Resolved: The Euro will mark a watershed in the eclipse of the American > economy, reducing the USA to the status of just another large economy and > causing a major political crisis in this country within the next 4-5 > years. Interesting prognosis but although the euro might be a serious competitor the old US dollar will probably stand its ground far longer than 4-5 years. The problem of the euro and EU is of course the tremendous task of the European Union to contribute to the rebuilding of the economies of Eastern Europe so badly affected by the marxist-leninist regimes. The question is if a Marshall plan would not be necessary. One only has to take a look at the former GDR to see what enormous problems Bonn (soon) Berlin has had with the new Bundeslaender in the east. And especially Bulgaria, Romania have no non-communist own government to help like in the German case. The euro was off to a rather bad start with the two conflicting concepts of the role of the European Central Bank. Only time can tell what will happen to the euro. Meanwhile enlargement, the conflict between Turkey and Greece and the Balkan powder keg will continue to threaten EU and the EMU project. An often forgotten aspect of the European Union is the ongoing regionalization that in the long perspective makes the transnational region a serious contender of the national state. The ongoing project Organizing European Space is only one of the European projects attempting to study what could be expressed as: There is indeed a rise of the regional in lockstep with the rise of the global. The British economist Alfred Marshall speaks of regions with an "industrial atmosphere" (Industry is in the air). National states are actually not very well suited for study of how economies function. The regional difference within countries is bigger than that between "industrial regions" in different European states. The euro and EU is standing for an archipelago of regions and cities in Europe connected with the networks of a new era: those of knowledge and capital. The influence of the national states is receding. Bertil Haggman Author Member, Swedish Authors Union bertil.haggman@helsingborg.se From dredmond@gladstone.uoregon.edu Wed May 6 14:04:27 1998 Date: Wed, 6 May 1998 13:04:23 -0700 (PDT) From: Dennis R Redmond To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: Re: Euro and EU In-Reply-To: <3550E368.4194@helsingborg.se> On Wed, 6 May 1998, Bertil Haggman wrote: > The problem of the euro and EU is of course the tremendous task of the > European Union to contribute to the rebuilding of the economies of > Eastern Europe so badly affected by the marxist-leninist regimes. The Eastern bloc regimes, for all their hideous faults (and there were many) grew a heck of a lot faster and had more social and economic equity under neo-Stalinism than many other peripheral countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America (many of which had no less barbaric governments). Eastern Europe ran into problems only when it tried to marketize everything all at once -- now the smarter countries, like Poland and the Czech Republic, are instituting Central European-style controls over the marketplace and creating developmental states of their own. You could argue that the 50-year-old guerilla struggle between Eastern European citizens and noxious governments/the Soviet Empire gave them the political and social tools, ironically enough, to deal with the new imperialists: the finance-mad elites of the European Union, who send trade delegations and bankocrats to Prague the way Moscow sent emissaries to the Czechslovakian Politburo. > The question is if a Marshall plan would not be necessary. One only has > to take a look at the former GDR to see what enormous problems Bonn > (soon) Berlin has had with the new Bundeslaender in the east. Problems, but also vast opportunities. Germany has, so I'm told, something like 50% of the external debt of Russia; European banks own most of Eastern Europe's debt, and have been financing mini-booms in Poland and Slovenia. West Germany's absorption of the East has cost money, yes, but the $100 billion in annual subsidies from West to East has also spurred a round of new investment, and kept the German economy relatively insulated from the overaccumulation crisis which hit the US in the early Nineties, and Japan in the mid-Nineties. The EU will blossom only if a similar redistribution takes place from rich EU lands to the poorer ones -- say, something like 5% of EU GDP or some $400 billion a year. You could give them the money, or just raise it via Euro-denominated debt. -- Dennis From dale.wimberley@vt.edu Thu May 7 10:49:35 1998 Date: Thu, 7 May 1998 12:53:10 +0100 To: World-System Network From: dale.wimberley@vt.edu (Dale W Wimberley) Subject: Attention PEWS members - PEWS candidates' statements on website PEWS members should have received their ballots from ASA by now. Each candidate for a PEWS Section office has written a statement which will appear in PEWS News, which you will receive soon by mail. (This is in addition to their biosketches, which are included in the ballot mailing. The candidates' statements aren't in the ballot mailing.) You can also read these statements at the PEWS website. Set your Netscape/Explorer/whatever to: http://www.cas.vt.edu/pews/election/default.html Dale Wimberley PEWS website manager From OWENJACK@FS.isu.edu Fri May 8 15:13:24 1998 Fri, 8 May 1998 15:10:09 -0600 (MDT) From: "J B Owens" To: WSN@csf.colorado.edu Date: Fri, 8 May 1998 15:19:23 -0600, MDT Subject: peace in Guatemala? I am posting the following message at the request of a Spanish colleague. Please repost it as widely as possible. Thank you for your help. Jack Owens ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date: Thu, 7 May 1998 ----------- !NUNCA MAS! !NUNCA MAS! !NUNCA MAS! [Never Again! Never Again! Never Again!] Instancias de Coordinacion, organizaciones, y grupos de la Sociedad Civil Guatemalteca (Ver Comunicado) que nos unimos por el cruel asesinato de Monsenor Juan Gerardi -el pasado domingo 26 de abril-, hacemos un llamado de Solidaridad a la Comunidad Internacional para unirse a la campana guatemalteca !!NUNCA MAS!!. [At the urging of various Guatemalan civic organizations and groups united by the cruel murder of Monsignor Juan Gerardi this past Sunday, 26 April, we are issuing a call for solidarity to the international community to join in the Guatemalan campaign NEVER AGAIN!!] El cruel asesinato de Monsenor Gerardi, dos dias despues de la entrega del informe del Proyecto de Recuperacion de la Memoria Historica -de la Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado-, oscurece el camino de esclarecimiento de la verdad. Ademas, pone en riesgo los incipientes logros alcanzados en el proceso de paz en Guatemala. [The cruel murder of Monsignor Gerardi, two days after the submission of the report of the Project for the Recuperation of Historic Memory, prepared by the Office of Human Rights of the Archbishopric, obscures the route by which to clarify the truth. Besides, it places at risk the initial accomplishments in the peace process in Guatemala.] A los miembros, organizaciones e instituciones de la Comunidad Internacional, pedimos lo siguiente: [Of the members, organizations, and institutions of the international community, we ask the following:] 1. Que reproduzcan y multipliquen la informacion que aqui enviamos, a traves de sus redes de comunicacion (Ver comunicados). Si quieren conseguir mas informacion al respecto, consultar la pagina de Internet . [1. That they reproduce and multiply the information that we send here, via their networks of communication. If they wish more information about this, consult the web page at the URL .] 2. Que manden cartas (preferiblemente por fax) exigiendo al gobierno de Guatemala que esclarezca el hecho (Ver accion urgente). Pueden dirigirlas a: [2. That they send letters (preferably by fax) demanding that the government of Guatemala clarify this incident. These can be sent to the following address:] Presidencia de la Republica de Guatemala: Telefax: 2214537 E.mail: arzu@guate.net Ministerio de Gobernacion: Fax: 2321207 y 2515368 Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores: mint@mieno.gt Secretaria de la Paz (SEPAZ): Fax: 2301731 2301711 y 2301713 3. Que se dirijan a sus gobiernos (Organismos Ejecutivo, Legislativo y/o Parlamentos), a las instituciones financieras y a otros organismos relevantes para que ellos a su vez presionen al gobierno de Guatemala para que este hecho se esclarezca lo mas pronto posible y para que el proceso de Paz en Guatemala se consolide. El esclarecimiento de este hecho es indispensable para hacer cambios profundos en materia de Derechos Humanos. [3. That they would ask their own governments (executive, legislative, and/or parliamentary organisms), the financial institutions and other relevant entities also to pressure the Guatemalan government to clarify the incident [the murder] as quickly as possible and to consolidate the peace process in Guatemala. The clarification of this incident is indispensable for making profound changes in the human rights situation.] Agradecemos la solidaridad y el acompanamiento de la Comunidad Internacional y al mismo tiempo les pedimos se unan a la campana de la Sociedad Civil Guatemalteca: !NUNCA MAS! !NUNCA MAS! !NUNCA MAS! [We appreciate the solidarity and companionship of the international community and at the same time, we ask them to join in the campaign of Guatemalan civil society: NEVER AGAIN! NEVER AGAIN! NEVER AGAIN!] From bertil.haggman@helsingborg.se Sat May 9 10:37:46 1998 Date: Sat, 09 May 1998 16:41:50 -0700 From: Bertil Haggman Reply-To: bertil.haggman@helsingborg.se To: dredmond@gladstone.uoregon.edu Subject: Re: Euro and EU Dennis R Redmond wrote: > The Eastern bloc regimes, for all their hideous faults (and there were > many) grew a heck of a lot faster and had more social and economic > equity under neo-Stalinism than many other peripheral countries in Asia, > Africa and Latin America (many of which had no less barbaric governments). > Eastern Europe ran into problems only when it tried to marketize > everything all at once -- now the smarter countries, like Poland and the > Czech Republic, are instituting Central European-style controls over the > marketplace and creating developmental states of their own. You could > argue that the 50-year-old guerilla struggle between Eastern European > citizens and noxious governments/the Soviet Empire gave them the political > and social tools, ironically enough, to deal with the new imperialists: > the finance-mad elites of the European Union, who send trade delegations > and bankocrats to Prague the way Moscow sent emissaries to the > Czechslovakian Politburo. The charge of imperialism against Brussels is not a very believable one when one considers that there are only about 20,000 EU employees in Brussels (about the same number of county employees in an ordinarily sized Europan county). At present also, I believe, the federal solution in EU is not very popular. Anybody who has seen the industrial wastelands created by communist regimes in Eastern Europe would not care much about marxist-leninist "growth economies". > Problems, but also vast opportunities. Germany has, so I'm told, something > like 50% of the external debt of Russia; European banks own most of > Eastern Europe's debt, and have been financing mini-booms in Poland and > Slovenia. West Germany's absorption of the East has cost money, yes, but > the $100 billion in annual subsidies from West to East has also spurred a > round of new investment, and kept the German economy relatively insulated > from the overaccumulation crisis which hit the US in the early Nineties, > and Japan in the mid-Nineties. The EU will blossom only if a similar > redistribution takes place from rich EU lands to the poorer ones -- say, > something like 5% of EU GDP or some $400 billion a year. You could give > them the money, or just raise it via Euro-denominated debt. Membership in EU will in the first round guarantee redistribution to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Estonia is on its way and of course Slovenia to becoming growth economies. A sensible US quote, in my opinion, can be found underneath: ”Europe’s impeding creation of a monetary union with a single currency, the euro, will be the most important change in the global economy well into the next century. It will have a more lasting impact than virtually any other economic event that can be imagined such as the reemergence of Japan as a powerhouse or the extension of NAFTA throughout South America. And it could pose a serious challenge to America’s economic supremacy.” This written by a former economic expert on President Carter's staff. Greetings Bertil Haggman From p34d3611@jhu.edu Sat May 9 11:32:43 1998 by jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (950413.SGI.8.6.12/950213.SGI.AUTOCF) Date: Sat, 09 May 1998 13:31:02 -0400 (EDT) From: Peter Grimes Subject: Forward: MAI ON SIX-MONTH HOLD (fwd) To: WSN ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sat, 9 May 1998 11:04:42 -0400 From: "nabiha z. z. megateli" Reply-To: slac@listproc.hcf.jhu.edu To: slac@listproc.hcf.jhu.edu Subject: Forward: MAI ON SIX-MONTH HOLD Hi all! Good news on MAI stalling FYI. Cheers, NAbiha >From: Chad Carpenter >To: "Enb-Team (E-mail)" >Subject: MAI ON SIX-MONTH HOLD >X-Listprocessor-Version: 8.0 -- ListProcessor(tm) by CREN > >MAI ON SIX-MONTH HOLD > >Ministers from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development >(OECD) last week agreed to a six-month hold on negotiations for a >Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). Ministers are to use this time >as a "period of assessment and further consultation between the negotiating >parties and with interested parties of their societies," according to a >communique from last week's OECD ministerial meeting in Paris. Talks for >the MAI began in 1995 and were to conclude with an agreement last year, >until the deadline was extended until April 28, 1998. It became evident >this winter that no agreement could be reached, which resulted in last >week's decision for a pause in negotiations. > >France remains the most outspoken against the MAI. According to French >Minister for European Affairs Pierre Moscovici, a MAI will only be >acceptable if it includes binding core labor standards for investors; >provisions for separate liberalization standards for regional economic >integration organizations (REIOs), e.g. the EU; and the renunciation by the >U.S. of any possibility of sanctioning foreign firms who invest in Cuba, >Iran or elsewhere. > >With regard to the latter, Mr. Moscovici said, "The United States can't >negotiate a multilateral agreement for trade and liberalization while at >the same time taking unilateral measures that are purely extraterritorial >in nature." The U.S. and EU remain far apart as well over the issue of >separate standards for REIOs. > >France and Canada together called for the MAI to protect cultural >industries such as the arts from being overrun by foreign investors. This >so-called "cultural exemption" position has gained popular support in >France as a reason for opposition against the MAI. > >Canadian Trade Minister Sergio Marchi gave voice to a concern held by many >in the global trade community over whether the OECD is the appropriate >forum for negotiating a MAI. Mr. Marchi argued that by negotiating a MAI >via the WTO the agreement would be open to nearly all likely recipients and >sources of foreign direct investment, rather than the small group of 29 >OECD member-states. Indeed, developing countries have been ultra wary of >supporting a MAI agreement they had no part in shaping. Mr. Marchi urged >that investment requires a "more permanent approach," through the WTO and >said that the work done thus far by the OECD is "important but preparatory >nonetheless." > >Japan last week also called for investment to be included in possible >Millennium Round talks at the WTO, although it is not clear if Japan >intended to call for parallel talks to the OECD or to move the MAI to the >WTO outright. > >The pause in MAI talks is seen in part as a victory for environmentalists, >trade unions and consumer advocates who lobbied vigorously against the MAI. >According to John Evans, secretary-general of the Trade Union Advisory >Committee to the OECD, "[t]he new debate on the MAI has shown politicians >where the fault line is on globalization...[This] agreement cannot be >negotiated only with the needs of investors in mind." > >OECD trade negotiators are formally due to meet again in October. EU trade >commissioner Sir Leon Brittan urged for a firm date to be set to resume >negotiations, lest absence of a date become "an elegant or not-so-elegant >way of signing the death warrant to the whole thing." > >"Investment pact in jeopardy in OECD as members agree to six-month pause," >INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORTER, April 29, 1998; "OECD accepts French demand >to pause MAI talks, paves way for WTO work," INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 1, >1998; "OECD agrees to continue talks on multilateral investment talks," >WALL STREET JOURNAL, April 29, 1998; "Japan favors inclusion of investment >in new WTO round;" "OECD fails to agree on opening up investment markets," >AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, April 27, 1998, "OECD's future," FINANCIAL TIMES, >April 28, 1998. >******************************************************* >Chad Carpenter >Program Officer >International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) >New York, NY >Tel: + 1 (212) 643-9599 >E-mail: chadc@iisd.org >http://www.iisd.ca/linkages > > ************** ^ ^ o o \_/ **************** Nabiha Z. Z. Megateli Department of Anthropology Johns Hopkins University 404 Macaulay Hall 3400 N. Charles Street Baltimore, MD 21218 tel : 410 243 2332 fax : 410 516 6279 e-mail : nmegateli@igc.apc.org Home address: 3040 Abell Avenue Baltimore, MD 21218 *************** ^ ^ o o -- / II \ **************** From calzugaray@minrex.gov.cu Sun May 10 03:26:43 1998 From: Carlos Alzugaray Treto To: "'bertil.haggman@helsingborg.se'" , WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: RE: Euro and EU Date: Sun, 10 May 1998 05:27:35 -0400 charset="iso-8859-1" On 9 May Bertil Haqqman wrote: > A sensible US quote, in my opinion, can be > found underneath: > > "Europe's impeding creation of a monetary > union with a single currency, > the euro, will be the most important > change in the global economy well into > the next century. It will have a more > lasting impact than virtually any > other economic event that can be > imagined such as the reemergence of Japan as > a powerhouse or the extension of NAFTA > throughout South America. And it could > pose a serious challenge to America's > economic supremacy." > > This written by a former economic expert > on President Carter's staff. > Would it be possible for you to give us the exact name of the source and where and when did he say that. Carlos Alzugaray, Assistant Profesor, Instituto Superior de Relaciones Internacionales (ISRI), La Habana, Cuba. Email: calzugaray@minrex.gov.cu > From thall@DEPAUW.EDU Sun May 10 17:00:27 1998 Date: Sun, 10 May 1998 18:00:23 -0500 (EST) From: "Thomas D. [Tom] Hall, THALL@DEPAUW.EDU" Subject: new book To: Network World-Systems The following book has just been released by U.Ariz. Press. For WSNers interested indigenous relations and early colonization in the western hemisphere it may be of interest. You can find the following in html under Chapters on my home page. tom Thomas D. [tom] Hall thall@depauw.edu Department of Sociology DePauw University 100 Center Street Greencastle, IN 46135 765-658-4519 HOME PAGE: http://www.depauw.edu/~thall/hp1.htm ----------------------- A new book on Latin American Frontiers Contested Ground: Comparative Frontiers on the Northern and Southern Edges of the Spanish Empire, 1998. Edited by Donna Guy and Thomas Sheridan, University of Arizona Press. ISBN 0-8165- 1860-2. The Spanish Empire in the Americas spanned two continents and a vast diversity of peoples and landscapes. yet intriguing parallels characterized conquest, colonization, and indigenous resistance along its northern and southern frontiers, from the role played by Jesuit missions in the subjugation of native peoples to the emergence of livestock industries with their attendant cowboys and gauchos and threats of Indian raids. In this book, nine historians, three anthropologists, and one sociologist compare and contrast these fringes of New Spain between 1500 and 1880, showing that in each region the frontier represented contested ground where different cultures and polities clashed in ways heretofore little understood. The contributors reveal similarities in Indian-white relations, military policy, economic development, and social structure; and they show differences in instances such as the emergence of a major urban center in the south and the activities of rival powers. By exploring issues of ethnicity and gender as well as different facets of indigenous resistance, both violent and nonviolent, these essays point up the vitality and volatility of the frontier as a place where power was continually contested and negotiated. CONTENTS Acknowledgements vii Maps viii 1. On Frontiers: The Northern and Southern edges of the Spanish Empire in the Americas. Donna J. Guy and Thomas E. Sheridan 3 2. The Jesuit Mission Frontier in Comparative Perspective: The Reductions of the Rio de la Plata and the Missions of Northwestern Mexico, 1599-1700. Daniel T. Reff 16 3. Indigenous Rebellions on the Northern Mexican Mission Frontier: From First-Generation to Later Colonial Responses Susan M. Deeds 32 4. The Colonial Pact and Changing Ethnic Frontiers in Highland Sonora, 1740-1840. Cynthia Radding 52 5. Women of the Buenos Aires Frontier, 1740-1810 (or the Gaucho Turned Upside Down). Susan Migden Socolow 67 6. Spanish Colonial Military Strategy and Ideology. Richard W. Slatta 83 7. Comparative Raiding Economies: North and South Kristine L. Jones 97 8. Interethnic Conlflict and Resistance on the Brazilian Frontier of Goias, 1750-1890. Mary Karasch 115 9. North to the Yerbales: The Exploitation of the Paraguayan Frontier, 1776-1810. Jerry W. Cooney 135 10. Rio de La Plata and The Greater Southwest: A View From A World-Systems Perspective. Thomas D. Hall 150 11. The Frontier as an Arena of Social and Economic Change: Wealth Distribution in Nineteenth-Century Buenos Aires Province. Lyman L. Johnson 167 12. Two, Three, Many Barbarisms? The Chihuahua Frontier in Transition for Society to Politics. Daniel Nugent 182 Notes 201 Bibliography 221 About the Contributor 261 About the Editors 263 Index 265 From chriscd@jhu.edu Mon May 11 09:22:42 1998 Date: Mon, 11 May 1998 11:23:49 -0400 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: Forward: MAI ON SIX-MONTH HOLD] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------4B9922909E6112078DBBDACB --------------4B9922909E6112078DBBDACB 09 May 1998 11:09:29 -0400 (EDT) Date: Sat, 09 May 1998 11:04:42 -0400 From: "nabiha z. z. megateli" Subject: Forward: MAI ON SIX-MONTH HOLD Sender: owner-slac@listproc.hcf.jhu.edu To: slac@listproc.hcf.jhu.edu Reply-to: slac@listproc.hcf.jhu.edu Hi all! Good news on MAI stalling FYI. Cheers, NAbiha >From: Chad Carpenter >To: "Enb-Team (E-mail)" >Subject: MAI ON SIX-MONTH HOLD >X-Listprocessor-Version: 8.0 -- ListProcessor(tm) by CREN > >MAI ON SIX-MONTH HOLD > >Ministers from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development >(OECD) last week agreed to a six-month hold on negotiations for a >Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). Ministers are to use this time >as a "period of assessment and further consultation between the negotiating >parties and with interested parties of their societies," according to a >communique from last week's OECD ministerial meeting in Paris. Talks for >the MAI began in 1995 and were to conclude with an agreement last year, >until the deadline was extended until April 28, 1998. It became evident >this winter that no agreement could be reached, which resulted in last >week's decision for a pause in negotiations. > >France remains the most outspoken against the MAI. According to French >Minister for European Affairs Pierre Moscovici, a MAI will only be >acceptable if it includes binding core labor standards for investors; >provisions for separate liberalization standards for regional economic >integration organizations (REIOs), e.g. the EU; and the renunciation by the >U.S. of any possibility of sanctioning foreign firms who invest in Cuba, >Iran or elsewhere. > >With regard to the latter, Mr. Moscovici said, "The United States can't >negotiate a multilateral agreement for trade and liberalization while at >the same time taking unilateral measures that are purely extraterritorial >in nature." The U.S. and EU remain far apart as well over the issue of >separate standards for REIOs. > >France and Canada together called for the MAI to protect cultural >industries such as the arts from being overrun by foreign investors. This >so-called "cultural exemption" position has gained popular support in >France as a reason for opposition against the MAI. > >Canadian Trade Minister Sergio Marchi gave voice to a concern held by many >in the global trade community over whether the OECD is the appropriate >forum for negotiating a MAI. Mr. Marchi argued that by negotiating a MAI >via the WTO the agreement would be open to nearly all likely recipients and >sources of foreign direct investment, rather than the small group of 29 >OECD member-states. Indeed, developing countries have been ultra wary of >supporting a MAI agreement they had no part in shaping. Mr. Marchi urged >that investment requires a "more permanent approach," through the WTO and >said that the work done thus far by the OECD is "important but preparatory >nonetheless." > >Japan last week also called for investment to be included in possible >Millennium Round talks at the WTO, although it is not clear if Japan >intended to call for parallel talks to the OECD or to move the MAI to the >WTO outright. > >The pause in MAI talks is seen in part as a victory for environmentalists, >trade unions and consumer advocates who lobbied vigorously against the MAI. >According to John Evans, secretary-general of the Trade Union Advisory >Committee to the OECD, "[t]he new debate on the MAI has shown politicians >where the fault line is on globalization...[This] agreement cannot be >negotiated only with the needs of investors in mind." > >OECD trade negotiators are formally due to meet again in October. EU trade >commissioner Sir Leon Brittan urged for a firm date to be set to resume >negotiations, lest absence of a date become "an elegant or not-so-elegant >way of signing the death warrant to the whole thing." > >"Investment pact in jeopardy in OECD as members agree to six-month pause," >INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORTER, April 29, 1998; "OECD accepts French demand >to pause MAI talks, paves way for WTO work," INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 1, >1998; "OECD agrees to continue talks on multilateral investment talks," >WALL STREET JOURNAL, April 29, 1998; "Japan favors inclusion of investment >in new WTO round;" "OECD fails to agree on opening up investment markets," >AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, April 27, 1998, "OECD's future," FINANCIAL TIMES, >April 28, 1998. >******************************************************* >Chad Carpenter >Program Officer >International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) >New York, NY >Tel: + 1 (212) 643-9599 >E-mail: chadc@iisd.org >http://www.iisd.ca/linkages > > ************** ^ ^ o o \_/ **************** Nabiha Z. Z. Megateli Department of Anthropology Johns Hopkins University 404 Macaulay Hall 3400 N. Charles Street Baltimore, MD 21218 tel : 410 243 2332 fax : 410 516 6279 e-mail : nmegateli@igc.apc.org Home address: 3040 Abell Avenue Baltimore, MD 21218 *************** ^ ^ o o -- / II \ **************** --------------4B9922909E6112078DBBDACB-- From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Mon May 11 14:06:39 1998 Mon, 11 May 1998 16:10:49 -0400 (EDT) Date: Mon, 11 May 1998 16:10:49 -0400 (EDT) From: Gunder Frank To: "Marilyn A. Levine, Lewis-Clark State College" , Pat Manning , jeff sommers , eh.res@eh.net, WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK , psn@csf.colorado.edu, Michael Perelman Subject: landes final - amen! Here is my final version of my comment on McNeill/Landes. I hope it is now ready for posting as is, except that I have tried and failed untold times to append at the beginning the EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION that Marilyn kindly wrote for H-Asia. I will try to send that to your separately for your insertion at the beginning and posting if you wish. Or you can write your own, or post this without any intro, or not post it at all, as you wish If you wish to cordinate your posting and possible replies with others, I suggest you contact Pat Manning or Jeff Sommers at the address above agf THE WEALTH OF NATIONS AND THE POVERTY OF DAVID LANDES by ANDRE GUNDER FRANK University of Toronto 96 Asquith Ave. Toronto, Ont. Canada M4W 1J8 Tel:416-972 0616 Fax:416-972 0071 e-mail: agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca http://www.whc.neu.edu/whc/resrch & curric/gunder.html The opening sentence of David Landes' The Wealth and Poverty of Nations [reviewed in NYRB April 23, 1998] is that "my aim in writing this book is to do world history." The reviewer, William McNeill, shows that Landes missed his target completely. Indeed, "Landes does not try to understand this history....[Instead his] vision of the human past remains shaped (and I would say skewed) by ... European economic history .... Nothing else matters much to him." I join McNeill in arguing "that there are serious defects in his approach," but I shall demonstrate several of the many more that McNeill missed or was too diplomatic to point out. It is alarming therefore that this book has received rave reviews in other media and is endorsed by Nobel laureates in economics and by the statement of John Kenneth Galbraith that this book is "truly wonderful." For in reality, it is instead dreadful that Landes fails even to attempt any global world history, which also leads him to misinterpret the comparative not to mention relational places of the West and the rest within it. Following my more detailed critiques, below I offer the outlines of an alternative much more world historical, not to mention realistic, analysis in which the predominance of Asia until 1800 foreshadows its re-emergence today. The opening sentence of McNeill's review is a quotation from Landes, which is reproduced in all other reviews I have seen as well: "If we learn anything from the history of economic development, it is that culture makes all the difference." For other reviewers, that seems to be the principal virtue and success of the book. For McNeill and myself it is the second major failing of the book and its author. Granted that we all make mistakes, but some of us try with time to correct them. McNeill (1990) himself revisited his own the Rise of the West twenty-five years later and found that he had been mistaken in neglecting world systemic connections in the past and excessively reflecting American domination in the present. I myself now revise the 1967 core-periphery and the 1978 world accumulation versions of development/underdevelopment that were based on presumptions of Eurocentrism and replace them by ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (1998). But what has Landes learned since he addressed the same issue in his Unbound Prometheus in 1969? Only more of the same 'West vs. the Rest' to quote Samuel Huntington's similarly misguided and [temporary] winner-take-all version of history. However doing any kind of history, let alone world history, like that had already been shown to be wrong three decades ago, and it is even more clearly wrong again to do the same now. For, as the Islamicist and world historian Marshall Hodgson already wrote before his death in 1968 All attempts that I have yet seen to invoke pre- Modern seminal traits in the Occident can be shown to fail under close historical analysis, once other societies begin to be known as intimately as the Occident. This also applies to the great master, Max Weber, who tried to show that the Occident inherited a unique combination of rationality and activism (Hodgson 1993:86). Hodgson (1993) and Blaut (1991,1992,1993,1997) derisorally call this "tunnel history" derived from a tunnel vision, which sees only "exceptional" intra- European causes and consequences and is blind to all extra-European contributions to modern European and world history. But Landes remains steadfast and still ignores or denies all of the world history we have learned since then. Witness that McNeill can justly write that Landes "assumes an unchanging culture [in China] ... and his chapters on Latin America, the Muslim lands and China [also Russia] bluntly attribute their fumbling in making progress toward modernity to defects in the culture and institutions of the peoples concerned." McNeill calls many of these "assumptions" "unabashedly triumphalist dubious assertions" that are reflected in Landes' terminology like dour, dull, diligent; avaricious, sanctimonious, hypocrites; intrinsic capabilities, curiosity quotient, highly competitive, dumb submission; simulacrum of homogeneity and docility in Iberian society where skills, curiosity, initiatives and civic interests wered wanting; Gallic bete noire and can't trust the Brits; Mediterranean religious and intellectual intolerance; self-imposed archaism, cupidity and inefficient Ottoman yoke; Egypt's social and cultural incapability; the Russians were worse [and] used to poverty and ignorance. India dreamt wistfully of technological revolution but was not ready for it because that would have required imagination outside the Indian cultural and intellectual experience and used to poverty and ignorance. Yet India not only dominated the world cotton textile market as we all know; but the Indians produced better, longer lasting and cheaper sailing vessels, which the British East India Company bought and even commissioned until after 1830 they were replaced by steamships. Although Landes writes "anyone who wants to understand world economic history must study China," [23] his 'study' finds that also the Chinese lacked range, focus, and above all, curiosity; they were a culturally anbd intellectually homeostatic society that could live with little change; they had indifference to technology, technological and scientific torpor; lacked institutions for finding and learning [in the world's most literate society!]; abhorred mercantile success, and were not motivated by greed and passion. They showed deliberate introversion, isolationism, risk aversion, irrationality, xenophobia, arrogance, haughtiness, stunned submissiveness, self-defeating escapism; were insecure and brittle, and so on and on. Yet even Landes seems aware of some contradiction with reality, and indeed with himself, since he also writes that "some of these may sound like a collection of cliche's" [523] and he even observes that "these stereotypes held an ounce of truth and a pound of lazy thinking" [174] by others. Then what about his own assumptions and allegations of "what lay inside: culture, values, initiative" [253] and the institutions that "make all the difference" ? Moreover, Landes contradicts himself and the evidence again and again elsewhere as well, for as McNeill rightly notes "Landes seemingly cannot make up his mind": Portugal had intellectual shortcomings [137] and Iberia missed the train of the so-called scientific revolution [180], but a Portuguese professor of astronomy and mathematics invented the nonius to give navigational and astronomical readings a major boost [204]. Spain easily conquered the Aztecs because they were divided [102]; but "Spain, though nominally united, was divided" [249] and Catalonia was "exceptional" [250]. Guilds assumed a zero-sum game of costs and benefits [42]and therefore offered resistance to change [445], but "guilds were found all over the world - in Europe, but also in Islamic lands, India, China, and Japan" [242]. These and many other instances in which Landes' account is contradicted by the evidence and indeed often by himself all derive from this original Eurocentric sin that McNeill also identifies: "his assumption that only what happened in Europe really mattered, while the rest of the world reacted to innovations that Europeans thrust down their throats. This is intrinsically improbable ... [as is] dismissing economic changes elsewhere as trivial ... [since] most of humankind - four fifths or thereabouts - descend from non-European peoples." However, neglecting to look seriously at the historical reality of the much of rest of the world, not to mention of the world as a whole, also leads Landes to make at least three dozen 'factual' statements and propositions about them that are flatly contradicted by the bulk of historical evidence itself. That in turn also vitiates his comparisons with 'the rest' of the alleged 'exceptionalism of the West,' which has long since been disconfirmed by historical research and social theory, most recently again by Jack Goody (1996) under the title The East in the West. So many of Landes' central and derivative propositions reflect factually mistaken Eurocentrist assumptions whose uses and repetitions he could have avoided it he had taken due account of the past three decades and more of serious scholarship. Yet Landes also goes on to make many other statements that are totally contrary to fact, such as "interruption of Islamic and Chinese intellectual and technological advance" [200] "clearly Chinese agriculture could not run fast enough" [24]; Europe's shipping could have run circles around the Chinese in 1450 and then "Europe could now plant itself anywhere on the surface of the globe within reach of a naval cannon" [89 Landes' italics]; and "two hundred and fifty years ago, this [income] gap ... between Europe and, say East or South Asia (China or India) was around 1.5 or 2 to 1." In reality, none of the above, and many more of Landes' beliefs have any basis in reality. Indeed, mostly the opposite has been historically and empirically demonstrated again and again. But not to Landes, who also instead makes claims such as "Britain made itself" [215] and "in Britain, enterprise got nothing from the state" [265], which also draws critique from McNeill for disregarding state military demand and protection. So why does and how can Landes incur all these and so many other grievous historical errors? He himself provides the answer when he writes "just because something is obvious does not mean that people will see it, or that they will sacrifice belief to reality" [493] and in his dismissal of it regarding India in one page [165]: "Numbers deserve credence only if they accord with the historical context." Therein Landes himself hits the nail on the head, and indeed into his own. He does not realize how much he hangs on to his beliefs against all reality precisely because he got the world historical context all wrong. That is why all the long since historically and empirically demonstrated facts that Landes either cannot see or still denies "seem to me [Landes] implausible in the light of the gulf between European and Asian techniques," which contrary to Landes vastly favored Asia until 1800. For the problem, as McNeill stresses but still insufficiently documents, is that Landes' extreme Eurocentrism and Weberianism [yes and Marxism!] totally blinds him to the realities of the world economy and its history. In claiming that "culture makes all the difference; (here Max Weber was right on)" [516] Landes does exactly what he himself criticizes in Aristotle, "to explain phenomena by the 'essential' nature of things" and neglects and denies the very world history he 'aims' to write. Instead, as McNeill notes, fully one third of Landes' chapters are devoted to European "exceptionalisms." The most important is the alleged European "invention of invention" [chapter 4] and the "seventeenth-century scientific revolution." Yet Landes himself cites Newton's belief in alchemy and the transmutation of matter and writes that still "scientists of the eighteenth century could not have explained why and how a steam engine worked" [206]. So how could it be, as Landes also claims on the same page 206 that "scientific method and knowledge paid off in application - most importantly in power technology"? "The fact of Western technological precedence is there.... My assumption of the ultimate advantage and benefience of [Western] scientific knowledge and technological capability is today under sharp attack, even in the Academy [and is] couched in preferences for feeling over knowing.... (514, 513 italics in the original and exemplifying footnote reference to "thus A.G. Frank"). But whatever his or my feelings, Landes' own knowledge and assumptions are based on "facts" that are wrong. The fact is that Western science did not contribute to technology before 1870, as was recognized by scientific authorities from Francis Bacon (1561-1626) to Thomas Kuhn (1967). Robert Adams (1996) reviews case studies and the work of other authorities on the question and himself concludes on a dozen occasions that science had no impact on technology whatsoever until a full century after the industrial revolution. Indeed Steven Shapin (1996) even denies that there was any so-called seventeenth century scientific revolution and Floris Cohen (1994:500) says that "the concept has by now fulfilled its once useful services [to the likes of Landes]; the time has come to discard it." But not for Landes. Apart from the logical fallacy stressed by Jack Goody (1996) of deriving novel changes like scientific and industrial revolution in the world from permanent "qualities" in Europe, not only are the alleged causes of this transformation historically or empirically false, but so are many of his other assertions. For not only are, as McNeill rightly insists, four fifths of the world non-European; but Asian, and particularly Chinese and Indians, were also richer, more productive and much more competitive than the still quite marginal Europe in the Eurasian world economy and history before 1750-1800, as Adam Smith noted time and again in 1776. The legendary East-West "Oriental" trade earned them far less than the silver the Europeans brought to the intra-Aasian "country" trade; and in that, as the Director of the British East India Company himself recognized in 1688, at any major Indian port all Europeans' share put together was less than ten percent of the Asians' Indian Ocean trade among themselves. In the flourishing South China Sea trade, the Europeans were even more marginal; and in the North China Sea, not to mention in China itself, Europeans were altogether absent. Nor was Europe and the West nearly as dominant there more recently as Landes' triumphalism falsely alleges. McNeill mentions several other reasons for Landes' many failings, including a crucial one: "Landes simply neglects demography ... a fundamental aspect of the human condition - population growth and decay ... [and makes] a misleading, and probably false, proposition." Not just probably, but certainly! All recent empirical estimates, including those by the European authorities Bairoch and Maddison, whom Landes cites and whose help he even acknowledges in his preface, agree that in 1800 per capita income was still higher in China than in Europe in 1800. Their and other estimates all show the same basic pattern of total world and comparative regional growth of population, production, and income, which is exactly contrary to what Landes alleges: In the centuries leading up to 1800, European population remained stable at about 20 percent of the world population and produced less than that share of world output, while production in Asia grew enough to support the increase in its share of total world population from 60 percent to 66 percent, which also produced a significantly higher 80 percent share of world production (Frank 1998). That is contrary to Landes, still through the eighteenth century Asia and particularly China and India were far more productive than Europe; and their per capita levels of income and consumption, as well as their productivity and life expectancy, were also correspondingly higher and still rising faster than in Europe and even in Western Europe and Britain. McNeill also justly rebukes Landes for claiming that the world of Adam Smith was already taking shape 500 years before his time and that the sources of the 'Rise of the West' and the industrial revolution began in the year 1000. Yet after all that time, Smith was still unable to recognize them or even the industrial revolution itself in 1776; nor, as Landes himself notes, did Malthus and Ricardo one and two generations later. Yet with hindsight Landes now claims to see the causes of this sudden and unexpected transformation and that "the key factor - the driving force has been Western civilization and its dissemination" [513], which moreover have been embedded in almost time-less "Judeo-Christian" values since Biblical times [38,58], but only in Europe! Against the contrary proposition that "Europe is a latecomer," Landes claims "that is patently incorrect. As the historical record shows, for the last thousand years, Europe (the West) has been the prime mover of development and modernity" [xxi]. For still more alarming is that this counter-historical opinion is shared by the two dozen editors and scores of consultants who produced LIFE magazine' September 1997 special issue on "the Millennium" in which 83 of the 100 most important "movers and shakers" were of European extraction. Fernand Braudel exaggerated a bit when he said that Europeans invented history, but not when he added that then they put it to good use - for themselves. For all historical and conceptual challenge to this European "invention" of history, Landes dismisses as mere "Europhobia" and "anti-Eurocentric thought [that] is simply anti-intellectual; also contrary to fact" [514]. Nonetheless, it is Landes' own claim that is contrary to fact and patently incorrect: The historical record shows quite unambiguously that during the whole first half of that millennium Europe was only the most marginalized western peninsular outpost of development in Eurasia and especially in China, as McNeill also points out. Yet according to my reading of the historical evidence, even for the following three centuries from 1500 to 1800 Europe still remained at most a very minor player in the world economic casino, in which the only chips it had to ante up were the gold and particularly the silver from the Americas. Moreover, the calories derived from imported colonial sugar and Baltic wheat and the Indian cotton textiles that replaced home grown wool [thus requiring less sheep to eat less grass and "men" as the saying went] all supplemented capital and freed natural and human resources that could be used for investment and development in Western Europe. But all these supplements and replacements were prduced elswhere by slaves and serfs and/or were bought with American supplied silver and gold. Even so, just to be able to get and keep this parasitic seat at the world economic table, Europe had to ship and pay out the only export good it had, the silver that Europe was looting from the Americas. With that, Europe had to pay for its own the perpetual balance of trade deficit and help settle that of China, whose agriculture and manufacturing were the world's most productive and competitive, as Adam Smith still noted in 1776. So paraphrasing the motto of the New York Times that so highly praised Landes' book, everything that fits, we print. Alas, four-fifths of the world and its history does not fit into Landes and The Times Euro-Western centric scheme of things and is either omitted, or stereotyped and skewed, or dismissed as "a weird pattern of isolated initiatives and sisyphean discontinuities," as McNeill also notes. Again to quote Landes himself, "this is history cart before horse, results before data, imagination before experience. It is also wrong" [197]. Wrong indeed is it for Landes to make his dozens of mistaken comparisons of alleged essential essences, and wrong for Landes to write "no one has abrogated the law of supply and demand" [522]. For he has sought to abrogate it himself, albeit unsuccessfully so, in the next paragraph when he adds that "culture can make all the difference" for his many wrong assumptions about institutions here and there. Landes is even more wrong in failing to apply this law of supply and demand on a world-wide competitive market basis. Indeed Landes' theoretical and analytic procedures are the very opposite of being world historical or holistic, as he self-styles them on page 120. Landes observes that British coal "was [a] fortuitously suitable... lucky strike" [189] and that wages were high in Britain relative to continental Europe. But his analysis, if any, is only parochial. He does not even attempt to examine how local relative factor prices and availability of capital were derived from and responded to demand and supply in a competitive world market, eg. for textiles not to mention capital. Much less does he consider how differing but related demographic and ecological pressures [high wages and expensive wood] made investment in labor saving and energy producing technological change suddenly rational in some 'Newly Industrializing Economies' in Europe but temporarily not so in Asia where labor costs were lower even with higher incomes. Again to quote McNeill also regarding other shortcomings in this book, "Landes does not raise the question, much less answer it.... All this is absent from Landes's pages. Surely it belongs in any adequate explanation of how we got to where and who we are." In Landes' book instead, "Britain made itself" and his "explanation" is its alleged "nonmaterial values (culture) and institutions"! [215]. Landes also dismisses the contrary findings of the "New Economic History, beguiled by numbers" [231,193], Marxists [274,382] "leftist political economists and economic historians" [252}, "Europhobia [and] globalists" [514] and others, especially "the H-World site on the Internet - a magnet for fallacies and fantasies [and] the invention of folklore" [54n]. Moreover on the basis of only the briefest e-mailed excerpts on the H-World and Economic History nets based on my still forthcoming book, Landes also seems to apply these dismissals to me and writes that I am only an "iconoclast" [89n] who "would argue (thus A.G. Frank) that Europe's knowledge and know-how did not surpass those of other civilizations until the Industrial Revolution. Bad history" [514n]. What I write may today indeed be the work of what Landes calls an iconoclast. But it was still historical reality and standard knowledge even for mainstream Europeans like Leibnitz, Voltaire and Smith, whom Landes [mis]cites out of all historical context. Indeed Adam Smith's successors Malthus and Ricardo still held the same opinion, and except for a couple of iconoclasts in their own time like Montesquieu, "economists have not always felt this way" as Landes recognizes himelf. It was only since the mid- nineteenth century that Marx, Maine, Durkheim, Sombart, Weber, Parsons, Polanyi, Rostow and still Landes and their followers invented their own Eurocentric folklore, fallacies and fantasies, which are still all too widely shared today. I can only hope that, if not immediately iconoclast, such unabashed Eurocentrism and triumphalism will at least soon again become obsolete, the moreso as Asia is REgaining its 'traditional' place and role in the world, which itself ReOrients. My modest contribution to that end is my own book ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age {University of California Press May/June 1998), which addresses - and redresses - the main theoretical concerns voiced by McNeill and myself about Landes, especially his disregard of the history of four fifth of humanity and his Weberian and other unfounded assumptions about their and Western institutions and culture. My only 400 page book also remedies many of the ommissions that McNeill noted in the 600 page book of Landes: Demography, agriculture, military and other technology as well as production and trade in Asia. Moreover, my book traces the historical development of the real world economy in which, until 1800, China and secondarly India have predominant roles, which are omitted or even denied by Landes and others. Most important unlike Landes and others, my book offers a truly global world economic/ demographic/ ecological analysis of how and why the subsequent Decline of the East and Rise of the West were mutually related and derivative from the structure and dynamic of the world economy itself, and not from any European miracle or exceptionalism. If if Landes will that he does none of the above and therefore also no world history at all, I will readily agree with Landes that I [still] do them badly. Indeed Landes himself observes rightly, alas not about himself, that "just because something is obvious does not mean that people will see it, or that they will sacrifice belief to reality; in the effort to have things both ways, or every way, to appease old interests, to encourage new" [493]. At least we can agree that "a good historian tries to keep his balance" [62] and "without controversy, no serious pursuit of knowledge and truth" [203]. So after Landes and others have had the opportunity to read both books and whatever else we may write, let reality, history and our readers themselves be the judge of the wealth of nations and the poverty of David Landes or myself. For let controversy, balance and cooperation flourish even between Landes and myself; and when all is said and done, let's just all try to do better. In closing, I wish to cite and make my own the very words with which Landes himself closes: "The one lesson that emerges is the need to keep trying. No miracles. No perfection. No millennium. No apocalypse. We must cultivate a sceptical faith, avoid dogma, listen and watch well, try to clarify and define ends, the better to chose the means" [524]. Then, instead of promoting Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations," perhaps even David Landes and I could agree to summarize the end with Wendell Wilkie's motto of "One World" and the means through the "Unity in Diversity" that Mikhail Gorbachev proposed to the United Nations. Respectfullly submitted Andre Gunder Frank May 6, 1998 [53rd anniversary of VE Day] . REFERENCES CITED Adams, Robert McC. 1996. Paths of Fire: An Anthropologist's Inquiry into Western Technology, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Blaut, J.M. 1992. Fourteen Ninety-Two. Political Geography XI,4,July 1992, reprinted in J.M.Blaut et al 1492. The Debate on Colonialism, Eurocentrism and History, Trenton, NJ:Africa World Press 1992. ------ 1993. The Colonizer's Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History, New York/ London: Guilford Press, 1993, ------ 1997. "Eight Eurocentric Historians," Chapter 2 in Decolonizing the Past: Historians and the Myth of European Superiority [manuscript] forthcoming. Cohen, H. Floris 1994. The Scientific Revolution. A Historiographic Inquiry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Frank, Andre Gunder 967. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press. ------ 1978a. World Accumulation 1492-1789, New York: Monthly Review Press and London: Macmillan Press. ------ 1978b. Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment New York: Monthly Review Press and London: Macmillan Press. ------- 1998. ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age. Berkeley: University of California Press. Goody, Jack 1996. The East in the West. Cambridge: Cambirdge University Press. Hodgson, Marshall 1993. Rethinking World History. Edited by Edmund Burke III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Huntington, Samuel 1993, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72, Summer. ------ 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking the World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster. Kuhn, Thomas S. 1969. "Comment" Comparative Studies in Society and History 11:426-30. ----- 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolution. 2nd. Ed.Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Landes, David S. 1969. The Unbound Prometheus. Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present Cambrige: Cambridge University Press. McNeill, William 1963. The Rise of the West. A History of the Human Community. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ----- 1990. "The Rise of the West After Twenty Five Years" Journal of World History. I,1: 1-22. Shapin, Steve 1996. Scientific Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Mon May 11 14:12:21 1998 Mon, 11 May 1998 16:15:21 -0400 (EDT) Date: Mon, 11 May 1998 16:15:21 -0400 (EDT) From: Gunder Frank Reply-To: Gunder Frank To: Pat Manning , jeff sommers , "Marilyn A. Levine, Lewis-Clark State College" , eh.res@eh.net, WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK , Michael Perelman , psn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Marilyn's introduction of agf/landes for H-Asia > EDITOR'S NOTE: > > The following is a response to a review in the _New York Review of > > Books_ about David Landes' work, _The Wealth and Poverty of Nations_. > > This response is by Andre Gunder Frank, University of Toronto, whose > > own work, _ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age_, will be > > published May/June 1998 by the University of California Press. > > Professor Frank has been communicating with Professor Landes about > > making this a dialogue and we welcome and will publish a response > > from Professor Landes in the hopes of making this a better dialogue. > > Members of H-ASIA are certainly welcome to respond to the issues > > raised here, which are relevant to understanding both Asian and World > > History. > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Andre Gunder Frank University of Toronto 96 Asquith Ave Tel. 1 416 972-0616 Toronto, ON Fax. 1 416 972-0071 CANADA M4W 1J8 Email agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca My home Page is at: http://www.whc.neu.edu/whc/resrch&curric/gunder.html ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From chriscd@jhu.edu Mon May 11 14:17:49 1998 Date: Mon, 11 May 1998 16:18:58 -0400 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: guatemalan situation To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu from susanne jonas: I am attaching something I wrote after the assassination. I have been in touch w/ people in Guatemala quite regularly since then, and I think the whole peace process is in the balance. Yesterday I heard that the mayor of Santa Cruz del Quiche (elected from a comite civico) was assassinated as well -- the message seems to be to try to destroy everything new. People in Guate are caught between the fear reflex and a determination not to let it all be destroyed. An entire nation is haunted by the bloody image of Msgr. Juan Gerardi's skull, crushed by a cement block and spread across the floor of his garage on the night of April 26. His corpse could be identified only by the ring on his finger (the only object of value). The method of assassination was grotesquely deliberate, the message an unmistakeable reminder to Guatemalans of the worst atrocities of the 36- year civil war. But the war is over; this is the kind of political crime that was supposed to have been ended forever by the signing of the Peace Accords in December 1996. So how can we make sense of such a deed? One of Guatemala's leading Bishops, Msgr. Gerardi was a giant of a man. During the height of the army's dirty war in the early 1980s, he was the target of assassination attempts and, after closing down the diocese in Quiché, was forced into exile. After returning in 1984, even as the war continued, he played a central role in developing the Catholic Church's Episcopal Conference into the army's most formidable adversary. Under his stewardship, the Archbishop's Human Rights Office was crucial during the peace negotiations of the 1990s. Just last Friday his office released a monumental report on the human rights crimes of the war, making clear that those crimes had been overwhelmingly committed by the army. Based on testimony taken from 6,000 civilians, the report was entitled "Nunca Más," "Never Again." Beyond his humanitarian (pastoral/ human rights) leadership, Msgr. Gerardi was also an intellectual giant. For the last ten years, while writing my most recent books on Guatemala, I relied on extensive discussions with him whenever I was in the country. His piercing wisdom is irreplaceable -- not unlike that of the Jesuits murdered in 1989 during El Salvador's civil war. But that was a war-time political crime; this is a peace-time crime. So how can we make sense of it? The stakes are high: the future of peace in Guatemala. This spectacularly beautiful country endured Latin America's longest and bloodiest Cold War civil war, which cost the lives of up to 200,000 civilians, mainly highlands Indians. The very brutality of the war, the scorched-earth policies and massacres carried out by Guatemala's U.S.-trained and - supported counterinsurgency army, made the peace process even more significant. For millions of Guatemalans, the signing of the Peace Accords on December 29, 1996 symbolized the end of a long nightmare, the possibility of a "reinvented" Guatemala -- demilitarized, ideologically pluralistic, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural (to reflect the country's 60% indigenous majority), tolerant enough to permit participation across the entire political spectrum and to confront the truth about past crimes. But the peace process always had its enemies. Peace resisters in the army and among the traditional economic elites never ceased in their attempts to subvert and undermine what was being built. Spending two weeks there just before Easter, I could sense the deterioration of the political climate, the growing resistances to implementing what had been signed. No one ever doubted that this second stage of the peace process would be difficult. But no one was prepared for defiance in so violent a form. What will be the long-range effect of the Gerardi assassination? Will it revive the reflex of fear that Guatemalans were slowly shedding -- above all, among civilians who have been coming forward to give testimony for the Church report and for the official Truth Commission report? Or will it galvanize the great majority of Guatemalans who have constructed, welcomed, and supported the peace process? And will it energize the government to follow through on the constitutional reforms that will demilitarize Guatemala and realize the dreams inherent in the Accords? This turning point is not the first for Guatemala. In 1954, the CIA ousted the democratically elected government of Jacobo Arbenz. On that occasion, at the height of the Cold War, Guatemalans thought they had no alternative but to accept the dirty hand they had been dealt. But today, nearly 45 years later, Guatemalans are not prepared to give up what they have won after so much bloodshed. With a great deal of help from the international community, Guatemala can defeat the desperate actions of a tiny, isolated (but still- powerful) coalition of peace resisters. What can the U.S. government do to help? FBI assistance in investigating the crime is only a small beginning. What Guatemala urgently needs from the U.S. in this moment of crisis is an unequivocal message of support for full and immediate compliance with the content of the Accords, particularly on demilitarization. U.S. funding should be conditioned on such compliance. Guatemala also needs Washington's contribution to Msgr. Gerardi's mission for truth: full declassification of all U.S. files pertaining to Guatemala's war and the U.S. role in that war. ------------------------ Susanne Jonas, who teaches Latin American & Latino Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz, has been writing about Guatemala for over 30 years, and is currently completing a new book on Guatemala's peace process. Recent works include The Battle for Guatemala (1991) and "Dangerous Liaisons: The U.S. in Guatemala,"Foreign Policy, Summer 1996 Contact: Friday thru Monday: TEL/FAX: 415- 826 8338 Tues thru Thurs: TEL 408 459 3232, FAX 408 459 3125 If anyone wants to know how to "help" keep the peace process momentum alive (i.e. how to pressure both the Guatemalan and U.S. governments), they should contact me at this e-mail -- as well as the Guatemala News & Information Bureau (gnib@igc.org). From chriscd@jhu.edu Mon May 11 14:26:05 1998 Date: Mon, 11 May 1998 16:27:19 -0400 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: Gunder's review of Landes To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu > > The following is a response to a review in the _New York Review of > > Books_ about David Landes' work, _The Wealth and Poverty of Nations_. > > This response is by Andre Gunder Frank, University of Toronto, whose > > own work, _ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age_, will be > > published May/June 1998 by the University of California Press. > > Professor Frank has been communicating with Professor Landes about > > making this a dialogue and we welcome and will publish a response > > from Professor Landes in the hopes of making this a better dialogue. THE WEALTH OF NATIONS AND THE POVERTY OF DAVID LANDES by ANDRE GUNDER FRANK University of Toronto 96 Asquith Ave. Toronto, Ont. Canada M4W 1J8 Tel:416-972 0616 Fax:416-972 0071 e-mail: agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca http://www.whc.neu.edu/whc/resrch & curric/gunder.html The opening sentence of David Landes' The Wealth and Poverty of Nations [reviewed in NYRB April 23, 1998] is that "my aim in writing this book is to do world history." The reviewer, William McNeill, shows that Landes missed his target completely. Indeed, "Landes does not try to understand this history....[Instead his] vision of the human past remains shaped (and I would say skewed) by ... European economic history .... Nothing else matters much to him." I join McNeill in arguing "that there are serious defects in his approach," but I shall demonstrate several of the many more that McNeill missed or was too diplomatic to point out. It is alarming therefore that this book has received rave reviews in other media and is endorsed by Nobel laureates in economics and by the statement of John Kenneth Galbraith that this book is "truly wonderful." For in reality, it is instead dreadful that Landes fails even to attempt any global world history, which also leads him to misinterpret the comparative not to mention relational places of the West and the rest within it. Following my more detailed critiques, below I offer the outlines of an alternative much more world historical, not to mention realistic, analysis in which the predominance of Asia until 1800 foreshadows its re-emergence today. The opening sentence of McNeill's review is a quotation from Landes, which is reproduced in all other reviews I have seen as well: "If we learn anything from the history of economic development, it is that culture makes all the difference." For other reviewers, that seems to be the principal virtue and success of the book. For McNeill and myself it is the second major failing of the book and its author. Granted that we all make mistakes, but some of us try with time to correct them. McNeill (1990) himself revisited his own the Rise of the West twenty-five years later and found that he had been mistaken in neglecting world systemic connections in the past and excessively reflecting American domination in the present. I myself now revise the 1967 core-periphery and the 1978 world accumulation versions of development/underdevelopment that were based on presumptions of Eurocentrism and replace them by ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (1998). But what has Landes learned since he addressed the same issue in his Unbound Prometheus in 1969? Only more of the same 'West vs. the Rest' to quote Samuel Huntington's similarly misguided and [temporary] winner-take-all version of history. However doing any kind of history, let alone world history, like that had already been shown to be wrong three decades ago, and it is even more clearly wrong again to do the same now. For, as the Islamicist and world historian Marshall Hodgson already wrote before his death in 1968 All attempts that I have yet seen to invoke pre- Modern seminal traits in the Occident can be shown to fail under close historical analysis, once other societies begin to be known as intimately as the Occident. This also applies to the great master, Max Weber, who tried to show that the Occident inherited a unique combination of rationality and activism (Hodgson 1993:86). Hodgson (1993) and Blaut (1991,1992,1993,1997) derisorally call this "tunnel history" derived from a tunnel vision, which sees only "exceptional" intra- European causes and consequences and is blind to all extra-European contributions to modern European and world history. But Landes remains steadfast and still ignores or denies all of the world history we have learned since then. Witness that McNeill can justly write that Landes "assumes an unchanging culture [in China] ... and his chapters on Latin America, the Muslim lands and China [also Russia] bluntly attribute their fumbling in making progress toward modernity to defects in the culture and institutions of the peoples concerned." McNeill calls many of these "assumptions" "unabashedly triumphalist dubious assertions" that are reflected in Landes' terminology like dour, dull, diligent; avaricious, sanctimonious, hypocrites; intrinsic capabilities, curiosity quotient, highly competitive, dumb submission; simulacrum of homogeneity and docility in Iberian society where skills, curiosity, initiatives and civic interests wered wanting; Gallic bete noire and can't trust the Brits; Mediterranean religious and intellectual intolerance; self-imposed archaism, cupidity and inefficient Ottoman yoke; Egypt's social and cultural incapability; the Russians were worse [and] used to poverty and ignorance. India dreamt wistfully of technological revolution but was not ready for it because that would have required imagination outside the Indian cultural and intellectual experience and used to poverty and ignorance. Yet India not only dominated the world cotton textile market as we all know; but the Indians produced better, longer lasting and cheaper sailing vessels, which the British East India Company bought and even commissioned until after 1830 they were replaced by steamships. Although Landes writes "anyone who wants to understand world economic history must study China," [23] his 'study' finds that also the Chinese lacked range, focus, and above all, curiosity; they were a culturally anbd intellectually homeostatic society that could live with little change; they had indifference to technology, technological and scientific torpor; lacked institutions for finding and learning [in the world's most literate society!]; abhorred mercantile success, and were not motivated by greed and passion. They showed deliberate introversion, isolationism, risk aversion, irrationality, xenophobia, arrogance, haughtiness, stunned submissiveness, self-defeating escapism; were insecure and brittle, and so on and on. Yet even Landes seems aware of some contradiction with reality, and indeed with himself, since he also writes that "some of these may sound like a collection of cliche's" [523] and he even observes that "these stereotypes held an ounce of truth and a pound of lazy thinking" [174] by others. Then what about his own assumptions and allegations of "what lay inside: culture, values, initiative" [253] and the institutions that "make all the difference" ? Moreover, Landes contradicts himself and the evidence again and again elsewhere as well, for as McNeill rightly notes "Landes seemingly cannot make up his mind": Portugal had intellectual shortcomings [137] and Iberia missed the train of the so-called scientific revolution [180], but a Portuguese professor of astronomy and mathematics invented the nonius to give navigational and astronomical readings a major boost [204]. Spain easily conquered the Aztecs because they were divided [102]; but "Spain, though nominally united, was divided" [249] and Catalonia was "exceptional" [250]. Guilds assumed a zero-sum game of costs and benefits [42]and therefore offered resistance to change [445], but "guilds were found all over the world - in Europe, but also in Islamic lands, India, China, and Japan" [242]. These and many other instances in which Landes' account is contradicted by the evidence and indeed often by himself all derive from this original Eurocentric sin that McNeill also identifies: "his assumption that only what happened in Europe really mattered, while the rest of the world reacted to innovations that Europeans thrust down their throats. This is intrinsically improbable ... [as is] dismissing economic changes elsewhere as trivial ... [since] most of humankind - four fifths or thereabouts - descend from non-European peoples." However, neglecting to look seriously at the historical reality of the much of rest of the world, not to mention of the world as a whole, also leads Landes to make at least three dozen 'factual' statements and propositions about them that are flatly contradicted by the bulk of historical evidence itself. That in turn also vitiates his comparisons with 'the rest' of the alleged 'exceptionalism of the West,' which has long since been disconfirmed by historical research and social theory, most recently again by Jack Goody (1996) under the title The East in the West. So many of Landes' central and derivative propositions reflect factually mistaken Eurocentrist assumptions whose uses and repetitions he could have avoided it he had taken due account of the past three decades and more of serious scholarship. Yet Landes also goes on to make many other statements that are totally contrary to fact, such as "interruption of Islamic and Chinese intellectual and technological advance" [200] "clearly Chinese agriculture could not run fast enough" [24]; Europe's shipping could have run circles around the Chinese in 1450 and then "Europe could now plant itself anywhere on the surface of the globe within reach of a naval cannon" [89 Landes' italics]; and "two hundred and fifty years ago, this [income] gap ... between Europe and, say East or South Asia (China or India) was around 1.5 or 2 to 1." In reality, none of the above, and many more of Landes' beliefs have any basis in reality. Indeed, mostly the opposite has been historically and empirically demonstrated again and again. But not to Landes, who also instead makes claims such as "Britain made itself" [215] and "in Britain, enterprise got nothing from the state" [265], which also draws critique from McNeill for disregarding state military demand and protection. So why does and how can Landes incur all these and so many other grievous historical errors? He himself provides the answer when he writes "just because something is obvious does not mean that people will see it, or that they will sacrifice belief to reality" [493] and in his dismissal of it regarding India in one page [165]: "Numbers deserve credence only if they accord with the historical context." Therein Landes himself hits the nail on the head, and indeed into his own. He does not realize how much he hangs on to his beliefs against all reality precisely because he got the world historical context all wrong. That is why all the long since historically and empirically demonstrated facts that Landes either cannot see or still denies "seem to me [Landes] implausible in the light of the gulf between European and Asian techniques," which contrary to Landes vastly favored Asia until 1800. For the problem, as McNeill stresses but still insufficiently documents, is that Landes' extreme Eurocentrism and Weberianism [yes and Marxism!] totally blinds him to the realities of the world economy and its history. In claiming that "culture makes all the difference; (here Max Weber was right on)" [516] Landes does exactly what he himself criticizes in Aristotle, "to explain phenomena by the 'essential' nature of things" and neglects and denies the very world history he 'aims' to write. Instead, as McNeill notes, fully one third of Landes' chapters are devoted to European "exceptionalisms." The most important is the alleged European "invention of invention" [chapter 4] and the "seventeenth-century scientific revolution." Yet Landes himself cites Newton's belief in alchemy and the transmutation of matter and writes that still "scientists of the eighteenth century could not have explained why and how a steam engine worked" [206]. So how could it be, as Landes also claims on the same page 206 that "scientific method and knowledge paid off in application - most importantly in power technology"? "The fact of Western technological precedence is there.... My assumption of the ultimate advantage and benefience of [Western] scientific knowledge and technological capability is today under sharp attack, even in the Academy [and is] couched in preferences for feeling over knowing.... (514, 513 italics in the original and exemplifying footnote reference to "thus A.G. Frank"). But whatever his or my feelings, Landes' own knowledge and assumptions are based on "facts" that are wrong. The fact is that Western science did not contribute to technology before 1870, as was recognized by scientific authorities from Francis Bacon (1561-1626) to Thomas Kuhn (1967). Robert Adams (1996) reviews case studies and the work of other authorities on the question and himself concludes on a dozen occasions that science had no impact on technology whatsoever until a full century after the industrial revolution. Indeed Steven Shapin (1996) even denies that there was any so-called seventeenth century scientific revolution and Floris Cohen (1994:500) says that "the concept has by now fulfilled its once useful services [to the likes of Landes]; the time has come to discard it." But not for Landes. Apart from the logical fallacy stressed by Jack Goody (1996) of deriving novel changes like scientific and industrial revolution in the world from permanent "qualities" in Europe, not only are the alleged causes of this transformation historically or empirically false, but so are many of his other assertions. For not only are, as McNeill rightly insists, four fifths of the world non-European; but Asian, and particularly Chinese and Indians, were also richer, more productive and much more competitive than the still quite marginal Europe in the Eurasian world economy and history before 1750-1800, as Adam Smith noted time and again in 1776. The legendary East-West "Oriental" trade earned them far less than the silver the Europeans brought to the intra-Aasian "country" trade; and in that, as the Director of the British East India Company himself recognized in 1688, at any major Indian port all Europeans' share put together was less than ten percent of the Asians' Indian Ocean trade among themselves. In the flourishing South China Sea trade, the Europeans were even more marginal; and in the North China Sea, not to mention in China itself, Europeans were altogether absent. Nor was Europe and the West nearly as dominant there more recently as Landes' triumphalism falsely alleges. McNeill mentions several other reasons for Landes' many failings, including a crucial one: "Landes simply neglects demography ... a fundamental aspect of the human condition - population growth and decay ... [and makes] a misleading, and probably false, proposition." Not just probably, but certainly! All recent empirical estimates, including those by the European authorities Bairoch and Maddison, whom Landes cites and whose help he even acknowledges in his preface, agree that in 1800 per capita income was still higher in China than in Europe in 1800. Their and other estimates all show the same basic pattern of total world and comparative regional growth of population, production, and income, which is exactly contrary to what Landes alleges: In the centuries leading up to 1800, European population remained stable at about 20 percent of the world population and produced less than that share of world output, while production in Asia grew enough to support the increase in its share of total world population from 60 percent to 66 percent, which also produced a significantly higher 80 percent share of world production (Frank 1998). That is contrary to Landes, still through the eighteenth century Asia and particularly China and India were far more productive than Europe; and their per capita levels of income and consumption, as well as their productivity and life expectancy, were also correspondingly higher and still rising faster than in Europe and even in Western Europe and Britain. McNeill also justly rebukes Landes for claiming that the world of Adam Smith was already taking shape 500 years before his time and that the sources of the 'Rise of the West' and the industrial revolution began in the year 1000. Yet after all that time, Smith was still unable to recognize them or even the industrial revolution itself in 1776; nor, as Landes himself notes, did Malthus and Ricardo one and two generations later. Yet with hindsight Landes now claims to see the causes of this sudden and unexpected transformation and that "the key factor - the driving force has been Western civilization and its dissemination" [513], which moreover have been embedded in almost time-less "Judeo-Christian" values since Biblical times [38,58], but only in Europe! Against the contrary proposition that "Europe is a latecomer," Landes claims "that is patently incorrect. As the historical record shows, for the last thousand years, Europe (the West) has been the prime mover of development and modernity" [xxi]. For still more alarming is that this counter-historical opinion is shared by the two dozen editors and scores of consultants who produced LIFE magazine' September 1997 special issue on "the Millennium" in which 83 of the 100 most important "movers and shakers" were of European extraction. Fernand Braudel exaggerated a bit when he said that Europeans invented history, but not when he added that then they put it to good use - for themselves. For all historical and conceptual challenge to this European "invention" of history, Landes dismisses as mere "Europhobia" and "anti-Eurocentric thought [that] is simply anti-intellectual; also contrary to fact" [514]. Nonetheless, it is Landes' own claim that is contrary to fact and patently incorrect: The historical record shows quite unambiguously that during the whole first half of that millennium Europe was only the most marginalized western peninsular outpost of development in Eurasia and especially in China, as McNeill also points out. Yet according to my reading of the historical evidence, even for the following three centuries from 1500 to 1800 Europe still remained at most a very minor player in the world economic casino, in which the only chips it had to ante up were the gold and particularly the silver from the Americas. Moreover, the calories derived from imported colonial sugar and Baltic wheat and the Indian cotton textiles that replaced home grown wool [thus requiring less sheep to eat less grass and "men" as the saying went] all supplemented capital and freed natural and human resources that could be used for investment and development in Western Europe. But all these supplements and replacements were prduced elswhere by slaves and serfs and/or were bought with American supplied silver and gold. Even so, just to be able to get and keep this parasitic seat at the world economic table, Europe had to ship and pay out the only export good it had, the silver that Europe was looting from the Americas. With that, Europe had to pay for its own the perpetual balance of trade deficit and help settle that of China, whose agriculture and manufacturing were the world's most productive and competitive, as Adam Smith still noted in 1776. So paraphrasing the motto of the New York Times that so highly praised Landes' book, everything that fits, we print. Alas, four-fifths of the world and its history does not fit into Landes and The Times Euro-Western centric scheme of things and is either omitted, or stereotyped and skewed, or dismissed as "a weird pattern of isolated initiatives and sisyphean discontinuities," as McNeill also notes. Again to quote Landes himself, "this is history cart before horse, results before data, imagination before experience. It is also wrong" [197]. Wrong indeed is it for Landes to make his dozens of mistaken comparisons of alleged essential essences, and wrong for Landes to write "no one has abrogated the law of supply and demand" [522]. For he has sought to abrogate it himself, albeit unsuccessfully so, in the next paragraph when he adds that "culture can make all the difference" for his many wrong assumptions about institutions here and there. Landes is even more wrong in failing to apply this law of supply and demand on a world-wide competitive market basis. Indeed Landes' theoretical and analytic procedures are the very opposite of being world historical or holistic, as he self-styles them on page 120. Landes observes that British coal "was [a] fortuitously suitable... lucky strike" [189] and that wages were high in Britain relative to continental Europe. But his analysis, if any, is only parochial. He does not even attempt to examine how local relative factor prices and availability of capital were derived from and responded to demand and supply in a competitive world market, eg. for textiles not to mention capital. Much less does he consider how differing but related demographic and ecological pressures [high wages and expensive wood] made investment in labor saving and energy producing technological change suddenly rational in some 'Newly Industrializing Economies' in Europe but temporarily not so in Asia where labor costs were lower even with higher incomes. Again to quote McNeill also regarding other shortcomings in this book, "Landes does not raise the question, much less answer it.... All this is absent from Landes's pages. Surely it belongs in any adequate explanation of how we got to where and who we are." In Landes' book instead, "Britain made itself" and his "explanation" is its alleged "nonmaterial values (culture) and institutions"! [215]. Landes also dismisses the contrary findings of the "New Economic History, beguiled by numbers" [231,193], Marxists [274,382] "leftist political economists and economic historians" [252}, "Europhobia [and] globalists" [514] and others, especially "the H-World site on the Internet - a magnet for fallacies and fantasies [and] the invention of folklore" [54n]. Moreover on the basis of only the briefest e-mailed excerpts on the H-World and Economic History nets based on my still forthcoming book, Landes also seems to apply these dismissals to me and writes that I am only an "iconoclast" [89n] who "would argue (thus A.G. Frank) that Europe's knowledge and know-how did not surpass those of other civilizations until the Industrial Revolution. Bad history" [514n]. What I write may today indeed be the work of what Landes calls an iconoclast. But it was still historical reality and standard knowledge even for mainstream Europeans like Leibnitz, Voltaire and Smith, whom Landes [mis]cites out of all historical context. Indeed Adam Smith's successors Malthus and Ricardo still held the same opinion, and except for a couple of iconoclasts in their own time like Montesquieu, "economists have not always felt this way" as Landes recognizes himelf. It was only since the mid- nineteenth century that Marx, Maine, Durkheim, Sombart, Weber, Parsons, Polanyi, Rostow and still Landes and their followers invented their own Eurocentric folklore, fallacies and fantasies, which are still all too widely shared today. I can only hope that, if not immediately iconoclast, such unabashed Eurocentrism and triumphalism will at least soon again become obsolete, the moreso as Asia is REgaining its 'traditional' place and role in the world, which itself ReOrients. My modest contribution to that end is my own book ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age {University of California Press May/June 1998), which addresses - and redresses - the main theoretical concerns voiced by McNeill and myself about Landes, especially his disregard of the history of four fifth of humanity and his Weberian and other unfounded assumptions about their and Western institutions and culture. My only 400 page book also remedies many of the ommissions that McNeill noted in the 600 page book of Landes: Demography, agriculture, military and other technology as well as production and trade in Asia. Moreover, my book traces the historical development of the real world economy in which, until 1800, China and secondarly India have predominant roles, which are omitted or even denied by Landes and others. Most important unlike Landes and others, my book offers a truly global world economic/ demographic/ ecological analysis of how and why the subsequent Decline of the East and Rise of the West were mutually related and derivative from the structure and dynamic of the world economy itself, and not from any European miracle or exceptionalism. If if Landes will that he does none of the above and therefore also no world history at all, I will readily agree with Landes that I [still] do them badly. Indeed Landes himself observes rightly, alas not about himself, that "just because something is obvious does not mean that people will see it, or that they will sacrifice belief to reality; in the effort to have things both ways, or every way, to appease old interests, to encourage new" [493]. At least we can agree that "a good historian tries to keep his balance" [62] and "without controversy, no serious pursuit of knowledge and truth" [203]. So after Landes and others have had the opportunity to read both books and whatever else we may write, let reality, history and our readers themselves be the judge of the wealth of nations and the poverty of David Landes or myself. For let controversy, balance and cooperation flourish even between Landes and myself; and when all is said and done, let's just all try to do better. In closing, I wish to cite and make my own the very words with which Landes himself closes: "The one lesson that emerges is the need to keep trying. No miracles. No perfection. No millennium. No apocalypse. We must cultivate a sceptical faith, avoid dogma, listen and watch well, try to clarify and define ends, the better to chose the means" [524]. Then, instead of promoting Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations," perhaps even David Landes and I could agree to summarize the end with Wendell Wilkie's motto of "One World" and the means through the "Unity in Diversity" that Mikhail Gorbachev proposed to the United Nations. Respectfullly submitted Andre Gunder Frank May 6, 1998 [53rd anniversary of VE Day] . REFERENCES CITED Adams, Robert McC. 1996. Paths of Fire: An Anthropologist's Inquiry into Western Technology, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Blaut, J.M. 1992. Fourteen Ninety-Two. Political Geography XI,4,July 1992, reprinted in J.M.Blaut et al 1492. The Debate on Colonialism, Eurocentrism and History, Trenton, NJ:Africa World Press 1992. ------ 1993. The Colonizer's Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History, New York/ London: Guilford Press, 1993, ------ 1997. "Eight Eurocentric Historians," Chapter 2 in Decolonizing the Past: Historians and the Myth of European Superiority [manuscript] forthcoming. Cohen, H. Floris 1994. The Scientific Revolution. A Historiographic Inquiry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Frank, Andre Gunder 967. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press. ------ 1978a. World Accumulation 1492-1789, New York: Monthly Review Press and London: Macmillan Press. ------ 1978b. Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment New York: Monthly Review Press and London: Macmillan Press. ------- 1998. ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age. Berkeley: University of California Press. Goody, Jack 1996. The East in the West. Cambridge: Cambirdge University Press. Hodgson, Marshall 1993. Rethinking World History. Edited by Edmund Burke III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Huntington, Samuel 1993, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72, Summer. ------ 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking the World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster. Kuhn, Thomas S. 1969. "Comment" Comparative Studies in Society and History 11:426-30. ----- 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolution. 2nd. Ed.Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Landes, David S. 1969. The Unbound Prometheus. Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present Cambrige: Cambridge University Press. McNeill, William 1963. The Rise of the West. A History of the Human Community. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ----- 1990. "The Rise of the West After Twenty Five Years" Journal of World History. I,1: 1-22. Shapin, Steve 1996. Scientific Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Wed May 13 09:03:14 1998 Wed, 13 May 1998 11:07:55 -0400 (EDT) Date: Wed, 13 May 1998 11:07:47 -0400 (EDT) From: Gunder Frank Reply-To: Gunder Frank To: dlandes@harvard.edu, H-NET List for World History , eh.res@eh.net, H-Asia , WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK , Pat Manning , jeff sommers Subject: landes/frank exchange Thank you David Landes for your friendly phone call about our 'exchange'. As per my offer, I am supplying you [ and ipso facto to them your] e-mail addresses of [and to] the 4 nets that i know to be carrying my now 4,000 word essay about your book and Bill McNeill's review of the same in the NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS. The 'lead' or 'organizing' net if any among them is H-world, whose coordinators are Pat Manning in general and for 'book reviews' Jeff Sommers, also cc'ed aboveat NEU in Boston. Just how they propose to 'coordinate' among these nets , which have some overlapping but mostly different subscribers, is up to them; and i do not know what they can or will do. An example of this problem is that one person [Taylor] has already sent a serious reply [supporting you as you will be glad to know] but on only one of the nets, h-world as i recall]. If you and I wish to address these interventions by others, not to mention our own, I hope that someone will figure out and implement a technical way to facilitate that on all the nets. I regret that I only today learned on the phone from you - and i so inform these nets and their subscribers - that you David Landes will be overseas for the next ten days and therefore until your return largely or entirely out of touch with any discussion that may develop. I am sorry therefore that these nets and I did not delay our posting for a time that would have been more convenient to you. That will also give me the opportunity [or is it excuse?] to delay any possible answer of my own for a while and then to prepare, if any, a consolidated response or two to all concerned. Bill McNeill does not use e-mail. Therefore, if he wishes still to participate, we would have to find some other way for him to do so. In the meantime we can also wait for a reply from Robert Silver as to whether he wishes to re-open the pages of the NYRB to any of us for this discussion and/or perhaps some other medium will wish to take us on. best regards and bon voyage gunder frank ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Andre Gunder Frank University of Toronto 96 Asquith Ave Tel. 1 416 972-0616 Toronto, ON Fax. 1 416 972-0071 CANADA M4W 1J8 Email agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca My home Page is at: http://www.whc.neu.edu/whc/resrch&curric/gunder.html ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From p34d3611@jhu.edu Wed May 13 12:19:37 1998 by jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (950413.SGI.8.6.12/950213.SGI.AUTOCF) Date: Wed, 13 May 1998 14:17:52 -0400 (EDT) From: Peter Grimes Subject: [Fwd: Stiglitz "HIPC Conditions Wrong"] (fwd) To: WSN This message is in MIME format. The first part should be readable text, while the remaining parts are likely unreadable without MIME-aware tools. Send mail to mime@docserver.cac.washington.edu for more info. ---2133065211-584691593-895083472=:11992 ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 13 May 1998 07:22:34 -0400 From: Barbara Larcom To: Peter Grimes , Carl Chatzky Subject: [Fwd: Stiglitz "HIPC Conditions Wrong"] ---2133065211-584691593-895083472=:11992 Tue, 12 May 1998 11:30:49 -0700 (PDT) Tue, 12 May 1998 11:28:45 -0700 (PDT) Date: Tue, 12 May 1998 11:26:22 -0700 (PDT) From: Njoki Njoroge Njehu Sender: owner-50-years@igc.apc.org Subject: Stiglitz "HIPC Conditions Wrong" To: 50-years@igc.org WORLD BANK SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT ADMITS HIPC CONDITIONS WRONG 'Greater humility' is needed, admitted the World Bank's chief economist and senior vice president Joseph Stiglitz, in a speech in which he called for an end to 'misguided' policies imposed from Washington. Joseph Stiglitz's wide-ranging condemnation of the 'Washington Consensus' and the conditions imposed on poor countries must raise fundamental questions about the entire debt relief process now being coordinated by the IMF and World Bank. Debt relief under the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) initiative is conditional on six years of faithfully obeying demands from the Fund and Bank which Stiglitz now calls 'misguided'. The World Bank's senior vice president and chief economist is scathing about what he calls the '"Washington Consensus" of US economic officials, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank'. He says that 'the set of policies which underlay the Washington Consensus are neither necessary nor sufficient, either for macro-stability or longer-term development.' They are 'sometimes misguided', 'neglect .. fundamental issues', are 'sometimes even misleading, and do 'not even address ... vital questions'. 'Had this advice been followed [in the United States], the remarkable expansion of the US economy ... would have been thwarted.' Russia followed the Washington Consensus line while China did not, Stiglitz notes, and 'real incomes and consumption have fallen in the former Soviet empire, and real incomes and consumption have risen remarkably rapidly in China.' The Washington Consensus only sought to achieve increases in measured GDP, whereas 'we seek increases in living standards - including improved health and education. ... We seek equitable development which ensures that all groups in society enjoy the fruits of development, not just the few at the top. And we seek democratic development.' Joseph Stiglitz made his speech in Helsinki, Finland, on 7 January 1998, and so far it has been little reported. Perhaps he needed to be as far away from Washington as possible, because he undermined virtually every pillar of the structural adjustment and stabilisation polices that serve as necessary conditions under HIPC. He asserts: MODERATE INFLATION IS NOT HARMFUL. Hyper-inflation is costly, but below 40% inflation per year, 'there is no evidence that inflation is costly'. Furthermore, there is no evidence of a 'slippery slope' - there is no evidence that one increase in inflation causes further increases. Thus 'the focus on inflation ... has led to macroeconomic policies which may not be the most conducive for long-term economic growth.' BUDGET DEFICITS CAN BE OK, 'given the high returns to government investment in such crucial areas as primary education and physical infrastructure (especially roads and energy).' Thus 'it may make sense for the government to treat foreign aid as a legitimate source of revenue, just like taxes, and balance the budget inclusive of foreign aid.' MACRO-ECONOMIC STABILITY IS THE WRONG TARGET. 'Ironically, macroeconomic stability, as seen by the Washington Consensus, typically down-plays the most fundamental sense of stability: stabilizing output or unemployment. Minimising or avoiding major economic contractions should be one of the most important goals of policy. In the short run, large-scale involuntary unemployment is clearly inefficient - in purely economic terms it represents idle resources that could be used more productively.' 'THE ADVOCATES OF PRIVATIZATION OVERESTIMATED THE BENEFITS of privatization and underestimated the costs.' And the gains occur prior to privatization, through a process of 'corporatization' which involves creating proper incentives. China 'eschewed a strategy of outright privatization'. COMPETITION, NOT OWNERSHIP, IS KEY. Private monopolies can lead to excess profits and inefficiency. Government must intervene to create competition. MARKETS ARE NOT AUTOMATICALLY BETTER. 'The unspoken premise [of the Washington Consensus] is that governments are presumed to be worse than markets. ... I do not believe [that]'. Stiglitz notes, in particular, that 'left to itself, the market will tend to underprovide human capital' and technology. 'Without government action there will be too little investment in the production and adoption of new technology.' PRIMARY EDUCATION MAY NOT BE THE RIGHT PRIORITY. Tertiary (university) technical education has a particularly high economic return because it enables the economy to import ideas. But here, Stiglitz has two caveats. He wants to see the training of more scientists and engineers and not extra liberal arts graduates as were trained in much of Africa. And he warns university education causes an immediate increase in inequality because 'the direct beneficiaries ... are almost always better off than average.' 'THE DOGMA OF LIBERALIZATION HAS BECOME AN END IN ITSELF AND NOT A MEANS TO A BETTER FINANCIAL SYSTEM.' Financial markets do not do a good job of selecting the most productive recipients of funds or of monitoring the use of funds, and must be controlled. Deregulation led to the crisis in Thailand and the 'notorious Savings and Loan debacle in the United States.' Perhaps the key problem is that Washington Consensus 'political recommendations could be administered by economists using little more than simple accounting frameworks.' This led to 'cases where economists would fly into a country, look at and attempt to verify these data, and make macroeconomic recommendations for policy reforms, all in the space of a couple of weeks.' Stiglitz calls for a new 'post-Washington Consensus' which, he says, 'cannot be based on Washington'. And, he adds, one 'one principle of the emerging consensus is a greater degree of humility, the frank acknowledgement that we do not have all the answers.' ---2133065211-584691593-895083472=:11992-- From chriscd@jhu.edu Wed May 13 14:15:20 1998 Date: Wed, 13 May 1998 16:16:46 -0400 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: Frank/Landes] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------A347111A61CAB7AF9C594D8D --------------A347111A61CAB7AF9C594D8D 13 May 1998 13:21:00 -0500 (CDT) Date: Wed, 13 May 1998 13:21:35 -0500 From: "Joshua L. Rosenbloom" Subject: Re: Frank/Landes To: mlevine@lcsc.edu, jeff sommers , Chris Chase-Dunn , "Marilyn A. Levine, Lewis-Clark State College" I'm copying several comments related to AGF's comments that have appeared on Eh.Res. I will continue to post traffic on EH.Research as it comes in to me. But will also pass these messages along unless you don't want them. And I would appreciate your doing the same. Then we can let AGF respond as he wishes. Date: Tue, 12 May 1998 15:03:11 -0500 From: "Alan M. Taylor" Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes Sender: owner-eh.res@eh.net To: eh.res@eh.net Reply-to: eh.res@eh.net ================= EH.RES POSTING ================= I am confused. It seems to me that Gunder Frank is between a rock and a hard place. The key hypothesis (an empirical claim) is that the East was about level with Europe ca. 1750. That seems like a testable hypothesis, and the work of many scholars, like Ken Pomeranz (whose work was the subject of a FORUM on This List), is putting it to the test. But what of its implications? Does it matter? And how does it matter? Suppose the hypothesis is false. The East was behind, as the Eurocentrics believe. Then we are back to having the old stroy about the "superiority" of European institutions for what--500, 750, 1,000 years? And Frank's case would be lost. Suppose the hypothesis is true. Then, following a ruthlessly nihilistic line, we may dismiss everything before the Industrial Revolution, at least in comparative terms, as of little interest. Everybody was on the same page, no great divergence, etc. But then, EVERYTHING, hinges on the last 250 or so years, and the "great bifurcation" (as Joel Mokr termed it in the online internet video seminar last week). And the issue there is why did Asia (read: non-European or non-European New World) fall so far behind? We know from Bairoch/Maddison et al. that this divergence was huge. Is this scenario any better for Frank? If the New Economic History, New Institutional History, and the New Growth Theory and Empirics, say anything, it is that, going beyond simple neoclassical models, policies and institutions did make a difference in growth outcomes. So hey, we have whittled down 1,000 years of "superior" European institutions to just 250 years... great! But that just happens to be the 250 years in which the gap between rich and poor nations has gone through thr roof. And so it really matters, and it still begs the question as to what made the difference for Europe, and why Asia (and others) didn't have the right conditions. So Frank now has to move to post-1750, not pre-1750, and tell us why that happened, and where we are going. And here there are two problems--one theoretical, one empirical. First, if it is not the Institutions/NEH/Growth story, then what is it--surely not a rehash of the discredited structuralist/dependency theories of the 1960s? Second, who said Asia is getting ready to once again catch and surpass Europe; a handful (literally) of countries have reached middle income per capita levels, namely the NICs, meaning they have reached the same level as the richest Latin American countries, and are close to the poorest "Western" nations. But the rest of Asia is far behind. China and India dominate the population weighted picture. Their institutional and policy environment is/was not very conducive for growth, or else why would their per capita incomes be so low? Even on the most optimistic forecasts, parity of the East (as a whole) and West might be decades or centuries away. I think (and I think David Landes, Joel Mokyr, and many others think) that the Industrial Revolution is so important because it is the beginning of that great bifurcation. (And that bifurcation is great even if we allow Europe to still have a lead in 1750; the lead just gets and order of magnitude bigger after that). Explaining that post-1750 bifurcation is probably THE greatest challenge of global economic history. Landes deserves credit: he has tried to meet that challenge, and he gave us a story. What's yours? Respectfully submitted, Alan M. Taylor Hoover Institution and Northwestern University ============ FOOTER TO EH.RES POSTING ============ For information, send the message "info EH.RES" to lists@eh.net. *********************************************************************** Date: Wed, 13 May 1998 11:57:24 -0500 From: Gregory Clark Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes Sender: owner-eh.res@eh.net To: eh.res@eh.net Reply-to: eh.res@eh.net ================= EH.RES POSTING ================= In the debate between Frank and Landes, and in the assessment of the meaning of Ken Pomeranz's work on China versus Europe it seems to me that we should keep in mind two things: 1. All economies of the world before 1800 were "Malthusian" in the sense that living standards did NOT depend directly on the production technology. Instead living standards depended on the factors determining the birth rate (fertility control, marriage etc) and on the factors determining the death rates (the disease environment, war, the operation of grain markets etc). Thus Pomeranz's interesting findings that living standards in the Yangzi delta circa 1800 were as high as those in Europe says nothing directly about the relative development of European and Chinese technology. For all we know living standards in sub-Saharan Africa may have been higher than in either of these places (because of the disease environment). Indeed one interpretation of Pomeranz's results are that they reinforce the work of Chinese demographers who have been emphasizing that Europe was not the only part of the world where there was limitation of fertility in the years before 1800. Though marriage was early and nearly universal for Chinese women, fertility was limited within marriage by means known and unknown. The high Chinese living standards thus may indicate only facts about Chinese family and social structure (and disease environment), and nothing about technology. Unless you have a theory of the IR which emphasizes high living standards this finding about China will not in itself change any views about what caused the IR. 2. By 1900 there was a huge gap in living standards between even the advanced areas of China like Shanghai and Britain and the USA. In nominal terms at least wages in China were one fifth those in Britain in cotton textiles. Recent work on Britain in the IR and later has emphasized slower and slower growth rates of output and of real wages (see Feinstein's recent work). Was this gap then the result of a collapse in Chinese living standards 1800-1900? Did China just stagnate from 1800 to 1900, or did it actually regress in living standards? And if it did regress, why did that happen within the Malthusian economic framework that still operated in China. Yours hurriedly! Greg Clark _________________________________________________________________ Gregory Clark Department of Economics PHONE 530-752-9242 University of California FAX 530-752-9382 Davis, CA 95616 _________________________________________________________________ ============ FOOTER TO EH.RES POSTING ============ For information, send the message "info EH.RES" to lists@eh.net. ************************************************************************** Joshua L. Rosenbloom e-mail: JRosenbloom@ukans.edu Department of Economics phone: 785-864-2839 Summerfield Hall Lawrence, KS 66045 University of Kansas http://www.bschool.ukans.edu/home/jrosenbloom/jlr.html *************************************************************************** --------------A347111A61CAB7AF9C594D8D-- From austria@it.com.pl Thu May 14 02:40:57 1998 Reply-To: From: "Austrian Embassy" To: Subject: Fw: May 1998 Le Monde Diplomatique in English Date: Thu, 14 May 1998 10:45:46 +0200 Enjoy this issue, more superb than ever before! Kindest regards from your "Euro" Arno/Arnaud what you prefer on the net ---------- > From: Le Monde diplomatique > To: English edition dispatch > Subject: May 1998 > Date: Montag, 11. Mai 1998 17:47 > > LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE > _________________________________________________________________ > > Le Monde diplomatique > > english edition > > May 1998 > > edited by Wendy Kristianasen > > > > ISRAEL AT FIFTY > > Palestine has not disappeared > > by Edward W. Said > > "There is no getting away from the fact that, as an idea, a memory, > and as an often buried or invisible reality, Palestine and its > people have simply not disappeared. No matter the sustained and > unbroken hostility of the Israeli establishment to anything that > Palestine represents, the sheer fact of our existence has foiled, > where it has not defeated, the Israeli effort to be rid of us > completely." > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1998/05/01said.html > > Original text in English > > > > Why Israel needs a Palestinian state * > > by Shimon Peres > > Theodore Herzl's vision led to an independent state that surpassed > anything he could have dreamed of; but he failed to take into > account the existence of another people. It is time to put right > that mistake. Oslo was the first step to an historic > reconciliation. But we should not forget that is in Israel's own > interests to forge an enduring peace based on two separate states, > in which both Palestinians and Israelis may prosper. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/1998/05/02peres.html > > translated by Wendy Kristianasen > > > > Zionism's secular revolution > > by Zeev Sternhell > > The Zionism of Israel's founding fathers, the Labour dynasty in > power until 1977, was born of the European nationalism of the turn > of the century. And the drive to possess Arab lands stemmed from > the very nature of that nationalism. With the victories of the June > 1967 war, a consensus emerged in Labour circles: Israel had a right > to the lands it had acquired in 1948-49 out of existential > necessity, but not to the lands conquered in 1967. Now, with the > passing of time, society, and with it Zionism, are taking a new > direction. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1998/05/03zion.html > > translated by Wendy Kristianasen > > > > A BELATED ENCYCLICAL ON THE HOLOCAUST > > The Vatican's slow repentance > > by Henri Madelin > > On 16 March the Vatican Commission for Religious Relations with the > Jews published a statement of capital importance entitled "We > remember : a reflection on the Shoah." It was preceded by a short > introduction written by John Paul II in person. The document said > little about the responsibility of the Catholic hierarchy or the > "silence" of Pope Pius XII. But it reiterated the Church's "common > patrimony with the Jews" and "deplored" anti-Semitism, making clear > the new direction of its relations with the Jewish world. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1998/05/04vatican.html > > translated by Barry Smerin > > > > BREEDING GROUND FOR THE FAR RIGHT > > Back to politics * > > by Serge Halimi > > In France, the far right has an advantage over the other parties: > it knows just how to exploit people's fears and misery. The larger > parties seem resigned to wait while the situation worsens, in the > hopes of forming a broad coalition against the extreme right. This > would be doomed to failure. But the way forward should be clear: > no-one had any time for Jean-Marie Le Pen during the movement of > protest which swept France at the end of 1995. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/1998/05/05fnsh.html > > translated by Francisca Garvie > > > > Women are saying no > > by Janine Mossuz-Lavau > > Despite variations over time and among different social groups and > ages, the number of French women who vote for the Front national is > less than that of men. This is also true in other European > countries. It seems that women are opting for independence and are > distancing themselves from the patriarchal doctrines that make up > the ideology of the far right. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1998/05/06lavau.html > > translated by Francisca Garvie > > Alsace, exception to the rule > > by Alain Bihr > > There has been much debate about the reasons for the growth of the > Front national in Alsace since the region has none of the classic > conditions which pull in the far-right vote. It is prosperous, with > low unemployment, and seems to have a vibrant cultural identity. > But appearances are deceptive. Alsace suffers from a lack of > identity; and what it needs is "more state", in the sense of a > greater sense of connection with France. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1998/05/07bihr.html > > translated by Ed Emery > > Holocaust denial is part of a strategy * > > by Valérie Igounet > > Insidiously, deliberately, as part of a carefully-considered > strategy, Jean-Marie Le Pen has sought to make holocaust denial > respectable. Those of the Front national who denied the holocaust > were referred to as "historians", the gas chambers were "a point of > detail". Ten years ago the "point of detail" remark provoked public > criticism from within the party. But today, the groundwork has been > done and the FN has come out of the closet. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/1998/05/08igou.html > > translated by Barry Smerin > > Italy's post-fascists bid for respectability > > by Paolo Raffone > > Heir to Mussolini's fascists, but now considered part of Italy's > anti-fascist "constitutional arc", Gianfranco Fini has succeeded in > turning his National Alliance into an avowedly post-fascist party, > which has won a legitimate and increasingly successful place among > today's political parties. Much of this new-found legitimacy comes > from a new liberal orientation and a refusal to ally itself with > the more extreme neo-fascist right. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1998/05/09raff.html > > translated by Ed Emery > > > > A TENSE PEACE > > Ukraine, a society in deadlock > > by Edourd Pflimlin > > Ukraine seems to be finding a middle way between East and West, > making for greater independence. But its external successes must be > set against severe internal problems. The deaths of 63 miners in an > explosion in a mine in Skachinskoho on 4 April revealed a plant in > disrepair and a society in decay. This had its effect on the > results of the legislative elections at the end of March, where the > communists and their left-wing allies opposed to President Leonid > Kuchma's liberal reforms won 173 of the 450 seats. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1998/05/10ukra.html > > translated by Malcolm Greenwood > > > > POST-APARTHEID EMPOWERMENT > > A Black boss for South Africa's gold > > by Thierry Secrétan > > With the end of apartheid, Black empowerment has become an > essential feature of the new South Africa. Even so, it may have > surprised some when a Zulu ex-guerrilla warfare expert and former > inmate of Robben Island with a taste for business became boss of > the celebrated gold-mining company, JCI. But then, suddenly, the > price of gold plummeted. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1998/05/11safr.html > > translated by Malcolm Greenwood > > > > THERE IS ANOTHER, BETTER WORLD * > > A hundred and fifty years ago Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels > published the Communist Manifesto and France had its 1948 > revolution. Much more recently, thirty years ago, Europe had its > revolutionary spring. Now again, people are beginning to say that > enough is enough. The whole fabric of civilised social living that > was created in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries is coming > under attack and a collective reaction is urgently required. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/1998/05/12intro.html > > translated by Ed Emery > > The hazards of internationalism * > > by Alain Gresh > > Billions of men and women, rendered powerless by the fragmentation > of the social struggle, are pinning their hopes on a new > universalism that does not leave the delicate fabric of the world > entirely in the hands of the money men. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/1998/05/13gresh.html > > translated by Barbara Wilson > > In the footsteps of Saint Karl * > > by Maurice Lemoine > > Whether through democratic pressure, Indian and peasant uprisings > or revolutionary movements, Latin America has never given up trying > to impose a human and political face onto economic development. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/1998/05/15lemoine.html > > translated by Ed Emery > > Return of the rebels * > > by Christian de Brie > > The working classes have not given up the fight despite both overt > and covert repression, a weakened and divided trade union movement > and media indifference or outright hostility. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/1998/05/16debrie.html > > translated by Sally Blaxland > > A need for utopia * > > by Ignacio Ramonet > > There is a need for dreamers who can think and thinkers who can > dream. The answer will not be a neatly-packaged, custom-built > project. It will be a new way of looking at things. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/1998/05/17ramonet.html > > translated by Barry Smerin > > A handicap removed * > > by Dominique Vidal > > Far from presaging the end of history and the irrelevance of > radical thought, the fall of the Soviet empire could give a new > lease of life to ideas of utopia. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/1998/05/18vidal.html > > translated by Sally Blaxland > > > > > > > (*) Star-marked articles are available to every reader. Other > articles are available to paid subscribers only. > > Yearly subscription fee: 24 US $ (Institutions 48 US $). > > > > ALL RIGHTS RESERVED - Le Monde diplomatique > ______________________________________________________________ > > For more information on our English edition, please visit > > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/ > > To subscribe to our free "dispatch" mailing-list, send an > (empty) e-mail to: > dispatch-on@london.monde-diplomatique.fr > > To unsubscribe from this list, send an (empty) e-mail to: > dispatch-off@london.monde-diplomatique.fr > > > From austria@it.com.pl Fri May 15 02:04:41 1998 Reply-To: From: "Austrian Embassy" To: Subject: Fw: Politico-military "pacification" in Chiapas Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 10:10:05 +0200 ---------- > From: Le Monde diplomatique > To: English edition dispatch > Subject: Politico-military "pacification" in Chiapas > Date: Donnerstag, 14. Mai 1998 16:50 > > _________________________________________________________________ > > A CENTRAL AMERICAN CLASSIC > > Politico-military "pacification" in Chiapas > > > (translated from http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/dossiers/chiapas/ ) > > At first glance, it would be both unjust and almost > irrelevent to blame the Mexican authorities for the murder > of 45 inhabitants of the Chiapas village Acteal on 22 > December 1997. As soon as the news broke out, President > Ernesto Zedillo described the massacre as "cruel, absurd and > unacceptable". On 3 January 1998 Minister of Interior Emilio > Chuayffet tendered his resignation, followed on 7 January by > Julio Cesar Ruiz Ferro, Governor of the State of Chiapas. As > early as 9 January, 46 people were arrested and charged. > Among them were the priista (1) mayor of Chenalho, Jacinto > Arias Cruz (accused of providing the murderers with vehicles > and weapons), and the director of public security of the > State of Chiapas. After a swift investigation, 113 people > were jailed. > > Control of the electorate in the federation's states, > especially in rural areas, has long been in the hands of > local oligarchies and casiques. Given the current discourse > of the central government in support of a more democratic > political system (witness the victory of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas > of the Democratic Revolution Party as mayor of Mexico), it > is hardly surprising to see local oligarchies distancing > themselves from control from the centre, which they fear > intends to change the rules of the game that have always > assured them domination and impunity. > > But there is more to be said. On 26 December 1997 Jorge > Madrazo, Attorney General of the Republic, went to the scene > of the crime, expressed his solidarity with the victims and > offered his explanation of the events. "Since the 1930s acts > of great violence have been witnessed in the commune of > Chenalho and other communes of Chiapas and this situation > has unfortunately never disappeared. These conflicts can be > labelled as inter-communal in the context of constant > disputes between local political and economic powers. They > also stem from the existence of religious diversity and, > more recently, ideological divisions (2)". > > This is an overly simplistic explanation. Just between > 1982-88, under the governorship of General Castellanos, > human rights organisations recorded 153 political > assassinations in Chiapas (inter-communal?), 692 abusive > incarcerations (disputes?), 503 sequestrations accompanied > by torture (religious diversity?), 407 expulsions of > families from their communities, 54 expulsions from > villages, 12 rapes and 29 attacks against protest movements. > > In 1988 and 1990, the state's penal code was revised, > penalising various offences said to be "political", > including the occupation of public roads and public > buildings and "tumultuous" gatherings, all of which are > traditional means of expression of peasant populations (3). > This series of violations of basic rights was not unrelated > to the January 1994 uprising and was a far cry from the > usual "local disputes". On 23 January, in Kanasin (Yucatan), > President Zedillo pledged not to use force to resolve the > Chiapas conflict. This was all very well. But at the same > time, the defence minister was sending several military > detachments to the area to "re-establish a climate of > security and avoid confrontations between rival groups". > > This is a return to a strategy developed in the 1980s in > Central America by, among others, the Christian Democrats in > Salvador: a democratic government "squeezed" between two > extremes - of the far left and the far right - which did not > differentiate between an armed social movement (the Frente > Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional - FMLN) and the death > squads. And, on the pretext of fighting the death squads, it > attacked the FMLN. It was no secret that a proliferation of > paramilitary groups - Peace and Justice, the Chinchulines, > the Red Mask, the Throat Cutters, the Alliance San Bartolome > de los llanos, the Mixed Operations Brigades, the Indigenous > Anti-Zapatista Revolutionary Movement, the Tomas Muntzer > Community, etc. - were operating in Chiapas, sowing terror > and causing massive population displacements, with the > passive - if not active - complicity of the army and the > authorities. > > An investigation revealed that former military and police > personel had trained Red Mask, the group held responsible > for the Acteal massacre. The arrest on 2 April of General > Julio Cesar Santiago Diaz (until then in hiding) confirmed > the involvement of the army at its highest level: the > general commanded a detachment of 40 troops posted nearby, > who could have prevented the tragedy, but failed to do so. > This shows the strategy (and the real responsibility) of the > authorities: the "militarisation" of a large portion of the > territory and an appeal, albeit more discreet, to the > paramilitary (by nature "uncontrollable") to embark on a > sweeping repression of the whole social movement. > > The tragedy of Acteal is only one unfortunate "bungle" which > came to public attention both because of its extent and, > consequently, the reactions it produced - not only > internationally. Negotiations carried out between the > Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) and the > government had allowed the signing in February 1996 of the > San Andres Accords. Based on these accords, the Commission > for Reconciliation and Peace (Cocopa), comprising delegates > of all parties represented in parliament, presented a bill > integrating their content into state legislation, which > would mean a reform of the constitution. > > The minister of the interior, Francisco Labastida Ochoa said > on 1 March 1998: "If the government signed the San Andres > Accords, it was obviously to comply with them. The president > of the republic has on numerous occasions stated that the > government will stand by its commitment: this is not > negotiable. Whoever says otherwise would be telling a lie. > The Cocopa has drawn up a proposal of constitutional reform. > This project has never been approved by the government. We > have never committed ourselves in this area. Nothing has > been signed". In fact, the authorities, alleging that > indigenous autonomy and its effects would constitute an > encroachment upon national sovereignty and the unity of > Mexico, have reneged on their commitments. > > A government bill on constitutional reform presented on 15 > March 1998 by President Zedillo was rejected by the > Zapatistas and by the main opposition party, the Democratic > Revolution Party (PDR). The EZLN refuses to renew > negotiations but the Zapatista social bases are unilaterally > implementing the Accords by forming 38 autonomous > municipios. More than the EZLN (which has not fired a single > shot since January 1994), it is this process of pacific > social organisation led by the indigenous people that the > authorities intend to crush. As in Central America, where > "the guerrilla moves amongst the people as fish in water", > the objective is to take the water away from the fish. A > large portion of the rural population of Chiapas now live in > a state of military occupation. And the paramilitary groups > have instituted a reign of terror. All the authorities need > do is to restore the discretion necessary to any campaign > aimed at regaining control. Since 1996, 4,435 foreigners > have accessed the conflict zones, most of them members of > some 200 non-governmental organisations (4). > > What we see here is, more or less, and without any formal > link, a process successfully applied in Guatemala in the > early 1990s: the presence of international observers with > two major missions: to dissuade, by their presence, > violations of human rights, and to spread information to the > outside world. In the context of an official campaign > against foreigners who are being accused of "manipulating > the indigenous", some fifteen people were "shown out" of the > country between 13 and 16 April. A 67 year-old Frenchman, > Michel Chanteau, priest of Chenalhe for the past 32 years, > was also expelled, accused of "pro-Zapatista activism" > (three other members of the clergy had been similarly > treated). > > Repression, isolation and silence: these are the ingredients > which accompanied the "pacification" campaigns applied in > Central America not so long ago. > > ______________________________________________ > (1) Member of the Institutional Revolutionary Party which > has held power for over 60 years. > (2) Le Mexique aujourd'hui, Information service of the Mexican > embassy, Paris, no. 68-69, December 1997-January 1998. > (3) "Rapport Mexique", Federation internationale des ligues > des droits de l'homme (FIDH), no 251, February 1998. > (4) El Pais, February 13 1998. > > > > MAURICE LEMOINE. > > > > > _________________________________________________________________ > > See also : > > * The fourth world war has begun, > by sub-commandante Marcos, août 1997. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/1997/08-09/marcos.html > > > On the Web > ---------- > > * EZLN. - http://www.ezln.org/ > > * FZLN. - http://spin.com.mx/~floresu/FZLN/ > > * Sipaz. - http://www.nonviolence.org/sipaz/ > > * Tendance floue. - http://www.chez.com/tf/ > > * Zapatistas in Cyberspace. - > http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/zapsincyber.html > > > > ALL RIGHTS RESERVED > Le Monde diplomatique. - http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/ > > > From chriscd@jhu.edu Fri May 15 13:47:26 1998 Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 15:48:29 -0400 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: Frank v. Landes on Eh.Res] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------06CB78C2DF5E313EBD000945 --------------06CB78C2DF5E313EBD000945 15 May 1998 13:01:51 -0500 (CDT) Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 13:02:22 -0500 From: "Joshua L. Rosenbloom" Subject: Frank v. Landes on Eh.Res To: jsommers@lynx.dac.neu.edu (Jeffrey Sommers), CHRISCD@jhu.edu (Chris Chase-Dunn), mlevine@lcsc.edu (Marilyn A. Levine), agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca (Gunder Frank), manning@neu.edu (Patrick Manning) I see Pat's point about the subject, but having started down one path I will retain the possibly off-putting "Frank versus Landes" so that the thread can be easily followed. Here are nine more postings from EH.RES as of about 1 PM Kansas time. (1) Date: Thu, 14 May 1998 10:20:13 -0500 From: Brad De Long Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes Sender: owner-eh.res@eh.net To: eh.res@eh.net Reply-to: eh.res@eh.net ================= EH.RES POSTING ================= On 12 May, Gunder Frank wrote: >many congratulations and best wishes to Brad for beginning to see the >light, which alas is not very compatible with Brad's 'defense' of David >Landes' book and his own theses in the ensuing debate -- which i have just >continued with my posting on the Landes book, in which I apologize for not >adding that Ken is the best guy and thing on that [non-Landes] wavelength. >But Dear Brad, Ken does not limit himself to 'comparisons'. He also makes >connections. I hope yuu will too. Most of what I might have written has already been written--very well--by Alan Taylor. I do, however, find it interesting to look back and reflect upon my own thoughts on western Europe compared to Chinese patterns of development... I suppose that my first image--acquired while taking Social Studies 10, which because of its concentration on *theory* leaves one with a somewhat shaky empirical foundation corresponding to the state of historical knowledge about 1870--was that of Max Weber: that the key to understanding why and when the industrial revolution took place was to grasp the peculiar means-ends instrumental rationality of Protestant northern Europe, that this peculiar cultural complex was closely tied up with religions and values, and that as a result Confucian, Hindu, and Buddhist Asia had no chance at all of successfully industrializing for centuries. This--Weberian--point of view has been decisively proven wrong by East Asian industrialization since 1950. I think that my second image--acquired after reading a little too much of Hannah Arendt and Karl Wittfogel--was that of South and East Asia as dominated by water-monopoly empires that are fundamentally hostile to change (which may disrupt the power of landlord and priestly elites) and that in their control over agrarian infrastructure have the power to make their hostility to change effective. You can see this position too as essentially Weberian--although the key here is the independence of the European city rather than the Protestant Ethic. And I still find myself believing (say, two days a week) that there was something very special about the Medieval Commune and what it developed into, and that this did play a major role in bringing us to where we are today. My third image was that constructed by Ernst Gellner and John A. Hall--I think of _Plough, Sword, and Book_, of _Powers and Liberties_, and of _Liberalism_. Their image of pre-industrial societies--of Agraria--is of societies in which warrior-princes, priests, and landlords all conspire to keep the peasants ignorant, barefoot, pregnant, and over taxed; to keep the urban merchants in constant fear of losing their fortunes, their businesses, and their lives; and in which technological advance is quickly abandoned either because the inventors have become rich and no longer wish to be corrupted by contact with production and toil, or because cheap and unfree labor forces leave those with power with no incentive to maintain and operate technology. In their view, the natural state of post-Neolithic Revolution humanity is somewhere between Merovingian Gaul and the Moghul Gangetic Plain, and that only a true miracle allowed our escape from Agraria's trap. I find myself believing their story, but also believing that they have vastly overstated the power of warrior, priest, and landlord elites to control historical developments. My fourth image was one I drew from Joel Mokyr's _Lever of Riches_: it is of Chinese and Indian civilizations that are progressive, dynamic, technologically and demographically expansionary up until about 1400 or so. But then circumstances--foreign conquest, Ming ideology, whatever--create a profound hostility to further change, transform the ruling class into a purely parasitic ruling class, and set both India and China on the track toward the semi-Malthusian subsistence-level near-catastrophe that they reached in the nineteenth century. Now Ken Pomeranz's work (and not his alone) is transforming my image of South and East Asian civilizations once again--but I do not yet have a clear picture of just what it was that blocked what is now Greater Shanghai (or Greater Canton, or Greater Tokyo, or Greater Mumbai, or Greater Calcutta) from becoming the locus of an advanced commercial economy on the brink of an industrial revolution in the sense of Greater London, Greater Paris, and Greater Amsterdam. Jim Blaut has an answer (which is, I think, the same as Eric Jones's answer in the _European Miracle: although Blaut talks in terms of pillage, murder, and extortion and Jones in terms of "ghost acreage" they are referring to the same phenomena). But I look at the size of the Dutch herring fleet compared to the VOC, and at the profits of the English wool industry compared to the fortunes of Robert Clive and Warren Hastings, and I find myself still thinking that long-distance trade is too small to bear the burden and that more is to be learned from trying to think hard about the internal dynamics... Brad DeLong ============ FOOTER TO EH.RES POSTING ============ For information, send the message "info EH.RES" to lists@eh.net. **************************************************************************** ************** (2) Date: Thu, 14 May 1998 10:52:26 -0500 From: "Anthony Patrick O'Brien" Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes Sender: owner-eh.res@eh.net To: eh.res@eh.net Reply-to: eh.res@eh.net ================= EH.RES POSTING ================= The May 25 issue of the New Republic contains a review by Jagdish Bhagwati of Landes and of Kindleberger's _World Economic Primacy: 1500-1990_. Bhagwati's conclusions about Landes: "Landes wishes to link the European miracle causally, in the spirit of Max Weber, to underlying values as defined by the Judeo-Christian, and especially Protestant, universe. Islam is held to be inimical to a repetition of the European experience owing to its allegedly holistic nature, with religion 'in principle supreme and the ideal government that of the holy men.' Such assertions recur throughout the book. And here Landes is stepping into quicksand. For it is impossible to relate culture or values to these pro-growth institutions and policy frameworks, and hence to economic growth, in a causally tight way. .... I do not mean to deny culture any role. But the precise role of culture in economic behavior remains elusive. The encouraging truth appears to be that growth-inducing institutions, like hardy perennials that will grow in different and indifferent soils, are resilient and compatible with a range of cultures. And for a historian who is confronted with economic success in extremely diverse cultures, it is ahistorical to assert otherwise." It would be interesting to learn where Bhagwati thinks the IR came from. Tony O'Brien Lehigh University ============ FOOTER TO EH.RES POSTING ============ For information, send the message "info EH.RES" to lists@eh.net. **************************************************************************** **************** (3) Date: Thu, 14 May 1998 12:45:52 -0500 From: "Joshua L. Rosenbloom" Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes Sender: owner-eh.res@eh.net To: eh.res@eh.net Reply-to: eh.res@eh.net ================= EH.RES POSTING ================= At 09:43 AM 5/14/98 -0500, jack a. goldstone wrote: >(2) Frank, Pommeranz, and others now make it difficult if not impossible >to see the roots of the great bifurcation in long-term structural changes >c. 1000-1700. The "action" is in the last few centuries. >(3) ...I would suggest instead a sudden "leap forward" in England, >due to (a) new institutions developed post-1689; (b) new technology >developed post-1689; and (c) a new religiously tolerant, scientifically >empirical, culture of inquiry, experiment, and innovation that developed >in England post-1689. >(4) If this seems to pivot everything on the Glorious Revolution, that's >right...If James II had triumphed...[t]he Dissenters who >provided the bulk of the entrepreneurial energy of the IR >in England might simply not have made their contribution, and perhaps >modern science and industry as we know it might never have developed in >the west.... >(5) In short, I think what needs to be explained is not a "long-term, >inevitable" process that leads to industrialization, but a rare, one-off, >developmental anomaly or "sport" that leads England on what is, by world >standards, a "peculiar path." The assertion that the Industrial Revolution may hinge on "accident" is certainly intriguing, but I am not yet prepared to accept that conjecture and give up looking for systematic differences. As a purely logical matter, even if we accept the view that the "great bifurcation" in incomes did not emerge until sometime in the 18th century, it is not so obvious that the roots of the West's distinctive path in the last several centuries are not to be found in prior events. These may not have translated into discernable differences in economic prowess, but they may still have a long history. I am hardly expert enough on this topic to suggest what these roots might be, but I have always been intrigued by the argument that William H. McNeill offers in _The Pursuit of Power_ (especially chapters 2-3), which identifies a unique trajectory of western development associated with political fragmentation and the emergence of significant international military competition within Europe. This competition, according to McNeill, both stimulated the development of new and more powerful military technologies (which ultimately gave the west a considerable advantage vis a vis the rest of the world), and obliged monarchs to grant increasing freedoms to merchants and financiers as part of the bargain for raising the funds to pay for military expenditures. Clearly some countries within Europe benefitted more from these developments than others, but their competition with eachother greatly raised the prospects of the emergence of regimes that loosened restrictions on religious and scientific dissent, thus making the ultimate transition that occurred in the 18th century more likely. Comments? Joshua Rosenbloom University of Kansas ============ FOOTER TO EH.RES POSTING ============ For information, send the message "info EH.RES" to lists@eh.net. **************************************************************************** ************* (4) Date: Thu, 14 May 1998 14:47:54 -0500 From: Jonathan_Liebowitz@uml.edu (Jonathan Liebowitz) Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes Sender: owner-eh.res@eh.net To: eh.res@eh.net Reply-to: eh.res@eh.net ================= EH.RES POSTING ================= 1) I've been pleased at the turn this discussion has taken in the past few days and thank recent posters for their insightful comments. In that vein I hope Gunder Frank would give his counter-Landes interpretation of modern economic growth. (I know we can all read his forthcoming book, but ...until it appears. 2) This is a bit in advance, but it seems like a good occasion to mention it--There will be a session at next fall's SSHA meeting discussing Landes's book. Participants will include P. David, D. McCloskey, J. Mokyr, K. Pomeranz, and G. Grantham, as well as Landes. Hope to see you all there. Jonathan J. Liebowitz (jonathan_liebowitz@uml.edu) Department of History University of Massachusetts Lowell ============ FOOTER TO EH.RES POSTING ============ For information, send the message "info EH.RES" to lists@eh.net. **************************************************************************** *************** (5) Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 12:36:12 -0500 From: Robert Marks Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes Sender: owner-eh.res@eh.net To: EH.RES@EH.NET Reply-to: eh.res@eh.net ================= EH.RES POSTING ================= From: Bob Marks, Whittier College (rmarks@whittier.edu) Having followed this discussion with interest, and now with Jack Goldstone including me in the "California school" with regard to many of the issues raised, I thought it was time to introduce myself to the Eh.Res list by way of comments on some of postings. First, and as a preliminary, the interest of historians whose primary focus has been Europe and/or North America in the work of Asianists is a welcome change, Brad de Long's comments about his education notwithstanding (maybe his experiences were exceptional). Most of us working on China have for a very long time immersed ourselves in work on Europe, becoming familiar with issues and perspectives coming from that body of work, and clearly that experience is beginning to bear fruit, as the work of Ken Pomeranz, Bin Wong, and James Lee (among others in the "California school") attests. Now that we are beginning to have a global dialog, maybe we will make some progress on understanding global processes. Now to some comments on others' postings: Greg Clark asserted (5/13/98) that prior to 1800, all economies in the world were Malthusian "in the sense that living standards did NOT depend directly on the production technology," but did depend on population dynamics. The work that I have done on the part of South China called Lingnan (and here I'll try to help Brad de Long begin to remember some of these regions of China by offering a translation: "South of the Mountains"), indicates that that region (Guangzhou/Canton and its hinterland, a very wealthy and "developed" part of late imperial China) may well have begun to break with a Malthusian regime in the second half of the eighteenth century, without having experienced an "industrial revolution" (but perhaps an industrious one). But that does not mean, as Greg suggests, that that important demographic change arose only from family and social structure reasons, and not technological developments. The evidence that I've developed (in my book, Tigers, Rice, Silk, and Silt: Environment and Economy in Late Imperial South China) suggests that in Lingnan, by the end of the 18th century grain prices and food supply had become delinked from harvest quality, assuring food supplies to urban and sub-urban residents and workders at reasonable prices, regardless of what the harvest was. The question is, Why? And here I would point to both technological developments in agriculture, in particular irrigation and the use of various techniques by which peasant farmers could get 5 or 6 harvests in two years from the same plot of land, and to organizational changes, in particular the development of a large, integrated, and efficient market for food grains, in particular rice. In fact, the eighteenth-century grain market in Lingnan was larger, more integrated, and more efficient (by various measures) than those in the most developed parts of Europe, allowing for the development of a very large and productive textile industry (both cotton and silk) in the Pearl River delta, utilizing spinning wheels and looms worked (and powered) by several individuals. In short, in at least one region of China ca. 1800, it is likely that living standards were not "determined" by birth and death rates (and their causes), although population dynamics undoubtedly remained important. None of this gets to the question of explaining the industrial revolution, as Greg Clark wants, but it should cast doubt on some verities, perhaps including the one that does away with the industrial revolution altogether in favor of an industrious revolution. For once again, even if we go down that route, historians working on China can demonstrate that China got that far too, and by 1800. So, yes, the work of yet another historian of China tends to support the case that the differences between China and Europe appeared very late, around 1800 in Lingnan, or later than the 1750 date suggested by Alan Taylor. So maybe we have to think about "the great bifurcation" as coming later than 1750. Which brings me to my last observation: in 1984 Braudel (in the Structures of Everyday Life) had already identified "the gap," its late appearance around 1800, and the need for explaining it, as the most important item on historians' agendas. But contrary to the thrust of Alan Taylor's last paragraph, it is not necessarily the Europeanists (e.g. the North/Landes/Jones Eurocentric view summarized by Jack Goldstone) who are helping the most with crafting an explanation (or perhaps more precisely, one that will hold up globally given the historical evidence we now have for China). In fact, I would submit that this whole debate is possible only because of the work that Asianists in general, but those working on China in particular, have done over the past 15 years. Gunder Frank is right: it's time for economic historians to ReOrient their views. ============ FOOTER TO EH.RES POSTING ============ For information, send the message "info EH.RES" to lists@eh.net. **************************************************************************** *************** (6) Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 12:36:12 -0500 From: Gunder Frank Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes Sender: owner-eh.res@eh.net To: eh.res@eh.net Reply-to: eh.res@eh.net ================= EH.RES POSTING ================= Liebowitz requests more information from my book. i'll see what i can do when i formulate some response. but one of them is to inform that at the same SSHA meets in Chicago Pomeranz is also an another panel ORIENTING THE EUROPEAN 'MIRACLE": COMPARISONS, CONNECTIONS, CONJUNCTURES along with Bin Wong, Gunder Frank as the other two paper givers, and Jim Blaut and Bruce Cumings as discussants organized by yours truly gunder frank Andre Gunder Frank University of Toronto ============ FOOTER TO EH.RES POSTING ============ For information, send the message "info EH.RES" to lists@eh.net. **************************************************************************** *********** (7) Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 12:36:12 -0500 From: Gunder Frank Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes Sender: owner-eh.res@eh.net To: eh.res@eh.net Reply-to: eh.res@eh.net ================= EH.RES POSTING ================= Liebowitz requests more information from my book. i'll see what i can do when i formulate some response. but one of them is to inform that at the same SSHA meets in Chicago Pomeranz is also an another panel ORIENTING THE EUROPEAN 'MIRACLE": COMPARISONS, CONNECTIONS, CONJUNCTURES along with Bin Wong, Gunder Frank as the other two paper givers, and Jim Blaut and Bruce Cumings as discussants organized by yours truly gunder frank Andre Gunder Frank University of Toronto ============ FOOTER TO EH.RES POSTING ============ For information, send the message "info EH.RES" to lists@eh.net. **************************************************************************** ****** (8) Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 12:46:21 -0500 From: "Alan M. Taylor" Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes Sender: owner-eh.res@eh.net To: eh.res@eh.net Reply-to: eh.res@eh.net ================= EH.RES POSTING ================= Joshua Rosenbloom trenchantly points out: >...As a purely logical matter, >even if we accept the view that the "great bifurcation" in incomes did not >emerge until sometime in the 18th century, it is not so obvious that the >roots of the West's distinctive path in the last several centuries are not >to be found in prior events. These may not have translated into discernable >differences in economic prowess, but they may still have a long history. I certainly agree. The great bifurcation may or may not have begun in 1800, but that empirical question is (yes) totally separate from the question of when and where any institutional/cultural/policy divergence began between West and "not-West". Lags [and thus path dependence] could indeed be very important. Jonathan Liebowitz persuasively argues: >1) I've been pleased at the turn this discussion has taken in the past few >days >and thank recent posters for their insightful comments. In that vein I hope >Gunder Frank would give his counter-Landes interpretation of modern economic >growth. (I know we can all read his forthcoming book, but ... So I second that motion. Assume for the time being that post-1800 is where the big empirical gaps are. Far from substituting for our purchase of his 400-page book, a few words from Frank might whet our appetite even more. Can Frank say: 1) if he agrees that the great bifurcation post-1800 is the big issue; 2) whether institutional/cultural/policy differences across regions mattered at that juncture (or else what did); 3) whether these institutional/cultural/policy differences, even if they DIDN'T cause a pre-1800 bifurcation, nonetheless had very long-run gestations over the preceding centuries. The Rise of the West, sooner or later, has to come from somewhere. Yours, Alan M. Taylor Hoover Institution and Northwestern University ============ FOOTER TO EH.RES POSTING ============ For information, send the message "info EH.RES" to lists@eh.net. **************************************************************************** *************** (9) Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 12:46:22 -0500 From: Brad De Long Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes Sender: owner-eh.res@eh.net To: eh.res@eh.net Reply-to: eh.res@eh.net ================= EH.RES POSTING ================= On Thu, 14 May 1998 Jack Goldstone wrote: >There is emerging what I like to call the "California" >school or interpretation of global economic history. This has been >developed in good part by scholars in California, and holds that there >were NO significant long-term advantages enjoyed by Europe over the main >centers of civilization in Asia; that the level of technology, science, >agriculture, and living standards were similar in these regions from 1000 >to 1800 AD, with Europe lagging if anything until nearly the end of this >period; and that even the dynamics of political and social structures and >conflicts in Asia and Europe were essentially similar from 1500 to 1850. Living standards and agriculture I can buy. And "Technology" is complex: are we talking rice seedlings, porcelain, or printing presses? Yet the slope of European technological progress in the second millennium is very impressive. By 1700 where outside of Europe are the equivalents of the eyeglasses? The astrolabes? The microscopes? The logarithmic tables? The lathes? The slide rules? The high-volume printing presses? The telescopes? The escapement clocks? The grenades? The--advanced--cannon? It is certainly true that eyeglasses, logarithms, screw-cutting lathes, and printing presses churning out volumes by Erasmus don't mean beans (directly) for sugar or cotton consumption in the Rhine or Thames delta (and that grenades and cannon tend to make life a lot more nasty, brutal, and short). But they mean a lot in terms of laying the groundwork for further developments. And science? 1800 is more than a century and a quarter past Newton. And politics? Where is the William the Silent of Asia? Where is Magna Carta? Where are the self-governing cities of Asia? Listen to only a few speeches from Mahathir Muhammed or Lee Kuan Yu and you can't help but be struck by the difference between their belief that rulers command and people obey and the ideas that governments are instituted not to give rulers the style of life to which they want to be accustomed but to secure the people's natural rights,and that they derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. And as Alan Taylor eloquently pointed out, to reduce the European Miracle from a ten-century to a two-century affair makes understanding and accounting for it much, much harder... Brad DeLong ============ FOOTER TO EH.RES POSTING ============ For information, send the message "info EH.RES" to lists@eh.net. ************************************************************************** Joshua L. Rosenbloom e-mail: JRosenbloom@ukans.edu Department of Economics phone: 785-864-2839 Summerfield Hall Lawrence, KS 66045 University of Kansas http://www.bschool.ukans.edu/home/jrosenbloom/jlr.html *************************************************************************** --------------06CB78C2DF5E313EBD000945-- From p34d3611@jhu.edu Fri May 15 16:28:20 1998 by jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (950413.SGI.8.6.12/950213.SGI.AUTOCF) Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 18:28:12 -0400 (EDT) From: Peter Grimes Subject: [Fwd: Anti-IMF testimony from Indonesia] (fwd) To: WSN This message is in MIME format. The first part should be readable text, while the remaining parts are likely unreadable without MIME-aware tools. Send mail to mime@docserver.cac.washington.edu for more info. ---2133065211-1476776241-895271292=:7897 ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 07:38:04 -0400 From: Barbara Larcom To: Peter Grimes , Denis Nikitin , Frida Berrigan , Howard Ehrlich , Leslie Bilchick Subject: [Fwd: Anti-IMF testimony from Indonesia] ---2133065211-1476776241-895271292=:7897 Thu, 14 May 1998 19:13:24 -0700 (PDT) Thu, 14 May 1998 21:15:10 -0400 (EDT) Date: Thu, 14 May 1998 21:08:46 -0400 From: 50 Years List Server <75721.1264@COMPUSERVE.COM> Sender: owner-50-years@igc.apc.org Subject: Anti-IMF testimony from Indonesia To: 50 Years National List Serv <50-Years@igc.org> Aryati is a pseudonym for an Indonesian human rights activist/researcher. She testified before the House human rights panel along with Pius Lustrilanang, Constancio Pinto, and Jaffar Siddiq Hamzah on May 7, 1998. This testimony has some very strong critique of the IMF bailout and "debt" in the second half. ------------------------------------------------------------------- Testimony of Aryati, May 7, 1998 At a Hearing of the Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights - United States House of Representatives I come to speak to you here today with some trepidation. Indonesia is not a free country where one can express criticisms of the government without worry about the possible consequences upon one's safety. I have no guarantees of protection: I am not a prominent leader of a mass organization, nor a member of the elite who has high connections. I am an Indonesian from a middle class background who is scared about telling you my honest opinions. I take this risk because I feel compelled to. I am one of the youths of my country who will have to bear, for many years into the future, the burden of what mistakes and crimes the government is committing today. I take this risk also in the hope that the U.S. government, so long a staunch and powerful supporter of Suharto's militarism, will reform itself and do something to ensure that Indonesia does have a government that respects and guarantees basic civil liberties, such as the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, and the freedom of association. Military To understand the Suharto government you have to understand the Indonesian military. We have been living under what is an institutionalized martial law regime for the past thirty three years. It is no ordinary military. It has what is officially called a "dual function": external defense and internal policing. Imagine for a moment that the US military had overthrown the US government by staging a coup and orchestrating the slaughter of about 500,000 people. Imagine the military then set up headquarters in each state, each county, each city and each town. Imagine that it placed one third to one half of the US military's troops in these headquarters. Imagine that there were no laws governing their actions nor any legislative oversight. Imagine further that the civilian administration was constantly monitored and controlled by the military and that many of the civilian administrators were themselves military officers. If you can imagine this scenario then you have a pretty good idea of how the Indonesian military operates. It is ubiquitous, all-pervasive, and beyond the law. When the US military speaks about training Indonesian military officers to respect human rights, we can only laugh. The structure of the Indonesian military places it as an all-powerful institution and the laws of our country allow it complete freedom to do what it wills. A few courses in good behavior are not going to alter what it is a very oppressive system of military rule. Besides, we are not even certain that the US military is sincere in claiming that it is providing such training. The US Congress should feel no qualms about cutting off JCET training if it is thinking about our benefit. Once the JCET training became public knowledge, the Pentagon claimed that it was meant only for the benefit of US soldiers who were given the opportunity to see how another military operates. So, by the Pentagon's own admission, the training was not designed to help the Indonesian military acquire less brutish habits. Let me explain how the government instills in us a culture of fear and robs us of our basic civil rights. In response to the student protests sweeping the country, the government has decided to intimidate the students by resorting to the tactic of "disappearances". According to the leading legal aid organization in Indonesia (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia), there are fifty persons that have disappeared over the past three months. One student activist who disappeared is Andi Arief. Military personnel kidnapped him from his home, in full view of his family, on March 28. The top generals of our country not only denied that the military had kidnapped him, they joked to the press that he had simply disappeared of his accord. For three weeks, his family, his friends, and his fellow students, worried themselves to the point of exhaustion. Knowing how the military operates, they were concerned for his very survival. On April 22, he turned up in the Jakarta central police station. The police had no arrest warrant and no explanation for how he got there. Andi Arief told his lawyers that he had been kidnapped by the special forces, Kopassus, held for three weeks of interrogation, and then dumped at the police station. One must note that the military did not break the law by kidnapping these fifty activists because none of the laws of our country apply to the military. Thus, Andi Arief's parents can not sue Kopassus for arresting their son without a warrant and holding him in detention without a habeus corpus. This is precisely what makes ordinary citizens so terrified of the military: it is unpredictable and unaccountable. It has been said that one can judge a government by its prisons. Well then, let us look at Indonesian prisons. There we will find people whose only crime was to criticize the government. Sri Bintang Pamungkas, the leader of an independent political party, criticized the government. He is now in Cipinang prison in Jakarta on charges of subversion. Accompanying him in that prison are 12 members of the banned People's Democratic Party (PRD) convicted of thought crimes. In the language of the prosecutors, they "deviated from the state ideology." There are presently at least twenty five political prisoners in Indonesia's prisons, some are in their teens, some in their seventies. Just in the past three months, 250 people have been arrested on political crimes -- such heinous crimes as holding peaceful meetings and holding peaceful demonstrations. We have a government that has a pathological fear of any public assembly that it does not control and any public leader who does not grovel before our president. Every single independent political party and trade union has been systematically destroyed by the government. In regions of the country where there has been serious organized resistance to the government -- Irian Jaya, Aceh, occupied East Timor -- it has not has been satisfied with arrests. It has resorted to massacres. You can guess what type of society we have. We are a people who are terrified of expressing our own opinions and terrified of getting involved in politics of any kind. Politics for us is a spectator sport -- and a cruel sport it is. We are daily bombarded by the statements of officials who are barely literate, barely articulate, and barely educated. When faced with public criticisms, they speak of "crushing", "smashing," and "hacking." They treat the youths of our country, those in their teens and twenties who are sincerely and peacefully attempting to change this society, as though they were foreign agents bent on subversion. We are not citizens of a state; we are subjects of a modern, militarized sultanate. It is obvious today that Suhartois reign is coming to a miserable end. A necessary condition for democracy in Indonesia is the ending of Suhartois presidency. But it is not a sufficient condition. The military, with its dual function, is prepared to continue Suhartoism without Suharto. What I mean is that the sources of the systematic human rights abuses we see today are not going to vanish with the demise of the Suharto presidency. For genuine democracy to exist in Indonesia, our laws will have to be changed to embody basic principles of human rights and the military will have to be confined to the barracks and put under civilian oversight. Economics For the past thirty three years we have been told this system of martial law was necessary for our material benefit. The religion of the government, its legitimating ideology, has been economic development, what is called in Indonesian, pembangunan. But what do we have to show for thirty years of development? Two hundred families have fat Swiss bank accounts while millions of people have had their land expropriated. A few timber contractors and palm oil companies have accumulated fortunes while chopping and burning down most of the rain forest. Thirty years of development has meant the victimization of many Indonesians. And we have not heard all their laments precisely because there has been no freedom to criticize what the state calls its "development program." Thirty plus years of development under martial law has meant the accumulation of an enormous debt. For thirty years, the United States, Japan and Europe provided billions of dollars annually as foreign aid to the Suharto regime. The US government, since Suharto took power in 1965 by ordering the massacre of thousands of people, has consistently maintained that his regime provides stability and security. Every single US president since Nixon, including the present incumbent, has, to their shame, celebrated the Suharto regime for its economic accomplishments and political stability. In effect, the US government has said that the Indonesian people were best kept under the thumb of a sultanate and that democracy was opposed to our best interests. US academics and retired Foreign Service personnel, such as those at the US-Indonesia Society here in Washington, have been saying that Indonesians would just have to sacrifice their political freedoms for economic growth. The economic crisis of the past nine months has put paid to these cynical propositions. Now, after suffering so that development could proceed, what is the prospect of the Indonesian people under the IMF bailout? In short, we are now expected to suffer even more to pay off a debt that we did not incur. Thanks to the Suharto regime's deal with the IMF, all Indonesians have been put into debt bondage. Our labor and resources are supposed to be devoted to paying off the debt for the next generation. Meanwhile, those 200 families who contracted the debt have enough money in their own personal accounts to pay it off many times over. Is it possible to deny that this current economic austerity plan by the IMF is a gross injustice? The Indonesian people never approved of accepting all those loans. We weren't even allowed to know what the government's economic policy was for all those years. Not even our farcical showcase parliament was given authority over economic policy, nor is it given any authority now. But the IMF is telling us that we have to share the debt burden equally. While it is apparently acceptable to the IMF that political power is monopolized, it absolutely insists that the debt be democratically distributed. Those governments that have loaned money to the Suharto regime and its crony capitalists for the past thirty years are now supporting the IMF's agreement. Thus, they appear to us like heroin pushers who, after keeping an addict hooked for years and driving him ever deeper in debt, throw him back on his family when he is near collapse, telling them that they have to foot the bill for his rehabilitation and for all his past debts. Please do not believe that you are doing us any favors by authorizing money for the IMF loans to Indonesia. We need democracy in order to settle our economic problems but that is not a word you will find in the agreement between Suharto and the IMF. The IMF, with the blessing of the Clinton administration, is actually hoping to engineer an economic recovery under the same political conditions of institutionalized martial law. This is, I assure you, an impossible dream. The protests against the Suharto regime have by now reached the point of no return. The Indonesian people, now that they have had the opportunity to express their long supressed grievances against this regime, are not going to be satisfied until it falls. Democracy is a rare commodity these days but it is no less vital to us than rice. It is paradoxical that the IMF is willing to dictate terms to Suharto when it comes to managing the economy but not when it comes to fundamental economic rights, such as the right of workers to organize. The IMF refuses to insist that, as a condition for receiving the loans, the government recognize workers rights. It calls that meddling in the internal affairs of Indonesia -- when it already controls the governmentis economic policy. If the IMF's agreement meddled in such a way as to allow the Indonesian people to have a greater voice over economic policy then perhaps the US Congress should support it. But, as it stands, the agreement is a worthless piece of paper signed by a collapsing dictator. The IMF money is not going to benefit us. As you know, much of the money will be simply transferred to foreign banks that made risky loans to the Indonesian government and Indonesian enterprises. The money will enter Indonesia for a moment and then get sent back out as debt payments. These payments are supposed to restore "investor confidence" but one has to wonder what kind of investors these are who believe in being rewarded for making bad decisions. It is astonishing that the foreign banks that made risky loans to a corrupt and unstable economic system want to be repaid in full. It is even more astonishing that they want the Indonesian people to pay for their bad decisions. Look at the tragic conditions Indonesia is now in after thirty years of US-supported stability and development. Indonesia has an abundance of fertile land yet we are now begging other countries to give us supplies of our staple food: rice. The Food and Agricultural Organization estimates that Indonesia needs to be given 2 million tons of rice for the estimated 7.5 million Indonesians who will require "food assistance" within the next year. There is a famine in eastern Indonesia now. We, living in other parts of the country, hardly hear anything about it and what we do hear are government whitewashes. We have been told by the Suharto regime and the US government to exchange our political freedoms for economic prosperity. We have wound up with neither. Recommendations As US Congressmen, you must realize that the only force that the military appears to feel accountable to is the US government. You greatly determine whether the Indonesian government receives economic aid from the IMF and political legitimacy in international forums such as the United Nations. I can assure you that the Suharto regime, feeling entirely unaccountable to the Indonesian people, does feel beholden to the US government. It panics on seeing any sign of displeasure with it here in Washington. I urge you to listen to more people than just Indonesian government officials and retired State Department officials. Since the government has not allowed for any opposition political leaders or parties to exist, it may seem difficult to know to whom one should listen. I suggest that you listen to those who have had the determination to sacrifice for their beliefs and the bravery to risk military violence to assert what they believe to be the truth. You should listen to people such as Sri Bintang Pamungkas who has demanded the international community refrain from loaning money and giving military aid to Indonesia until a democratic regime can be established. You should especially listen to the youth, such as Pius Lustrilanang, who have no interests other than those of the nation's. In conclusion, I would recommend that: 1) The US military not assist the Indonesian military. The US government should restrict itself to civilian relations with the Suharto regime. 2) The US Congress should not authorize money for the IMF to be loaned to the Suharto regime. ---------------- Begin Forwarded Message ---------------- Suharto accused of torture, White House concerned With Indonesia By Harry Dunphy Associated Press Writer WASHINGTON (AP) -- Opponents of Indonesian President Suharto charged Thursday that his military forces were responsible for repeated human rights abuses, including killings, disappearances, torture and arbitrary arrests. They also called for an end to all U.S. military training of Indonesian forces and recommended that the United States and the United Nations send representatives to Indonesia to investigate their claims. Meantime, White House spokesman Mike McCurry said the Clinton administration is calling on Indonesia's government "to respect the individual human rights of those who are voicing legitimate dissent" and use caution in trying to restore order. "And most importantly, (we ask) that they address the fundamental concerns that many people in Indonesia have about the status of their economy," McCurry said. On Capitol Hill, a veiled, unidentified witness told a House Judiciary human rights panel that many ordinary Indonesians "were terrified of expressing our own opinions" because they feared reprisals by Suharto's government. Rep. Christopher Smith, R-N.J., who chaired the hearing, said the testimony, "ripped away any respectability the Suharto regime may claim and exposed daily atrocities" that made it difficult to support international aid for Indonesia. The International Monetary Fund last week resumed payments that are part of a $43 billion rescue package to help Indonesia face its most serious economic crisis in 30 years. The World Bank is expected to approve a $1.5 billion loan to the Jakarta government before the end of the month. Pius Lustrilanang, 30, a prominent opposition figure, told the panel he was abducted for two months earlier this year, probably by Indonesian special forces, and administered beating and electric shocks in attempts to learn of his political activities. After international pressure on the government, he was released last month and fled the country. Weakened by the economic crisis, Lustrilanang said, the "government has become more vicious and brutal towards voices of dissent. ... The human rights situation in Indonesia is fundamentally flawed." Constancio Pinto, U.S. representative of the National Council of Resistance in East Timor, the former Portuguese colony Indonesia annexed in 1975, urged the United States to "stop all types of military support to a dictator that for 33 years has continually committed gross human rights violations." "Training Indonesian ... (special forces commando units) is just like training (Iraqi President ) Saddam Hussein's troops," he said. AP-WS-05-07-98 1813EDT, Posted at 3:39 p.m. PDT Thursday, May 7, 1998 ----------------- End Forwarded Message ----------------- ---2133065211-1476776241-895271292=:7897-- From chriscd@jhu.edu Mon May 18 08:34:32 1998 Date: Mon, 18 May 1998 10:35:28 -0400 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: Dialogue: Frank, Landes et al #4 (10 messages)] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------D3044D2D4ECC528959933DA6 --------------D3044D2D4ECC528959933DA6 16 May 1998 10:08:48 -0500 (EST) Date: Sat, 16 May 1998 09:15:47 -0500 From: manning@neu.edu (Patrick Manning) Subject: Dialogue: Frank, Landes et al #4 (10 messages) To: H-WORLD@h-net.msu.edu Joshua Rosembloom ****************************************** H-WORLD editor's note: This is the fourth in a series of postings containing the dialogue of Gunder Frank, David Landes and others on global economic history. It includes 7 messages originally posted on eh.res, two messages originally posted on H-ASIA, and one message posted herein by H-WORLD. PM ****************************************** (1). Originally posted on eh.res. Date: Thu, 14 May 1998 10:52:26 -0500 From: "Anthony Patrick O'Brien" Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes ================= EH.RES POSTING ================= The May 25 issue of the New Republic contains a review by Jagdish Bhagwati of Landes and of Kindleberger's _World Economic Primacy: 1500-1990_. Bhagwati's conclusions about Landes: "Landes wishes to link the European miracle causally, in the spirit of Max Weber, to underlying values as defined by the Judeo-Christian, and especially Protestant, universe. Islam is held to be inimical to a repetition of the European experience owing to its allegedly holistic nature, with religion 'in principle supreme and the ideal government that of the holy men.' Such assertions recur throughout the book. And here Landes is stepping into quicksand. For it is impossible to relate culture or values to these pro-growth institutions and policy frameworks, and hence to economic growth, in a causally tight way. .... I do not mean to deny culture any role. But the precise role of culture in economic behavior remains elusive. The encouraging truth appears to be that growth-inducing institutions, like hardy perennials that will grow in different and indifferent soils, are resilient and compatible with a range of cultures. And for a historian who is confronted with economic success in extremely diverse cultures, it is ahistorical to assert otherwise." It would be interesting to learn where Bhagwati thinks the IR came from. Tony O'Brien Lehigh University **************************************************************************** (2). Originally posted on eh.res. Date: Thu, 14 May 1998 12:45:52 -0500 From: "Joshua L. Rosenbloom" Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes ================= EH.RES POSTING ================= At 09:43 AM 5/14/98 -0500, jack a. goldstone wrote: >(2) Frank, Pommeranz, and others now make it difficult if not impossible >to see the roots of the great bifurcation in long-term structural changes >c. 1000-1700. The "action" is in the last few centuries. >(3) ...I would suggest instead a sudden "leap forward" in England, >due to (a) new institutions developed post-1689; (b) new technology >developed post-1689; and (c) a new religiously tolerant, scientifically >empirical, culture of inquiry, experiment, and innovation that developed >in England post-1689. >(4) If this seems to pivot everything on the Glorious Revolution, that's >right...If James II had triumphed...[t]he Dissenters who >provided the bulk of the entrepreneurial energy of the IR >in England might simply not have made their contribution, and perhaps >modern science and industry as we know it might never have developed in >the west.... >(5) In short, I think what needs to be explained is not a "long-term, >inevitable" process that leads to industrialization, but a rare, one-off, >developmental anomaly or "sport" that leads England on what is, by world >standards, a "peculiar path." The assertion that the Industrial Revolution may hinge on "accident" is certainly intriguing, but I am not yet prepared to accept that conjecture and give up looking for systematic differences. As a purely logical matter, even if we accept the view that the "great bifurcation" in incomes did not emerge until sometime in the 18th century, it is not so obvious that the roots of the West's distinctive path in the last several centuries are not to be found in prior events. These may not have translated into discernable differences in economic prowess, but they may still have a long history. I am hardly expert enough on this topic to suggest what these roots might be, but I have always been intrigued by the argument that William H. McNeill offers in _The Pursuit of Power_ (especially chapters 2-3), which identifies a unique trajectory of western development associated with political fragmentation and the emergence of significant international military competition within Europe. This competition, according to McNeill, both stimulated the development of new and more powerful military technologies (which ultimately gave the west a considerable advantage vis a vis the rest of the world), and obliged monarchs to grant increasing freedoms to merchants and financiers as part of the bargain for raising the funds to pay for military expenditures. Clearly some countries within Europe benefitted more from these developments than others, but their competition with eachother greatly raised the prospects of the emergence of regimes that loosened restrictions on religious and scientific dissent, thus making the ultimate transition that occurred in the 18th century more likely. Comments? Joshua Rosenbloom University of Kansas **************************************************************************** (3). Originally posted on eh.res Date: Thu, 14 May 1998 14:47:54 -0500 From: Jonathan_Liebowitz@uml.edu (Jonathan Liebowitz) Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes ================= EH.RES POSTING ================= 1) I've been pleased at the turn this discussion has taken in the past few days and thank recent posters for their insightful comments. In that vein I hope Gunder Frank would give his counter-Landes interpretation of modern economic growth. (I know we can all read his forthcoming book, but ...until it appears. 2) This is a bit in advance, but it seems like a good occasion to mention it--There will be a session at next fall's SSHA meeting discussing Landes's book. Participants will include P. David, D. McCloskey, J. Mokyr, K. Pomeranz, and G. Grantham, as well as Landes. Hope to see you all there. Jonathan J. Liebowitz (jonathan_liebowitz@uml.edu) Department of History University of Massachusetts Lowell **************************************************************************** (4). Originally posted on eh.res. Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 12:36:12 -0500 From: Robert Marks, Whittier College Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes ================= EH.RES POSTING ================= Having followed this discussion with interest, and now with Jack Goldstone including me in the "California school" with regard to many of the issues raised, I thought it was time to introduce myself to the Eh.Res list by way of comments on some of postings. First, and as a preliminary, the interest of historians whose primary focus has been Europe and/or North America in the work of Asianists is a welcome change, Brad de Long's comments about his education notwithstanding (maybe his experiences were exceptional). Most of us working on China have for a very long time immersed ourselves in work on Europe, becoming familiar with issues and perspectives coming from that body of work, and clearly that experience is beginning to bear fruit, as the work of Ken Pomeranz, Bin Wong, and James Lee (among others in the "California school") attests. Now that we are beginning to have a global dialog, maybe we will make some progress on understanding global processes. Now to some comments on others' postings: Greg Clark asserted (5/13/98) that prior to 1800, all economies in the world were Malthusian "in the sense that living standards did NOT depend directly on the production technology," but did depend on population dynamics. The work that I have done on the part of South China called Lingnan (and here I'll try to help Brad de Long begin to remember some of these regions of China by offering a translation: "South of the Mountains"), indicates that that region (Guangzhou/Canton and its hinterland, a very wealthy and "developed" part of late imperial China) may well have begun to break with a Malthusian regime in the second half of the eighteenth century, without having experienced an "industrial revolution" (but perhaps an industrious one). But that does not mean, as Greg suggests, that that important demographic change arose only from family and social structure reasons, and not technological developments. The evidence that I've developed (in my book, Tigers, Rice, Silk, and Silt: Environment and Economy in Late Imperial South China) suggests that in Lingnan, by the end of the 18th century grain prices and food supply had become delinked from harvest quality, assuring food supplies to urban and sub-urban residents and workders at reasonable prices, regardless of what the harvest was. The question is, Why? And here I would point to both technological developments in agriculture, in particular irrigation and the use of various techniques by which peasant farmers could get 5 or 6 harvests in two years from the same plot of land, and to organizational changes, in particular the development of a large, integrated, and efficient market for food grains, in particular rice. In fact, the eighteenth-century grain market in Lingnan was larger, more integrated, and more efficient (by various measures) than those in the most developed parts of Europe, allowing for the development of a very large and productive textile industry (both cotton and silk) in the Pearl River delta, utilizing spinning wheels and looms worked (and powered) by several individuals. In short, in at least one region of China ca. 1800, it is likely that living standards were not "determined" by birth and death rates (and their causes), although population dynamics undoubtedly remained important. None of this gets to the question of explaining the industrial revolution, as Greg Clark wants, but it should cast doubt on some verities, perhaps including the one that does away with the industrial revolution altogether in favor of an industrious revolution. For once again, even if we go down that route, historians working on China can demonstrate that China got that far too, and by 1800. So, yes, the work of yet another historian of China tends to support the case that the differences between China and Europe appeared very late, around 1800 in Lingnan, or later than the 1750 date suggested by Alan Taylor. So maybe we have to think about "the great bifurcation" as coming later than 1750. Which brings me to my last observation: in 1984 Braudel (in the Structures of Everyday Life) had already identified "the gap," its late appearance around 1800, and the need for explaining it, as the most important item on historians' agendas. But contrary to the thrust of Alan Taylor's last paragraph, it is not necessarily the Europeanists (e.g. the North/Landes/Jones Eurocentric view summarized by Jack Goldstone) who are helping the most with crafting an explanation (or perhaps more precisely, one that will hold up globally given the historical evidence we now have for China). In fact, I would submit that this whole debate is possible only because of the work that Asianists in general, but those working on China in particular, have done over the past 15 years. Gunder Frank is right: it's time for economic historians to ReOrient their views. **************************************************************************** (5). Originally posted on eh.res. Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 12:36:12 -0500 From: Gunder Frank Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes ================= EH.RES POSTING ================= Liebowitz requests more information from my book. i'll see what i can do when i formulate some response. but one of them is to inform that at the same SSHA meets in Chicago Pomeranz is also an another panel ORIENTING THE EUROPEAN 'MIRACLE": COMPARISONS, CONNECTIONS, CONJUNCTURES along with Bin Wong, Gunder Frank as the other two paper givers, and Jim Blaut and Bruce Cumings as discussants organized by yours truly gunder frank Andre Gunder Frank University of Toronto **************************************************************************** (6). Originally posted on eh.res. Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 12:46:21 -0500 From: "Alan M. Taylor" Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes ================= EH.RES POSTING ================= Joshua Rosenbloom trenchantly points out: >...As a purely logical matter, >even if we accept the view that the "great bifurcation" in incomes did not >emerge until sometime in the 18th century, it is not so obvious that the >roots of the West's distinctive path in the last several centuries are not >to be found in prior events. These may not have translated into discernable >differences in economic prowess, but they may still have a long history. I certainly agree. The great bifurcation may or may not have begun in 1800, but that empirical question is (yes) totally separate from the question of when and where any institutional/cultural/policy divergence began between West and "not-West". Lags [and thus path dependence] could indeed be very important. Jonathan Liebowitz persuasively argues: >1) I've been pleased at the turn this discussion has taken in the past few >days >and thank recent posters for their insightful comments. In that vein I hope >Gunder Frank would give his counter-Landes interpretation of modern economic >growth. (I know we can all read his forthcoming book, but ... So I second that motion. Assume for the time being that post-1800 is where the big empirical gaps are. Far from substituting for our purchase of his 400-page book, a few words from Frank might whet our appetite even more. Can Frank say: 1) if he agrees that the great bifurcation post-1800 is the big issue; 2) whether institutional/cultural/policy differences across regions mattered at that juncture (or else what did); 3) whether these institutional/cultural/policy differences, even if they DIDN'T cause a pre-1800 bifurcation, nonetheless had very long-run gestations over the preceding centuries. The Rise of the West, sooner or later, has to come from somewhere. Yours, Alan M. Taylor Hoover Institution and Northwestern University **************************************************************************** (7). Originally posted on eh.res. Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 12:46:22 -0500 From: Brad De Long Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes ================= EH.RES POSTING ================= On Thu, 14 May 1998 Jack Goldstone wrote: >There is emerging what I like to call the "California" >school or interpretation of global economic history. This has been >developed in good part by scholars in California, and holds that there >were NO significant long-term advantages enjoyed by Europe over the main >centers of civilization in Asia; that the level of technology, science, >agriculture, and living standards were similar in these regions from 1000 >to 1800 AD, with Europe lagging if anything until nearly the end of this >period; and that even the dynamics of political and social structures and >conflicts in Asia and Europe were essentially similar from 1500 to 1850. Living standards and agriculture I can buy. And "Technology" is complex: are we talking rice seedlings, porcelain, or printing presses? Yet the slope of European technological progress in the second millennium is very impressive. By 1700 where outside of Europe are the equivalents of the eyeglasses? The astrolabes? The microscopes? The logarithmic tables? The lathes? The slide rules? The high-volume printing presses? The telescopes? The escapement clocks? The grenades? The--advanced--cannon? It is certainly true that eyeglasses, logarithms, screw-cutting lathes, and printing presses churning out volumes by Erasmus don't mean beans (directly) for sugar or cotton consumption in the Rhine or Thames delta (and that grenades and cannon tend to make life a lot more nasty, brutal, and short). But they mean a lot in terms of laying the groundwork for further developments. And science? 1800 is more than a century and a quarter past Newton. And politics? Where is the William the Silent of Asia? Where is Magna Carta? Where are the self-governing cities of Asia? Listen to only a few speeches from Mahathir Muhammed or Lee Kuan Yu and you can't help but be struck by the difference between their belief that rulers command and people obey and the ideas that governments are instituted not to give rulers the style of life to which they want to be accustomed but to secure the people's natural rights,and that they derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. And as Alan Taylor eloquently pointed out, to reduce the European Miracle from a ten-century to a two-century affair makes understanding and accounting for it much, much harder... Brad DeLong ************************************************************************** (8). Originally posted on H-ASIA. Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 19:06:18 -0500 Reply-to: H-Net list for Asian History and Culture Subject: H-Asia: A Discussion of World History - Landes Review H-ASIA May 15, 1998 ============================ From: b.pavier@bilk.ac.uk Subject: A Discussion of World History - Landes Review It seems to me that the discussion is rapidly heading towards one of those inconclusive academic wrangles, since it is missing the central point of the central dynamic of social conflict. It is surely pertinent that on the thirtieth anniversary of May 68 I last night watched Indonesian students and workers taking charge of central Jarkata and, hopefully, toppling Suharto and his corrupt and brutal gang. Hopefully, this will be the start of a hot summer both in Indonesia and in an increasing number of other countries. This brings back the point that the driving force of world history is class conflict - who takes part and who wins. In other words, contrary to 'common-sense' assumptions of a large part of the academic community, the future does really lie with old Karl Marx and Fred Engels. Looking very briefly at a couple of examples, work in recent years on C18 South Asia (notably, but not only, by Chris Bayly) demonstrates how the East India Company's empire rested for sixty years on collaboration with sophisticated and extensive merchant classes. What comes out of a reading of this era is that, with the exception of Tipu Sultan, no-one in South Asia realised the nature of the people with whom they were dealing, and thus did not undestand the dynamics of capitalism. The British were thus able to wage a successful class struggle against these people in the first three decades of the C19 - even though they had been formally ruling them for the previous sixty years. Secondly there is the instance of Muhammad Ali in Egypt. This ruler attempted to modernise the Egyptian state and economy in the first four decades of the C19 and to turn his state in the dominant one in West Asia. The events of the period, and the response of the major capitalist powers, especially Britain, clearly indicate that this was a viable aspiration, and they then moved to crush the Egyptian imperialist state. Thus there is nothing inherent about who's more advanced than someone else - it depends on the material conditions of a society and the most important element in those is class conflict, inside particular societies or between ruling classes in different societies. The key seems to lie in the opening paragraph of the Communist Manifesto - if class conflict is not resolved, then what results is the mutual ruin of both contending classes. If you look at Asia it seems to me to be that in China, South Asia, etc., the failure of anyone to decisively win the class war meant that they became vulnerable to the European bourgeoisie from those countries who had achieved decisive victories in class struggles. I realise that this may not be the most popular view with our correspondents - however, it has the advantage of offering a general explanation as to what happened. Barry Pavier Department of General Education, Bradford and Ilkley Community College, Bradford BD7 1AY, UK ************************************************************************* (9). Originally posted on H-ASIA. Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 19:06:18 -0500 Reply-to: H-Net list for Asian History and Culture Subject: H-Asia: A Discussion of World History - Landes Review From: "Thomas C. Bartlett" In reply to Jack Goldstone's interesting remarks, particularly his reference to sholars who have "documented the extensive silver flows into China......", I would like to add the name of William Atwell of Hobart and William Smith College. I believe Atwelll's first publication on this subject was done around 15 years ago, or more. Atwell is a historian of China, not an economist, by primary training, according to my understanding, so he may not have become so conspicuous among the people involved in this debate. But he has recently spent time as a visiting faculty member at U. Cal-Berkeley, which presumably would have put him in close communication with some California-based scholars. Atwell's work, as I remember it, showed dramatic oscillations in the inflow of silver from abroad in the 17th century. This can be related to the views of the 17th century Chinese scholar Gu Yanwu, whom I have studied. Gu's writings make clear the highly negative view taken by this conservative elite Confucian statecraft writer to the monetization of tax payment in late Ming China. His argument is that the requirement to pay taxes in silver impoverishes peasants and so causes social unrest. Gu wrote an essay on this subject which is said to show remarkable similarities to an essay written by his nephew when taking the civil service examination in the 1670s. But, like many of Gu's opinion, this recommendation was not implemented by the Qing. Thomas Bartlett La Trobe University Melbourne, Australia ************************************************************************* (10). Posted here for the first time on H-WORLD. From: Steve Muhlberger, Nipissing University stevem@faculty.unipissing.ca This is shaping up to be the best discussion since I joined this list. Thanks to all the contributors. Keep it up. --------------D3044D2D4ECC528959933DA6-- From chriscd@jhu.edu Mon May 18 08:35:31 1998 Date: Mon, 18 May 1998 10:36:33 -0400 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: Dialogue: Frank, Landes et al #5 (1 message)] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------FA672B40FB67FB75C2760F9F --------------FA672B40FB67FB75C2760F9F 16 May 1998 10:57:32 -0500 (EST) Date: Sat, 16 May 1998 10:04:30 -0500 From: manning@neu.edu (Patrick Manning) Subject: Dialogue: Frank, Landes et al #5 (1 message) To: H-WORLD@h-net.msu.edu Joshua Rosembloom ****************************************** H-WORLD editor's note: This is the fifth in a series of postings containing the dialogue of Gunder Frank, David Landes and others on global economic history. It is a response by Gunder Frank to messages received through May 15. PM ****************************************** Originally posted on H-WORLD. Date: Sat, 16 May 1998 10:36:39 -0400 (EDT) From: Gunder Frank Subject: gunder frank net response # 1 (fwd) To: H-NET List for World History Thank You One and All for your interest, attention, consideration and patience with me. A family medical emergency is the real reason and David Landes' absence the official excuse for the tardiness of this my first general response and the delay till still later of my detailed reply. I fully agree with Taylor and others that circa 1800 represents a disjuncture, and that it remains to be explained by me and others. I say 'remains to be' because I disasgree with Taylor et al when they contend that received theory has offered some satisfactory explanations. I contend that they are not even minimally satisfactory or accetable, and under title 2 below I again summarize - in three short paragraphs - my general reservations, written long before reading Landes's new book and your reactions to my critique thereof. Under title 3 below, I then append MY OWN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION as a somewhat longer but still excessively short summary extract from my book ReORIENT. Of course, that is intended as a challenge to others to join in to the still outstanding task of constructing a holistic real world or really holistic global/world embracing explanation, in which Ken Pomeranz is also engaged, but alas David Landes is not [yet?]. I beg indulgence to postpone my detailed reply to critiques until I catch up with the backlog accumulated during the above mentioned medical problem and I sort out and put in order your responses that I have received via 5 e-mail diuscussion lists in differently assembled and packaged but also often duplicated/ triplicated form [which I offered to David Landes also to do for him in his absence aboad]. Then, I promise to try to address your specific comments, critiques and related or alternative explanations [thank you again] in a future detailed and organized 'comprehensive' reply. So for now, here goes only what I already wrote BEFORE I read what you just wrote, but after long-winded other discussions with some colleagies named below. 2. SUMMARY CRITIQUE OF RECEIVED THEORY AGAIN Received theory attributes the industrial revolution and the "rise" of the West to its alleged "exceptionality" and "superiority." The source of the same is sought in turn in the also alleged long standing or even primeval Western preparation for take-off. This contention mistakes the place and misplaces the "concreteness" of the transformation by looking for it in Europe itself. Yet the "causes" of the transformation can never be understood as long as they are examined only under the European streetlight and must instead be sought under the world- wide global illumination in the system as a whole. That turns all received theory on its head. The argument - and the evidence! - is that world development between 1400 and 1800 reflects not Asia's weakness but its strength, and not Europe's nonexistent strength but rather its relative weakness in the global economy. For it was all these regions' joint participation and place in the single but unequally structured and unevenly changing global economy that resulted also in changes in their relative positions in the world. The common global economic expansion since 1400 long benefited the Asian centers earlier and more than marginal Europe, Africa, and the Americas. However, this very economic benefit turned into a growing absolute and relative disadvantage for one Asian region after another in the late eighteenth century. Production and trade began to atrophy as growing population and income, but also their economic and social polarization, exerted pressure on resources, constrained effective demand at the bottom, and increased the availability of cheap labor in Asia more than elsewhere in the world. That world economic change also opened the door to the "Rise of the West,' which smust be re-examined in terms the more important global historical continuity instead of any and all its dis- continuities. The perception of a major new departure in 1500, which allegedly spells a dis-continuous break in world history, is substantially [mis] informed by a Eurocentric vantage point. Once we abandon this Eurocentrism and adopt a more globally holistic world or even pan EurAsian perspective, dis-continuity is replaced by far more continuity. Or the other way around? Once we look upon the whole world more holistically, historical continuity looms much larger, especially in Asia. Indeed, the very "Rise of the West" itself then appears derived from this global historical continuity. East Asia's renewed rise to world economic prominence makes it all the more urgent to focus on the long historical continuity of which this process is a part. 3. GUNDER FRANK'S ALTERNATIVE SUMMARY EXPLANATION: A WORLD DEMOGRAPHIC/ ECONOMIC/ ECOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF THE DECLINE OF THE EAST AND THE RISE OF THE WEST My explanation has three related parts. A combination of demographic and micro-/macro-economic analysis identifies an inflection of population and economic productivity growth rates that led to an "exchange" of places between Asia and Europe in the world economy/system between 1750 and 1850. Microeconomic analysis of world-wide supply-and-demand relations and relative economic and ecological factor prices can show how they generated incentives for labor and capital saving and energy producing invention, investment and innovation, which took place in Europe. On the other hand, macroeconomic analysis of cyclical distribution of income and derivative effective demand and supply in Asia illuminate the opportunity to do so profitably in world economic terms. This sumamry eplanation of the related "Decline of the East" and "Rise of ther West" may be briefly elaborated as follows: The simple hypothesis is that technological innovations were a function of demand and supply and of relative factor prices of inputs like labor, capital, and land. Therefore it was primarily the higher wages and relatively abundant capital in Europe that eventually generated labor saving and energy producing technology. This argument may be challenged by the observation [eg. by Pomeranz 1997] that the "industrial revolution" was less labor "saving" than labor "extending" and that it increased the productivity of both labor and capital. Direct wage rates or costs may also have been as high [or even higher] in some parts of China, eg. in the Yangtze Valley and the South, though probably not anywhere in India, than in some parts of Europe, especially England. An unequal distribution of income generates luxury and import demand at the top and a large supply of cheap labor at the bottom. I contended that this was the case moreoso, and Pomeranz (1997) that it was not so, in China than in Europe, although we agree that it probably was more unequal than either in India. N9 But the problem of absolute, relative and world wide comparative wage costs - in entrepreneurial calculation as in our analysis of the same - is related also to local and regional problems of labor allocation. And there were some economic differences in labor allocation especially between agriculture and industry, which were related to some institutional differences. However, it is less clear to what extent these differences were underlying causes or of the observed allocation of labor or whether they were only different institutional mechanisms through which the labor allocation were organized. Particularly important differences were: A. Bonded labor in India (Pomeranz 1997). B. Women were tied to the village and their labor was restricted to agriculture and dopmestic industry, eg. spinning, in China (Goldstone 1996). C. Some industrial workers could still draw directly on some subsistence goods produced by women-village- agriculture in China but less so in England without having to aquire these through the market (Pomeranz 1997). D. Enclosures [to produce more cheaper wool for textiles on more land - "sheep ate men"] expulsed male and female labor from the land into urban un/employment in England [and elsewhere in Europe?]. The industrial "revolution" was initiated with cotton textiles, but these required both a growing "external" supply of cotton [for Europe - from its colonies] and a "world" market for all in which everybody had to compete [except China, which still had a growing and protected domestic and regional market]. The industrial "revolution" also required and took place in the supply and production of more and cheaper energy, especially through coal and its use in making and using machinery to generate steam power, first stationary and then also mobile. The critical role of coal and its replacement of wood as a source of fuel in Britain is demonstrated by Wrigley (1994). These sources of power technically and economically first required [and permitted] concentration of labor and capital in mining, transport, and production. Then they also permitted faster and cheaper long distance transport via steam powered railway and shipping. Investment in such "revolutionary" industrial power, equipment, organization and the labor necessary to make them work was undertaken wherever, but also only where, it was economically rational and possible to do so, in terms of (A) Labor allocation and cost alternatives; (B) Location and comparative costs of other productive inputs [eg. timber/coal/animal/human sources of power and transport,as well as raw materials like cotton and iron], which were related to the geographical location of these resources and to ecological changes in their availability; (C) capital availability and alternative profitable uses; and (D) Market penetration and potential. At the turn of the eighteenth-nineteenth centuries the above mentioned factors in world economic competitive and comparative circumstances, changes, and transformation generated the following results: - India continued but was threatened in its competitive dominance on the world textile market on the basis of cheap and also bonded skilled labor. Domestic supplies of cotton, food and other wage goods continued to be ample and cheap; and productive, trade and financial organization and transport remained relatively efficient despite suffering from increasing economic and political difficulties. However, supplies of alternative power and materials, eg. from coal and iron/steel, were relatively scarce and expensive. Therefore, Indians had little economically rational incentive to invest in innovations at this time. They were further impeded from doing so first by economic decline beginning already in the second quarter of the eighteenth century or earlier; then by the [resulting?] decline in population growth and British colonialism from the third quarter onwards; and finally from a combination of both decline and colonialism as well as "Drain" of capital from India to Britain. India switched from being a net exporter to being a net importer of cotton textiles in 1816. However India did continue to struggle on the textile market and began again to increase textile production - by then also in factories - and exports in the last third of the nineteenth century. - China still retained its world market dominance in ceramics, partially in silk and increasingly in tea, and remained substantially self-sufficient in textiles. China's balance of trade and payments surplus continued into the early nineteenth century. Therefore China had availability and concentration of capital from both domestic and foreign sources. However, China's natural deposits of coal were distant from its possible utilization for the generation and industrial use of power, so that progressive deforestation still did not make it economical to switch from wood to coal for fuel. Moreover, transport via inland canals and coastal shipping, as well as by road, remained efficient and cheap [but not from outlying coal deposits]. This economic efficiency and competitiveness of the Chinese on both domestic and world markets also rested on absolutely and comparatively cheap labor costs. Even if per-capita income was higher than elsewhere, as Bairoch notes, and its distribution was no more unequal than elsewhere [as Pomeranz and Goldstone claim], the wage good cost of production was low, both absolutely and relatively. Labor was abundant for agriculture and industry, and agricultural products were cheaply available also for industrial workers and therefore to their employers, who could pay their workers low subsistence wages. Goldstone (1996) emphasizes one reason: Women were tied to the villages and therefore remained available for [cheap] agricultural production. Pomeranz (1997) emphasizes a related reason: Urban industrial workers were still able to draw for part of their subsistence on "their" villages, which was produced cheaply in part by the women to whom Goldstone refers. In other words from an entrepreneurial industrial employer and market perspective, wage goods were absolutely and relative cheap; because agriculture produced them efficiently and cheaply also with female labor. The "institutional" distribution of cheap food to urban and other workers in industry, transport, trade and other services was functionally equivalent to what it would also have been if the functional distribution of income had been MORE unequal than it was. The availability of labor was high, its supply price low, its demand for consumer goods attenuated; and there was little incentive to invest in labor saving or alternative energy using production or transport. Elvin (1973) sought to summarize such circumstances in his "equilibrium trap." Even so, China still remained competitive on the world market and maintained its export surplus. Emperor Ch'ien Lung said in his 1793 message to King George III of England "I set no value on objects strange and ingenious and have no use for your country's manufactures" (Schurman and Schell 1967, I:108-109). - Western Europe and particularly Britain were hard put to compete especially with India and China. Europe was still dependent on India for cotton textiles and on China for ceramics and silks that Europe re-exported and from which it profited in its [economic and/or political] colonies in Africa and the Americas. Moreover, Europe remained dependent on its colonies for most of the money it needed to pay for these imports, both for re-export and for its own consumption and other use, eg, as inputs for its own production and export. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, there was a decline in the marginal if not also the absolute inflow of precious metals and other profits through the slave trade and plantations from the European colonies in Africa and the Americas. To recoup and even to maintain - never mind to increase - its [world and even domestic] market share Europeans collectively and its entrepreneurs individually had to attempt to increase their penetration of at least some markets, and to do so either by eliminating competition politically/militarily or by undercutting it by lowering its own costs of production, or both. Opportunity to do so knocked when the "Decline" began in India and West Asia, if not yet in China. Wage and other costs of production and transport were still uncompetitively high in Britain and elsewhere in Europe. However especially after 1750, rising incomes and declining mortality rates sharply increased the rate and amount of population growth. Moreover, the displacement of surplus labor from agriculture increased its potential supply to industry. At the same time, the imposition of British colonialism on India reversed the perennial capital outflow to India and turned it into "The Drain" from India and into Britain. Moreover, a combination of commercial and colonial measures would permit the import of much more raw cotton to Britain and Western Europe. Deforestation and ever scarcer supplies of wood and charcoal and rendered these more expensive. At the same time since the second third of the eighteenth century, first relative and then absolute declines in the cost of coal made the replacement of charcoal [and peat] by hard coal increasingly economical and then common in Britain. The Kondratieff B phase in the last third of the eighteenth century generated technological inventions and improvements in textile manufacturing and steam engines [first to pump water out of coal pits and then also to supply motive power to the textile industry]. At the turn of the eighteenth-nineteenth centuries, the "first" A phase [identified by Kondratieff] and the Napoleonic wars generated increased investment in and the expansion of these new productive facilities and then also of transport equipment. Ever more of the available but still relatively high cost labor force was incorporated into the "factory system." Production increased rapidly; real wages and income declined; and "the workshop of the world" conquered ever more foreign markets through "free trade." Yet even then, British colonialism had to prohibit free trade to India and recurred to the export of its opium to force an "Open Door" into China. - Most other parts of the world still fall through the cracks of our world economic analysis. Yet in brief, we can observe that most of Africa may have had labor/land ratios at least as favorable to labor saving investment as Europe. However Africa did not have an analogous resource base [except the still undeveloped one in Southern Africa], and far from having a capital inflow, Africa suffered from capital outflow. The same was true of the Caribbean. Latin America had resources and labor, but also suffered from colonial and neo-colonial capital outflow as well as specialization in raw materials exports, while its domestic markets were captured by European exports. West, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia became increasingly captive markets for if not also colonies of Europe and its industry, to which they supplied the raw materials that they had previously themselves processed for domestic consumption and export. In the nineteenth century, only the European "settler colonies" in North America, Australasia, Argentina, and Southern Africa were able to find other places in the international division of labor, and China and Japan were able to continue offering significant resistance. In short, changing world demographic/ economic/ ecological circumstances suddenly - and for most people including Adam Smith unexpectedly - made a number of related investments economically rational and profitable: in machinery and processes that saved labor input per unit of output, thus increasing the productivity and use of labor and its total output; increasing productive power generation; and increasingly productive employment and productivity of capital. This transformation of the productive process was initially concentrated in selected industrial, agricultural, and service sectors in those parts of the world economy whose comparative competitive POSITION made -- and then continually re-made -- such Newly Industrializing Economies [NIE] import substituting and export promoting measures economically rational and politically possible. Thus, this transformation was and continues to be only a temporally localized and still shifting manifestation of a WORLD economic process, even if it is not spread uniformly around the world -- as historically nothing ever has been and still is not likely. But that is another - later - story, which will lead to the Re-emergence of East Asia in the world economy today. --------------FA672B40FB67FB75C2760F9F-- From chriscd@jhu.edu Mon May 18 08:38:32 1998 Date: Mon, 18 May 1998 10:39:38 -0400 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: Dialogue: Frank, Landes et al #6 (2 messages)] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu This is a multi-part message in MIME format. 17 May 1998 08:17:35 -0500 (EST) Date: Sun, 17 May 1998 07:24:35 -0500 From: manning@neu.edu (Patrick Manning) Subject: Dialogue: Frank, Landes et al #6 (2 messages) To: H-WORLD@h-net.msu.edu Joshua Rosembloom ****************************************** H-WORLD editor's note: This is the sixth in the series of postings containing the dialogue of Gunder Frank, David Landes and others on global economic history. It includes two messages posted to H-WORLD on May 16. PM ****************************************** (1). Originally posted on H-WORLD From: Jim Blaut, University of Illinois - Chicago <70671.2032@compuserve.com Herewith a brief response to two of Brad DeLong's thoughtful, quizzical comments. (1) "[As] Alan Taylor eloquently pointed out, to reduce the European Miracle from a ten-century to a two-century affair makes understanding and accounting for it much, much harder..." I don't think that anyone, and certainly not Gunder Frank, is arguing that you don't have to look for pre-18th-century csauses for 18th-century effects. The problem is: how far back do you have to go? Frank and I argue that you don't have to go back before the 16tth century, because the rise of Europe relative to other civilizations was kicked off initially by the inflow of silver (etc.) from the Americas after 1492. Landes, Jones, & Co. of course argue otherwise. They find saome unique European genius (mentality, culture) in Europe 1000 years ago (Landes, Lynn White, MacFarlane, Weber, et al.) or 5000 years ago (Jones, Mann, Hall, Wittfogel, et al.), something, or some things, that propelled Europe and only Europe forward toward later modernization. This, of course, is the conventional position. I think it has in it a large dose of Eurocentric folklore. For every trait in ancient or medieval Europe that seems to be part of the explanation for Europe's later rise (relative to other civilizations), I think you find either that (1) the trait was also present in non-Europe, or (2) the trait was not really all that progressive, or all that pregnant with implications for later progress, or (3) the trait could be balanced off against some trait of non-Europe which was equally pregnant with implications for later development. The problem here is what I call "tunnel history." You know that Europe in later times had some undeniable superiority or priority. You search for the causes of that superior or prior fact *only* in prior European facts, neglecting the rest of the world. (2) "Where are the self-governing cities of Asia?" There were self-governing cities, city-states or small kingdoms dominated by a single city, along all the coasts of the Indian Ocean from Sofala and Kilwa around to Malacca and beyond. There were many port cities lying within large empires but enjoying essenmtially complete autonomy in matters relating to the economy. I think the Weberian idea that European cities were somehow uniquely "free" is folklore: everything European was endowed with freedom, everything Asian was unfree, oppressed by Oriental despotism. A similar argument applies to the now-conventional idea that the political fragmentation of medieval Europe allowed for economic development in ways not possible ("blocked") elsewhere by "empire." Note first that the older conventional view held quite the opposite to be the case: the fragmentation of feudal societies was altogether bad, and had to be replaced by central governments before modernization was possible. The newer pro-fragmentation theory seems to me to be more of the Oriental despotism mythology. Empires like China did not fundamentally suppress economic activity in local regions and cities (see Bob Marks' post on his work on South China). Indian Ocean port cities under the Mughals were allowed, even in some ways encouraged, to operate as autonomous economic entities. Centralized polities indeed had specific advantages: a large area serving as labor shed and market (this argument anticipates the modern theory of the "national economy"), a potential for the diffusion of technology uninhibited by political and migration barriers. Etcetera. There is the view that smaller polities somehow mean more individualism. I think this is romantic nonsense. Was a baron more democratic than a king in Magna Carta times? What about all those medieval tolls between markets? My guess is that markets were freer under empires, ceteris paribus, than under fragmented feudal semi-polities. Respectfully submitted, Jim Blaut ************************************************************************* (2). Originally posted on H-WORLD From: Brad DeLong, University of California - Berkeley delong@econ.berkeley.edu (Responding to Andre Gunder Frank, May 16): >Thank You One and All for your interest, attention, consideration and >patience with me. A family medical emergency is the real reason and David >Landes' absence the official excuse for the tardiness of this my first >general response and the delay till still later of my detailed reply. I hope that everyone involved is better--or at least recovering. >I fully agree with Taylor and others that circa 1800 represents a >disjuncture, and that it remains to be explained by me and others. I find myself worried that we might be about to fall into what I think of as the Rostow strap. A generation ago W.W. Rostow knew that the industrial revolution was important, and concluded that it must have shown itself in a rapid jump in economy-wide productivity levels and rates of economic growth. It didn't. Even large structural changes in a small sector have--initially--little effect on economy-wide averages. Today I think that we are in danger of making that mistake in reverse: just because we can see no large productivity differentials at the level of the economy as a whole between, say, southern France and Lingnan (:-) I'm learning) in the eighteenth century doesn't mean that the differences in technology, economic structure, ideology, politics, and culture weren't important... >Under title 3 below, I then append MY OWN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION as a >somewhat longer but still excessively short summary extract from my book >ReORIENT. Of course, that is intended as a challenge to others to join in >to the still outstanding task of constructing a holistic real world or >really holistic global/world embracing explanation, in which Ken Pomeranz >is also engaged, but alas David Landes is not [yet?]. I think that David Landes's treatment of non-European Eurasia and North Africa is probably wrong in two different dimensions, but let me concentrate only on the first. The first is Landes's belief that climate near the equator somehow militates against first commercial development and second industrialization. The second is his overly-static picture of the agrarian civilizations of temperate-zone Asia. Landes wants to argue that because tropical climates are hot and disease-ridden, that human productivity there is low, hence no civilization can ever amass the surplus above biological subsistence necessary to set out on the road that eventually leads to industrialization. The problem is that Landes is also a follower of the tradition of M.M. Postan (as am I) --that before the industrial revolution it is probably informative and insightful to try to analyze human civilizations from the perspective of ecologico-cultural equilibrium. When living standards are relatively high, birth rates are high and death rates are low; when living standards are relatively low birth rates are low and death rates are high (or, rather, variable). This means that if technological progress is sufficiently slow (and before the industrial revolution it was "sufficiently slow" always and everywhere), then a civilization's population density will within several generations adjust itself to resources and technologies in such a way that keeps living standards oscillating around the civilization's set-point of rough population balance. Thus in the long-run of a century or so, a civilization's living standards are determined not by its summer temperature or by the prevalence of pinworms, but by its ecological and cultural practices that determine its set-point. A civilization like northwest Europe can have a relatively high set-point if culture delays marriage until the male member of the couple has a farm or a secure place. A civilization like that of the Yangtse delta as described by Ken Pomeranz can have a relatively high set-point if heads of lineage restrict their younger siblings fertility . A civilization like that of Poland can have a relatively low set-point if the second serfdom turns large proportions of the population into landless laborers with no incentive to delay nuptuality or diminish fertility. A civilization like that of the Yellow River valley can have a relatively low set-point if senior members' control over lineage juniors breaks down. As a result, I think that Landes's argument that regions near the equator were always extremely unlikely places for commercial and industrial revolutions is deeply flawed. Hot summers and the consequent difficulty of hard summer work might keep Ceylon from having the pre-industrial population density of the Rhine delta (or the Yangtse delta), but I don't think that they have any implications for pre-industrial average living standards. If you wanted to rescue Landes's argument about climate, I think you would have to identify a line of causation running from location near the equator to some particular set of ecologico-cultural practices that leads to a relatively low living-standard set-point... >- Western Europe and particularly Britain were hard put to compete >especially with India and China. Europe was still dependent on India for >cotton textiles and on China for ceramics and silks that Europe re-exported >and from which it profited in its [economic and/or political] colonies in >Africa and the Americas. Moreover, Europe remained dependent on its >colonies for most of the money it needed to pay for these imports, both for >re-export and for its own consumption and other use, eg, as inputs for its >own production and export. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth >centuries, there was a decline in the marginal if not also the absolute >inflow of precious metals and other profits through the slave trade and >plantations from the European colonies in Africa and the Americas. To >recoup and even to maintain - never mind to increase - its [world and even >domestic] market share Europeans collectively and its entrepreneurs >individually had to attempt to increase their penetration of at least some >markets, and to do so either by eliminating competition >politically/militarily or by undercutting it by lowering its own costs of >production, or both. I have often wondered whether late seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth century European perceptions that labor was cheap in the Orient might not have been consequences of American silver and the price revolution: wages were low in the Orient, but subsistence was cheap as well. Large nominal wage differentials (large enough to make China and India super-competitive with Europe as producers of cotton textiles, ceramics, and silks) are perfectly consistent with relatively equal real wages and living standards, with a higher nominal price level in Europe, and with a consequent flood of specie out of Europe to Asia. (And, later, a flood of EOC opium out of India to China.) >In short, changing world demographic/ economic/ ecological circumstances >suddenly - and for most people including Adam Smith unexpectedly - made a >number of related investments economically rational and profitable: in >machinery and processes that saved labor input per unit of output, thus >increasing the productivity and use of labor and its total output; >increasing productive power generation; and increasingly productive >employment and productivity of capital. This transformation of the >productive process was initially concentrated in selected industrial, >agricultural, and service sectors in those parts of the world economy whose >comparative competitive POSITION made -- and then continually re-made -- >such Newly Industrializing Economies [NIE] import substituting and export >promoting measures economically rational and politically possible. A point for Gunder Frank is the failure of the industrial revolution to take root first in the Netherlands. It seems as though the Dutch had better--more productive and more value-adding--things to do than to monkey with steam engines and put workers who could be adding lots of value on the Amsterdam docks to work watching early spinning machines. Or so I read Jan de Vries and Adrian van der Woude's [? the book is in the office] argument in their _The First Modern Economy_. Brad DeLong From chriscd@jhu.edu Mon May 18 08:43:24 1998 Date: Mon, 18 May 1998 10:44:37 -0400 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: Dialogue: Frank, Landes et at # 7] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------B80BAF6AD3203EFE98923FCB --------------B80BAF6AD3203EFE98923FCB 18 May 1998 08:03:48 -0500 (EST) Date: Mon, 18 May 1998 07:10:50 -0500 From: manning@neu.edu (Patrick Manning) Subject: Dialogue: Frank, Landes et at # 7 To: H-WORLD@h-net.msu.edu Joshua Rosembloom ******************************************* H-WORLD editor's note: This is the seventh in the series of postings containing the dialogue of Gunder Frank, David Landes and others on global economic history. It includes two messages submitted to H-WORLD on May 17, and distributed with this posting on May 18. PM ******************************************* (1). Originally submitted to H-WORLD, first posted here. From: Mark Jones jones_m@netcomuk.co.uk (Responding to Brad DeLong, May 17). > The problem is that Landes is also a follower of the tradition of M.M. > Postan (as am I) --that before the industrial revolution it is probably > informative and insightful to try to analyze human civilizations from the > perspective of ecologico-cultural equilibrium. When living standards are > relatively high, birth rates are high and death rates are low; when living > standards are relatively low birth rates are low and death rates are high > (or, rather, variable). The evidence for this is partial and there are counterfactuals. The booming West European population 1750-1800 was generally and often accompanied by depressed living standards, hunger and civil unrest. Equally, there is no single 50-year period in the previous 500 years where population swings in Europe and Asia cannot be more easily acsribed to the obvious effects of war, plague, adverse or positive climate fluctuations. In general, there has been no eco-equilibrium in human settled populations during the present Interglacial, ie, the agrarian period. The entire period has been characterised by secular growth trends in population and productivity. So what is the evidence for the existence of 'set-points' which in any case are moving targets? So the qualitative change which the IR represents was only an inflection in a long-term underlying trend; and it's too early in any case to argue that we've escaped the Malthusian trap :). The argument for the effects of American silver and the European price revolution, in altering the balance of input and especially labour costs between Europe and Asia is more compelling. The real catalyst of change however was the mobilisation of fossil fuels, which also of course explains why Britain and Belgian has an IR and the Dutch didn't. Belgium and Britain had coal. Holland did not. Mark Jones ************************************************************************* (2). Originally submitted to H-WORLD, first posted here. From: Ken Pomeranz, University of California - Irvine klpomera@uci.edu I've been trying to keep up with the Landes/Frank discussion while (like most of us) doing 15 other things, and so have kept postponing joining in; but now I can't help myself. I write from a serious disadvantage, not yet having read Landes, but much of the discussion seems to stand on its own. First, I think Frank's work, my own work and that of various others whom Jack Goldstone calls the "California school" does make it seem very likely that the "great divergence" is a post-1750 phenomenon, perhaps even a post 1800 one; at least I think the burden of proof would now lie with those who think it came earlier. It may well be, as Alan Taylor suggests, that this shorter time frame makes the "European miracle" harder to explain than if we saw it slowly emerging since 1000, but so be it; I think it is the task we have nonetheless. Greg Clark asks how we can explain the huge size of the gap circa 1900 if it had only been growing for 150 years or so. Various possibilities come to mind, including 1)that the higher estimates of British growth during the "Industrial Revolution" may turn out to be not far off after all; and 2)that not only was Britain/Europe growing rapidly during the 19th century, but China -- or at least many parts of it -- were actually going through a pretty significant decline. Most of my estimates of per capita consumption ca. 1750 in China are in fact, considerably higher than ca. 1900, and in at least one important area -- cotton cloth -- I think a good case can be made for almost no change in absolute levels of output, or even a slight decline, over a period in which population doubled.Nor do we lack for explanations of such a decline in 19th century China. There was a serious breakdown in government, at least in mid-century, with massive civil wars, and serious decay of some important public infrastructure (especially, though not exclusively for water control). Opium, still a fairly trivial problem in 1750, became an astonishingly widespread problem during the 19th century. Estimates of the amount of opium produced and imported ca. 1900 might have been enough to supply as many as 40,000,000 addicts. Third, and seemingly independently, there seems to have been a breakdown in some regions (though not all) of the micro-level social structures that in other Chinese times and places were central to the operation of preventive checks on population, leading to very rapid, ecologically disastrous population growth in these regions (especially North China) -- and to a contraction of the crucial streams of cheap primary products (rice, timber, raw cotton) that these regions had previously exported to china's richest areas. Moreover, as the population of these poorer regions grew much faster than that in wealthier regions, they further depressed Chinese averages. None of this, however, changes the fact that Europe (or at least Northwestern Europe) underwent an astonishing growth spurt in this period, which we still need to explain. If we define "institutions" broadly enough, then an explanation of this spurt in terms of "superior institutions" becomes almost tautological: the only alternative to it would be to say it was all a matter of luck or (which amounts to the same thing) Europeans riding the wave of developments that were really centered elsewhere. And while I do think global processes deserve more attention than they usually get, they aren't the whole story. But if "superior institutions" is to be a meaningful answer, it needs to be broken down considerably. What were European institutions better for? Reducing transactions costs? Encouraging technological innovation? Plundering others? Developing human capital? We need some ways of assessing these possibilities, assessing the impact of "superiority" in each area in which it might have existed, and assessing the impact of those things that do fall outside the bounds of even a broad definition of institutions (e.g. resource endowments). When it comes to lowering transaction costs, I'm dubious about overall European superiority before the breakdown of public order in mid-19th century China. Chinese land markets were remarkably active and in many ways less restricted than those in Europe; a similar case could also be made for labor markets, and for at least some product markets (both the degree of price integration and the scale of product flows in china's long-distance grain trade, for instance, would compare quite well with anything int he Atlantic world before It is however, probably important that a lot of European inferiorities in these areas get erased at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century, as guilds, common land, etc., were vastly reduced by French Revolutionary and Napoleonic-era reforms on much of the continent. And as these deficits disappeared, one area in which European institutions probably were much better at keeping transaction costs down -- namely financial markets-- became much more important. As technological and other changes created various economic sectors in which firms needed large sums of relatively patient capital, which exceeded the capital-raising abilities of families and other sorts of personal networks(first, perhaps in railroads, then in a whole set of industries affected by Chandler's managerial revolution) institutions like the corporation became quite important. Previously this institutional form, however clever, had been of limited importance for anything besides extra-continental trade and colonization. And the sophistication of European public finance -- which had exceeded that of China (though I'm not so sure about India) for quite a while, became much more significant as states a)began to do more things that could be beneficial to the economy, rather than spending almost all the money they raise don war-making and b)extended their war-making (with the aid of new weapons) to continental Asia, making China's relative weakness in public finance far more important than it had been when the Empire's only serious external rivals ( various steppe and NE Asian tribal groups) had been people who had still less of a system for drawing on future state revenues. Add together European catch-up in areas where it had been behind, the expanded importance of one area where it had long been ahead, and the spectacular if temporary collapse of public order in mid-19th century China and one can see a significant role for "institutional superiority" in lowering transaction costs during "the great divergence" without having to posit that this superiority came from a gap that had long been growing. The question of promoting technological change (in part by encouraging science) seems like the best case for a slowly maturing Western European advantage -- Margaret Jacob's work on the culture of science in Britain, for instance, makes a lot of sense to me. But even here, we are talking about a post-1500 development, not a post-1000 one. Moreover, it's relationship to the Industrial Revolution (at least in its early stages) remains, I think, pretty controversial -- certainly there were people using Newtonian mechanics to calculate how much power they'd get out of a new water wheel, but there were also a lot of crucial advances that seem to have been fairly distant from science. Moreover, we should remember that Europe was not ahead in all important areas, even as late as 1800 -- and that which technological advantages turned out to be crucial and which relatively unimportant depended on a lot of things. Thus, Europe remained relatively backward in agricultural yields per acre even in 1800 (though the potato was helping it close some of that gap) -- and that particular bit of backwardness might have mattered a lot more had it not been for the existence of a)parts of Europe, which, thanks to rather rigid institutions, had not participated nearly as much in the post 1450 expansion (either in output or in population growth) as the most advanced parts of Europe, or many parts of China, and thus still had relatively large amounts of land per capita (something Frank emphasizes as a European "advantage of backwardness) and b)had Europe also not had, due to a combination of skills, luck (especially in the form of epidemics) and ruthlessness, the Americas as a place to which to send 50,000,000 people over the next century, and from which to export staggering quantities of primary products (something which I have contrasted with the very different relationships between China's most advanced regions and its peripheries, most of which were rapidly filling up by the late 18th/early 19th century). And for all that European technology advanced a long a broad front in this period, I wonder how much many of these clever innovations would have mattered had it not been for the fundamental coal/steam engine breakthrough in Britain -- one which took plenty of knowledge to be sure (though it should be noted that both the Chinese and the Indians, and probably others, had all the basic science you needed for a steam engine), but also depended, as I have argued elsewhere, on the fortunate location of large coal deposits near the crucial market and artisanal center of London (which both enabled and encouraged the very inefficient and awkward first steam engines, useful only for pumping out mines,into something vastly more important). By contrast, virtually all of China's coal was hundreds of land-locked miles from the markets and artisanal talents of the Lower Yangzi, Lingnan, and Southeast Coast. Moreover, the problem in these mines was not water that needed to be pumped out, but, on the contrary, such severe aridity that explosions were happening all the time. So while there were limited incentives to try shake Chinese coal mining (by this time a rather backward sector) out of its torpor, the Chinese instead dealt with fuel shortages through the diffusion of extremely efficient stoves, a very far-flung timber trade, the use of crop residues (and finding ways of preventing that diversion of residues from impoverishing the soil) and so on -- all quite clever, too, but not part of a path that would lead either to the fundamental break with dependence on annual flows of solar energy that England's fossil fuel breakthrough represented, or the tremendous iron/steel boom, or the clever idea of putting the steam engine on a set of tracks to solve transport problems, etc. The point is not that Europe was "just lucky," by any means, but that a lot of things are involved in determining which technological advantages/disadvantages opened a world of self-sustaining growth (or foreclosed it) and which led to incremental improvements (or the lack of them) but no great transformation. In this regard, I'm somewhat dubious of Landes' apparent stress (I'm still getting his argument second hand, so I may be being unfair) on clocks and spectacles. It's true, Europeans were the world's leaders in both these areas (as far as I know) by the 18th century, but Chinese made remarkably good copies of both (see Needham, for instance, on the very high quality of cuckoo clocks based on European models but made in places like Suzhou and Hangzhou --if the point is that the skills developed in making these gadgets developed a reservoir of skills in making complex gear systems, etc., which had broader application, the extremely elaborate jackwork of these gadgets should establish that this was no European monopoly.) Assertions of blanket technological superiority still seem shaky to me, even near the end of the 18th century: and when we try to figure out which kinds of technological superiority mattered, we get a series of path-dependent stories in which scientific knowledge and artisanal cleverness per se often don't seem to me the most important factors. As far as having institutions for developing human capital, is concerned, it seems to me one would have to grant a Western European and North American advantage by sometime in the mid-19th century, with the spread of public education and so on. But at least so far, I don't see strong evidence of a clear advantage that kicks in early enough to explain the beginnings of the great divergence. Finally, we get to exploiting other parts of the world, at which Europeans clearly did excel. Clearly, this story cannot be reduced to "Europeans were nastier, or better at being nasty," and I don't think people who point to this factor generally mean to do so: effectively exploiting the new World in particular involved navigational skills, joint-stock companies, etc., along with plenty of violence, good luck with geography and germs, and a peculiar political economy (a bunch of relatively equal states almost constantly at war with each other) which quite likely did more harm than good within Europe's own boundaries, but created big benefits for Europe insofar as it encouraged overseas expansion. (Not to mention the irony that the buoyancy of Chinese silver demand had much to do with keeping the price high enough to make the first couple of centuries of European presence in the New World sustainable in the first place: take away that demand, as Dennis Flynn and others have shown, and the slide in silver's value would have been so rapid in the 16th century that Spanish administration in the New world would have become a money loser within a few decades.) Again, the point is not to "bash Europe" and say that the post-1750 miracle can be reduced to luck and ruthlessness, or that it can be explained entirely based on post-1750 developments: I would certainly agree with Brad DeLong that we don't want to make the "Rostow error" of thinking that just because we can't see big divergences until the last couple hundred years there weren't some pretty important differences that go back further. The point is, I think, that those differences cut both ways, so that only at the very end does it become clear that one place is headed for something much better than the other; indeed what might have seemed like advantages at one point (e.g the more or less free land and labor markets in china's hinterlands, as opposed to the many growth-slowing institutions in much of continental Europe) could be disadvantages later. Moreover, this eventual result depends on complex interactions involving many factors that neither Europeans nor Chinese could have predicted or controlled. So by all means, let's look for stories that place the 19th century in the context of much longer regional trajectories,as Landes does -- but we also have to look at how non-linear those trajectories were, at their similarities as well as their differences, and at the effects of their interactions. ************************************************************************** --------------B80BAF6AD3203EFE98923FCB-- From kpmoseley@juno.com Mon May 18 21:37:01 1998 From: kpmoseley@juno.com To: chriscd@jhu.edu Date: Mon, 18 May 1998 22:48:22 -0700 Subject: Re: [Fwd: Dialogue: Frank, Landes et al #4 (10 messages)] X-Juno-Line-Breaks: 0-2 Thanks for forwarding this interesting material. I am embarassed to have to ask, but what association is the SSHA? Thanks - kpm _____________________________________________________________________ You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail. Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com Or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866] From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Tue May 19 07:33:44 1998 Tue, 19 May 1998 09:32:20 -0400 (EDT) Date: Tue, 19 May 1998 09:32:20 -0400 (EDT) From: Gunder Frank To: kpmoseley@juno.com Subject: Re: [Fwd: Dialogue: Frank, Landes et al #4 (10 messages)] In-Reply-To: <19980518.233637.6982.0.kpmoseley@juno.com> Social Science History Association, and Tom Hall is a stalwart. g/On Mon, 18 May 1998 kpmoseley@juno.com wrote: > Date: Mon, 18 May 1998 22:48:22 -0700 > From: kpmoseley@juno.com > To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK > Subject: Re: [Fwd: Dialogue: Frank, Landes et al #4 (10 messages)] > > Thanks for forwarding this interesting material. > I am embarassed to have to ask, but what association is the SSHA? > Thanks - kpm > > _____________________________________________________________________ > You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail. > Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com > Or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866] > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Andre Gunder Frank University of Toronto 96 Asquith Ave Tel. 1 416 972-0616 Toronto, ON Fax. 1 416 972-0071 CANADA M4W 1J8 Email agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca My home Page is at: http://www.whc.neu.edu/whc/resrch&curric/gunder.html ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From OWENJACK@FS.isu.edu Tue May 19 10:14:55 1998 From: "J B Owens" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Tue, 19 May 1998 10:21:10 -0600, MDT Subject: IEHA Seville Congress- cancellation I forward the following. Please send it on to other relevant lists. Jack Owens, Idaho State University ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date: Tue, 19 May 1998 10:00:16 METDST From: INAKI LOPEZ MARTIN (HEC) To: ESPORA-L@raven.cc.ukans.edu [Spanish & Portuguese History List] Subject: Important! Dear members of ESPORA. I got this e-mail this morning. IEHA Congress in Seville Canceled. I hope it may help. ******************************************************************* TO ALL THOSE INTERESTED IN THE XII INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC HISTORY CONGRESS It is with the deepest regret that I must let you know that, due to causes outside our control, we have been unable to reach an agreement enabling us to achieve the material organization of the Seville Congress. (Its scientific organization, i.e., the edition of the Proceedings, is nearly finished, however). Due to this inability we have been obliged to suspend the actual meetings of the XII International Economic History Congress. I recommend that you ask immediately for the reimbursement of the money that is owed you. Since we do not know the amounts you advanced for registration dues and other concepts, you should immediately communicate (we suggest fax, e-mail or telephone for speed) with the company PROMOCION DE CONGRESOS EN EL SUR S.A. (Proconsur) and ask them for immediate reimbursement of the total amount deposited. You could send your request either to the General Manager (Mr. Pablo Recio) or to the President (Prof. Dr. Guillermo Sierra). In case you do not have it, the address of Promocion de Congresos en el Sur S.A is as follows: Promocion de Congresos en el Sur, S.A. Av. San Francisco Javier 15, 4a Planta 41018 Seville, Spain. Tel.: 345-492 2755; Fax: 345-492 3015; e-mail: You may let them know the bank account to which the transfer should be made and/or any other pertinent details. I also request that you send a copy of your claim and copies of your order forms to me at the FUNDACION DE HISTORIA ECONOMICA, Amado Nervo 5 2A, 28007 Madrid (Tel. and fax: 341-502 0268; e-mail: ), since Promocion de Congresos en el Sur S.A. has not seen it fit to provide me with this information. If you know of any other people who may have registered in the XII Congress I suggest that you let her/him know about the present letter. Thank you for your cooperation and understanding. Sincerely, Gabriel Tortella President, International Economic History Association --------------------------------------------------- | Inaki Lopez Martin | | Researcher Dept. History & Civilisation | | European University Institute | | Via dei Roccettini 9 | | Florence (Italy) | | | | e-mail: imartin@datacomm.iue.it | | imartin@iuecalc.iue.it | | | | My HOMEPAGE http:// | www.ukans.edu/carrie/ms_room/martin_coll/contents.htm | | | News... Current address (See below) | /) (\ ___________ IN BELGIUM | ****************************************************************************** Inaki Lopez Martin Visiting Researcher Dept. Geschiedenis Faculteit Letteren Katholieke Unversiteit van Leuven Blijde-Inkomststraat 21 B-3000 Leuven (Belgium) e-mail: imartin@onyx.arts.kuleuven.ac.be Phone (office): (0)16 324992 ****************************************************************************** FORWARDED BY: ******************************************************** J. B. "Jack" Owens, Professor of History Project Coordinator, Computer-Mediated Distance Learning Idaho State University, Pocatello, ID 83209 USA e-mail: owenjack@isu.edu www: http://www.isu.edu/~owenjack fax: 208-236-4267 ******************************************************** From austria@it.com.pl Wed May 20 03:21:30 1998 Wed, 20 May 1998 11:18:24 +0200 (MET DST) Wed, 20 May 1998 11:18:01 +0200 (MET DST) Reply-To: From: "Austrian Embassy" To: , , , , Subject: now available for class-room use/publication from members Date: Wed, 20 May 1998 11:24:30 +0200 Arno Tausch Schwierige Heimkehr. Sozialpolitik, Migration, Transformation und die Osterweiterung der EU ISBN 3-9266777-52-4 Eberhard-Verlag Muenchen/Munich Holzstrasse 13 D-80469 Munich Germany From gernot.kohler@sheridanc.on.ca Wed May 20 10:01:39 1998 Date: Wed, 20 May 1998 12:01:36 -0400 (EDT) To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: Gernot Kohler Subject: anatomy of a praxeology (Mandel) ....some thoughts on praxeology...The praxeology of: Ernest Mandel, The Second Slump (1978) is presented in "The Workers' Movement and the Crisis" (chapter 5, section 3, p. 192-208). Mandel subdivides the future into three time zones (stages), namely: Zone 3 (distant future) -- "a democratic, self-managed, and planned socialist society based on the power of workers' councils" (p. 208; this corresponds to the stage of "communism" of some Marxist texts); Zone 2 (middle-range future) -- "transitional demands ... expropriation of all companies that close down or lay off masses of workers ...; nationalization .... of all credit institutions, key industries, and monopolies ... ", etc. (p. 207; this corresponds to the stage of "socialism" of some Marxist texts); Zone 1 (the present and the near future) -- "defensive fight for immediate demands" (p. 206). Here he lists the following targets (written in 1970's Europe): (1) "35-36 hour week"; (2) "a sliding scale of wages" [not clear to me what he means]; (3) "defense of the right to strike and the freedom to negotiate wages"; (4) "solidarity with the hardest hit sectors -- immigrant workers, women, youth, old people, the unemployed" ... "such are the prime imperatives of this essentially defensive struggle" (p. 206). The vision for future Zone 3 and future Zone 2 is radical, while the demands for the present Zone 1 are fairly pragmatic and could have been taken from a newsletter of a Canadian labour union in 1998 or an economic statement of the Canadian Roman Catholic church. From a left-Keynesian point of view, the long-term goal (utopia) of a democratic and just world which serves the people sounds just fine. (Why bicker about the special feature of "workers' councils"; it's utopia.) However, how to get there (transition) is a mighty problem. Instead of ubiquitous nationalization (Mandel), Keynesians try to sell "government intervention" of various kinds. From a globocentric point of view, Mandel's praxeology appears remarkably eurocentric. Most importantly, one cannot postulate the existence of workers' solidarity around the world. What is the commonality of material interests between a Swiss worker ($40,000 per year?), a Thai sweatshop worker ($1,000 per year?), a Mozambiquan subsistance farmer ($0 per year?) and the academic proletariat of the world (unemployed?)? It seems that commonality of interests does not simply exist (as Mandel seems to imply) but is, if anything, a "constructed reality". If this is so, then "solidarity" is a goal rather than a premise of action; and one of the tasks of WS praxeology would appear to be to figure out -- not how to use (existing) solidarity, but how to bring about (create) solidarity on a global scale. Comments? -gk From p34d3611@jhu.edu Wed May 20 19:57:38 1998 by jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (950413.SGI.8.6.12/950213.SGI.AUTOCF) Date: Wed, 20 May 1998 21:57:13 -0400 (EDT) From: Peter Grimes Subject: INDONESIA To: WSN Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 07:38:04 -0400 From: Barbara Larcom To: Peter Grimes , Denis Nikitin , Frida Berrigan , Howard Ehrlich , Leslie Bilchick Subject: [Fwd: Anti-IMF testimony from Indonesia] [ Part 2: "Included Message" ] Date: Thu, 14 May 1998 21:08:46 -0400 From: 50 Years List Server <75721.1264@COMPUSERVE.COM> To: 50 Years National List Serv <50-Years@igc.org> Subject: Anti-IMF testimony from Indonesia Aryati is a pseudonym for an Indonesian human rights activist/researcher. She testified before the House human rights panel along with Pius Lustrilanang, Constancio Pinto, and Jaffar Siddiq Hamzah on May 7, 1998. This testimony has some very strong critique of the IMF bailout and "debt" in the second half. ------------------------------------------------------------------- Testimony of Aryati, May 7, 1998 At a Hearing of the Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights - United States House of Representatives I come to speak to you here today with some trepidation. Indonesia is not a free country where one can express criticisms of the government without worry about the possible consequences upon one's safety. I have no guarantees of protection: I am not a prominent leader of a mass organization, nor a member of the elite who has high connections. I am an Indonesian from a middle class background who is scared about telling you my honest opinions. I take this risk because I feel compelled to. I am one of the youths of my country who will have to bear, for many years into the future, the burden of what mistakes and crimes the government is committing today. I take this risk also in the hope that the U.S. government, so long a staunch and powerful supporter of Suharto's militarism, will reform itself and do something to ensure that Indonesia does have a government that respects and guarantees basic civil liberties, such as the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, and the freedom of association. Military To understand the Suharto government you have to understand the Indonesian military. We have been living under what is an institutionalized martial law regime for the past thirty three years. It is no ordinary military. It has what is officially called a "dual function": external defense and internal policing. Imagine for a moment that the US military had overthrown the US government by staging a coup and orchestrating the slaughter of about 500,000 people. Imagine the military then set up headquarters in each state, each county, each city and each town. Imagine that it placed one third to one half of the US military's troops in these headquarters. Imagine that there were no laws governing their actions nor any legislative oversight. Imagine further that the civilian administration was constantly monitored and controlled by the military and that many of the civilian administrators were themselves military officers. If you can imagine this scenario then you have a pretty good idea of how the Indonesian military operates. It is ubiquitous, all-pervasive, and beyond the law. When the US military speaks about training Indonesian military officers to respect human rights, we can only laugh. The structure of the Indonesian military places it as an all-powerful institution and the laws of our country allow it complete freedom to do what it wills. A few courses in good behavior are not going to alter what it is a very oppressive system of military rule. Besides, we are not even certain that the US military is sincere in claiming that it is providing such training. The US Congress should feel no qualms about cutting off JCET training if it is thinking about our benefit. Once the JCET training became public knowledge, the Pentagon claimed that it was meant only for the benefit of US soldiers who were given the opportunity to see how another military operates. So, by the Pentagon's own admission, the training was not designed to help the Indonesian military acquire less brutish habits. Let me explain how the government instills in us a culture of fear and robs us of our basic civil rights. In response to the student protests sweeping the country, the government has decided to intimidate the students by resorting to the tactic of "disappearances". According to the leading legal aid organization in Indonesia (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia), there are fifty persons that have disappeared over the past three months. One student activist who disappeared is Andi Arief. Military personnel kidnapped him from his home, in full view of his family, on March 28. The top generals of our country not only denied that the military had kidnapped him, they joked to the press that he had simply disappeared of his accord. For three weeks, his family, his friends, and his fellow students, worried themselves to the point of exhaustion. Knowing how the military operates, they were concerned for his very survival. On April 22, he turned up in the Jakarta central police station. The police had no arrest warrant and no explanation for how he got there. Andi Arief told his lawyers that he had been kidnapped by the special forces, Kopassus, held for three weeks of interrogation, and then dumped at the police station. One must note that the military did not break the law by kidnapping these fifty activists because none of the laws of our country apply to the military. Thus, Andi Arief's parents can not sue Kopassus for arresting their son without a warrant and holding him in detention without a habeus corpus. This is precisely what makes ordinary citizens so terrified of the military: it is unpredictable and unaccountable. It has been said that one can judge a government by its prisons. Well then, let us look at Indonesian prisons. There we will find people whose only crime was to criticize the government. Sri Bintang Pamungkas, the leader of an independent political party, criticized the government. He is now in Cipinang prison in Jakarta on charges of subversion. Accompanying him in that prison are 12 members of the banned People's Democratic Party (PRD) convicted of thought crimes. In the language of the prosecutors, they "deviated from the state ideology." There are presently at least twenty five political prisoners in Indonesia's prisons, some are in their teens, some in their seventies. Just in the past three months, 250 people have been arrested on political crimes -- such heinous crimes as holding peaceful meetings and holding peaceful demonstrations. We have a government that has a pathological fear of any public assembly that it does not control and any public leader who does not grovel before our president. Every single independent political party and trade union has been systematically destroyed by the government. In regions of the country where there has been serious organized resistance to the government -- Irian Jaya, Aceh, occupied East Timor -- it has not has been satisfied with arrests. It has resorted to massacres. You can guess what type of society we have. We are a people who are terrified of expressing our own opinions and terrified of getting involved in politics of any kind. Politics for us is a spectator sport -- and a cruel sport it is. We are daily bombarded by the statements of officials who are barely literate, barely articulate, and barely educated. When faced with public criticisms, they speak of "crushing", "smashing," and "hacking." They treat the youths of our country, those in their teens and twenties who are sincerely and peacefully attempting to change this society, as though they were foreign agents bent on subversion. We are not citizens of a state; we are subjects of a modern, militarized sultanate. It is obvious today that Suhartois reign is coming to a miserable end. A necessary condition for democracy in Indonesia is the ending of Suhartois presidency. But it is not a sufficient condition. The military, with its dual function, is prepared to continue Suhartoism without Suharto. What I mean is that the sources of the systematic human rights abuses we see today are not going to vanish with the demise of the Suharto presidency. For genuine democracy to exist in Indonesia, our laws will have to be changed to embody basic principles of human rights and the military will have to be confined to the barracks and put under civilian oversight. Economics For the past thirty three years we have been told this system of martial law was necessary for our material benefit. The religion of the government, its legitimating ideology, has been economic development, what is called in Indonesian, pembangunan. But what do we have to show for thirty years of development? Two hundred families have fat Swiss bank accounts while millions of people have had their land expropriated. A few timber contractors and palm oil companies have accumulated fortunes while chopping and burning down most of the rain forest. Thirty years of development has meant the victimization of many Indonesians. And we have not heard all their laments precisely because there has been no freedom to criticize what the state calls its "development program." Thirty plus years of development under martial law has meant the accumulation of an enormous debt. For thirty years, the United States, Japan and Europe provided billions of dollars annually as foreign aid to the Suharto regime. The US government, since Suharto took power in 1965 by ordering the massacre of thousands of people, has consistently maintained that his regime provides stability and security. Every single US president since Nixon, including the present incumbent, has, to their shame, celebrated the Suharto regime for its economic accomplishments and political stability. In effect, the US government has said that the Indonesian people were best kept under the thumb of a sultanate and that democracy was opposed to our best interests. US academics and retired Foreign Service personnel, such as those at the US-Indonesia Society here in Washington, have been saying that Indonesians would just have to sacrifice their political freedoms for economic growth. The economic crisis of the past nine months has put paid to these cynical propositions. Now, after suffering so that development could proceed, what is the prospect of the Indonesian people under the IMF bailout? In short, we are now expected to suffer even more to pay off a debt that we did not incur. Thanks to the Suharto regime's deal with the IMF, all Indonesians have been put into debt bondage. Our labor and resources are supposed to be devoted to paying off the debt for the next generation. Meanwhile, those 200 families who contracted the debt have enough money in their own personal accounts to pay it off many times over. Is it possible to deny that this current economic austerity plan by the IMF is a gross injustice? The Indonesian people never approved of accepting all those loans. We weren't even allowed to know what the government's economic policy was for all those years. Not even our farcical showcase parliament was given authority over economic policy, nor is it given any authority now. But the IMF is telling us that we have to share the debt burden equally. While it is apparently acceptable to the IMF that political power is monopolized, it absolutely insists that the debt be democratically distributed. Those governments that have loaned money to the Suharto regime and its crony capitalists for the past thirty years are now supporting the IMF's agreement. Thus, they appear to us like heroin pushers who, after keeping an addict hooked for years and driving him ever deeper in debt, throw him back on his family when he is near collapse, telling them that they have to foot the bill for his rehabilitation and for all his past debts. Please do not believe that you are doing us any favors by authorizing money for the IMF loans to Indonesia. We need democracy in order to settle our economic problems but that is not a word you will find in the agreement between Suharto and the IMF. The IMF, with the blessing of the Clinton administration, is actually hoping to engineer an economic recovery under the same political conditions of institutionalized martial law. This is, I assure you, an impossible dream. The protests against the Suharto regime have by now reached the point of no return. The Indonesian people, now that they have had the opportunity to express their long supressed grievances against this regime, are not going to be satisfied until it falls. Democracy is a rare commodity these days but it is no less vital to us than rice. It is paradoxical that the IMF is willing to dictate terms to Suharto when it comes to managing the economy but not when it comes to fundamental economic rights, such as the right of workers to organize. The IMF refuses to insist that, as a condition for receiving the loans, the government recognize workers rights. It calls that meddling in the internal affairs of Indonesia -- when it already controls the governmentis economic policy. If the IMF's agreement meddled in such a way as to allow the Indonesian people to have a greater voice over economic policy then perhaps the US Congress should support it. But, as it stands, the agreement is a worthless piece of paper signed by a collapsing dictator. The IMF money is not going to benefit us. As you know, much of the money will be simply transferred to foreign banks that made risky loans to the Indonesian government and Indonesian enterprises. The money will enter Indonesia for a moment and then get sent back out as debt payments. These payments are supposed to restore "investor confidence" but one has to wonder what kind of investors these are who believe in being rewarded for making bad decisions. It is astonishing that the foreign banks that made risky loans to a corrupt and unstable economic system want to be repaid in full. It is even more astonishing that they want the Indonesian people to pay for their bad decisions. Look at the tragic conditions Indonesia is now in after thirty years of US-supported stability and development. Indonesia has an abundance of fertile land yet we are now begging other countries to give us supplies of our staple food: rice. The Food and Agricultural Organization estimates that Indonesia needs to be given 2 million tons of rice for the estimated 7.5 million Indonesians who will require "food assistance" within the next year. There is a famine in eastern Indonesia now. We, living in other parts of the country, hardly hear anything about it and what we do hear are government whitewashes. We have been told by the Suharto regime and the US government to exchange our political freedoms for economic prosperity. We have wound up with neither. Recommendations As US Congressmen, you must realize that the only force that the military appears to feel accountable to is the US government. You greatly determine whether the Indonesian government receives economic aid from the IMF and political legitimacy in international forums such as the United Nations. I can assure you that the Suharto regime, feeling entirely unaccountable to the Indonesian people, does feel beholden to the US government. It panics on seeing any sign of displeasure with it here in Washington. I urge you to listen to more people than just Indonesian government officials and retired State Department officials. Since the government has not allowed for any opposition political leaders or parties to exist, it may seem difficult to know to whom one should listen. I suggest that you listen to those who have had the determination to sacrifice for their beliefs and the bravery to risk military violence to assert what they believe to be the truth. You should listen to people such as Sri Bintang Pamungkas who has demanded the international community refrain from loaning money and giving military aid to Indonesia until a democratic regime can be established. You should especially listen to the youth, such as Pius Lustrilanang, who have no interests other than those of the nation's. In conclusion, I would recommend that: 1) The US military not assist the Indonesian military. The US government should restrict itself to civilian relations with the Suharto regime. 2) The US Congress should not authorize money for the IMF to be loaned to the Suharto regime. ---------------- Begin Forwarded Message ---------------- Suharto accused of torture, White House concerned With Indonesia By Harry Dunphy Associated Press Writer WASHINGTON (AP) -- Opponents of Indonesian President Suharto charged Thursday that his military forces were responsible for repeated human rights abuses, including killings, disappearances, torture and arbitrary arrests. They also called for an end to all U.S. military training of Indonesian forces and recommended that the United States and the United Nations send representatives to Indonesia to investigate their claims. Meantime, White House spokesman Mike McCurry said the Clinton administration is calling on Indonesia's government "to respect the individual human rights of those who are voicing legitimate dissent" and use caution in trying to restore order. "And most importantly, (we ask) that they address the fundamental concerns that many people in Indonesia have about the status of their economy," McCurry said. On Capitol Hill, a veiled, unidentified witness told a House Judiciary human rights panel that many ordinary Indonesians "were terrified of expressing our own opinions" because they feared reprisals by Suharto's government. Rep. Christopher Smith, R-N.J., who chaired the hearing, said the testimony, "ripped away any respectability the Suharto regime may claim and exposed daily atrocities" that made it difficult to support international aid for Indonesia. The International Monetary Fund last week resumed payments that are part of a $43 billion rescue package to help Indonesia face its most serious economic crisis in 30 years. The World Bank is expected to approve a $1.5 billion loan to the Jakarta government before the end of the month. Pius Lustrilanang, 30, a prominent opposition figure, told the panel he was abducted for two months earlier this year, probably by Indonesian special forces, and administered beating and electric shocks in attempts to learn of his political activities. After international pressure on the government, he was released last month and fled the country. Weakened by the economic crisis, Lustrilanang said, the "government has become more vicious and brutal towards voices of dissent. ... The human rights situation in Indonesia is fundamentally flawed." Constancio Pinto, U.S. representative of the National Council of Resistance in East Timor, the former Portuguese colony Indonesia annexed in 1975, urged the United States to "stop all types of military support to a dictator that for 33 years has continually committed gross human rights violations." "Training Indonesian ... (special forces commando units) is just like training (Iraqi President ) Saddam Hussein's troops," he said. AP-WS-05-07-98 1813EDT, Posted at 3:39 p.m. PDT Thursday, May 7, 1998 ----------------- End Forwarded Message ----------------- From chriscd@jhu.edu Thu May 21 13:18:13 1998 Date: Thu, 21 May 1998 15:19:27 -0400 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: Castro's speech to the World Health Organization (fwd)] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------2B0C080855067B3BE134B322 --------------2B0C080855067B3BE134B322 19 May 1998 19:23:12 -0400 (EDT) Date: Tue, 19 May 1998 19:22:59 -0400 (EDT) From: chatski carl Subject: Castro's speech to the World Health Organization (fwd) To: Ann R Chist "Who can save our species? The blind, uncontrollable law of the market? Neo-liberal globalization, alone and for its own sake, like a cancer which devours human beings and destroys nature? That cannot be the way forward or at least it can only last for a brief period in history." ---President Castro, May 14th 1998 ....* According to the calculations of renowned economists, the world economy grew six-fold and the production of wealth and services grew from less than five trillion to more than twenty-nine trillion dollars between 1950 and 1997. Why then is it still the case that each year, 12 million children under five years of age die -- that is to say 33,000 per day -- of whom the overwhelming majority could be saved? Nowhere in the world, in no act of genocide, in no war, are so many people killed per minute, per hour and per day as those who are killed by hunger and poverty on our planet -- 53 years after the creation of the United Nations. The children who die and could be saved are almost 100% poor and of those who survive, we must ask why 500,000 are left blind every year for lack of a simple vitamin which costs less than a pack of cigarettes per year? Why are 200 million children under five years of age undernourished? Why are there 250 million children and adolescents working? Why do 110 million not attend primary school and 275 million fail to attend secondary school? Why do two million girls become prostitutes each year? Why in this world -- which already produces almost 30 trillion dollars worth of goods and services per year -- do one billion 300 million human beings live in absolute poverty, receiving less than a dollar a day -- when there are those who receive more than a million dollars a day? Why do 800 million lack the most basic health services? Why is it that of the 50 million people who die each year in the world, whether adults or children, 17 million -- that is approximately 50,000 per day -- die of infectious diseases which could almost all be cured -- or, even better, be prevented -- at a cost which is sometimes no more than one dollar per person? How much is a human life worth? What is the cost to humanity of the unjust and intolerable order which prevails in the world? 585,000 women died during pregnancy or in childbirth in 1996, 99% of them in the Third World, 70,000 due to abortions carried out in poor conditions, 69,000 of them in Latin America, Africa and Asia? Apart from the huge differences in the quality of life between rich and poor countries, people in rich countries live an average of 12 years longer than people in poor countries. And even within some nations, the difference in life expectancy between the richest and poorest is between 20 and 35 years. It is really sad to think that just in the area of maternal and post-natal services, in spite of the efforts of the WHO and UNICEF over the last 50 years, the number of deaths from lack of medical services has been 600 million children and 25 million mothers who could have survived. That would have required a more rational and more just world. In that same post-war period, in the area of military expenditure, 30 trillion dollars were spent. According to UN estimates, the cost of providing universal access to basic health care services would be 25 billion dollars per year -- just three percent of the 800 billion dollars which are currently devoted to military expenditure -- and this after the end of the Cold War. There is no let up in arms sales, which have the sole purpose of killing, while the medicines which should be provided to save lives become increasingly expensive. The market in medicines in 1995 reached 280 billion dollars. The developed countries, with 14.6% of the world's population -- 824 million inhabitants -- consume 82% of the medicines. The rest of the world -- 4 billion 815 million people -- consume only 18%. Prices of medicines are prohibitive for the Third World, where only the privileged sectors can afford them. The control of patents and markets by the large transnational companies enables them to raise those prices as much as ten times above their production costs. Some of the latest antibiotics are priced at 50 times their production cost. And the world's population continues to grow. We are now almost six billion and growing at a rate of 80 million per year. It took two million years to reach the first billion people, a hundred years to reach the second billion, and 11 years to reach the last billion. In 50 years, there will be four billion new inhabitants on the planet. Old illnesses have returned and new ones are appearing: AIDS, the Ebola virus, Anthrax, BSE or mad cow disease -- more than thirty according to the specialists. Either we defeat AIDS or AIDS will destroy many Third World countries. No poor person can pay the 10,000 dollars per person each year that current treatments cost -- which merely prolong life without actually curing the disease. The climate is changing. The seas and the atmosphere are heating up. The air and water are becoming contaminated. Soil is eroding, deserts are growing, forests are disappearing and water is becoming scarce. Who can save our species? The blind, uncontrollable law of the market? Neo-liberal globalization, alone and for its own sake, like a cancer which devours human beings and destroys nature? That cannot be the way forward or at least it can only last for a brief period in history. The WHO is fighting heroically against these realities and it also has the duty of being optimistic. As a Cuban and a revolutionary, I share their optimism. With a current infant mortality rate of 7.2 per thousand live births during the first year; a doctor for every 176 inhabitants -- which is the highest level in the world -- and a life expectancy of more than 75 years of age, Cuba has fulfilled the WHO Health for All program for the year 2000 since 1983 -- in spite of the cruel blockade it has suffered for almost 40 years, in spite of being a poor, Third World country. The attempt to commit genocide against our country has only made us redouble our efforts and increased our will to survive. The world can also fight and win. Thank you very much. ------------------------------------------------------- Castro Slams Drug Companies By Geir Moulson Associated Press Writer Thursday, May 14, 1998; 10:42 a.m. EDT GENEVA (AP) -- Cuban President Fidel Castro painted a gloomy picture today of a developing world condemned to high death rates, partly because major drug companies charge inflated prices for medicines. In an impassioned speech at a session celebrating the 50th anniversary of the U.N health agency, Castro also condemned growing global trade liberalization and ``an economy that grows by itself and for itself, like a cancer.'' He decried the U.S. economic embargo against his island nation, but said the sanctions have only ``led to the multiplication of our strengths and our will to survive.'' Castro also deplored high death and disease rates in developing countries, and pointed to inflated drug prices by pharmaceutical companies as the culprit. ``The control of patents and markets by the big transnational companies allows them to raise prices over 10 times above production costs,'' Castro said. ``Either we defeat AIDS, or AIDS will devastate several Third World countries,'' Castro said. The 70-year-old Cuban leader was given a standing ovation as he entered the hall of the 191-nation World Health Assembly -- the annual meeting of the World Health Organization. During a weeklong visit, Castro will also address the World Trade Organization when leaders gather to mark half a century of the global trading system, born at a meeting in Havana, Cuba, in 1948. The Cuban leader and first lady Hillary Rodham Clinton were staying in the same hotel today, but the hotel manager said any clash of ideologies would be ``no problem.'' ``Everyone is in their own place and it works very well,'' Herbert Schott, director of Geneva's luxury Hotel Intercontinental, told The Associated Press. The hotel, which has hosted Mrs. Clinton and the U.S. president on a previous visit to Geneva, is favored by security services for their ability to protect it. *--- 2 Introductory paragraphs All praise to the World Health Organization, which together with UNICEF, has helped to save the lives of hundreds of millions of children and millions of mothers, which has relieved the suffering and saved the lives of many more millions of human beings. These two institutions -- together with the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Development Program, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the World Food Program, the United Nations Population Fund, UNESCO, and other organizations so bitterly opposed by those who would like to erase from the face of the earth the noble ideas which inspired the creation of the United Nations - - have made a decisive contribution to the establishment of a universal awareness of the serious problems of the world today and the great challenges which we have before us. --------------2B0C080855067B3BE134B322-- From gderlug@nwu.edu Fri May 22 16:44:04 1998 Fri, 22 May 1998 17:44:01 -0500 (CDT) In-Reply-To: <35604770.A494B7B2@jhu.edu> Date: Fri, 22 May 1998 17:45:44 -0500 To: chriscd@jhu.edu, WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: "Georgi M. Derluguian" Subject: Further evidence Dear Chris, Here is further evidence of our grand theory. The modern world-system, which, Natürlich, is a capitalist world-economy, commodifies the last instituional relics of previous historical system, which consisted of world-empires. In any case, shouldn't we discuss if demise at hand? Georgi MICROSOFT Bids to Acquire Catholic Church By Hank Vorjes VATICAN CITY (AP) -- In a joint press conference in St. Peter's Square this morning, MICROSOFT Corp. and the Vatican announced that the Redmond software giant will acquire the Roman Catholic Church in exchange for an unspecified number of shares of MICROSOFT common stock. If the deal goes through, it will be the first time a computer software company has acquired a major world religion. With the acquisition, Pope John Paul II will become the senior vice-president of the combined company's new Religious Software Division, while MICROSOFT senior vice-presidents Michael Maples and Steven Ballmer will be invested in the College of Cardinals, said MICROSOFT Chairman Bill Gates. "We expect a lot of growth in the religious market in the next five to ten years," said Gates. "The combined resources of MICROSOFT and the Catholic Church will allow us to make religion easier and more fun for a broader range of people." Through the MICROSOFT Network, the company's new on-line service, "we will make the sacraments available on-line for the first time" and revive the popular pre-Counter-Reformation practice of selling indulgences, said Gates. "You can get Communion, confess your sins, receive absolution -- even reduce your time in Purgatory -- all without leaving your home." A new software application, MICROSOFT Church, will include a macro language which you can program to download heavenly graces automatically while you are away from your computer. An estimated 17,000 people attended the announcement in St. Peter's Square, watching on a 60-foot screen as comedian Don Novello -- in character as Father Guido Sarducci -- hosted the event, which was broadcast by satellite to 700 sites worldwide. Pope John Paul II said little during the announcement. When Novello chided Gates, "Now I guess you get to wear one of these pointy hats," the crowd roared, but the pontiff's smile seemed strained. The deal grants MICROSOFT exclusive electronic rights to the Bible and the Vatican's prized art collection, which includes works by such masters as Michelangelo and Da Vinci. But critics say MICROSOFT will face stiff challenges if it attempts to limit competitors' access to these key intellectual properties. "The Jewish people invented the look and feel of the holy scriptures," said Rabbi David Gottschalk of Philadelphia. "You take the parting of the Red Sea -- we had that thousands of years before the Catholics came on the scene." But others argue that the Catholic and Jewish faiths both draw on a common Abrahamic heritage. "The Catholic Church has just been more successful in marketing it to a larger audience," notes Notre Dame theologian Father Kenneth Madigan. Over the last 2,000 years, the Catholic Church's market share has increased dramatically, while Judaism, which was the first to offer many of the concepts now touted by Christianity, lags behind. Historically, the Church has a reputation as an aggressive competi- tor, leading crusades to pressure people to upgrade to Catholicism, and entering into exclusive licensing arrangements in various kingdoms whereby all subjects were instilled with Catholicism, whether or not they planned to use it. Today Christianity is available from several denominations, but the Catholic version is still the most widely used. The Church mission is to reach "the four corners of the earth," echoing MICROSOFT's vision of "a computer on every desktop and in every home". Gates described MICROSOFT's long-term strategy to develop a scalable religious architecture that will support all religions through emulation. A single core religion will be offered with a choice of interfaces according to the religion desired -- "One religion, a couple of different implementations," said Gates. The MICROSOFT move could spark a wave of mergers and acquisitions, according to Herb Peters, a spokesman for the U.S. Southern Baptist Conference, as other churches scramble to strengthen their position in the increasingly competitive religious market. Georgi M. Derluguian Assistant Professor Department of Sociology Northwestern University 1812 Chicago Avenue Evanston, Illinois 60208-1330 (847) 491-2741 (rabota) From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Fri May 29 13:24:51 1998 Fri, 29 May 1998 15:24:42 -0400 (EDT) Date: Fri, 29 May 1998 15:24:42 -0400 (EDT) From: Gunder Frank Reply-To: Gunder Frank To: eh.res@eh.net, H-NET List for World History , H-Asia , WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: AGF response # 3: taylor/frank on landes DUMP THE LABLES AND DEBATE THE THEORY AND EMPIRICS ON THEIR MERITS writes Alan Taylor on May 27. LETS DO IT. The private exchanges between Alan and me are friendlier and more constructive than the public ones. I wonder why? I'll try some of the same for the public good as well. In Alan's second paragraph asks a lot of specific questions and so does another one about half way through. Whether we have answers to them, I dont know, and even less if this is the time and place to seek and offer concrete answers to these concrete questions, but see below. For present purposes, it seems more fruitful to me first to address what I hope Alan and others will agree is the theoretical or at least analytical MAIN ISSUE that Alan poses: "Frank wants it both ways: sometimes a single market [A], sometimes many [B]" where [A] Eurasia was one big competitive market - actually i would amend that to the WORLD market [that is why the ec-hist including Alan's May 28 'editorial' separation of question #4 about colonial exploitation and # 3 about Eurasian trade and market is NOT acceptable - and I sent them a 'private' not critiquing their editorial re-phrasing, which the ec-hist 'owners' can post if they wish] and [B] more segmented markets . Alan then asks, "Is Frank proposing [a] or [b] or something in between [c] or somemthing else [d]" ? "You can't have it both ways" [a] & [b], and presumably still less also [c] and [d] to boot. MY ANSWER: Not only CAN I/we have it both ways, we MUST, because that is what the REAL world was and still is like. I grant you that I am not an expert on segmented market analysis, eg David Gordon et al's segmented labor markets. But surely having ONE WORLD MARKET and observing that it is ALSO SEGMENTED is not only possible but altogether realistic, and therefore necessary, Alan Taylor to the contrary notwithstanding. Indeed, that is what economic analysis is - or should be - all about, for if the real world really were one homogeneous perfectly competitive self-equilibrating general equilibrium, there would not be much left to analyze - nor to remedy! That obliterates Alan's MAIN analytical/substantive critique and converts it into his own weakness [and als that of his econ-hist co-editors] and into the strength at least potentially in the future of the segmented whole analysis of that time and place and process that Ken Pomeranz and I are pursuing. Only by way of example, I return to some of Alan's above metioned introductory and midway questions: - which variables are endogenous and which exogenous? to what process where? [i know that he is asking to what 'model' and not to what reality]. Well it depends. but one thing is sure: if segmented markets are part and parcel of a single global one, then whatever may seem 'exogenous' to the segment may well be endogenous to the whole - really! so it behoves us to construct a 'model' that can accomadoate the same. -supply versus demand for money. I actually devote a whole chapter 3 to that "Money Went Around the World and Made the World Go Round" - and on your demand, I supply an analysis of why, how, how much, and to what effect, which pulls the rug out from under that monetary authority Charles Kindleberger's still recent myths about 'spenders and hoarders' - exogeneity or endogeneity of population growth? Good question! in my 'model' it is partly one and partly the other. that is a major weakness of my model - so far. But Landes' procedure of totally excluding population growth from his 'model' theory certainly is NO help, as McNeil already observed. In my analysis, I dont know about 'model', population growth rates are regionally segmented/differentiated as part of a single world wide process, not only of population growth but of economic growth. My 'model' is neither Matlthusian nor Boserupian, but a synthesis of both, but i hope a better and more realistic synthesis than that of Ronald Lee, whom i consulted privately alas without much result. -what drives technology? well, in part population growth - and vice versa! - and which endowments matter (labor,land,capital, skills ....)? well, ALL of them, and reciprocally with population growth, both globally and regionally/sectorally - and they matter in different ways in different 'segments' of the whole! also for what drives technology. How? That is the question my dear Watson Taylor. We would all be grateful if you or David Landes could give us a clue. - deterministically or probabilistically, what are the shocks, random or otherwise and who do intial conditions and dynamics translate into final outcomes? Good question/s. Thats what we are trying to figure out. One thing is sure: we never will by following "at least Landes' theory [that] can be stated in brief and coherent terms." That is exactly why we are trying to construct one or more alternative ones. -"There are many other gaps in economic logic along the way" - maybe, nobody is perfect. But so far, there are many more gaps in economic DATA/ INFORMATION along the way. Why? Because economists and historians have not even troubled themselves to try to dig them up or even to estimate them. Why Not? At least in large part because of THEIR OWN GAPS in their own 'economic logic,' which are as deplorable as they are large: Ken and I are applying 'the economic logic' of demand/supply analysis to segmented factor prices [yes of the factors Taylor named above] including ecologically and demographically derived ones and the corresponding alternative costs and benefits segmentally and globally. We would now have a lot more data at our disposal if Messsrs Taylor and Co. had not been ILlogically looking only at each or at most some individual trees while wandering lost in the global forest, that they cant even see,or like Patrick O'Brien still in 1997 (Journal of World History] outright denying that there was any before 1846. Now what kind of 'economic logic" is that? And dont tell me that thius is 'only' rhetoric, unless you mean not mine but that of 'economists'. Alan writes "I personally don't see how any economist is going to be persuaded as yet" No doubt, Alan, you are right about that. But how much is that a function of that "I don't see the evidence of Frank's coherent theory yet" and how much is it a function of 'economists' congenital myopia and blindness, indeed refusal even to apply their own logic world wide? I already told you that when he was still my professor [woe was to both of us] your Hoover Institution colleague Uncle Milt told me [for God's sake or at least for that of my grade in his class and my subsequent career] NOT to read beyond chapter 3 in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. But I did anyway, and i learned something, including how not to have a career as an economist. Small loss, as is their persuasion. For his troubles, Uncle Milt got a Nobel Prize, but not for Peace! I got plenty of nothing, to each his own. Which finaly brings me to another matter in Alan's same May 27 posting. I already asked him privately by 'virtue' of what evidence if any he inweighs against dependence theory [and alas me personally- see below] with "locically inconsistent and empirically useless theory, misreading of history, and a distraction for policymakers and scholars alike, with enourmous costs"? I would counsel us all to leave that question aside publicly here and now for at least four good reasons: 1. the issue bere is supposeldly another, but 2. if Alan has [what?] evidence to support his view on what is not at issue here, i can marshall quite a lot to support the other side. 3, other 'theories' have also generated 'enourmous costs' - we can see some of the costs of the IMF theories and policy makers in Indonesia right now. I wrote a book entitled ECONOMIC GENOCIDE; EQUIBRIUM ON THE POINT OF A BAYONET about some of the costs of Alan Taylor's Hoover Institution colleage Milton Friedman's monetarism in Chile to which I can testify from personal experience. Alas the cost were not limited to that country but have been just about world-wide. 4. If that sounds like assigning 'guilt by association' it is my quite deliberate turning of the tables on Alan to help show him that this kind of if-communists-say-milk-is-good-for-babies-it-must-be-bad argumement is less than constructive in "rightly going to place a high premium on getting a coherent theory from Frank given this background" Can we now go back to DEBATE THE THEORY AND EMPIRICS ON THEIR MERITS? PLEASE! cheers gunder frank ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Andre Gunder Frank University of Toronto 96 Asquith Ave Tel. 1 416 972-0616 Toronto, ON Fax. 1 416 972-0071 CANADA M4W 1J8 Email agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca My home Page is at: http://www.whc.neu.edu/whc/resrch&curric/gunder.html ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Sat May 30 06:19:56 1998 Date: Sat, 30 May 1998 08:19:52 -0400 (EDT) From: Gunder Frank To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: ReORIENT book publication announcement (fwd) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Andre Gunder Frank University of Toronto 96 Asquith Ave Tel. 1 416 972-0616 Toronto, ON Fax. 1 416 972-0071 CANADA M4W 1J8 Email agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca My home Page is at: http://www.whc.neu.edu/whc/resrch&curric/gunder.html ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 29 May 1998 16:38:20 -0400 (EDT) From: Gunder Frank To: agf Subject: ReORIENT book publication announcement This is to announce the May/June 1998 publication of my book ReORIENT: GLOBAL ECONOMY IN THE ASIAN AGE by Andre Gunder Frank University of California Press, 400 pp ISBN 0-520-21474-9 paper US$ 19.95 ISBN 0-520-21129-4 cloth US$ 55.00 ORDER US: California-Princeton Fulfillment Services 1445 Lower Fery Road, Ewing, NJ 08618 FAX TOLL FREE : 1-800-999-1958 telef info: 609 883-1759 ORDER UK: University Presses of California, Columbia & Princeton, Ltd 1 Oldlands Way Bognor Regis West Sussex PO22 9 SA FAX : 44-1243-842167 Author's Abstract, Referee's Comments, and Table of Contents follow below A Debate about the thesis of this book and its challenge of that of David Landes THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS [Norton 1998] is on-going during May 1998 simultaneously on 4 e-mail discussion nets and may be found on: H-World [history], H-Asia [history], Econ-hist [economic history], and WSN [World Systems Network] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Andre Gunder Frank University of Toronto 96 Asquith Ave Tel. 1 416 972-0616 Toronto, ON Fax. 1 416 972-0071 CANADA M4W 1J8 Email agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca My home Page is at: http://www.whc.neu.edu/whc/resrch&curric/gunder.html ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ R e O R I E N T : G L O B A L E C O N O M Y I N T H E A S I A N A G E [University of California Press, May/June 1998] by Andre Gunder Frank AUTHOR'S ABSTRACT This book outlines and analyzes the global economy and its sectoral and regional division of labor and cyclical dynamic from 1400 to 1800. The evidence and argument are that within this global economy Asians and particularly Chinese were preponderant, no more "traditional" than Europeans, and in fact largely far less so. The historical documentation poses an 'emperor has no clothes' challenge to all received Eurocentric historiography and social theory from Montesquieu, Marx and Weber, or Toynbee and Polanyi, to Rostow, Braudel and Wallerstein. The books's global economic analysis offers a more holistic theoretical alternative. 'The Rise of the West' was not due to any 'European Miracle exceptionalism' that allegedly permitted it to pull itself up by its own bootstraps as Weberians have contended. Nor did Europe build a 'European world-economy around itself" a la Braudel and thereby as per Marx and Wallerstein [as well as my own WORLD ACCUMULATION 1492-1789] initiating a European centered 'Modern Capitalist World-System' primarily by exploiting the wealth of its American and African colonies. Instead, Europe used its American silver to buy itself marginal entry into the long since existing world market in Asia, which was much larger, more productive and competitive, continued to expand much faster until 1800, and was able to support a rate of population growth in Asia that was than double that of Europe until 1750. Then changing world economic/ demographic/ ecological relations and relative factor prices in the competitive global economy resulted in the temporary 'Decline of the East' and the opportunity for the also temporary 'The Rise of the West'. Europe took advantage of this world economic opportunity through import substitution, export promotion and technological change to become Newly Industrializing Economies after 1800, as is again happening today in East Asia. That region is now REgaining its 'traditional' dominance in the global economy, with the Chinese 'Middle Kingdom' again at its 'center.' PUBLISHER REFEREES SUMMARIES & EVALUATIONS Frank gained his world wide fame by making an argument that caused a revolution in thinking about Third World Development. Well, the same thing is about to happen again, except this time the stakes are much higher. Now it is the theories of the endogenous nature of change in the West that is being challenged. The Wallersteinian world economy did not give rise to the world-system, Frank argues, but the Afroeurasian world system gave rise to the European world economy. To correct the historical fact is to challenge the theoretical scaffolding of everyone from Marx to Weber to Braudel to Wallerstein. Frank's point is that they simply got it wrong. [He] turns on their heads many of the received assumptions about the origin of the modern world system/economy. The book is that conceptually important. - ALBERT BERGESEN, University of Arizona The book moves to argue that almost all received social theory is wrong, since it a) directs our attention to supposedly unique features of European society that were actually neither very unusual nor of much importance in explaining the divergent development paths, and b) directs our attention away from [these and to] attempting analysis at the global level, which the author claims is by far the most illuminating place to look for explanations of what may at first seem like regional differences. This will be an extremely important book of sufficient originality and importance ... at the intersection of several important literatures [to] have a major impact. It could not be more ambitious. - KENNETH POMERANZ University of California at Irvine This is a bold new interpretation that creates a distinctive argument to explain Europe's post-1800 successes. The author places his argument in an even longer-run perspective to suggest that Europe's 'rise' may be just a temporary one bracketed on either side by eras of Asian dominance. It departs from virtually all other 'global' or 'world' system perspectives by arguing that Europe was not the central location of economic dynamism in the early modern world (1400-1800) and therefore that 'capitalism' was not a unique cultural phenomenon that can explain the differential economic success of Europe over Asia. The author redefines our baseline for assessing the 'rise' of Europe. I believe this book could become a benchmark study. - BIN WONG University of California at Irvine The book is a plea for global studies as a general historical proposition, notably the argument of the centrality of Asia for the period 1400-1800, and the rejection of the entire Eurocentric analysis of incorporation, 1500 and all that. This can be a landmark book that shapes substantially the scholarship and understanding of the next generation of researchers. It should have an immediate impact. - MARK SELDEN State University of New York T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S Preface Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION TO REAL WORLD HISTORY VS. EUROCENTRIC SOCIAL THEORY HOLISTIC METHODOLOGY AND OBJECTIVES GLOBALISM, NOT EUROCENTRISM CHAPTER OUTLINE OF A GLOBAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ANTICIPATING AND CONFRONTING RESISTANCE AND OBSTACLES Chapter 2: THE GLOBAL TRADE CAROUSEL 1400-1800 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WORLD ECONOMY Thirteenth and Fourteenth Century Antecedents The Columbian Exchange and its Consequences Some Neglected Features in the World Economy WORLD DIVISION OF LABOR AND BALANCES OF TRADE 1400-1800 Mapping the Global Economy The Americas Africa Europe West Asia - The Ottoman Empire - Safavid Persia India and the Indian Ocean - North India - Gujarat and Malabar - Coromandel - Bengal Southeast Asia - Archipellago and Insular - Continental Japan China - Population, Production, Trade - China in the World Economy Central Asia Russia and the Baltics A Sino-Centric World Economy Summary Chapter 3: MONEY WENT AROUND THE WORLD AND MADE THE WORLD GO ROUND WORLD MONEY: ITS PRODUCTION AND EXCHANGE Micro- and Marco- Attractions in the World Casino Dealing and Playing in the Casino The Numbers Game - Silver - Gold - Credit HOW DID THE WINNERS USE THEIR MONEY? Spenders vs Hoarders Inflation or Production in the Quantity Theory of Money Money Expanded the Frontiers of Settlement and Production Chapter 4: THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: COMPARISONS AND RELATIONS QUANTITIES:POPULATION,PRODUCTION,PRODUCTIVITY, INCOME, TRADE Population, Production and Income Productivity and Competitiveness World Trade 1400-1800 QUALITIES: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Eurocentrism Regarding Science and Technology in Asia Guns Ships Printing Textiles Metallurgy, Coal and Power Transport World Technological Development MECHANISMS: ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS European - Asian Comparisons Global Institutional Relations --In India --In China Chapter 5 HORIZONTALLY INTEGRATIVE MACROHISTORY SIMULTANEITY IS NO COINCIDENCE DOING HORIZONTALLY INTEGRATIVE MACROHISTORY Demographic/Structural Analysis A "Seventeenth Century Crisis"? Monetary Analysis and the Crises of 1640 Kondratieff Analysis The 1762-1790 Kondratieff "B" Phase Crisis and Recessions More Horizontally Integrative Macrohistory? Chapter 6 WHY DID THE WEST WIN [TEMPORARILY] ? UP AND DOWN THE LONG CYCLE ROLLICOASTER? THE DECLINE OF THE EAST PRECEDED THE RISE OF THE WEST The Decline in India The Decline Elsewhere in Asia HOW DID THE WEST RISE? Climbing Up on Asian Shoulders Supply and Demand for Technological Change in the World Economy Supplies and Sources of Capital A GLOBAL ECONOMIC/DEMOGRAPHIC ACCOUNTING FOR THE DECLINE OF THE EAST AND THE RISE OF THE WEST A Demographic Economic Model A High-Level Equilibrium Trap? The Evidence 1500-1750 The 1750 Inflection Past Conclusions and Future Implications Chapter 7 HISTORIOGRAPHIC CONCLUSIONS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS HISTORIOGRAPHIC CONCLUSIONS: THE EUROCENTRIC EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES 1. The Asiatic Mode of Production [AMP] 2. European Exceptionalism 3. A European World-System or a Global Economy? 4. 1500: Continuity or Break? 5. Capitalism? 6. Hegemony? 7. The Rise of the West and the Industrial Revolution 8. Empty Categories and Procustean Beds THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS:THROUGH THE GLOBAL LOOKING GLASS 1. Holism vs. Partialism 2. Commonality/Similarity vs. Specificity/Difference 3. Continuity vs. Dis-continuities 4. Horizontal Integration vs. Vertical Separation 5. Cycles vs. Linearity 6. Agency vs. Structure 7. Europe in a World Economic Nutshell 8. Jihad vs. McWorld in the Anarchy of the Clash of Civilizations? REFERENCES INDEX From cemck@cs1.presby.edu Sat May 30 15:07:12 1998 Date: Sat, 30 May 1998 17:07:05 -0400 (EDT) From: Charles McKelvey To: WSN@CSF.COLORADO.EDU Subject: Conference in Cuba Conference Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Cuban Revolution The conclusion of the year 1998 will mark the 40th anniversary of the triumph of the Cuban Revolution. La Casa de Altos Estudios "Don Fernando Ortiz" of the University of Havana will convene a conference commemorating this important event. The conference is intended for academics, writers, artists and students. Cubans and foreigners are invited to participate in the discussions, round tables and cultural activities planned for the conference. The conference will be held at the University of Havana from November 18 through November 21, 1998. The themes for discussion will include the following: the historic dynamic of the Cuban Revolution; groups, sectors and social classes in the process of the Cuban Revolution; the women's revolution; revolution, economy and social development; community and revolution; revolution, democracy and human rights; ideology and revolution; education and health; cultural revolution; the conflict between Cuba and the United States; revolution and emigration; the Cuban Revolution in the popular imagination; and international relations and activities of the Cuban revolution. The program will include presentations by actors in the Cuban process during the course of the last 40 years. In addition, during the program, a sample of the most well-known expressions of Cuban culture will be presented, along with conferences and discussions concerning these expressions of art. La Casa de Altos Estudios "Don Fernando Ortiz" has asked the Center for Development Studies to organize a delegation from the United States to participate in the conference. U.S. participants wishing to make presentations can do so in English or Spanish. Translators will be available to translate presentations made in English and to provide interpretations for those not understanding or needing assistance with Spanish. The cost for the program is $540 for a package that includes hotel accommodation in double room, breakfast, transportation between airport and hotel and to all conference events, conference registration, translator services, visa from Cuban government, license to travel to Cuba from U.S. government, and fees to the Center for Development Studies. Or an alternate package is available for $615 consisting of the same accommodations and services, except that daily dinner also is included. Participants must make their own arrangements for air travel to Havana. For flight information, contact Marazul Tours, 201-319-9670, fax 201-319-9009. U.S. citizens wishing to participate should send the following information: full name, position (full title, e.g., professor of sociology), institution, work address, home address, work telephone, home telephone, fax number, e-mail address, passport information (passport number, date of issue, country and place of issue, expiration date), place of birth and date of birth. Those wishing to give a presentation should provide a title and one-page abstract of their presentation. (Please submit the title and the abstract in the language in which you intend to present). Send the information by U.S. mail, e-mail, or fax by September 1 to Charles McKelvey, Center for Development Studies, 210 Belmont Stakes, Clinton, South Carolina 29325; e-mail ; fax 864-833-8481. The Center for Development Studies will make consolidated applications for travel licenses from the U.S. government and visas from the Cuban government. The Center for Development Studies is a non-profit organization incorporated in the state of South Carolina on September 23, 1996. Its objectives include increasing understanding of Central America and the Caribbean by conducting travel seminars. In June 1997, the Center for Development Studies conducted its inaugural project, when a group of eight faculty and graduate students in the fields of sociology and political science from various colleges and universities in the United States participated in a three-week travel seminar and research project in Cuba, conducted jointly by the Center for Development Studies and la Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciences Sociales (FLACSO), Programa Cuba. In July 1998, the Center for Development Studies, again in cooperation with FLACSO Cuba, is sponsoring an experiential research seminar in Cuba. Entitled "The Cuban Revolution: Surviving into the 21st Century," the participants are eight university and college professors and graduate students in the social sciences, Romance languages and literature from various universities and colleges in the United States. The Center for Development Studies intends to conduct a similar seminar in Cuba in 1999. From paul.baer@pobox.com Sun May 31 20:41:13 1998 Received: from unix1.sncc.lsu.edu (unix1.sncc.lsu.edu [130.39.129.86]) by csf.Colorado.EDU (8.8.4/8.8.4/CNS-4.1p-nh) with SMTP id UAA16689 for ; Sun, 31 May 1998 20:41:08 -0600 (MDT) Received: from slip129-37-218-51.la.us.ibm.net by unix1.sncc.lsu.edu (AIX 3.2/UCB 5.64/4.03) id AA31665; Sun, 31 May 1998 21:39:27 -0500 X-Sender: usinet.pgbaer@pop5.ibm.net Message-Id: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Sun, 31 May 1998 21:40:26 -0500 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: Paul Baer Subject: Critiques of "Cultural Theory" In recent work on responses to global climate change, I've come across some extensive use of an obnoxious trend from cultural anthropology called "Cultural Theory" (cited to Mary Douglas and a host of others). If anyone is familiar with healthy materialist critiques, they would be very welcome - I'd rather not have to reinvent the critical wheel if it's already been done... Thanks in advance, --Paul Baer Institute for Environmental Studies Louisiana State University