From chriscd@jhu.edu Thu Oct 1 09:48:35 1998 Date: Thu, 01 Oct 1998 11:47:25 -0400 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: Fwd: Addition to FBC website] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------D8300331D23A4485374806AB --------------D8300331D23A4485374806AB Thu, 01 Oct 1998 10:27:10 -0400 (EDT) Date: Thu, 01 Oct 1998 10:29:26 -0400 From: immanuel wallerstein Subject: Fwd: Addition to FBC website To: chriscd@jhu.edu oct. 1, 1998 dear chris, can you put this message on the wsn and psn networks. thank you/immanuel ANNOUNCEMENT To: WSN, PSN As of Oct. 1, 1998, the web site of the Fernand Braudel Center will contain a twice monthly commentary on the world today by Immanuel Wallerstein. They will appear the 1st and 15th of each month. They may be downloaded at . They are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term. Prof. Immanuel Wallerstein Fernand Braudel Center Binghamton University Binghamton, NY 13902-6000 USA Tel: 1-607-777-4924 FAX: 1-607-777-4315 Email: Web: --------------D8300331D23A4485374806AB-- From chriscd@jhu.edu Fri Oct 2 07:30:12 1998 Date: Fri, 02 Oct 1998 09:29:40 -0400 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: Havana Film Festival Tour] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------3E7B2A4D4D53816921338EB0 --------------3E7B2A4D4D53816921338EB0 for chriscd@jhu.edu; Fri, 02 Oct 1998 02:43:57 -0400 (EDT) 02 Oct 1998 01:36:48 -0500 (CDT) by mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu (8.9.1/8.9.1/mcfeeley.mc-1.24) 02 Oct 1998 01:35:03 -0500 (CDT) Date: Fri, 02 Oct 1998 02:34:17 -0400 (EDT) From: ArtsCuba@aol.com Subject: Havana Film Festival Tour Sender: owner-lasnet@mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu To: lasnet@mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu, ArtsCuba@aol.com Reply-to: ArtsCuba@aol.com Film students, Latin Americanists, film professionals and film hobbyists - Attend the 20th Annual Latin American Film Festival in Havana, Cuba. Dates: Nov.28 - Dec. 12 - or one week of that time period. Meet Cuban filmmakers and tour production facilities and the Cuban Film Institute. The trip is sponsored by the Cuban Film Institute. All travel is licensed by the Treasury Department. For further information please write: artscuba@aol.com --------------3E7B2A4D4D53816921338EB0-- From p34d3611@jhu.edu Fri Oct 2 14:04:59 1998 by jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (980427.SGI.8.8.8/950213.SGI.AUTOCF) 02 Oct 1998 16:03:50 -0400 (EDT) Date: Fri, 02 Oct 1998 16:03:48 -0400 (EDT) From: Peter Grimes Subject: Stop the MAI in the IMF Quota Increase To: WSN BOUNDARY="-2133065211-1422937999-907358628=:18306" This message is in MIME format. The first part should be readable text, while the remaining parts are likely unreadable without MIME-aware tools. Send mail to mime@docserver.cac.washington.edu for more info. ---2133065211-1422937999-907358628=:18306 ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Subject: [Fwd: Stop the MAI in the IMF Quota Increase] ---2133065211-1422937999-907358628=:18306 30 Sep 1998 12:21:18 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 30 Sep 1998 12:18:08 -0700 (PDT) From: Njoki Njoroge Njehu Subject: Stop the MAI in the IMF Quota Increase Sender: owner-50-years@igc.apc.org To: 50-years@igc.org ACTION ALERT: STOP THE MAI IN THE IMF APPROPRIATION OPPOSE THE IMF QUOTA INCREASE On September 17, the House voted against the Administration's request to add $15 billion to the Foreign Operations Appropriation for an increase in the U.S. quota to the IMF. Nonetheless, the House leadership is under tremendous pressure to agree to the Senate version of the appropriation, which approves $18 billion for the IMF, including the quota increase. If the quota increase is added, it will trigger a provision of the authorizing language in the appropriations bill that requires the IMF to become an enforcer of trade agreements such as NAFTA and GATT/WTO, as well as of potential future investment and trade agreements such as the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). Many Members of Congress are not aware that this language is in the bill. The presence of this language should be very controversial, as it creates a large opening for advancing agreements such as NAFTA and the MAI without Congressional votes. Last week the House rejected granting fast-track authority the President to negotiate free trade agreements such as NAFTA by a margin of 180-243. Section 601 (a) of the recently passed Foreign Operations Appropriation bill contains investment deregulation conditions that would automatically apply if a deal is made appropriating the $14.5 billion quota increase to the IMF. This section conditions the quota increase appropriation on requiring that the IMF board of directors "publicly agree" to require borrowing countries to: "liberalize restrictions on investment" and establish the equivalent of the MAI standard of national treatment on investment through "guarantee[ing] nondiscriminatory treatment in insolvency proceedings between domestic and foreign creditors" Section 601 (a) will have the effect of encouraging plant closings in the U.S., since the IMF will be guaranteeing conditions that multinational corporations seek when they transfer capital from the U.S. to developing nations. Those conditions are also now the subject of multilateral negotiation in the MAI. Note that, unlike the unenforceable "voice and vote" provisions of the IMF appropriations on worker rights, the trade and investment liberalization conditions of the bill are a requirement which the IMF must meet to receive the quota increase. (See analysis of the language by Rob Weissman of Essential Action at http://www.preamble.org/IMF/essential.htm) WHAT YOU CAN DO: Call your Representative toll-free at 800-335-4949 or 888-898-7717, or at 202-225-3121 and ask him/her to oppose the quota increase and the MAI/NAFTA/WTO enforcement provisions of the appropriation. If your Representative is a Republican, ask him/her to ask Bob Livingston, Chair of the Appropriations Committee, to remove 601(a) from the bill and oppose adding the quota increase. If your Representative is a Democrat, ask him/her to ask Representative David Obey, Ranking Member on Appropriations, to remove 601(a) from the bill and oppose adding the quota increase. Note that even if your Representative has been a supporter of adding the quota increase (like Obey) he/she may be receptive to striking the trade liberalization language. __________________________________________ :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: Njoki Njoroge Njehu Public Outreach Coordinator 50 Years Is Enough Network 1247 E Street, SE Washington, DC 20003 - USA Phone: 202/IMF-BANK; 202/544-9355 Fax: 202/544-9359 Email: wb50years@igc.org Web: www.50years.org ---2133065211-1422937999-907358628=:18306-- From kpmoseley@juno.com Sat Oct 3 15:24:21 1998 From: kpmoseley@juno.com To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Sat, 3 Oct 1998 16:05:54 -0700 Subject: : NY Times on IMF X-Juno-Line-Breaks: 0-521 --------- Begin forwarded message ---------- From: "Taylor-Kamara, Obai A." To: LEONENET@MITVMA.MIT.EDU Subject: NY Times on IMF Date: Fri, 2 Oct 1998 10:19:42 -0400 October 2, 1998 I.M.F. Role in World Economic Woes Is Hotly Debated Related Articles Rubin Urges More Disclosure in Global Finance I.M.F. Lets Its Rule on Full Repayment Slip (Aug. 26) Second-Guessing the Economic Doctor (Feb. 1) By DAVID E. SANGER ASHINGTON -- When the world's finance ministers and central bankers gathered last year in Hong Kong, they nervously congratulated each other for containing -- at least for the moment -- a nasty financial brush fire in Asia. In a year's time, many predicted in hallway chatter, the troubles in Thailand and Indonesia would look like a replay of Mexico in 1995 -- a rough bump in the road for a world enjoying remarkable prosperity. Talk about bad market calls. Twelve months later, as the same financial mandarins clog Washington with their limousines and glide through endless receptions at the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, just about everything that could have gone wrong in the world economy has: the worst downturn in Japan since World War II, economic meltdown in Russia, a depression in Indonesia that is plunging 100 million people below the poverty line, and deep fears over what happens next in Latin America. What makes this year's IMF meeting most remarkable, though, is that the harshest criticisms are directed at the monetary fund itself, and, by extension, at the U.S. Treasury, which is viewed as the power behind the IMF. This year, in place of confident predictions, there are mutual recriminations. Arguments are breaking out over whether the true culprits were crony capitalists and weakened leaders like Russian President Boris Yeltsin, or huge investors who poured money into the world's emerging markets with reckless abandon in the mid-1990s and panicked in the past 12 months. Whatever the reason, one reality prevails: Hundreds of billions of dollars have fled from economies on four continents -- seeking the safest havens possible, often in the United States -- and the money is not returning anytime soon. And the subtext of every seminar on capital flows and every conclave of nervous ministers will be some painfully blunt questions: Can this be stopped? Or is the world headed for a global recession? Fifty-three years ago the IMF was created after the Bretton Woods conference which sought to stabilize the world economy and secure the peace after World War II. Now it is under attack from all sides, charged not only with worsening a bad situation by misjudging the economics, but with being politically tone-deaf in some of the most volatile capitals in the world, from Jakarta, Indonesia, to Moscow. For the first time, there are disturbing questions about whether the institution itself is still capable, financially or politically, of containing the kind of economic contagion that caught the world unaware. Once, the IMF's critics were largely found in Africa and South Asia, were the fund was often viewed as arrogant; today they include Wall Street's biggest players and top officials in the most powerful economies of Asia and Europe. Only a few -- including former Secretary of State George Schultz and members of Congress who are increasingly suspicious of all international institutions -- are talking about scrapping the IMF altogether. But almost everyone is talking about creating a "new financial architecture" that can do what the old one clearly cannot: smother financial wildfires before they leap around the globe. President Clinton, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other leaders, after months of silence, have edged into the debate, in some cases wresting the issue for the first time from their finance ministers and central banks. Their fear, their advisers say, is that 15 months of financial turmoil are now threatening political stability. The blunt-speaking Prime Minister of Singapore, Goh Chok Tong, recently described the cost of failure in stark terms that both Clinton and Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin have avoided. "A prolonged economic downturn in Asia will revive latent tensions against the West," he warned. Such concerns have turned this year's meeting into a tumbled mass of worries and a groping for short and long-term solutions. The Japanese, the French, the Southeast Asians are all arriving in Washington with different diagnoses of what went wrong, and different solutions about how to set it right. The United States has its own set of plans, a mix of suggestions to force more disclosure of financial data in countries around the world and to impose more American-style financial standards and regulation. Meanwhile, an ideological argument is breaking out over whether the world should slow down a long march toward more free and open markets -- a strategy pressed by the Clinton administration for the past six years. Others argue that it is unwise to start rebuilding the hospital while the patients are still on the operating tables. "Last year the standard answer that all of us were given came down to this: 'We have the IMF and the World Bank, and they know best,"' Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said over breakfast in Washington the other day, reflecting on how the crisis turned 30 years of astounding growth in his country into an overnight depression. "Then they said everything that went wrong was our fault," he said. "But now, now I think people know that much of the problem came from the outside, and we need something better." And the IMF itself is beginning to fight back, an awkward role for an institution dominated by Ph.D. economists who are unaccustomed to being openly challenged. "Every place you turn you read the same story, that we came in, that we made things worse," said Stanley Fischer, the deputy managing director of the fund, who was born in Northern Rhodesia -- now Zambia -- and became chairman of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's economics department before taking a job that has now put him in the center of the financial storm. "We frequently get the blame, some of it well-deserved," he said. "But it is politically convenient for governments around the world to cry, 'The IMF made us do it,' and pin their mistakes on us. That's fine. We'd rather be loved, but more than that we'd like to be effective." MISCALCULATIONS, POLITICS AND SAFETY NETS On a steaming January day, Michel Camdessus, the IMF's top official, slipped into Jakarta to the private residence of President Suharto and sat down for a four-hour meeting to tick off, line by line, the huge reforms Indonesia would have to implement in return for tens of billions of dollars in emergency aid. Two previous deals had collapsed when Suharto ignored the fund's conditions, so Camdessus insisted that he strike a deal directly with Suharto, then Asia's longest-serving leader. It was a meeting of men who knew different worlds of power politics: Suharto rose as a general in central Java, and Camdessus had detonated mines in Algeria for the French army before entering the French Treasury on his way to becoming head of France's central bank. "It was all there," a senior IMF official recalled. "He was told he had to dismantle the national airplane project, the clove monopoly, all the distribution monopolies." At one point, Camdessus looked at the impassive Suharto and said, "You see what this means for your family," a reference to their vast investments in the country's key industries. "He said, 'I called in my children, and they all understand."' But within months, that exchange in Jakarta came to symbolize the IMF's twin troubles: Its inability to understand and reckon with the national politics of countries in need of radical reform, and its focus on economic stabilization rather than the social costs of its actions. Suharto had no intention of fulfilling the agreement. It was, one of his former Cabinet members said, "a delaying move that was obvious to everyone except Camdessus." Perhaps one reason why the IMF sometimes appears tone-deaf is that its senior staff is almost entirely composed of Ph.D. economists. There are few officials with deep experience in international politics, much less the complexities of Javanese culture that were at work in Indonesia. Historically, experts in politics and security have gravitated to the United Nations, development experts to the World Bank, and economists to the IMF -- creating dangerous gaps in a crisis like this one. As a result, the fund had only a rudimentary understanding of what would happen if its demands were met and all Indonesia's state monopolies were quickly dissolved. While that system lined the pockets of the Suhartos and their friends, it also distributed food, gasoline and other staples to a country that stretches for 3,000 miles over thousands of islands. To help balance the budget, the fund demanded a quick end to expensive subsidies that keep the price of food and gasoline artificially low. But that, combined with the huge currency devaluation that sparked the crisis, resulted in high prices and shortages that fueled riots that continue to this day, as millions of Indonesians lose their jobs. The IMF -- unintentionally, its officials insist -- also sped Suharto's resignation, insisting on the elimination of "crony capitalism," code words for removing the Suharto family from the center of the economy. Ultimately, that may prove to be Indonesia's salvation, if the new government can contain the rioting against the ethnic Chinese minority -- whose money is desperately needed to save the country's fast-shrinking economy. "It is worth noting," Fischer said this week, "that our programs in Asia -- in Indonesia, Korea and Thailand -- only took hold after there was a change in government." Nonetheless, the Indonesia experience has revived the argument that the IMF is so focused on stabilizing banks and currencies, on preventing capital flight and freeing up markets, that it is blind to the social costs of its actions. Among the toughest critics has been its sister institution, the World Bank, whose main charge is alleviating poverty. "You've seen the tension almost every day," one senior World Bank official said recently. The bank has gone to extraordinary lengths in recent months to differentiate its role from that of the fund, and to announce a tripling of aid to the poorest in the countries hit by the economic chaos. Even U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has joined the argument, warning in a speech at Harvard recently that "if globalization is to succeed, it must succeed for poor and rich alike. It must deliver rights no less than riches. It must be harnessed to the cause not of capital alone, but of development and prosperity for the poorest of the world." IMF officials say they are changing strategies when they see they are exacting too great a social cost. "It's a very difficult formula to get exactly right," Fischer said in August, as Russia was teetering and the IMF was sending in $4.8 billion in aid that was rapidly wasted. "You need enough discipline to send the right message to the markets and keep investors from fleeing. But you need enough leeway to keep people from suffering more than they otherwise would." In recent months, he noted, the IMF has allowed more spending to sustain subsidies for basic goods for longer periods in Indonesia, Korea and elsewhere. "There is a new flexibility at the IMF" a senior Indonesian official concluded recently. "It is a lot better." A U.S. PAWN, OR A RUNAWAY AGENCY? The Clinton administration admits that the IMF has many failings, many of them on display this year. But it insists that the world has gone through global financial crises without an IMF once before in this century -- and the result was the 1930s. "I have no doubt the situation over the past year would have been much worse -- with greater devaluations, more defaults, more contagion, and greater trade dislocations -- without the program agreed with the IMF and the finance it has provided," Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers told Congress last week. Many Republicans and some Democrats are unconvinced. Even though the Senate has overwhelmingly approved an $18 billion contribution to the fund to help it fight new crises, the House defeated that measure two weeks ago. The fund's last hope of getting the money, which will free up nearly $100 billion in contributions from other nations waiting for the United States to act, will come when the House and Senate try to resolve their budget differences in a conference committee in the next 10 days. A rejection, Rubin insists, would send a message around the world that the United States is turning its back on the one institution charged with restoring economic stability. Everywhere else in the world, though, politicians and businessmen insist that one of the biggest problems with the IMF is that, contrary to the view of Congress, it acts as the U.S. Treasury's lap dog. Ask in Jakarta or Moscow, and the response is the same: The IMF never ventures far without looking back for the approving nod of its master. That view may not be far wrong. In ordinary times, the United States largely leaves its hands off, as the IMF's executive board -- made up of 24 representatives of the 182 member nations -- delve into the intricacies of budget policy in Greece or banking regulation in Argentina. "Surveillance" of the world's economies is the fund's main activity. When the United States weighs in, however, is when the IMF is called on to rescue a country in deep trouble. Only then does the IMF -- and the U.S. Treasury -- have the leverage to extract commitments in return for billions in aid. In theory, the U.S. influence is limited: It has an 18.5 percent vote in the fund. Germany, Japan, France and Britain have about 5 percent each. But in practice the United States usually gets its way, exercising its influence behind the scenes, often in interactions between Fischer and Summers. The two met when Fischer was on the MIT faculty and Summers was a graduate student taking one of his classes, later becoming a colleague at MIT. Each served as chief economist of the World Bank. It was Summers who was instrumental in placing Fischer in the fund's no. 2 job, and these days they talk constantly. "It's usually a warm relationship," Fischer said this summer. "Remember, this is a job where you cannot turn to outsiders for advice -- you can't call the chief economist at a Wall Street firm, or even many of your academic friends, because so many of the issues are confidential." The Treasury's relations with Camdessus are often more strained as he plays the role of world diplomat, traveling the globe and trying to coax along political leaders. The tensions were obvious from the start of the Asia crisis. The fund made little secret of its displeasure that the United States was not offering direct aid to Thailand, a major U.S. ally, as a sign of support and confidence. Mindful of the backlash in Congress when Mexico was bailed out with U.S. money, that was the last thing the Treasury planned to do. Summers, in turn, thought the fund was not forcing the Thais to implement its reform commitments rigorously enough or disclose their true financial picture. Within the U.S. government there was other dissension: The State and Defense Departments felt the United States should do more for Thailand, but backed off when the Treasury asked if they would like to pony up some aid out of their own budgets. There were other conflicts. When Japan used the last IMF meeting to propose setting up a $100 billion "Asia Fund" -- one that would exclude the United States and would probably offer aid under much more relaxed conditions than the IMF does. Rubin called up Camdessus at breakfast one morning and told him that the Japanese proposal would undercut the IMF's authority. "We've just had a dispute with Michel," Rubin reported to his aides as he returned to his orange juice and croissant. One of them shot back: "And it's only 8 a.m." Camdessus backed down at Rubin's insistence and walked away from money that Asia could have used. Japan says it will be back with a similar proposal this weekend, this time for a $30 billion fund. Camdessus has also rankled U.S. officials with statements that amounted to cheerleading to reassure the markets -- sometimes in the face of the facts. In June, with Russia on its way to collapse, Camdessus declared that "contrary to what markets and commentators are imagining" about the slow collapse of Russia's economy, "this is not a crisis. This is not a major development." The bailouts of Russia and South Korea were prime examples of how Washington muscles into the IMF's turf as soon as major U.S. strategic interests are involved. Last Christmas, as South Korea slipped within days of running out of hard currency to pay its debts in December, it sent a secret envoy, Kim Kihwan, to work out a rescue package. "I didn't bother going to the IMF," Kim recalled recently. "I called Summers' office at the Treasury from my home in Seoul, flew to Washington and went directly there. I knew that was how this would get done." Within days the Treasury dispatched David Lipton, its most experienced veteran of emergency bailouts, who is leaving his post as undersecretary for international affairs this month, to shadow the IMF staff's negotiations with the government in Seoul. Fischer was displeased. "To make a negotiation effective, it has to be clear who has the authority to do the negotiating," he said. WHO LOST RUSSIA? The pattern was repeated this summer, when the United States raced to put together a $17 billion package for Russia. The IMF's staff in Moscow declared that Russia needed no money at all -- it just needed to enact policies that would restore confidence in investors. The Americans and Germans came to a different conclusion. Soon after, U.S. officials gathered in the White House situation room to consider what might happen to Russia if the ruble was devalued and market reforms collapsed and to push the IMF to come up with emergency money. So the fund began assembling a last-ditch program to prop up a country that had resisted its reform plans for seven years. Camdessus, though, was still hesitant, questioning whether the IMF should risk its scarce resources in Russia. "We had to pull Michel along," a senior Treasury official recalled. As it turned out, Camdessus' instincts were right while the approach championed by Rubin and Summers proved disastrously wrong. The first installment of that payment -- $4.8 billion -- was wasted, propping up the currency long enough, in the words of one IMF official, "to let the oligarchs get their money out of the country." Then Yeltsin reversed his commitments, let the ruble devalue anyway, began printing money with abandon and fired virtually every reformer in his government -- resulting in a collapse of the IMF agreements and the indefinite suspension of its aid program. Now, inside the IMF and on Capitol Hill, there are recriminations over "who lost Russia." Publicly, Fischer argues that "there are no apologies owed for what we attempted in Russia." But some IMF officials complain privately that they let Rubin and Summers run roughshod over them, striking a deal that fell apart within weeks as the Russian parliament rebelled and Yeltsin backed away from his commitments. Summers responds that the United States "took a calculated risk" because "it was vastly better that Russia succeed than not succeed." The Russian collapse touched off new rounds of economic contagion, with investors fleeing Latin America, and triggering huge losses in hedge funds like Long Term Capital, the Greenwich, Conn., investment firm that needed to be rescued by Wall Street powerhouses whose money it had invested. "Russia was a turning point," said Robert Hormats, the vice chairman of Goldman, Sachs & Co. "It made the world realize that some countries can fail, even if the IMF and the Treasury intercede. And that changed the perception of risk." Now, as the countries meet to face a future that the IMF has warned could be very bleak, they need to reverse those perceptions, or watch countries slowly starve for lack of capital. The emerging markets are calling for controls on short term investments. The French want a stronger IMF. The Americans say the answer is more disclosure, so that investors are better warned, and tougher regulation. "These are usually nice, quiet meetings; everyone very polite," a top U.S. official said earlier this week. "Not this year." --------- End forwarded message ---------- ___________________________________________________________________ You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail. Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com Or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866] From tbos@social-sci.ss.emory.edu Mon Oct 5 15:55:56 1998 From: "Terry Boswell" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Mon, 5 Oct 1998 17:55:17 EST5EDT Subject: Senior Faculty Search at Emory University WSN, Please spread the word: The Department of Sociology at Emory University is searching for a position in the area of comparative political economy and development, rank open, including advanced associate or full professor level. Applicants should have a distinguished record of scholarship, including evidence of successful grant writing and graduate training. This area is one of the four major concentrations in our department and is part of a University-wide initiative to internationalize the curriculum. We seek applicants who have an active interest in building an interdisciplinary program in global development in conjunction with Emory's new International Institute. Preference will be given to applicants with a background in comparative industrialization or economic development. Applications should include a letter of interest, evidence of research and teaching quality, vita and a list of references. We will notify candidates before requesting letters of reference. The committee will begin screening applications after January 11, 1999. Send applications to Terry Boswell, Chair, Senior Search Committee, Department of Sociology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322. Emory is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Employer. Terry Boswell Department of Sociology Emory University Atlanta, GA 30322 From chriscd@jhu.edu Fri Oct 9 09:45:30 1998 Date: Fri, 09 Oct 1998 11:45:18 -0400 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: GRI.c5 (1/2) -- re: achieving functional democracy] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------74D434E4FA9313566EB83E2E --------------74D434E4FA9313566EB83E2E Wed, 07 Oct 1998 07:00:31 -0400 (EDT) Date: Wed, 07 Oct 1998 12:00:19 +0100 From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: GRI.c5 (1/2) -- re: achieving functional democracy To: christopher chase-dunn Chris, Yesterday, my latest attempt to post to wsn failed. Would you please post this two part chapter for me? Thanks, rkm ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Globalization and the Revolutionary Imperative Part II - Chapter 5 - preliminary Copyright 1998 by Richard K. Moore 26 September 1998 - 5780 words book maintained at: http://cyberjournal.org/cadre/gri/gri.html ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Part II - Envisioning a livable world: common sense, not utopianism ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5 - Democracy: collaboration and harmonization instead of competition and factionalism ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- What is democracy? -- a functional definition ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Democracy is, to put it mildly, an overused word. In the parlance of neoliberal globalization, democracy is equated with laissez-faire capitalism, as in democratic market reforms. In more general parlance, democracy is typically equated with multi-party elections, and for that reason Western nations are generally referred to as democracies -- even though citizen satisfaction is generally poor and steadily declining. For our purposes -- envisioning a livable world -- we need a functional definition of democracy: democracy is not a mechanism; democracy is a result. If people generally believe that they are involved in their society's governance, that their concerns matter, and that society is serving their interests as well as can be expected, then that would be strong evidence for a functioning democracy. If people are more inclined to say that government doesn't listen to them, and avoid political participation out of impotent apathy, that is strong evidence that democracy is absent. Such a citizens' test would not certify very many Western nations as being democratic. Any formal system, whether it be elections, political parties, or constitutions, can be corrupted and subverted. I have argued in earlier chapters that Western democratic institutions have in fact been corrupted by capitalism and that effective power has become concentrated in the hands of an elite oligarchy. I further argued that Western republics were set up intentionally to favor established wealthy interests over popular interests. In a functional survey of modern nations, I submit, the West would show up in the oligarchy column, not the democracy column. In this chapter we will look more closely at Western political systems, and try to identify why they do not lead to functional democracy. We will also at other models of governance, ask how they pass the "citizens' test", and see what they may have to offer us. My goal in this investigation is to develop enough insight into the dynamics of political systems so that we can begin to get a feeling for how robust democracy might be achieved in modern societies. Recall from the previous chapter: If livable societies are to be achieved and sustained, the most fundamental requirement is that stable, locally-based, democratic governance be established. Only democracy is based on popular will, only stable democracy can maintain social well being in a dynamic society, and only locally-based democracy can adjust to local requirements. Competitive factionalism -- a failed paradigm ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ There is a rationale for Western political systems, a theory by which they are supposed to work and achieve a rough-and-tumble version of democracy. The theory is that political parties will arise which represent various popular interests, and that by choosing among those parties people will be able to express their preferences. Competition among parties, the theory goes, will ultimately result in government agendas which reflect majority sentiments. In looking at how these systems work in practice, it becomes clear that they fail to live up to the theory at every single phase of their operations. The leading parties in the West are dominated by wealthy interests, and in recent years the policies of most major parties have converged into a single stream: corporate globalization. Little real choice is offered to the voters. Citizen preference itself has become generally meaningless because public information and debate are controlled by corporate-owned media. Elections, instead of being a way for policy priorities to be determined by voters, have become instead a way for corporate-beholden candidates to be sold to the electorate by sophisticated advertising campaigns. Such are the mechanisms of oligarchic rule in a paper democracy. There are so many things wrong with these political systems that a strong case can be made for reform almost anywhere you want to look. There are hundreds of citizen groups and organizations in the West pushing for reform of media, of campaign financing, or of corporate lobbying. There are groups pushing for proportional representation, others for minor political parties, and others who want everyone wired into some kind of online system of electronic "direct-democracy". The problem with such reformist approaches is that even if they were implemented, we would still be left with only a rough-and-tumble democracy, a competitive democracy based on factional politics. In what follows, I will endeavor to establish that competitive politics is itself incompatible with functional democracy. Rather than being aberrations, the various corruptions plaguing Western political systems are inherent in those systems. Already in the classical Roman Republic, before Roman Emperors arose, most of the modern Western corruptions could already be seen. Election districts were rigged to favor wealthy interests, and huge fortunes were typically expended in carrying out political campaigns. Roman politics evolved from republican democracy, to oligarchy via corruption, to direct rule by an Emperor. As we have seen in previous chapters, this same pattern is now being played out globally, with corporate bureaucracies (IMF etc) instead of the Emperor and his court, US and NATO elite forces instead of the Roman Legions, and television instead of circuses. Competitive politics, by its very nature, invites corruption. The goal of a political party, or faction, is to win power, and politics becomes a competition for power among societal factions. Alliances-of-convenience are formed to achieve majorities, and a politician class arises which is skilled at making deals and running election campaigns -- the game of politics becomes the game of power brokering. Wealthy interests would then be blind not to see the opportunities available from buying into the power game, concentrated as it is in the hands of power brokers and politicians, thereby gaining control over society's policy agenda. A political system based on factional competition ideally suits the purposes of the best-organized and best-funded faction, and the faction with the best access to media: the elite oligarchy. Even if some magical means were available by which such corruptions could be prevented, competitive politics would still be an unsound basis for functional democracy. If a majority can dictate policy to a minority, and ignore the interests of that minority, then a significant portion of the society, at any given time, is effectively disenfranchised. In a functional democracy, people generally, not just some temporary majority, must feel that society is responsive to their interests. >From a societal perspective, the purpose of politics is to adjudicate among interests and to provide a mechanism by which societal decisions can be made and societal problems solved. In a functional democracy, the adjudication process must be inclusive; it must involve the harmonization of interests, not the defeat of one by another. As any modern organizational consultant will readily tell you, a "win-lose" approach to business, or negotiations of any kind, is not as productive as a "win-win" approach. Overall benefit is greatest when the interests of all parties are served by an agreement or a contract. Just as business practices provided useful models for sustainability, so do organizational practices provide useful models for democracy: a win-win (inclusive) approach provides the most overall benefit. Only with an inclusive political process, which harmonizes among diverse interests, can a functional democracy be achieved. Only then can the societal problem-solving process take into account the interests of citizens generally. Ultimately the goal of politics is to enable societal problem solving. In a functional democracy the problem-solving process must be informed by the full range of societal interests. A profound paradigm shift occurs when you start thinking about politics as a problem solving process rather than a power competition. Any good corporate manager will tell you that problems are best solved when all viewpoints are carefully listened to. Often an unpopular minority view reveals problems that are critical to the success or failure of an endeavor. A competitive political paradigm suppresses minority views; a problem-solving paradigm welcomes minority participation. The contrast between the paradigms of problem-solving and power-competition can be best understood in microcosm, by comparing the processes of decision-making meetings in Western politics with those in modern corporations. The paradigm for political decision-making meetings is based on competitive factionalism, and is embodied in Robert's famous Rules of Order. Discussion continues, under these rules, until some faction feels that it has assembled a majority for its side. A vote is then called, and if a majority assents, the matter is settled and debate is ended. There is no incentive to pursue harmonization of interests beyond that which is required to achieve a majority block. And there is no incentive to listen to minority views at all. The failures of Western democracy can be already seen in the process of a typical meeting, as it might occur in a municipal council hall or on the floor of the US Congress. The competitive system, from bottom to top -- from meetings to elections -- is simply poor at solving societal problems. It merely provides a forum in which factions can battle over previously-determined partisan agendas. The paradigm for a decision-making meeting in a modern corporation is one of collaborative problem solving. A good manager listens to all views, attempts to harmonize conflicts, and seeks a solution that everyone can support. Corporations are in the end hierarchical, and the manager may make the final decision, even if it's unpopular -- but at least he or she, if competent, will listen to all views and seek consensus wherever achievable: that makes for a more effective team. Important work gets done at such a meeting; human creativity is exercised for collective goals; effective problem-solving is accomplished in pursuit of agreed objectives. Functional democracy, I suggest, must be based on a problem-solving paradigm rather than on competition and factionalism. Once again, sound business practices provide better societal models than do traditional Western political practices. This should really be no surprise: in our capitalist societies businesses are expected to operate effectively, while governments are set up to be subverted. Centralism vs. localism ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Another essential flaw in Western democratic systems is centralism. By centralism I refer to two characteristics: (1) the making of most significant societal decisions at the center -- in the society-wide governing body, and (2) the failure of politicians to represent the interests of the constituencies that elected them. In Western societies, parliaments and congresses have nearly unlimited power to make micro decisions for all levels of society, and the elected delegates are only nominally obligated to represent the interests of their constituencies -- in fact delegates generally represent the interests of party politics and of the corporate community, which dominates campaign funding. To survive in politics, a politician must get elected. What this means in today's world is Can the politician be sold to the constituency at election time? Achieving an affirmative answer to this question has much more to do with campaign funding and favorable coverage by media, than it has to do with the voting record of the candidate. The career imperative of a successful politician in the West is clear: serve the interests of the oligarchy, which has unlimited funding and media access available as needed. Both characteristics of centralism are inherently counter-democratic, according to our functional definition. By making most decisions at the center, popular will is diluted; no matter how conscientious the delegates may be, they must consider problems at the society macro level, and concerns of minor localities tend necessarily to be overlooked. And with no real obligation to represent constituencies, there is every incentive not to be conscientious at all, but to instead represent other interests, interests that provide greater benefit to the political career of the delegate. When centralism and factionalism are combined, as they are in leading Western nations, then functional democracy becomes all but impossible. With factions vying for power, wealthy interests busily buying influence, political power concentrated in a central governing body, and delegates free to support whatever policies they choose, it is little wonder that the will of the people plays little role in societal decision making and problem solving. One can hardly imagine a system better suited to the usurpation of power by an elite oligarchy. In the previous chapter, when focusing on societal feedback mechanisms, I argued that democracy must be locally based. Unless the solutions to local problems are agreed to locally, society lacks the feedback necessary to sustain democracy, to pass the citizens' test. In a functional democracy, we can assume that there must be some system of local governance which is inclusive of all local interests, employs a collaborative approach to problem solving, and which has considerable sovereignty over local affairs. Such local governance eliminates one of the characteristics of centralism: the making of most decisions on a society-wide basis. There are, however, many problems which cannot practically be dealt with locally. Transportation, communications, energy, allocation of scarce resources, trade policies, finances, and others, require society-wide problem solving, albeit with room for local variations in the implementation of solutions, and perhaps local approval of proposed solutions. After perhaps intermediate levels of government, there must be some kind of society-wide governing body that has responsibility for addressing society-wide problems. In a functional democracy, the problem-solving approach used by this central body must be aimed at harmonizing the wishes of the various localities, as represented by their delegations. The delegates do not come to the central body firmly committed to particular solutions, but rather with an informed understanding of the desires and requirements they are bringing to the discussion. If each delegate reliably represents their constituencies in the central deliberations, then the consensus solutions that are arrived at are likely to successfully harmonize the overall interests of society. But how to assure that delegates reliably represent their constituencies? In today's systems of democracy, delegates are selected, theoretically, on the basis of character, judgement, experience, integrity, intelligence, good sense, and other personality traits. When a candidate is elected, the presumption is that the electorate trusts him or her personally to do the right thing for the constituency. Needless to say, this system does not work very well. The problem is not that the wrong person might get elected in these systems, but rather that localities are focusing on delegate selection rather than on problem solving. In order for the locality to be represented properly in the central body, the locality must take the time to consider what position it wants taken to the central body for the important issues of the day. Without local deliberations on societal issues, the delegate lacks the information necessary to adequately represent the locality in central deliberations, regardless of how responsible and conscientious he or she might be. Even at the local level there are diverse interests, and no one person embodies the knowledge and needs of the whole community. Problem solving at the local level requires the participation of the whole community. Only by that means can the locality even become aware of what position it wants to be represented centrally. If the locality has no awareness of what it wants, as a community, then how could any elected official possibly be expected to represent its will? For this reason alone, it is no wonder that Western societies are not democracies. Local deliberation of society-wide issues is a necessary feedback mechanism in a functional democracy. The local governance system, then, is concerned with solving local problems itself, and with identifying its priorities regarding wider issues, as its contribution to society-wide governance. The role of a delegate in this system is clear: it is to take the local agenda to the central body and to represent it in the deliberations. It is not the judgement or character of the delegate which is of central importance -- although poor judgement or character would hardly be a recommendation -- but rather that the delegate can and will represent the local agenda, as articulated locally. In today's democracies, people represent localities, and society-wide policies are determined by the dynamics of centralism and factionalism; in a functional democracy, agendas represent localities, and society-wide agendas are harmonized from those through the collaboration of delegates. At the local level, a community agenda is harmonized from the interests of all; at the central level, a societal agenda is harmonized from the various local agendas, with the process possibly repeated at intermediate levels. This is the meaning of localism in the context of a functional democracy, and localism eliminates the counter-democratic characteristics of centralism. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [continued...] --------------74D434E4FA9313566EB83E2E-- From chriscd@jhu.edu Fri Oct 9 09:46:09 1998 Date: Fri, 09 Oct 1998 11:45:43 -0400 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: GRI.c5 (2/2) -- re: achieving functional democracy] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------BE72082ADDBD533630357CA0 --------------BE72082ADDBD533630357CA0 Wed, 07 Oct 1998 07:00:22 -0400 (EDT) Date: Wed, 07 Oct 1998 12:00:06 +0100 From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: GRI.c5 (2/2) -- re: achieving functional democracy To: christopher chase-dunn [continued...] ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Functional democracy -- is it a utopian vision? ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ So far this chapter has been an investigation into functional democracy, an attempt to identify why Western systems fail to be democratic, and an attempt to identify the processes necessary for functional democracy. In this investigation, perhaps ironically, models from sound corporate management practices have proven to be particularly useful. In this investigation, I have not simply invented models -- my goal is not to be a creative designer of societal systems. What I have tried to do is to look closely at the problems to be solved, based on the requirements of functional democracy, and to seek to identify how similar problems are routinely solved in today's societies. I have tried to follow a scientific approach: analysis followed by synthesis, with each step carefully argued and substantiated by due consideration of all relevant issues. An interesting question at this point can be asked regarding the uniqueness of the solutions that have been articulated. Are there other systems which would be equally promising or more promising, in the achievement of functional democracy? In some sense this question is difficult to answer -- who can guarantee, in any situation, that better approaches might not come along? But in another sense, I don't think there is that much room for fundamental variation in solutions to the problem of achieving functional democracy. Our citizens' test is a very strong requirement, and certain basic characteristics must be present in a society for that requirement to be satisfied: Necessary characteristics of a functional democracy ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ If a general sense of participation is to be assured to the members of society, then local communities must, as communities, have a similar sense of control over their own destiny. In order for communities to develop such a sense, the people must work together as a community in addressing the problems they face as a community. In order that the wider society include the needs of all in its problem solving, localities must work out their agendas regarding society-wide issues and those agendas must be represented at society-wide (central) collaborative sessions. It is difficult to see how functional democracy could be reliably achieved without at least the above fundamental characteristics being present in the solution. If any one of these characteristics is not in some way satisfied, there is a clear feedback problem: the information necessary to achieve functional democracy either won't be generated, or it won't be reliably delivered to where it is needed, or it won't be appropriately incorporated into societal problem solving. If indeed we have succeeded in identifying the essential and necessary characteristics of a functional democracy, several questions naturally arise. There is the question that heads this chapter: Is functional democracy itself, along with the characteristics that have been identified, utopian? Or can such systems be realistically implemented, and will they function as intended? These kinds of questions can only be answered empirically -- by testing in the real world. Fortunately, there are real-world examples we can look at, and even better, the examples are current ones. There are societies today in which the fundamental elements that have been identified above have in fact been implemented, and where very promising results have been achieved in terms of functional democracy and certification by the citizens' test. The first example is one most readers have probably never heard of, and the second example is one that most readers have heard about frequently in the mass media, but most of what they've heard has been untrue. The first example is a participatory budgeting project ("PB-POA") that has been going on since 1989 in Porto Alegre, capital city of Rio Grande do Sul, the southernmost state of Brazil. The second example is the political system of Cuba. These examples will be presented in the two following sections. Both are based on local citizen collaboration in problem solving, both have achieved remarkable results in terms of sound societal operation, and in both cases general citizen satisfaction with the system is very high. These examples demonstrate that the principles of functional democracy developed in this investigation are neither utopian nor limited to theory: the principles can be implemented, they can perform as intended, and they can achieve functional democratic governance. The claim being made in this chapter is a rather strong one: There are certain principles of democratic governance, enumerated above, that are both necessary and sufficient to achieve functional democracy, provided that the principles are appropriately implemented, and that surrounding conditions permit them to operate effectively. In other words: functional democracy is achievable, its implementation must incorporate certain essential characteristics, and those characteristics have been identified. If this claim is a valid one, then these characteristics can be of considerable value in informing a movement to overcome elite domination and move toward livable, sustainable societies. The characteristics can guide the operation of the movement itself, making it both democratic and effective at solving movement problems. And an understanding of the requirements of democracy and of sustainability informs the political agenda of the movement, so that it can focus its efforts on achieving systemic societal transformation, and avoid the pursuit of reforms which may be superficially appealing, but which do not lead to functional democracy, and hence can never overcome elite domination nor achieve sustainable societies. PB-POA -- local democracy in Brazil ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Following the adoption of a new Federal Constitution in 1988, and spurred by the inability of the central government to provide adequate services, Brazil has experienced an unprecedented period of decentralization during the nineties. There has been a strengthening of civil society and a good deal of innovation in the development of local, participatory, democratic systems. [footnote to be provided to a paper by Zander Navarro] Of particular interest to this investigation are the experiences of the Participatory Budgeting project (PB) in Porto Alegre. In this project, community associations and other organized social sectors were mobilized to solve the problem of how to best utilize municipal funds. The project has been a considerable success in several different ways. First, the mobilization itself was successful. The level of participation has been high enough that the entire city feels itself involved in the process. Second, the problem-solving process used is collaborative and inclusive, rather than factional. Mechanisms have been developed so that city-wide policies can be harmonized from the requirements determined by the various constituencies. Third, the results for the city were outstanding. Porto Alegra has a solid record of healthy financial management, and municipal services are indeed carried out according to the democratically determined priorities. In this example, the functional democratic process occurs outside of the electoral political system. The various community organizations, and the overall PB organizing structure, have no official governmental mandate. They are institutions of the civil society, and the validity of the budget they develop arises solely from the fact that everyone knows that it expresses the will of the people generally. The elected city officials routinely accept the PB-developed budget; any other course would make little political sense. Porto Alegra is an example of what we have been calling a locality within the larger Brazilian society. Within its borders, and within the domain of budgeting, it seems fair to say that Porto Alegra has achieved a functional democracy, and one that has the essential characteristics previously identified. The system in Porto Alegra is multi-level, so it even demonstrates, in microcosm, that it is possible to harmonize problem-solving among several smaller localities by appropriate use of delegates. If Brazil as a whole employed a similar system. Porto Alegra would be well-prepared to make its contribution to problem solving in the larger society by sending a representative delegation. Some readers may be skeptical at this point, asking themselves if there is a dark side to this Brazilian story, if there are failures in this PB system. There may be some failures, but that misses the point. No system is perfect, but a system that has the basic formula right is capable of being improved over time. A system that has the basic formula wrong, as do Western democracies, can never be made right, although there are infinite opportunities for would-be reformers to expend their energy in pointless attempts. Cuba -- functional democracy on a national scale ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ I must assume that many readers, when they see the name Cuba, immediately think "dictatorship" and "refugees". To such readers it must seem absurd to cite Cuba as an exemplary democratic system. I can only say that Cuba has been the subject of decades-long disinformation campaign, particularly in the US media. The successes of socialist Cuba show the lie of capitalist rhetoric, and a defamatory media campaign has been the chosen rebuttal, along with embargoes and all other manner of harassment by the US. >From sources outside the mass media one gets a quite different picture of Cuba, one that can by no means be characterized as a dictatorship. One particular observer, Charles McKelvey, has investigated Cuba's political system and discovered remarkably effective democratic processes at work. He is a Professor of Sociology at Presbyterian College, in Clinton, South Carolina, and has been to Cuba several times. He describes his experience as follows: "I have been to Cuba four times since 1993. Last summer, I was there for ten weeks, and my activities included in-depth interviews of university professors and leaders in the Popular Councils concerning the political process in Cuba. In addition, I talked to many different people that I met informally, sometimes through families with which I was connected and other times with people I met as I traveled about Havana by myself. I do not consider myself an expert on Cuba. I would describe myself as someone who is knowledgeable about Third World national liberation movements and is in the process of learning about the Cuban case. My general impression is that the revolutionary government enjoys a high degree of legitimacy among the people. Occasionally, I came across someone who was alienated from the system. There disaffection was not rooted in the political system but in the economic hardships that have emerged during the "special period." The great majority seemed to support the system and seemed very well informed about the structures of the world economy and the challenges that Cuba faces. Many defended the system with great enthusiasm and strong conviction. I had expected none of this prior to my first trip, recalling my visit to Tanzania in 1982, by which time many had come to view "ujamaa socialism" as a faded dream, at least according to my impressions during my brief visit. But to my surprise, I found much support for the revolutionary project in Cuba. I could not help but contrast this to the United States, where there is widespread cynicism in regard to political and other institutions. "The Cuban political system is based on a foundation of local elections. Each urban neighborhood and rural village and area is organized into a "circumscription," consisting generally of 1000 to 1500 voters. The circumscription meets regularly to discuss neighborhood or village problems. Each three years, the circumscription conducts elections, in which from two to eight candidates compete. The nominees are not nominated by the Communist Party or any other organizations. The nominations are made by anyone in attendance at the meetings, which generally have a participation rate of 85% to 95%. Those nominated are candidates for office without party affiliation. They do not conduct campaigns as such. A one page biography of all the candidates is widely-distributed. The nominees are generally known by the voters, since the circumscription is generally not larger than 1500 voters. If no candidate receives 50% of the votes, a run-off election is held. Those elected serve as delegates to the Popular Councils, which are intermediary structures between the circumscription and the Municipal Assembly. Those elected also serve simultaneously as delegates to the Municipal Assembly. The delegates serve in the Popular Councils and the Municipal Assemblies on a voluntary basis without pay, above and beyond their regular employment. " [source document to be noted] For those who remain skeptical regarding Cuba, I can suggest looking at some of the material in the bibliography. Especially notable are the achievements of Cuba in the areas of human rights, health care, and education. My own conclusion after reviewing material from many sources, is that McKelvey's report above can be essentially accepted at face value. On that basis, it appear that Cuba has achieved a general functional democracy at a national scale. It passes the citizens' test, and it has each of our essential characteristics: local problem solving, delegation to central bodies of agendas instead of personalities, and a collaborative, harmonizing approach to solving societal problems. Functional democracy -- how can it be achieved in the West? ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ For Western nations, the situation is comparable to Brazil: there are pre-existing electoral structures around which a functional democratic process would have to be created. In the West, then, the path to functional democracy is the path of a strong civil society. As in Brazil, local organizations need to be mobilized and frameworks need to be created so that these constituencies can collaborate in addressing local and societal issues. These structures then need to be repeated at various levels, right up to the national level. The output of this process is the development of a comprehensive policy agenda for every level of governmental policy, an agenda which has the overwhelming support of the society generally, and which includes variation in solutions depending on local needs and preferences. The role of Western elected officials, given a strong and universally supported civil society, would simply be to implement the articulated agenda, in the same way that the officials in Porto Alegre implement PB's budget. The role of an elected official becomes that of a civil servant, with a job to do; the game of power-brokering disappears and with it the professional politician. Candidates would presumably be active and recognized participants in their local civil societies, and their loyalties would be firmly in line with the consensus that had arisen from the collaborative process. The problem of achieving functional democracy in the West is not a technical one. As described above, and as exemplified in Brazil, there is no inherent reason why a strong civil society cannot be developed and operate harmoniously within existing constitutions and electoral systems. And as exemplified in Cuba, the processes of functional democracy can work effectively even when there are several intermediate levels of government involved. The problem in the West is not technical, it is motivational and organizational. Before people in the West can achieve functional democracy, they must be motivated, they must feel an urgent need to change the existing system. (It is noteworthy that both of our examples were developed only under great pressure -- the poverty of Brazil and the US enmity which confronted Cuba.) If a sense of general urgency does develop in the West, then the creation of the civil society structures will be a formidable organizing task. These observations suggest directions for the efforts of those citizens, activists, leaders, and writers who are already motivated to achieve democracy, and who would like to bring about the conditions necessary for the creation of strong civil societies. In order to generate societal motivation for change, the problem is one of public education. People need to be made aware that global capitalism is destroying our societies and that economic and social conditions are only going to get worse. They need to understand that national sovereignty is being transferred to corporate-dominated bureaucracies, and that police state laws and infrastructures are being systematically developed to control populations. They need to see that the little democracy we have in the West is being rapidly taken away, and that only a brief window of opportunity remains in which to rise up and make our democracies work. Most of all, they need to realize their own empowerment, to become aware that they have a much bigger role to play in running society than to mark a ballot every once in a while. All their lives they've been told they are a free people; it is time for them to believe it. Organizing the civil society is a task that can begin immediately, and what it amounts to is primarily a shift in perspective on the part of those activists and organizers who are already involved in the hundreds of reformist movements and citizens organizations currently in existence. Their perspective needs to be strategically informed: there can be no small victories over the capitalist system; there can only be a general victory. Activist energy must be directed toward the development of collaboration between different organizations, and the creation of the infrastructures of a civil society. Education and organizing contribute synergistically to one another. As more people become motivated, their participation strengthens existing organizations, and as organizations begin to collaborate with one another, the growing movement begins to take on the characteristics of a strong civil society. Presumably a point of critical mass will occur, a turning point, where the wider society becomes generally aware of the budding civil society. After that, the movement could be expected to grow very rapidly, and the quality and integrity of the infrastructures developed would be put to the test. In Chapter 7, the problems of movement building and public education will be investigated in more detail. For now I would like to summarize the results of this chapter's investigation: Functional democracy is achievable, and it must be based on the principles of localism, collaborative problem solving, and inclusive harmonization of all societal interests. In Western societies, the process of functional democracy can be achieved through a well-organized civil society, working within the constraints of existing constitutions and electoral systems. In order to move toward the achievement of functional democracies, people in the West need to be educated as to the dire threats posed by capitalism and globalization, and activists and organizers need to focus their attention on building the infrastructures for a democratic civil society. [end Chapter 5] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- This material is a draft book in-progress. You are encouraged to send feedback to the author at editor@cyberjournal.org. Non-commercial forwarding is hereby authorized, in entirety, including this sig. Please keep in mind that this material is a preliminary draft, that the presentation is to be expanded, and that substantiating examples and references are to be included -- suggestions invited. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ a political discussion forum - cj@cyberjournal.org To subscribe, send any message to cj-subscribe@cyberjournal.org A public service of Citizens for a Democratic Renaissance (mailto:cdr@cyberjournal.org http://cyberjournal.org) ---------------------------------------------------------- To subscribe to our activists list, send any message to: renaissance-network-subscribe@cyberjournal.org Help create the Movement for a Democratic Rensaissance ---------------------------------------------- crafted in Ireland by rkm ----------------------------------- A community will evolve only when the people control their means of communication. -- Frantz Fanon --------------BE72082ADDBD533630357CA0-- From rkmoore@iol.ie Fri Oct 9 10:44:32 1998 Date: Fri, 9 Oct 1998 17:44:16 +0100 To: chriscd@jhu.edu From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Re: [Fwd: GRI.c5 (1/2) -- re: achieving functional democracy] 10/09/98, christopher chase-dunn wrote: >Yesterday, my latest attempt to post to wsn failed. Would you please post >this two part chapter for me? Dear Chris, Many thanks. rkm From arnomd@online.no Sat Oct 10 02:39:12 1998 Sat, 10 Oct 1998 10:38:46 +0200 (MET DST) From: "=?iso-8859-1?Q?Arno_Mong_Daast=F8l?=" To: "MAI-not (E-mail)" , "TOES 97 (E-mail)" , , "IPE (E-mail)" , "World Systems Network (E-mail)" , "PEN-List - Progressive Economists Network (E-mail)" Subject: U.S. AID TO RUSSIA: WHERE IT ALL WENT WRONG Date: Sat, 10 Oct 1998 10:33:27 +0200 charset="iso-8859-1" U.S. AID TO RUSSIA: WHERE IT ALL WENT WRONG Here is an important testimony for the US congress which I received from Wendell Solomons in Colombo, Sri Lanka: solomons@slt.lk Greetings! Arno arno@daastol.com http://daastol.com This is the link: http://www.house.gov/international_relations/full/ws917982.htm Wendell's introductory text: I am sending you as an attachment the Dr Janine Wedel testimony to a Congress committee. The question is how around 12 people got their hands on $ 4 billion in aid money from Britain, Germany, Japan, USA, and painted themselves as "young reformers", unsupervised by the convening US government. U.S. AID TO RUSSIA: WHERE IT ALL WENT WRONG Testimony before the Committee on International Relations U.S. House of Representatives by Janine R. Wedel Associate Research Professor, Department of Anthropology; and Research Fellow, Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies The George Washington University From rkmoore@iol.ie Sat Oct 10 04:08:29 1998 Date: Sat, 10 Oct 1998 11:08:17 +0100 To: arnomd@online.no From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Re: U.S. AID TO RUSSIA: WHERE IT ALL WENT WRONG 10/10/98, Arno Mong Daastøl wrote: >The question is how around 12 people got their hands on $ 4 billion in aid >money from Britain, Germany, Japan, USA, and painted themselves as "young >reformers", unsupervised by the convening US government. > >U.S. AID TO RUSSIA: >WHERE IT ALL WENT WRONG >Testimony before the >Committee on International Relations >U.S. House of Representatives The thesis that "something went wrong" is highly questionable. The West has been doing its best to destroy the Soviet Union ever since it was created, and now a formula has finally been found to grind it into the dust. I'll post an article by Michel Chossudovsky, a Canadian economist, which analyzes IMF policy generally. rkm From rkmoore@iol.ie Sat Oct 10 04:08:36 1998 Date: Sat, 10 Oct 1998 11:08:22 +0100 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu (world-system network) From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: 1/2> Chossudovsky: FINANCIAL WARFARE (fwd) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Date: Tue, 22 Sep 1998 Sender: World Order Conference List From: Ross Wilcock Subject: Financial Crisis To: WOC-L@PGS.CA -----Original Message----- From: Michel Chossudovsky [mailto:chossudovsky@sprint.ca] Sent: Monday, September 21, 1998 11:25 PM To: Recipient list suppressed Subject: financial crisis FINANCIAL WARFARE by Michel Chossudovsky Professor of Economics, University of Ottawa, author of "The Globalisation of Poverty, Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms", Third World Network, Penang and Zed Books, London, 1997. Copyright by Michel Chossudovsky Ottawa 1998. All rights reserved. To publish or reproduce this text, contact the author at chossudovsky@sprint.ca or fax 1-514-4256224 * * * "Practices of the unscrupulous money changers stand indicted in the court of public opinion, rejected by the hearts and minds of men". (Franklin D. Roosevelt's First Inaugural Address, 1933) Humanity is undergoing in the post-Cold War era an economic crisis of unprecedented scale leading to the rapid impoverishment of large sectors of the World population. The plunge of national currencies in virtually all major regions of the World has contributed to destabilising national economies while precipitating entire countries into abysmal poverty. The crisis is not limited to Southeast Asia or the former Soviet Union. The collapse in the standard of living is taking place abruptly and simultaneously in a large number of countries. This Worldwide crisis of the late twentieth century is more devastating than the Great Depression of the 1930s. It has far-reaching geo-political implications; economic dislocation has also been accompanied by the outbreak of regional conflicts, the fracturing of national societies and in some cases the destruction of entire countries. This is by far the most serious economic crisis in modern history. The existence of a "global financial crisis" is casually denied by the Western media, its social impacts are downplayed or distorted; international institutions including the United Nations deny the mounting tide of World poverty: "the progress in reducing poverty over the [late] 20th century is remarkable and unprecedented..."1. The "consensus" is that the Western economy is "healthy" and that "market corrections" on Wall Street are largely attributable to the "Asian flu" and to Russia's troubled "transition to a free market economy". Evolution of the Global Financial Crisis ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ The plunge of Asia's currency markets (initiated in mid-1997) was followed in October 1997 by the dramatic meltdown of major bourses around the World. In the uncertain wake of Wall Street's temporary recovery in early 1998 --largely spurred by panic flight out of Japanese stocks-financial markets backslided a few months later to reach a new dramatic turning-point in August with the spectacular nose-dive of the Russian ruble. The Dow Jones plunged by 554 points on August 31st (its second largest decline in the history of the New York stock exchange) leading in the course of September to the dramatic meltdown of stock markets around the World. In a matter of a few weeks (from the Dow's 9337 peak in mid-July), 2300 billion dollars of "paper profits" had evaporated from the U.S. stock market.2 The ruble's free-fall had spurred Moscow's largest commercial banks into bankruptcy leading to the potential take-over of Russia's financial system by a handful of Western banks and brokerage houses. In turn, the crisis has created the danger of massive debt default to Moscow's Western creditors including the Deutsche and Dresdner banks. Since the outset of Russia's macro-economic reforms, following the first injection of IMF "shock therapy" in 1992, some 500 billion dollars worth of Russian assets --including plants of the military industrial complex, infrastructure and natural resources-have been confiscated (through the privatisation programmes and forced bankruptcies) and transferred into the hands of Western capitalists.3 In the brutal aftermath of the Cold War, an entire economic and social system is being dismantled. "Financial Warfare" ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ The Worldwide scramble to appropriate wealth through "financial manipulation" is the driving force behind this crisis. It is also the source of economic turmoil and social devastation. In the words of renowned currency speculator and billionaire George Soros (who made 1.6 billion dollars of speculative gains in the dramatic crash of the British pound in 1992) "extending the market mechanism to all domains has the potential of destroying society".4 This manipulation of market forces by powerful actors constitutes a form of financial and economic warfare. No need to recolonise lost territory or send in invading armies. In the late twentieth century, the outright "conquest of nations" meaning the control over productive assets, labour, natural resources and institutions can be carried out in an impersonal fashion from the corporate boardroom: commands are dispatched from a computer terminal, or a cell phone. The relevant data are instantly relayed to major financial markets-often resulting in immediate disruptions in the functioning of national economies. "Financial warfare" also applies complex speculative instruments including the gamut of derivative trade, forward foreign exchange transactions, currency options, hedge funds, index funds, etc. Speculative instruments have been used with the ultimate purpose of capturing financial wealth and acquiring control over productive assets. In the words of Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad: "This deliberate devaluation of the currency of a country by currency traders purely for profit is a serious denial of the rights of independent nations".5 The appropriation of global wealth through this manipulation of market forces is routinely supported by the IMF's lethal macro-economic interventions which act almost concurrently in ruthlessly disrupting national economies all over the World. "Financial warfare" knows no territorial boundaries; it does not limit its actions to besieging former enemies of the Cold War era. In Korea, Indonesia and Thailand, the vaults of the central banks were pillaged by institutional speculators while the monetary authorities sought in vain to prop up their ailing currencies. In 1997, more than 100 billion dollars of Asia's hard currency reserves had been confiscated and transferred (in a matter of months) into private financial hands. In the wake of the currency devaluations, real earnings and employment plummeted virtually overnight leading to mass poverty in countries which had in the post-War period registered significant economic and social progress. The financial scam in the foreign exchange market had destabilised national economies, thereby creating the preconditions for the subsequent plunder of the Asian countries' productive assets by so-called "vulture foreign investors".6 In Thailand, 56 domestic banks and financial institutions were closed down on orders of the IMF, unemployment virtually doubled overnight.7 Similarly in Korea, the IMF "rescue operation" has unleashed a lethal chain of bankruptcies leading to the outright liquidation of so-called "troubled merchant banks". In the wake of the IMF's "mediation" (put in place in December 1997 after high-level consultations with the World's largest commercial and merchant banks), "an average of more than 200 companies [were] shut down per day (...) 4,000 workers every day were driven out onto streets as unemployed".8 Resulting from the credit freeze and "the instantaneous bank shut-down", some 15,000 bankruptcies are expected in 1998 including 90 percent of Korea's construction companies (with combined debts of $20 billion dollars to domestic financial institutions).9 South Korea's Parliament has been transformed into a "rubber stamp". Enabling legislation is enforced through "financial blackmail": if the legislation is not speedily enacted according to IMF's deadlines, the disbursements under the bail-out will be suspended with the danger of renewed currency speculation. In turn, the IMF sponsored "exit programme" (ie. forced bankruptcy) has deliberately contributed to fracturing the chaebols which are now invited to establish "strategic alliances with foreign firms" (meaning their eventual control by Western capital). With the devaluation, the cost of Korean labour had also tumbled: "It's now cheaper to buy one of these [high tech] companies than buy a factory-and you get all the distribution, brand-name recognition and trained labour force free in the bargain"...10 The Demise of Central Banking In many regards, this Worldwide crisis marks the demise of central banking meaning the derogation of national economic sovereignty and the inability of the national State to control money creation on behalf of society. In other words, privately held money reserves in the hands of "institutional speculators" far exceed the limited capabilities of the World's central banks. The latter acting individually or collectively are no longer able to fight the tide of speculative activity. Monetary policy is in the hands of private creditors who have the ability to freeze State budgets, paralyse the payments process, thwart the regular disbursement of wages to millions of workers (as in the former Soviet Union) and precipitate the collapse of production and social programmes. As the crisis deepens, speculative raids on central banks are extending into China, Latin America and the Middle East with devastating economic and social consequences. This ongoing pillage of central bank reserves, however, is by no means limited to developing countries. It has also hit several Western countries including Canada and Australia where the monetary authorities have been incapable of stemming the slide of their national currencies. In Canada, billions of dollars were borrowed from private financiers to prop up central bank reserves in the wake of speculative assaults. In Japan-where the yen has tumbled to new lows-"the Korean scenario" is viewed (according to economist Michael Hudson), as a "dress rehearsal" for the take over of Japan's financial sector by a handful of Western investment banks. The big players are Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Morgan Gruenfell among others who are buying up Japan's bad bank loans at less than ten percent of their face value. In recent months both US Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin and Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright have exerted political pressure on Tokyo insisting "on nothing less than an immediate disposal of Japan's bad bank loans-preferably to US and other foreign "vulture investors" at distress prices. To achieve their objectives they are even pressuring Japan to rewrite its constitution, restructure its political system and cabinet and redesign its financial system... Once foreign investors gain control of Japanese banks, these banks will move to take over Japanese industry..."11 Creditors and Speculators ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ The World's largest banks and brokerage houses are both creditors and institutional speculators. In the present context, they contribute (through their speculative assaults) to destabilising national currencies thereby boosting the volume of dollar denominated debts. They then reappear as creditors with a view to collecting these debts. Finally, they are called in as "policy advisors" or consultants in the IMF-World Bank sponsored "bankruptcy programmes" of which they are the ultimate beneficiaries. In Indonesia, for instance, amidst street rioting and in the wake of Suharto's resignation, the privatisation of key sectors of the Indonesian economy ordered by the IMF was entrusted to eight of the World's largest merchant banks including Lehman Brothers, Credit Suisse-First Boston, Goldman Sachs and UBS/SBC Warburg Dillon Read.12 The World's largest money managers set countries on fire and are then called in as firemen (under the IMF "rescue plan") to extinguish the blaze. They ultimately decide which enterprises are to be closed down and which are to be auctioned off to foreign investors at bargain prices. Who Funds the IMF Bailouts? ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Under repeated speculative assaults, Asian central banks had entered into multi-billion dollar contracts (in the forward foreign exchange market) in a vain attempt to protect their currency. With the total depletion of their hard currency reserves, the monetary authorities were forced to borrow large amounts of money under the IMF bailout agreement. Following a scheme devised during the Mexican crisis of 1994-95, the bailout money, however, is not intended "to rescue the country"; in fact the money never entered Korea, Thailand or Indonesia; it was earmarked to reimburse the "institutional speculators", to ensure that they would be able to collect their multi-billion dollar loot. In turn, the Asian tigers have been tamed by their financial masters . Transformed into lame ducks-they have been "locked up" into servicing these massive dollar denominated debts well into the third millennium. But "where did the money come from" to finance these multi-billion dollar operations? Only a small portion of the money comes from IMF resources: starting with the Mexican 1995 bail-out, G7 countries including the US Treasury were called upon to make large lump-sum contributions to these IMF sponsored rescue operations leading to significant hikes in the levels of public debt.13 Yet in an ironic twist, the issuing of US public debt to finance the bail-outs is underwritten and guaranteed by the same group of Wall Street merchant banks involved in the speculative assaults. In other words, those who guarantee the issuing of public debt (to finance the bailout) are those who will ultimately appropriate the loot (eg. as creditors of Korea or Thailand) --ie. they are the ultimate recipients of the bailout money (which essentially constitutes a "safety net" for the institutional speculator). The vast amounts of money granted under the rescue packages are intended to enable the Asian countries meet their debt obligations with those same financial institutions which contributed to precipitating the breakdown of their national currencies in the first place. As a result of this vicious circle, a handful of commercial banks and brokerage houses have enriched themselves beyond bounds; they have also increased their stranglehold over governments and politicians around the World. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ (continued...) From rkmoore@iol.ie Sat Oct 10 04:08:45 1998 Date: Sat, 10 Oct 1998 11:08:30 +0100 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu (world-system network) From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: 2/2> Chossudovsky: FINANCIAL WARFARE (continued...) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Strong Economic Medicine ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Since the 1994-95 Mexican crisis, the IMF has played a crucial role in shaping the "financial environment" in which the global banks and money managers wage their speculative raids. The global banks are craving for access to inside information. Successful speculative attacks require the concurrent implementation on their behalf of "strong economic medicine" under the IMF bail-out agreements. The "big six" Wall Street commercial banks (including Chase, Bank America, Citicorp and J. P. Morgan) and the "big five" merchant banks (Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley and Salomon Smith Barney) were consulted on the clauses to be included in the bail-out agreements. In the case of Korea's short-term debt, Wall Street's largest financial institutions were called in on Christmas Eve (24 December 1997), for high level talks at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.14 The global banks have a direct stake in the decline of national currencies. In April 1997 barely two months before the onslaught of the Asian currency crisis, the Institute of International Finance (IIF), a Washington based think-tank representing the interests of some 290 global banks and brokerage houses had "urged authorities in emerging markets to counter upward exchange rate pressures where needed...". 15 This request (communicated in a formal Letter to the IMF) hints in no uncertain terms that the IMF should advocate an environment in which national currencies are allowed to slide.16 Indonesia was ordered by the IMF to unpeg its currency barely three months before the rupiahs dramatic plunge. In the words of American billionaire and presidential candidate Steve Forbes: "Did the IMF help precipitate the crisis? This agency advocates openness and transparency for national economies, yet it rivals the CIA in cloaking its own operations. Did it, for instance, have secret conversations with Thailand, advocating the devaluation that instantly set off the catastrophic chain of events?" (...) Did IMF prescriptions exacerbate the illness? These countries' moneys were knocked down to absurdly low levels".17 Deregulating Capital Movements The international rules regulating the movements of money and capital (across international borders) contribute to shaping the "financial battlefields" on which banks and speculators wage their deadly assaults. In their Worldwide quest to appropriate economic and financial wealth, global banks and multinational corporations have actively pressured for the outright deregulation of international capital flows including the movement of "hot" and "dirty" money.18 Caving in to these demands (after hasty consultations with G7 finance ministers), a formal verdict to deregulate capital movements was taken by the IMF Interim Committee in Washington in April 1998. The official communique stated that the IMF will proceed with the Amendment of its Articles with a view to "making the liberalization of capital movements one of the purposes of the Fund and extending, as needed, the Fund's jurisdiction for this purpose". 19 The IMF managing director, Mr. Michel Camdessus nonetheless conceded in a dispassionate tone that "a number of developing countries may come under speculative attacks after opening their capital account" while reiterating (ad nauseam) that this can be avoided by the adoption of "sound macroeconomic policies and strong financial systems in member countries". (ie. the IMF's standard "economic cure for disaster").20 The IMF's resolve to deregulate capital movements was taken behind closed doors (conveniently removed from the public eye and with very little press coverage) barely two weeks before citizens' groups from around the World gathered in late April 1998 in mass demonstrations in Paris opposing the controversial Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) under OECD auspices. This agreement would have granted entrenched rights to banks and multinational corporations overriding national laws on foreign investment as well derogating the fundamental rights of citizens. The MAI constitutes an act of capitulation by democratic government to banks and multinational corporations. The timing was right on course: while the approval of the MAI had been temporarily stalled, the proposed deregulation of foreign investment through a more expedient avenue had been officially launched: the Amendment of the Articles would for all practical purposes derogate the powers of national governments to regulate foreign investment. It would also nullify the efforts of the Worldwide citizens' campaign against the MAI: the deregulation of foreign investment would be achieved ("with a stroke of a pen") without the need for a cumbersome multilateral agreement under OECD or WTO auspices and without the legal hassle of a global investment treaty entrenched in international law. Creating a Global Financial Watchdog ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ As the aggressive scramble for global wealth unfolds and the financial crisis reaches dangerous heights, international banks and speculators are anxious to play a more direct role in shaping financial structures to their advantage as well as "policing" country level economic reforms. Free market conservatives in the United States (associated with the Republican Party) have blamed the IMF for its reckless behaviour. Disregarding the IMF's intergovernmental status, they are demanding greater US control over the IMF. They have also hinted that the IMF should henceforth perform a more placid role (similar to that of the bond rate agencies such as Moody's or Standard and Poor) while consigning the financing of the multi-billion dollar bail-outs to the private banking sector.21 Discussed behind closed doors in April 1998, a more perceptive initiative (couched in softer language) was put forth by the World's largest banks and investment houses through their Washington mouthpiece (the Institute of International Finance). The banks proposal consists in the creation of a "Financial Watchdog-a so-called "Private Sector Advisory Council"-with a view to routinely supervising the activities of the IMF. "The Institute [of International Finance], with its nearly universal membership of leading private financial firms, stands ready to work with the official community to advance this process." 22 Responding to the global banks initiative, the IMF has called for concrete "steps to strengthen private sector involvement" in crisis management-what might be interpreted as a "power sharing arrangement" between the IMF and the global banks.23 The international banking community has also set up it own high level "Steering Committee on Emerging Markets Finance" integrated by some of the World's most powerful financiers including William Rhodes, Vice Chairman of Citibank and Sir David Walker, Chairman of Morgan Stanley. The hidden agenda behind these various initiatives is to gradually transform the IMF --from its present status as an inter-governmental body-into a full fledged bureaucracy which more effectively serves the interests of the global banks. More importantly, the banks and speculators want access to the details of IMF negotiations with member governments which will enable them to carefully position their assaults in financial markets both prior and in the wake of an IMF bailout agreement. The global banks (pointing to the need for "transparency") have called upon "the IMF to provide valuable insights [on its dealings with national governments] without revealing confidential information...". But what they really want is privileged inside information.24 The ongoing financial crisis is not only conducive to the demise of national State institutions all over the World, it also consists in the step by step dismantling (and possible privatisation) of the post War institutions established by the founding fathers at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. In striking contrast with the IMF's present-day destructive role, these institutions were intended by their architects to safeguard the stability of national economies. In the words of Henry Morgenthau, US Secretary of the Treasury in his closing statement to the Conference (22 July 1944): "We came here to work out methods which would do away with economic evils-the competitive currency devaluation and destructive impediments to trade-which preceded the present war. We have succeeded in this effort"25 NOTES ^^^^^ 1. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report, 1997, New York, 1997, p. 2. 2. Robert O'Harrow Jr., "Dow Dives 513 Points, or 6.4", Washington Post, 1 September 1998, page A. 3. Bob Djurdjevic, Return looted Russian Assets, Aug. 30, Truth in Media's Global Watch, Phoenix, 30 August 98. 4. See "Society under Threat- Soros", The Guardian, London, 31 October 1997. 5. Statement at the Meeting of the Group of 15, Malacca, Malaysia, 3 November 1997, quoted in the South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, 3 November 1997. 6. See Michael Hudson and Bill Totten, "Vulture speculators", Our World, No. 197, Kawasaki, 12 August 1998. 7. Nicola Bullard, Walden Bello and Kamal Malhotra, "Taming the Tigers: the IMF and the Asian Crisis", Special Issue on the IMF, Focus on Trade No. 23, Focus on the Global South, Bangkok, March 1998. 8. Korean Federation of Trade Unions, "Unbridled Freedom to Sack Workers Is No Solution At All", Seoul, 13 January 1998. 9. Song Jung tae, "Insolvency of Construction Firms rises in 1998", Korea Herald, 24 December 1997. Legislation (following IMF directives) was approved which dismantles the extensive powers of the Ministry of Finance while also stripping the Ministry of its financial regulatory and supervisory functions. The financial sector had been opened up, a Financial Supervisory Council under the advice of Western merchant banks arbitrarily decides the fate of Korean banks. Selected banks (the lucky ones) are to be "made more attractive" by earmarking a significant chunk of the bail-out money to finance (subsidise) their acquisition at depressed prices by foreign buyers, --ie. the shopping-spree by Western financiers is funded by the government on borrowed money from Western financiers. 10. Michael Hudson, Our World, Kawasaki, December 23, 1997. 11. Michael Hudson, "Big Bang is Culprit behind Yen's Fall", Our World, No. 187, Kawasaki, 28 July 1998. See also Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and Japanese Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi, Joint Press Conference, Ikura House, Tokyo, July 4, 1998 contained in Official Press Release, US Department of State, Washington, 7 July, l998. 12. See Nicola Bullard, Walden Bello and Kamal Malhotra, op. cit. 13. On 15 July 1998, the Republican dominated House of Representatives slashed the Clinton Administration request of 18 billion dollar in additional US funding to the IMF to 3.5 billion. Part of the US contribution to the bail-outs would be financed under the Foreign Exchange Stabilisation Fund of the Treasury. The US Congress has estimated the increase in the US public debt and the burden on taxpayers of the US contributions to the Asian bail-outs. 14. Financial Times, London, 27-28 December 1997, p. 3). 15. Institute of International Finance, Report of the Multilateral Agencies Group, IIF Annual Report, Washington, 1997. 16. Letter addressed by the Managing director of the Institute of International Finance Mr. Charles Dallara to Mr. Philip Maystadt, Chairman of the IMF Interim Committee, April 1997, quoted in Institute of International Finance, 1997 Annual Report, Washington, 1997. 17. Steven Forbes, "Why Reward Bad Behaviour, editorial, Forbes Magazine, 4 May 1998. 18. "Hot money" is speculative capital, "dirty money" are the proceeds of organised crime which are routinely laundered in the international financial system. 19. International Monetary Fund, Communiqué of the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund, Press Release No. 98/14 Washington, April 16, 1998. The controversial proposal to amend its articles on "capital account liberalisation" had initially been put forth in April 1997. 20. See Communique of the IMF Interim Committee, Hong Kong, 21 September 1997. 21. See Steven Forbes, op cit. 22. Institute of International Finance, "East Asian Crises Calls for New International Measures, Say Financial Leaders", Press Release, 18 April 1998. 23. IMF, Communiqué of the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors, April 16, 1998. 24. The IIF proposes that global banks and brokerage houses could for this purpose "be rotated and selected through a neutral process [to ensure confidentiality], and a regular exchange of views [which] is unlikely to reveal dramatic surprises that turn markets abruptly (...). In this era of globalization, both market participants and multilateral institutions have crucial roles to play; the more they understand each other, the greater the prospects for better functioning of markets and financial stability... ". See Letter of Charles Dallara, Managing Director of the IIF to Mr. Philip Maystadt, Chairman of IMF Interim Committee, IIF, Washington, 8 April 1998. 25. Closing Address, Bretton Woods Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, 22 July 1944. The IMF's present role is in violation of its Articles of Agreement. Michel Chossudovsky Department of Economics, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, K1N6N5 Voice box: 1-613-562-5800, ext. 1415 Fax: 1-514-425-6224 E-Mail: chossudovsky@sprint.ca Alternative fax: 1-613-562-5999 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ a political discussion forum - cj@cyberjournal.org To subscribe, send any message to cj-subscribe@cyberjournal.org A public service of Citizens for a Democratic Renaissance (mailto:cdr@cyberjournal.org http://cyberjournal.org) ---------------------------------------------------------- Non-commercial reposting is hereby approved, but please include the sig up through this paragraph and retain any internal credits and copyright notices. .--------------------------------------------------------- To subscribe to our activists list, send any message to: renaissance-network-subscribe@cyberjournal.org Help create the Movement for a Democratic Rensaissance ---------------------------------------------- A community will evolve only when the people control their means of communication. -- Frantz Fanon From arnomd@online.no Sun Oct 11 01:10:29 1998 Sun, 11 Oct 1998 09:10:22 +0200 (MET DST) From: "=?iso-8859-1?Q?Arno_Mong_Daast=F8l?=" To: , "'WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK'" Subject: RE: U.S. AID TO RUSSIA: WHERE IT ALL WENT WRONG Date: Sun, 11 Oct 1998 09:09:28 +0200 charset="iso-8859-1" In-Reply-To: I quite agree Richard! I have copied two chapters on the historical / political role of credit from my article on Russia below (http://daastol.com/rus97.html ) In general I still agree with what I wrote two years ago. Arno Richard wrote The thesis that "something went wrong" is highly questionable. The West has been doing its best to destroy the Soviet Union ever since it was created, and now a formula has finally been found to grind it into the dust. I'll post an article by Michel Chossudovsky, a Canadian economist, which analyzes IMF policy generally. Rkm A short story on credit There may be reasons to pay some attention to the character of the IMF (International Monetary Fund), since it has not only been central in setting up destructive policies in the developing world, but has also been instrumental in securing Russia a new position in this club. In order to arrive at a deeper insight of the character of this policy it may be of interest to start with a small historical introduction. Credit has historically been a most important instrument in state-building, warfare and a crucial tool in the international power-game (Wallerstein, 1978, p.44; Marx, 1972, I,4,1050; Braudel, 1985, p.241; Kennedy, 1989, p.89). Anderson explains how this advantage of credit has been used by Britain, In the 1730s the philosopher George Berkeley described it as 'the chief advantage England has over France; and three decades later an expert on commercial questions spoke of the strength of England's public credit as 'the permanent miracle of her policy, which has inspired both astonishment and fear in the States of Europe'. ... These comments had much justification: of the costs of the four great wars fought by Britain in 1702-83 three-quarters were raised by borrowing. It was borrowing moreover at relatively low rates of interest: the ability to raise money cheaply was a major British advantage in the country's struggle with France. (Anderson, 1987, p.108) Writes historian Carroll Quigley, Credit had been known to the Italians and the Netherlanders long before it became one of the instruments of English world supremacy. ... This new stage of financial capitalism, which continued to dominate England, France, and the United States as late as 1930, was made necessary by the great mobilisations of capital needed for railroad building after 1830. ... The third stage of capitalism is of such overwhelming significance in the history of twentieth century, and its ramifications and influences have been so subterranean and even occult, ... This system had its centre in London for four chief reasons. ... great volume of savings ... oligarchical social structure ... aristocratic but not noble ... skill in financial manipulation, especially on the international scene. (Quigley, 1966, pp. 48-50). Zara Steiner notices that, It is the present view of some historians that it was Britain's financial and commercial role and not its manufacturing base that was, and remained, the real source of her wealth. The City of London played the dynamic role in overseas expansion and stood at the centre of Britain's global prestige. World trade was invoiced in pounds and financed by London. (Steiner, 1994, p.48) There are reasons to regard the years since the fall of Bretton Woods as a reversal of the historical process from monopoly capitalism back to pre-1931 financial capitalism. From Pax Americana and almost back to Pax Britannica. Anthony Sampson calls the domestic British phenomenon in the 1980s a, return to the freedom and internationalism of the Edwardian times before it broke apart seventy years ago. (Sampson, 1993, p.115, in the section called; 'The City Transformed'). The new credit cartel The IMF has used this instrument forcefully in Russia, and has been able to direct the development with small means actually being paid out, as the IMF-loans have been used as a carrot and a whip to pressure debtor nations into compliance. IMF has attached certain conditions to its loans - the SAPs (structural adjustment programs) - which for any involved nation, in general, concerns deregulation of internal and external economic affairs: prices are to be deregulated, tariffs and subsidies are to be reduced and companies are to be privatised. The flip coin of this policy is that, on the other hand, the money- and credit-supplies are to be tightly regulated. That is the limit to this liberalism; do not liberalise credit and money: make credit cheap and available; to some extent a deflationary policy, which Quigley claims historically is a hall-mark of financial capitalism (Quigley, 1966, chapter on Financial Capitalism). In particularly, one should not, make it more readily available to some activities rather than to other activities. When this is being combined with liberalisation of the financial markets, one may conclude that this policy regards growth in speculation and consumption as, in practice, better than growth in investments in infrastructure. The method of attaching conditions is old and was practised with the Phoenicians and their apprentices, the Venetians. It usually concerned different kinds of foreign access to local markets and to local companies, as it does in the case of Russia. This policy generally favours foreign interests. The IMF's power is far larger, but also more indirect than is usually noticed. Practically speaking all banks and nations of the industrialised world demand that the debtor country conform to the "advice" of the IMF. Thereby, these countries through the IMF, in practice establish an international credit-cartel which can dictate conditions and thereby the internal domestic policy of any debtor country. This is on an international scale. On the national scale the policy implemented is again precisely limiting the availability of credit. What this amounts to therefore, is more or less a world-wide dictatorship through the resource of credit, perhaps the strongest instrument of power there is. The policy is also, since it makes this resource scarce, to the benefit of those who already have this resource; the creditors. So, to some extent this amounts to a world government run by the creditors - who are not democratically elected but representatives of banks and their investors. There has for a long time been a recognised goal of the free trade school to establish a world government, in order to secure global free trade. This was pointed out by List and Roscher (List, 1841, p. 120ff; Roscher, 1882, § LXVII ), concerning the ideas of J.B.Say and Quesnay. With the establishment of the United Nations and the closely related IMF, WTO and the World Bank, together establishing a universal credit cartel, this may have come through. What we seem to have, therefore, is a theoretical goal among free-traders of a world government, and the actual establishment of this by a "union" of creditors. On the board of the IMF, interests are represented according to the size of investments, as contrasted with democratic principles. First, the US and secondly, Britain are the nations with most influence at the board of the organisation. Their representatives may not only be bankers, but also politicians put in at the board of the IMF. They are likely to be subject to prevalent ways of evaluating matters within the board of banking experts. Their way of thinking have, however, changed over the years. During the years of Pax Americana, in the 1950s and the 1960s, due primarily to the revival of the American System-tradition of economics under F.D.Roosevelt, there was considerable support in these world economic organisations for construction of infrastructure in the developing countries. One of the founders of the World Bank, the American Harry Dexter White, represented this line and wanted the World Bank to become a financial supporter of public goods which private investors would not fund. There was always another tendency, at the start represented by Lord Keynes, who wanted the World Bank to perform more according to standard private bank criteria and only perform as a guarantee fund for private investments. Keynes argued against, "the absurd notion of debtor countries being responsible for international investment." (Oliver, 1975, p.151; Gavin and Rodrik, 1995, p.329) This tendency today prevails (Daily Telegraph, 1996). This policy may represent a more narrow-minded banking policy, paying more attention to the short-term bottom line of accounts, than to long-term growth potentials. This tendency gained ground, in particular from the end of the 1960s. It started with the devaluation of the pound; followed with the establishment of British off-shore banks; the end of the Bretton Woods system; and the rigged oil crisis in 1973 and Paul Volcker's US interest-rate hike in 1979, which both turned oil rents into third-world debts, and into interests for the Anglo-American banks. The general liberalising policy during the 1980s put the candle on the cake. The change in "development" policy from promotion of technology and grand infrastructure projects, to local projects and "attitude" development (for instance education in family planning), within the world economic policy institutions is one part of what might be termed the "banker's counter-revolution" of the 1970s and 1980s. What we have arrived at today, and increasingly so, is probably a kind of financial capitalism where national governments are at the mercy of the whims of the financial markets, whose whims again are at the mercy of cynical large scale speculators whatever nationality they may be. The references are: Anderson, M.S. (1987). Europe in the Eighteenth Century, 1713-1783, 3.ed. (1961), London: Longman. Braudel, Ferdinand, (1985). Civilisation & Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, (1979), Vol.III; The Perspectives of the World, London: Fontana Press. Kennedy, Paul. (1989). The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, Economic Change and Military Conflict 1500 to 2000, London: Fontana Press (1988). Marx, Karl, (1972). Kapitalen, Copenhagen: Rhodos. Quigley, Carroll. (1966). Tragedy and Hope, A History of the World in Our Time, New York: Macmillian. Sampson, Anthony. (1993). The Essential Anatony of Britain. Democracy in Crisis, rev.ed., Sevenoaks, Kent: Coronet Books, Hodder and Stoughton (1992) (1 ed.: 1962). Steiner, Zara. (1994). The Fall of Great Britain, Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy, in: Geir Lundestad (ed.), The Fall of Great Powers, Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy, Nobel Symposium 1987, Oslo-Oxford: Scandinavian University Press. / Oxford University Press. Wallerstein, Immanuel. (1978). Det moderne verdenssystem, 2 vols,. Oslo: Gyldendal. (translation of The Modern World System, Academic Press 1974). From david_nz@xtra.co.nz Sun Oct 11 03:00:43 1998 From: "David Fraser" To: "WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK" Subject: Re: 1/2> Chossudovsky: FINANCIAL WARFARE (fwd) Date: Sun, 11 Oct 1998 20:53:12 +1300 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_01BDF559.28C5FB80 I was struck by the quote from Chossudovsky copied below "The existence of a "global financial crisis" is casually denied by the Western media, its social impacts are downplayed or distorted; international institutions including the United Nations deny the mounting tide of World poverty: "the progress in reducing poverty over the [late] 20th century is remarkable and unprecedented..."1. The "consensus" is that the Western economy is "healthy" and that "market corrections" on Wall Street are largely attributable to the "Asian flu" and to Russia's troubled "transition to a free market economy"." The power of words to (mis)describe truth are shown in that small piece. Who is to blame for the "global financial crisis"? Probably those with the most to gain. Is the crisis "Asian flu"? Do we blame the Asians, the Russians, the Africans, Chinese? My interest is not the argument about "who" but the use of cute sound bites and pithy headlines to determine national thinking and social behaviour. "Asian flu" very usefully transfers blame to all Asians. The West is therefore blameless. The West hasn't got the flu. They are not sick. It is therefore not within the Western consciousness that the financial crisis facing Asian (and other) countries has its origins in Western greed. Who is at fault for this mis-information. Unfortunately it is our ourselves and therefore, through reflection, the media. We have an appetite for sexual scandal that smothers the more important, though harder to uncover, stories of financial intrigue. The media, for the most part, reports what it is told. It is to expensive to do otherwise. And to make a semblance of sense in 30 seconds on national prime time news requires gross generalisations and memorable words. Linda Smircich in Putnam and Pacanowsky's "Communication and Organisation: An interpretative approach" (1983) showed how the words "the energy crisis" of 1973 mis-described a minor fluctuation in oil supplies to cover a bargaining position of gas companies. The three word sound bite told us the problem and what we needed to do in response. And it was bullshit. Such is, I believe, the "Asian Flu" and the "global financial crisis". To be sure there is a crisis. Many countries will be embroiled in major social upheaval because of it. But it is a crisis not of their making. It is not their fault though forever they have the blame. DF ------=_NextPart_000_01BDF559.28C5FB80

I was struck by the quote from = Chossudovsky copied below

"The existence of a = "global financial crisis" is casually denied by the
Western = media, its social impacts are downplayed or distorted; = international
institutions including the United Nations deny the = mounting tide of World
poverty: "the progress in reducing = poverty over the [late] 20th century is
remarkable and = unprecedented..."1. The "consensus" is that the = Western
economy is "healthy" and that "market = corrections" on Wall Street are
largely attributable to the = "Asian flu" and to Russia's troubled "transition
to a = free market economy"."

The power of words to = (mis)describe truth are shown in that small piece.  Who is to blame = for the "global financial crisis"?  Probably those with = the most to gain.  Is the crisis "Asian flu"?  Do we = blame the Asians, the Russians, the Africans, Chinese?

My = interest is not the argument about "who" but the use of cute = sound bites and pithy headlines to determine national thinking and = social behaviour.  "Asian flu" very usefully transfers = blame to all Asians.  The West is therefore blameless.  The = West hasn't got the flu.  They are not sick.  It is therefore = not within the Western consciousness that the financial crisis facing = Asian (and other) countries has its origins in Western greed.

Who = is at fault for this mis-information.  Unfortunately it is our = ourselves and therefore, through reflection, the media.  We have an = appetite for sexual scandal that smothers the more important, though = harder to uncover, stories of financial intrigue. The media, for the = most part, reports what it is told.  It is to expensive to do = otherwise.  And to make a semblance of sense in 30 seconds on = national prime time news requires gross generalisations and memorable = words.

Linda Smircich in Putnam and Pacanowsky's = "Communication and Organisation: An interpretative approach" = (1983) showed how the words "the energy crisis" of 1973 =  mis-described a minor fluctuation in oil supplies to cover a = bargaining position of gas companies.  The three word sound bite = told us the problem and what we needed to do in response.  And it = was bullshit.

Such is, I believe, the "Asian Flu" and = the "global financial crisis".  To be sure there is a = crisis.  Many countries will be embroiled in major social upheaval = because of it.  But it is a crisis not of their making.  It is = not their fault though forever they have the = blame.

DF


------=_NextPart_000_01BDF559.28C5FB80-- From d9870017@post01.osaka-gaidai.ac.jp Sun Oct 11 14:46:28 1998 Date: Mon, 12 Oct 1998 00:59:47 +0900 From: Mizuno Mitsuaki To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Q: books on Kashmir One of my colleagues are seeking the books on Kashmir, India written by the author sounds like 'Zutchi', or 'Zuchi' or 'Ztsuchi'. She and I does not know the actual author. But according to her, this book is one of the most important scholarly books on Kashmir issue (after independence) written in English. As I am not specialist on Kashimir issue, please kindly tell me the actual title, author and publisher. -- Mizuno Mitsuaki, South Asian Studies and International Relations Osaka University of Foreign Studies e-mail: d9870017@post01.osaka-gaidai.ac.jp http://www.osaka-gaidai.ac.jp/~d9870017/index.htm From r.barendse@worldonline.nl Mon Oct 12 07:38:48 1998 From: "Dr. R.J. Barendse" To: Subject: Re: Slavonica Date: Tue, 14 Jul 1998 15:42:43 +0200 boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0039_01BDAF3E.0ACD45E0" Dit is een meerdelig bericht in MIME-indeling. ------=_NextPart_000_0039_01BDAF3E.0ACD45E0 charset="iso-8859-1" Thanks for the various interesting papers on the situation in Russia = etc. I have a couple of remarks both on the previous discussion and on = the paper which Arno Daastol urged everybody to read: 1.) As to the question of how 12 people got their hand on some $ 4 = bilion aid to Russia, I read in the Dutch newspaper `De Volkskrant' that = this mainly goes back to the 1995 elections when the Russian oligarchy = gave extensive financial support to Yelzin's campaign in return for = being allowed the proceeds from `privatized' companies.=20 Indeed, this already was the case during the conflict between Yelzin = and the Russian parliament, when again Yeltzin appears to have had = massive financial support from the oligarchy in return for selling them = the assets of state-companies. In fact, I even heard that during the = attempted coup in 1980 and the `fight for the white house', men were = walking around in the crowd of the `democrats' (never more than a few = thousand in a city of 11 milion anyway) liberally distributing dollars = to everybody. This money was - I heard - appearantly mainly derived = from the Russian maffia, the `Organizatija', but you may wonder how much = derived from foreign `aid'.=20 For foreign aid is appearently distributed by Yeltzin (and = Chernomirdin) for buying political support, through the media, or - and = more importantly - by assuring jobs to potential voters. Thus - for = example - during Yeltzin's visit to the former Communist bastion of = Volgograd. I don't think, by the way, that Yeltzin is very different = from other Russian politicians in this respect - it is more or less the = accepted way of doing things in Russia. The reformed Communist Party = still disposes of the funds of the old communist party which it uses to = buy support, and it now seems clear that the oligarchy also funded the = Lebed campaign, in return for him supporting Yeltzin during the second = round of the election.=20 I don't think much will change whoever comes to power - if Lebed = were to come to power, more money would probably go to former generals = of the Moldavia army, if the communists came to power more money would = go to industries run by the former Nomenklatura - as is already the case = during the recent change of the cabinet. Political support is bought = and, conversibly, leverage on the market is bought by political support. = And, indeed, this is not new. Russian politics has always had a = strain of gangsterism where local strongmen support politicians - if = need be with arms - in return for financial - and other - favours where = such deals are brokered by (criminal) middlemen or by `state-merchants' = .. If I don't go back all the way to the state-merchants (the Gos'ti) in = the 17 th century who also doubled as middlemen in the market for = political support (they actually have a lot in common with the present = oligarchy) or go back to local strongmen in that century like the = Khovantsin family - kind of 17 th century's Lebeds - I mention them = since are the subject of THE classic work on the grim world of Russian = politics (the opera `Khovantsina' of Modeste Mussorgsky, which everybody = interested in Russian politics should ponder on).=20 Even if I don't go back that far I might still refer back to the = `Uzbek maffia' and the activities of Breznev-family in the 1970's or = perhaps to Beria and his financial/military/political NKVD - empire in = the 1930's.=20 Probably western observers have too much been misled by = `Kreminology' which assumed the USSR was a monolithic `totalitarian' = power-structure centred on the Kremlin. To understand Russian politics = they should perhaps refer more to the literature on the = Nazi-dictatorship which is now being caracterized as a `polycratic = anarchy of overlapping competences'. If seen in this light there's = nothing new under the sun.=20 The fault here is rather with the western donors (yes - and the IMF) = who assume they are giving to the `government'. While the `government' = is really but one of many groups vieing for power and influence - aid is = invested in Russia for buying support by one group.=20 Maybe - this is part of some devillish complot by the IMF to = undermine the Russian state as R.K. Moore argues, but I rather think the = IMF has no idea either of what is going on in the Kremlin, let alone = outside Moscow. I would rather think it is desparately looking for = somebody to carry out its magnificient `structural adjustement policies' = too. Most IMF-`advisors' only know what they have seen on TV, and, once = in Moscow for a few days don't venture much further than `Hotel Rossia' = - cheap booze, cheaper girls - as indeed do the western correspondents = from whom they get their information.=20 The economy is now being run by an oligarchy with political support = (really a Nomenklatura in disguise though granted with the approval of = the Harvard business-school now rather than the Party-school) And, = likewise, whole sectors of it have simply ceased paying taxes to the = `government' . They now pay, say, protection racket to the Organizatija = - why should they pay to the `government' if the `government' gives = nothing in return ? And I don't think this will change very much in the = forseeable future either.=20 2.)Chudovski claims that `assets of Russian state-companies are = being sold to western multinationals' - are they ? Sure, the only = company which really counts in Russia, Gazprom, is trying to attract = western investors and is trying to work with western oil-companies but = it is hardly really being sold to them. As I hear most western investors = are extremely reluctant to invest in Russia. I believe twice as much = foreign capital has been invested in Hungary than in the entire CIS now. = Just like the IMF the foreign investors are also on the look-out for a = reliable partner=20 But again this is nothing new. It reminds me somewhat of the = situation during World War I when the British and French enterpreneurs = and governments also had to deal with local `buzzinesmen' (as such = shadowy figures are now called in `Anglo-Ruski') to fetch thousands of = tons of French or British munition, riffles, food, medicine etc. etc. = from Murmansk to Petrograd. Virtually all of this `disappeared' somehow = with historians still unable to figure out what happened to it.=20 I really doubt whether foreign investment is going to make much of = an impact on Russia anyway, not because the infrastructure is not there = - as Daastol claims, but because there is TOO MUCH of it. The kind of = investments Russia would need are, for example, investments in drilling = for oil in the Arctic seas off the Kola-peninsula, entertaining and = building new gas-pipes in Tjumen - imagine an Artic tundra about as vast = as the whole of western Europe, covered with gas-wells and pipe-lines as = far as they eye can reach - or in mining in Northeastern Siberia - a = region as large as the entire USA covered in dense taiga with 2000 meter = high mountains, subject to frequent earthquakes - and, mind you, all of = this in permafrost conditions.=20 Now, all US oil -companies, combined, already had difficulties = building the Alaska pipeline which is a minor project compared to the = Baikul-Amur Magistral railroad of the Soviet area - or, again, remember = the problems with the tunnel under the Canal - a minor project compared = to these investments in Russia. Moreover, much of the Russian industry = is built on a scale which completely dwarves anything known to western = investors - thus, the Magnitorsk ironworks alone produced more steel = than the entire UK. To modernize the steel-industry in Magnitogorsk = alone would require funds which are completely beyond the US or European = steel-manufacturers. =20 Basically, even to modernize the Russian industry (and, remember the = USSR was the world's foremost producer of an endless array of goods = ranging from oil to cement, from natural gas to tractors, from steel to = diamonds or coal) entails investments on a scale which are simply not in = the range of private industry. And, furthermore, these would be = investments on the very long run and the present global financial = climate is not very conducive to this.=20 The only thing western firms are appearently willing to invest in = are commercial enterprise (selling say Danish cheese, Guzzi-shoes or = Benneton-watches in Moscow's former GUM or along the Nevski - Prospect = in Petersburg - not of course in Russia's provinces where the shops are = still as empty as in the Soviet-period) with profits on the very short = term. Since the massive structural investments needed are simply beyond = the means of private western investors and certainly beyond Russia's new = 'buzzinesman' - they can only be provided by the Russian state. I use to = joke that in Russia capitalism is the longest road from socialism to = socialism because all these massive enterprises can simply not be run by = private enterpreneurs. Nor can they in the `West'. Even in Britain under = Attlee's labour government, for example, the coal-industry which needed = massive restructuring had to be taken over by the state because no = private enterpreneur could raise the funds required - as even the = quary-owners themselves were willing to admit. 3.)And, contrary to what Daastol thinks this is NOT a new situation = - I would urge him to study the NEP-period in the 1920's more closely = when - granted, briefly - the Bolsheviki experimented with a free = market.NEP failed not primarily because of the Bolsheviki's animosity = towards the `bourgeoisie' (who, in any case, were only a = quasi-bourgeoisie - pretty much like the contemporary `buzzinesman' - = first getting rich on first WWI, then Civil War, speculation) or the = `Kulaks'. But because on the one hand the Kulaks were getting rich = quickly by withholding stocks of grain from the cities, and, on the = other, because nobody was willing to make risky investments in the = infrastructure - steel, railroads, electrification - needed for the = industrialisation of Russia. So that, while commerce was booming, even = much of the damage done to the industry of the Czarist period was still = not repaired.=20 Whatever one thinks about Stalin's methods (and there was a broad = agreement among the Bolsheviki on the aims to be achieved) without the = forced industrialisation and, yes, the collectivisation of agriculture = Russia might have remained in the same state of economic and = institutional turpour as it is in now.=20 But on a much lower level - for, in the period of count Witte - who = Daastol so admires - in the beginning of this century the industrial = growth did not even keep pace with the growth of the population. And, = anyway, lest we forget - the Czarist regime paid for this by exporting = Ukrainian grain while the population of the Ukraine was starving - as = much as did the Bolsheviki. For I would not defend the Bolshevik regime = but it should be remember that the Czarist regime was not a very = pleasant regime either.=20 But, to end with a cheery note, during his recent visit to Moscow = and while the press kept on nagging about the Lewinsky-case president = Clinton made one sensible remark. The Russians, he reminded us, have a = flair of getting themselves into seemingy unsolvable problems (just = study the Velikie Smut, the Razkol, or the Opritchnik in the 16 th - 17 = th century or not so long ago the terrible defeats suffered in = july-november 1941) so that everybody has given up already - and then = making an equally incredible recovery, while the situation seems = completely hopeless to outsiders. In many ways they are the most = remarkable people in the world. Dozvedanije R.J. Barendse International Institute Asian Studies - Leiden University From `Upside-up' in Amsterdam instead of `Down under' in Canberra. r.barendse@worldonline.nl =20 ------=_NextPart_000_0039_01BDAF3E.0ACD45E0 charset="iso-8859-1"

Thanks for the various interesting papers on the situation = in Russia=20 etc. I have a couple of remarks both on the previous discussion and = on the=20 paper which Arno Daastol urged everybody to read:

1.) As to the question of how 12 = people got=20 their hand on some $ 4 bilion aid to Russia, I read in the Dutch = newspaper=20 `De Volkskrant' that this mainly goes back to the 1995 elections = when the=20 Russian oligarchy gave extensive financial support to Yelzin's = campaign in=20 return for being allowed the proceeds from `privatized' companies.=20

Indeed, this already was the case = during the=20 conflict between Yelzin and the Russian parliament, when again = Yeltzin=20 appears to have had massive financial support from the oligarchy in = return=20 for selling them the assets of state-companies. In fact, I even = heard that=20 during the attempted coup in 1980 and the `fight for the white = house', men=20 were walking around in  the crowd of the `democrats' (never = more than a=20 few thousand in a city of 11 milion anyway) liberally distributing = dollars=20 to everybody. This money was - I heard  - appearantly mainly = derived=20 from the Russian maffia, the `Organizatija', but you may wonder how = much=20 derived from foreign `aid'. =

For foreign aid is appearently = distributed by=20 Yeltzin (and Chernomirdin) for buying political support, through the = media,=20 or - and more importantly - by assuring jobs to potential voters. = Thus - for=20 example - during Yeltzin's visit to the former Communist bastion of=20 Volgograd. I don't think, by the way, that Yeltzin is very different = from=20 other Russian politicians in this respect - it is more or less the = accepted=20 way of doing things in Russia. The reformed Communist Party still = disposes=20 of the funds of the old communist party which it uses to buy = support, and it=20 now seems clear that the oligarchy also funded the Lebed campaign, = in return=20 for him supporting Yeltzin during the second round of the election.=20

I don't think much will change = whoever comes=20 to power - if Lebed were to come to power, more money would probably = go to=20 former generals of the Moldavia army, if the communists came to = power more=20 money would go to industries run by the former Nomenklatura - as is = already=20 the case during the recent change of the cabinet. Political support = is=20 bought and, conversibly, leverage on the market is bought by = political=20 support.

And, indeed, this is not new. = Russian politics=20 has always had a strain of gangsterism where local strongmen support = politicians - if need be with arms - in return for financial - and = other -=20 favours where such deals are brokered by (criminal) middlemen or by=20 `state-merchants' . If I don't go back all the way to the = state-merchants=20 (the Gos'ti) in the 17 th century who also doubled as middlemen in = the=20 market for political support (they actually have a lot in common = with the=20 present oligarchy) or go back to local strongmen in that century = like the=20 Khovantsin family - kind of 17 th century's Lebeds - I mention them = since=20 are the subject of THE classic work on the grim world of Russian = politics=20 (the opera `Khovantsina' of Modeste Mussorgsky, which everybody = interested=20 in Russian politics should ponder on).

Even if I don't go back that far I = might still=20 refer back to the `Uzbek maffia' and the activities of = Breznev-family in the=20 1970's or perhaps to Beria and his financial/military/political NKVD = -=20 empire in the 1930's.

Probably western observers have = too much been=20 misled by `Kreminology' which assumed the USSR was a monolithic=20 `totalitarian' power-structure centred on the Kremlin. To understand = Russian=20 politics they should perhaps refer more to the literature on the=20 Nazi-dictatorship which is now being caracterized as a `polycratic = anarchy=20 of overlapping competences'. If seen in this light there's nothing = new under=20 the sun.

The fault here is rather with the = western=20 donors (yes - and the IMF) who assume they are giving to the = `government'.=20 While the `government' is really but one of many groups vieing for = power and=20 influence - aid is invested in Russia for buying support by one = group.=20

Maybe - this is part of some = devillish complot=20 by the IMF to undermine the Russian state as R.K. Moore argues, but = I rather=20 think the IMF has no idea either of what is going on in the Kremlin, = let=20 alone outside Moscow. I would rather think it is desparately looking = for=20 somebody to carry out its magnificient `structural adjustement = policies'=20 too. Most IMF-`advisors' only know what they have seen on TV, and, = once in=20 Moscow for a few days don't venture much further than `Hotel Rossia' = - cheap=20 booze, cheaper girls - as indeed do the western correspondents from = whom=20 they get their information.

 The economy is now being run = by an=20 oligarchy with political support (really a Nomenklatura in disguise = though=20 granted with the approval of the Harvard business-school now rather = than the=20 Party-school) And, likewise, whole sectors of it have simply ceased = paying=20 taxes to the `government' . They now pay, say, protection racket to = the=20 Organizatija - why should they pay to the `government' if the = `government'=20 gives nothing in return ? And I don't think this will change very = much in=20 the forseeable future either.

2.)Chudovski claims that `assets = of Russian=20 state-companies are being sold to western multinationals' - are they = ? Sure,=20 the only company which really counts in Russia, Gazprom, is trying = to=20 attract western investors and is trying to work with western = oil-companies=20 but it is hardly really being sold to them. As I hear most western = investors=20 are extremely reluctant to invest in Russia. I believe twice as much = foreign=20 capital has been invested in Hungary than in the entire CIS now. = Just like=20 the IMF the foreign investors are also on the look-out for a = reliable=20 partner

But again this is nothing new. = It reminds me somewhat of the situation = during World War=20 I when the British and French enterpreneurs and governments also had = to deal=20 with local `buzzinesmen' (as such shadowy figures are now called in=20 `Anglo-Ruski') to fetch thousands of tons of French or British = munition,=20 riffles, food, medicine etc. etc. from Murmansk to Petrograd. = Virtually all=20 of this `disappeared' somehow with historians still unable to figure = out=20 what happened to it.

I really doubt whether foreign = investment is=20 going to make much of an impact on Russia anyway, not because the=20 infrastructure is not there - as Daastol claims, but because there = is TOO=20 MUCH of it. The kind of investments Russia would need are, for = example,=20 investments in drilling for oil in the Arctic seas off the = Kola-peninsula,=20 entertaining and building new gas-pipes in Tjumen - imagine an Artic = tundra=20 about as vast as the whole of western Europe, covered with gas-wells = and=20 pipe-lines as far as they eye can reach - or in mining in = Northeastern=20 Siberia - a region as large as the entire USA covered in dense taiga = with=20 2000 meter high mountains, subject to frequent earthquakes - and, = mind you,=20 all of this in permafrost conditions.

Now, all US oil -companies, = combined, already=20 had difficulties building the Alaska pipeline which is a minor = project=20 compared to the Baikul-Amur Magistral railroad of the Soviet area - = or,=20 again, remember the problems with the tunnel under the Canal - a = minor=20 project compared to these investments in Russia. Moreover, much of = the=20 Russian industry is built on a scale which completely dwarves = anything known=20 to western investors - thus, the Magnitorsk ironworks alone produced = more=20 steel than the entire UK. To modernize the steel-industry in = Magnitogorsk=20 alone would require funds which are completely beyond the US or = European=20 = steel-manufacturers.        

Basically, = even to=20 modernize the Russian industry (and, remember the USSR was the = world's=20 foremost producer of an endless array of goods = ranging=20 from oil to cement, from natural gas to tractors, from steel to = diamonds or=20 coal) entails investments on a scale which are simply not in the = range of=20 private industry. And, furthermore, these would be investments on = the very=20 long run and the present global financial climate is not very = conducive to=20 this.

The only thing western firms are appearently = willing to=20 invest in are commercial enterprise (selling say Danish cheese, = Guzzi-shoes=20 or Benneton-watches in Moscow's former GUM or along the Nevski - = Prospect in=20 Petersburg - not of course in Russia's provinces where the shops are = still=20 as empty as in the Soviet-period) with profits on the very short=20 term.

Since the massive structural = investments=20 needed are simply beyond the means of private western investors and=20 certainly beyond Russia's new 'buzzinesman' - they can only be = provided by=20 the Russian state. I use to joke that in Russia capitalism is the = longest=20 road from socialism to socialism because all these massive = enterprises can=20 simply not be run by private enterpreneurs. Nor can they in the = `West'. Even=20 in Britain under Attlee's labour government, for example, the = coal-industry=20 which needed massive restructuring had to be taken over by the state = because=20 no private enterpreneur could raise the funds required - as even the = quary-owners themselves were willing to admit.

3.)And, contrary to what Daastol = thinks this=20 is NOT a new situation - I would urge him to study the NEP-period in = the=20 1920's more closely when - granted, briefly - the Bolsheviki = experimented=20 with a free market.NEP failed = not=20 primarily because of the Bolsheviki's animosity towards the = `bourgeoisie'=20 (who, in any case, were only a quasi-bourgeoisie - pretty much like = the=20 contemporary `buzzinesman' - first getting rich on first WWI, then = Civil=20 War, speculation) or the `Kulaks'. But because on the one hand the = Kulaks=20 were getting rich quickly by withholding stocks of grain from the = cities,=20 and, on the other, because nobody was willing to make risky = investments in=20 the infrastructure - steel, railroads, electrification - needed for = the=20 industrialisation of Russia. So that, while commerce was booming, = even much=20 of the damage done to the industry of the Czarist period was still = not=20 repaired. 

Whatever one thinks about Stalin's = methods=20 (and there was a broad agreement among the Bolsheviki on the aims to = be=20 achieved) without the forced industrialisation and, yes, the=20 collectivisation of agriculture Russia might have remained in the = same state=20 of economic and institutional turpour as it is in = now. 

But on a much lower level - for, = in the period=20 of count Witte - who Daastol so admires - in the beginning of this = century=20 the industrial growth did not even keep pace with the growth of the=20 population. And, anyway, lest we forget - the Czarist regime paid = for this=20 by exporting Ukrainian grain while the population of the Ukraine was = starving - as much as did the Bolsheviki. For I would not defend the = Bolshevik regime but it should = be remember=20 that the Czarist regime was not a very pleasant regime either. =

But, to end=20 with a cheery note, during his recent visit to Moscow and while the = press=20 kept on nagging about the Lewinsky-case president Clinton made one = sensible=20 remark. The Russians, he reminded us, have a flair of getting = themselves=20 into seemingy unsolvable problems (just study the Velikie Smut, the = Razkol,=20 or the Opritchnik in the 16 th - 17 th century or not so long ago = the=20 terrible defeats suffered in july-november 1941) so that everybody = has given=20 up already - and then making an equally incredible recovery, while = the=20 situation seems completely hopeless to outsiders. In many ways they = are the=20 most remarkable people in the world.

Dozvedanije

R.J. Barendse

International Institute Asian Studies - Leiden=20 University

From `Upside-up' in = Amsterdam instead of=20 `Down under' in Canberra.

r.barendse@worldonline.nl

  =

------=_NextPart_000_0039_01BDAF3E.0ACD45E0-- From arnomd@online.no Tue Oct 13 04:59:17 1998 Tue, 13 Oct 1998 12:59:07 +0200 (MET DST) From: "=?iso-8859-1?Q?Arno_Mong_Daast=F8l?=" To: , "'WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK'" Subject: RE: Slavonica Date: Tue, 13 Oct 1998 12:56:20 +0200 boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0007_01BDF6A9.2F5BE760" In-reply-to: <000201bdaf2e$aa9b41e0$abd5f1c3@rbarends> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0007_01BDF6A9.2F5BE760 charset="iso-8859-1" Dear R.J. Barendse! I greatly appreciated your very thoughtful comments! You obviously know Russian history better than I do. Still, allow me some comments. Somehow it seems you have misunderstood me. (Are you confusing Wedel's views with my own - I forwared Wedel's testimony and not my own - which article are you commenting on?): 1) I AM aware of the liberalisation period under Bukharin, and argued in my article on "Shock Therapy Rent-Seeking ...." (http://daastol.com/rus97.html) that perhaps Stalin was a better choice - in THAT respect. See the chapter Bukharin and Stalin. 2) I am not a great fan of the Witte PERIOD but an (not uncritical) admirer of the Witte PERSON. Witte had some hard struggles with the autocratic parts of the elite and stated his western liberal ideas clearly in line with his other "List-ian" ideas. 3) Concerning infrastructure. You argue that there is too much of it in Russia. That is a matter of definition, I think. Too much to be able to take care of with the present socio-economic regime. Too little to develop Russia into a descent economy. I still belive (as in MY article and as List & Witte did) that infrastrructure development may be used as a productivity enhancing locomotive for the whole economy. And goverment has particular role to play here, in initiating such public goods (!) projects - which by definition are not the obligation of private agents. The comment you had on this concerning the NEP period's failure fits here: "nobody was willing to make risky investments in the infrastructure". - Quite descriptive of Bukharin's policy under the slogan "enrich yourself" - related to his studies in Vienna with the Austrian School and Böhm-Bawerk. May I add, not quite revolutionary I suppose, but, I believe the legal structure to be the crucial point: security of civil rights including property. Unfortumately what little was built during Witte etc. was torn down afterwards. Best! Arno http://daastol.com ------=_NextPart_000_0007_01BDF6A9.2F5BE760 charset="iso-8859-1"
Dear=20 R.J. Barendse!
 
I=20 greatly appreciated your very thoughtful comments! You obviously know = Russian=20 history better than I do. Still, allow me some comments. = Somehow it seems=20 you have misunderstood me. (Are = you confusing=20 Wedel's views with my own - I forwared Wedel's testimony and not my own=20 - which article are you commenting on?):
 
1) I=20 AM aware of the liberalisation period under Bukharin, and argued in my = article=20 on "Shock Therapy Rent-Seeking ...." (http://daastol.com/rus97.html)= that=20 perhaps Stalin was a better choice - in THAT respect. See the chapter = Bukharin=20 and Stalin.
 
2) I=20 am not a great fan of the Witte PERIOD but an (not uncritical) admirer = of the=20 Witte PERSON. Witte had some hard struggles with the autocratic parts of = the=20 elite and stated his western liberal ideas clearly in line with his = other=20 "List-ian" ideas. 
 
3)=20 Concerning infrastructure. You argue that there is too much of it in = Russia.=20 That is a matter of definition, I think. Too much to be able to take = care of=20 with the present socio-economic regime. Too little to develop Russia = into a=20 descent economy. I still belive (as in MY article and as List & = Witte did)=20 that infrastrructure development may be used as a productivity enhancing = locomotive for the whole economy. And goverment has particular role to = play=20 here, in initiating such public goods (!) projects - which by definition = are not=20 the obligation of private agents.
 
The=20 comment you had on this concerning the NEP period's failure fits here:=20 "nobody was willing to make risky investments in the = infrastructure".=20 - Quite descriptive of Bukharin's policy under the slogan = "enrich=20 yourself" - related to his studies in Vienna with the Austrian = School and=20 Böhm-Bawerk.
 
May I=20 add, not quite revolutionary I suppose, but, I believe the legal = structure to be=20 the crucial point: security of civil rights including property. = Unfortumately=20 what little was built during Witte etc. was torn down=20 afterwards.
 
Best!
 
------=_NextPart_000_0007_01BDF6A9.2F5BE760-- From rozov@nsu.ru Wed Oct 14 08:59:06 1998 Wed, 14 Oct 1998 21:57:07 +0700 (NOVST) From: "Nikolai S. Rozov " To: "Dr. R.J. Barendse" , wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Wed, 14 Oct 1998 22:00:28 +0000 Subject: Re: Slavonica Reply-to: rozov@nsu.ru In-reply-to: <000201bdaf2e$aa9b41e0$abd5f1c3@rbarends> Dear Rene and All, thanks for your thoughtful analysis of Russian affairs in present and past. Being a Russian i am far from being an expert in Russian history and especially in current conjunctures around the Kremlin, but as far as i know and feel these matters, you are in general quite close to the truth. just some notes on the NEP, 'the way from socialism to socialism (via capitalism)' and about the possible historian reasons of why Russian are so 'remarkable' people. On 14 Jul 98 Dr. R.J. Barendse wrote: Whatever one thinks about Stalin's methods (and there was a broad agreement among the Bolsheviki on the aims to be achieved) without the forced industrialisation and, yes, the collectivisation of agriculture Russia might have remained in the same state of economic and institutional turpour as it is in now. Nikolai: it's right that nobody besides the state wished to invest heavy industry and infrastructure (mainly militarily oriented)in 1920-th, but it did not mean the necessity for collectivization in the form of 1929-34 (mass hunger in Ukraine, mass expropriation, mass vilent migrations to Siberia). Really the short-term effect has been achieved but on expence of factual extermination of Russian agrarian countryside, peasants' cultural and biological genofond. Almost full degradation of modern Russian agraria (mass alchogolism, inherited debilism and desertness in kolkhoses and 'derevnia's), inability of Russians to provide themselves with cheese, meat, butter (that are imported from Western Europe) is a longue term effect of Stalin's collectivization. We have other historical cases, even with fully military-beaurocratic polities, when the success of industrialization was achieved not by extermination of countryside but by its development, take f.e. the Prussian reform in 1807-14. My thesis is that it would be much more efficient (not to say of morality) not to expropriate Kulaks and NEPmen but to make alliance with them and to collect finances from taxes, not from plane state robbery. it was a fresh idea on the transition from socialism via capitalism to a some new edition of socialism. Even if it occurs to be right i predict that this new socialism will be much more inefficient even in comparison with the Brezhnev's one. Socialism (as any fully beaurocratic centralized system) can be effective only if it is 'pure'. Alliances with commerce are possible (as in ancient empires or modern China) but in conditions of some effective counter-corruption mechanisms in hand. The nature of modern Russian semicapitalism/semisocialism is an extreme curruption of state offices from the top all the way down(as you also mentioned), that's why even if a new socialism emerges it will be neither efficient, not stable. Thanks for for the final hopeful remark on specific features and merits of Russians, but even here historical analysis leads us not to triumphal and hopeful but to rather deplorable conclusions. In fact almost each case of Russian rises (take Christianization, John IV, Peter the Great, Ekatherine II, Nikolai I, bolshevics, stalinism) included something like 'a new marriage' between the State (usually associated with a new Idea) and People. The necessary condition for termination of conflicts ('smuta') was just a mere physical extermination by young new state of everybody who disagreed with the Idea ( and new state power). Pagans, Boyars, Bowmen (streltsy), Razin, Pugachev, Dekabrists, all representatives of the regime ancien (in 1917-18), revolutionaries-'trotskists', Kulaks, intelligentsia during the Collectivization and the Great terror - all they were victims for new rises of the Russian State (its avataras). Let me hope that this historical pattern came to its end. The arguement is that the scale of repressions after the overt conflict in October 1993 was very low in fact, suffis to say that main political enemies of Eltsin who has won that time (Rutskoi, Hasbulatov, Baburin, Makashov, etc) were not shot down but were released and they even had possibility to regenerate as political leaders. In spite this fact the very "shooting the Parliament" still is one of the most scandalous blames versus Eltsin and his regime, and in rather wide range amopong common people. I appreciate very much Rene's remark that 'nothing is new', but i am ready to argue that some significant shift in easiness of mass extermination of political enemies took place (with no guarantees from new regress, of course). And this is good, surely. But from the other side... It does not mean that Russia has no more chances for a new rise (having being deprived of this 'good old' but bloody tradition). It does mean that some radically new forms of State-People solidarity must emerge in Russia. The previous form of solidarity based only or mainly on power and coercion have come to their end. As we know from history new forms of this kind do not emerge faster than centuries. That's why even if Clinton's and Rene's hopes on a new Russian rise are incarnated in some time, I doubt very much to be an alive witness of it. Best wishes from Russia Nikolai ****************************************************** Nikolai S. Rozov, PhD, Dr.Sc. Professor of Philosophy E-MAIL: rozov@nsu.ru FAX: 7-3832-397101 ADDRESS: Philosophy Dept. Novosibirsk State University 630090, Novosibirsk, Pirogova 2, RUSSIA Welcome to PHILOFHI (the mailing list for PHILosophy OF HIstory and theoretical history) http://www.people.virginia.edu/~dew7e/anthronet/subscribe/philofhi.html and Philosophy of History Archive (PHA) http://www.nsu.ru/filf/pha/ ********************************************************************* From chriscd@jhu.edu Thu Oct 15 08:11:53 1998 Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1998 10:11:55 -0400 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: Licensed Cuba Trip] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------6E3737AB6C2885EC2E12ED93 --------------6E3737AB6C2885EC2E12ED93 chriscd@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (ORCPT rfc822;chriscd@jhu.edu); Tue, 13 Oct 1998 14:25:43 -0500 (CDT) by mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu (8.9.1/8.9.1/mcfeeley.mc-1.24) 13 Oct 1998 14:22:27 -0500 (CDT) 13 Oct 1998 14:22:24 -0500 (CDT) Date: Tue, 13 Oct 1998 14:25:28 -0500 From: Regina McGoff Subject: Licensed Cuba Trip Sender: owner-lasnet@mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu To: lasnet@mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu Reply-to: mcgoff@augsburg.edu I hope that this is acceptable for the list. This is a unique opportunity for academics, since there don't seem to be many licensable trips to Cuba, so I wanted to pass this on. There are still a few spaces available for a January 1999 trip to Cuba with St. Mary's University for licensable individuals. We must make the application for any additional participants by October 23, so please contact us if you are interested in this trip. All participants must be licensed for travel to Cuba by the US Department of the Treasury. Here is some brief information on the trip: > >Our Island Neighbor: United States and Cuba Relations >January 5 to 13, 1999 >Join a seminar to Cuba which will focus on U.S.-Cuba relations, exploring >the past and present role of the United States in Cuba. Hear Cuban opinions >about the 1998 U.S. Congressional legislation on Cuba, legislation which >would exempt food and medicine from the U.S. embargo against Cuba. What are >the implications of U.S. policy for the lives and health of Cubans? Learn >about Cuba's political and cultural history, its traditions, and the >current economic, social and political structure. Investigate with us the >economic development of our island neighbor, especially as it pertains to >possibilities for economic reforms and foreign investment, private >enterprise on a small or medium scale, and alternative economic >enterprises. $1870 , including room and board, all program costs, >interpretation, ground transportation and round-trip airfare from Houston, >Texas. (airfare can be arranged from other locations). > > Center for Global Education Augsburg College 2211 Riverside Avenue Minneapolis, MN 5545 1-800-299-8889 globaled@augsburg.edu http://www.augsburg.edu/global --------------6E3737AB6C2885EC2E12ED93-- From gernot.kohler@sheridanc.on.ca Thu Oct 15 13:34:37 1998 Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1998 15:34:31 -0400 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: Gernot Kohler Subject: Gills on Globalization and Resistance Here are some quotations from Barry K. Gills (University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK) -- from his editorial in _New Political Economy_, vol. 2, no. 1 (March 1997), pp. 11-15 (Special Issue on Globalization and the Politics of Resistance). ...."It is precisely the apolitical reading of globalisation that we most seek to reject. This is what we mean when we say we wish to reclaim the territory of the 'political'." ...."We must begin by firmly putting people back into the analysis as actors and agents in the processes of social and historical change." ...."there is an urgent need to reassert the values of the broad social and political left: i.e. to revalidate old values, such as worker solidarity, democracy, state intervention, welfare and redistribution; while also proposing new ones, such as gender equality, protection of the environment and the right of civil society to reconstitute itself..." ...."As far as slogans are concerned, we must reject the corporate mantra of 'globalisation or die' and its political economy counterpart 'Hayek lives and Keynes is Dead'. We might prefer to chant 'Keynes (or Marx, depending on your preference) should be reincarnated and Hayek should be mummified for eternity'." ...."Keynes, and Marx also, concentrated his effort on the problem of how to prevent repetition of the human tragedy of general economic and social crises brought about by destructive forces in modern capitalist economies. We would do well to do likewise." ...."the broad social left can no longer afford to be divided by doctrinaire controversies..." The special issue of the journal includes several articles on resistance under conditions of, or against, globalization. From storytellers@mindspring.com Sat Oct 17 15:28:08 1998 Date: Sat, 17 Oct 1998 17:24:02 -0400 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: John Dempsey Parker Subject: Searching for Common Ground Dear Network Friends: Searching for Common Ground A transitional housing community for international refugees and immigrants needs a global communication system. Resettled refugees face a myriad of barriers limiting adaptation and social mobility in their new host nations. With the psychological, mental, and physical trauma that characterizes the refugee experience, refugees can better adapt to change through visonary community building processes. Community building, locally and globally, can cultivate the social network infrastructure for intercultural sharing, communication, and understanding to work for the benefit of the whole community. The NEED: A transitional housing initiative for refugees and immigrants is looking for an international network or resources that will link residents to their homelands, refugee camps, and/or families via the Internet. This transitional housing concept was created to reduce or eliminate situations where families come and immediately do not have a safety net or are uncomfortable with their new residence where they are placed on arrival. Refugees (from Ethiopia, Egypt, Vietnam, Somolia, Benin Republic, Gambia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Bosnia and other countires) now living in the U.S. have been separated from family and friends, sometimes for over five years. The extreme difficulty of contacting and locating their relations by phone or fax creates a desire for creative communication systems. This is an opportunity to build community on the common ground of shared suffering, involuntary displacement, resilience, and strength. The new arrivals, in the aftermath of colonialism and often post-colonialism, are so fragmented socially, politically, and ecomically that they cannot, or have not been able to live together here in the states, though they may have been forced to tolerate one another in the refugee camps. Then there are culturally derived hierarchical divisions (ie. casts, clans, and social classes) that refuse to live with one another as neighbors, especially equal partners. So, in an effort to address the fragmentation, and not force people to live with others for a long period of time that they do not feel comfortable with, the idea of transitional housing emerged which helps prepare folks to live in the U.S. Refugees are examples of the human capability to survive and succeed during the most tramatic forms of cultural change that humans can experience. Access to Internet resources for this refugee community will cultivate additional adpatation strategies and empower them to cope and manage their lives in creative new meaningful ways. "We must be the change we wish to see." - Gandhi Confidentiality prohibits any details regarding the refugee community's location, name, and organizational relationships at the present time. For more information on the needed Internet resources or to contact the refugee community: catalinaplace@msn.com dtsdixie98@aol.com *** Please share this story with others. In Peace and Solidarity, John Parker Storytellers Network http://www.angelfire.com/biz/storytellers From aa4013a@american.edu Sun Oct 18 12:02:32 1998 From: aa4013a@american.edu To: psn@csf.colorado.edu, wsn@csf.colorado.edu, socgrad@psn.colorado.edu Date: Sun, 18 Oct 1998 14:01:18 -0400 Subject: CALL FOR ACTION: Persecution of Chinese in Indonesia Dear Colleagues, I am writing all of you to invite your participation in my letter-writing campaign for the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Please write to your Congressmen/women and your senators and urge them to act to protect the Indonesian Chinese from continuing persecution in their adoptive homeland. A letter that I wrote is attached for your use, all you need to do is to sign it, write your name and address and send it to your representatives in Congress. Feel free to make copies of this letter and distribute it to your colleagues and students. The more people write this letter, the better the chance for this campaign to make an impact in Congress. Some of you might have cynical views against the power elite in Washington, however, please join me in supporting this campaign to try to protect this unfortunate minority group from future persecution and possible "ethnic cleansing." Feel free to write me if you have any questions or concerns. Thank you for your help on this. Sincerely, Alex --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Letter begins here Dear Congressperson/Senator I am outraged to hear about the human rights abuses directed against the ethnic Chinese of Indonesia. The stories of mass rapes and murders of Indonesian Chinese women in the hands of unknown perpetrators are very horrible. It is more outrageous to hear that so far the Indonesian government has failed to condemn these crimes and to bring these perpetrators into justice. I urge you to support any congressional resolution that would condemn the human rights abuses against the Indonesian Chinese and would rebuke the Indonesian government for failing to take strong actions to protect them. I also want you to support any legislation that would make protection for the ethnic Chinese and other minorities/religious groups in Indonesia as a condition for any disbursement of US foreign aid to that country. Finally, I want you to support legislation that would guarantee all Indonesian Chinese people who want to seek save haven in the United States to receive political asylum in this country. Let me know what you stand for on this issue. I look forward to hear from you on this matter. Sincerely, ( ) Please print your name, your home address and your home state below. From ryszard@stemplowski.demon.co.uk Wed Oct 21 09:55:47 1998 by post.mail.demon.net with smtp (Exim 2.05demon1 #1) id 0zW0bl-0003Sr-00 From: "Ryszard Stemplowski" To: Subject: The New Great Depression? Date: Wed, 21 Oct 1998 16:55:47 +0100 boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0041_01BDFD13.A6547240" This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0041_01BDFD13.A6547240 charset="iso-8859-2" The Great Depression Revisited ------=_NextPart_000_0041_01BDFD13.A6547240 name="Chile in the year 1932.HTM" filename="Chile in the year 1932.HTM" Ryszard Stemplowski, Panstwowy socjalizm w realnym kapitalizmie: = Chile w roku 1932, Wydawnictwo TRIO, Warszawa 1996, p

Ryszard Stemplowski, Panstwowy socjalizm = w realnym kapitalizmie: Chile w roku 1932, Wydawnictwo TRIO, = Warszawa 1996, p.450, in Polish
-------------------------------------------------------------------------= ------------

State-Socialism in Real Capitalism: Chile in the = year 1932
( Table of Contents )

Chapter One: The antecedents: conflicts, reforms, = crises, p. 15

The economic and social structure; political = aspirations of the middle class groups; political and economic = conflicts; the military reformers in 1924-25; Constitution of 1925; = conflicts and reforms under authoritarian governments; the Great = Depression; the economic and political crisis.

Chapter Two: Chronology of the Socialist Republic: people and = events, p. 47

Chapter Three: State-socialism: inspirations and ideas, p. = 99

inspirations; "Plan Lagarrigue"; Lagarrigue's inspirations; = Proclamation by the Revolutionary General Staff; Juntas' first = pronouncement; "Thirty Points" of the Nueva Acción = Pública; a declaration by a member of the Junta; a circular = letter in the Ministry of Defence; programmatic declarations of the = revolutionary leaders; first decrees get mentioned; programmatic = declarations after the ousting of Grove and Matte; more decrees get = mentioned; other declarations; concluding remarks.

Chapter Four: Economic policy: decrees and credits, p. = 141

Export policy; import policy; regulations of the = manufacturing industry; steering the production of and trading in the = basic commodities; stimulating production activities; customs and tax = policies; civil law provisions and credit in the domestic market; = foreign exchange policy; monetary policy; concluding remarks.

Chapter Five: International conditions: market and = military-political power, p.177

Foreign trade and foreign assets in Chile; markets for = copper and nitrates not under government controls; diplomatic = interventions and getting the gold back; alien activities and the fiasco = of the foreign exchange deposits policy; tackling the foreign monopoly = of petroleum supply and the foreign withholding of the supply; British, = US, and German diplomacies, and the use of a force problem; decree on = the General Commissariat, and foreign objections; foreign diplomats vis = a vis communism as a criterion; USA and its conditions for the = diplomatic recognition; United Kingdom and its conditions for the = diplomatic recognition; Germany and its conditions for the diplomatic = recognition; businesspeople and the US, UK and German diplomats; = concluding remarks.

Chapter Six: Public opinion: frustrations and expectations, p. = 279

Political agitation; communists; Catholic Church; big = landowners; "white guard" activities; "strike of the crossed arms"; = socialist organisations; other parties and organisations; trade unions; = civil servants', engineers', bankers', and medical doctors' = associations; women; students; Supreme Court judges; military officers; = Santiago press; reactions to the ousting of Grove and Matte; one = perception of socialism; censorship; industrialists; conservatives' = conferences; fascists; parliamentary system as a topic for the debate; = Acción Revolucionaria Socialista; socialist organisations = before the electoral campaign; agricultural workers and los = Mapuches; the "responsible" politicians; concluding remarks.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion: crisis, State-Socialism, capitalism, p. = 365

Assertive economic policy; redistributive function; = new laws; the rule of law in foreign relations; political mobilisation = of middle class groups; economic nationalism; socialism in capitalism. =

Bibliography, p. 411

Index, p. 437

When he was writing the book, Ryszard Stemplowski, LLM = PhD, was a research fellow at the Institute of History, Polish Academy = of Sciences, Warsaw

------=_NextPart_000_0041_01BDFD13.A6547240-- From upf@upf.org Sun Oct 25 22:26:02 1998 Sun, 25 Oct 1998 22:30:48 -0600 (CST) Date: Sun, 25 Oct 1998 22:34:07 -0600 From: UPF To: upf@upf.org Subject: Cleaning up my address book! This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------F68D2690A043E472579EE9EB Greetings! Just in the process of cleaning up my address book. If, for any reason what-so-ever, you do not want to remain in my address book; please let me know ASAP. I would rather have a few people that I communicate with regularly, than a million people who barely want to talk at all! Let me know. Thanks! -- Your Friend in Peace, Glen Nuttall UPF http://www.upf.org upf@upf.org "Courageous Knowledgeable People, United Compassionate World, Committed Responsible Future" "Out of Respect for Diversity comes Recognition of Fundamental Freedoms, Individual Rights, and Legitimate Responsibilities" "In the common interest of a Lasting World Peace through a Unified Planetary Assembly" --------------F68D2690A043E472579EE9EB begin: vcard fn: Glen Nuttall n: Nuttall;Glen org: United Planetary Federation - unified peace foundation adr: PO Box 17470;;;Chicago;IL;60617-0470;USA email;internet: upf@upf.org title: Chief Coordinator tel;work: 1.800.484.8027 code 6093 tel;fax: 1.219.924.1380 (call first) tel;home: 1.219.924.3243 x-mozilla-cpt: ;0 x-mozilla-html: FALSE version: 2.1 end: vcard --------------F68D2690A043E472579EE9EB-- From rkmoore@iol.ie Wed Oct 28 03:49:36 1998 Wed, 28 Oct 1998 10:48:11 GMT Date: Wed, 28 Oct 1998 10:48:11 GMT To: renaissance-network@cyberjournal.org From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: "Achieving a Livable World" - Introduction social-movements@staffmail.wit.ie, philofhi@yorku.ca (philosophy of history), wsn@csf.colorado.edu (world-system network) Dear friends, My thanks to the many of you who have been sending in feedback on my book in progress. Based on this feedback, and comments from publishers, I am now rewriting from the beginning. People asked for more direct language, more examples, and a less abstract presentation. My abilities in this direction are, shall we say, not greatly developed. Nonetheless, I agree the suggestions make good sense. Further feedback as to "reader accessibility" will be welcome. This introduction, being an overview, remains more abstract than (hopefully) will be Chapter 1. rkm ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Achieving a Livable World a democratic response to globalization Introduction - draft 2.1 Copyright 1998 by Richard K. Moore Latest update: 28 October 1998 - 2845 words comments to: editor@cyberjournal.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Introduction ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1998 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the first of the global free-trade agreements. At a United Nations conference in Geneva celebrating this anniversary, US President Bill Clinton opened his speech with the statement "Globalization is not a policy choice; it is a fact". This statement suggests a number of questions: What is globalization? Where did it come from? Where is it heading? Why does it appear to be inevitable? Why does the most powerful leader in the world express powerlessness in the face of globalization? Is what he says true, or are there alternatives to globalization? If so, what are they and how can they be pursued? This book is an investigation into these questions. The investigation will take us back to the birth of democratic republics in the late Eighteenth Century -- what is referred to as the Era of Enlightenment. We will look at the role played by political elites in the establishment of these republics, and we will review the history of the past two centuries, giving special attention to the power of elites and to the development of capitalism and imperialism. Our investigation will reveal that many common assumptions about this history are in fact myth. We will find that Western democracies have represented not the ascendency of popular sovereignty, but rather a political compromise that has served the interests of wealthy elites while granting to Western populations a number of privileges and benefits. We will find that globalization brings the abandonment of this political compromise -- what has often been referred to as the social contract -- along with the abandonment of constitutional democracy and of Western privileges. In our review of capitalism, we will learn that incredible energy and creativity has been unleashed by capitalism's growth imperative (its inherent need for never-ending economic growth). Besides all the industrial and technological innovations that this creativity has enabled, we will find that the design of societal systems has been one of capitalism's most inventive fields of endeavor. In order to create room for ever more growth, elites have become highly organized and very effective at political intrigue and at implementing systematic changes in societies worldwide. We will discover that globalization is in fact a grand elite project -- a coordinated, coherent suite of initiatives -- and that it is unfolding on a canvas much broader than is generally appreciated. Tight government budgets, privatization, downsized companies -- these aspects of globalization are known to nearly everyone. Those who inform themselves -- and there are many useful books available -- learn that globalization also brings accelerating environmental damage, increased poverty, destabilized societies, and a house-of-cards global financial system. But even that does not adequately capture the scope of the globalization project. I hope it will become clear, as this investigation unfolds, that globalization amounts to an overall restructuring of the world order, a political rebuilding project that goes very deep. In globalization's new world order, democratic governance and national sovereignty are being bulldozed clean from the global building site. The system of strong national republics, which was the West's heritage from the Enlightenment era, is being systematically dismantled. Political arrangements are being scraped way back, and old political strata, so to speak, are re-emerging. In some ways, globalization scrapes us back to the robber-baron era of the late nineteenth century, when laissez-faire capitalism reigned supreme, boom and bust cycles were frequent, and politicians were "in the pockets" of magnates such as John D. Rockefeller and J. Pierpont Morgan. Today it is called deregulation instead of laissez-faire, and it is giant transnational corporations (TNC's) that exert the political influence instead of colorful robber barons, but the game is the same, as are the results. In other dimensions, the globalization project is scraping even deeper, taking us back to the feudal era, with wealth and power concentrated in the hands of a super-rich elite, and with most everyone else reduced to a kind of disenfranchised serfdom. In still other aspects, globalization takes us all the way back to the Roman Empire, only this time on a global scale. Instead of an Emperor and Roman Legions, we have a World Trade Organization and a US/NATO strike force. And again the once-proud citizens of republics are being reduced to consuming bread and circuses -- and to unquestioned obedience to arbitrary imperial edicts. In every crisis, according at least to the Chinese symbol for crisis, there is both danger and opportunity. The opportunity brought by globalization is for people everywhere, from all walks of life, to wake up to the dire threat that faces them, and to do something about it. This investigation will show that the capitalist elite is too thoroughly entrenched for meaningful reform to be accomplished through standard political channels. And we will see that the corporate system is too dependent on endless growth for reform to be possible within the terms of that system. Only a radical restructuring of economic arrangements can provide for livable, stable societies. And only a radical shift of political power -- the dethroning of the elite establishment -- can create a political environment in which such a transformation can be accomplished and workable democracy established. In many parts of the third world, we will discover, people are generally aware of the threat posed by globalization. Centuries of struggle against imperialism have led to heightened political awareness, and organized resistance to globalization is growing rapidly. However, the methods by which the West dominates the third world are very effective, having been perfected during centuries of imperialism. For this reason, we will find that a successful response to globalization must be led by the West itself. Unfortunately, Westerners have been slower to understand the nature of the threat, due to sophisticated media propaganda and centuries of relative privilege. We will take a critical look at the history of Western political movements, seeking to understand why some succeeded and others failed. We will find that every political movement has a predictable set of obstacles to overcome, ranging from internal divisiveness, to systematic repression, to co-option at the very gates of would-be triumph. Based on these experiences, we will endeavor to formulate a strategy for a successful political movement aimed at ending elite domination and establishing a stable, sustainable, and democratic world system. This will be a common-sense investigation, not an academic treatise. My own background is in software systems, not in economics, history, or political science. This investigation works directly from the reported facts, and there will be no attempt to relate the work to the various theoretical frameworks that the social sciences have developed over the years. How this investigation is structured ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ At a recent workshop on political activism, I learned about a "change formula" which helps clarify how social change occurs. The formula states that the force for change is related to discomfort level, quality of vision, and available means. If people are comfortable with existing arrangements, they are unlikely to seek or favor change. Even if they are very uncomfortable, they won't usually be eager for change unless they have a clear vision of something better. And even then, with both discomfort and vision, little progress can be made until a practical means has been identified by which the vision can be realized. If a group of people are to work together for change, as in a political movement, then they need to have a shared sense of discomfort, a common vision of something better, and an agreed means of achieving it. If such a movement is to be global in scope, then a great deal of agreement will be required among a very large number of people. With all due humility, I offer this book as an attempt to contribute toward building that level of agreement and helping to spark a global movement for a livable world. Part I addresses the issue of discomfort. I hope to show that globalization represents perhaps the gravest danger ever to face humanity. This turns out to be a relatively straightforward case to make. The evidence is abundant all around us, and only a steady diet of corporate propaganda and official doubletalk keeps so many people from recognizing the evidence for what it is. Besides the evidence presented here, a bibliography is provided listing several outstanding books which have looked in more detail at the various aspects of globalization and corporate power. Part II seeks to articulate an appropriate vision for a livable world. This turns out to be an investigation of a quite different kind. While understanding the threat of globalization is a matter of interpreting observable facts, identifying an appropriate vision calls for a consideration of system dynamics. Politics, economics, the environment, and world order are all systems. In a livable world, I will argue, these systems need to work together in harmony and they need to be stable and robust. The notion of livability, I will argue, leads naturally to the identification of certain fundamental principles. These principles can be interpreted as requirements for a livable world system. By considering these requirements, and following where they take us, we will be led to the architecture for a livable world. This process is a matter of discovering objective necessities, not of describing subjective ideals. It is more like a map than a recipe. This kind of systems analysis has been used effectively by many previous investigators and thinkers. The US Constitution, with its checks and balances, represents a deep understanding of the system dynamics of factional politics. Adam Smith, one of the Enlightenment thinkers, explored the system dynamics of free markets, by looking at supply and demand as system forces. Karl Marx, in the nineteenth century, worked out the dynamics of a more complete model of the capitalist system, taking also into account monopolization and political power. The terminology of systems had not been invented at the time of these earlier efforts, but they exemplify systems analysis nonetheless. System dynamics are much better understood today. Adam Smith had only the simple models of Newton to work from, and Marx had only the slightly more complex models developed during early industrialization. Since that time the development of complex computer software, and the study of biological systems, have given us an incredibly enriched understanding of how complex systems function, and of what characteristics are necessary to ensure stability and reliability. As I said before, this will be a common-sense investigation. The lessons we will draw from systems theory are very simple ones -- there will be no mathematics nor even diagrams. The point really is to look at things as systems, to identify the underlying forces at work, and to work out how those forces can be kept in balance. This is what Smith did with regard to the forces of supply and demand. With modern system concepts we have the tools necessary to look at the whole system instead of only an idealized subsystem such as free-market economics. In discovering our vision, or architecture, for a livable world, we will develop a common-sense understanding of what democracy means in practice, of how sustainability can be managed, and how a stable world order can be most reliably ensured. We will draw on examples from many real-world systems, including, with some irony, those used in modern corporations. One of the core principles of a livable world, we will find, is that of localism. Localism -- an emphasis on the political and economic self-determination of localities -- turns out to be necessary and central to both democracy and sustainability. Part III seeks to outline the means by which global transformation can be accomplished. We will learn from the experience of previous social movements and we will draw on the results of Part II. From previous movements we will work out movement strategy -- how to prevail in the face of determined opposition. Part II shows us how the movement can be unified and coordinated, while also being democratic and locally based. Many previous movements have failed at the very point of victory. The victory of the French Revolution, for example, led to bloody chaos while the Russian Revolution led to dictatorship. These movements managed to defeat the old regimes, but when victory was won a power vacuum was created, and into it leapt those hungry for power. A democratic, locally-based movement can be not only the means of achieving victory, but it can also become the basis for democracy in the new world. If the movement models itself on its own vision for a livable world, then as it develops it becomes the society it seeks. Thus no power vacuum is created, and the transition can be smooth to livable, democratic societies. Our investigation will show that the principle of non-violence must be central to a successful movement. In the context of Western liberal values, as Gandhi and Martin Luther King demonstrated, a non-violent strategy gives maximum advantage to people, in the face of powerful, armed establishments. And non-violence also builds the kind of movement that can become the civil society appropriate for a livable world. The prospects for success There remains a fundamental question: Is there any reason to believe that a global grass-roots movement is possible or likely in current circumstances? Are historical conditions right for such a movement to arise? Globalization itself, I suggest, has created, and is creating, conditions which are favorable to the development of such a movement. To begin with, globalization is creating the conditions for massive unrest and discomfort, as will be discussed in Part I. In addition, the development of a functioning global society is creating a cultural vacuum. Our cultures, our political traditions, and our identities are oriented around nations as the largest unit of society. As economics and politics operate more and more globally, we are set adrift as to who we are, what society we are part of, and what the values and rules of our societies are. Into this vacuum are rushing fundamentalist religions, nationalistic movements, messianic cults, and various other radical ideologies and agendas. In this respect we can compare current conditions to those of the Roman Empire. The administration and trading systems that Rome established connected diverse cultures into a larger society. None of the existing religions matched the scale of the new society, and evangelistic religions such as Mithraism and Christianity rushed in to fill the vacuum. The gods offered by the Romans themselves, apparently, didn't have sufficient appeal. The only "god" offered by today's global regime is market forces, supported by its trinity of growth, deregulation, and free-trade. This "religion" is hardly satisfying as the foundation of global culture, and there is little wonder people everywhere are searching for new cultural anchors, or reaching back nostalgically for old ones. US Congressman Newt Gingrich comes to mind, with his sentimental praise of an idealized Main Street America. There is reason to be fearful during such a time of cultural instability, given the comfort to be found in easy answers and repressive fundamentalist ideologies. But in a time of searching, enlightened ideas may also find an audience. Cultural instability provides a favorable opportunity for mass movements, of whatever variety. Of particular significance is globalization's abandonment of traditional Western privileges. As social services are dismantled and wages decline, Western governments are increasingly devoting themselves to promoting corporate interests rather than promoting social well being and healthy national economies. The relative privilege of Western populations has traditionally provided a mass constituency in support of the established capitalist system. As more and more Westerners come to realize that globalization is betraying this unwritten social contract, many of them are looking for new solutions. This creates an opportunity for mass political movements in the very heart of the beast -- the Western fortress of global capitalism. In addition, there seem to be cracks showing up in the capitalist edifice itself. One of the most successful capitalists, billionaire financier George Soros, told us in the Atlantic Monthly (February 1997) that unrestrained capitalism has become the greatest threat to "open societies" and democratic values. The collapse of Asian economies shook global confidence, and Western leaders have called officially for reform of the international financial system. A major free-trade proposal, the Multilateral Agreement on Investments, was recently stalled due to disputes among Western leaders. These kind of developments do not mean that capitalism will collapse, but any such weaknesses or divisions enhance, at least psychologically, the prospects for our movement. As the millennium approaches, I believe it is fair to say that anxiety regarding global instability and social deterioration is at a very high level worldwide. Old systems really are falling apart, and the new global system has not managed to instill confidence or cultural identity. The objective conditions, I suggest, are almost ideally favorable for mass movements. The challenge is for responsible people of good will everywhere to rise up and make use of this opportunity. The window of opportunity is closing fast, as nations are being disempowered and popular will is being made rapidly irrelevant. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ CITIZENS FOR A DEMOCRATIC RENAISSANCE mailto:cdr@cyberjournal.org http://cyberjournal.org --- To join the discussion on bringing about a movement for a democratic renaissance, send any message to: renaissance-network-subscribe@cyberjournal.org --- To subscribe to the the cj list, which is a larger list and a more general political discussion, send any message to: cj-subscribe@cyberjournal.org --- To review renaissance-network archives, send any message to: renaissance-network-index@cyberjournal.org ----------------------------------- A community will evolve only when the people control their means of communication. -- Frantz Fanon From tbos@social-sci.ss.emory.edu Thu Oct 29 07:34:27 1998 From: tbos@social-sci.ss.emory.edu To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Thu, 29 Oct 1998 09:32:52 +0000 Subject: historians defend constitution HISTORIANS IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION As historians as well as citizens, we deplore the present drive to impeach the President. We believe that this drive, if successful, will have the most serious implications for our constitutional order. Under our Constitution, impeachment of the President is a grave and momentous step. The Framers explicitly reserved that step for high crimes and misdemeanors in the exercise of executive power. Impeachment for anything less would accordingly leave the president to "serve at the pleasure of the Senate," thereby mangling the system of balances that is our chief safeguard against abuses of public power. Although we do not condone President Clinton's private behavior or his subsequent attempts to deceive, the current charges against him depart from what the Framers saw as grounds for impeachment. The vote of the House of representatives to conduct an open-ended inquiry creates a novel all-purpose search for offenses by which to remove a President from office. The theory of impeachment underlying these efforts is unprecedented in our history. The new processes are extremely ominous for the future of our political institutions. If carried forward, they will derange the balance of power arrange by the Constitution and will leave the Presidency permanently disfigured and diminished, at the mercy as never before of any Congress. Any majority in the House of Representatives will be able to use scandal-mongering against any President to meet the lowered impeachment bar. The Presidency, historically the center of leadership during our great national ordeals, will be crippled in facing the inevitable challenges of the future. On November 3 the country faces a choice between preserving or undermining our Constitution. Do we want to establish a precedent for the future harassment of presidents and to tie up our government with a protracted national agony or to get back to the national business. We urge you, whether you are a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent, to oppose the dangerous new theory of impeachment, and to demand the restoration of the normal operations of our federal government. As of noon, Thursday, October 22, more than 400 historians from every part of the United States have signed this statement. The signatories include: C. Vann Woodward, Yale University James M. McPherson, Princeton University David Donald, Harvard University Edmund S. Morgan, Yale University Joseph Ellis, Mount Holyoke College Edward Ayres, University of Virginia David Kennedy, Stanford University Henry Louis Gates, Harvard University Drew Gilpin Faust, University of Pennsylvania George Fredrickson, Stanford University Linda Gordon, University of Wisconsin Jack Rakove, Stanford University David Brion Davis, Yale University Carl Degler, Stanford University John Hope Franklin, Duke University Robert Dallek, Boston University Hugh Davis Graham, Vanderbilt University Gerda Lerner, University of Wisconsin John Morton Blum, Yale University Taylor Branch, Goucher College Co-sponsors: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., City University of New York Sean Wilentz, Princeton University From swelden@orion.oac.uci.edu Thu Oct 29 11:45:06 1998 Date: Thu, 29 Oct 1998 10:44:56 -0800 (PST) From: Sharon Welden To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: forwarded PBS special anncmnt (fwd) ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 29 Oct 1998 07:26:20 -0500 From: "David L. Richards, Jr." Subject: forwarded PBS special anncmnt This is from Suzanne Stenson Harmon: ================================================== Uprisings in Indonesia and Nigeria, massive layoffs of miners in South Africa, and protests against child labor worldwide have all been reported as separate and distinct events. GLOBALIZATION & HUMAN RIGHTS,a new public television special from the producers of RIGHTS AND WRONGS and SOUTH AFRICA NOW, explores how these and other current events are linked to the forces of "globalization," the economic engine that is transforming the world in its own image. GLOBALIZATION & HUMAN RIGHTS takes viewers on a journey that starts at a summit for corporate decision-makers - the World Economic Forum in the Alps of Switzerland - and travels deep into the gold mines of South Africa, then visits the controversial Shell oil fields of Nigeria and Nike shoe factories in Asia while examining an emerging conflict in a new world order between those making macro-economic decisions and those struggling to cope with the impact of those decisions. At the core of the program is the ongoing debate over whether or not human rights concerns should be linked to economic policies. ** For broadcast dates and times of GLOBALIZATION & HUMAN RIGHTS in your hometown, send any message to globaltv-info@igc.org. A computer will answer and send you the complete list, to date. ---------------- ** For information on public television's mission and mandates, go to the home page of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting at http://www.cpb.org --------------- ** Institute for Global Communication has a fantastic set of human rights-related organizations on the web. Find them at http://www.igc.org/igc/issues/hr/ ---------------- ** Create an active electronic community of justice and peace, a community of conscience-partners who engage, study, reflect, change and act at all levels on what causes injustice. http://www.justicenet.org/ ---------------- ** An outstanding collection of justice, peace & environmental links including many links on international issues, plus reports on Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. http://www.ipt.com/htmlpub/jpi/hotlist.htm ---------------- ** On Usenet news, there are two groups you can download whose topics are extremely relevant: soc.rights.human and alt.activism.soc.politics. ---------------- ** Quaker programs addressing human rights...some of them pretty close to home. Imagine that. Here's a place you can get involved. http://www.afsc.org/pindx/humright.htm ** More Quaker programs addressing the global economy http://www.afsc.org/pindx/globecon.htm ** For a full list of programs, including human rights, by location: http://www.afsc.org/location.htm ----------------- ** See our homepage at http://www.globalvision.org for more information about this show and other Globalvision productions. ---------------- ** http://www.imf.org Try it. It's very educational. ----------------- ** What is our elected body up to? Try a word search on "human rights"... http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas2.html ----------------- ** British Columbia's National Centre for Sustainability's incredible "Globalization & the MAI" pages. (MAI is "Multilateral Agreement on Investment", but maybe you knew that.) http://www.islandnet.com/~ncfs/maisite/ ----------------- ** The way to your heart is through your stomach? Go to Institute for Agricultural and Trade Policy (IATP)'s Globalization and Global Governance page http://www.iatp.org/global/ ----------------- ** If you live in California, you probably already know about this. The rest of us? Let's take a lesson. http://www.emf.net/~cheetham/keys.html ----------------- ** The Steelworkers site, with a lot of current union information, along with background on their own lawsuit against NAFTA. http://www.uswa.org ----------------- ** Visit the web site of ITVS, one of GLOBALIZATION & HUMAN RIGHTS' funders. http://www.itvs.org ++++++++++++++++++ There is so much more out there. The intersection of human rights, labor practices, and the trend toward globalization bring myriad issues together...not just overseas, but here at home. Get involved. Do something. If nothing else, watch the show! Rory O'Connor & Danny Schechter Producers, GLOBALIZATION & HUMAN RIGHTS ++++++++++++++++++ From jsommers@lynx.dac.neu.edu Sat Oct 31 22:06:21 1998 Received: from mail1.dac.neu.edu (mail1.dac.neu.edu [129.10.1.75]) by csf.Colorado.EDU (8.8.5/8.8.4/CNS-4.1p-nh) with ESMTP id WAA25874 for ; Sat, 31 Oct 1998 22:06:19 -0700 (MST) Received: from lynx.neu.edu ([129.10.172.122]) by mail1.dac.neu.edu with ESMTP id AAA25967 for ; Sun, 1 Nov 1998 00:06:13 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: <363C51F4.CD6BB74B@lynx.neu.edu> Date: Sun, 01 Nov 1998 12:20:05 +0000 From: Jeffrey Sommers Reply-To: jsommers@lynx.dac.neu.edu MIME-Version: 1.0 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Boris Kagarlitsky Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------C28B3FAE596AE3D78E3F920B" --------------C28B3FAE596AE3D78E3F920B Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; x-mac-type="54455854"; x-mac-creator="4D4F5353" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit The World History Center and the Center for the Study of Russia and the Soviet Union are bringing BORIS KAGARLITSKY to five New England venues. He will speak on the contemporary situation in Russia at all these presentations. The presentation schedule is: Nov. 3rd, Tues., 2:00 at Northeastern University as part of the World History Seminar: event is free and open to the public (teachers are welcome to bring their students). It will be held in 240 Eagan. Contact person is Jeffrey Sommers , coordinator of the World History Center . Co-sponsors are the NU department of Journalism, Modern Languages, Political Science, and the Gorbachev Foundation of North America. Nov. 4th, Wed., 12:30 at Harvard, Bergson Room on the Second Floor of the Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University, 1737 Cambridge Street. For information call Elsa Ransom at (617) 495-4037. Nov. 4th, Wed., 5:00 Tufts, Raab Rm. of Lincoln Filene Ctr., contact is Professor David Mulholland . Nov. 5th, Thurs., 4:00, Yale. Contact administrative assistants of Professor Ivo Banac at (203) 432-3423. Nov. 6th, Fri., noon, Brown U., with participation of Sergei Khrushchev, Watson Institute Conference Room, 2 Stimson Ave. Contact persons are: Leslie Brown and Jean Lawlor . For a sampling of Boris Kagarlitsky's recent commentary go to the following web sites: "The banks have run out of money and the shops have run out of goods. This time it is the Russian elite who have lost everything and the IMF has only limited prospects of bailing them out. Boris Kagarlitsky assesses what the future holds..." http://www.redpepper.org.uk/month.html "Boris Kagarltisky's testimony on Sept. 10, 1998 to the Banking Subcommittee of the US Congress on the IMF and impact of structural reform policies on Russia" http://www.preamble.org/IMF/kagarlit.htm "Russian Students: Optimism Has Turned to Anger" http://www.thenation.com/backissu.htm "Cost of maintaining U.S.-friendly 'stability' in Russia is going up" http://messenger-inquirer.com/perspective/e7185.htm --------------C28B3FAE596AE3D78E3F920B Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit The World History Center  and the Center  for  the Study of Russia and the Soviet Union are bringing BORIS KAGARLITSKY to five New England venues.  He will speak on the contemporary situation in Russia at all these presentations.  The presentation schedule is:

Nov. 3rd, Tues., 2:00 at Northeastern University as part of the World History Seminar: event is free and open to the public (teachers are welcome to bring their students).  It will be held in 240 Eagan.  Contact person is Jeffrey Sommers <jsommers@lynx.neu.edu>, coordinator of the World History Center <www.whc.neu.edu>.  Co-sponsors are the NU department of Journalism, Modern Languages, Political Science, and the Gorbachev Foundation of North America.

Nov. 4th,  Wed., 12:30 at Harvard, Bergson Room on the Second Floor of the Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University, 1737 Cambridge Street.  For information call Elsa Ransom at (617) 495-4037.

Nov. 4th, Wed., 5:00 Tufts, Raab Rm. of Lincoln Filene Ctr., contact is Professor David Mulholland <dmulholl@emerald.tufts.edu>.

Nov. 5th,  Thurs., 4:00, Yale.  Contact administrative assistants of Professor Ivo Banac at (203) 432-3423.

Nov. 6th, Fri., noon, Brown U., with participation of Sergei Khrushchev, Watson Institute Conference Room, 2 Stimson Ave.  Contact persons are: Leslie Brown <Leslie _Baxter@brown.edu> and Jean Lawlor <Jean_Lawlor@brown.edu>.
 

For a sampling of Boris Kagarlitsky's recent commentary go to the following web sites:

"The banks have run out of money and the shops have run out of goods.
This time it is the Russian elite who have lost everything and the IMF has only limited
prospects of bailing them out. Boris Kagarlitsky assesses what the future holds..."
http://www.redpepper.org.uk/month.html

"Boris Kagarltisky's testimony on Sept. 10, 1998 to the Banking Subcommittee of the US Congress on the IMF and impact of
structural reform policies on Russia"
http://www.preamble.org/IMF/kagarlit.htm

"Russian Students: Optimism Has Turned to Anger"
http://www.thenation.com/backissu.htm

"Cost of maintaining U.S.-friendly 'stability' in Russia is going up"
http://messenger-inquirer.com/perspective/e7185.htm
 
 
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