From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Wed May 1 05:04:02 1996 Date: Tue, 30 Apr 96 18:33:22 EDT From: (Greg Ehrig) To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Confused NWO definitons X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO I will reply to this one first: 4/29/96, Greg wrote: >In short, while neither measure is perfect, I guess I am a >conservative in the sense that I prefer the evils of the old GDP per >capita system (with caveats for income dispersion & others) to the >unknown evils of some of the more "newfangled" systems of >measurement. I think this is an excellent example of where academic methodology serves to obscure truth more than it helps elucidate understanding. Living standards and welfare are OBVIOUSLY deteriorating in many first-world countries. There's higher unemployment, more homelessness, more hours-worked necessary for bare survival, desperation among college graduates, astronomical health-care costs, etc. etc. Indices which fail to reflect reality should be discarded or refined, not defended. True science is grounded in unbiased observation, not rigid methodologies. -rkm _____________End of message If you recall, my original posting pointed out some contradictions in your "doublespeak" article. In it you asserted that the first world was in decline because it was competing with the third world, but that, and I quote: "globalization" leads to a _greater_ prosperity disparity between the "developed" and "developing" nations, as measured by the _disposable income_ and living standards of the global populations. End Quote. Now, you are telling me that what you are defining "wealth" the same as you would "standard of living". Fine. However, I am struck by the increasing irony of debating with the author -- who seems to avoid debate by constantly redefining the words he uses -- of a paper ostensibly on the subject of the corruption of language. Some other musings on this post: >. Indices which fail to >reflect reality should be discarded or refined, not defended. I see. So when the data does not fit the theory, the data must be either discarded or changed to fit the theory, hmm? > True science is grounded in unbiased observation, not rigid >methodologies. Let me tell you a little science story I learned in school. It is a true story, but I do not remember the name of the British Scientist who conducted it. He was a man of integrity and was a highly prestigous scientist, and a member of the royal society. Once upon a time there was a great, respected scientist, who truly attempted --as we know from his personal journals -- to view the world from an unbiased perspective. This particular scientist was an anthropologist, interested in studying the diffences which arise within the human race. One of the elements he studied was brain size. It so happened that this scientist worked at the British Museum and had a large collection of Human skulls to work with. He hit apon a method of measuring brain size -- he would simply pour sawdust into the hole (formed by the spinal cord at the base of the skull) until it was full. Then he would pour out the skull into a beaker, and have an exact measure of the volume of the brain which once rode inside the skull. This he did with many different skulls, and after exhaustive experimentation, published his result: Blacks were substantially less intelligent than whites because they had, on average, smaller brains! Remember that this scientist was considered the world expert in his field, and was widely respected for his integrity. The time was the late 19th century. And he was wrong, but he did not know it. Can you guess how? Later, the same experiments were done on the same skulls using lead shot instead of sawdust. It was found that the skulls were indistinguashable, on average, in terms of their brain size. One can imagine the white scientist picking up a smaller caucasian skull, frowning, and tamping just a bit more sawdust into it, or filling a black skull not quite up to the rim with sawdust. The moral of the story? As they teach in philosophy of science classes, NO OBSERVER IS UNBIASED. History is full of wrong answers arrived at when the right ones were attainable because no one wanted ugly facts to ruin a beautiful theory. Rigid Methodologies are the only known way to help avoid researcher bias. This is especially true in the social sciences, but it is present even in the "hard" sciences. Even Albert Einstein, near the end of his life, refused to accept quantum theory on the grounds that "God does not play dice with the universe". >From what I remember, (and no one has yet given the reference) the GPI was put out a small political group with a definite agenda. You can not go about and define all data which disagrees with your theory as "flawed" and that which agrees as "enlightened". As I said before, all sources that I know show increased standards of living. The Statistical Abstract, the UN, and just about any organization that collects international data show things like: ownership of appliances, production and consumption of food, motor vehicle registrations, average wages per man hour in manufacturing among production workers, time spent to earn selected food items, per capita consumption of meat and poultry items, and so on. Almost all of these measures support the conclusion that global living standards are going up, and have the advantage of not being subject to researcher bias. A more up to date example of bias affecting analysis is the current "stagnant wage" debate here in the US. It is true that real cash wages among manufacturing workers remain stagnant, BUT what is not mentioned is that, when non-cash benefits (pension, health, in-kind compensation) are factored in, total compensation (wages + benefits) has continued to increase. Similarly, many studies which perport to show declining wealth for the bottom 10 percent of the US economy only report wage income. What more rigorous analyses show is that when benefits from the state (welfare, food stamps, afdc, etc.) are brought in, real income is rising. Why are these oversights allowed to occur? The answer is that stagnant wages make for a better story, and helps more government agencies, than one based on slow but steady total compensation for workers. Anxiety in the first world is OBVIOUSLY increasing, but whether living standards are depends entirely where you sit. Another observation: Every person equates the economic interests of the Nation with that of his own, and vice versa. I have talked to people in Texas, after the fall in oil prices wiped out the local economy, who were demanding that the government heavily tax imports of oil -- because it would help the economy of texas. Never mind what that would do to other parts of the economy - in fact, I don't think it ever occured to them that it would result in layoffs for people in detroit, or higher prices for"the people", --"those folks did alright in the past, and besides, I don't know them, so they aren't really people" (remember the inverse-square law) This law applies to the desperate college graduates as equally as it does to anyone else. -Greg From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Wed May 1 05:10:27 1996 Date: Wed, 1 May 1996 05:10:24 -0600 (MDT) From: gehrig@banyan.doc.gov To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: historical responsibility X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO Forwarded to: i[wsn@csf.colorado.edu] cc: Comments by: Greg Ehrig@USOTP@TA -------------------------- [Original Message] ------------------------- I must say, just as I was losing all hope for Richard, he comes out with something like this! I almost agree completely with what he has to say on the subject. The only caveat I would add is that we should not assume we can change human nature into something that it is not. The mistake of almost all Utopian beliefs, (like marxism, for example)were in making assumptions about the changeability of man that were, in retrospect, wrong. Bruce had an interesting set of points on the subject, too, but I think the problem of drug prohibition in america is due more to irrationality than deliberate malice by one group or the other. After all, how does it benefit any group for society to pay close to 60,000 a perp, per year, for imprisonment time, not to mention the costs of letting repeat violent offenders out more frequently? The only group I can think of is the prison guards' union, and it is unlikely they are the core group of the NWO....or is it? ;-> ___________End of Message 4/29/96, Greg Ehrig wrote: >Is there a statute of limitations for historical crimes? > >For instance, do people of Anglo descent owe restitution to people of >Saxon descent for the centuries of slavery and exploitation suffered >by the former at the hands of the latter? How do you determine what >reparations are "Just"? As Bob Dylan said: "Show me someone who's not a parasite and I'll go out and say a prayer for him." Or as Joseph Campbell observed: life is AT-ROOT a self-consuming bloody cannibalistic beast. (Big fish eat the little fish, and so ad infinitum.) This is the human condition -- we got where we are partly (or perhaps largely) via warfare, despotism, genocide, and injustice. The miracle of human conciousness is that it is possible to CREATE the concept of justice, to GENERALIZE inborn familial-tribal caring to the brotherhood of man, and to COMPREHEND the ecological interconnection of species, resources, and energy. This is a creative process, not a deductive one. Let's just admit that we ALL share in the guilt of history, if ANYONE is guilty. The useful question is how we can collaborate in creating more just societies, more equitable distribution of wealth, and sustainable economies -- NOT how we should allocate guilt. When a Hindu admitted to Ghandi that he killed a Muslim child, Ghandi's "justice" was for that man to raise another child to be a "good Muslim" -- NOT to go out and hang himself. Some of the worst injustices have been carried out in the name of correcting past injustices. Wasn't The Holocaust itself justified by an alleged ancient crime of Jews? Isn't the present persecution of the Palestinians justifed by ancient land-ownership claims? (bolstered by a misplaced urge to "make up" for the Holocaust?) Let's clear the books and start anew. Our collective debt is unrepayable. -rkm From timmons@mailhost.tcs.tulane.edu Wed May 1 11:06:41 1996 From: "J. Timmons Roberts" Subject: Conference on Economic Globalization May 10-12 (fwd) To: envtecsoc@csf.colorado.edu (envtecsoc) Date: Wed, 1 May 96 12:08:44 CDT ENVTECSOCers, WSNers: The impressive lineup at this conference seemed to merit its cross- posting. Timmons Roberts timmons@mailhost.tcs.tulane.edu Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 30 Apr 1996 16:10:56 -0400 (EDT) > From: Chris McGinn > To: Jeremy Madsen > > > INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON GLOBALIZATION presents > > GLOBAL TEACH-IN 2: > THE SOCIAL, ECOLOGICAL, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL > COSTS OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION > > WHEN: MAY 10-12, 1996 > > WHERE: George Washington University Lisner Auditorium > (21st and H St., NW - Washington, DC) > > TICKETS: (800) 955-5566 or in D.C. (703) 218-6500; Discount tickets > and scholarships are available. > > INFORMATION: International Forum on Globalization > P.O. Box 12218, San Francisco, CA 94211-0218 > (415) 771-3394 Fax: (415) 771-1121 Email: ifg@igc.org > > > Friday, May 10, 7:30pm: Panel I, Consequences of Economic Globalization > > Saturday, May 11, 9 AM - 6 PM: Panel II, Reports from the Planet > Saturday May 11, 7-9 PM: Debate: Do Free Trade and Economic Globalization > Benefit Human Beings and the Earth? > > Sunday, May 12, 9:30 AM - 5:30 PM: Panel IV: Equity, Labor and Jobs in a > Global Economy AND Panel V: The Crisis of Government and the > Emergence of Global Corporate Rule > > The International Forum on Globalization (IFG) is a new alliance of > leading activists, economists, researchers and writers representing more > than twenty countries. We have joined together to respond to the threats > of economic globalization to democracy, communities, human welfare and > the environment. > > We believe the world's corporate and political leadership is undertaking > a restructuring of global politics and economics that may prove as > historically significant as any event since the industrial revolution. If > continued, this trend will have grave impacts on every aspect of human > life and the natural world. > > > FRIDAY, MAY 10, 7:30 PM > PANEL I: CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION > > Vandana Shiva, Research Foundation for Science Technology and Natural > Resource Policy, "The Commodification of Nature" > > Lori Wallach, Public Citizen, "The Assault on Democracy" > > Carl Pope, Sierra Club, "NAFTA and GATT: Disaster for the Environment" > > Martin Khor, Third World Network, "Re-colonizing the Third World" > > David Korten, People-Centered Development Forum, "The Failed Paradigms > of Globalization" > > Helena Norberg-Hodge, International Society for Ecology and Culture, > "Destroying Local Economies and the Homogenization > of Culture" > > Maude Barlow, Council of Canadians, "NAFTA and the Loss of Canadian > Sovereignty and Culture" > > Jerry Mander, Public Media Center, "The Media - Missing the Story > > > SATURDAY, MAY 11, 9 AM - 6 PM > PANEL II: > REPORTS FROM THE PLANET > > Edward Goldsmith, "The Ecologist" Magazine, "The Backlash to European > Integration" > > Richard Moore, Southwest Network for Environmental and Social Justice, > "Resistance within the United States" > > Yao Graham, Integrated Social Development Center, "The Implications > for Africa" > > Vicky Tauli-Corpuz, Cordillera Women's Education and Resource Center > "Women, Native Peoples, and the Marginalization of the > Third World" > > Sara Larrain, Chilean Ecological Action Network, "Expanding NAFTA to Chile" > > Ignacio Peon Escalante, Mexican Action Network on Free Trade > "The Costs of "Adjustment" for Mexico" > > Anurahda Mittal, Instsitute for Food and Development Policy, "The > Failure of Development" > > > PANEL III: GLOBALIZATION, ECOLOGY, AND SUSTAINABILITY > > Randy Hayes, Rainforest Action Network, "The Final Invasion of > Wild Places" > > Brent Blackwelder, Friends of the Earth-U.S., "Globalized Economy: > Inherently Unsustainable" > > David Morris, Institute for Local Self-Reliance, "The Viability of > Local Economies" > > Christina Desser, Migratory Species Project, "Creating a Consciousness > of Sustainabilty at the Grassroots" > > Andy Kimbrell, International Center for Technology Assessment, "Mega- > Technologies and the Natural World" > > Leesteffi Jenkins, Trade and Animal Protection, "Global Environmental > Deregulation" > > > SPECIAL DEBATE, 7-9 PM, MAY 11 > DO FREE TRADE AND ECONOMIC GLOBALISM BENEFIT HUMAN BEINGS > AND THE EARTH? > > Ralph Nader, Center for Study of Responsive Law > > Dr. Jagdish Bhagwati, Professor of Economics, Columbia University > > Vandana Shiva, Research Foundation for Science, Technology, and > Resource Policy > > Plus other prominent representatives from business and trade communities > > > SUNDAY, MAY 12, 9:30 AM - 5:30 PM > PANEL IV: EQUITY, LABOR, AND JOBS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY > > John Cavanaugh, Institute for Policy Studies "Dynamics of Global > Economic Inequity" > > Walden Bello, Focus on the Global South, "Dark Side of the Asian > Miracle" > > Jeanne Guana, South West Organizing Project, "The South in the North" > > Colin Hines, Campaign Against the Single European Currency, "The > Politics of Economic Insecurity" > > Barbara Shailor, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace > Workers, AFL-CIO, "Organized Labor's Response to > the Global Economy > > Bill Troy, Tenn. Industrial Renewal Network, "The Rise of Contract > Labor and the Just-in -Time-Workforce > > > PANEL V: THE CRISIS OF GOVERNMENT AND THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL > CORPORATE RULE > > Ted Halstead, Redefining Progress, "Economic Indicators as Instruments > of Corporate Rule" > > Richard Grossman, Program on Corporations, Law and Democracy, "Democracy > and the Historical Relationship Between Citizens > and Corporations" > > Agnes Bertrand, Institut d'Etude sur la Globalisation Economique, > "The WTO: Enforcing the New Economic World Order" > > Mark Ritchie, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, "The New > Role of Government Under Global Corporate Rule" > > Mika Iba, Network for Safe and Secure Food and Environment, "Japan: > Creating the Corporate State" > > Atila Roque, Instituto Brasiliero de Analyses Socio-Economico, "Responding to > Globalization's Impacts on Democracy in Brazil" > > Tony Clarke, The Polaris Institute, "Dismantling Corporate Rule" > > > PLUS 30 WORKSHOPS (PARTIAL LIST) > > Defining a New Economic Paradigm: From Growth to Sustainability > > Policy Steps Towards Economic Localization > > Beyond Left and Right > > Biocolonization and Intellectual Property Rights > > The Globalization of Media and Technology > > Protecting Biodiversity and Wilderness Against Globalization > > Gender and Globalization > > >From the IMF to the GOP: Structural Adjustment and the Contract with America > > Fighting Global Deregulation > > Industrial Agriculture vs. Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security > > Organizing Labor in a Globalized Economy > > The Migratory Species Project: A Strategy for Creating a Grassroots > Consciousness of Sustainability > > Ending Sweatshops at Home and Abroad > > Organizing Around the World Bank and the IMF > > Dismantling Corporate Rule > > Globalization and the Roots of Violence > > Organizing in the Washington, DC Area > > > > > > > From DennyB@vax1.Mankato.msus.edu Wed May 1 12:45:20 1996 V4.2-13 #3750) id <01I46Z72UP9S00FIHR@MSUS1.MSUS.EDU>; Wed, Date: Wed, 01 May 1996 10:37:33 -0500 From: Denny Braun Subject: Declining Wages To: WSN@csf.colorado.edu Organization: Department of Sociology, Mankato State University Greg Ehrig wrote: > A more up to date example of bias affecting analysis is the current > "stagnant wage" debate here in the US. It is true that real cash > wages among manufacturing workers remain stagnant, BUT what is > not mentioned is that, when non-cash benefits (pension, health, > in-kind compensation) are factored in, total compensation (wages + > benefits) has continued to increase. Similarly, many studies which > perport to show declining wealth for the bottom 10 percent of the US > economy only report wage income. What more rigorous analyses > show is that when benefits from the state (welfare, food stamps, > afdc, etc.) are brought in, real income is rising. Why are these > oversights allowed to occur? The answer is that stagnant wages > make for a better story, and helps more government agencies, than > one based on slow but steady total compensation for workers. _________________________________________________________________________________________________(material from THE RICH GET RICHER 2nd ed.--forthcoming) To begin with, since reaching its peak in 1972-73 real average weekly earnings have fallen by nearly 19 percent through December of 1994. A graphic illustration of this can be seen in data which traces the performance of average weekly earnings paid in the United States since the end of World War II. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which collects and monitors such data, has converted the earnings into constant 1982 dollars to remove the effect of inflation and permit a fair comparison to earlier years. The facts speak for themselves. The average American worker is worse off today than at any time in the past third of a century. In terms of real earnings, today's typical worker actually earns less pay as workers in 1960. The picture gets worse. The decline in wages has been fairly widespread, although some sectors have managed to stay even or inch ahead slightly. Figure 5.8 tracks the performance of real average weekly earnings (in constant 1982 dollars) by private industry groups between 1970 and 1993. Although the figures show general decline for all earnings recipients as a whole, some workers were able to eke out a few gains. Those jobs in the service sector which are supposed to be the highlight of our emerging high-tech, information-age economy are stagnant over the past 23 years, as is the average weekly pay of manufacturing jobs. Those in the mining industry actually gained weekly earnings, but five other industrial categories lost real income. Among the worst hit are retail workers. Already at a paltry $205 per week in 1970, their average weekly earnings had skidded 30 percent to end at $143 in 1993. Considering the loss of manufacturing jobs and the explosion of retail jobs in the U.S. during this period, the implication for average weekly earnings for most American workers is forbidding. (End RICH GET RICHER material) _________________________________________________________________________________________________ As for the claim that employers are really paying as much or more in compensation when fringe benefits are factored in, Lawrence Mishel and Jared Bernstein, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 1994-95 (p. 114) show: 1. A drop of 13% drop in hourly wages ALONE between 1977 and 1994 (from $15.40 down to $13.39); 2. An increase in employer fringe benefits of 12.5% for health and pension ($1.52 up to $1.71) and an increase of 20.9% in employer payroll taxes ($1.29 up to $1.56). In essence, Ehrig is partly correct regarding the employer increase in this area. But, it was not enough to stem the slide of wages; 3. Factoring all of the above together, there is still an 8.5% decrease in hourly wages. I would also add, as Mishel and Bernstein do, that employers have been shedding pension and health benefits at record rates, or adopting much less generous plans. Between 1979 to 1989 the cost of retirement benefits fell nearly 40% (p. 132). The percentage of the private workforce covered by a pension plan went down from 50% in 1979 to 43% in 1980 (p. 134). The government has just announced that the number of Americans not covered by any health insurance jumped over the past few years from 37 million to 42 million (much of this due to employer discontinuance of health coverage). The following material is relavant to the claim that our nation's welfare benefits (not counted as income) really mislead us into believing those with low income are more impoverished than reality. ____________________________________________________________________________________________ To be sure, the way poverty is currently measured is far from perfect. The Census Bureau, which gathers the yearly poverty statistics in its March Current Population Survey, admits that several improvements could be made to the data. Aside from including in-kind benefits such as food stamps when measuring income, taxes need to be subtracted out to derive a better index of real disposable income. Spending for food no longer represents one third of a family budget according to the Current Expenditure Survey (CEX). Most families now require a lot more than three times their food budget to adequately function in today's society, since child- care, housing, transportation and health costs are relatively more expensive. No adjustments are made to income for people in different regions of the country, despite very real variations in the cost of living from one region to the next (it is much cheaper to live in the South and/or in rural areas). The various methodological and conceptual difficulties which have mounted in the thirty- some years since the measure's inception now demand remedy. Accordingly, and by special invitation of Congress, the National Research Council established a panel to address the concerns about how poverty is measured. Their report is now complete and contains a variety of recommended changes that meet some of these concerns. For example, the experts now agree with conservative critics that the dollar value of food stamps, subsidized housing, school lunch programs, and home-energy assistance should be counted as income. In 1992, 36.8 million persons were officially designated as poor under current measurement techniques. Counting in- kind benefits such as the above would reduce the poverty count by 4.2 million individuals (11.4 percent). Yet, it is only fair to subtract state, federal and payroll taxes (such as Social Security) from income, which adds 1.2 million more to the poverty register. Another 2.7 million are added when the cost of work-related expenses (transportation, uniforms, dues, child care, etc.) is taken into account. A whopping 5.3 million cross the line into poverty when out-of-pocket expenditures for medical and health care are added into the economic equation. In all, the analysis concludes that if all of the panel's recommended changes were to be adopted by Congress, anywhere from 9.1 to 11.4 million additional persons could be added to the poverty count. Although many of these changes are long over-due, it is highly unlikely they will be instituted by politicians currently engaged in slashing welfare programs. The belief by the majority in Congress is that the nation is now strapped for cash, and can no longer shoulder the burden of social programs as it has in the past. Ultimately, it is politically impossible for elected officials to admit that poverty is even a worse problem than we previously realized--but to then go about the business of tearing down the nation's social safety net. Most experts are of the opinion that poverty--as currently measured--is vastly understated. The nearly unanimous feeling is that the way poverty is defined by the government is way too low to be realistic in identifying those who are greatly deprived. A study by Andrew Winnick, for instance, states that the official definition of poverty vastly understates the extent of the problem. Instead, he presents alternative measures which lead him to conclude that as many as one-third of American families are poor. Lee Rainwater, in an analysis of U.S. poverty rates from 1949 to 1989, introduces a number of refinements to its measurement--such as an equivalence scale to account for need based upon different family sizes and age of household head. He also bases his definition of poverty upon what the American public thinks it ought to be, which has consistently been half of mean household income. Even when non-cash benefits such as food stamps are counted as income, Rainwater concludes that there has been a tangible rise in poverty during the 1970s and 1980s. By 1989, his measure categorizes 19.1 percent of persons as under poverty, a rate that is one-half again as large as the official level of 12.8 percent. Using different methodology, Rodgers and Rodgers not only support the conclusion that there has been a real rise of poverty in the past two decades, but that it has become chronic and less transitory in nature. _________________________________________________________________________________________________ Best regards, Denny -- Denny Braun Department of Sociology Mankato State University Mankato, MN 56002-8400 Voice: (507) 389-5609 FAX: (507) 389-5615 From hk1@axe.humboldt.edu Wed May 1 16:46:36 1996 Date: Wed, 01 May 1996 15:46 -0700 (PDT) From: Harutiun Kassakhian Subject: Re: Confused NWO definitons In-reply-to: To: Greg Ehrig Mr.Ehrig, are you claiming that more employed persons in the US have higher wages plus benefits (more people have access to health insurance, for instance) and that the total value of wages +benefits has gone up? Where is this information to be found? Is the insecurity of the Social Security system (Secretary of Dep. of Labor stated that young Americans should begin saving for their retirement due to the potential failure of the Social Security system sometime in the mid-21st century) fuelling private pension schemes? If this is true, than the qualms over Medicare and Social Security cuts are needless, and we should all just sit back and enjoy our medical insurance, pensions and long vacations. From aaustin@mtsu.edu Wed May 1 18:04:56 1996 Date: Wed, 1 May 1996 19:05:56 -0500 (CDT) From: "Andrew W. Austin" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Re: historical responsibility (fwd) Hopefully this will make it through this time. AA ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 1 May 1996 13:52:40 -0500 (CDT) From: Andrew W. Austin To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Re: historical responsibility (fwd) "Homo sapiens sapiens" is a biological concept. Biology is socially constructed, or, at the very least, interpreted through socially constructed frames. Reality, including empirical reality, is only made meaningful within conceptual and symbolic systems created through, and reified by, social interaction and processes. Humans are at the center of history and science, because history and science are human products. I call this the "fact" of historicity. What is "human"is a social concept. What is human is not only interpreted thought socially constructed frames that are subject to the "fact" of historicity, but the human itself is a social product. We are all born Homo sapiens, this is our genetic/biological/morphological heritage as a species, nomenclature made meaningful through taxonomic schemes (schemes constructed by humans and constructed socially). But we must be socialized (humanized) to become human. Therefore, to say that there is an unalterable "human nature" is to naturalize an historically and socioculturally given entity, on both the conceptual and the material level. This sort of doctrine or ideology becomes a barrier to critical theory and analysis. Whereas history and science are human products, humans are products of social relations. Science, and its speculations vis a vis "human nature," are, at the core, a social process. To summarize, human beings and what is considered being human is a product of the sociocultural and historical matrix, itself a product of social relations, made meaningful in the intersubjective. These reciprocal relationships have been defined variously as interaction between agent and structure, and structure and process, etc. But it is, in all cases, self-in-society and society-in-self simultaneously. Human is a creative entity; we make and remake ourselves. Therefore, a human cannot have a permanent character or "nature." It is absolute idealism (and utopian) to posit such a nature, particularly ahistorically and asocially. Peace, Andy From ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au Wed May 1 20:04:07 1996 02 May 1996 12:03:01 +1000 Date: Thu, 02 May 1996 12:03:00 +1000 From: "Bruce R. McFarling" Subject: Re: Declining Wages In-reply-to: <3187853D.6D87@vax1.Mankato.msus.edu> To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK On Wed, 1 May 1996, Denny Braun wrote: > Greg Ehrig wrote: >... > > > A more up to date example of bias affecting analysis is the current > > "stagnant wage" debate here in the US. It is true that real cash > > wages among manufacturing workers remain stagnant, BUT what is > > not mentioned is that, when non-cash benefits (pension, health, > > in-kind compensation) are factored in, total compensation (wages + > > benefits) has continued to increase. ... > As for the claim that employers are really paying as much or more in > compensation when fringe benefits are factored in, Lawrence Mishel and > Jared Bernstein, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 1994-95 (p. 114) show: >... > 2. An increase in employer fringe benefits of 12.5% for health and pension > ($1.52 up to $1.71) and an increase of 20.9% in employer payroll taxes > ($1.29 up to $1.56). In essence, Ehrig is partly correct regarding the > employer increase in this area. Can we make an empirical observation whether the increase in dollar value of finge benefits for health is an increase in quantity or an increase in price? One useful indicator would be the percentage of workers covered by health insurance: increasing health benefits in payment terms as a hidden wage increase should not be associated with a declining percentage of the workforce covered, while increasing health benefits in payments terms in response to sectoral price inflation would likely be associated with a declining percentage of the workforce covered. And to account the increase in taxes for social security funding on the fantasy that a nation can make provision for claims on future product by saving up the funds to do so as an increase in 'benefits' businesses pay to workers goes counter to common sense. Both the employee paid contribution and the employer paid contribution are components of a tax, and represent a reduction in the disposable income of the workers. It can be counted as part of wages to consider the hiring decisions of firms, but not when dicussing the benefits received by workers. Virtually, Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Thu May 2 05:52:54 1996 Date: Wed, 1 May 96 18:32:20 EDT From: (Greg Ehrig) To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Stagnant Wage debate X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO I disagree with Denny Braun, and instead of refuting him in this letter ( I _do_ have a job ) I would recommend to all the ongoing discussion cited in the csn webpage : The Feed. go to http://www.feedmag.com/ and click on the Stagnant Wages discussion. The Feed is more on the left of the issue, but seems to give fair time to detractors, who lay out the case fairly effectively. One of the best discussions on the subject of Competitiveness, though, can be found in Paul Krugman's _Pop Internationalism_. --Greg From OWENJACK@FS.isu.edu Thu May 2 11:28:57 1996 From: "J B Owens" Organization: Idaho State University To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Thu, 2 May 1996 11:30:26 -0600, MDT Subject: EHA: comparative history FYI: Jack Owens, Idaho State Univ. ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date: Thu, 2 May 1996 08:50:48 -0400 Reply-to: World-L - Forum on non-Eurocentric world history From: Haines Brown Date: Wed, 1 May 1996 17:23:57 -0400 From: "Alan M. Taylor" Subject: GC: EHA Meetings 1996: "Comparative History" (x-EH.NEWS) ================= GLOBAL.CHANGE POSTING ================= From: Martha L. Olney The 1996 Economic History Association meetings will be held September 6 - 8, 1996 at the Claremont Resort and Spa in the Berkeley/Oakland Hills of California. The theme for this year's program is "Comparative History." A preliminary program will be printed in the June 1996 issue of the _Journal of Economic History_. (A preliminary/preliminary version is included below.) Registration materials will be sent to EHA members in early June. If you are not a member of the EHA and would like to receive registration materials, please send an e-mail to Ms. Mary King, EHA Admin. Ass't, eha@falcon.cc.ukans.edu. Include your name and snail mail address. Again this year, there will be substantial discounts for graduate students. All faculty are encouraged to inform their graduate students of these offers!! Graduate students receive a 50 percent discount on the registration fee, a free one-year subscription to the Journal of Economic History, discounted hotel rates, and a 75 percent discount on group meals. And special gatherings for graduate students are in the works! Faculty! To help pay for all these graduate student subsidies, we will be offering you the option to "Treat a graduate student to lunch" or "Treat a graduate student to dinner." Please plan now to include a little extra in your registration check. Your donations are fully tax deductible. For further information, please contact Meetings Coordinator Martha Olney, EHA Annual Meetings Office, 190 El Cerrito Plaza #370, El Cerrito, CA 94530. E-mail: MOlney@econ.berkeley.edu. Fax: 510- 527-4558. Further announcements regarding the 1996 EHA meetings will be posted to the list "EHA". If you are interested in attending the 1996 meetings, we encourage you to subscribe to this new list. To subscribe, send an e-mail to: lists@cs.muohio.edu Leave the "subject" heading blank. In the text of the message, write only the following: subscribe EHA Preliminary program: Questions or comments to Avner Greif (avner@leland.stanford.edu) Plenary Session: Comparative Studies of Economic Growth Paul David: Real Income and Economic Welfare Growth in the Early Republic. Or Another Try At Getting the American Story Straight. Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff: Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the United State. Barry Eichengreen: Postwar Europe's Growth: A Comparative Institutional Analysis A Precocious Infant: The Market in Medieval England Clark, Greg The Surprisingly Complete Grain Markets of Medieval England Galloway, Jim Market Networks in the London Region c. 1400 Campbell, Bruce The Changing Composition of English Agricultural production in the Century of the Black Death The Politics and Economics of Competition: Some Historical and International Comparisons. Davis, Lance & Gallman, Robert The Politics of International Capital Flows: Canada, Argentina & US Lipartito, Kenneth Regulating Competition in Telecommunications Industry: US & UK 1890-1920 Yeager, Mary Cultures of Protection: Divergent Development Paths in Mexican & Brazilian Steel Industries Pushing and Pulling: the Process of Migration Fleicaino, Zadia M. Mexican Immigrants to the United States: Evidence on Selection and Economic Performance from 1910-1990 Hutchinson, Bill Patterns of Trade and Immigration in the Nineteenth Century U.S.: Comparisons with Recent Experience Wegge, Simone To Part or not to Part: Emigration and Inheritance Institutions in 19th Century Hesse-Cassel Nurturing the Business: Financial Systems and Economic Performance Feldman, Gerald Hugo Stinnes and His Bankers, 1895-14. Haber, Stephen The Efficiency Consequences of Institutional Change: Capital market Regulation and Industrial Productivity Growth in Brazil, 1866-1934 Hanley, Anne Financial Institutions and Economic Change: The Sao Paulo Bolsa, 1886-1914 Organization, Technology, and Production Krozner, Randall Evolution of Corporate Ownership and Governance since the Great Depression Raff, Daniel What Actually Happened at Highland Park? Micro-Economic History and the Coming of Mass Production Thomson, Ross The Internationalization of Technology, 1874-1929: Evidence from U.S., British, and German Patent Experience Violence, and the Fruits of the Land Clay, Karen Land Tenure Arrangements in Post Gold Rush California: Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation Alston, Lee and Liebcap, Gary Violence Over Claims to Land: Analysis and Comparisons Between the 20th Century Brazilian Amazon and the 19th Century West Wishart, David Comparing Cherokee and White Agriculture in the Southeastern Upcountry Circa 1840: Are There Lessons for Today's Developing Indigenous Communities? Financing and Distributing Finn, Margot C. The Cultural Construction of Cash: Credit and Ready Money in English Consumer Relations Potter, Mark Lending Clienteles and the Institutions of Public Finance in Early Modern France Field, Alexander The Relative Productivity of American Distribution, 1869-1992 Labor Markets During the Industrialization Process Boyer, George R. The Influence of London on Labor Markets in Southern England 1830-1914 Brown, John Job Tenure and Employment Structure During High Industrialization: The Case of Germany Before WWI Burnette, Joyce Employment Patterns of Agricultural Day-Laborers near Sheffield: Gender Differences and Changes Over Time, 1772-5 and 1831-45 Growth, and Well Being in North America Egnal, Marc Long Swings in Growth in Colonial North America: A Comparison of Development in the Thirteen Colonies and Canada Costa, Dora L. Rising Equality: The Health of the American Population, 1910-92 Bernstein, Michael A. Economic Instability in the United States: A Comparison of the 1930s and the 1970s Government's Policy , Adjustment, and Growth Fishback, Price & Kantor, Shawn The Effects of New Deal Expenditures on Local Economic Development LaCroix, Sumner Convergence in China During the Maoist and Reform Regimes Grant, Jonathan Private Enterprise and the State in Russia: A Comparative Study of the Putilov Company (1868-1917) and the Kirov Works Today =--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--= Martha L. Olney Economics Department, UC Berkeley MOlney@econ.berkeley.edu ------------------------------------------------------------- Alan M. Taylor mailto:amt@nwu.edu http://www.econ.nwu.edu/faculty/taylor/ Office: Home: Department of Economics 928 Judson Avenue, Apt. 1 Northwestern University Evanston, IL 60202-1861 2003 Sheridan Road tel:847-475-9635 Evanston, IL 60208-2600 tel:847-491-8234 fax:847-491-7001 From OWENJACK@FS.isu.edu Thu May 2 11:30:30 1996 From: "J B Owens" Organization: Idaho State University To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Thu, 2 May 1996 11:31:41 -0600, MDT Subject: World History Association web page FYI. Jack Owens, Idaho State Univ. ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date: Thu, 2 May 1996 09:25:39 -0400 Reply-to: World-L - Forum on non-Eurocentric world history From: Haines Brown Subject: Announce: World History Association web page I would like to announce the World History Association Web page located at: http://neal.ctstateu.edu/history/WHA/ The page includes information about the World History Association and its publications, Journal of World His- tory and World History Bulletin. The names of officers, council members, and editors are accompanied by addresses, telephone numbers, and hot e-mail links. There are also links for the contents of the Journal of World History, for on-line resource for the study of world history and a set of links for teaching world history. Haines Brown (brownh@ccsua.ctstateu.edu) From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Fri May 3 10:21:01 1996 Date: Fri, 3 May 96 12:20:00 EDT From: (Greg Ehrig) To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: re: historical responsibility X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO What about self-interest? Because self-interest can lead (depending on societal pressures) to either Selfishness or Cooperation, is it not a deeper force in human nature? Self interest/human nature has, to my knowledge, beat all utopian reformers. To my knowledge, this, and certain other human traits, have evidenced themselves no matter what the idological/societal enviornment. In those societies which wished these human traits away when formulating the "ideal" always found massive hypocrisy within their poorly-functioning societies. For instance, early christianity's beliefs regarding sex were fine, so long as it remained a religion. When the religion became the dominant construct in medieval Europe, Christianity went from being voluntary to mandatory -- and guaranteed its own corruption as a result of its emphasis on the ideal, as opposed to real, view of human nature. Barbara Tuchman's _A Distant Mirror_ shows in large part the folly of the belief that an ideologically - imposed societal construct cannot remold human beings into something that they are not. One of the best students of the subject, IMHO, is the writer Orson Scott Card, particularly reflected in his _The call of Earth_ series. It is difficult for me to imagine a purely "cooperative" or "competitive" society -- Capitalist societies are highly cooperative, when viewed as a system, and Socialist/Communist can be highly competitive. Where the fallacy lies, in one system or the other, is when it is assumed that a given group or class of people will behave in a self-less way over time. Selflessness is not unknown to human individuals, but again IMHO, it is too dammed rare and unpredictable to attempt to base a society on. ---Greg From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Fri May 3 10:47:43 1996 Date: Fri, 3 May 96 12:47:06 EDT From: (Greg Ehrig) To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Standard of living index X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO Found the standard of living index that someone mentioned before: What it is is just consumption plus government minus military: This means that when military spending goes up, Standards of living go down, and when investment goes up, standards of living go down. When taxes go up, standards of living go up, and when the deficit grows larger, standards of living go up. (Resources are transferred from the Capital market (K) to Government debt (G). Now, according to Richard, the Japanese corporatocracy is the model worthy of emulation. Let's compare the numbers for standard of living for Japan and, oh, let's say, the U.S. Remember that absolute numbers don't mean anything to this measure -- Rather, it shows which sectors of the economy are being stimulated at any given time. It does not tell you whether the pie is growing or not, just who is getting what proportion of each slice of the pie. Remember, Japan spends almost nothing on its military as a % of GDP, so the Japanese living standards should be much higher than the U.S. ---- For Japan: 1970 63.8 1971 64.8 1972 64.9 1973 65.1 1974 66.0 1975 67.8 1976 67.2 1977 66.8 1978 67.0 1979 67.2 1980 66.1 1981 65.2 1982 66.0 1983 66.7 1984 65.6 1985 64.5 1986 65.0 1987 64.5 1988 63.3 1989 62.5 For the U.S.: 1970 76.9 1971 76.1 1972 76.1 1973 74.9 1974 75.1 1975 77.3 1976 77.0 1977 75.8 1978 74.6 1979 73.7 1980 74.0 1981 73.1 1982 75.4 1983 75.4 1984 73.7 1985 74.5 1986 75.5 1987 75.8 1988 75.6 1989 74.9 Surprise! lIving standards for the U.S. are higher! The reason is that this does not really reflect living standards -- just the relative balance in society between consumers(C) and (G); and producers (I) and military. Japan squeezes its consumers, taking away their share of gdp, and redistributes the flow to producers. Thus, their "standard of living" is much lower. This is why this is not a particularly relevant data series to our discussion. ---That's it for now, Greg From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Fri May 3 13:06:04 1996 Date: Fri, 3 May 96 15:05:22 EDT From: (Greg Ehrig) To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: .RERE standard of living index. X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO Joshua wrote: " If you multiply the standard of living index times GDP (per capita times population) I think you'd get a more meaningful index of what Bob Summers at Penn had in mind when he devised that index. I'm not expert on it, though. " I really think that the index as presented is meant more as comparison tool across countries, not within them. For example, the eighties are commonly demonized as the "decade of greed", by which I assume is meant that people spent more for themselves and saved & invested less. If that were in fact what happened, the standard of living variable would have shown it as an _increase_ in standard of living in the united states, since C and G would have been rising, and I would be falling, improving the ratio. Multiplying this ratio by GDP would show the average of total consumption per person -- not reflecting savings balances, investments, and so on. This index was probably more useful for comparing economies during the cold war, when there really were different economic systems in operation. The whole thing is fairly spurrious, anyway, because you pay a price when you shift resources to consumption: Less production in the future. So, if you were to have 1.0 on the Standard of living scale, life would be good -- for a very short time. In that schenario, "the people" (i.e. consumers) would literally consume everything the economy has, and future consumption would be projected to zero. (Investment is a measure of future consumption, because it determines future production -- no production in the future=no consumption in the future.) --Greg From deibert@unixg.ubc.ca Fri May 3 14:09:53 1996 Date: Fri, 3 May 1996 13:09:49 -0700 (PDT) To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: deibert@unixg.ubc.ca (Ronald J. Deibert) Subject: Research Note Dear Colleagues: I have been asked to write a research note for the journal *International Organization* on IR-related research resources on the Internet and World-Wide Web. The research note will attempt to cover general social science resources, academic and professional sites, government sites, and most of the standard issue-areas (e.g., international organization; international security; IPE; environment; culture/gender/critical studies, etc) that would be of interest to readers of *International Organization*. I will also be including a section on methodological and pedagogical issues concerning Internet communications, and will be reviewing web-pages used for courses. Obviously such a researh note can not hope to be comprehensive. Instead, I am going to examine critically some of the better sites in each area, and then provide additional lists of sites in footnotes or in an appendix. *I am seeking and very much encourage any input people may have on sites they think should be reviewed, on areas that should be covered, and on their general perspectives about research on the Internet -- particulary from those who have used the Internet as a teaching aid.* I will be researching and writing the research note over the course of the summer and into the fall, and can be reached at the following email address: deibert@unixg.ubc.ca Thanks, Ron ps. please forward this message to relevant others. Ronald J. Deibert Assistant Director Institute of International Relations C456-1866 Main Mall University of British Columbia Vancouver, B.C. V6T-1Z1 Phone: 604-822-3844 Fax: 604-822-5540 Email: deibert@unixg.ubc.ca From rkmoore@iol.ie Fri May 3 15:15:07 1996 Fri, 3 May 1996 22:14:51 +0100 (BST) Date: Fri, 3 May 1996 22:14:51 +0100 (BST) To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Re: D Braun's chapter on inadequacty of GNP/GDP measures Unfortunately, the line breaks in Denny's excellent chapter made it difficult to read (at least in my mailer program). I've prepared a much more readable, narrow column version, which I'll be happy to forward to anyone who wants it. Regards, rkm BTW> Denny: can your draft be forwarded beyond WSN? ________________________________________________________________ 4/30/96, Denny Braun wrote: > The following is new material from my revised edition of THE RICH GET RICHER > (which unfortunately for me will not be out until early in 1997). It is > germane to our thread about the adequacy of comparing countries on GDP or > GNP per person. >----------------------------------- > Income Distribution and Available Data From rkmoore@iol.ie Fri May 3 15:15:17 1996 Fri, 3 May 1996 22:15:03 +0100 (BST) Date: Fri, 3 May 1996 22:15:03 +0100 (BST) To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Re: relationship between short-term & long-term planning 4/30/96, Harutiun Kassakhian wrote: >The two tendencies: long term-planning by policy makers in national >governments, international financial institutions, etc, and short-term >planning in US corporate borad-rooms are fundamentally unrelated. Harutiun's comment is certainly consistent with observed behavior -- a broad class of corporate operations continue to be decided by short-term profit considerations, while elite planning (so to call it) listens to a more distant drummer. But is this a case of complete disconnect? Are elite planners out of touch with corporate reality? Do they listen too much to ivory-tower think tanks? Or, conversely, are corporate operatives out of touch with their longer-range opportunities, are their noses too close to the stock-valuation grindstone? Allow me to suggest that there is a very intimate connection indeed between these seemingly disparate mindsets. It seems to me that what the elite planners are endeavoring to create is a global development environment (as opposed to global marketplace) which will be attractive to short-term-oriented operators. Thus while it may be true that no single corporation would take the trouble to champion a NAFTA or GATT (given the long horizon), nonetheless: "Once it is built they will come". In other words: when GATT (with its capital portability), and the IMF (with its mandated structural "reforms") make global economies attractive as venues for short-term capital investments, then those investments will indeed be forthcoming. Thus I would argue that the elite planners are working at a higher level of conciousness -- they are taking into account the behaviour of corporate operatives, and are working more at the "god level" re/ creating future corporate playing fields. One might then ask -- Who are these elites really? Who is it that has the incentive to devote resources to the long-range growth opportunities for capital _in general_? Others on this list are probably more capable of answering this question than myself, but let me at least submit that the big banks and financial institutions have every reason to maximize the future demand for development loans. Rather than devoting all their marketing dollars to competing for pie-share with other banks, an international bank would rationally apportion considerable marketing dollars to insuring a bigger pie next time around. Especially if the bank had a client base which it could expect to retain as the pie grows. The recruitment of national governments as allies in this long-range endeavor is a consequence of the "special relationship" national governments have with international banks -- out of proportion revenue-wise compared to other economic sectors. This special relationship is evidenced by the existence of Central Banks (including the Federal Reserve), and has been cemented over the decades (centuries?) by the dependence governments periodically experience toward these banks (during wartime and times of monetary crisis). Thoughts? -rkm From hk1@axe.humboldt.edu Fri May 3 16:33:19 1996 Date: Fri, 03 May 1996 15:33 -0700 (PDT) From: Harutiun Kassakhian Subject: re: historical responsibility In-reply-to: To: Christian Harlow "Human nature?" Where do we look for human nature, in taoist philosophy, in Australian aboriginal cultures, or in Hobbes? This pseudo-religion of "human nature" is too consistantly used to justify everything from capital punishment to privatizing public schools in the attempt at constructing a rationale for the policy configurations of American governments and corporations. The song goes like this."Human's by nature are greedy. Any attempt to reform the existing system is doomed to failure, because the reforms are "artificial" and ideological, lead by a bunch of intellectuals who are doomed to fail." Yet the ideologues of "pro-market" reform aren't held accontable. In an "Economist" magazine article, the writer praised "pro-market" reforms in Chile. The article stated that the standard of living had risen. Yet the article stated that the gap between the rich and poor had grown. What has gone on in Chile? As with America in the 1980-1996 period, assessment of as Reagan put it, "are you better off now than you were before," are highly charged with political baggage. For the 35-year-old fast food worker or security guard (two rapidly growing industries) life may not be as good as it was for his dad, the shipyard worker. For the lap-top crowd, the positive economic indices are trustworthy. As long as the fast-food workers don't spit in the food (the minimum wage has not gone up this year) the lap-toppers are very happy. "Human nature" as a rationalization of the existing scheme of things in America just isn't bought by many Americans. The Buchanan presidential candidacy, the resentment towards "restructuring" outsourcing has pissed a lot of people off. Even Alan Greenspan recently said that the gaping inequalities in the US threaten the stability of our social fabric. The task of social scientists is to understand what's going on, and maybe suggest some policies that can be adopted by corporations and governments so as to prevent the "Blade Runnerization" of America. Pegging anything "human nature" is a waste of intellectual resources. From ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au Sat May 4 01:09:01 1996 Date: Sat, 04 May 1996 17:07:50 +1000 From: "Bruce R. McFarling" Subject: Re: Standard of living index In-reply-to: To: Greg Ehrig On Fri, 3 May 1996, Greg Ehrig wrote: > Found the standard of living index that someone mentioned before: > > What it is is just consumption plus government minus military: You will recall that what I had said was along the lines of start with GDP, identify things you want to count as benefits, omit things you want to count as neutrals, and subtract the things you want to count as bads. Making the point that adding everything at market values and using it as a welfare measure is *specifying* that everything is a good, and nothing is a neutral or a bad, which is just as biased (and potentially politically motivated) as any other specification in the family. It is not 'neautral' because 'it does not attempt to judge which are good and which are bad': it *implies* that all transactions are beneficial. And this is independent of the question of unweighted, weighted, or prioritized measures: GDP as a welfare measure specifies that everytime money is spent it is good, and everytime it is not spent, it is bad. And I suggested starting here, and subtracting spending on prisons as well as military spending. I don't know where to find those numbers at the moment, but *including* them *requires the premise* that building more prisons is a good thing for people's standard of living. > This means that when military spending goes up, Standards of living go > down, and when investment goes up, standards of living go down. Notice: if aggregate demand is shifted from military spending to investment: standard of living goes up on this index. Of aggregate demand is shifted from consumption to investment, current standard of living goes down. That's exactly how I would argue it should work, at least in qualitative terms. Someone alse could argue the contrary. But the judgement is not avoided when it is evaded by relying on GDP: rather, a specific contrary judgement is being made. And saying "well, at least I know the problems with GDP" is not a convincing argument that all purchases should be treated as contributions to personal welfare. > Now, according > to Richard, the Japanese corporatocracy is the model worthy of > emulation. BTW, this is a point (the joys of emulating Japanese corporatocracy), where I am a little dubious. Refer to Dossbach's (sp?) excellent work on Japan and 'Post-Fordism'. > Let's compare the numbers for standard of living for > Japan and, oh, let's say, the U.S. Remember that absolute numbers > don't mean anything to this measure -- Rather, it shows which > sectors of the economy are being stimulated at any given time. That's not what I said, and since I am the 'someone' alluded to above, I think this is significant. I said take GDP, go to the World Bank indexed value, subtract prisons, see where you are, and keep going. Obviously you multiply the index number by total GDP to get the indexed value. > It does not tell you whether the pie is growing or not, just who is > getting what proportion of each slice of the pie. Obviously: the World Bank datset avoids correlating the time series unecessarily, since it was developed for time series econometric estimation. The index number is given instead of the indexed GDP value for very good statistical reasons, but that does not prevent us from using the indexed value. > Remember, Japan > spends almost nothing on its military as a % of GDP, so the Japanese > living standards should be much higher than the U.S. ---- Why? This is false. Current spending on investment is *not* a contribution to current standard of living. You can make an argument that current investment will lead to improved future standards of living, but that is a case to be made by establishing the relationship between previous investment spending and current standard of living, not by _a priori_ dictating that current investment spending contributes to the current standard of living just as much as current consumption spending (and whether or not the GPI subtracts or omits the right things from C, obviously not even all current consumption spending represent an improvement in welfare). > For Japan: > > 1970 63.8 > 1971 64.8 > 1972 64.9 .... > 1987 64.5 > 1988 63.3 > 1989 62.5 > > > For the U.S.: > 1970 76.9 > 1971 76.1 > 1972 76.1 .... > 1987 75.8 > 1988 75.6 > 1989 74.9 > Surprise! lIving standards for the U.S. are higher! The reason is that > this does not really reflect living standards -- just the relative > balance in society between consumers(C) and (G); and producers (I) > and military. Japan squeezes its consumers, taking away their share > of gdp, and redistributes the flow to producers. Thus, their > "standard of living" is much lower. I will state a hypothesis: consider the indexed value and even on this index the growth in standard of living story will change dramatically. And I have not looked at these particular indexed values, so that *is* a hypothesis. > This is why this is not a particularly relevant data series to our > discussion. And this has been why it is one *quite* relevant point of departure for exactly the type of critical judgement that must be exercised to offer market value - based aggregates as welfare measures. Virtually, Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au From ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au Sat May 4 01:59:11 1996 Date: Sat, 04 May 1996 17:58:02 +1000 From: "Bruce R. McFarling" Subject: Re: .RERE standard of living index. In-reply-to: To: Greg Ehrig On Fri, 3 May 1996, Greg Ehrig wrote: > Joshua wrote: > > " If you multiply the standard of living index times GDP (per capita > times population) I think you'd get a more meaningful index of what Bob > Summers at Penn had in mind when he devised that index. I'm not expert > on it, though. > " > > I really think that the index as presented is meant more as > comparison tool across countries, not within them. No, the data in the Penn World tables were developed for growth studies, and it was therefore obviously intended for both time series comparisons within countries as well as comparisons between countries: any growth measure has to involve a comparison within a country at different periods of time! But to use it as a single index, rather than as a single dimension in a multi-dimensional analysis, you should multiply by GDP, and per capita GDP would be more appropriate to what we have been discussing. Virtually, Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au From rkmoore@iol.ie Sat May 4 06:32:47 1996 Sat, 4 May 1996 13:32:34 +0100 (BST) Date: Sat, 4 May 1996 13:32:34 +0100 (BST) To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Buchanan's right on the New World Order (fwd) Date: Tue, 30 Apr 1996 08:39:33 -0400 From: zzballardc@winthrop.edu (CAROLYN BALLARD) To: rkmoore@iol.ie Subject: NWO To: prj@conch.aa.msen.com Subj: Buchanan was right. Buchanan's right on the New World Order by D.L. Cuddy ********************* The press smear against Pat Buchanan recently reached its height when columnist Charles Krauthammer ridiculed his defending Americans against the "New World Order." Buchanan's belief that the power elite are moving us toward a world government is dismissed as a "fanatic plot." But there is plenty of evidence that we should take this threat seriously. President Clinton and several of his appointees support the goal of establishing a world government. Clinton administration appointee Strobe Talbot wrote four years ago in Time magazine that "perhaps national sovereignty wasn't such a great idea after all" and that "the case for world government" was "clinched." For this article, the now State Department official won the World Federalist Associat- ion's Norman Cousins Global Governance Award. When President Clinton congratulated Talbot on the award in a letter, he noted that the World Federalist Association worked for "world peace and world government" and wished the organization "future success." Clinton's ambassador to Spain and former campaign adviser on United Nations matters, Richard Gardner, has outlined the strategy for pursuing world government."[A]n end run around national sovereignty, eroding it piece by piece, will accomp- lish much more than the old-fashioned frontal assault," he wrote in a 1974 article for Foreign Affairs. He added the "We will be seeking new rules in the GATT. ...These will subject countries to an unprecedented degree of international surveillance over up to now sacrosanct 'domestic' policies. Before he became a Clinton assistant secretary of state, Winston Lord said in a 1992 speech that "To a certain extent, we are going to have to yield some of our sovereignty, which will be controversial at home..." Some of ceding of national sovereignty has occurred. Article XVI of the new World Trade Organization states that "Each member shall ensure the conformity of it's laws, regulations, and administrative procedures with its obligations." Buchanan fight against such conformity, especially if it means an unfair practice like forcing American workers to compete with Chinese slave labor. Buchanan also has warned about the increasing influence of the World Court. A 1995 report by the Commission on Global Govern- ance, endorsed by U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali recommends that "A new world order must be organized. ...Accept- ance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court should surely be a basic condition for membership in the United Nations. We strongly endorse community initiatives to...encourage the disarming of citizens..." The United Nations has an increasing hold on U.S. foreign policy. The United Nations blocked a plan to take out a missile launcher in Bosnia that eventually shot down U.S. pilot Scott O'Grady. The Clinton administration feels so insecure in assert- ing national sovereignty that it repeatedly reminds everyone that U.S. missions in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia have been approved by the United Nations. The Buchanan campaign has provided a valuable service by scrutinizing the movement toward a New World Order. Congress can do its part by banning the use of State Department appropriations or grants to other international organizations for promoting the doctrine of one world government or one world citizenship. This restriction was law from 1953 to 1986. Such a ban, contained in a congressional conference report, has passed the House. The Senate should do likewise. -------------------------------------------- D.L. Cuddy is a Raleigh, N.C. based writer -------------------------------------------- Detroit News, Thursday, March 28,1996 From rkmoore@iol.ie Sat May 4 11:55:42 1996 Sat, 4 May 1996 18:55:30 +0100 (BST) Date: Sat, 4 May 1996 18:55:30 +0100 (BST) To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: re: prosperity indices All these numbers seem to be dancing on heads of pins. What I'd like to see are two measures: one of how well people are doing, and one of how well corporations are doing. For people, I want quite different things that what we've been talking about. I'd want to know average hours per year spent working, how many family members work, how many years of education occur on average, how earnings compare to living costs, medical costs, transportation costs -- and other things of that nature. A single number is unlikely to suffice, but two or three summary-numbers might do per country. For corporations, I imagine the existing measures probably provide the appropriate information. Then it might be interesting to compare the relationship between the the two measures in different countries... and ask questions like: Where are do people seem to be favored, and where corporations, relatively speaking? rkm From aaustin@mtsu.edu Sun May 5 08:54:07 1996 Date: Sun, 5 May 1996 09:55:05 -0500 (CDT) From: "Andrew W. Austin" To: gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Subject: re: historical responsibility In-Reply-To: Can you name, using a nonfunctionalist interpretative frame and avoiding explanations of human phenomena (myth, rituals, attitudes, norms) based on sapien capacities and/or morphology (such as 'we play Bach and other animals can't'), name some human culture "traits" that are transepochal? Curious. Andy Austin From jborocz@orion.oac.uci.edu Sun May 5 10:12:31 1996 Date: Sun, 5 May 1996 09:12:14 -0700 (PDT) From: Jozsef Borocz To: "Richard K. Moore" Subject: prosperity, indices In-Reply-To: Don't the United Nations Development Program's _Human Development Reports_ do just what you are looking for? (Provide a set of measures pertaining to non-business related aspects of the quality of life. I seem to remember very interesting tables in the first, (I think 1993) edition, comparing country rankings based on literacy, life expectancy, completed years of schooling, % of female children completing elementary and highschool, etc. with rankings based on various measures of national output, particularly the purchasing power parity and current exchange rate estimates of gross national domestic product.) >From the former set, they then go on creating something called HDI (human development index) and its rankings are contrasted with GDP rankings (they subtract the latter from the former). The outcome is predictable: the former state socialist countries, along with a few European post-war Marshall aid-recipient welfare state democracies stand out on the positive extreme; the remainder of the core countries (the U.S. included) and much of the "third world" in the middle with enormous variance, and the oil-rich "third world" countries (whose GDP figures are boosted enormously by the oil revenues that somehow do not exactly appear to be redistributed :-() are trailing the rest of the world. This (subtracting rankings) is a statistically somewhat sloppy way of presenting the data--I guess they must have decided to do it this way to make it understandable for a lay audience. (After all, most of their readership is politicians.) :-( BTW, two interesting asides. The first edition received serious political criticism (from governments whose countries which did not appear in as favorable ligth as they had expected). Consequently, the UN general assembly distanced itself from the report and insisted that this was a UNDP research result and not a political document. Second, for the second edition, the HDI was revised such that it would not reflect negatively on some important nations. Which the most important such nation was, I will not say. I will, however, give two hints: it is that same nation which (1) due to the singificance of its economy, is supposed to pay 1/4 of the entire UN budget and (2) has back dues for four years, forcing the world organization to borrow from its peace keeping budget to sustain its operations. (BTW, I hear the entire budget of the world organization, net of peace keeping, is smaller than that of the New York Police Department. I also hear the UN is operating on emergency funding and is just about to go bankrupt. Who I hear these things from? Well, a couple of friends who work for the UN as economists. This is all supported, however, by none other than Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General [see: _New York Times_, a few days ago].) Best, Jozsef (Borocz) virtually: at the University of California, Irvine in reality: Dept of Sociology, Rutgers University From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Mon May 6 09:54:06 1996 Date: Mon, 6 May 96 11:53:22 EDT From: (Greg Ehrig) To: smtp%NISTServer1%Server[aaustin%mtsu.edu]@banyan.doc.gov Subject: re: historical responsibility X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO A partial list of universal preconditions for human behavior, with some conclusions. 1. They live in an enviornment which has limited resources. 2. There is competition between groups (either inter or intra-group competition) and individuals _for_ these limited resources. Those individuals/groups which do not compete, gain less of the resources and thus, grow smaller and eventually die out. Each individual has an interest in preserving his/her genetic heritage. Those individuals/groups which do not, grow smaller and eventually die out. (for group -- think of the quakers) (breaking your rule here) Humans differ from animals in that they have a concept of time -- both future and past. This leads to the modification of behavior to take into account results from the past and possible consequences for the future: Thag-- "Thag kill all horses. Tribe eat good, therefore, Thag good!". Tharg -- "Horses make horses, no more horse in future, tribe eat good now, bad in future. Thag bad." QED, the enviornment influences genetic selection to ensure some common traits and strategies in all humans. While these may vary tremendously on a superficial level, on a deeper level most or all human behavior is remarkably consistent over time. As seems to be nature's rule, very simple preconditions give rise to enormously complex systems. The fact that the system is complex could deter one from attempting to understanding it. But in making the assumption that simple means underly the complex behaviors can help enormously in making predictions of the future, if one has a sufficient understanding of the underlying principles. In this case, an understanding of the underlying principles of human nature can help enormously in making limited predictions for complex systems. Reading: "Cows, Pigs, Wars, and Witches" -- written by an anthropologist. subject is the rational base of culture -- demonstrated by looking at some of the most apparently "irrational" cultural tabus/traditions (cow worship, pork bans, cargo cults, christianity, etc) and examinines them from the point of view of their being rational responses evolved by society to meet enviormental/political/economic challenges --challenges almost always arising because of the problem of limited resources. "Bionomics" by Rothschild -- seminal work on "the economy as an ecosystem" The recent work on genetic base of behavior (i.e. the idea that many human behaviors are a result of genetic competition between individuals) sorry, can't think of the author's names right now. From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Mon May 6 10:30:13 1996 Date: Mon, 6 May 96 12:29:33 EDT From: (Greg Ehrig) To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: prosperity, indices X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO > The outcome is predictable: the >former state socialist countries, along with a few European >post-war >Marshall aid-recipient welfare state democracies stand out on the >positive extreme... The indices show _eastern europe, russia, and cuba_ as having higher standards of living??? To a lesser extent, they show the more socialized w. european economies?? Does anyone assert that these countries have higher standards now? If not, what does this imply about the measure? To me, it goes back to the Living Standards index on the Penn world database: Resources were transfered from producers to consumers, helping them in the short run but damaging future consumption because of declining investment. --G From aaustin@mtsu.edu Mon May 6 13:10:06 1996 Date: Mon, 6 May 1996 14:11:03 -0500 (CDT) From: "Andrew W. Austin" To: Harutiun Kassakhian Subject: Nature as Ideology The following adds my voice to yours. Humans and their conceptual understanding of the world are social constructions. This means that particular views of how human beings and their relations are naturally constituted are constructed by human beings. In societies with differential power arrangements, these constructions are not arrived at consensually, rather they are constructed and distributed by a power elite who have interests in the status quo or the transformation of society in a certain direction: the form that benefits them or fulfills a societal conception they hold. In order to maintain social control over the powerless majority, it is the task of the hegemonic institutions, controlled by the powerful, to naturalize social relations, thus placing them beyond question and change or resistance for the majority. Ideology which naturalizes historically contingent relations mystifies differential power relations. This is the strength of theologies and philosophies: their ability to make contemporary contexts appear timeless and universal. But of course, historical reality is not timeless and universal. Since humans do not have a nature, and their behavioral and attitudinal constitutions are socially constructed and mediated, and conditioned by productive forces, then the questions are "In what sort of society do you want to live?" and "What type of people do you want this society to produce?" The answer is clear (allow me to polarize it for analytical purposes): If you want selfish, freedom-stealing, and self-destructive humans, then I recommend choosing a capitalist mode of production. If you want cooperative, loving, and creative humans, then I suggest choosing a communist mode of production. The capitalist tells you "I realize that the second choice is marvelous, but human nature will not permit it." A capitalist would say this. The goal here is to convince the powerless majority that the goal they seek is not possible because of powers beyond their control: God and/or nature. But because human being is a social product, and since we can change society, then we know we can change human being. So choice *does* exists--we are not bound by human nature to exist in inequal social orders--and it is a choice that must be made; for to not make this choice is to allow others to make it for you. One more thing, the human nature argument is an attempt to objectify a concept, permitting the powerful who control the definition of the concept to be seen as advancing an objective and neutral argument. But objectivity is impossible, and neutrality is not desirable. Therefore these arguments about where we ought to go, or in what sort of society shall we live, are value judgments. If the goal is communism, then we ought to set about achieving the goal. If the goal is capitalism, then the only argument I see supporting such an exploitative and self- destructive productive mode is appeal to either God or nature. But we can see through this now. Andy From hk1@axe.humboldt.edu Mon May 6 13:59:54 1996 Date: Mon, 06 May 1996 12:59 -0700 (PDT) From: Harutiun Kassakhian Subject: re: historical responsibility In-reply-to: <"VlI8+m,WXlA"@crow.nist.gov> To: Greg Ehrig the quakers or the shakers? The Society of Friends is alive and well. The Shakers died out because of their belief in celibacy. From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Mon May 6 14:05:29 1996 Date: Mon, 6 May 96 16:04:58 EDT From: (Greg Ehrig) To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Some corrections& amendments on historical respons ibility X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO I did not mean to suggest that social existence is the result of pure competiton between groups: cooperation is also a means of maximising benefits, which leads to complex patterns of cooperation and competition that I should have explicitly mentioned. The point being that self-interest gives rise to both and is one reasonably predictable element of human nature. Also, several private emails have pointed out that I meant the shakers, not the quakers. (probably a song title in there somewhere....) From aaustin@mtsu.edu Mon May 6 15:52:47 1996 Date: Mon, 6 May 1996 16:53:40 -0500 (CDT) From: "Andrew W. Austin" To: gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Subject: Re: Some corrections& amendments on historical respons ibility In-Reply-To: On Mon, 6 May 1996 gehrig@banyan.doc.gov wrote: > The point > being that self-interest gives rise to both and is one reasonably > predictable element of human nature. Followers of Ayn Rand advance an argument that asserts that all behavior is motivated by self-interest, what they define as "selfishness." You assert the existence of altruistic behavior and they argue that altruism has its root in selfishness. You point out a mother protecting her children even if it kills her, a stranger rushing into a burning building to save children he doesn't know, a daughter taking care of her dying aunt--all examples of altruism. "No, no," the objectivist argues, "each of these is an example of selfishness. The mother saved her children because it gives her great satisfaction to know her children will live. The man rushes into the building for fame and fortune as a hero. And the daughter feels good when she helps her grandmother." You may think that your objectivist friend has stumbled upon the ultimate argument, an argument impervious to counterexample. But wait... therein lies the fallacy. You ask your friend to present to you one example of altruistic behavior. If you friend cannot, and surely he cannot because his whole argument was that all motivation is self-interest, then you have no argument before you. It is tautological, that is say, true by definition, to say (according to our objectivist) that all behavior is carried out in self-interest. This is a special form of the begging-the-question fallacy called the "self-sealing argument." Why? In the ordinary meaning of "selfish" or "self-interest" we do not count a person doing good things for others as selfish. In fact, this is the opposite of selfish, it is unselfish or altruistic behavior. If the meaning of "selfish" or "self-interest" is expanded to encompass its opposite, the word "selfish" becomes cognitively empty. Under such a fallacy it would by IMPOSSIBLE by definition to do any act that was NOT selfish. Under such a definition of behavior described as selfish (in this case ALL behavior), any claim made about humans beings using this term has no empirical content, i.e. it tells us nothing about human behavior or motivation. Again, all it says is that human behavior being selfish is true by definition. This is no argument at all. Peace, Andy From elena@jhu.edu Mon May 6 16:18:13 1996 06 May 1996 18:11:00 -0500 (EST) 06 May 1996 18:06:57 -0500 (EST) Date: Mon, 06 May 1996 18:06:49 -0400 From: Elena M Ermolaeva Subject: Hawaiian Sovereignty Elections Council web site (fwd) To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 5 May 1996 22:15:27 -0400 From: Scott Crawford Reply-To: pacific-islands-l@coombs.anu.edu.au To: Pacific-Islands-L@postbox.anu.edu.au Subject: Hawaiian Sovereignty Elections Council web site Announcing Hawaiian Sovereignty Elections Council web site: URL: "The Hawaiian Sovereignty Elections Council was created to facilitate a process for the Hawaiian people to determine whether a sovereign Hawaiian government will be created and what form it might take." The "Native Hawaiian Vote" scheduled for this summer will ask the question by mail-out ballot: "Shall the Hawaiian people elect delegates to propose a native Hawaiian Government?" Voter registration forms are available for download in Adobe Acrobat format. Voter registration deadline is July 15. Native Hawaiians 18 years or older living in Hawaii and abroad are eligible to vote. Includes background documents and links to other Hawaiian organizations and sovereignty sites. Contact: Yvette Fernandez Lulani McKenzie P.O. Box 3290, Honolulu, Hawai`i 96813 On O`ahu call (808) 587-2834 Neighbor Islands and International, call toll free: 1-800-95VOTER Fax (808) 586-0169 Please place links to this site where appropriate, and forward this message in it's entirety to other relevant lists and interested parties. -- ___________________________________________________________ | Hawai`i - Independent & Sovereign | | exec@hawaii-nation.org http://www.hawaii-nation.org/ | |___________________________________________________________| "The cause of Hawaii and independence is larger and dearer than the life of any man connected with it. Love of country is deep- seated in the breast of every Hawaiian, whatever his station." - Queen Lili`uokalani _______________________________________________________________ From jborocz@orion.oac.uci.edu Mon May 6 17:02:41 1996 Date: Mon, 6 May 1996 16:02:21 -0700 (PDT) From: Jozsef Borocz To: gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Subject: Re: prosperity, indices In-Reply-To: On Mon, 6 May 1996 gehrig@banyan.doc.gov wrote: > > The outcome is predictable: the > >former state socialist countries, along with a few European > >post-war > >Marshall aid-recipient welfare state democracies stand out on the > >positive extreme... > > The indices show _eastern europe, russia, and cuba_ as having higher > standards of living??? I guest this only shows that one should only look into the mirror if one is willing to accept what the mirror will show. Before the stuff you are quoting from me (above), I think I explained in my original message how these computations were made. I will only summarize here. GDP/cap rankings were subtracted from "Human Development Index" rankings. If your country was #1 in GDP/cap and #1 in HDI, you get a score of 0. You also get a score of 0 if your country is 15th in GDP/cap and 15th in HDI. The same if your country is 237th on both measures. Now, here comes the interesting stuff. If your country was higher in HDI ranking than in GDP/cap ranking, you get a positive number (that's "good": in the UNDP's thinking, that indicates that your society translates its material resources into human life quality "better" than others); if your GDP/cap ranking is higher than your HDI, that is "bad", i.e., the opposite, etc. In these terms, I don't think it's so difficult for anybody to see how Cuba could show, with its near-full literacy, state-run immunization campaigns, etc., better results than its neighbors with the same GDP/cap, for instance. After all, state socialism was, in the peripheral context particularly, a major, state-run industrial modernization project. Literacy, health and hygiene measures, education, etc. are all components of that. I don't see what there is to be surprised about. These are not measures of popular extacy about the system. > socialized w. european economies?? Does anyone assert that these > countries have higher standards now? If not, what does this imply > about the measure? If you re-read my original message, I insisted that this was a very problematic method of presenting the data. There are better ways. Now, it is a separate question to adjudicate the extent to which life expectancy at birth is a good or bad measure of the quality of life in a society. Is the literacy rate a good measure or a bad one? I don't know: I would need to know the purpose to be able to comment on the usefulness of those measures. All I said in my posting was that the specialized branch of the world organization seems to have thought that those were "good." I suspect they thought so for a reason. For instance these are relatively readily available measures. They are also robust. They are little-prone to systematic falsification on the local data reporting level. There are probably other good reasons that I can't think of right now. BTW, these tables are all widely available for perusal in the UNDP Human Development Reports: if you feel like it, you can easily plot the various quality of life measures against the GDP scores. You can fit a regression line and see which countries fall one standard deviation higher / lower than their "expected value". I suspect you would get pretty much the same substantive result as I described. You can procede and add other control variables and see if you can reduce the distance of those outliers. It would be an interesting exercise. If you do that, my sense is that you would get the same result even today, with state socialism gone, except probably with greater magnitudes as the GDPs of the post-state-socialist countries are, with one or two exceptions, steeply falling while at least some quality of life measures (e.g., educational attainment, etc.) will take at least one generation to correct (downwards, where they "belong"). The IMF, with its structural adjustment axe aimed precisely at the educational and health care delivery systems of these societies, also helps in rectifying that anomaly. 8-( > To me, it goes back to the Living Standards index > on the Penn world database: Resources were transfered from > producers to consumers, helping them in the short run but damaging > future consumption because of declining investment. The relevancy (and to a certain extent the meaning) of this sentence escapes me. Please rephrase. Jozsef From chriscd@jhu.edu Tue May 7 08:54:21 1996 07 May 1996 10:53:38 -0500 (EST) 07 May 1996 10:52:06 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 07 May 1996 09:38:10 -0600 (CST) From: chris chase-dunn Subject: RE: Buchanan's right on the New World Order (fwd) Sender: chriscd@jhu.edu To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu X-NUPop-Charset: English The "New World Order," economic globalization and neo-liberalism are understandably receiving long-due criticism from popular forces. A conference is being held in Washington about the costs of globalization. Phil McMichael's article, "The new colonialism: global regulation and the restructuring of the interstate system," (pp. 37-56 in David A. Smith and Jozsef Borocz (eds.) _ A New World Order? Global Transformations in the Late Twentieth Century_ (New York: Praeger 1995) makes the case against economic globalization. But progressives need to be wary about joining up with economic nationalists like Buchanan. The progressive attack on neo-liberalism needs to be organized at national, international and global levels if it is to succeed. Socialism at the national level has never worked in the past and it certainly will not work in a world that is more interlinked than ever before. In the same Smith and Borocz collection is a thoughtful article by Andre Drainville about new forms of Left internationalism. It may be the case that the old forms were somewhat premature, and that internationalism has finally become not only desireable but necessary. This does not mean that local, regional and national-level struggles are irrelevant. They are just as relevant as they always have been. But they need to also have a global strategy and global-level cooperation lest they be isolated and defeated. The international segment of the world capitalist class is indeed moving slowly toward global state formation. Rather than oppose this move progressives should make every effort to organized social and political globalization, and to democratize the emerging global state. We need to prevent the normal operation of the interstate system and future hegemonic rivalry from causing a future war among core powers. And we need to transform the emerging world society into a global democratic commonwealth based on collective rationality, liberty and equality. To do this we need to construct a new philosophy of democratic and egalitarian liberation. But this will not require throwing out all the ideals of the European Enlightenment. It was not the Enlightenment philosophy that caused Europe to dominate and exploit the world. Rather it was the military and economic power generated by capitalism that made European hegemony possible. The ideals of the Enlightment had often to be stretched or ignored in the process. Of course many of the main ideals that have been the core of the Left Wing critique of capitalism are shared by non-European philosophies. Democracy (in the sense of popular control over collective decision-making) was not invented in Greece. It was a characteristic of all non-hierarchical human societies on every continent. My point is that the new universalism can incorporate quite a lot from the old universalisms. After all, national self-determination and multiculturalism _vis a vis_ religion have been important features of liberalism. It is not liberal ideology that caused so much exploitation and domination. It was the failure of real capitalism to live up to its own ideals. That is the problem that progressives must solve. chris Prof. Chris Chase-Dunn Department of Sociology Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, MD. 21218 USA tel 410 516 7633 fax 410 516 7590 email chriscd@jhu.edu From chriscd@jhu.edu Tue May 7 09:10:40 1996 07 May 1996 10:01:05 -0500 (EST) 07 May 1996 10:01:04 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 07 May 1996 08:47:21 -0600 (CST) From: chris chase-dunn Subject: Fwd: AFRICAN NGO DECLARATION TO UNCTAD IX Sender: chriscd@jhu.edu To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu, ipe@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu X-NUPop-Charset: English ------------------------------ From: Patrick Bond Date: Sat, 4 May 1996 04:25:35 -0400 Subject: Fwd: AFRICAN NGO DECLARATION TO UNCTAD IX From: Date: Mon, 29 Apr 1996 20:46:32 +0000 Subject: AFRICAN NGO DECLARATION TO UNCTAD IX Comrades If any of you have reason to reproduce this in any of your publications, please let me have a copy for the media group's records: Rachel Houghton, IFAA. Fax: +27 11 403 2454. Also, please disseminate this to as many friends as possible. Thanks ----------------------------------------------------------------------- MARKET DOESN'T REPLACE NEED FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AFRICAN NGO DECLARATION FOR UNCTAD IX (This declaration has been prepared by the parallel NGO Conference to UNCTAD IX, held from 24-28 April 1996, in Midrand, South Africa.) INTRODUCTION This declaration emerges from the discussions amongst African NGOs, labour, religious and other civil society organisations who came together in a parallel conference prior to UNCTAD IX. With the par ticipation of similar organisations from other countries we exchanged experiences and ideas around issues of trade and development, and voiced our concerns about the impact of the global economic sys tem upon our communities and countries. We share a common vision of a world which recognises its essential interdependence while embracing human diversity in all its forms; where justice and equity for all peoples is the first priority, an d in which principles of democracy and popular participation are universally upheld so that the creation of a peaceful, cooperative and sustainable future is secured. The current system of globalisation and liberalisation has had devastating effects upon African economies. Our countries have been pushed backwards into increasing debt, de-industrialisation, agricul tural decline, environmental degradation, poverty and deepening inequality. Those worse affected, such as children, youth and women, are already at the margins of society. Financial and physical reso urces continue to be drained out of Africa. Its marginalisation is both a product of an inequitable international system and of factors internal to African economies and polities. We oppose a system which places growth above all other goals, including human well-being, and which undermines national economic development and social security. We see that this system creates incen tives for capital to externalise its social and environmental costs. It over-exploits and destroys the natural environment and encourages the unsustainable use of resources. It turns social services into commodities out of reach of the poor, generates jobless growth, derogates the rights of workers and undermines trade union and other democratic rights. This global system has resulted in an ever greater concentration of power and control over resources into the hands of a relatively few transnational corporations and financial institutions. This pro cess has exacerbated inequalities within and between countries, actively encouraged competition for investment and financial resources, and discouraged regional cooperation and integration amongst Af rican countries. However, we affirm that globalisation and liberalisation are not irresistible processes but are the product of human agencies and can therefore be influenced and changed. With respect to UNCTAD itself, we are concerned that it has largely taken on board the 'realities' of the liberalising globalised world order, although it does adopt a more holistic and questioning a pproach and raises issues of particular concern to the developing world. We are concerned at the relative inaccessibility of UNCTAD to the voices of non-governmental organisations and social movement representatives. Nonetheless, we believe that UNCTAD can play a useful role as a monitoring, research and policy development organisation and as a capacity building and technical support institution to governments and non-governmental forces in Africa. In coming together prior to UNCTAD IX we have reached the following conclusions: 1 GLOBALISATION AND LIBERALISATION We see that it is the strategies of business organisations and the interventions of financial institutions and governments that have produced the inter-linked processes of globalisation and liberalis ation. Globalisation requires - and is reinforced by - the liberalisation or 'deregulation' of investment and capital movements, trade in goods and services, communications and other national and int ernational economic transactions. African countries have for many years already been subject to such liberalisation processes through the imposition of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). The neo-liberal economic paradigm makes our governments unresponsive to our basic economic and social needs, forces open our economies to the advantage of external traders and investors and makes African countries ever more dependent upon the richer industrialised countries and their transnational corporations. Our countries are being recolonised, and the responsibility of our governments to us is being replaced by their responsivenes s to the needs and interests of TNCs and their home governments. In this context we make the following key recommendations: 1.1 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS must heed the calls from their non-governmental organisations and social movements to resist the imposition of SAPs and other liberalisation programmes. These are damaging to people and economies and to governments' own policy independence and relevance. 1.2 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS must be transparent in their dealings with the Bretton Woods Institutions and other external agencies and, by providing full information and resources to their own people, ena ble us to be more effective players and active partners in the struggles against liberalisation programmes. 1.3 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS must take responsibility for their own actions and not use the pretext of their obligations to external agencies and international forces as excuses for their own faults and t heir failures to respond to the democratic demands and development needs of their own people. 1.4 UNCTAD as a research and capacity building organisation focused particularly upon the needs of less/least developed countries must support the right, and provide the technical and policy backup f or governmental and non-governmental organisations and social movements in Africa, to pursue development programmes that are relevant to their visions and needs. 1.5 UNCTAD must resist the global hegemony of the neo-liberal paradigm and legitimise the creation of development policies based upon national and local diversities and democratic rights. 2 FINANCIAL FLOWS AND INVESTMENT The attraction of foreign investment through the creation of 'conducive conditions' are presumed - including by UNCTAD - to be the essential pre-condition for economic development worldwide. However, as African countries are encouraged to compete with each other for such foreign investment they aggravate their divisions and their dependence upon, and exploitation by, profit-seeking foreign inves tors. Our experience of foreign investment in Africa is that it is minuscule in scale, concentrated in the extractive sectors, and while it has limited positive linkages into our economies it has many nega tive economic, social and environmental effects. The purported necessity to attract foreign investment is utilised by financial institutions and foreign governments as an instrument to impose their p olicies upon our governments. In the same way debt obligations are deliberately maintained by creditors - particularly the Bretton Woods Institutions - on account of the policy leverage it gives them over governments and countries under debt management programmes. In this context we make the following key recommendations: 2.1 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS must resist such dependence upon foreign investment by mobilising all possible internal financial sources and development resources, including community, cooperative, and nati onal public and private enterprise. Furthermore, governments must play direct social and economic development roles on more democratic, participatory and accountable bases than hitherto. 2.2 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS should have recourse to Official Development Assistance (ODA) while they work towards mobilising alternative resources. Such ODA should be allocated through transparent consul tative processes and utilised in appropriate and accountable ways. 2.3 AFRICAN COUNTRIES must insist on the cancellation of external debts that cannot be repaid in order to enable the mobilisation of internal resources for investment. Any further external borrowing must be subject to clearly defined development aims and transparent democratic consultations and controls. 2.4 UNCTAD should conduct objective analyses of, and monitor, the operations of transnational corporations (TNCs) around the world, especially their effects on local communities, national economies a nd the environment. The UNCTAD investment division should operate within the perspective of the former UNCTC, instead of seeing its role as servicing the interests of TNCs. 2.5 UNCTAD should continue its work on monitoring the nature and effects of the astronomical and volatile speculative international financial flows promoted by financial deregulation and liberalisati on. It should produce effective proposals for regulatory controls upon such dangerous financial forces. 3 TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES The new multilateral rules-based trade regime that emerged out of the Uruguay Round of GATT has removed theoretically the unilateralist threats and pressures by strong countries that have long featur ed in international trade relations. However, neither it its creation, nor in its content and application is the new world trade regime, under the World Trade Organisation (WTO), an equitable or impa rtial system. UNCTAD and other international agencies are already calculating that, of the hundreds of billions of dollars of increased trade that is anticipated as a result of the more open trade system, Africa w ill actually lose a further US$2.5-3bn in the immediate future. Although these are described as mere 'transitional costs', trade liberalisation has had profoundly damaging effects upon African countr ies, particularly in the area of de-industrialisation. We see the new trade rules as a device to give legal force on the international plane to the trade liberalisation programmes already being impos ed within the countries of Africa. In this context we make the following key proposals: 3.1 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS must adopt joint negotiating positions in the forthcoming meeting of the WTO in Singapore at the end of this year in order to expose and oppose the limitations that Trade Rela ted Investment Measures (TRIMs) will impose upon national investment strategies. They must also resist the inclusion within the WTO of the proposed Multilateral Investment Agreement (MIA). This would remove any governmental regulatory controls, open up African countries to foreign investors completely, and destroy local enterprises and farms. 3.2 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS must similarly oppose the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) which is forcing countries to open up their service sectors to transnational corporations. At the same time, Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) are imposing further financial and legal restrictions on access to technology, with the danger of the further appropriation by private enterp rise of the world's resources and human knowledge. 3.3. While powerful governments are creating conditions for the rapid opening up of the markets of developing countries, AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS must struggle together for the right to formulate and util ise appropriate trade and development strategies for their countries. This includes targeted and transitional tariff policies and other instruments in the interests of their economies and peoples. 3.4 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS must resist trade arrangements which result in the continent being used as a dumping ground for dirty industries and hazardous materials. They must resist the over - exploitat ion of natural resources for trade and debt-related payments. The imposition of disguised trade-related protectionist environmental standards act as a further non-tariff barrier to the continent's ex ports. 3.5 UNCTAD must provide analyses, information and technical support to LDCs in all future trade and other international economic negotiations to ensure that the subordination and sidelining of their interests and needs, that characterised the Uruguay Round, does not happen again. 3.6 UNCTAD must monitor independently the world trade system to counter the bias against the LDCs and to ensure that the WTO does not become yet another international institution, like the IMF and th e World Bank, utilised by the most powerful industrialised countries in the service of their own interests. 4 REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION Harmonisation, coordination and cooperation in technical, economic, environmental, social and political spheres is essential in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world. Such cooperation i s particularly important for African countries. It is the essential basis for them to combine their resources and form larger markets, and achieve economies of scale in investment and production. Th is would enable them to create appropriate forms of self-sustaining development, as well as participate more effectively - to the degree and in the directions that they judge necessary - in a highly competitive world economy. UNCTAD acknowledges the importance of regional integration for LDCs, but there are contradictory trends and conflicting strategies in this sphere of international relations, as in others. In Africa w e see our governments paying mere lip service to the aims of regional and continental integration. While signing formal cooperation and integration agreements they continue to have recourse to unilat eral rather than multilateral strategies and pursue policies that create competition rather than cooperation between potential development partners. In this context we make the following key proposals: 4.1 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS must resist the impetus toward 'solo' integration into a hostile global economy that is being promoted by SAPs and other unilateral liberalisation programmes. 4.2 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS must enter into serious multilateral negotiations with fellow members of formal regional agreements and turn these into real processes of cooperation and integration; while at the same time recognising and supporting multifaceted and informal processes of cross-border trade and other forms of bottom-up cooperation and integration. 4.3 AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS must make the entire process of regional cooperation and integration more transparent and democratic. It is only on the basis of direct popular participation, and as a people- driven process, that regional integration will be real, sustainable and secure, and where the rich diversity of peoples' cultures will be respected and built upon. 4.4 UNCTAD must support regional integration amongst LDCs by all means, including the defence, extension and utilisation of the 'special and differential' provisions inserted into the Uruguay Round a s a gesture towards the particular difficulties of LDCs. Fragile as these concessions are, the allowances for negotiated multilateral preferential and free trade agreements amongst LDCs must be uphel d and implemented. 4.5 At the same time, UNCTAD also has a potentially important role to play in monitoring international trade patterns and trade agreements - particularly the latest strategies being utilised by the p owerful blocs of industrialised countries to coopt or integrate existing or potential regional groupings in the rest of the world into their respective free trade areas. These competitive struggles a re reminiscent of the 19th century scramble to carve up the world into competing 'spheres of influence' and colonial empires. 5 THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS. We must develop our own capacities to analyse and understand the implications of globalisation and liberalisation. In this respect, NGOs must prioritise capacity building, as well as lobbying governm ents and international agencies, such as UNCTAD, toward the creation of an enabling environment for this. It is evident that we African NGOs could do more advocacy and lobbying among civil society and towards our governments if we have information and effective analyses. In this context we are convinced that it is essential for NGOs, popular civil society organisations, academics, labour, religious and other democratic social movements to be partners in development endeavours at all levels - policy- making, negotiations, agreement monitoring and so on. Therefore we recommend that: 5.1 NGOs demand from our governments, UNCTAD and other international organisations full information and participation in the decision-making processes on all agreements and processes relating to ques tions of international trade and development. 5.2 NGOs utilise such sources, together with our own independent research and experiences, to develop effective input into national, regional, and international debates and negotiations on these issu es. 5.3 NGOs draw upon the experiences and understanding of our communities and constituencies in improving popular understanding of the local and national implications of globalisation and liberalisatio n. Popular civil society organisations should be able to evaluate and measure economic growth and development on the basis of peoples' indicators. 5.4 NGOs, as organised participants in the struggles for democracy and development in our countries, must link into national, regional and continental networks to ensure the most effective sharing of experiences and information, with coordinated campaigns and programmes of action. 5.5 NGOs must create effective and mutually supportive alliances with counterpart organisations and networks in other countries of the South and the North on the basis of our shared problems, our con cern for our planet and our common humanity. ------ Forwarded message ends here ------ Patrick Bond 51 Somerset Road National Institute for Economic Policy Kensington 2094 * Johannesburg P.O. Box 32848 * Braamfontein 2017 Phone: 2711-614-8088 Phone: 2711-403-3009 * Fax: 2711-339-6395 E-mails: PBOND@WN.APC.ORG and PATRICK@NIEP.ORG.ZA From chriscd@jhu.edu Tue May 7 09:15:45 1996 07 May 1996 11:13:33 -0500 (EST) 07 May 1996 11:13:26 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 07 May 1996 09:59:43 -0600 (CST) From: chris chase-dunn Subject: Fw: Karl Marx Sender: chriscd@jhu.edu To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu X-NUPop-Charset: English ------------------------------ From: Martha Gimenez Date: Sun, 5 May 1996 13:00:00 -0400 To: PROGRESSIVE SOCIOLOGISTS NETWORK Subject: Karl Marx karl heinrich marx Hans Magnus Enzensberger gigantic grandfather jehovah-bearded on brown daguerrotypes i see your face in the snow-white aura despotic quarrelsome and your papers in the linen press: butcher's bills inaugural addresses warrants for your arrest your massive body i see in the "wanted" book gigantic traitor displaced person in tail coat and plastron consumptive sleepless your gall-bladder scorched by heavy cigars salted gherkins laudanum and liqueur i see your house in the rue d'alliance dean street grafton terrace gigantic bourgeois domestic tyrant in worn-out slippers: soot and "economic shit" * usury "as usual" * children's coffins backstair calamities no machine-gun in your prophet's hand: i see it calmly in the british museum under the green lamp break up your own house with a terrible patience gigantic founder for the sake of other houses in which you never woke up gigantic zaddik i see you betrayed by your disciples: only your enemies remained what they were: I see your face on the last picture of april eighty-two: an iron mask: an iron mask of freedom * Quotations from Marx's letters to Engels in the 1850s and 1860s. H.M.E. From sbabones@jhu.edu Tue May 7 09:40:14 1996 07 May 1996 11:38:46 -0500 (EST) 07 May 1996 11:38:15 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 07 May 1996 11:38:06 -0400 From: Salvatore Babones Subject: RE: Buchanan's right on the New World Order (fwd) In-reply-to: <199605070938217625.chriscd@jhu.edu> To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Chris is absolutely right on giving the Enlightenment a chance. What we have now (in the core states) is not liberal capitalism but restained corporatism. Although I am less certain than Chris is that globalization is the way to go, I AM certain that real (as opposed to rhetorical) freedom and democracy should be given a chance. Throw out the oppression, not the liberating philosophy in the name of which that oppression has been perpetuated. Salvatore Babones Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, USA sbabones@jhu.edu From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Tue May 7 10:19:59 1996 Date: Tue, 7 May 96 12:19:14 EDT From: (Greg Ehrig) To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: prosperity, indices X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO > To me, it goes back to the Living Standards index > on the Penn world database: Resources were transfered from > producers to consumers, helping them in the short run but damaging > future consumption because of declining investment. >The relevancy (and to a certain extent the meaning) of this sentence >escapes me. Please rephrase. Let me try it this way. Every nation has a finite amount of resources, which economists classify in various ways -- The most familiar of which is Labor and Capital. ( L & K are perhaps too simplistic -- economists since the 19th century have used a five factor model, but that is another story) Society (or in the case of command economies, government) chooses to allocate these resources in order to achieve some specific result: higher living standards, (world domination, in the case of command economies) etc. Follow me so far? Now: Economists have also broken down the "mix" of allocations any ecomomy may transfer these resources _to_ We will use the classic model for simplicity. The model is as follows: All resources in the economy = Government spending + Investment + Consumption Y = G + I + C Now, if you spend more on Government, the benefit is that you can achieve your social goals-- That is, more economic equality, artificially high levels of consumption spending on things like health, and welfare, pensions, the conquest of western europe, stuff like that. Spending on G does not expand the economy, as (I) does. Rather, it is a form of almost pure consumption. Remember, because resources are finite, every dollar spent here will be a dollar less somewhere else. If you spend more on investment, then you do a very borgeious thing: you defer current pleasure for an anticipated reward in the future. For instance, if you go to college, you are deferring current consumption so that in the future you will (presumably) have a higher income. In other words, more spending on I means that in the future, "the pie" (Y) will be larger. Less spending, and the total pie will eventually grow smaller. (For intensive growth only. Extensive growth is a concept I will explain when someone asks why the SU and Socialized countries grew at all) The trade off is that you have to spend less on C and G Consumption (C) has been covered fairly intesively in this thread, but basically represents the amount of goods and services that "the people" have to use. In market economies, the only real control the state has over this sectioning of resources is (G), and that is only as large as what "the people" allow it to extort from them, so it stays fairly small. In command economies, the State owns everything, whether de facto or de jure. Thus, it can shift around the mix, spending more on G than the "people" would want to do for themselves. Alternatively, "the people" can decide to allow the government to extort more money from them, and allow it's share of G to grow. The result is the same. How does this concept relate to your question? Simple: the command economies put more of their resources into G, and neglected I and C. The predicatable result was that in the short term, "the people" benefited, as the services provided by G made up for the marginal loss of consumption goods and the major loss of investment. Over time, as the lower share of I led to a shrinking of total GDP, more resources had to be transferred from C and I in order to maintain Government spending(G), which in turn led to less investment and even more decline in Y. To sum up in relation to your question: Spending more on social improvements, when the nation could not really afford them, was loosely analogous to a farmer eating his seed corn. Less crops meant that he had to eat more of his seed every year, until things could no longer go on. The result is a _very_ painful period of transition for the farmer. In an ideal world (if resources were infinite), a country could completely stamp out waste, tragedy, and human suffering & ignorance immediately. However, in the real world (where resources are limited) this is not a goal that can be attained on command - as the command economies found out to their sorrow. The above example is not the main reason why the former communist countries fell, but was a pretty significant factor in their fall, and it does explain why all of the more socialized W Euro countries are in such trouble today. --Hope this helps, G From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Tue May 7 10:51:04 1996 Date: Tue, 7 May 96 12:50:23 EDT From: (Greg Ehrig) To: smtp%NISTServer1%Server[chriscd%jhu.edu]@banyan.doc.gov Subject: re: Fw: Karl Marx X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO POVERTY, n. A file provided for the teeth of the rats of reform. The number of plans for its abolition equals that of the reformers who suffer from it, plus that of the philosophers who know nothing about it. Its victims are distinguished by possession of all the virtues and by their faith in leaders seeking to conduct them into a prosperity where they believe these to be unknown. REFORM, v. A thing that mostly satisfies reformers opposed to reformation. --Ambrose Bierce, The cynic's dictionary From chriscd@jhu.edu Tue May 7 10:51:12 1996 07 May 1996 11:48:25 -0500 (EST) 07 May 1996 11:47:43 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 07 May 1996 10:34:01 -0600 (CST) From: chris chase-dunn Subject: FWD: RE: Globalization Teach In Sender: chriscd@jhu.edu To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu X-NUPop-Charset: English ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The International Forum on Globalization presents *******Global Teach-In 2******** The Social, Ecological, Cultural and Political Costs of Economic Globalization WHEN May 10-12, 1996 WHERE George Washington University Lisner Auditorium 21st and H Streets, N.W. Washington, D.C. TICKETS (800) 955-5566 or in D.C. (703) 218-6500 CONTACT INFORMATION International Forum on Globalization PO Box 12218 San Francisco, CA 94112-0218 USA Tel: 415-771-3394 Fax: 415-771-1121 Email: ifg@igc.org In Washington, D.C. 202-234-9382 x 244 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~ The International Forum on Globalization (IFG) is a new alliance of leading activists, economists, researchers and writers representing more than twenty countries. We have joined together to respond to the threats of economic globalization to democracy, communities, human welfare and the environment. We believe that the world's corporate and politcal leadership is undertaking a restructuring of global politics and economics that may prove as historically significant as any event since the industrial revolution. If continued, this trend will have grave impacts on every aspect of human life, and on the natural world. This public event is the second in a series being held in the US, Canada and abroad, to focus attention on the major issues resulting from the rush to globalize. The International Forum on Globalization (a project of El Bosque) * * * PROGRAM ************************Friday, May 10, 7:30pm************************ Panel I The Consequences of Economic Globalization Vandana Shiva, Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Natural Resource Policy The Commodification of Nature Lori Wallach, Public Citizen The Assault on Democracy Carl Pope, Sierra Club NAFTA and GATT: Disaster for the Environment Martin Khor, Third World Network Re-colonizing the Third World David Korten, People-Centered Development Forum The Failed Paradigms of Globalism Helena Norberg-Hodge, International Society for Ecology and Culture Destroying Local Economies and the Homogenization of Culture Maude Barlow, Council of Canadians NAFTA and the Loss of Canadian Sovereignty and Culture Jerry Mander, Public Media Center The Media- Missing the Story ***********************Saturday, May 11, 9am-6pm************************ Panel II Reports from the Planet Edward Goldsmith, The Ecologist The Backlash to European Integration Richard Moore, Southwest Network for Environmental and Economic Justice Resistance within the United States Yao Graham, Integrated Social Development Center The Impacts on Africa Vicky Tauli-Corpuz, Cordillera Women's Education & Resource Center Women, Native Peoples, and the Marginalization of the Third World Sara Larrain, Chilean Ecological Action Network Expanding NAFTA to Chile Ignacio Pen Escalante, Mexican Action Network on Free Trade The Costs of RAdjustmentS for Mexico Anuradha Mittal, Institute for Food and Development Policy The Failure of Development ___________________________________________________________________________ Panel III Globalization, Ecology, and Sustainability Randy Hayes, Rainforest Action Network The Final Invasion of Wild Places Brent Blackwelder, Friends of the Earth-U.S. Globalized Economy: Inherently Unsustainable David Morris, Institute for Local Self-Reliance The Viability of Local Economies Nicanor Perlas, Center for Alternative Development Initiatives World Trade and the Ecology of Asia Christina Desser, Migratory Species Project Creating a Consciousness of Sustainability at the Grassroots Andy Kimbrell, International Center for Technology Assessment Mega-Technologies and the Natural World Leesteffi Jenkins, Trade and Animal Protection Global Environmental Deregulation ___________________________________________________________________________ Special Debate, 7-9pm, May 11 Do Free Trade and Economic Globalism Benefit Human Beings and the Earth? Including: * Ralph Nader, Center for Study of Responsive Law * Dr. Jagdish Bhagwati, Professor of Economics, Columbia University * Vandana Shiva, Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Natural Resource Policy * plus other prominent representatives from the business and trade communities. ***********************Sunday, May 12, 9:30am - 5:30pm*********************** Panel IV Equity, Labor, and Jobs in a Global Economy John Cavanagh, Institute for Policy Studies The Dynamics of Global Economic Inequity Walden Bello, Focus on the Global South Dark Side of the Asian Miracle Jeanne Gauna, SouthWest Organizing Project The South in the North Colin Hines, Campaign Against the European Single Currency The Politics of Economic Insecurity Barbara Shailor, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO Organized Labor's Response to the Global Economy Bill Troy, Tennesse Industrial Renewal Network The Rise of Contract Labor and the Just-In-Time-Workforce ___________________________________________________________________________ Panel V The Crisis of Government and the Emergence of Corporate Rule Ted Halstead, Redefining Progress Economic Indicators as Instruments of Corporate Rule Richard Grossman, Program on Corporations, Law and Democracy Democracy and the Historical Relationship between Citizens and Corporations Agnes Bertrand, Institut d'Etude sur la Globalisation Economique The WTO: Enforcing the New Economic Order Mark Ritchie, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy The New Role of Government under Global Corporate Rule Mika Iba, Network for Safe and Secure Food and Environment Japan: Creating the Corporate State Atila Roque, Instituto Brasiliero de Analyses Socio-Economico Responding to Globalization's Impacts on Democracy in Brazil Tony Clarke, The Polaris Institute Dismantling Corporate Rule ___________________________________________________________________________ Plus 30 Workshops (Partial List) Defining a New Economic Paradigm: From Growth to Sustainability Policy Steps Toward Economic Localization Beyond Left and Right Biocolonization and Intellectual Property Rights The Globalization of Media and Technology Gender and Globalization Protecting Biodiversity and Wilderness Against Globalization >From the IMF to the GOP: Structural Adjust. and the Contract With America Fighting Global Deregulation Industrial Agriculture vs Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security Organizing Labor in a Globalizing Economy A Strategy for Creating a Grassroots Consciousness of Sustainability Ending Sweatshops at Home and Abroad Organizing Against the World Bank and the IMF Dismantling Corporate Rule Globalization and the Roots of Violence Organizing in the Washington, D.C. Area ___________________________________________________________________________ TICKETS BY MAIL SEATS ARE LIMITED. ORDER SOON. General Students/Seniors (ID required) All Events: May 10 -12 $ 50 ____ $ 25 ____ Friday night only $ 15 ____ $ 8 ____ Saturday only (includes debate) $ 30 ____ $ 15 ____ Sunday only $ 25 ____ $ 12 ____ Event Sponsor - all events $100 ____ (includes sponsorship packet) TOTAL # tickets ________ ________ Enclosed is my check for $ __________ made payable to the IFG: El Bosque. Discount: Please deduct 10% for orders postmarked by April 26. Limited scholarships available. Please contact the IFG to apply. The IFG relies on your donations to fund these programs. $100 sponsors will receive a special sponsorship packet including IFG publications. Name_________________________________________________________ Address ______________________________________________________ City_____________________________ ST______ Zip_________________ Phone___________________________ Fax_________________________ Visa / MasterCard #_________________________________Expiration_________ (circle one) Mail to: International Forum on Globalization PO Box 12218 San Francisco, CA 94112-0218 Mail orders must be postmarked by April 26. Some tickets may be available at the door. All prices include a $5 public membership in the International Forum on Globalization, which entitles you to annual mailings and newsletters. Co-sponsoring organizations: Overseas Development Network, Institute for Policy Studies, Public Citizen, Sierra Club, Third World Network, Friends of the Earth-US, International Center for Technology Assessment, Citizens Trade Campaign, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, People- Centered Development Forum, Foundation on Economic Trends, Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Southwest Network for Environmental and Economic Justice, Humane Society International, Mexican Action Network on Free Trade, International Society for Ecology and Culture, Institut d'Etude sur la Globalisation Economique, Council of Canadians, Equipo Pueblo, Chilean Ecological Action Network, Institute for Food and Development Policy, American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Canadian Federation of Humane Societies, Cordillera Women's Education and Resource Center, Rainforest Action Network, Learning Alliance, Overseas Development Network, International Rivers Network, Georgetown Law School/Harrison Institute, The U.S. 50 Years Is Enough Network, Program on Corporations, Law, and Democracy. ***** NOTES from Chris McGinn (CMCGINN @ CITIZEN) at 5/06/96 5:02 PM ------ Forwarded message ends here ------ From rkmoore@iol.ie Tue May 7 11:23:08 1996 Tue, 7 May 1996 18:21:19 +0100 (BST) Date: Tue, 7 May 1996 18:21:19 +0100 (BST) To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Re: prosperity, indices 5/05/96, Jozsef Borocz wrote: >Don't the United Nations Development Program's _Human Development >Reports_ do just what you are looking for? ... I seem >to remember very interesting tables in the first, (I think 1993) edition, >comparing country rankings based on literacy, life expectancy, ... Jozsef - Can an online version of this report be dredged up? It would be interesting to look at it in conjunction with other '93 data and ask some questions about the true effects of corporatism/"development". >for the second edition, the HDI was revised such that it would >not reflect negatively on some important nations. No surprise: "There's Lies, there's Damn Lies, and then there's Statistics". When most "studies" -- and most university research -- are funded by corporations, then we end up with a "made to order" version of truth reigning supreme in consensus-reality public consciousness, and in the governmental process. Is unfettered academic inquiry destined to extinction? rkm From rkmoore@iol.ie Tue May 7 11:23:10 1996 Tue, 7 May 1996 18:21:11 +0100 (BST) Date: Tue, 7 May 1996 18:21:11 +0100 (BST) To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: re: human nature 5/05/96, Andrew W. Austin wrote: >Can you name, using a nonfunctionalist interpretative frame and avoiding >explanations of human phenomena (myth, rituals, attitudes, norms) based >on sapien capacities and/or morphology (such as 'we play Bach and other >animals can't'), name some human culture "traits" that are transepochal? First, there is the inheritance from animal-hood that must be identified and characterized. In this regard, for example, our innate social nature is closer to the family/tribal patterns of baboons than it is to, say, ant colonies or giraffe nursery-groups. The scope and details of these fixed-traits are, shall we say, controversial -- but this is a major part of human nature nonetheless. Second, in comparison to animal behaviors, one thing that seems to centrally characterize mankind is our "re-programmability". Animals are born with a comparatively fixed trait-program (including migration patterns, hunting methods, etc.) which is modified only slightly for local conditions. Man's "behavior computer" seems to be _almost_ infinitely re-programmable, especially during the period prior to adolescence. But once the re-programming (aka socialization) occurs, then man-in-culture acts much like animal-in-wild. People find their economic niches in their community much like an animal stakes out its territory, and people typically conform to the language & customs of their group with all the rigor of a lion pride on a hunt. Its almost as if each culture is a sub-species, but with a socially-carried "patch" appended to the bio-evolved DNA-string. Just how much of our "program" is fixed, and how much is modifiable, is an interesting question -- and one which could probably be elucidated by appropriate re-interpretation of many existing studies from psychology, anthropology, etc. Also the question of switching cultures is interesting -- past a certain age, for example, immigrants tend to keep the old language and customs, regardless of how maladaptive that may be in the new environment. The reprogrammable part also carries some operational baggage. There are mechanisms of learning and memory, for example, that determine the range of languages we can learn, and the kind of syntax structures that are likely. It seems that through intensive/intrusive conditioning, man can be re-programmed even more than is "good for him" -- an "override program" in "volatile memory" can supercede parts of what I would call the bio-fixed "basic nature". This is perhaps what Freud was talking about in Civilization and its Discontents, and it seems that much of our neuroses and feelings of estrangement come from ignorance and inattention of that which is intrinsic within us. There is a tension between what we "need to be" and what we "force ourselves to be". Andrew - with some fairness, you might say that I've merely punted your question -- rephrased it as further questions re/ boundary between fixed and reprogrammable traits, and the "operational" constraints on learning. But it seems to me that an adequate containing model of human nature is necessary before useful questions can be asked. --- 5/06/96, Greg Ehrig wrote: >Humans differ from animals in that they >have a concept of time -- both future and past. This leads to the >modification of behavior to take into account results from the past >and possible consequences for the future: Thag-- "Thag kill all horses. >Tribe eat good, therefore, Thag good!". Thank you Greg for continuing to articulate the canonical concensus-reality position, concisely summarized for WSN. You perform a noble service to the group by revealing the shallow assumptions and thinking that characterize most public (and much academic) discourse re/ our various topics. I mean no personal slight in my critical remarks -- I respond to your crafted presentation, and assume the subtleness of your own thinking may not be fully represented therein. Where does one begin to unravel such a house of cards, as your familiar cave-man scenario of human development? I could mention that many animals _do_ have a sense of time, do learn new tricks, and even pass on learned behavior to offspring -- but that would be nitpicking. The more central fallacy in your scenario is the assumption that human "tribes" (an OK moniker for a variety of group sizes and structures) started out with very little savvy, and developed cultural forms, hunting, etc. as a cognitive activity. Typically this scenario is extended to include the claim that man started as individual cave-men, with only nuclear family in tow, and entered into a voluntary "social contract" to form tribes in the first place. This whole scenario is fantasy, the invention of eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers who wanted to find Laws as simple as Newton's underlying every observable system. They HYPOTHESIZED tableau-noir cognitive man because it suited their model of a useful-theory paradigm, not because it had any basis whatsoever in observation. In fairness, there was virtually nothing then "known" (that clever academia-centric term) about what we'd now call ethology, ethnology, or even psychology. We can credit their audacity in tackling complex systems with virtually no base-knowledge, but we need not continue to wear their chains (as do the behaviorsists), now that we have some elementary observation-based understanding of the subject. It is an interesting comment on the academic/scientific process -- as it actually operates -- that old theories persist even when their assumptional underpinnings have been fatally eroded by discoveries in "unrelated" fields. "Unrelated", of course, means "out of communication, institutionally", not "unrelated, scientifically", so we can (sadly) understand the continued promulgation of dinasaur-vintage models. To wit... As Andrew W. Austin later wrote: >Humans and their conceptual understanding of the world are social >constructions. This means that particular views of how human beings and >their relations are naturally constituted are constructed by human >beings. What we now "know" is that man-in-tribe evolved as a system. The whole time the higher (super-animal) cognitive machinery was evolving, it was ALWAYS in the context of a cultural/economic system at least as complex as what we can now observe in, say, baboon troops. The whole concept of individualism is a relatively modern notion, perhaps first conceived in near-historical times, and not given its full modern articulation until the Greeks. --- Greg hypothesized cognitive-thought, and even spoken language (ie. "Thag"), as being the primary vehicle of cultural development among human tribes. This of course ignores the adaptability-quotient of proto-man tribes, which was probably considerable. Even more, it ignores the richness of the functioning tribal socio-economic infrastructures that came with man from his pre-higher-cognitive origins. There was never a tableau-noir world which cognition/language was forced to contend with, except as we've later invented, ala existentialism. As with other animals, there must have been a time when human language was "less complex" than culture -- when it barely stretched to provide the action-tokens and thing-identifiers necessary to organize the hunt or to describe over-the-hill dangers. Much later, of course, language is infinitely more complex than culture, and has evolved to fill new worlds of its own making. It would be interesting to speculate on when the cross-over point was: when did language first match culture in complexity, and then begin to rapidly outstrip it? Would this millennia-granularity "point" mark a beginning of accelerated cultural innovation? Would it mark an acceleration of cross-tribal communications? rkm ** NOTE **> I'll be offline from 10th to 26th of May. <** ** You can send messages, selectively, but be patient re/ reply ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ Posted by Richard K. Moore - rkmoore@iol.ie - Wexford, Ireland Cyberlib: www | ftp --> ftp://ftp.iol.ie/users/rkmoore/cyberlib ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ From jborocz@orion.oac.uci.edu Tue May 7 11:49:21 1996 Date: Tue, 7 May 1996 10:49:00 -0700 (PDT) From: Jozsef Borocz To: "Richard K. Moore" Subject: Re: prosperity, indices In-Reply-To: > Jozsef - Can an online version of this report be dredged up? It > would be interesting to look at it in conjunction with other '93 data and > ask some questions about the true effects of corporatism/"development". Sorry, I am not aware of an electronic version (although I would be extremely surprised if they had not used computers to produce the tables...) Jozsef From aaustin@mtsu.edu Tue May 7 11:59:09 1996 Date: Tue, 7 May 1996 12:59:57 -0500 (CDT) From: "Andrew W. Austin" To: "Richard K. Moore" Subject: re: human nature In-Reply-To: I make a distinction between the biological entity, Homo sapiens, and the social entity, Human. I never denied that we are natural. This was even implied in my admission of capacity due to morphology. But these physical things are not human. What is human is socially bestowed, that is thru language, culture, motivations, social action, etc.. I specifically produced this dichotomy in my writing to avoid the naturalization of social production so common in appeals to "human nature." If we are to say that humans have a nature, then we have to recognize that nature as a product of social interaction and history and not the product of nature in the biological, genetic, morphological sense. If we are to talk about the scientific musings on the biological entity Homo sapiens, then we need to specify that this is the subject at hand. By recognizing the distinction between social being and animal nature we avoid extremes of idealism and materialism. Moreover, I disagree with the assertion that we are naturally social. Homo sapiens are not human or social outside of society. Thus natural being is not sufficient for human (or social) being. Another way to say this is that society, a social product, is a necessary condition for social being. Homo sapiens learn to be social. If it is learned it is not natural in the sense that I understand natural. Andy From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Tue May 7 12:53:39 1996 Date: Tue, 7 May 96 14:53:05 EDT From: (Greg Ehrig) To: smtp%NISTServer1%Server[rkmoore%iol.ie]@banyan.doc.gov Subject: re: Re: prosperity, indices X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO ....and all academics are, of course, cooly objectivistic in their world-view, with no biases which would affect their delphic meditiations. From ROZOV@cnit.nsu.ru Wed May 8 03:22:44 1996 8 May 96 16:15:02 NSK-6 From: "Nikolai S. Rozov" Organization: Center of New Informational Tech. To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Wed, 8 May 1996 16:14:28 -0600 (NSK) Subject: RE: Buchanan's right on the New World Order (fwd) Thank you Chris for turning discussion to the most basic points. At the same time I still wonder why so much Western left (or progressive) scholars (including you?) so much overestimate the Principle of State and underestimate the Principle of Law. In political-economic area Wallerstein distinguishes only two basic types of super-societal historical systems: world-empires (with the logic of centralized extraction and redistribution of tribute) and world-economies (comments not needed in this list). As far as I know nobody after Wallerstein suggested any other basic and persuasive type of stable super-societal entity. We all agree, as I hope, that Modern Global World System belongs to the type of world-economy. All talks about transforming it into (or creation over it) some World State with World Government (or World Party fighting for it, etc) mean for me the (unconscious?) attempt to transform Global World- Economy into Global World-Empire. The last 'good' or 'progressive' World-Empire is expected to extract tribute from, say, 'naughty' Transnational Companies (in form of world taxes, etc) and redistribute it for progressive humanistic goals. Here I direct you to recent clear and very persuasive Greg Ehrig's msg concerning allocation resources among Government's needs(G), Investement(I), and Consumption(C). Dear historians, am I not right that all world history is full of examples of permanent intention of world-empires to minimize I and C in order to maximize G ? History of socialism also tells us that the interior logic of centralized redistribution always prevailed over best humanistic principles and traites of socialists - fathers of system. Have contemporary progressivists and 'world socialists' any real arguments that allow not to extrapolate these historical rules to their desired 'World Party', 'World State'. or 'World Government'? And the last, why not to focus attention and forces to humanistically oriented modernization of international LEGAL SYSTEM concerning economic relations between core, semiperiphery , and periphery? Why not to try to create new legal-economic options that should make humanistic/ecological activities profitable and exploitive/antiecological activities non-profitable? I cannot believe that the grand intellectual polential of modern political economists (and first of all w-system tradition) is not sufficient for at least designing the conceptual project of this global-legal-modernization task. My best regards, Nikolai Rozov > From: chris chase-dunn > To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK > > The "New World Order," economic globalization and neo-liberalism are > understandably receiving long-due criticism from popular forces. A conference is > being held in Washington about the costs of globalization. Phil McMichael's > article, "The new colonialism: global regulation and the restructuring of > the interstate system," (pp. 37-56 in David A. Smith and Jozsef Borocz > (eds.) _ A New World Order? Global Transformations in the Late > Twentieth Century_ (New York: Praeger 1995) makes the case against > economic globalization. > > But progressives need to be wary about joining up with economic > nationalists like Buchanan. The progressive attack on neo-liberalism > needs to be organized at national, international and global levels if it is > to succeed. Socialism at the national level has never worked in the past > and it certainly will not work in a world that is more interlinked than ever > before. In the same Smith and Borocz collection is a thoughtful article > by Andre Drainville about new forms of Left internationalism. It may be the > case that the old forms were somewhat premature, and that internationalism > has finally become not only desireable but necessary. > > This does not mean that local, regional and national-level > struggles are irrelevant. They are just as relevant as they always have > been. But they need to also have a global strategy and global-level > cooperation lest they be isolated and defeated. > > The international segment of the world capitalist class is indeed moving > slowly toward global state formation. Rather than oppose this move > progressives should make every effort to organized social and political > globalization, and to democratize the emerging global state. We need to > prevent the normal operation of the interstate system and future hegemonic > rivalry from causing a future war among core powers. And we need to > transform the emerging world society into a global democratic commonwealth > based on collective rationality, liberty and equality. > > To do this we need to construct a new philosophy of democratic and > egalitarian liberation. But this will not require throwing out all the > ideals of the European Enlightenment. It was not the Enlightenment > philosophy that caused Europe to dominate and exploit the world. Rather > it was the military and economic power generated by capitalism that > made European hegemony possible. The ideals of the Enlightment had often to > be stretched or ignored in the process. > > Of course many of the main ideals that have been the core of the Left > Wing critique of capitalism are shared by non-European philosophies. > Democracy (in the sense of popular control over collective decision-making) > was not invented in Greece. It was a characteristic of all non-hierarchical > human societies on every continent. My point is that the new universalism > can incorporate quite a lot from the old universalisms. After all, > national self-determination and multiculturalism _vis a vis_ religion > have been important features of liberalism. It is not > liberal ideology that caused so much exploitation and domination. It was > the failure of real capitalism to live up to its own ideals. That is the > problem that progressives must solve. > > chris > Prof. Chris Chase-Dunn > Department of Sociology > Johns Hopkins University > Baltimore, MD. 21218 USA > tel 410 516 7633 fax 410 516 7590 email chriscd@jhu.edu > Nikolai S. Rozov Professor of Philosophy Moderator of the mailing list PHILOFHI (PHILosophy OF HIstory and theoretical history) http://darwin.clas.virginia.edu/~dew7e/anthronet/subscribe /philofhi.html Dept. of Philosophy Novosibirsk State University Fax.: (3832) 355237 630090, Novosibirsk E-mail: rozov@cnit.nsu.ru Pirogova 2 RUSSIA From D.Ohearn@Queens-Belfast.AC.UK Wed May 8 07:01:48 1996 Date: Thu, 25 Apr 1996 12:54:19 PDT From: "Denis O'Hearn" Subject: RE: Buchanan's right on the New World Order (fwd) To: chriscd@jhu.edu On Tue, 07 May 1996 09:38:10 -0600 (CST) chris chase-dunn wrote: > But progressives need to be wary about joining up with economic > nationalists like Buchanan. The progressive attack on neo-liberalism > needs to be organized at national, international and global levels if it is > to succeed. Socialism at the national level has never worked in the past > and it certainly will not work in a world that is more interlinked than ever > before. > This does not mean that local, regional and national-level > struggles are irrelevant. They are just as relevant as they always have > been. But they need to also have a global strategy and global-level > cooperation lest they be isolated and defeated. i couldn't agree more. but i hear a lot of core leftists (more in britain than the us) dismissing national liberation movements, perhaps failing to distinguish between emancipatory nationalisms (which take many of their roots from the enlightenment) and core nationalisms (like Buchanan's and Thatcher's, which betray the enlightenment). in this respect, i believe several recent commentators on wsn are wrong in their attitudes toward emancipatory national movements and especially in their seeming willingness to accept national boundaries which have been set up as part of a historical process of oppression. for my part, i would LOVE to see scotland independent, although i also realise that the character of an independent scotland is problematic and of greater importance than independence of itself. marx's writings on ireland are quite interesting in this respect. he counsels british socialists to support irish nationalism, and calls on irish workers to advance the national struggle as their main duty to internationalism, on the basis that this is their greatest weapon in advancing the international struggle and weakening the ruling classes in the british core. obviously, things have changed since marx's time, but enlightened nationalism today may be an important means of advancing the progressive potential of regional bodies like the european union...the breakup of britain would weaken one of the most reactionary elements of europe, giving progressives in places like scotland a much greater influence than they have now, since their position on issues like the social chapter is simply stifled by london. as chris indicates, however, this can only work if national movements on the european periphery organize amongst themselves and also with progressive movements throughout europe. > It was not the Enlightenment > philosophy that caused Europe to dominate and exploit the world. Rather > it was the military and economic power generated by capitalism that > made European hegemony possible. The ideals of the Enlightment had often to > be stretched or ignored in the process. > hear, hear. this is, however, a historical process and past hegemonic practices obviously have effects on peripheral and working-class possibilities today. again, this is why i disagree with recent comments about forgetting historical responsibility, letting by-gones be by-gones, starting anew. by-gones have not gone bye-bye. although the masses and even middle class academics of the core cannot be held responsible for the sins of their ancestors, they are responsible if they ignore the continuation of power structures that were constructed by their ancestors. the disagreement between buchanan and the neoliberals is simply about how best to keep these structures in place. Denis O'Hearn Sociology Department Queens University Belfast From wally@cats.ucsc.edu Wed May 8 11:33:49 1996 From: wally@cats.ucsc.edu Date: Wed, 8 May 1996 10:33:44 -0700 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: RE: Buchanan's right on the New World Order (fwd) Yes, indeed, Dr C-D has a very important message: do not confuse protectionism with progressive radicalism. One could even argue that one of the reasons the "state-socialist" wave of progressivism failed was that it embraced protectionism and thus rendered its practitioners' states increasingly uncompetitive. w d From sbabones@jhu.edu Wed May 8 14:58:06 1996 08 May 1996 16:03:44 -0500 (EST) 08 May 1996 15:46:45 -0500 (EST) Date: Wed, 08 May 1996 15:46:30 -0400 From: Salvatore Babones Subject: Re: prosperity, indices In-reply-to: To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: Salvatore Babones A note on Greg Ehrig's run-through of the basic econometric model: A government CAN directly affect I (aggregate investment) in at least two ways: THE COMMAND METHOD: The government can tax C (consumption), either directly through sales taxes or indirectly through property and income taxes, and use the proceeds to finance research and development, college scholarships, and the like. THE LIBERAL METHOD: The government can effectively lower the rate of interest that must be paid on credit bound for investment (as opposed to consumtion) through its framing of banking and accounting regulations. The government doesn't determine what investments are made, but makes investment as a whole more attractive than consumption. The first mechanism is, of course, obvious, and as a result well-recognized. The second method is harder to see in operation, and a government itself may be only dimly aware of what it is doing. ********** Also -- I would challenge Greg Ehrig to give a single example of "extensive" growth that is not also "intensive", or an example of growth that is not also development. (This is not a PERSONAL challenge -- the distinction goes back at least as far as Schumpeter's _Theory of Economic Development_, and almost certainly much farther, but it is a distinction that I think is in error) ********** Salvatore Babones Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, U.S.A. sbabones@jhu.edu From jborocz@orion.oac.uci.edu Wed May 8 16:09:15 1996 Date: Wed, 8 May 1996 15:08:56 -0700 (PDT) From: Jozsef Borocz To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: state vs law; left hand vs right hand In-Reply-To: Not to be picky, but, dear Nikolai, how are you going to achieve legality without a state to enforce the law? Isn't it meaningless to divorce the former from the latter? If you want global rule of law, you have to want a world state. Or, do you have an alternative enforcement mechanism in mind? (The only one I, with my limited imagination, can think of is the mafia; that gives me no alternative but to clearly prefer the state in its bourgeois democratic form thank you very much.) Jozsef From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Wed May 8 16:32:34 1996 Date: Wed, 8 May 96 16:22:05 EDT From: (Greg Ehrig) To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Human Nature, Socialism, Science X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO Digest of Posts on WSN network Due to the number of postings on this group, I am trying to cut down on the amount of time I spend reading & posting. Here are my rebuttals to the posts I both found and found interesting. (Threw away many of the posts to cut down the load on my server) Stephen Sherman said: I really don't get all this talk about maximizing benefits--was David Ricardo around three and a half billion years ago when somehow chemicals on earth started to act in ways that we now call life? Or even two million years ago when some creatures which were very human like began to appear? IF not, why presume the transhistorical validity of his approach to explaining action?...... _______________________ According to that logic, the sun must have orbited the earth until Newton "invented" the laws of gravity. There is a difference between discovery and invention. Ricardo did not pass legislation which decreed that human behavior in general, and economies specifically, worked according to self interest -- he discovered and theorized this principle. As to your second point, as I said before, there are complex patterns of cooperation and competition within societies. Genetic self interest, could lead an individual to sacrifice himself on the battlefield. How? First, a male is fairly disposable, genetically speaking. Once his, ah, contribution to procreation is finished, there are no further demands that nature imposes on him in raising his young. (Remember, from the gene's point of view, individual life is secondary to the main mission of the creation of more copies of the gene. In other words --borrowing from Rothschild here -- a chicken is just an egg's way of making another egg.) It might well be in the interests of one copy of the gene to sacrifice itself to improve the odds of survival of other copies of the gene, carried by family and young. This is a strategy that was better suited for an age of small tribal conflict, and the latent predispositions has been, er, capitalized on by the modern nation-state - which has successfully transferred old tribal loyalties to the nation-state. Clearly, modern warfare is not rational from the point of view of the gene. But, in this, Nation-States were able to grow and thrive by taking advantage of this aspect of human nature. .As Montaigne put it: A rational army would run away. Tribes or nation states which are defended by armies that run away tend not to survive, and thus the genes within them have less opportunity to perpetuate themselves, and are selected out of the population. In a modern society, where the "tribe" protected is composed of millions of members, the most rational choice would be to run away. However, the hardwiring of the human brain -- human nature -- allows nation states to have wars because the hardwiring does not "know" that circumstances have changed. -- It is "natural" behavior. One more point while I am on the subject. Obviously, I do not believe in social Darwinism. It led -- like so many other ideas in the physical sciences applied to society (more on this later) -- to monstrous, unworkable ideologies and caused a great deal of human suffering. The bell curve is obviously a work of this type of belief, and yes, genetic variation does occur more within "races" than across them. What I am speaking of is the broad evolution of _humans_, their competition for the resources of the planet long before agriculture and civilization developed, and the traits and predispositions which led naturally to strategies of dealing with the real world. These strategies were hardwired into the brain, and form the base from which human behavior, in all of its diversity, flows. To use a playful analogy, my personal computer has ROM memory -- fixed instructions that cannot be changed, present at "birth", and the defining element of what I call a "Macintosh". These instructions allow an amazing degree of flexibility, but put limits on the nature of the computer: Think about the differences between Macs and Sun OS servers, or adding machines, or any other hardware platform you can think of. It is the nature of the hardwiring which determines the performance envelope of the computer. RAM, "learned" memory, can differ enormously from machine to machine, (depending on what software packages you load) but all share certain underlying characteristics, both strengths and weaknesses. (like that #$*%ed bug that affects my disk insertions....) The pathetic spectacle of seeing a PC attempt to imitate a Mac offers a lesson on the futility of attempting to impose software which is ill-suited for the hardware of a given system. [this one should be good for at least another dozen flames :=> ] Moving on; It is a complete mystery to me that "objective observers" can "observe" a theoretical economic paradigm applied in many different places and times, all of which fail --miserably-- and say that the obvious solution is that the paradigm was not applied widely enough. Reading all of the excuses and props afforded socialism/communism, and the desperate search for scapegoats for its failure - mostly individuals (which are supposed to be "mere flotsam on the sea of inevitable economic forces") really does make one believe in that element of human nature called pride, and identity -- both of which must be protected against admission of failure. By its fruit, the tree is known. Relativity vs. Relativism Andrew Austin asserts that (a) Einstein proved that Time and Space were relative. Therefore, (b) everything is relative. Broken down this way, the absurdity of the logic is fairly clear. It is not, however, the first time that this mistake has been made, particularly by the intelligentsia. The thesis of Paul Johnson's incredibly good history, _Modern Times_, is that most of the woes of our particularly evil century spring from two events: The first World War, and the publishing of Einstein's theory of relativity. He is worth quoting: Chapter one, "A Relativistic world" "....The impact of his theory was immediate, and cumulatively immeasurable. But it was to illustrate what Karl Popper was later to term 'the law of unintended consequence'....At the beginning of the 1920s, the belief began to circulate, for the first time at a popular level, that there were no longer any absolutes: of time and space, of good and evil, of knowledge, above all of value. *Mistakenly but perhaps inevitably, relativity became confused with relativism.* No one was more distressed than Einstein by this public misapprehension. .... He believed passionately in absolute standards of right and wrong. ..[and] insisted the world could be divided into subjective and objective spheres, and that _one must be able to make precise statements about the objective portion_......He lived to see moral relativism, to him a disease, become a social pandemic, just as he lived to see his fatal equation bring into existence nuclear warfare. [Note this does not support Austin's assertion that "What Einstein means is that time and space are conceptual relationships"] (Also worth quoting) "....The emergence of Einstein as a world figure in 1919 is a striking illustration of the dual impact of great scientific innovators on mankind,. They change our perception of the physical world and increase our mastery of it, but they also change our ideas. The second effect is often more radical than the first. ....(Illustrates with social impact of Gallileo and Newton) .... Darwin's notion of the survival of the fittest was a key element both in the Marxist concept of class warfare and of the racial philosophies which shaped Hitlerism. Indeed the political and social consequences of Darwinian ideas have yet to work themselves out, as we shall see through this book. So, too, the public response to relativity was one of the principal formative influences on the course of twentieth - century history. " I submit that it is necessary to understand _to what extent_ darwinist views influence human behaviors. Genetic selection _does not_ significantly influence human affairs at the level of culture or conflict between cultures - or even between individuals. It _did_ have a past influence on shaping our modern behavior patterns, that cultures/tribes/nations can and do use to further their own ends. Austin wrote: > It is not at all guaranteed that people will calculate >the consequences of present behaviors. Of course. What I submitted was that humans have the _capability_ to use the past to modify their behavior with an eye towards modifying the future. This does not mean that individuals always utilize the capability. (If humans _always_ learned from the past, there would be no socialists :=>) Another, related posting from Andrew Austin went like this: >If you want selfish, freedom-stealing, and self-destructive >humans, then I recommend choosing a capitalist mode of production. If you >want cooperative, loving, and creative humans, then I suggest choosing a >communist mode of production. The capitalist tells you "I realize that >the second choice is marvelous, but human nature will not permit it." A >capitalist would say this. The goal here is to convince the powerless >majority that the goal they seek is not possible because of powers beyond >their control: God and/or nature. But because human being is a social >product, and since we can change society, then we know we can change >human being. So choice *does* exists--we are not bound by human nature to >exist in inequal social orders--and it is a choice that must be >made; for to not make this choice is to allow others to make it for you. I am going to combine my reply to this post with the one to the poster who submitted the article based on Ayn Rand's _The Virtue of Selfishness_ which the poster argued was a circular argument. It has been some time since I read _The Virtue of Selfishness_, but from what I recall, the point of the book was not that all human behavior was motivated by self-interest, but that it was the most moral of the impulses which give rise to human behavior (as suggested by the title) Now, I am not going to go debate this issue, since I am pretty rusty on the arguments, but the key question that the book asked was: Which motive has caused more suffering in human history, self interest or altruism? (You might send your rebuttals to some group who cares to hear them, like alt.libertarian.ayn_rand). In order to answer for Rand, I would have to reread her book and that I am disinclined to do. Moreover I should point out that I did not assert that all behavior in humans is self-interested. Instead, I pointed out that 1. True altruism is too dammed rare to build a society around, and therefore 2. Depending upon a class of self-less unbiased observers to be available to run the society is folly. I _do_ feel, however, that your preference for communism over capitalism, based on the traits you think are desirable in society is at best, wrong-headed. Freedom: Capitalism is the most purely free economic system that I know of: No one forces you to buy anything, no one forces you to work, and no one forces you to sell. Indeed, capitalism _depends_ on freedom to survive: when information is hindered, prices lose their information value, and inefficies begin to mount. I always thought Communists rebutted this assertion by sneering that it includes the freedom to starve: Yes. It does. What freedom does communism depend on to survive? I know of several authoritarian regimes that have adopted some form of capitalism, and over time had the economic system drive the Government towards democracy and civil liberties (Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, even to some extent China). I am unaware of a Communism, or even Democracy, driving the economic system or itself towards more freedom. I would go further and assert that where there is not a free economic system, civil liberties do not have any effective champions. As for Cooperative, Loving, and Creative humans, I suppose that you could call Polish cooperation in the 1968 Russian invasion of Prague to be "co-operative". I suppose that the Stalin and Lenin cults could be called "Loving", and the subversion of the psychiatric profession to jail and "treat" dissidents reclassified as mental patients be called "Creative". I would not do so. From esommer@direct.ca Wed May 8 16:32:51 1996 Date: Wed, 08 May 1996 14:30:35 -0700 To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: esommer@direct.ca (eric steven sommer) Subject: Introduction to Stewards Planetary House. Hi there, I think that the Stewards Planetary House, a new just-being-born social movement, institution, and way-of-life-in-the-making, will be of special interest to participants in the World Systems mailing list. I am therefore appending to this brief note a copy of our draft summary program. As a general program, this document is necessarily skeletal - and somewhat general - in its presentation of the various facets of our approach. You will, however, find a list, approximately 2/3 of the way through the program document, of works which set out various aspects of the SPH in some detail. Most of these documents are available free by e-mail. Please feel free to request any which interest you. Also, in keeping with our committment to inquiry, openness, and dialogue, please feel free to voice any suggestions, criticisms, or other points you wish to make regarding our approach. As one of our Steward's sayings goes, "We learn from everyone!" The Stewards Planetary House: Proposed Draft Summary Program. "Whenever you are in doubt...apply the first test. Recall the face of the poorest and the weakest man whom you may have seen, and ask yourself if the step you contemplate is going to be any use to him. Will he gain anything from it? Will it restore him to a control over his own life and destiny? True development puts first those that society puts last". - Mahatma Gandhi. Dear People, The Stewards Planetary House is now seeking associates to establish itself as a new way of life for `underclass' or poor people throughout the planet. We are particularly interested at this time in connecting with interested people in the Vancouver, B.C. Canada area, and in North America generally, although inquiries from interested people anywhere are welcomed. (Our internet address is: esommer@direct.ca) The Stewards Planetary House (SPH) is a new inquiry-based way of life, social movement, and planetary institution which we refer to as `the other way to live'. A central purpose of the SPH is to organize the planetary underclass - which includes ourselves - as the `Stewards' or caretakers of the world. Stewards will work together to build the Stewards Planetary House as their `organized planetary intelligence' - a planet-wide `house of the underclass' which is: a) planetarily-networked ; b) informationally-integrated; c) locally land-based, and d) available to, and at the service of, unemployed people, working poor people, members of the `non-traditional' highly-educated underclass, and all others throughout the planet who may be won over to Stewardship or caring for the earth. Stewards will work together through the SPH to meet one another's material, self-esteem, and higher-level spiritual and creative needs, while simultaneously caring for the world and its beings. The elements of the Stewards `household intelligence' include the following: A) `The Stewards Code' This is a code of conduct and communication designed to enable Stewards to inquiringly work together to discover - and to enact - patterns of interaction through which they can best promote one another's being, together with that of the planet. This code is built, and amended as needed, by the Stewards themselves. All members of the Stewards Planetary House are distinguished by their adherence to this code, which serves them as a `planetary linking language' for `communication, collaboration, and co-ordination' with one another and with the world. B) The socio-political organization of poor or underclass people - beginning with ourselves - into local `Steward's Houses'. These houses are the local `instantiation' of the Stewards Planetary house. They are not primarily physical structures. They are rather informationally-integrated, extended-family-like `social units of co-operation' which in certain respects resemble the traditional `noble houses' such as `The House of Windsor' found in Europe. Members of SPH houses live `in community', but not necessarily communally C) Acquisition of local land in each area as geographic `bases' for the Planetary Stewards House. The Stewards strategy may be paraphrased as `converge locally; connect globally'. The land basis of Stewardship supports the Stewards' houses in achieving stable life, subsistence or livelihood, Stewardship management of the land, contact with the natural world, and space to build planetary information linkages. D) The informational networking together of the entire Steward's Planetary House. The emerging `planetary information system' is an integral part of the Stewards Planetary House. In-depth informational networking, advanced data-basing, CSCW (computer-supported co-operative work), and CSCL (computer-supported co-operative learning) are key features of the Stewards Planetary House. Network and other informational technologies will be used to connect Stewards for `communication, collaboration, and co-operation', in their joint planetary endeavor to become increasingly able to care for and promote one another's being together with that of the land and the planet. This `informationing' together of the Stewards forms a key part in: 1) Connecting all members of each local Stewards house; 2) Connecting all members of all houses within the planetary house; 3) Connecting all members of all houses with the entire planetary underclass, and with all other people, beings, resources, and potentialities of the planet as a whole. E) Stewards work together through the SPH to build a new kind of `Networked Wholistic Service Economy' - an economy which replaces the traditional socialist `labour theory of value' , and the western capitalist `utility theory of value', with the collaborative endeavor to discover, create, and deliver `being values' to one another. Stewards work together through the SPH to meet one another's material, self-esteem, and higher-level spiritual and creative needs, while simultaneously caring for the world and its beings. F) A flexible inquiry-based program of `Total Human Development' for all Stewards. This program involves the total physical, mental, emotional and spiritual development of human beings. It is an inquiry-based endeavor, whose essential goal is that of discovering - and enacting - methods which optimally enhance the functioning of individual Stewards, while simultaneously amplifying their ability to interact or work together to care for - and to promote - one another's being, together with that of the planet. Network technology, advanced data-basing, CSCL (computer-supported co-operative learning), and other information technologies will all eventually be used to support both research and delivery in this area. Traditional as well as new `leading-edge' methods of personal development will be made available. G) Political action in support of all legitimate poor people's rights. These rights include subsistence or survival rights to adequate food, shelter, clothing, transportation, as well as sufficient access to information and social institutions to allow normal participation in cultural life. A key means to these ends is enactment of legislation - and securing of government and popular support - for the formation of `communal property associations' or `co-operative property associations'. Such associations, which have already been legislated into law in South Africa, are a kind of `juristic person' through which members of disadvantaged communities may progressivly acquire, hold, and manage whatever kinds of property they wish to, including land, on a common stewardship basis. Such associations differ from traditional co-ops in their flexible ability to pragmatically accomodate any and all types of property - whether material, intellectual, or land - which a group of Stewards wish to acquire, hold, and manage in common. The SPH aims to enable all poor people, wherever they may be on the planet, to interconnect with one another on the basis of Stewardship. We aim to enable poor people to work together to care for one another together with the planet - through their own local organizations including local `Stewards Houses', and through planetary organizations including the Stewards Planetary House. The ultimate purpose of the SPH is to assist poor and underclass people in forming the organized, planetary intelligence of Underclass Stewardship. HOW TO CONNECT WITH US We expect to have a website operating within 60 days. Meanwhile, if you would like to join us, or if you would like to enter into dialogue with us, or if you would like to request literature, we can be reached at esommer@direct.ca We particularly need people with information technology-related capabilities such as computer programming skills; people with land access/land management skills; people with participatory-democratic management skills; and people with skills related to education and total human development. However, all people, regardless of their skills, are welcome to inquire about our planet-wide-house-in-the-making. Detailed works on the central role of openness and inquiry in Stewardship, and on the philosophical, economic, political, spiritual, communicative, informational, and other aspects of Stewardship are available free in paper-based format or by e-mail to interested people. If you would like to receive any of these works, just ask us: 1. `The Stewards Planetary House: Proposed Draft Summary Program', 7 pages. 2. `The Stewards Manifesto: Putting Our Lives and Our Planet Back Together Again'. (Subtitled: `Organizing the Planetary Underclass As The Ste/wards of The World: Spiritual Politics for the 21st. Century'. ), by Eric Sommer, 75 pages. 3. `The Mind of The Steward: Inquiry-Based Philosophy for a New World', by Eric Sommer, 200 pages. 4. `The Steward's Theory of Wholistic Economics: The Discovery, Creation, and Delivery of `Being Values', by Eric Sommer, 40 pages. 5. `The Oikome: A Concept for Unifying Ecology, Economics, Economic Anthropology, and Cultural Ecology, by Stewart Piddocke, 103 pages. 6. `The Terrestre: Notes on a unit of agricultual production for ecologically Sound Self-subsistence and Terrestrial Stewardship', by Stuart Piddocke, 63 pages. 6. `The Seven Paths of Liberation: Foundation of Future Progress', by Eric Sommer, 25 pages. 7. `The Center For Total Human Development: A Proposal', by Eric Sommer, 12 pages. 8. `The World As Interaction: Foundations for the Theory of Knowledge, Action, and Economics', by Stuart Piddocke., 1200 pages. 9. `The Theory of Synergy: A Mindframe for Grasping Complexity', by Stuart Piddocke, 350 pages. A manuscript being revised, may be available for comment. 10. `The Steward's Code: An Operational System for Caring, Communication, Co-operation, Co-ordination, and Inquiry.' (in preperation)' 40 pages. If you would like to join us, or if you would like to enter into dialogue with us, we can be reached at esommer@direct.ca Glossary and Addenda: A number of novel and little-known terms and concepts have been introduced in this document. The following brief discussions are intended to clarify a number of these terms and concepts: 1. Question: You state that the Stewards Planetary House is composed of `the organized planetary intelligence of the Stewards'. What is meant by this phrase `organized planetary intelligence'? Answer: The `organized planetary intelligence of the stewards' is made-up of: 1) the individual Stewards, together with 2) all of the means which they employ to increase their ability to hear and see and know one another and to work with one another, as well as the other beings of the world, in order to care for and promote one another's being together with that of the other beings of the world. Every means, instrument, method, arrangement, practice, or measure which stewards use to increase their ability to work together to meet one another's needs - together with the needs of our planet - increases our planetary intelligence and builds our planetary house. This conceptionFrom ???@??? Wed May 08 12:04:52 1996 To: From: esommer@direct.ca (eric steven sommer) Subject: Introduction to Stewards Planetary House. Bcc: Hi there, Thanks for your interest in the SPH. I am appending to this brief note a copy of the draft summary program of the Stewards Planetary House. As a general program, this document is necessarily skeletal - and somewhat general - in its presentation of the various facets of our approach. You will, however, find a list, approximately 2/3 of the way through the program document, of works which set out various aspects of the SPH in some detail. Most of these documents are available free by e-mail. Please feel free to request any which interest you. Also, in keeping with our committment to inquiry, openness, and dialogue, please feel free to voice any suggestions, criticisms, or other points you wish to make regarding our approach. As one of our Steward's sayings goes, "We learn from everyone!" The Stewards Planetary House: Proposed Draft Summary Program. "Whenever you are in doubt...apply the first test. Recall the face of the poorest and the weakest man whom you may have seen, and ask yourself if the step you contemplate is going to be any use to him. Will he gain anything from it? Will it restore him to a control over his own life and destiny? True development puts first those that society puts last". - Mahatma Gandhi. Dear People, The Stewards Planetary House is now seeking associates to establish itself as a new way of life for `underclass' or poor people throughout the planet. We are particularly interested at this time in connecting with interested people in the Vancouver, B.C. Canada area, and in North America generally, although inquiries from interested people anywhere are welcomed. (Our internet address is: esommer@direct.ca) The Stewards Planetary House (SPH) is a new inquiry-based way of life, social movement, and planetary institution which we refer to as `the other way to live'. A central purpose of the SPH is to organize the planetary underclass - which includes ourselves - as the `Stewards' or caretakers of the world. Stewards will work together to build the Stewards Planetary House as their `organized planetary intelligence' - a planet-wide `house of the underclass' which is: a) planetarily-networked ; b) informationally-integrated; c) locally land-based, and d) available to, and at the service of, unemployed people, working poor people, members of the `non-traditional' highly-educated underclass, and all others throughout the planet who may be won over to Stewardship or caring for the earth. Stewards will work together through the SPH to meet one another's material, self-esteem, and higher-level spiritual and creative needs, while simultaneously caring for the world and its beings. The elements of the Stewards `household intelligence' include the following: A) `The Stewards Code' This is a code of conduct and communication designed to enable Stewards to inquiringly work together to discover - and to enact - patterns of interaction through which they can best promote one another's being, together with that of the planet. This code is built, and amended as needed, by the Stewards themselves. All members of the Stewards Planetary House are distinguished by their adherence to this code, which serves them as a `planetary linking language' for `communication, collaboration, and co-ordination' with one another and with the world. B) The socio-political organization of poor or underclass people - beginning with ourselves - into local `Steward's Houses'. These houses are the local `instantiation' of the Stewards Planetary house. They are not primarily physical structures. They are rather informationally-integrated, extended-family-like `social units of co-operation' which in certain respects resemble the traditional `noble houses' such as `The House of Windsor' found in Europe. Members of SPH houses live `in community', but not necessarily communally C) Acquisition of local land in each area as geographic `bases' for the Planetary Stewards House. The Stewards strategy may be paraphrased as `converge locally; connect globally'. The land basis of Stewardship supports the Stewards' houses in achieving stable life, subsistence or livelihood, Stewardship management of the land, contact with the natural world, and space to build planetary information linkages. D) The informational networking together of the entire Steward's Planetary House. The emerging `planetary information system' is an integral part of the Stewards Planetary House. In-depth informational networking, advanced data-basing, CSCW (computer-supported co-operative work), and CSCL (computer-supported co-operative learning) are key features of the Stewards Planetary House. Network and other informational technologies will be used to connect Stewards for `communication, collaboration, and co-operation', in their joint planetary endeavor to become increasingly able to care for and promote one another's being together with that of the land and the planet. This `informationing' together of the Stewards forms a key part in: 1) Connecting all members of each local Stewards house; 2) Connecting all members of all houses within the planetary house; 3) Connecting all members of all houses with the entire planetary underclass, and with all other people, beings, resources, and potentialities of the planet as a whole. E) Stewards work together through the SPH to build a new kind of `Networked Wholistic Service Economy' - an economy which replaces the traditional socialist `labour theory of value' , and the western capitalist `utility theory of value', with the collaborative endeavor to discover, create, and deliver `being values' to one another. Stewards work together through the SPH to meet one another's material, self-esteem, and higher-level spiritual and creative needs, while simultaneously caring for the world and its beings. F) A flexible inquiry-based program of `Total Human Development' for all Stewards. This program involves the total physical, mental, emotional and spiritual development of human beings. It is an inquiry-based endeavor, whose essential goal is that of discovering - and enacting - methods which optimally enhance the functioning of individual Stewards, while simultaneously amplifying their ability to interact or work together to care for - and to promote - one another's being, together with that of the planet. Network technology, advanced data-basing, CSCL (computer-supported co-operative learning), and other information technologies will all eventually be used to support both research and delivery in this area. Traditional as well as new `leading-edge' methods of personal development will be made available. G) Political action in support of all legitimate poor people's rights. These rights include subsistence or survival rights to adequate food, shelter, clothing, transportation, as well as sufficient access to information and social institutions to allow normal participation in cultural life. A key means to these ends is enactment of legislation - and securing of government and popular support - for the formation of `communal property associations' or `co-operative property associations'. Such associations, which have already been legislated into law in South Africa, are a kind of `juristic person' through which members of disadvantaged communities may progressivly acquire, hold, and manage whatever kinds of property they wish to, including land, on a common stewardship basis. Such associations differ from traditional co-ops in their flexible ability to pragmatically accomodate any and all types of property - whether material, intellectual, or land - which a group of Stewards wish to acquire, hold, and manage in common. The SPH aims to enable all poor people, wherever they may be on the planet, to interconnect with one another on the basis of Stewardship. We aim to enable poor people to work together to care for one another together with the planet - through their own local organizations including local `Stewards Houses', and through planetary organizations including the Stewards Planetary House. The ultimate purpose of the SPH is to assist poor and underclass people in forming the organized, planetary intelligence of Underclass Stewardship. HOW TO CONNECT WITH US We expect to have a website operating within 60 days. Meanwhile, if you would like to join us, or if you would like to enter into dialogue with us, or if you would like to request literature, we can be reached at esommer@direct.ca We particularly need people with information technology-related capabilities such as computer programming skills; people with land access/land management skills; people with participatory-democratic management skills; and people with skills related to education and total human development. However, all people, regardless of their skills, are welcome to inquire about our planet-wide-house-in-the-making. Detailed works on the central role of openness and inquiry in Stewardship, and on the philosophical, economic, political, spiritual, communicative, informational, and other aspects of Stewardship are available free in paper-based format or by e-mail to interested people. If you would like to receive any of these works, just ask us: 1. `The Stewards Planetary House: Proposed Draft Summary Program', 7 pages. 2. `The Stewards Manifesto: Putting Our Lives and Our Planet Back Together Again'. (Subtitled: `Organizing the Planetary Underclass As The Ste/wards of The World: Spiritual Politics for the 21st. Century'. ), by Eric Sommer, 75 pages. 3. `The Mind of The Steward: Inquiry-Based Philosophy for a New World', by Eric Sommer, 200 pages. 4. `The Steward's Theory of Wholistic Economics: The Discovery, Creation, and Delivery of `Being Values', by Eric Sommer, 40 pages. 5. `The Oikome: A Concept for Unifying Ecology, Economics, Economic Anthropology, and Cultural Ecology, by Stewart Piddocke, 103 pages. 6. `The Terrestre: Notes on a unit of agricultual production for ecologically Sound Self-subsistence and Terrestrial Stewardship', by Stuart Piddocke, 63 pages. 6. `The Seven Paths of Liberation: Foundation of Future Progress', by Eric Sommer, 25 pages. 7. `The Center For Total Human Development: A Proposal', by Eric Sommer, 12 pages. 8. `The World As Interaction: Foundations for the Theory of Knowledge, Action, and Economics', by Stuart Piddocke., 1200 pages. 9. `The Theory of Synergy: A Mindframe for Grasping Complexity', by Stuart Piddocke, 350 pages. A manuscript being revised, may be available for comment. 10. `The Steward's Code: An Operational System for Caring, Communication, Co-operation, Co-ordination, and Inquiry.' (in preperation)' 40 pages. If you would like to join us, or if you would like to enter into dialogue with us, we can be reached at esommer@direct.ca Glossary and Addenda: A number of novel and little-known terms and concepts have been introduced in this document. The following brief discussions are intended to clarify a number of these terms and concepts: 1. Question: You state that the Stewards Planetary House is composed of `the organized planetary intelligence of the Stewards'. What is meant by this phrase `organized planetary intelligence'? Answer: The `organized planetary intelligence of the stewards' is made-up of: 1) the individual Stewards, together with 2) all of the means which they employ to increase their ability to hear and see and know one another and to work with one another, as well as the other beings of the world, in order to care for and promote one another's being together with that of the other beings of the world. Every means, instrument, method, arrangement, practice, or measure which stewards use to increase their ability to work together to meet one another's needs - together with the needs of our planet - increases our planetary intelligence and builds our planetary house. This conception has many practical implications - including a powerful new approach to the nature of economic value and its practical creation. 2. Question: What do you mean by `Underclass people'? Answer: Underclass people, a category which many of us fit into whether we like it or not, are a high proportion of the world's population. The modern underclass is by no means restricted to the `rough people' or `people of the street'. They are, in fact, by far its smallest part. Rather, the modern underclass is composed of all of the working poor; of formerly middle class people being driven down into the base of society; of highly-skilled and highly-educated people subsisting on part-time or low-paid/low-skill service sector work; and of all people living on state transfer payments such as welfare or UIC or old age pensions; of `non-traditional' highly-educated underclass people in economically marginal postions; and many others. In addition, the role of women in the underclass should be emphasized. Women represent 1/2 of the planet's population; provide nearly 2/3 of its work hours; but receive only 1/10th of its income and own less than 1/100th of its property. Stewardship recognizes that Underclass people are generally the population sector most in need. Alongside this `special concern' with underclass people, however, the door of the Stewards House is also open to all people who sincerely wish to practice Stewardship. 3. Question: What is the link between the planetary underclass and Stewardship? Answer: There are several interdependent links between the underclass and stewardship. First, the compassionate spirit of the underclass/stewardship link is exemplified in the quote from Ghandi at the beginning of this document. Stewardship involves caring for the world, including all of its beings - human, natural, and divine. Underclass people are a high proportion of the world's population. Underclass people are also generally the segment of the population most in need. So compassionate Stewardship requires creation of a `vehicle' - which we call the Stewards Planetary House - which underclass people can use to care for and to nurture one another together with the planet. A second link between the underclass and Stewardship is a strategic one: The planetary underclass is rapidly emerging to occupy a key position at this time on the planet. The modern underclass includes the `working underclass', the `non-working underclass', and the `non-traditional underclass' of highly-educated and highly-skilled people in economically marginal positions. Together with third world peasents and labouring people, these strata are one of the fastest expanding population sectors on the Earth. These strata are expanding with breathtaking speed partially because of the dis-employment effects of the very information technologies which form, along with the land, such an integral part of the Steward's Planetary House. Another factor in the strategic position occupied by underclass people is that, whether working in `underclass jobs' or surviving without one, underclass people have the least to loose and the most to gain through building Stewardship. A third link between underclass people and stewardship is that it is in large measure the separation from the land which makes us vulnerable to underclass status. Restoring that link, through Stewardship, is a key to restoring our power, dignity, and ability to work together to care for one another together with the world. From aaustin@mtsu.edu Wed May 8 17:27:05 1996 Date: Wed, 8 May 1996 18:24:20 -0500 (CDT) From: "Andrew W. Austin" To: gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Subject: Re: Human Nature, Socialism, Science In-Reply-To: Einstein said something to the effect of "Space and time do not exist independent of physical objects, rather physical objects are spatially and temporally extended." What Einstein meant by this, and he said this specifically to clear up the confusion surrounding his general theory of relativity, was that there is no structure called space-time. This would be a lot like the old argument of ether keeping the planets from falling down. Einstein was arguing, specifically, that time and space are conceptual systems of measurement. Space is not a physical thing. It is a thing between our ears (some more than others, perhaps). Space is a concept. It would not exist if human beings had not thunk it. How anybody could dispute this is beyond me. The concept "space" is a human construct. A planet is not a human construct. It is a physical object. The nature of the planet is an interpretation through socially constructed epistemic frames. Space is not physical, existing only in the conceptual realm. It has, obviously, to your mind, been well-objectivated, however, and this is the popular misconception. Many stand with you, Paul, regarding the object-facticity of space-time. I was the one who posted the argument pointing out the tautological nature of your appeals to human nature vis a visa self-interest, and it was a very sound critique of your argument. You see, I have run into this "all behavior is in self-interest" argument time and time again and I am ready for it. It is absurd. I stand by my critique. Self-sealing arguments are well know in logic, and your was a classic textbook example of one. I refer you to page 194 of Bruce N. Waller's Critical Thinking (1988) for a destruction of a fallacy quite similar to yours. You don't need to consult Ayn Rand. The point is general. How is communism freedom? Let me first note that democracy is the political side of the communist productive mode. A society run by the people is a democracy. It is also communist. Freedom from exploitation is the freedom I would hold up as the communist's goal. Some of us, Paul, still believe in the labor theory of value. I am one of those people. All wealth (except for some trivial exceptions, like a beautiful view) is created in labor. I am convinced of this fact. And, because of this fact, any system that does not allow the people to keep the full value of the social surplus created by their labor is wrong. Slavery was wrong and so is capitalism. It is wrong because it stands against human freedom and creativity. I support a particular form of communism called communist- anarchism. Other terms used to describe this view are "social libertarianism," or just "libertarianism, and good old "democracy." Communism hasn't "failed"; it has never existed in modernity. State socialist experiments have not worked in the context of the capitalist world-system. But just because my car runs out of gas 10 miles to New York doesn't mean that I should throw my hands up in the air and pledge never to go to New York. Communism is a better world. Human beings create their worlds. And so we should set about creating a better one. Capitalism is exploitation. It is wage-slavery. It creates poverty and suffering. And it is immoral. That's all I have to say about that. Andy From gonick@csf.colorado.edu Thu May 9 02:35:04 1996 Date: Wed, 8 May 1996 13:26:59 -0600 (MDT) From: Lev Gonick To: ipe , wsn@csf.colorado.edu, femisa@csf.colorado.edu, casenet@csf.colorado.edu Subject: General ISA Call for Papers for Toronto 1997 A General Call and contact information for panels and papers for the 1997 Annual Meetings of the ISA are now available on-line. Point your web browsers to http://csf.colorado.edu/isa/toronto.htm (that's htm and not html :-) Lev Gonick lev.gonick@csf.colorado.edu From OWENJACK@FS.isu.edu Thu May 9 09:47:36 1996 From: "J B Owens" Organization: Idaho State University To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Thu, 9 May 1996 09:49:01 -0600, MDT Subject: CFP: Economic & Business History, April 1997, Richmond, It appears that this Society doesn't even consider the possibility of a world-systems or global approach to the subject. Jack Owens, Idaho State Univ. ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date: Wed, 8 May 1996 23:37:14 -0400 Reply-to: H-Net Latin-American History List From: Jacquelyn Kent Subject: CFP: Economic & Business History, April 1997, Richmond, VA CALL FOR PAPERS ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS HISTORICAL SOCIETY ANNUAL MEETING RICHMOND, VIRGINIA APRIL 24-26, 1997 The EBHS welcomes proposals for panels and papers on all aspects of North American, European, and non-Western economic and business history, all time periods. Please send abstracts of the proposed papers (two page maximum) along with the names of presenters, positions and affiliations, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses to the address below. Papers presented at the meeting will be considered for publication in ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS HISTORY, the Society's proceedings edited by Professor William Childs. Papers published in the Proceedings are eligible for the Charles J. Kennedy Award of Excellence. ATTENTION GRADUATE STUDENTS: a limited number of stipends will be available to help defray the expenses of graduate students who participate in the 1997 program. The initial deadline for proposals and abstracts is SEPTEMBER 30, 1996. However, additional proposals will be accepted until JANUARY 7, 1997. Send proposals and abstracts to: Michael S. Smith President and Program Chair Economic and Business Historical Society Department of History University of South Carolina Columbia, South Carolina 29208 FAX: 803-777-4494 e-mail: smithm@garnet.cla.sc.edu michael smith department of history university of south carolina phone: 803-777-7421 fax: 803-777-4494 ============ FOOTER TO H-BUSINESS POSTING ============ For information, send the message "info H-BUSINESS" to lists@cs.muohio.edu. J. B. "Jack" Owens, Professor of History Idaho State University, Pocatello, ID 83209 USA e-mail: owenjack@isu.edu www: http://isuux.isu.edu/~owenjack From rkmoore@iol.ie Thu May 9 11:20:38 1996 Thu, 9 May 1996 18:20:20 +0100 (BST) Date: Thu, 9 May 1996 18:20:20 +0100 (BST) To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK , PHILOFHI@YORKU.CA, the-alliance@igc.apc.org From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: re: Buchanan's right on the New World Order 5/07/96, chris chase-dunn wrote [to WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK]: > The international segment of the world capitalist class is indeed moving >slowly toward global state formation. Rather than oppose this move >progressives should make every effort to organized social and political >globalization, and to democratize the emerging global state. We need to >prevent the normal operation of the interstate system and future hegemonic >rivalry from causing a future war among core powers. And we need to >transform the emerging world society into a global democratic commonwealth >based on collective rationality, liberty and equality. This is a recipe for disaster, and is a position we see inreasingly espoused by pro- New-World-Order apologists, avowed or otherwise. It's cloaked in progressive rhetoric in an attempt to seduce progressives away from agendas which have some hope of countering the elite corporate global takeover. The NWO is _not_ about trade -- corporations already enjoy plenty of capital portability and access to markets -- the NWO is at heart a _political_ initiative, aimed at overturning national sovereignty and undoing the beneficial remnants of the Enlightenment. Abandoning the nation state is exactly what the elite hopes progressives will do, that's what the demonize-and-bankrupt-government campaign is all about, together with all the laissez-fair propaganda about "free markets" and privatization. Nation-states are the only "people's fortress" that has any hope whatsoever of standing against the corporate onslaught. The spectre of warfare is raised (notably by Kohl) as a shallow attempt to scare people into the anti-sovereignty camp -- this spectre is patently ridiculous: the U.S. holds and will retain absolute global military hegemony, and its use of that power will not be constrained by this or that international arrangement. Not only does the global-level dilute progressive influence to the maximum possible degree, but the globalist regime is being specifically engineered (WTO, GATT, et al) to omit all the Enlightenment-generated mechanisms of popular representation, balance of powers, etc. > To do this we need to construct a new philosophy of democratic and >egalitarian liberation. Untrue and deceptive. Existing western philosophies of democracy and egalitarianism are perfectly adequate -- it is their corruption by corporate money that is the problem. Submitting to the corporate globalist agenda, and pursuing some new utopian egalitarian vision, is absolutely the wrong path to preserve or enhance democracy. Respectfully yours, Richard Moore ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ Posted by Richard K. Moore - rkmoore@iol.ie - Wexford, Ireland Cyberlib: www | ftp --> ftp://ftp.iol.ie/users/rkmoore/cyberlib ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ From rkmoore@iol.ie Thu May 9 11:20:44 1996 Thu, 9 May 1996 18:20:33 +0100 (BST) Date: Thu, 9 May 1996 18:20:33 +0100 (BST) To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK , PHILOFHI@YORKU.CA From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: re: human nature Dear Andew Austin, You wrote [to WSN]: >I make a distinction between the biological entity, Homo sapiens, and the >social entity, Human. I never denied that we are natural. This was even >implied in my admission of capacity due to morphology. But these physical >things are not human. What is human is socially bestowed, that is thru >language, culture, motivations, social action, etc.. ...Moreover, I disagree >with the assertion that we are naturally social. This view is demonstrably false -- it denies all that is known about human evolution. There is indeed a SOCIAL heritage which is pre-human, even an ECONOMIC heritage -- these EVOLVED into a more cognitively-aware set of social & economic arrangements. This is simply fact. For some reason you seek to force a clear distinction between the pre-human and the post-animal, as if proto-man had gone into a cacoon as a baboon (so to speak), and came out as homo sapiens, with behavior patterns as distinctly different as between a caterpiller and a butterfly. It simply didn't happen that way, and the attempt to force analysis into that mold undermines the validity any investigation before it begins. The reality is that man DOES have _some degree_ of inborn societal pre-dispositions. How extensive they are, and how overridable -- and at what psychological cost they are overridden -- these are questions worthy of study. This innate layer needs to be identified and "subtracted out" of current data if you want to measure what is uniquely human. If you look at DNA -- and DNA carries LOTS of behavioral content in most species -- you find that man's DNA is incredibly similar to other species that are much "lower" on the evolutionary chain. In a biological sense, what is uniquely human is a very small patch indeed on animals, tinier yet with respect to primates. This small patch is mostly related to the cognitive centers, and seems to have given reason and imagination dominion over behavior. But within what parameters? Some "mystics" can cognitively control bodily functions, but I think we'd agree "human nature" includes nonetheless a normal heartbeat, body temperature, and breathing rate. Similarly man can be coerced into abandoning community and pursuing narrow individualist self-interest -- but that doesn't make it healthy to his phsychological nature, nor does it prove no such nature exists. Until the advent of modern ethology, animals were studied mostly in captivity, and researchers imagined they were learning something useful about animal behavior. They were deceived. We now know that animal nature requires a natural context before it can express itself and be observed. And if animals are kept too long in captivity, they often lose the capacity to develop their latent behaviors, even if released back into the wild. The question re/ man is what is "the wild" and how does man behave there? It is clear from observing so-called primitive societies that man naturally lives in close-knit communities (fixed or mobile) in which social behavior and economic activity are intimately intertwined, and in which community obligations and individual prerogatives are both valued, to varying degrees. This may not suit your political agenda, but it's the way things are. Regards, Richard From aaustin@mtsu.edu Thu May 9 13:57:30 1996 Date: Thu, 9 May 1996 14:58:21 -0500 (CDT) From: "Andrew W. Austin" To: "Richard K. Moore" Subject: re: human nature In-Reply-To: What a strawman. Pre-sapiens, all clades of Homo (sapiens neadertalis, erectus, habilis) and all Australopithecine clades (gracile forms africanus, afarensis, and even the robust clades, robustus, for example) were all social. We arose from a social context. Primates are generally social. Where in the world did you get the idea that I said Homo sapiens were the only primates that were social? Or that they have not ever been social? I never said this. I never said anything like this. I simply said there is a difference between the social and the natural constitution of our being. If you believe this is a false dichotomy, then you are a believer in sociobiology. But just as sure as you are about the facticity of your position, I am as certain that you are wrong. Please refrain from building strawmen about my text. People who have trouble understanding my position might adopt your outrageously incorrect interpretation of my position and this moves the debate further away from any useful dialogue. Is this obfuscation of my argument purposeful? Andy From aaustin@mtsu.edu Thu May 9 14:01:58 1996 Date: Thu, 9 May 1996 15:02:49 -0500 (CDT) From: "Andrew W. Austin" To: "Richard K. Moore" Subject: re: human nature In-Reply-To: On Thu, 9 May 1996, Richard K. Moore wrote: > Some "mystics" can cognitively control bodily functions, but I > think we'd agree "human nature" includes nonetheless a normal heartbeat, > body temperature, and breathing rate. Similarly man can be coerced into > abandoning community and pursuing narrow individualist self-interest -- but > that doesn't make it healthy to his phsychological nature, nor does it > prove no such nature exists. Chickens have a normal heartbeat, body temperature, and breathing rate. Chickens are not humans. You want to so naturalize ideology that you are calling a basic function of animal life "human nature." At this point the dialogue has passed reason. This may not suit your political agenda, but it's the way things are. Have they always been this way? Will they always be this way? Are we right now where no generation has ever been before us: at the TRUTH? Is this the end of history? Can we stop learning or thinking now and just relax because we have solved all the mysteries of the universe? "it's the way things are." What a ridiculous assertion. Andy From mgold@oise.on.ca Thu May 9 14:38:34 1996 Date: Thu, 9 May 1996 16:36:09 -0400 (EDT) From: Mitchell Gold To: eric steven sommer Subject: Re: Stewards Planetary House In-Reply-To: <96May8.152705-0700pdt.268184-6063+129@aphex.direct.ca> We have received your post re: Sterwards Planetary House, and would like to introduce our selves to you. We are the Home Planet Alliance. Enclosed is our first newsletter. We are planning to hire students in the summer, to go into the community, to raise awareness of our program, and other like minded programs. You may be interested in: our project, our materials, some other alliance that serves your need. We refer you to our prime directive, "all receiving is for the purpose of sharing" and our Ten Transformers, see newsletter, and our attitude and framework for creating global citizens. How do we support each other? Let's talk. Mitchell L Gold home planet alliance co-ordinator P.S. Vancouver, is one of the selected towns for our summer job program. From rkmoore@iol.ie Thu May 9 15:00:53 1996 Thu, 9 May 1996 22:00:35 +0100 (BST) Date: Thu, 9 May 1996 22:00:35 +0100 (BST) To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: re: human nature 5/09/96, Andrew W. Austin wrote: >Please refrain from building strawmen about my text. But Andrew, you said plainly: >Moreover, I disagree with the assertion that we are naturally social. I never pursue obfuscation intentionally, I prefer to elucidate rather than confuse. >Chickens have a normal heartbeat, body temperature, and breathing rate. >Chickens are not humans. You want to so naturalize ideology that you are >calling a basic function of animal life "human nature." At this point the >dialogue has passed reason. I believe this helps me make my point. You recongize that chickens have a heartbeat, and therefore you wouldn't claim heartbeat as being uniquely human -- it belongs to man-as-animal. My point is that socialization -- to some un-quantified extent -- is also part of man-as-animal. This animal-part of socialization is extended by a cognitive uniquely-human part -- as evidenced in our more complex societies. Human nature includes both our animal-part and our post-animal part. My point is that our social aspect includes both innate and cognitive components. I believe you have denied this, when for example you said: >But these physical >things are not human. What is human is socially bestowed, that is thru >language, culture, motivations, social action, etc. The portion of our behavior-tendencies that is innate is NOT a "physical thing". >Can we stop learning or thinking now and just >relax because we have solved all the mysteries of the universe? Now isn't THIS obfuscation and straw-man creation? Recognizing a few facts about human nature is hardly solving "all the mysteries of the universe". Hope to pick up the thread when I return, Richard From dasmith@orion.oac.uci.edu Thu May 9 15:12:32 1996 Date: Thu, 9 May 1996 14:12:22 -0700 (PDT) From: David Smith To: world-system network Uh, pardon me guys, but has WSN become the "Sociobiology Chat Room"? As a passive observer of all this, I must say that I am disappointed that a somewhat interesting discussion of states and sovereignty in the changing global economy has been transformed into debates about selfish genes and name-calling. Maybe y'all got diverted from the critically important issues when you allowed the "capitalism is the one true way" ideologue/Ayn Rand reader to dictate the direction of the dialogue (by the way: how DID/WHY he wander off the from alt.libertarian? surely they must miss him...) dave smith sociology, uc-irvine From aaustin@mtsu.edu Thu May 9 15:37:36 1996 Date: Thu, 9 May 1996 16:38:37 -0500 (CDT) From: "Andrew W. Austin" To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: Correction and Additional Comments In-Reply-To: The question "Or that they have not ever been social?" should read "Or that hominids have not always been social?" Of course hominids have always been social. The earliest hominid remains showed that they not only lived in groups but that they took care of their elderly. In a recent book on primate social behavior entitled Good Natured (can't remember the author right now; the book is in my home office) primates of all kinds are shown doing very social things, such as caring for a retarded sibling. But as the Harlow study showed, nurturing behavior in primates is learned. The more we learn about primate behavior the more we recognize socialization into the community. More and more of what was thought to be instinct or nature is tuning out to be social. Just because we have always been social doesn't mean this is genetic. I use this illustration to demonstrate how learned behavior can be naturalized. It is 2000 years from now. A group of Japanese sailors love to visit an island to feed a bunch of monkeys that live there. They feed them rice. It is entertaining because when you throw the rice on the beach, the monkeys scoop up the sand and throw it in the water so that the rice rises to the surface. For as long as anybody can remember, these monkeys have been doing this. So, like the raccoon washing her food, the sailors assume this is instinct. However, we are not 2000 year in the future. We know that neither the monkeys', nor the sailors', behavior is instinctual. A few years ago the monkeys painstakingly picked individual pieces of rice from the sand. The sailors deliberately threw the rice in the sand so this would occur, because when they just threw the bags of rice on the beach, the monkeys dragged the bags of rice into the woods. So the ripped the bags open and scattered the rice. But one day a female accidentally threw some sand into the water and found that the rice floated to the surface. Pretty soon all the monkeys were doing this (except the old male monkeys--they were set in their ways). Over the next several year it is expected that the old male monkeys will die out and all the monkeys will be throwing rice in the water to extract the sand. Instinct? I reiterate, a single Homo sapiens raised apart from society will NOT be human. It will not speak, nurture, think, drive automobiles, fight wars, or act in self-interest. It will not avoid incest. It will not drive tankers for Exxon. If it is a male, it will not play football. If it is a female, it will not desire to play dolls. It will be neither criminal nor saint. It will, however, eat, sleep, defecate, and probably ejaculate like other mammals. But this is NOT human nature. Social being is so much better than the term "human nature." This way we recognize that we have a natural being and a social being. Andy From aaustin@mtsu.edu Thu May 9 15:47:46 1996 Date: Thu, 9 May 1996 16:48:33 -0500 (CDT) From: "Andrew W. Austin" To: "Richard K. Moore" Subject: re: human nature In-Reply-To: If it is natural then it is not human. If it is animal nature then it is not human nature. The "nature" of humans is social. "Human" is unique. It is what we DO NOT share with other animals. It is what we DO NOT hold in common with other life on earth. How is pointing out the animal parts of my constitution providing support for the human part of us? We are like animals. So? We are, in fact, animals. I believe that my assertions of fact, such as we are physical and we are social, are on far more solid empirical ground than your theory of intrinsic human nature. You were the one who asserted the facticity of only tentative things, not me. Well, I have beat this horse to death. I will try to refrain from posting on this thread. Great discussion, however. Andy From MKENNE05@ucis.vill.edu Thu May 9 16:51:45 1996 Date: Thu, 9 May 1996 18:51 EST From: MKENNE05@ucis.vill.edu To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: re: new world order to complement/in response to rkmoore's recent reply to chris chase-dunn: i can't help but agree with most of rkmoore's criticism of a single global state; but i would also question whether the nation-state does/will do much to control for many of the problems created by a globalised capitalist economy. it seems that increasingly, the idea of a nation-state is becoming irrelevant given 1) the challenges to the nation-state from without by the larger world economy; and 2) the challenges to the nation-state from within by ethnic groups that had never considered themselves fully part of that state (see the scottish or welsh in the uk, the basques, catalonians, and the comunidad valenciana in spain, etc.) and what of those "nations" still without a "state"? my question is not posed so as to reject either alternative, but rather to examine the extent to which it is possible to escape the either/or distinctions made when theorising international cooperation; and also to perhaps solicit comments about efforts to turn the European Union into a federal structure... does the concept of subsidiarity help to control for some of these problems simultaneously? surely you know, rkmoore (richard is it?), that ireland has benefitted tremendously from considering itself as "european"... michael kennedy mkenne05@ucis.vill.edu From ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au Thu May 9 21:58:27 1996 10 May 1996 13:57:33 +1000 Date: Fri, 10 May 1996 13:57:33 +1000 From: "Bruce R. McFarling" Subject: Re: human nature To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu I tend to agree with the suggestion that this may be straying a bit far from the topic of the list. It branched from the discussion of measuring economic welfare effects experienced by different countries over the recent past, and I saw a connection with World-System theory so I threw my A$0.02 worth into the discussion. But whether social systems are *not* natural systems, or whether humans are naturally social animals so that social systems are a special type of natural systems (though one, obviously, of special interest to social scientists 8-)# does not seem to be a relevant distinction unless we start to connect World-Systems with local and global ecosystems, for example. And whether or not human nature is an immutable that has sufficiently specific social consequences to serve as a stable base for social theory, I don't see how a discussion that accepts that as a premise is a discussion about World-Systems theory. That's why there are different mailing lists for people with interests in pursuing different approaches to social science (for example). Virtually, Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au From aaustin@mtsu.edu Thu May 9 23:01:29 1996 Date: Fri, 10 May 1996 00:01:39 -0500 (CDT) From: "Andrew W. Austin" To: "Bruce R. McFarling" Subject: Re: human nature I agree with this. I am largely responsible for this tangent. It is just that appeals to human nature to legitimate political ideology irritate me so. They are so awful because they commit the naturalistic fallacy and because they are hurtful. They are typically used by conservative and liberal ideologues to legitimate arguments about how we can't make the world better because of negative characteristics embedded in human nature (and then support systems which enhance these alleged characteristics). I always make it a point to attack an argument that holds this premise. So when I saw this argument presented here, I jumped on it. I believe that the naturalistic fallacy is the most egregious mistake in argumentation. I agree with Mihailo Markovic when he writes: All conservative advocates of law and order derive the legitimacy of a coercive state machinery from the view of human begins as naturally egoistic, aggressive, acquisitive, primarily interested in the satisfaction of their own appetites. All ideologues of laissez-faire agree with Malthus that men are "really inert, sluggish, averse from labor, unless compelled by necessity. As liberalism gradually gives way to state-bureaucratism, domination and hierarchy are more and more stressed as central genetic characteristics of the human species. According to Desmond Morris (1967): "As primates we are already loaded with the hierarchy system. This is the basic way of life." Status quo ideologies tend to develop skeptical views. One variant of this skepticism is reluctance to endorse any structural change because there are animal instincts in human beings which must not be unleashed. The more an ideology is past-oriented, and expresses the interests of those who hope to restore historically obsolete structures of domination, the gloomier and more cynical its view of human beings, who are considered basically evil (lazy, aggressive, egoistic, greedy, acquisitive, even brutish). The worse their image, the less hope for any project of social improvement, the more justification for restrictions of freedom. Markovic takes a jab at some radicals, as well, writing that they "tend to be very optimistic in their conceptions of human nature." I posit neither an optimistic nor pessimistic nature. We are neither good natured nor original sin. And we aren't both at birth, either. We are socialized to be who we are. This is our "nature." Humans socially define these things. We construct the belief systems which give birth to these concepts and make them meaningful in the everyday lifeworld. The social world molds out thoughts and behaviors, and we in turn, determine the social world though our activities. As a Marxist, I would love to rely on an optimistic view of a naturally-good natured human being. But this would be falsely legitimating my argument by an appeal to nature. I appreciate everyone's patience with all this. Andy P.S. I recommend Genes and Gender VI: On Peace, War, and Gender, edited by Anne E. Hunter 1991. This book does a fair job at demolishing sociobiological theories. From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Fri May 10 08:57:58 1996 Date: Fri, 10 May 96 10:57:34 EDT From: (Greg Ehrig) To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: re:human nature X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO One quick comment: It has been observed that most intensive discussions of economics quickly dissolve into a blaze of amateur sociology. Looks like we're no exception. From jborocz@orion.oac.uci.edu Fri May 10 09:28:47 1996 Date: Fri, 10 May 1996 08:28:36 -0700 (PDT) From: Jozsef Borocz To: gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Subject: re:human nature In-Reply-To: On Fri, 10 May 1996 gehrig@banyan.doc.gov wrote: > One quick comment: It has been observed that most intensive > discussions of economics quickly dissolve into a blaze of amateur > sociology. Looks like we're no exception. Excuse me? From OWENJACK@FS.isu.edu Fri May 10 10:02:09 1996 From: "J B Owens" Organization: Idaho State University To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Fri, 10 May 1996 10:03:23 -0600, MDT Subject: Area Studies On a lighter note (I just finished a quite demanding semester), I submit this quote from the latest issue of *Lingua franca: The Review of Academic Life* (May-June 1996). The quotation is from Jacob Heilbrunn, "The News from Everywhere: Does Global Thinking Threaten Local Knowledge? The Social Science Research Council Debates the Future of Area Studies" (pp. 48-56). "By the late 1960s, however, the excitement of nation building had evaporated, and academic cooperation with the government was in ill repute. Area studies continued, of course, but in a different key. Scarred by the Vietnam War, scholars like Andre [accent on the "e"] Gunderfrank [sic] began championing 'dependency theory,' or the idea that American capital was exploiting Latin America and that socialism would come to the rescue...." I swear that I didn't make this up. Jack J. B. "Jack" Owens, Professor of History Idaho State University, Pocatello, ID 83209 USA e-mail: owenjack@isu.edu www: http://isuux.isu.edu/~owenjack From aaustin@mtsu.edu Fri May 10 10:12:24 1996 Date: Fri, 10 May 1996 11:13:19 -0500 (CDT) From: "Andrew W. Austin" To: gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Subject: re:human nature In-Reply-To: Who is "we"? AA From wxhst3+@pitt.edu Fri May 10 10:55:35 1996 ID ; Fri, 10 May 1996 12:41:13 -0400 (EDT) Date: Fri, 10 May 1996 12:41:05 -0400 (EDT) From: Bill Haller Sender: Bill Haller Reply-To: Bill Haller Subject: WSN and the human nature debates To: "Andrew W. Austin" In-Reply-To: To Andy in particular, I can't help but think if you knew more of the world-systems literature you'd have a better sense of what the people on this list know and do not know. No one needs to be burdened with arguments against positions they don't even subscribe to because that just gets pedantic. If our earlier exchange started leading you to think that there's a reactionary behind every corner who needs to be rooted out and exposed, even here on WSN, then I apologize for that. (After all, it's not the least bit fun thinking you're alone in your social morality.) The overwhelming majority of people on this list probably take a great deal of pleasure and satisfaction in working hard for the common good. To WSN more generally, I have to say there is something I liked about seeing a discussion of "human nature" on WSN: the micro-level issues are important for how the macro-level dynamics play out. Take the issue of conflict among core states for example. What core state could rally the national political will necessary to initiate a war against other core powers if its people were basically content? I haven't dug into whatever literature there may be on economic recession, populist social movements, and militarism but that thesis involves a link to the micro level, at least implicitly. I understand that anthropologists (such as Marvin Harris, or am I mistaken?) have observed that this also happens at the level of local ecosystems: as nutrients in the soil are depleted, harder work with the digging stick or the hoe is required to harvest the same yield. The human response, after some threshhold of declining efficiency is passed, is to go make war on the tribe in the next valley (plowshares into swords, as it were). I'd appreciate corrections and comments from those who know more about this line of reasoning, especially those who see a relation between the B-phases of K-waves and the outbreak of conflicts among core powers. That's enough of my amateurish sociological dabbling for today--back to production on my dissertation (a somewhat more professional effort, or so I hope). Eat heartily and smile for goodness sake! Bill Haller Sociology, Pitt P.S. For those who haven't heard, Stephan Roach, Wall Street economist (and long-time apologist for corporate restructuring as I understand) announced recently that he changed his mind about restructuring and that he has now embraced the "hollowing out" thesis (a la Harrison and Bluestone). He admitted some concern about the consequences of so many working so much harder for so much less. (The concern he expressed is about social order and stability, of course, and not the exploitation of workers). From aaustin@mtsu.edu Fri May 10 11:17:12 1996 Date: Fri, 10 May 1996 12:18:11 -0500 (CDT) From: "Andrew W. Austin" To: Bill Haller Subject: Re: WSN and the human nature debates In-Reply-To: I have been on this list for a very long time and have not commented much before. All the people on here are very decent people and I have the utmost respect for them. I do know quite a bit about world-systems theory. I have done extensive reading into this area. But you couldn't know that since I have not made any arguments vis a vis world-systems theory. The particular argument in question was directed at only one person who was justifying bourgeois relations based on human nature. Two other individuals, one publically and one privately, have since picked up the thread and I have engaged the debate. I do not see reactionaries behind every corner. I presented Markovic's argument as an explanation of my motivation to press this argument. I think your characterization of my perceptions is off-base. There is no need for you to apologize for what is an incorrect assertion regarding my perception of people on this list. But this mistake is easily made because my arguments have been at a general level in an attempt to avoid personalizing the debate. I mean nothing negative in my comments here; I think there has been a misunderstanding. I post this publically because I want to dispel for the whole list the notion (that your comments may reify) that I hold anybody here in ill-regard. This isn't true. Thanks for the post. AA From hk1@axe.humboldt.edu Fri May 10 15:04:19 1996 Date: Fri, 10 May 1996 14:04 -0700 (PDT) From: Harutiun Kassakhian Subject: Re: your mail In-reply-to: To: David Smith The discussion on human nature has left out the key point. Man's nature is rationality and its innate affinity towards a world of spiritual ideals. Yet the baser and coarser elements of mankind are closer to the animal kingdom and are devoid of this rationality. Thus, the reason why there is an aristocracy, is because a lineage of noble blood is not only full of the spirit that elevates it closer to divinity itself in the great chain of being. The lack of a hereditary aristocracy is a sign of barbarism in a society, and a society guided by leaders from the plebeian classes runs counter to the laws of nature. Hence Cromwell and Robespierre, and the lack of good taste in America 1996. I would believe that Aristotle would extensively support me on these points. :) From hk1@axe.humboldt.edu Fri May 10 15:26:52 1996 10 May 1996 14:26 -0700 (PDT) Date: Fri, 10 May 1996 14:26 -0700 (PDT) From: Harutiun Kassakhian Subject: Re: your mail To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK For those who may find my claim for the necessity of an aristocracy, one need only look at the art, music and literature of societies ruled by aristocracies to realize that aristocracy is the most natural form of social order. Mozart and Shakespeare have yet to be matched by the vulgar art of capitalist democracy. Only a hereditary aristocracy can have the tranquility and transcendance necessary for true aesthetic appreciation. From cscpo@polsci.umass.edu Fri May 10 17:43:19 1996 Date: Fri, 10 May 1996 19:43:11 -0400 From: "colin s. cavell" Subject: Human nature and...now...aristocracy... To: WSN@csf.colorado.edu >The discussion on human nature has left out the key point. >Man's nature is rationality and its innate affinity towards >a world of spiritual ideals. Yet the baser and coarser elements >of mankind are closer to the animal kingdom and are devoid of this >rationality. >Thus, the reason why there is an aristocracy, is because a lineage of >noble blood is not only full of the spirit that elevates it closer to >divinity itself in the great chain of being. >The lack of a hereditary aristocracy is a sign of barbarism in a society, >and a society >guided by leaders from the plebeian classes runs counter to the laws of >nature. Hence Cromwell and Robespierre, and the lack of good taste in >America 1996. >I would believe that Aristotle would extensively support me on these points. >:) The only morsel of value to be gathered from the above message is that the class struggle is alive and well. Alexander's teacher would not disagree. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Colin S. Cavell Department of Political Science "The proletarian movement is the Thompson Tower, Box 37520 self-conscious, independent movement University of Massachusetts of the immense majority, in the Amherst, MA 01003-7520 interest of the immense majority." Internet: cscpo@polsci.umass.edu --Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels Voice: (413) 546-3408 "The Communist Manifesto" http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~cscpo ============================================================================== From wxhst3+@pitt.edu Fri May 10 18:17:23 1996 ID ; Fri, 10 May 1996 19:11:41 -0400 (EDT) Date: Fri, 10 May 1996 19:08:46 -0400 (EDT) From: Bill Haller Subject: Re: your mail To: Harutiun Kassakhian Harutian, Gott Im Himmel! I hope you were just kidding!!! Bill Haller (One more tasteless German-American plebe.) From ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au Sat May 11 00:16:46 1996 11 May 1996 16:15:36 +1000 Date: Sat, 11 May 1996 16:15:36 +1000 From: "Bruce R. McFarling" Subject: re:human nature In-reply-to: To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK On Fri, 10 May 1996, Greg Ehrig wrote: > One quick comment: It has been observed that most intensive > discussions of economics quickly dissolve into a blaze of amateur > sociology. Looks like we're no exception. One reason I dropped out when the discussion took this turn. Much of the institutional economic approach[*] to these fundamental questions of social science is based on work in sociology and anthropology, so I figured it would be awfully arrogant to start mouthing off on these topics with so many professional sociologists on the list. Virtually, Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au [*] Actual institutional economics, not the 'New' Institutional economics. As with New Keynesian and New Classical, 'New' in this case mostly means 'No Effing Way' Institutional. From fharbour@osf1.gmu.edu Sun May 12 12:21:07 1996 Date: Sun, 12 May 1996 14:21:05 -0400 (EDT) From: "FRANCES V. HARBOUR" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Human nature (forward) For what it's worth, I thought some members of this list might find the=20 following announcement from another list of interest. -Fran Harbour ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 10 May 1996 11:25:54 +0100 From: paola cavalieri To: soceth-l@usc.edu Subject: Special issue E&A Announcement: publication of the multilingual issue of Etica & Animali (from Paola Cavalieri). ETICA & ANIMALI 8 (1996) Special issue devoted to The Great Ape Project Contents From=20the Editor Paola Cavalieri and Will Kymlicka, Expanding the Social Contract Robert Elliot, Solidarity, Property Rights, Redistribution and the Great Ap= es Michael Allen Fox, Planet for the Apes Birut=E9 M. F. Galdikas and Gary L. Shapiro, Orangutan Ethics Takayoshi Kano, Lingomo-Bongoli, Gen'ichi Idani and Chie Hashimoto, The Challenge of Wamba Volker Sommer, "Sind Affen denn auch Leute?" Ja. Denn zwischen Natur und Kultur flie=DFen die =DCberg=E4nge Carlo Foppa, L'insoutenable poids de la th=E9orie de l'=E9volution Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Taking Evolution Seriously: A Matter of Primate Intelligence Kristin Andrews, The First Step in the Case for Great Ape Equality: The Argument for Other Minds Dieter Birnbacher, The Great Apes - Why They Have a Right to Life Lorenzo Pe=F1a, Anthropoid Rights and Paternalism Presentation by Paola Cavalieri, editor The Great Ape Project, published in 1993, shows that we should respect at least some nonhuman beings as our moral equals, giving equal consideration to their interests as to ours. We now know that chimpanzees, gorillas and orangutans have the very same capacities that warrant regarding all humans as moral equals. Consequently strong legal, economic and political protection must be provided for the individual members of these species. Three years on, the special issue, devoted to the Great Ape Project, of Etica & Animali bears witness to the vitality of, and widespread support for, the view that other great apes are our moral equals. In this volume, authors from a variety of cultural backgrounds, including the continental intellectual tradition, discuss and develop the view. The question as to the moral standing of the nonhuman great apes is positioned within contemporary debates in evolutionary biology, philosophy of mind, anthropology and applied ethics. Furthermore, discussion of notions such as bi-cultural citizenship, moral space, and collective rights to resources, provides a basis for framing and implementing the extended sphere of moral equals so that justice might be secured for the nonhuman great apes. The issue also includes descriptions of some individual attempts to improve on the current situation of nonhuman great apes. The respective authors believe that no piecemeal approach to securing justice for nonhuman great apes is likely to be particularly successful. Moving from a theory of universal human rights - arguably the ethical paradigm of the present - to a theory of universal anthropoid rights requires significant changes to dominant worldviews. Hopefully this special issue of Etica & Animali will contribute to the required changes. For more informations: http://194.21.24.2/freewww/gap_etica/home.html e-mail: gap_etica@planet.it From ROZOV@cnit.nsu.ru Mon May 13 01:37:24 1996 13 May 96 14:35:27 NSK-6 From: "Nikolai S. Rozov" Organization: Center of New Informational Tech. To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Mon, 13 May 1996 14:35:03 -0600 (NSK) Subject: World State or World Law Apologies for some delay in answering. I have been out of net, and wsn was occupied by hum.nat. discussion. Maybe it's high time now to turn to basic questions raised by R.Moore and Ch.Chase-Dunn about the desirable image of global future which from my viewpoint must be based both on humanistic values and contemporary political-economic knowledge. > From: Jozsef Borocz > To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK > Not to be picky, but, dear Nikolai, how are you going to achieve legality > without a state to enforce the law? Isn't it meaningless to divorce the > former from the latter? If you want global rule of law, you have to want a > world state. Or, do you have an alternative enforcement mechanism in > mind? Extremely strange for me, dear Jozsef, to get questions of this type. For many centuries (at least since The Peace of Westphalia, 1648) international law exists and influences global development without any world state but using agreement and ratification by legitime state powers of nations-participants. New level of international legal system was achieved by creating UN: any country entering UN must agree with its Charter - a battery of basic law- like statements. Keeping in mind all just criticisms of UN and its daughter organizations (such as FAO, UNESCO, Security Council, commision for global environment, Interpol, etc) we should not reject,as I hope, significant and mainly positive influence of UN legal principles and correspondent programs for after-WWII global processes. Now we need a new level of innovation and integration of international legal system (in world trade and economics, in arms trade, in national debts policy, in international monetary and banking system, in exporting non- renewable natural raw resources from periphery to core, in exporting pollutive industry from core to periphery, etc etc) Each country entering these new legal agrrements must correct its own national legal system and supply correspondent forces (police, bearucracy) for realization of new international laws. Old and new profiled international organizations (such as FAO, Interpol, WTO, etc) can and should accomplish those functions of new legal system that cannot be supplied by national forces. Don't tell me please how many problems are raised here, I know it but I am sure that the problems of creating World State, the problems of supplying it with necessary political and financial power (without which it would be just a fiction!) and the problems of further defence against this new Global State Monster would be much more complicate. (The only one I, with my limited imagination, can think of is the > mafia; that gives me no alternative but to clearly prefer the state in its > bourgeois democratic form thank you very much.) I also prefer MULTIPLICITY of bourg.democr.states integrated by voluntarily accepted GLOBAL LEGAL SYSTEM over all kinds of visible and invisible mafias that seem to be first in grasping benefits of any World State Power. Further comments on the problem State or Law? Nikolai Nikolai S. Rozov Professor of Philosophy Moderator of the mailing list PHILOFHI (PHILosophy OF HIstory and theoretical history) http://darwin.clas.virginia.edu/~dew7e/anthronet/subscribe /philofhi.html Dept. of Philosophy Novosibirsk State University Fax.: (3832) 355237 630090, Novosibirsk E-mail: rozov@cnit.nsu.ru Pirogova 2 RUSSIA From chriscd@jhu.edu Mon May 13 07:56:21 1996 13 May 1996 09:54:13 -0500 (EST) 13 May 1996 09:53:55 -0500 (EST) Date: Mon, 13 May 1996 08:39:56 -0600 (CST) From: chris chase-dunn Subject: Fw: Awards FROM THE LEFT Sender: chriscd@jhu.edu To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu X-NUPop-Charset: English ------------------------------ From: "T R. Young" <34LPF6T@CMUVM.CSV.CMICH.EDU> Date: Wed, 8 May 1996 16:10:43 -0400 To: PROGRESSIVE SOCIOLOGISTS NETWORK Subject: Awards FROM THE LEFT The Marxist Section of the American Sociology Association has two Awards for excellence in progressive scholarship--preferably class analysis and politics, education, health care, gender roles, crim and social control tactics, majority/minority relations, and the like. The Deadline has been extended to 14 June, 1996...partly because ASA did not get the announcements out and partly because I have been remiss in my duties...but you redeem our irresponsibilities and get good work before the two Committees soonest. 1. The Al Syzmanski Award is for Graduate Students who have written a paper or finished a thesis which responds to the quest for a praxis sociology and a praxis society. Send nominees/papers/supportive materials to the Chair: MARTIN MURRAY, Sociology, SUNY at Binghamton, N.Y., 13901 2. The Scholarly Achievement Award. This Award goes to Faculty and/or Research Scholars who have contributed in a given work, over a life-time or has made some most helpful contribution to progressive scholarship. SEND nominees/papers/supportive materials to: Stephanie Shanks-Meile, Sociology, N.W. Indiana University Gary, Indiana, 46408 These awards are open to non-members of the Section [who are most cordially invited to join us before, after, or in spite of the Award]. They are also open to grad student and scholars in England, New Zealand, Australia, the Americas including Canada as well as in other parts of the world. Prof. Chris Chase-Dunn Department of Sociology Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, MD. 21218 USA tel 410 516 7633 fax 410 516 7590 email chriscd@jhu.edu From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Mon May 13 08:55:10 1996 Date: Mon, 13 May 1996 08:55:08 -0600 (MDT) From: gehrig@banyan.doc.gov To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: re: re:human nature X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO Forwarded to: i[wsn@csf.colorado.edu] cc: Comments by: Greg Ehrig@USOTP@TA -------------------------- [Original Message] ------------------------- > Of course, many on wsn are professional sociologists. I was aware of that. Nevertheless......By its fruit the tree is known. (My apologies to those sociologists who confirm my prejudices...:=> ) From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Mon May 13 09:04:38 1996 Date: Mon, 13 May 96 11:04:08 EDT From: (Greg Ehrig) To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: re:re:human nature X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO > Of course, many on wsn are professional sociologists. I was aware of that. Nevertheless......By its fruit the tree is known. (My apologies to those sociologists who confirm my prejudices...:=> ) Let me put this in a more reasoned way: I am a practicing economist, but I do not claim that by virtue of this fact, my theories are what *must* be true-- or that it should add one iota to my argument. If I cannot express my ideas and beliefs to a larger audience of non-economists, then I am not a professional -- just a technician, or, worse yet, a religious fanatic of the cult called 'economist'. If I were one of these, I might be tempted to fill my posts with my own profession's technical jargon in an attempt to show that, since I know all of these obscure words, each of which hints at a mysterious and arcane concept, I must know something about what I am talking about. ---Food for thought, G From jborocz@orion.oac.uci.edu Mon May 13 09:10:16 1996 Date: Mon, 13 May 1996 08:10:10 -0700 (PDT) From: Jozsef Borocz To: gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Subject: re:human nature In-Reply-To: <199605131455.IAA08277@csf.Colorado.EDU> On Mon, 13 May 1996 gehrig@banyan.doc.gov wrote: > > Of course, many on wsn are professional sociologists. > > > I was aware of that. Nevertheless......By its fruit the tree is known. > > (My apologies to those sociologists who confirm my prejudices...:=> ) Is there any moderator on this list? From jborocz@orion.oac.uci.edu Mon May 13 09:10:18 1996 Date: Mon, 13 May 1996 08:08:09 -0700 (PDT) From: Jozsef Borocz To: "Nikolai S. Rozov" Subject: Re: World State or World Law In-Reply-To: <222851CCB@cnit.nsu.ru> On Mon, 13 May 1996, Nikolai S. Rozov wrote: > I also prefer MULTIPLICITY of bourg.democr.states integrated by > voluntarily accepted GLOBAL LEGAL SYSTEM over all kinds of visible and > invisible mafias that seem to be first in grasping benefits of any World > State Power. First of all, who the heck advocated the mafia? Did you read what I wrote? What Gospodin Professor Dr. Rozov calls (excuse me for replacing the capitals with lowercase letters) a global legal system either (1) has coercive power to enforce laws, (2) is territorially defined and (3) is legitimate, in which case it is a state, or any one of those does not apply, in which case you have the same as before, an interstate system (which, with all the legal jingo of international law didn't exactly stop two world wars, hundreds of local wars, military invasions, occupation, counter-occupation, imperial state formation, colonialism, the shooting of civilian aircraft, genocide, etc.) or a mafia. Furthermore, I would appreciate if you were kind enough in not confusing an analytical point (i.e., my insistence that legality cannot exist without a public authority to enforce the law) with a political program which you seem to attach to my posting. > > Further comments on the problem > State or Law? > > Nikolai No, thank you. No further comments. None at all. I sure appreciate the scholarly tone though. Spasibo bolshoye. "And-a the same-a to you too-a." (Jim Jarmusch: _Down by Law_) Jozsef Borocz From chriscd@jhu.edu Mon May 13 09:59:37 1996 13 May 1996 11:58:51 -0500 (EST) 13 May 1996 11:58:29 -0500 (EST) Date: Mon, 13 May 1996 10:44:31 -0600 (CST) From: chris chase-dunn Subject: Fw: General ISA Call for Papers for Toronto 1997 Sender: chriscd@jhu.edu To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu X-NUPop-Charset: English ------------------------------ From: Lev Gonick Date: Wed, 8 May 1996 15:26:59 -0400 To: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY Subject: General ISA Call for Papers for Toronto 1997 A General Call and contact information for panels and papers for the 1997 Annual Meetings of the ISA are now available on-line. Point your web browsers to http://csf.colorado.edu/isa/toronto.htm (that's htm and not html :-) Lev Gonick lev.gonick@csf.colorado.edu From chriscd@jhu.edu Mon May 13 10:02:52 1996 13 May 1996 12:01:46 -0500 (EST) 13 May 1996 12:01:37 -0500 (EST) Date: Mon, 13 May 1996 10:47:23 -0600 (CST) From: chris chase-dunn Sender: chriscd@jhu.edu To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu X-NUPop-Charset: English dear wsners, thanks to all the recent discussants for their tolerance and common sense. (please do not deconstruct the term "common sense.") if you are going away for awhile you may want to postpone ws so that your mailbox does not fill up. to do that send the message set wsn mail postpone to listproc@csf.colorado.edu when you get back and want to start wsn again send the message set wsn mail noack to listproc@csf.colorado.edu i will be off for two weeks. peter grimes will mind the store. chris Prof. Chris Chase-Dunn Department of Sociology Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, MD. 21218 USA tel 410 516 7633 fax 410 516 7590 email chriscd@jhu.edu From cjreid@netcom.com Tue May 14 01:58:56 1996 Date: Tue, 14 May 1996 00:58:53 -0700 (PDT) From: "Charles J. Reid" Subject: Kennan in AR (fwd) To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK FYI. Recent review on Kennan's latest book. -- Charlie Reid cjreid@netcom.com "Salus populi suprema est lex" (Cicero) The welfare of the people is the highest law. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Support the Citizens' Rights Amendment: "Congress shall pass laws consistent with the rights of citizens to a job, education, housing, and health care." ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Wisdom, Youth, and One Blind Eye: George Kennan's Look at This Century's End By Charles J. Reid (George F. Kennan. At a Century's Ending: Reflections 1982-1995. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996. 351 pp., Ind., $27.50 cloth.) SANTA CRUZ, Calif -- One sign of culpability is the rush to explain. Psychologists and interrogators recognize it immediately: the attempt to avoid or shift blame by pleading one's words have been grossly misinterpreted or distorted. If this is true, George Kennan, in "At a Century's Ending," has been caught in a historical trap of his own making. Every student of 20th Century U.S. foreign policy knows that George Kennan was a key architect of American Cold-War foreign policy. He was the author of a 1946 embassy report which singlehandedly reshaped Washington's view of the world. Writing from Moscow, Kennan argued that Soviet intransigence immediately following World War II was an attribute of the Soviet system itself. Communist ideology and Russian insecurity explained the Soviet system and the Soviet threat. This made the goals and purposes of the United States and the Soviet Union utterly incompatible. Back in Washington a State Department official drafted a memo attempting to turn Kennan's abstract observations into an operational foreign policy formulation. Recall that the Soviet Union moved to consolidate its position in Eastern Europe and failed to demobilize at war's end as the Western Allies did. Kennan's colleague argued the U.S. should act "in the first instance by diplomatic means and in the last analysis by military means if necessary" to stop the threat of Soviet expansion, which seems real at the time. A few months later, in 1947, Kennan wrote an even more famous article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" under the pseudonym "X." It is a remarkable foreign policy document. In it, Kennan predicts the fall of the Soviet Union and explains why. He writes how the U.S. can defeat the Soviet Union with a "policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world." Looking back over past 50 years, it is clear that the policy of containment Kennan recommended had its successes and failures. The failures were almost exclusively limited to the military and human rights arenas: Korea, Vietnam, Latin America. One of the objectives of the documents Kennan includes in "At a Century's Ending" is to clarify wha he "meant" by the term "containment." In "Containment: Then and Now" he writes, "When I used the word 'containment' with respect to that country in 1946, what I had in mind was not at all the averting of the sort of military threat people are talking about today." Today, he says, he was speaking then of a "political-ideological threat." The implication is that American hard-liners, especially those who came to power after 1952, distorted his recommendations, and ended up dragging out the Cold War a lot longer than necessary. If this is true, then Kennan seems to be looking back with one blind eye, somehow not seeing where his responsibility lies for some of the more painful American experiences. In the broad scheme of things, this may be understandable, if one is concerned with one's place in history. Yet we have to remember that the 1948 Truman Doctrine was a corollary of containment, and Korea was an application. Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Gorbachev still lay ahead. "At a Century's Ending" includes some 40 essays and talks from 1982 to 1995 covering a gamut of subjects. The book is truly a pleasure to read, though it is sometimes difficult to determine whether Kennan interprets historical events as a subjective witness through the personal prism of his own historical experience or as an objective historian. Certainly, Kennan's wisdom stretches out over time through his reflections on the Cold War, his analysis of the Balkan Crisis, his prediction of the coup against Gorbachev, his prognosis for Russian Democracy, or his magnificent discussion of morality and foreign policy and his distaste for covert action. One myth has dogged Kennan through the years, namely his ability to "divine Russia." Unfortunately, there is little evidence of this in the book. In "The Gorbachev Prospect," he describes the Russian people as "a population that, to use Chekhov's phrase, wakes up from the bad dream of daily life only behind a vodka glass in the pub on Saturday nights." This would appear to be an unflattering stretch. He shows little appreciation for the festive Russian spirit embodied in music and art, the emotional romanticism, the quest for personal loyalty, and the instinct for survival Russians needed to make it through the years of Soviet rule, not the least through the very psychopathology of Stalin that Kennan describes in "Letter to Robert Tucker." Kennan, a graduate of St. John's Military Academy and Princeton, is certainly inclined to sit in Presbyterian judgment when evaluating his Russian colleagues. He harshly judges Andrei Gromyko in "The Buried Past," a review of the former Soviet Foreign Minister's memoirs. Noting the long list of Stalinist-era crimes, Kennan suggests that Gromyko "saw no evil, heard no evil," and barely criticized Stalin in his autobiography. Yet Kennan suggests we might forgive Gromyko: "The Russian Revolution involved many mass bewilderments." Somehow "Russian" and "Soviet" invariably get used interchangeably. There may be an explanation for Kennan's aloofness from the Russian Culture. After being accepted by the U.S. Foreign Service, Kennan actually pursued Russian Studies that the University of Berlin during the waning days of the Weimar Republic. German universities were in ferment. They were hotbeds of German idealism and romanticism where the works of Hegel, Husserl, and Heiddiger held sway. The Nazi Party, with it's Uebermensch, anti-Slav philosophy, lurked in the corridors. And shortly after Hitler assumed power in 1933, students from the University of Berlin amassed in a great demonstration to inaugurate the first book burning of the Nazi Reich. By then Kennan was in Moscow, but it is hard not to conclude that he must have been influenced by his years at a German university in the early 1930s. Kennan's greatest strength lies not in his ability to divine the motives and behavior of people, but in his genius for determining how institutions worked in systems, and how systems relate to each other. He is an analytical historian with wisdom forged by steady witness and reflection, not human interaction. His record of successful prediction proves this. Being able to observe and evaluate events with detachment, he seems to have the uncanny ability to determine what direction the course of events will take. Probably his finest writing appears in "Witness," a review of "The Uses of Adversity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe," by Timothy Garton Ash. Kennan's writing is crisp, fresh, and precise. You could easily conclude the writer is a young news magazine staff writer fresh out of college, proof that somewhere in the tempered, aged soul there always glows the creative energy of youth. It is hard to believe that Kennan is 92 years old. His concern for America at the turn of this Millennium is obviously sincere and in tune with the times. This is clear in the essays "Morality and Foreign Policy" and "Security and the Moscow Embassy." While Kennan is obviously nostalgic for the "good old days" when covert agents didn't control the embassies, he has a clear sense of the modern challenges facing diplomats today. He's full of energy when he discusses nuclear weapons control, deficit spending, environmental protection, and managing population growth. These concerns, which will face the world through the next century, pop up unexpectedly throughout the book. We can only hope the current generation of foreign policy practitioners read this book, and heed his perspicacious yet always diplomatic advice. -30- (Charles J. Reid is a Bay area freelancer.) * * * From ROZOV@cnit.nsu.ru Wed May 15 07:18:02 1996 15 May 96 20:13:43 NSK-6 From: "Nikolai S. Rozov" Organization: Center of New Informational Tech. To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Wed, 15 May 1996 20:13:16 -0600 (NSK) Subject: Re: World State or World Law Strange that the list keeps silence, well... > From: Jozsef Borocz > On Mon, 13 May 1996, Nikolai S. Rozov wrote: > > I also prefer MULTIPLICITY of bourg.democr.states integrated by > > voluntarily accepted GLOBAL LEGAL SYSTEM over all kinds of visible and > > invisible mafias that seem to be first in grasping benefits of any World > > State Power. J.Borocz: > First of all, who the heck (??? NR) advocated the mafia? Did you read what I wrote? > it's misunderstanding by Mr.Borocz, not mine. He advocated world state in comparison to int.legal system and I noted here that being Main beaurocracy, world state would be more vulnerable for misusing (corruption, f.e. by mafia, emperial ambitions, etc) than existing state beaurocraties. > What Gospodin Professor Dr. Rozov calls (excuse me for replacing the > capitals with lowercase letters) being a member of wsn for more than two years I am deeply dissapointed to meet such mode of speech in international academic communication. Is it normal here now? or really the list needs now some kind of moderation? > a global legal system either (1) has > coercive power to enforce laws, which can be transfered to nation states and/or specialized international organizations (Court of Justice, UN forces, etc) > (2) is territorially defined what for? >and (3) is > legitimate, perfectly right >in which case it is a state, or any one of those >does not > apply, in which case you have the same as before, an interstate system > (which, with all the legal jingo of international law didn't exactly stop > two world wars, hundreds of local wars, military invasions, occupation, > counter-occupation, imperial state formation, colonialism, the shooting > of civilian aircraft, genocide, etc.) or a mafia. > too many things into one sack, law never stops anything, it is just a legal instrument for legal struggle for real social forces (including states, soc. movements, etc) Principles of international law played significant role in ending medieval military nightmare, served as a basis for coalitions against main aggressors in Europe of XIX-XX, such as Napoleonic France, Germany in WW1 WW2. UN with its Charter, Assembleys and Security Council was created after WW2. Who would dare to say that UN, its structures and law-like principles did not help significantly in saving us from nuclear WW3 in 50-60-70th? Can we forget that decolonization of 60th occured with curiously small military conflicts and vitims in created international regime? Right, that intern. legal system cannot give absolute guarantees against cited social disasters, but where are reasons that new world state would give better quarantees? > Furthermore, I would appreciate if you were kind enough in not confusing an > analytical point (i.e., my insistence that legality cannot exist without a > public authority to enforce the law) with a political program which you > seem to attach to my posting. well, I see now that Mr.Borocz has a non-vulnerable and non-falsificable analytical-critical position free of any own pragmatic suggestions but ready to attack any suggestions by others. that's why my arguments should be directed against the very idea (political program) of world socialist state which as I know is widely spread among Western left intelligentsia, including WS scholars and wsn members. > > Further comments on the problem > > State or Law? > No, thank you. No further comments. None at all. I really wonder about the silence of the list. I see several possible answers. 1) Has WS tradition and wsn really transformed into critical-analytical 'normal science' with complete impotence in global-progressive-pragmatic area? Only in this case discussion of preferable strategies for our global can occur out of interest here. 2)Maybe trivial conformism is the reason, and nobody wishes to debate with world socialist state idea, supported by our Chairman Prof. Chase-Dunn? (I think that it is the worst that Chris can expect from the list) 3) Maybe there are well empirically and theoretically based arguments proving that any movement towards humanistically-ecologically oriented deep modernization and enforcement of international legal system is useless and is not worthy for discussion. In fact I prefer namely the 3rd possibility. So, where are these arguments? Mr.Borocz:> "And-a the same-a to you too-a." (Jim Jarmusch: _Down by Law_) To be sincere I don't wish to speek any more with Mr.Borocz, at least until his non-polite personal attacks are replaced by real meaningful arguments. Nikolai S. Rozov From hk1@axe.humboldt.edu Wed May 15 13:15:31 1996 Date: Wed, 15 May 1996 12:15 -0700 (PDT) From: Harutiun Kassakhian Subject: Regarding the future of the nation-state In-reply-to: <1ED36B18E7@cnit.nsu.ru> To: "Nikolai S. Rozov" A question: The ability of French unions to mobilize public opposition to Chirac's austerity programs has to a certain degree slowed down the French governments plan's to cutback the French social safety net. Does the French case provide an example of how public mobilization can provide a hindrance to the curtailment of social services in a core region? Are similar tactics in the US, or Germany to be expected in the future? From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Wed May 15 14:17:54 1996 Date: Wed, 15 May 96 16:17:12 EDT From: (Greg Ehrig) To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: World State vs. World Law X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO I attended a couple of the Global Teach in workshops last weekend, and was generally disappointed, save for one entitled "Devolution vs. Globalization: Issues of State's Soverignty". The three moderators, Bob Sturmburg (Georgetown Law Prof), Ladd Cahoon(ditto, student?), and David Morris, (Center for local action???) had some very interesting insights into the nature of the WTO. Basically, both David and Bob asserted that the WTO represented the extension of the legal side of the U.S. Constitution on a global basis (The clause giving the Feds the right to regulate interstate commerce, in particular). The difference, they argued, is that while the legal mechanisims are in place, there is no corresponding creation of a political side, as there is in the U.S. constitution. Rather, the WTO more closely resembles the old articles of confederation: -- something David Morris in particular argued was not all that bad of a thing. Instead of a political state being created, the WTO relies on a court to adjudicate disputes, and the self-interest of the members to enforce it. Since the power of the court is to "legitimate" the injured party to impose limited trade sanctions, in practice, countries which have a greater share of their economies dependent on trade tend to have a greater interest in abiding by the court's decisions, whereas countries with a lesser makeup of trade in their GDP, can affort to ignore or flout the court's rulings more often. While I am fairly ignorant of the WTOs organizational theory, this struck me as a fairly relevant example of an international organization, based on law, that is able to act somewhat along the lines of of what Dr. Rozov was thinking of. The drawbacks of this system are (acc. to Stumberg et.al.) that because there is no political system in place, there is little democratic process in the system. Also, the members who make up the court are composed of corporate-complex people. S pointed out that there really are no other candidates for consideration, because accumulating experience in international trade is something that by and large only corporate people, or lawyers in firms employed by corporates, do. They made the point in passing that sometimes this means that the opinions of the court members influences its objective decisions. This, of course, caused a great deal of consternation on the part of the audience, who, like most people, tend to assume that Judges are perfectly objective. To S, though, this was a fairly minor point, because as a law professor he knows that this is the case in any legal system, here in the U.S. or elsewhere. While S knew that in practice there are no objective observers, most of the audience found this to be a radically new concept. The concerns held were that, because the WTO is a system whose mission is to promote Free Trade, many local enviornmental movements would be hindered in some of the tactics to promote enviornmentalism. Basically, for things like Mandatory recycled content laws, the WTO makes the system go from the highest common denomitor to the lowest common denominor in terms of percentage recycled content. The upcoming OECD agreement on investment was also something which I did not take extensive notes on but was a fairly interesting piece. I also went to one of the workshops that RIchard Moore was teaching. He seemed nothing like my mental picture of him (the guy was a large hispanic/native american with a self-deprecating sense of humor, and was from my home-town of Albuquerque: not quite what I pictured) -- then I realized that he was a different Richard. Richard, your Namesake sends his best wishes. Comments? Greg Ehrig From chriscd@jhu.edu Thu May 16 07:33:03 1996 16 May 1996 09:32:17 -0500 (EST) 16 May 1996 09:32:08 -0500 (EST) Date: Thu, 16 May 1996 08:18:20 -0600 (CST) From: chris chase-dunn Subject: Fw: ISA, Letter from the President, No.4 Sender: chriscd@jhu.edu To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu X-NUPop-Charset: English ------------------------------ From: isa@emducms1.sis.ucm.es (International Sociological Association) Date: Tue, 14 May 1996 09:45:20 -0400 To: Apparently-to: chriscd@jhu.edu To: chriscd@jhu.edu Subject: ISA, Letter from the President, No.4 Letter from the President, No.4, May 1996 by Immanuel Wallerstein Internationalizing the ISA Internationalizing an international organization may seem to be a curious objective. Yet, the reality is, as everyone knows, that the International Sociological Association, like every other world scholarly associations today, is less international than it should be and claims to be. The historical construction of the social sciences and the geopolitics of the world-system are the two major constraining parameters within which our association lives. Both are obvious. The social sciences emerged, as university disciplines, only in the late nineteenth century, and originally primarily in five countries: Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States. To be sure, by 1945 they came to be established formally in many other countries, and almost everywhere in the period since 1945. But the geographic spread of their organizational strength remains lopsided. The historical reality is compounded and maintained by the fact that financial resources are equally lopsided in their distribution, which means that sociologists in the "South" do not have at their distribution many of the elementary facilities that are available to many sociologists in the "North": adequate library facilities, rapid communications networks (today, access to the Internet), research funds, travel funds, adequate salaries, and all the other material bases of our work. The ISA is in no position to affect significantly these constraints. The question is what can it do to minimize their negative effects? The first question is, why should the Association care? The answer seems to me obvious, but I am not sure everyone really agrees. Sociologists have always had, as one of their basic premises, that social realities are socially constructed, and that if one constructs them differently, the outcome will be different. Few sociologists are "essentialists", which means, in this case, that few sociologists believe that the reason that sociology is stronger in some countries than in others has to do with biology or climate or virtually unchangeable cultural differences. In addition, sociologists have tended to believe that one's social perspective, and hence one's intellectual perspective, varies according to one's social position. Many sociologists derive from this premise the belief that the search for plausible representations of social reality is enhanced by bringing to bear on this reality a multiplicity of perspectives. This is all, as I say, introductory verities but worth underlining. Indeed, what I have said constitutes virtual pieties, to which constant obeisance is made. But little is done about it. What in fact can we do? For there is a third constraint for an association like the ISA. It is very poor, and cannot by largesse compensate in any significant way for lopsided distribution of world resources for scholarship. The first thing ISA can do - the easiest financially, but perhaps the most important intellectually - is to transform the norms. We need to recognize that, however much we aim at and/or believe in the possibility of universal propositions, the weight of our particularism (our varying social locations) is today so great, and so consequential for the nature of our research and our interpretation of its results, that we must systematically take it into account in both the social science we do and our reflections upon this social science. The particularism that we all bring to bear on our work not only determine/influence/distort our evaluations of reality (that is to say, reflect our politics in the broad sense of the term) but determine/influence/distort in many (complex) ways our epistemologies. The former effect is more visible than the latter. We can ameliorate the situation in two ways: from the top down and from the bottom up. Both are necessary. Both are already going on. Both need to be reinforced. To ameliorate the situation from the top down means that an organization like the ISA needs to be constantly conscious of the importance of allowing space for all points of view and working hard at overcoming the numerical underrepresentation in our ranks of any points of view by overrepresenting them proportionately in our allocation of invitations to play intellectual roles at our congresses and colloquia. We must regard this not as acts of social welfare or even social justice but as acts required in order to maximize collective intellectual gain. The bottom up is more important and more difficult. In reality, sociology (and all modes of knowledge) will only be truly international when there are strong multiple bases. What is important is that there are vibrant nodes of work in different loci, each of which has a real internal life and sufficient interaction to create its own minitraditions and sense of priorities. One mechanism is regional associations. I was recently invited to attend the XXth Congress of the Asociaci"n Latinoamericana de Sociolog!a. I do not know what the first nineteen were like, but I can say that the twentieth was extremely alive intellectually (200 delegates, including a significant group of students, with their own sessions) and with a distinctive and unmistakable Latin American voice. Another mechanism is publications of the region, circulating first of all in the region and addressing its issues in terms of its modes of analyses. Of course, if, and to the extent that, one can create very strong singular research loci with outreach in the region, the worldwide impact will be perhaps greatest. I am in no sense calling for the creation of solid institutional bases for a world sociology. Only when these regional bases are truly vibrant, and truly original, will be able to begin to overcome the particularist variety of universalist claims which now prevails. It was this concern that led to my previous letter on the languages of scholarship. Far from being an administrative question (the conveniences of communication), the question of multilinguality is another aspect of the effort to construct a "pluralistic universalism". This letter is full of good sentiments and is short on practical solutions. I invite the members of ISA to offer the richness of their experiences in responses. There will now be a Bulletin Board* attached to each letter. Hence, all responses will be available to the totality of those connected to the Internet, but only ISA members (individual and collective) may contribute to the debate. The Executive Committee of ISA will take seriously all specific suggestions of what we can do as an organization to "internationalize" our international association. * In order to participate in the Bulletin Board discussions, please, send e-mail to isa@sis.ucm.es saying: JOIN ISA DISCUSSION GROUP. Prof. Chris Chase-Dunn Department of Sociology Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, MD. 21218 USA tel 410 516 7633 fax 410 516 7590 email chriscd@jhu.edu From jborocz@orion.oac.uci.edu Thu May 16 12:49:59 1996 Date: Thu, 16 May 1996 11:49:51 -0700 (PDT) From: Jozsef Borocz To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: State, Law, Respect, and Tolerance In-Reply-To: <1ED36B18E7@cnit.nsu.ru> We have thus a nice demonstration of what happens in the international arena where there is no real enforcement mechanism. :-) Academic quarrels are so vicious because the stakes are so low. :-)) Jozsef 8-))) From harlowc@tidepool.com Mon May 20 20:32:57 1996 Date: Mon, 20 May 1996 19:32:34 -0700 From: Christian To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Re:State, Law, and Tolerance???? On Thu, 16 May 1996, Jozsef Borocz wrote: > > We have thus a nice demonstration of what happens in the > international arena where there is no real enforcement mechanism. :-) > > Academic quarrels are so vicious because the stakes are so low. :-)) > > Jozsef 8-))) > Can't we do better than this? I thought when I joined WSN I would get to hear interesting cutting edge ideas about the global economic system. I was drawn to WSN to hear disscussions about current debates within the field. You know things like 500 or 5000 years? What about Wallerstein's latest book and thesis about the delegitimation of liberal democracy? What is Africa going to look like in 50 years? Is America a declining hegemonic power--How can WST make it's case so that it will become a theory of praxis again? Is the logic of the World System in the midst of a transformation on par with the Neolithic Revolution and/or the capitalist? What are the effects of globalization on social movements and marginalized peoples? ETC.......... Isn't it unfortunate that we haven't seen much of this here recently? To be honest I have friends that are also on WSN--we're all graduate students and the questions above are the sort that drew us into WST as perhaps the best explanatory theory relating to these processes. Yet, I've seen more disscussions about WST on history and philosophy lists than on this one. ChrisCD and others recently began to discuss issues relating to WST, which was really nice to see. Unfortunately the issues were lost in a quagmire of ad hominen personal attacks and irrelevant bourgeois postings on human nature. The former: unprofessional, unnecessary and unhelpful; The latter: irrelevant because it wasn't designed to show a connection between (so-called) human nature and WS structures or processes. Anyways my point is that WSN could and should be a useful tool to attract new converts and intrigue thinkers young and old to utilize the WS approach to confront current social issues but as it stands the "intellectual bullies" (whats the point?) and lack of relevant postings do nothing but discourage younger students from posting and make passive observers of the list wonder if WST is relevant anymore. I think we know it is relevant. Shouldn't we act like it? Sincerely, Christian Harlow From p34d3611@jhu.edu Mon May 20 23:35:09 1996 21 May 1996 01:34:45 -0500 (EST) 21 May 1996 01:34:44 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 21 May 1996 01:34:32 -0400 From: Peter Grimes Subject: WSN Focus To: WSN I would like to encourage the notion that we should concentrate on ideas and not on each other. As for ideas, they ought to be demonstrably linkable to the central issues defining the trajectory of WST. --Peter Grimes From ROZOV@cnit.nsu.ru Tue May 21 00:38:11 1996 21 May 96 13:37:12 NSK-6 From: "Nikolai S. Rozov" Organization: Center of New Informational Tech. To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Tue, 21 May 1996 13:36:58 -0600 (NSK) Subject: World Law vs World State As far as I know WST since its creation had in its focus the various aspects of inter-societal movements of goods, capitals, resources, technologies, etc. May I ask if the idea of international legal system ('World Law') enforced for more humanistic and just exchanges between members of the core, the semiperiphery and the periphery of the Global Modern World System is appropriate for discussion in wsn? Thank you, Nikolai S. Rozov >I would like to encourage the notion that we should concentrate on ideas >and not on each other. As for ideas, they ought to be demonstrably >linkable to the central issues defining the trajectory of WST. >--Peter Grimes From p34d3611@jhu.edu Tue May 21 01:32:08 1996 21 May 1996 03:31:38 -0500 (EST) 21 May 1996 03:31:37 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 21 May 1996 03:31:21 -0400 From: Peter Grimes Subject: Clarification To: WSN My earlier comment was not intended to define any one issue as irrelevent to WST; rather, I simply wished to encourage those contributions that were not personal attacks, but were instead of theoretical substance. --Peter Grimes From hk1@axe.humboldt.edu Tue May 21 15:12:38 1996 Date: Tue, 21 May 1996 14:12 -0700 (PDT) From: Harutiun Kassakhian Subject: Re: WSN Focus In-reply-to: To: Peter Grimes A issue of interest, and hopefuly one that is pertinent to the WST discourse: Have other Kondratieff B phases (similar to the one we are presently experiencing) coincided with a lack of anti-systemic movements? What factors can explain the decline of the influence of anti-systemic movements in the world-system? Are people simply more sheepish nowaday due to the collapse of the USSR as a viable model of an alternative socio-economic order? Is the rise of crime on a global level an answer to class polarizations? If Wallerstein's concept that "liberalism" and the State served to control and funnel the demands of the "dangerous classes"in the 19th and 20th century, couldn't the lack of "liberalism" as a legitimizing ideology of the state and the lack of "stateness" lead to uncontrollable social explosions in the 21st century, primarily taking the form of what today we deem as "crime?" I am not a sociologist, but it seems that on a micro level, the the family structure and religious institutions purvey the individual with a system of ethics, that can insure the loyalty of a marginalized individual toward a social system that does not benefit him or her. The decline of these institutions and the decline of "liberalism" (ideologies grounded in western ideas of progress and modernity) allows for the unchecked expression of discontent bred from subjugation without hope of betterment. With no agenda to capture state power, gangsterism (LA style) and riots would be the norm, put down by sheer brute force. Was not banditry the only alternative to serfdom in medeival europe? It seems that the anti-sytemic movements of medieval europe were usually various forms of heretical proto-protestantism, revolving around a rebellion against the church and feudal order. Yet the average disgruntled peasant was more likely to become a bandit than a part of a heretical rebellious sect. Can we speak of a depoliticized anti-systemic movement? From U17043@UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU Tue May 21 21:45:20 1996 Date: Tue, 21 May 96 20:19:13 CDT From: U17043@UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU Subject: antisystemic movements in the near future (unthinkability To: World-Systems Network Harutiun Kassakhian asks: > Can we speak of a depoliticized anti-systemic movement? I've been saying, for years, with no prospect of any satisfaction other than being proved right In The Last Days or more Engelsianly, "In the final analysis," rather fatuously, right there, positing that anyone else would notice, that the *next*, not the *previous*, "cycle" of "antisystemic movements" (the terms in quotes have stuck, without serious theoretical justification, and no more than vaguely descriptive as they are, so I'll put up with them here), will be considerably less amenable to characterization as Leftist or Political than were those previous ones, themselves requiring a protracted struggle of a generational sort within academia, sociology in particular and above (below) all, to attain dignification qua social dovements. The condition of sociological theory of social movements was so deplorable because it had fixated on the Cold-War-concrete-embedded totalitarian party-state menace as its Pole Star (Blau, Heberle); its great days of occupational heroism preseved the 1930s ambience in amber; and between the two, partly reinforcing and partly antithetical as these Heritages or Traditions, 1930s-derived, were, the Golden Oldie Age (a variant on Hobsbawm's Golden Age; see The Age of Excess, 1995) of the 1950s, recalled today as the type case of a socially-quiescent historical period (howbeit recent research is turning it into, you guessed it, a Transitional Period), gave no hint that social upheavals to come should differ from those of the 1930s and earlier. [Note: profuse apologies for the preceding sentence which, as an ethnic sociologist from birth, I began under the misapprehension that it was simply writable; whereupon, in the Night of the Reifications, complicative contributory causal-correlative connections Suggested Themselves.] Cursory historical-sociological skimming will reveal that the regnant paradigm [ [That's it. Switch to English.], better, *figment*, used in sociologists' vulgar notions of social movements, date from the period 1829-1834, for the USA(1829), France(1831), and Britain(1833-4), in that order. In all three countries, later generalized to soidisant Western Civilization (given space I may explain why points should be taken off for juxtaposing those words by a student), bourgeois parliamentarism was made to mediate the class struggle through political parties, as the bourgeoisie as class increasingly exhibited its historically unique bifurcation into entrepreneurial and politico-military specialists. In periods of social quiescence, bourgeois stifling suffocation of vestigial consciousness of class interests under the pall of fragmented "issues," as fought over in frequent elections, complicated by ethnic or subethnic cleavages and the quirky outcroppings of idiosycrasy even in the most conformist times and places, The Man Who, was matched by the entrpreneurs' wallowing in their own vulgarity to overtly express their hegemony. Some of you harbor a theoretical error, occasionally articulated in carping over CEO remuneration. It's like this. There is no formal neoclassical-economic reason why wasteful consumption by the rich should be helpful to capitalist economic growth. It is not. It is harmful; it is waste. Rich people's significance is exclusively cultural. It must be rammed home, internalized, takenforgranted, that *mere moneygrubbers are the highest form of life* (in Medieval times, believed indicative of the imminence of the antichrist). The incentive to get rich, itself, is contingent upon the visible uncontested adoration-prone social licentiousness, "doing-whatever-i-damn-please," of the filthy rich. It's demonstrable that (howbeit separable only notionally from structural factors) when the impulse to become filthyrich, Else its popularly accorded desirability, Else the *normative alternatives* in high-prestige to filthy- richness such as perhaps the Full Professorship coupled with fame of stellar magnitude (consult Lingua Franca, ascertain which of you are real Stars), Else some sudden appeal to either the politico-military wing of the class or to some real or socially constructed Opposition (eg, that which once was called Free, and at the time was cheap, becomes bit by bit Alternative, charges exorbitantly, and conveys snob appeal to the mere affluent (howbeit still ignored by filthyrich proper). Reagan triumphed over just such a threat. When social movements appeared, they were, during the period c. 1830 to c. 1950, notable for a trend, carrying over from the previous to the present version to the next one, to increasing formal-organizational cohesion. Also, as on a continuing basis, the proletariat was identified as the "dangerous classes," a reputation it continued to justify by most predictably Making the Trouble, formal, overt, and doctrinal formulations of the rationale for class-consciousness, and in several advanced capitalist countries the theory, additionally, of the historic mission of the proletariat and its identification with Human Reason, became normative. Formal-organizati- onal cohesion bridged the functional division the capitalist class' internal bifurcation had previously imposed on the workers themselves. *Secular- rationalist* ideologies dominated discourse so long as the bourgeois order was neither objectively nor delusionally under threat; these included the liberalism of the bourgeoisie itself. The political repertory of conservatism copied the techniques of the proletarian left with more money and relatively unobtrusive hierarchical direction: In relative bossiness, as between union bosses and boss bosses, there is no contest. Political bosses, hereditary autocrats in Chicago, have attained the magical powers which summon imaginary Community Groups out of the ground to applaud the televised destruction of pay phones in minority neighbourhoods, such that the applauders themselves cannot make calls after dark, so much for the First Amendment. That's, however, only the culmination of unobvious hierarchical coercion, an all-important *image* or *appearance* denied the masses each of whom is powerless singly. I have mentioned trends which, as trends will (others do not), ceased. Anyone recall something we once called "secularization," likewise supposedly endureth forever? No more, ask your local Muslim or, as of roughly the same period in the USA, Christian. But the background of Christian desecularization is the 1960s. The following occurred in the 1960s, and I cannot explain here. (a) Subcultural cohesion superseded formal-organizational cohesion. (b) Subjectivist ideologies, which posit an Experience wherefor only members of some given social category are eligible and which is at the inception of insurgency, imparted in group process, superseded secular- rationalist ones. Cf "identity politics," an unfortunately merely descriptive usage. (c) Social-movement-agent roles were adopted by social-category advocates on every possible basis except class. (d) Social-movement upheavals were marked by a dialectic whereby an incessant pressure was placed upon the liberatory culture to innovate faster than it was being commercialized and mass-marketed; subsequently, the culture almost wholly slipped into niche-market status within the capitalist culture industry. (e) The test of authenticity having become Direct Experience, the contrary proposition, that Direct Experience made something authentic, was manipulated by the Experience-fabricators of the Right; this however only after the struggle subsided. *** Now for NEXT TIME *** Repetition of any of the previous social-movement types, each once objectively rational in its appropriate historical epoch, ie, the religious, the secular-rationalist/class-organizational, the subjectivist/subcultural, would be masochistic. The most creative aspects of the 1960s lay precisely in their bypassing the countertechniques applied by conservative bureaucracies in repression directed against social-movement bureaucracies; "solidarity forever/for the union makes us strong." Until your negotiators see the inside of that boardroom. Arrests and surveillances of activists, leaders, "outside agitators," and Leninsts to whom was attributed Vanguard magic by themselves, untransformed Movement participants, and police-bureaucrats alike, were decoys for the Movement proper, however unwittingly. It is noteworthy that repeated calls for reversions to the 1930s model by SDS would-be authority-figures were given guilt-ridden Yeas at the time, and applause after, but got *behavioural nays* in Movement culture and life: As everyone agreed that more bureaucratic structure was vitally necessary, its enfeeblement to utter collapse, as SDS did in 1968, developed apace. Overt appearances of dissidents superseded membership cards; refusal of Drugs identified one of Them. Most important of all, whether the Movement "accomplished" anything or not, whether any vestige of its physical remains survived, became tangential. ("What do you hope to *accomplish* by doing this?") Where can you go from that? The next social upheaval will, it is safe to say, have as social-movement agents people of origins and social-category placement not susceptible to prediction at this time. They will be unconscious of or will vehemently deny their involvement in "politics," which they will use as a term of abuse, perhaps in inciting fistfights. (Not sexist, as I foresee the popularity of suchlike brawls among women, even elegant ladies of NOW. ANYTHING IS POSSIBLE; AND GUESSWORK, IF ANYWHERE CLOSE TO WHAT HAPPENS, WILL EXIBIT IMPOVERISHED IMAGINATION.) I believe it certain that none of the participants will have any intention of having the least thing to do with any Left, and will punch out, I suggest, those who hopefully tell them so. At best, the virtuous, ie, deserving of moral support from well-wishers Up In Cyberspace, where the movement partici- pants, as good citizens of the USA, will spend a great deal of time wandering around in themselves, and quite as much lost as we are, will be those who hit but do not shoot. It's unlikely that the same brawlers will confront consistently solidary brawlers on the other side. That is, the Bloods and Crips are as obsolete as all other allegiances. The social-movement activists will be assailers of bureaucracies; they will refuse to have any speak in their name, represent them, or even know where they are to be found. A movement activist will be identifiable by having assaulted a bureacratic agency or part thereof, solitarily or in mob formation. It doesn't matter which bureaucracy that was. Free-enterprise terrorism is highly likely, to the extent that psychic preparedness for panic-inducing acts is widespread among millions at any given time, yet those who actually commit the acts never knew beforehand that they would, as it happened they actually did, do it when they did do it. Less dramatic forms of chaotic behaviour may take the form of, say, inexplicable, to the person called upon in principle to explain, reluctance to remove his or her body from the domicile to the place of employment by the appointed time, as required. Or, as we colloquially say, "function." (Something which did not exist as socially normative prior to c. 1800, in England; see Landes, Revolution in Time, 1980.) "Function," of course, is a mixed metaphor from medicine and engineering with the connotation, "moving part in somebody else's machine." Let's face it, it will be big, it will be disgusting, and I as well as the lot of you, pretty much, will denounce it as The End Of Civilization, equated with The End Of The World. You may recall, the same denumciations were made by genteel academics of the 1960s Movements. And this time, I hope, provided I'm not required to watch it or get caught outside during it, that the charge is accurate this time. By Civilization, we euphemize the class relation such that some do the work; others, no kin of theirs, do the Civilization. For the latter, their inability to delegate to a flunkey the looking-on whilst the lowly scum did the work, while they themselves hung out with Socrates at the drunk-orgy (*sym-posion*) where higher Thingies of the Mind got wrung out, was indeed The End of the World. High time this racket ended, already. Don't worry; I foresee that all those not actually Created Equal will be readily able to get the hang of the thing in an accessible-to-all twelve-step program. Daniel A. Foss From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Wed May 22 11:09:07 1996 Date: Wed, 22 May 96 13:08:48 EDT From: (Greg Ehrig) To: smtp%NISTServer1%Server[hk1%axe.humboldt.edu]@banyan.doc.gov Subject: re: Re: WSN Focus X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO Forgive my ignorance, but what are we defining as "anti-systemic movements"? From aaustin@mtsu.edu Wed May 22 12:48:37 1996 Date: Wed, 22 May 1996 13:49:38 -0500 (CDT) From: "Andrew W. Austin" To: gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Subject: help! In-Reply-To: I am not sure who to ask this question of. But why am I getting two copies of each post? Thanks, Andy From U17043@UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU Wed May 22 13:16:25 1996 Date: Wed, 22 May 96 12:48:16 CDT From: "Daniel A. Foss" Subject: the case for leaving 'anti-systemic' movements undefined To: World Systems Network Mere seconds ago, Greg Ehrig inquired, >Forgive my ignorance, but what are we defining as "anti-systemic >movements"? In a 1992ish book entitled Anti-Systemic Movements..., Four Evangelists of WS theory, Immanuel Wallerstein, Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, and Andre Gunder-Frank explored the destiny and global scale of anti-systemic movements in what, I feel quite certain, should, nay, must be taken as the definitive pronunciation on the profound importance and consequentiality of anti-systemic movements. Nowhere, in this Breviary-Update of cutting-edge WS theory, is the usage "anti-systemic movements" defined, and so it should remain. Yes, I could elaborate as to why, wherein the wisdom of this procedure, ie, UNDEFINED-relegation, evinces its essential wisdom. But that'd merely get me into worse Trouble. Oh, whythehecknot. Quickie identification of the movements in question is simplicity itself: women's movements, racial-ethnic minority movements, lesbian-gay-bisexual movements, environmentalist movements, local-community-autonomist movements (exclusive of Amitai Etzioni-an Communitarianism, by current consensus ugly- reactionary and repressive in character, whereto I concur and on better grounds than most, to wit, thirty seconds of sheer terror trapped in a dysfuntional hotel elevator with Amitai Etzioni, revelatory of Character as a plane crash, except one survives) notably NGO movements in Peru and elsewhere. Islamicist terrorism promoted by Islamic Jihad in Egypt, Islamic Salvationist Front in Algeria, Hizbullah in the circum-Palestine region, and analogous entities, whilst they engage in community-building volunteer work, including self-help infrastructural development, localized welfare- benefit payment schemes, and entire educational systems which fill the yawning void in this area consequent to or indicative of the collapse of the official state bureaucracies, are excluded. The reader should be able to readily discern the reason. One Positive development attributable to the despised and excluded armed Islamicists, however, is suggested in the following anecdote: Two Jewish friends of mine, nearly killed by a Cairo bomb, sent a postcard ecstatically gratified that they were blown up as tourists, not as *Jewish* tourists. Thus we pronounce Klinghofferism dead as Klinghoffer himself. If you are confused by the foregoing, it is not without reason. Others will disagree. New Religions, a fortiori, such as the mock-Hindu sects of the earlier 1970s, the Nichiren Shoshu Buddhists and more importantly, the South Korean crusade to save the US from Communist aggression, ie, The Unification Church led by Rev Sun Myung Moon (which built upon the pioneering efforts of ISKCON, Divine Light Mission, and Christian youth-targeted fundamentalist and gnostic analogues of the South Asian competition, not to mention the suicidal Poeples Church, 1979, and Branch Davidians, 1992, are without exception dismissed as conservative or worse. The fruit of all the aforementioned toiling in the vineyard, Moral Majority, Christian Crusade, and whatever's next, are far worse than that. As I said yesterday, anyone recall a "pattern variable" called "secularization"?) Without exception, in the capitalist core countries, there has been no anti- reported as having been perpetrated against the "system" by any movemnt mentioned above. It is also the case that, by my own definition of social movements, which will be omitted here due to the execrable regard the book is held by the perverse few who have heard of it and *then* didn't read it, these movements no longer exist qua social movements at this time; they are, have been throughout the period of recuperation and social quiescence since the Nixonian repression, stable subcultures within a stagnant hegemonic culture, where routine politics is practiced on both/multiple sides via the anticipable devices of mass-membership organizations, lobbying, the odd ritualized protest march ("episodic dissidence" in my obliviated book), and special-interest or niche media. Now, the serious problem. In what sense of "system" were the anti-systemic movements ever anti-sustemic? There are two possibilities. The first is the Talcott Parsons structural-functionalist "Social System," after the book, The Social System, 1956ish. This is a synchronic, static model. Talcott Parsons has said to this writer, as well as to this writer's co-author of that time, who was driving the car, in a Personal Communication, "I don't know much about history." Nor, it is safe to say, did he know the immensely popular song whereof that was the first line, verbatim. Unlike the marxian *mode of production* or *social formation*, riven as it is by class struggle rooted in appropriation of material surplus product by the exploiting-ruling class from its direct producers, the Parsonian social system is a Seamless Robe of Capitalist Rationality at every point; hence it cannot be attacked at its weakest point, the class contradiction. It is destructible if and only if it is attacked everywhere at once. The latter inference was Unthought by Parsons himself; it was however advocated by Herbert Marcuse, in One-Dimensional Man, 1964, and in later works somewhat less abstruse. On the latter account he became a hero to aficionados of rock, dying in California, where he belonged. That the Marcusian dystopia was merely the Parsonian utopia turned inside out went unrecognized, except in my first book, justifiably excluded from the professional literature. The unity of theory and praxis in anti-ing a system, which is a strategy of total disruption at every point at once, is associated with the name Daniel Cohn-Bendit, since *evenements* of the magnitude of May 1968 in France must be associated with somebody's name. (Today, Daniel Cohn-Bendit has a good job in the environmentalist business, lives in obscurity, and both supports and raises his family, a quite conservative "life-style" these days. Nobody, of course, cares. The Marcusian *all-azimuth* disruptionism strategy (the asterisked term derives from French thermonuclear missle-aiming policy, such that at one time, a missle pointed at Moskva was counterbalanced by one drawing a bead on the District of Columbia). The possibility that the "system" the anti-systemic movements are anti- corresponds to system as employed in the usage Political Economy of the World System is nil. Like all social movements, they were at their inception state- specific; and in their current, ossified, even quasi- or fully bureaucratized form, they are even more so. Their cultural features accept the cultural and stylistic hegemony of the Upper Middle Class of the US, the only portion of the occupation-income-structure whose real incomes are appreciating. In terms of the international aspect of their cultural impact, this is derivative immediately from US cultural hegemony. That's simplicity itself. Those who object to some of my sentence-lengths are reminded that, by birth, I am not of your People. I was born a sociologist, and was raised in the Sociological Tradition of my People, whose Sacred Language I am entitled to use, in requiting, by you, the Sufferings of our People, as we deserve. In 1961, the great Johns Hopkins University demographer, James C. Beshers, said to me, Personal Communication, "Sociologists are the [African-Americans] of the academic profession." Our subsequent sufferings, wanderings, famines, houndings from pillar to post, all validated the race- relations model. Take one look at my scarred visage; the face of a Visible Minority indeed. Karl Marx perished of suicidal depression before he could kill himself. Max Weber not merely spent half his life in the Bin, but was Meaningfully Committed to celibacy excepting just once with his Marianne Weber's best friend. Emile Durkheim, aside from Jewish self-hatred, was totally screwed up beyond belief. These three, yet I say unto ye, the greatest of these, longest sentences ever written, too, was Marx. WE DEMAND that, in such cases where the ethnicity of all job applicants for anything is UNKNOWN or UNDEFINED, the System Default should be set to Sociolo- gist, the latter, if any present, should be hired. HIRE THE SOCIOLOGIST. He or she can't do anything, either. Daniel A. Foss ======================================================================== 6 LINE 1 %DATE LINE 2 %FROMEND %FROM LINE 3 %SUBJ LINE 4 %IDEND %IDSTART LINE 5 %DIV LINE 36 V920104 %RESUME repeat: better off undefined 23 10 4 1 0 0 0 36 From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Wed May 22 13:39:40 1996 Date: Wed, 22 May 96 15:39:25 EDT From: (Greg Ehrig) To: smtp%NISTServer1%Server[U17043%UICVM.UIC.EDU]@banyan.doc.gov Subject: re: the case for leaving 'anti-systemic' movements undefined X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO If I understand you correctly, anti-systemic movements are those which more or less do not approve, benefit from, or support the (undefined) "system". But, only liberal groups can be anti-systemic, and religious ones cannot? I had trouble seperating out any of the movements that you think are anti -system, so I still am confused as to your argument. Could you do something like this :? anti-system: PLN, castro, harmonica virgins, etc. pro-system: Mobil Oil, Boy Scouts, American Autoduel Association. etc..... Not being a sociologist, I have a little trouble separating ideas from adjectives :=> From hk1@axe.humboldt.edu Wed May 22 14:31:06 1996 Date: Wed, 22 May 1996 13:31 -0700 (PDT) From: Harutiun Kassakhian Subject: re: the case for leaving 'anti-systemic' movements undefined In-reply-to: To: Greg Ehrig I guess I'm getting sucked into another one. . . first of all when you speak of "liberal" groups as being anti-systemic, do we mean the anti-systemic movements of FDR, Lord Keynes, the British labor party,the liberalism of European Social-Democratic parties? (that's sarcasm.) If it's pro-enhancing the capital accumulatory process, it's pro-system. If it's says "ouch! the accumulatory process is hurting me stop it or slow down," it's anti-systemic. Coal miner's strikes, Kenyans refusing to pay "Hut Taxes" to British Empire, Brazilian Indians oppose clear-cutting of their forests are all example of groups opposing the accumulatory process. The Zapatistas are anti-systemic, the Assembly of God isn't. Wallerstein has stated that Jihad is anti-systemic. I guess there's that book I haven't read, McDonalds v. Jihad about local opposition to the global economy. Anyhow, I am continually puzzled by your interest in WST. Are there any writers on WST that you feel coincide with your own view-point? On Wed, 22 May 1996, Greg Ehrig wrote: > If I understand you correctly, anti-systemic movements are those > which more or less do not approve, benefit from, or support the > (undefined) "system". But, only liberal groups can be anti-systemic, > and religious ones cannot? > I had trouble seperating out any of the movements that you think are > anti -system, so I still am confused as to your argument. Could you do > something like this :? > > anti-system: PLN, castro, harmonica virgins, etc. > > pro-system: Mobil Oil, Boy Scouts, American Autoduel Association. > etc..... > > Not being a sociologist, I have a little trouble separating ideas from > adjectives :=> > > From U17043@UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU Wed May 22 14:32:05 1996 Date: Wed, 22 May 96 14:46:28 CDT From: "Daniel A. Foss" Subject: load it negative To: World Systems Network Firstly and foremostly, it should be borne in mind, howbeit that's up to you, that many of the folks around here, ie, this list, do not like capitalism very much. Some, indeed, hate it with that sort of passion called *cognitive*. Others, because they, personally, don't have any money. Marx, for example, spent his life deadbroke, sponged off his mother as I do, and also from his hereditary-noblewoman wife (something made possible by his perspicacious if unappreciated daddy, who converted the lot of the *mishpokhe* to Lutheranism, instantly, in those pre-Emancipation days, giving the family higher Marx). Yet that's tangential, in that it was Marx' *cognitive* passion which, first, drove him to the analysis of the significance of the measurement and (consequent) social-control function of time in capitalism; and second, insofar as this was True, was reluctant to let Them do it to him. As we'd put it, Karl Marx never held an honest job in his entire life. Only once, as his family starved, did he even apply. The position was railroad clerk. No exp ncsry. Gd hndwrtng a must. Marx' illegibility of scrawl, for the occasion so much worse than usual, got him a don't-call-us-we'll-call-you, which should've suggested to Marx the invention of the telephone to get called on; alas didn't. For many whose memories go back to 1989, the year the apparent exit-door from capitalism, unsafe as it was, got bricked over, the word System meant and still means, in effect, a conspiracy run by Them. The trouble with this, as with most others, conspiracy theory is not its total falsity, but its partaking of the simplistic. For instance, there are few plots; there are however regularly and Elsewise scheduled Meetings which, in archaic language, are "functionally interchangeable," with plots: in Modern English, a distinction without a difference. World-System theory is more sophisticated. The Capitalist World System is the only interrealted institutionalized market-exchange organization in the world, and its ramifications extend through all known and a couple of unknown sovereign states, core, semiperiphery, periphery. Unknown sovereign states are those which became sovereign after I ceased counting at #175. Arrighi's elegant analysis of the dialectical relation between "territorialism" and "entrepreneu- rialism" - though I like my own, cruder, analysis better - expresses quite plainly the fact that neither the states nor the businesses *alone* gives you the capitalist system tout court. What's more, you overthrow capitalism in one state, the world market seeps under your door like noxious toxic gaseous fumes, sucking you into dependence on it, and infesting you till it bursts out like something killed by Signourey Weaver in the last reel. It follows from this that, in World-System theory, socialism, which all of us who can't stand capitalism desire, can only be installed, that's right, we have the software, you run INSTALL, by simultaneous takeovers by the World Party, or "mondialization," in the coinage of W. Warren Wagar, of all sovereign states at once. The anticipated date for this is 2044, howbeit two hotheads, the noble Terrence McKenna, who likes Dec 2011, and the egregious Robert Anton Wilson, the vestiges of whose tattered reputation I am at this very moment shredding myself, who plumps for a few months later, well into 2012, dissent (but who cares). There is no instance of an "anti-systemic" movement which has, on a contin- uing basis, from its inception to the present day, taught, advocated, and practiced the struggle against capitalism on a global scale; has resisted resolutely and without equivocation the blandishments of capitalism in both its globalist-territorialist and globalist-entrepreneurialist aspects, and that categorically. No. That's wrong. The exception is, The Red Balloon Collective, founded 1967, State University of New York at Stony Brook. World headquarters is the residence of Mitchel (actually, his mother, Rose) Cohen, 2637 Cropsey Av, Apt #7H, Brooklyn NY, forgot zipcode, tel (718) 449-0037. The "psychedelic Bolshevism" stuff has been recycled with advancing, uh, maturity. Oh, I'm not at all sure of the third digit of that building address, either. Exact precision by tomorrow. Daniel A. Foss From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Wed May 22 15:01:18 1996 Date: Wed, 22 May 96 17:00:57 EDT From: (Greg Ehrig) To: smtp%NISTServer1%Server[hk1%axe.humboldt.edu]@banyan.doc.gov Subject: re: the case for leaving 'anti-systemic' movements undefined X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO >f it's says "ouch! the accumulatory process is hurting me stop it or slow down," it's anti-systemic. I see. So Ronald Reagan and the Democratic Congress were anti-systemic inasmuch as they ran higher budget deficits, thus draining capital from capital markets, making its price higher, and disrupting the capital accumulation process? Should Capitalists then have recognized Ronnie for the class enemy that he was? Did they? >Anyhow, I am continually puzzled by your interest in WST. Let's call it morbid curiosity. >Are there any writers on WST that you feel coincide with your own view-point? Should this matter? Regards, G From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Wed May 22 15:08:38 1996 Date: Wed, 22 May 96 17:07:46 EDT From: (Greg Ehrig) To: smtp%NISTServer1%Server[U17043%UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU]@banyan.doc.gov Subject: re: load it negative X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO Cool. How do I join? From mpearson@scu.edu.au Wed May 22 23:54:42 1996 Date: Thu, 23 May 1996 15:56:04 +1000 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: mpearson@scu.edu.au (Michael Pearson) Subject: Early Modern World Systems Dear Colleagues: if there have indeed been too many personal attacks recently, and not enough discussion of real WSN issues, then I hope the following short text will provoke some response, either to me or to the network. What follows is a very abbreviated version of a longer article, but I hope it can be understood without the masses of empirical data which buttresses the main points. It is a brief contribution to the problem of delineating world-economies before capitalism. Early Modern East Africa and the World-Economy Wallerstein's joint piece with Palat [Palat, Ravi Arvind, and Immanuel Wallerstein, "Of What World-System was Pre-1500 'India' a Part?" in S. Chaudhuri and M. Morineau, eds., Merchants, Companies and Trade forthcoming] raises, at least implicitly, several questions about the place of Africa in the early modern world. It is claimed that the cores in Gujarat and Coromandel fed on lowly-remunerated laborers in other areas, and even caused deindustrialisation in the Middle East and southeast Asia. However, they do include "the eastern coasts of Africa" as part of "an evolving world-economy" centered on Gujarat and Coromandel. This leaves the position of the African interior obscure, but we must assume that it is not to be included. This point must be made clear. In his own major work and smaller pieces devoted to Africa he finds no exploitation while an area is external to the modern world-system, and the exchange is only in luxuries. But in the Palat and Wallerstein piece they write more fully about the situation before the modern world-system, and find that in this India-centered world economy there can, even though there is no capitalism, still be inequality and unequal trade. The coast of east Africa is included here as part of this precapitalist world-economy. The interior is implicitly to be seen as external to this world-economy, just as both it and the coast were to the evolving modern world-system until the nineteenth century. The key questions are the precise position of the east African coast in this world-economy, and then the coast's relations with the interior: Palat and Wallerstein, at least implicitly, leave out the interior, which then must be external, while Chase-Dunn and Hall [Chase-Dunn, Christopher, and Thomas D. Hall, eds, Core/Periphery Relations in Precapitalist Worlds, Boulder, 1991] imply that it is included. In their list of world-system types they follow Wolf's three modes of production, and find the Indian Ocean to be an example of "commercializing state-based world-systems in which important aspects of commodification have developed but the system is still dominated by the logic of the tributary modes." In the core of these commercializing world-systems, in which the core seems to be an empire, there is more use of money, of credit and interest, of wage labor, and of price-setting markets. In the core-empires the rulers use sophisticated means to tax merchants, "and outside the bounds of empires, in interstitial semiperipheral regions, autonomous city-states controlled by merchant and production capitalists created and sustained market relations between empires and peripheral regions." They say these centralised empires will be more exploitative towards peripheries than earlier empires, as they are better at concentrating resources at the center. A host of empirical data helps to flesh out the discussion. I have accumulated much data about the huge profits which foreign traders made in East Africa. This of course rings a bell with dependency theorists: surely the Indians and Arabs and Portuguese who are making these profits are exploiting someone? Add to this the fact that the exports are primary products - gold and ivory - while the imports are manufactures - cloths and beads - and we seem to have a classic first world-third world situation, as noted by authors such as Rodney, Sheriff and Alpers. The reality is rather different. We need to say more about the three main products traded, and introduce the notion of relative values. We may then find a very different result, a rather Panglossian one where it seems everyone did well, a confirmation of Abu-Lughod in fact. This is primarily because of the notion of relative values. A society can export products which it does not value, but which are valued in other areas. Goods then have a cultural as well as a material value. This would seem to account for the massive profits which the traders, nearly all foreigners, made. In the case of gold, it was little use in a non-monetised society, but in one like India which in the early modern period was monetising rapidly it had an obvious demand. So also with slaves, essential for west Indian and Brazilian plantations, but not in great demand in Africa except for some domestic and minor agricultural work. And so also for beads, produced in massive quantities in India for little cost, but highly prized in Africa. The concept of relative values applies most clearly to the trade in ivory. From an Indian point of view, when an African killed an elephant he was gaining a tusk which could be sold. But from the African point of view it was much more than this. A dead elephant provided an important source of protein. Killing an elephant got rid of a pest that damaged crops. And a dead elephant produced two tusks. One went to the local ruler, but the other could be exchanged for some other product of more use or prestige value than ivory, such as cloths or beads. Overall the advantage lay with Africa. Most of the products they received were discretionary rather than necessities in their agricultural and hunting lives, except for cloth on the plateau, though even for this there were local substitutes. For the trader however a sale or exchange was obviously essential, for this was his raison d'=EAtre. Thus Africans could work as much or as little as they wanted. Faced with this situation, the traders in effect tried to create a market, or force one on the African producers. It seems then that this trade was, from the African point of view, a benign one. Differing use values and the autonomy of the African hunter or peasant faced with mercantile capitalism meant that the notion of exploitation or any more general detrimental impact is hard to sustain. Cloth imports merit a more extended discussion, for it has been claimed that African production was undercut by imports from India based on more advanced productive techniques. If so, we have a clear reinforcement of Palat and Wallerstein's finding of deindustrialisation, or more general claims that foreign trade exploited Africa. The question is whether these imports undercut an existing textile industry in the area, that is deindustrialised it. The evidence is frankly a little confusing; certainly blanket claims that either Indian competition or the activities of the Portuguese destroyed an indigenous industry seem to be wide of the mark. David Beach in several works has summed up this matter. Africans had learnt to spin and weave by copying the techniques used in imported Indian cloth, and by the sixteenth century the growing of cotton and weaving of cotton cloth was well established. However, their methods were slow as compared with their Indian competitors, and weaving interfered with the dominant crop cycle. Thus it made good rational economic sense to import cloth, given the nature of Shona society. This was a stratified society, and when it was possible they collected gold and ivory to get beads and cloth which in turn could "buy" grain or cattle. If long-distance trade, especially that to the coast, was peripheral for both producers and rulers in the interior states, though for different reasons, it then seems that we do indeed have a benign situation where trade produced no exploitation. Valuable goods were taken from Africa, but these were valued in the receiving areas around the Indian Ocean but not in the producing areas, where their production, from the peasant point of view, and their taxation, from the view point of the state, were marginal to more central concerns to do with food production and animal husbandry for the peasant, and politico-military matters for the elite. The labor to produce export goods was surplus labor, not labor extracted from say food production. Nor was it labor which otherwise would have been used to "develop" Africa, claims by Sheriff and Alpers to the contrary. On the other hand Indian products - beads and cloths especially - found an extra market, though probably not one of very great comparative size, for east Africa was a minor outlet for Gujarat's total production. The Swahili port cities played a vital connective role, a compradorial one no doubt, but one which needs to be seen as not exploitative but rather as facilitative in their relations with the interior. Unlike the interior, these city states were closely linked to the world economy. As classic semi-peripheries they suffered from this. Their fates often were determined by forces beyond their control, not the activities of the Portuguese in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries but rather far distant forces which affected them within the world economy. In general terms, producers and consumers at either end of the far flung network determined kinds, quantities and values, and the Swahili had to adapt to this. For example, levels of gold production in the Zimbabwe plateau determined Sofala's gold exports and hence Kilwa's prosperity. But consumption at the other end of the network also affected Kilwa, that is competition from new gold supplies from the Americas and Japan, and the varying demand for gold in the various consuming countries. For example, as India monetised its demand for gold rose. The coast then played a very different role in the world-economy as compared with the interior. It seems that these ports were semi-peripheries, but for a series of unique reasons they did not interact with an interior which was a periphery. Rather the interior must be seen as external to this world economy. We seem then to need to modify a little what Chase-Dunn and Hall have claimed: "outside the bounds of empires, in interstitial semiperipheral regions, autonomous city-states controlled by merchant and production capitalists created and sustained market relations between empires and peripheral regions." It seems to me that Palat and Wallerstein are much nearer the mark. It is not clear if their notion of deindustrialisation in the Middle East and southeast Asia as a result of more advanced techniques in Gujarat and Coromandel is meant to apply to east Africa also, but in fact we can show that this was the case on the coast in some products and some areas. More generally, in this world economy where the core was parts of India, we can clearly locate the Swahili coast in a semiperipheral position, and follow them in their implicit exclusion of the interior from the system. In terms of world-system theory we have, in short, a pre-capitalist world-economy where a core is connected by a semiperipheral area to an external area. These findings seem to reinforce doubts about the utility of the standard world-system distinction between luxuries and necessities. Here, and in many other areas, the notion seems to be of little use in determining when relations between two areas move from being external to systemic. The key to understanding the nature of exchange between India and east Africa is the concept of differing use values in these two very different economies. Indeed, in fairness we must note that Wallerstein himself is aware of this, for when writing of the luxury-necessity dichotomy he noted that "each side tends to have different cultural definitions of value." [I. Wallerstein, "The Ottoman Empire and the Capitalist World-Economy: Some Questions for Research," Review, II, 3, 1979, pp. 390-1] The final question is to ask whether this is really very useful anyway. Presumably my findings add something to the large body of world-system writing, but maybe fitting east Africa into a particular box is not really very rewarding, except in a completely academic way. One could sketch a quite different analysis, one which concentrates on production rather than exchange, and which ignores the world-system terminology of cores and peripheries, the existence or otherwise of coerced labor (this of course being important in defining which areas belong in which category of core, periphery and semi-periphery), and whether the trade was in luxuries or necessities. If we follow Eric Wolf's analysis we can see both India and the interior east African states as being tributary modes of production, though the African ones were much more disaggregated than were the Indian states, to the extent indeed that "state" may not be the best term to use for the Mutapa "authority structure". In both areas merchants provided the crucial linkages to keep exchange and production going, and to link up the state and the producer. In both labor was coerced to the extent that in Africa it had to pay tribute, in India taxes in the form of land revenue. But the real point is that in neither area was labor subsumed by capital. To use the world-system model is really just to say that goods were being exchanged across the Afrasian Sea. This is of course a very familiar statement. Indeed there was exchange, and due to differing use values this involved no exploitation or assymetrical extraction of resources from the less developed, primary producing African side. We have two sorts of systems of production which intersect rather nicely, with benefit to all involved. Perhaps the central point is that this was not really unequal exchange, as is characteristic of any world-system. There are real problems with using the level of remuneration of labor to explain unequal exchange anyway, especially before capitalism, but more concretely we can say nothing definite about the levels of remuneration of laborers in Africa as compared with India anyway. No doubt producers in India profited from the sale of their manufactures to less developed areas, of which east Africa was a minor part, yet this does not ipso facto set up a relationship of exploitation. Michael Pearson Adjunct Professor =46aculty of Arts Southern Cross University PO Box 157 Lismore 2480 Phone: (066) 20 3946 Fax: (066) 22 1683 Email: mpearson@scu.edu.au From p34d3611@jhu.edu Thu May 23 00:10:28 1996 23 May 1996 02:09:59 -0500 (EST) 23 May 1996 02:09:57 -0500 (EST) Date: Thu, 23 May 1996 02:09:50 -0400 From: Peter Grimes Subject: Re: WSN Focus (fwd) To: WSN Date: Tue, 21 May 1996 17:28:41 -0400 (EDT) From: "A. Gunder Frank" To: Harutiun Kassakhian Subject: Re: WSN Focus shortest of short response by Gunder Frank. FRank and Fuentes have written 2 things on CYCLES in social movements, which from their protagonists point of view are anti-systemic. In the first one, we also distingish between moves that are against the system and thos that really attack /harm the system itself, which are few if any. This was in our chapter in Amin,Arrighi, Frank,Wallerstein TRANSFORMING THE REVOLUTION. SOC MOVS IN THE WORLD SYST, Montly Rev press 1990, i think. That chapter had a part on CYCLEs in soc movs, which we extended in a later arciel devoted only to studying cycles in Soc movs. In both, the findings were that [anti systemic] soc movs increased in two Kondratoiff B pahses, the 1816-48 one and the 1967-- one, except that we also found taht they petered out in the 90s or late 80s. The otehr big wave was in the 1890s-1914, which is usually regarded as an A phase. We speculate a lot about that. This second version is publioshed in RESEARCH IN SOC MOVS , CONFLICTS AND CHANGE editeb by L Kriesber, M Dobkowski & I Wallimann JAI ptress vol 17, 1994 pp 173-196. In a word, its not true that anti-syt movs do not increawe in B phase. gunder frank From craig.harris@ssc.msu.edu Thu May 23 05:14:38 1996 From: craig.harris@ssc.msu.edu Date: Thu, 23 May 96 7:15:33 EDT To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: re: early modern world systems i want to accept michael pearson's invitation to a discussion on the delineation of world economies before capitalism . . .i agree that east africa provides a fruitful venue for the examination of the question . . . my concern is not with the details of the exchange (e.g., ivory, textiles); that is very well covered by pearson and others . . . instead my concern is with the analytical use of exploitation . . . on the one hand pearson's point is well taken: even if in every other social context x is worth ten times as much as y, if people in context a think x is worth less than y, then it can be argued that one has not exploited the people in context a if one has traded their x for others y . . . this is the starting point of classical economics and arbitrage systems . . . but my purpose is to raise what i see as an underlying question: does the fact that the people of a are happy with the exchange mean that no exploitation has taken place . . . i would argue that the answer is no for at least two possible reasons . . . one reason can be seen in the ivory . .. . even if the east africans placed little value on the ivory and viewed the elephants as a nuisance, harvesting elephants and ivory beyond some level of sustainable yield would be exploiting the ecological system, because harvesting above sustainable yield would be gradually eliminating the elephants from the system and thus (presumably) diminishing the complexity/stability of the ecological system . . . a second reason is outlined by pearson for cloth . . . even if the east africans placed little value on their own cloth, trading other goods for imported cloth would be exploiting the social system, because it would be gradually eliminating the industrial productive capacity from the system . . . it seems to me that a broader view of what constitutes exploitation is needed . . . what these two examples seem to me to point to is the notion that extracting value from a system in way that does not permit the reproduction or regeneration of that system, needs to be encompassed in a view of exploitation . . . given this view, i would suggest that wherever in east or central africa one might have been located, if a consequence of the activities of the world system was the degradation of some local system, then that local system was a part of the world system cheers, craig harris craig k harris dept of sociology michigan state university east lansing michigan 48824-1111 tel: 517-355-5048 fax: 517-432-2856 From andrei@rsuh.ru Thu May 23 09:16:06 1996 From: "Korotaev A." Organization: rsuh To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Thu, 23 May 1996 19:06:08 +0300 Subject: Re: Early Modern World Systems Reply-to: andrei@rsuh.ru > Dear Colleagues: if there have indeed been too many personal attacks > recently, and not enough discussion of real WSN issues, then I hope the > following short text will provoke some response, either to me or to the > network. I am completely with Pearson, I do agree there have indeed been too many personal attacks (and newspaper talk) recently, and not enough discussion of real WSN issues. I think Pearson has completely succeded in drawing our attention precisely to real WSN issues raising most pressing question of reconstructing the traditional world system approach which looks now more and more defective, especially clearly with the treatment of the pre-Modern intersocietal communiction networks (and of course [though it appears a bit less self-evident] with respect to the Modern one). Pearson paper calls again for the substitution of the primitive and simplistic core - s/periphery-periphery scheme with more sophisticated and appropriate categories, or at least for a radical reconstruction of these categories. To what have been said by Pearson I could add another example - South Arabia as a part of the world system of the end of the 1st mil.BC - the beginning of the 1st mil.CE. No doubt it was an integral part of the system (just remember the Hadramis introducing in the far-away Dhofar the second frankinsence harvest in order to raise its yields to be sold at the Mediterranean markets). It of course could not be considered as the system core (it seems evident, but if anyone wants I could present my arguments). But it rather exploited the core rather than was exploited, incedentally, using any of the criteria mentioned by Craig Harris: 1) "Even if in every other social context x is worth ten > times as much as y, if people in context a think x is worth less > than y, then it can be argued that one has not exploited the people > in context a if one has traded their x for others y . . . " But as is evidenced by Strabo and Pliny the Elder, the "Mediterraneans" were just sure that they paid for the South Arabian spices much more than their real cost. And what is more, I belive they were not completely wrong, as they dealt with real monopoly prices (and I could present evidence for that too). 2) "If a consequence of the activities of the world system was the > degradation of some local system, then that local system was a part (I assume a periphery part? - A.K.) > of the world system." It seems possible to argue that the inclusion of South Arabian into the world system (apparently at the end of the 2nd mil.BC - for detail see e.g.my "Ancient Yemen". Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) did not lead to any degradation however you would define it. Actually it led to the emergence of the South Arabian civilization and rapid development in all possible areas (fed to a considerable extent by the "exploitation" of the "core"). To summarize my brief argument (or rather introduction to real argument) I just find the traditional world system categories and approaches completely inapproprite to deal with the material I work with and completely support the call (inherent in Perason's paper) for the radical reconstruction of the WS theory. Hence, instead of discussing secondary parapolitical points basing ourselves on the assumption that the WS theory is something finally proved and established and it could be considered a firm ground to discuss anything it seems more appropriate to think if this ground is really firm, if it is safe to discuss anything on it. May be it is more reasonable to create such a ground first? P.S. I would not like anyone to think that what was said could be only relevant for exotic old times - take e.g. the modern Arabian oil exporting countries exploiting the "core" ones. Andrey Korotayev, Senior Research Fellow Oriental Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences 12 Rozhdestvenka, Moscow 103753, Russia ANDREI@RSUH.RU From sbabones@jhu.edu Thu May 23 10:59:33 1996 23 May 1996 12:58:47 -0500 (EST) 23 May 1996 12:58:36 -0500 (EST) Date: Thu, 23 May 1996 12:57:50 -0400 From: Salvatore Babones Subject: re: the case for leaving 'anti-systemic' movements undefined To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: Salvatore Babones An excellent discussion of anti-systemic movements is coming soon in Vol. 2 of the Journal of World-Systems Research (http://csf.colorado.edu/wsystems/jwsr.html). Salvatore Babones Johns Hopkins University From Claudiu@ix.netcom.com Thu May 23 17:08:34 1996 Date: Thu, 23 May 1996 16:07:02 -0700 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: Claudiu Secara Subject: re: the case for leaving 'anti-systemic' movements undefined =20 Quote: "All through the '80s, the very top factors of the political elite [of the U.S.] were in place to help quicken the process of disintegration in order to alert the insensitive masses, to confront the self-serving individualistic interests, and to awaken the narcoleptic and the secluded upper-middle classes.=20 This was done by shortening the time that society could live on borrowed money, by leading the borrowing frenzy and freeing the speculative vice on such a scale that it would grow out of proportion; by encouraging corruption, depravity, inequality, public indecency, and deficiency to unprecedented levels; by bringing the victims, the poor, and the homeless from the hidden institutions onto the main street, and by letting crime run rampant and drug use increase and diversify, =96 all while the state powerbrokers, Congress included, went on the loose.=20 The cumulative net effect was a low, overall, national performance and an inevitable economic crisis at a time when ever more limited sets of options were left for policy making. The overburdened credit lines, the financial squeeze, a spreading sense of collective guilt, moral debasement, and ethical drifting were, ultimately, bringing down the once-unshakable sense of intangible superiority."=20 in The New Commonwealth: From Bureaucratic Corporatism to Socialist= Capitalism Page 276. Claudiu A. Secara From p34d3611@jhu.edu Sat May 25 01:53:06 1996 25 May 1996 03:52:36 -0500 (EST) 25 May 1996 03:52:34 -0500 (EST) Date: Sat, 25 May 1996 03:52:15 -0400 From: Peter Grimes Subject: Re: Early Modern World Systems (fwd) To: WSN From: "A. Gunder Frank" To: "Korotaev A." Subject: Re: Early Modern World Systems Respectfully submitted to Andrey from Andre/s/as/w/i: "Bronze Age World System Cycles" CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY vol. 34, No. 4, Aug-Oct 1993:383-429 [including "CA treatment" by a donzen archaeologists from around the world] brings my argument that Arabia WAS part of a World System at the time you say, that there WAS a world system, and that it included what is now Russia, as shown by EN Chernykh ANCIENT METALLURGY IN THE USSR: THE EARLY METAL AGE CAmbridge univ press 1992, translatioin of Russian original andre gunder frank From mpearson@scu.edu.au Mon May 27 18:41:43 1996 Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 10:43:17 +1000 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: mpearson@scu.edu.au (Michael Pearson) Subject: Gunder Frank and World Systems Dear Colleagues: I was really pleased to get some responses to my post about early modern world-systems and East Africa. And yes, Prof Fahey [on H-World], Ricardo is alive and well in the Land of OZ; my piece though was located specifically in a WSN context. I would like to take the opportunity to reply to Andre Gunder Frank, and raise a more general matter to do with his work. This is NOT a personal attack. Indeed I do this with some concern, for I consider Gunder Frank to be an iconic, even if not hegemonic or canonical, figure in the field of political economy. Yes, I have read the various pieces he mentioned in his reply to my post, and indeed I've long been interested in matters like bullion flows before 1800. My problem is that there seems to be in all his work a disturbing underlying synchronic element. His work on Latin America so many years ago was the first, or at least the most effective, rebuttal of modernisation theory. However, he seemed to be telling us that essentially the 'development of underdevelopment' began as the Spanish arrived in the sixteenth century, and the 'creation of poverty' proceeded thereafter, with very little change. Yet surely the world-historical context changed dramatically between say 1550 and 1950? Now Gunder Frank is asking us to accept the notion of world systems going back 5,000 years or more. To the extent that exchange has occurred over all human history, this is an unexceptional claim. However, heuristically this is not very useful. It reminds me of Eric Wolf's 'tributary mode' of some fifteen years ago, where it seems that most of the world for most of the time is to be located in this broad category. Yes, Wallerstein and Amin and so many others are 'right,' for capitalism DOES make a difference. When capital penetrates production this marks the major transition in human history since maybe the agricultural revolution. This happened not sometime in the sixteenth century as Wallerstein et al would have it, but during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Maybe I'm just unreconstructed, but Marx knew this, and here at least he was right. Thus to find world systems from the dawn of 'civilisation' and to see no generic change from then to now is to obscure the seismic impact of capitalism [which does not mean merely the accumulation of capital]. Analysis of movements within world systems, and changes in the location of their centers, over the last 5,000 years is all very well, but when one of these pre-capitalist world economies becomes a modern world-system [following of course Wallerstein's schema] human history changes dramatically. This is not to privilege 'Europe,' it is to recognise what's important, and for better or worse this happened in Europe. There's no question that the Indian economy in say the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries was the center of a vast world economy stretching all around the Indian Ocean area, but all the evidence shows that this structure could not compete with newly emergent capitalism in Europe. As an historian I'm always keen to find change, to attempt diachronic analysis. My charge is that Gunder Frank falls short here. What do all of you out there think? Michael Pearson Adjunct Professor Faculty of Arts Southern Cross University PO Box 157 Lismore 2480 Phone: (066) 20 3946 Fax: (066) 22 1683 Email: mpearson@scu.edu.au From sbabones@jhu.edu Mon May 27 19:25:45 1996 27 May 1996 21:25:28 -0500 (EST) 27 May 1996 21:25:24 -0500 (EST) Date: Mon, 27 May 1996 21:25:16 -0400 From: Salvatore Babones Subject: Cycles of Hegemony To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Dear WSN subscribers, I've written out here some ideas on cycles of hegemony. I would really appreciate any suggestions and/or comments that you might be interested in offering. The posting is a little longer than usual (c. 2000 words), so if you are going to respond publicly via WSN, it would be a good idea NOT to quote this entire posting in your reply (of course, if you want to send your comments directly to me, quote away!). Here it is: An Endogenous Model of Hegemonic Cycles Hegemonic processions are a recurring feature of world- systems accounts of modern history. Wallerstein's "cycles of hegemony," Arrighi's "systemic cycles of accumulation," and Modelski and Thompson's "long cycle of global politics" are all roughly equivalent categorizations of the same basic phenomenon. In all three accounts, a global war is followed by the long-term commercial, political, and military hegemony of a single state in the international system; as the relative power of the hegemon wanes over time, challenger states arise, which in turn provokes a new global war. At least four such hegemonic cycles have been identified in Western history: the Dutch (c. 17th century), the first British (c. 18th century), the second British (c. 19th century), and the American (c. 20th century). It is doubtless true that under the criteria established by each author -- preponderance of world trade (Wallerstein), control over world financial markets (Arrighi), global naval dominance (Modelski and Thompson) -- hegemonic cycles have, in fact, occurred. But driven by their interest in discovering and substantiating the existence of hegemonic cycles, these authors have left aside the problem of *explaining* them. Instead, what Wallerstein, Arrighi, and Modelski and Thompson have done is give accounts of the cycles of hegemony that have historically occurred. As history, cycles of hegemony must be accepted, but as sociology, they are still a mystery to be explained. At issue is not whether the events related by Wallerstein, Arrighi, and Modelski and Thompson did in fact occur, but whether they are regular, naturally-occurring, predictable phenomena. Why should there always exist a state powerful enough to exercise hegemony? Why should such a state take on the duties of being a hegemon? Why should that hegemon ever decline? Why should the decline of a hegemon lead to global war? These questions can be adequately answered only by means of an endogenous model of the genesis, rise, decline, and eclipse of hegemons. The model must be endogenous rather than exogenous because only an endogenous model can give rise to recurring cycles: an exogenous model could only be cyclical if the exogenous variables were themselves cyclical; thus, positing an exogenous model serves only to move the problem one step back. Historical models are always exogenous -- every part of history is inseparably the result of all of the rest of history -- and, as a result, history can only be nomothetic when hypothetical future values for all of the exogenous variables are given. With all-endogenous models, however, it is possible to make predictions without any assumptions about variables in the future. In this paper, I attempt to build such an all-endogenous model of cycles of hegemony. The model will be presented with reference to global (sea- power-based) hegemony; with the appropriate substitutions, the model works just as well for more local, land-power- based hegemonies. Several assumptions will be necessary. First, it must be assumed that in peacetime the existence of a hegemon carries with it benefits for all of the core states. Second, it must be assumed that the exercise of hegemony implies costs that must be borne by the hegemonic state, to the extent that the maintenance of hegemony implies a net loss for the hegemon. Third, it must be assumed that only a state that possess a large financial advantage (ability to finance wars) over all of the other core states can act as a hegemon. I will examine each of these assumptions in turn. In evaluating the plausibility of these assumptions, it must be kept in mind that a hegemon is not a nation, a country, or a people, but a state. That is to say, the entity that exercises hegemony is a government. Thus, in order to understand the incentives and consequences associated with hegemony and the decisions that affect hegemony, it is the incentives and consequences for governments or governing classes that must be considered, and not those for the myriad private citizens of the countries involved. It should also be kept in mind that the prima facie test of an assumption in a causal model is that of *plausibility*, not correctness. If, however, a model that is built upon plausible assumptions turns out to make correct predictions, that is evidence (but still not proof) that the assumptions themselves are correct. First -- do all core states benefit from the existence of a hegemon? In times of peace, hegemons coordinate the activities of the core states in attempts to suppress piracy and enforce commercial laws. The existence of a hegemon creates a stable global business environment, which facilitates trade and investment flows across borders. Trade flows bring with them increased tax revenues for all states, and investment flows promote economic development, which, in the long run, also leads to increased tax revenues. On the other hand, a domineering hegemon may close off some parts of the world to exploitation by a non- hegemonic state and its citizens. However, this situation must be contrasted to one in which no hegemon exists: in the absence of a hegemon, no state will be able to profitably expand overseas, since the competition of all- against-all is bound to be more expensive than the profits to be had from exploitation in competition with other would- be exploiters. Put differently, when the seas are not secure, overseas possessions are a liability, not an asset - - Spain paid dearly in privateered silver whenever Europe was at war. Overall, then, it is at least plausible to assume that the existence of a hegemon caries with it benefits for all core states. Second -- do the costs of maintaining hegemony outweigh the direct benefits of being a hegemon? A hegemonic state must bear alone all of the costs of policing the seas, plus the ad hoc costs of maintaining world peace: bullying trouble-maker states into toeing the common line, maintaining diplomatic posts far and wide, rescuing the citizens of other core states who get into trouble in foreign lands, etc. In return, hegemons get their pick of all of the opportunities for exploitation in the wider world. However, unless hegemon possesses a truly overwhelming military advantage over the rest of the core, it cannot parcel out the world however it wishes. No hegemon has ever been strong enough to challenge the rest of the core powers simultaneously. In addition, a hegemon may be forced to forgo the choicest opportunities for exploitation and parcel them out to other states in attempts to "keep the peace." Thus, although a hegemon has some ability to allocate overseas spheres of exploitation to core powers, it may or may not itself come out ahead in that allocation. On the other hand, the costs of maintaining hegemony are unambiguous. Thus, it is at least plausible that the costs of maintaining hegemony may outweigh the benefits of being a hegemon. Third -- must a state possess a large financial advantage over all of the other core states in order to be a hegemon? A hegemon may act to maintain peace, but it does so by implicitly threatening war. Although a hegemon may not be able to challenge all other core powers simultaneously, it must at least give the impression of being able to defeat any one of the other core powers easily, or it could not keep the other core states in line. In practice, a hegemon must not only be able to defeat any one other core power in competition overseas, but also be able to defend itself against any combination of other core powers likely to be formed against it. Without the respect that comes with overwhelming power, no state could hope to act as a hegemon, and power, especially naval power, comes with money. It is certainly more than plausible that in order to be a hegemon a state must possess a large financial advantage over the other core states. Given these three assumptions, the model is simple. Any situation in which a hegemon does not exist is a situation of world war, the war of all-against-all (Modelski and Thompson's "macrodecision" phase). This must be so, since in the absence of a hegemon, no state has the power to enforce its will among the other core states. Such a situation may go on indefinitely until one state emerges with enough of a power differential over the other core states to qualify as a potential hegemon. Note that this process does not compromise the endogeneity of the model: there is no postulated exogenous event that will assuredly lift one state into a position of potential hegemony; there is just a stochastic likelihood that eventually one state will stand out from all of the others. In the case of sea- power hegemony, that a hegemon will emerge is all the more likely, given the all-or-nothing outcomes typical of battles at sea. Still, there is no assurance that a hegemon will emerge, only a likelihood that increases with time. Once a state emerges that possesses the resources which would enable it to act as a hegemon, that state must make a choice as to whether or not it will take up the mantle of hegemony. Under the first assumption above, if the state exercises hegemony, it will be the beneficiary of a stable global order, but under the second assumption above, it will be forced to pay the costs of being a hegemon. If in the state's judgement the costs of exercising hegemony outweigh the benefits to be gained from a stable global order, then the state will not become a hegemon, and the world will remain in a state of war until circumstances change to make hegemony more attractive. This approximates what happened when the United States declined global hegemony after World War I: the wars continued until the U.S. finally did take up the mantle of hegemony after World War II. However, if in the state's estimation the benefits of global order do outweigh the costs of hegemony, then the potential hegemon will opt to become an actual hegemon (Modelski and Thompson's "execution" phase). As hegemon, the state will be able to set many of the parameters under which the world operates (Modelski and Thompson's "agenda-setting" phase). The ramifications of hegemonic stability do not, however, benefit only the hegemonic state; the other core states benefit as well. As a result, the initial advantage of the hegemon erodes over time, since all of the core states share in the benefits of hegemony, while the hegemon bears all of the costs. Over time, the other core powers gain on the hegemon to the point where the hegemon must seek partners to help it keep the peace (Modelski and Thompson's "coalition-building" phase). Eventually, the hegemon's initial advantage will disappear entirely, and it will be unable to act as a hegemon at all. This initiates a new period of wars, which lasts until another hegemon arises, starting a new hegemonic cycle. ----------------- I would welcome any comments that anyone on the list would like to make. If you would like to respond privately, please direct your correspondence to sbabones@jhu.edu. Thanks for taking the time to consider my ideas, and I look forward to hearing from the list. Salvatore J. Babones Johns Hopkins University From sbabones@jhu.edu Mon May 27 21:23:05 1996 27 May 1996 23:22:39 -0500 (EST) 27 May 1996 23:22:36 -0500 (EST) Date: Mon, 27 May 1996 23:22:22 -0400 From: Salvatore Babones Subject: Michael Pearson and World-Systems To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: Salvatore Babones In reply to Michael Pearson's piece ("Gunder Frank and World Systems") I'd like to address the issue of the "system"-ness of world-systems. I think that seminal world-systems theorists like Frank and Wallerstein have mainly been *discoverers*: they have recognized patterns in human existence that nobody else particualrly noticed before. They have pointed out the existence of systemic sets of relationships among people and peoples throughout history. Their discoveries are, of course, *true*: they are actually existing patterns in the historical data. There have been world systems existing on either end of the Central Asian steppes which have been synchonously impacted by the activities of the nomads (Frank); there have been both world-systemic and world-imperial divisions of labor (Wallerstein). These are now-revealed facts, not speculative hypotheses. We owe these two monumental thinkers (and workers!) an enormous round of applause for bringing these facts to light. On the other hand, there is even more still to do. One largely unaddressed issue is this: what makes a world-system a SYSTEM? Answering this question is the key to dealing with the issues raised in Pearson's posting. So long as we have only a world-systems *account* of history, and not a world-systems *theory* of history, world-systems thinking is easy prey to the charge of historicism. (It may be ironic that Pearson, an historian, is the one effectively making the charge of historicism, but personally I think that it is refreshing.) OF COURSE Wallerstein is right that the roots of 19th century European capitalism can be traced back to 18th century British "capitalism" can be traced back to seventeenth century Dutch money-grubbing can be traced back to sixteenth century Genoese loan-sharking can be traced back . . . can be traced back to the Roman Equites, etc. OF COURSE Frank is right that there were copper age world-systems, Modelsky and Thompson are right that there were 14th century Chinese world-systems, and Chase-Dunn is right that there were pre-Columbian Native American world-systems. After all, there were worlds, and there were systematic human relationships, and there always will be. Pearson's charge in the end comes down to the charge of historicism because he raises the critical question of change. But to understand how a system changes, we have to know what a system IS. If a world-system is defined as being a certain geographical area "the Chinese world-system", etc.), then the question of what makes a system a system IS being answered -- trivially. Wallerstein defines a world-system in terms of the division of labor, which is a good start, but Wallerstein's definition contains the all-too-often-forgotten implication that a world-empire is NOT a world-system, and thus we must talk not of the many world-systems in history, but of THE world-system, the "Modern World-System". Change -- really significant sociological change -- only begins in the Wallersteinian system with the inception of the Modern World-System. I suggest instead that world-systems be thought of in network terms. Imagine block-modelling all of the relations between all of the people in the world. The world would fall out into a few large blocks of people who had dense relations and a whole lot of small blocks of people who were relatively isolated from other blocks. Take the fifteenth century world: a few large blocks (Europe, Islam, China, Polynesia?, Inca, Aztec, African empires -- please excuse the lacunae in my historical knowledge -- etc.) and an enormous number of small blocks consisting of sets of villages (Chase-Dunn's California natives, etc.). Over time, network ties change -- and thus the "systems" of interactions that make up the world's world-systems change. CHANGE OCCURS AT THE MICRO LEVEL. Cortes et al. land in Mexico; the "European world-system" does not "expand" into America. Change at the macro level is epi-phenomenal. REAL, but epi-phenomenal. (A planet is REAL, but a planet is epi-phenemenal. The actual phenomena to be observed are protons, electrons, etc.; the planet is just a set of relationships. Nonetheless, a very important set of relationships.) Capitalism is a mammoth change precisely because it changes so much of what goes on at the micro level. Europe in 1850 is recognizably the same map as Europe in 1650, but the social relations that make up Europe are vastly different. Europe is at both points in time a "system" (a "block" in network terms), but it is a very different system after the rise of capitalism. Macro-continuity is coupled with micro-discontinuity. The system has the same name, but the system is of an entirely different nature. To sum: I don't dispute the account of history as told by Wallerstein, Frank, Chase-Dunn, Modelski, Thompson. On the contrary, I'm thrilled that they've done so much of the spadework. Besides being great thinkers, they have been dedicated laborers. I just think that it's time to formalize what they've done and integrate it into a theoretical whole. Salvatore J. Babones Johns Hopkins University From aaustin@mtsu.edu Mon May 27 22:02:54 1996 Date: Mon, 27 May 1996 23:03:58 -0500 (CDT) From: "Andrew W. Austin" To: Salvatore Babones Subject: Re: Michael Pearson and World-Systems In-Reply-To: How can one transcend the "fact" of historicity? Why would someone want to? The recognition of historicity is a plus, not a hindrance. To be aware of the social construction process (and its roots in the larger world construction process of the particular sociohistorical epoch in which that awareness is embedded) involved in theorizing about scientific constructions of theories and models (all social constructions) provides the critical epistemology necessary for generating the most comprehensive analysis of the sociohistorical forms under investigation. Luhmann, and his mentor, Parsons, both proceeded in their construction of social systems theory by simultaneously presenting a comprehensive (general) theory of systems. Even though their systems are obviously functional (at the theoretical level, it is difficult to substantiate analytical categories and complexes of categories, such as systems, as explanatory in the sense of cause and effect), their examples provide us with some useful groundwork in the areas of systems analysis (or modeling). Habermas' further modifications to both Parson's work, and his collaborations with Luhmann, are even more productive. This is because Habermas, aware of the hermeneutical processes of reality production (including theoretical and empirical constructions), provides the necessary critical epistemology to carry out the analysis in a self-reflexive manner. I would argue, that it is not possible to transcend the "fact" of historicity, for to do so puts one in a paradoxical position of holding things independent of thought (or consciousness, ultimately a product of society), which is an obvious impossibility. Even if we could exist in this imagined ethereal realm, why would we want to step outside the meaningful cognitive space we call knowledge? AA From sbabones@jhu.edu Mon May 27 22:19:06 1996 28 May 1996 00:18:40 -0500 (EST) 28 May 1996 00:18:39 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 00:18:31 -0400 From: Salvatore Babones Subject: Re: Michael Pearson and World-Systems In-reply-to: To: "Andrew W. Austin" First: very impressive response time, Dr. Austin. Second: there's certainly no need for ME to put more than $.02 in to the discussion of the nature of reality. But my two cents is this: the world is to some degree predictable, and thus there is to some degree more to the world than history, since history in itself says nothing about the future. Salvatore From brownii@hal.hahnemann.edu Tue May 28 07:25:33 1996 wsn@csf.colorado.edu; Tue, 28 May 1996 09:32:12 -0400 (EDT) 28 May 1996 09:23:24 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 09:23:24 -0500 (EST) From: "Edward K. Brown II" Subject: Re: Michael Pearson and World-Systems In-reply-to: To: "Andrew W. Austin" Transcendence is not the removal of cognition for a behavoral aesthetic. Transcendence is the removal of fact so that others who do not exist historically or geographically (in time and space) can understand and use the resulting theory or system described. Facts are only locii to a specfic cognition or behaviorism. Nothing more, nothing less. Knowledge can be practiced in theory. Knowledge can be studied in history. Ed Brown II On Mon, 27 May 1996, Andrew W. Austin wrote: > How can one transcend the "fact" of historicity? Why would someone want > to? The recognition of historicity is a plus, not a hindrance. To be aware > of the social construction process (and its roots in the larger world > construction process of the particular sociohistorical epoch in which that > awareness is embedded) involved in theorizing about scientific > constructions of theories and models (all social constructions) provides > the critical epistemology necessary for generating the most comprehensive > analysis of the sociohistorical forms under investigation. Luhmann, and > his mentor, Parsons, both proceeded in their construction of social > systems theory by simultaneously presenting a comprehensive (general) > theory of systems. Even though their systems are obviously functional (at > the theoretical level, it is difficult to substantiate analytical > categories and complexes of categories, such as systems, as explanatory in > the sense of cause and effect), their examples provide us with some useful > groundwork in the areas of systems analysis (or modeling). Habermas' > further modifications to both Parson's work, and his collaborations with > Luhmann, are even more productive. This is because Habermas, aware of the > hermeneutical processes of reality production (including theoretical and > empirical constructions), provides the necessary critical epistemology to > carry out the analysis in a self-reflexive manner. > > I would argue, that it is not possible to transcend the "fact" of > historicity, for to do so puts one in a paradoxical position of holding > things independent of thought (or consciousness, ultimately a product of > society), which is an obvious impossibility. Even if we could exist in > this imagined ethereal realm, why would we want to step outside the > meaningful cognitive space we call knowledge? > > AA > Edward K Brown II BROWNII@hal.hahnemann.edu From andrei@rsuh.ru Tue May 28 07:45:48 1996 From: "Korotaev A." Organization: rsuh To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 17:15:08 +0300 Subject: AXIAL AGE WORLD SYSTEM Reply-to: andrei@rsuh.ru My attempt to provoke a discussion on the issues of the 5000 year old World System (or the Central [first order] world-system [intersocietal network] - it does not seem so important how we would call it) and the pre- modern world-systems/intersocietal networks in general does not appear to have been successful. I tried to do this by mentioning some South Arabian data, which to my mind did not fit into any of the proposed world[-]system models. However, I think, I should have taken into consideration the simple fact that these data are completely unknown outside a very narrow circle of specialists in this field - e.g. I have never got across any references to any of such Sabaeologist classics as Christian Robin, Muhammad `Abd al-Qa:dir Ba:faqi:h, Avraam Lundin, or A.F.L.Beeston in any of the WS papers (including the ones dealing with the WS of the 1st mil. BC - 1st mil.AD). Hence, it appears necessary to spell out the above-mentione WS-relevant South Arabian data in a bit more detail. Andrey Korotayev SOUTH ARABIA AS AN ELEMENT OF THE LONG AXIAL AGE WORLD SYSTEM (Some Theses) Andrey Korotayev 0.1. I think, the data mentioned below could be reasonably interpreted in two ways (which do not exclude each other): South Arabia could be reasonably described either as "core-exploiting" periphery of the Long Axial Age Circum-Mediterranean world-system, or as a second (or third?)-order centre of the Long Axial Age World System. 0.2. The first interpretation could be possible if we consider a periphery not as a system element necessarily exploited by the system core, but rather as such an element whose evolution is influenced by the evolution of the core to a qualitatively greater extent than its own evolution influences the evolution of the core. 0.3. The other interpretation also appears rather reasonable. It seems appropriate to speak within the pre-Modern (but not necessarily only pre-Modern) World System model about the centres of different orders (a hierarchy of centres?). In some sense it appears possible to say that within the LAA World System the South Arabians managed to create their own second (or third?) order world-system (of the world-economy rather than world- empire type) whose periphery at some periods included considerable parts of Eastern, Central and even Northern Arabia, Ethiopia and East Africa. 1. South Arabia appears to have been included into the world system in the late second 2nd - early 1st mil.BC (Old Testament, Bet Shemesh tablet, Suhu texts, Assyrian royal inscriptions, glottochronological data, Russian-Yemeni excavations at Raybu:n and other archaeological [French, Italian, American, German] materials, including radiocarbon datings] &c). This appears to have been connected with a significant (by influence, but not necessarily by numbers) migration from the North-West Arabia and seems to have gone hand in hand with the development of the Transarabian incense (but not only incense) trade and the emergence of the South Arabian civilization. 2. This trade appears to have been monopolized from the very beginning by the Sabaean Kingdom (which was also the South Arabian hegemon in the 1st half of the 1st mil.BC), though at the end of the 8th cent.BC. this monopoly seems to have been challenged by Awsa:n which apparently acquired control over the main Arabian centres of the frankincense production, which in its turn appears to have led to the Sabaean colonization of Ethiopia, the alternative source of the frankincense. The crushing defeat of the Awsanian Kingdom by the Sabaeans in the 1st half of the 7th century with the consequent reacquisition of their control over the main Arabian frankincense sources appears to have led to the end of the Sabaean interest in their Ethiopian colonies (as has been suggested most recently by Frantsouzoff). 3. By the end of the 1st half of the 1st mil.BC the Sabaean hegemony in the Arabian South comes to its end. On the other hand, one could observe the strengthening of the main rival kingdoms - Minaean, Qatabanian and Hadrami. In the second half of the 1st mil.BC the Transarabian incense trade appears to have been dominated by the Minaeans and Hadramis (as is evidenced by the Classical sources and Minaean inscriptions [found from South Arabia through Arabian North and Egypt to Delos]) who seem to have developed a direct way through the gravel passage in the Sayhad desert to bypass the competitor kingdoms. The Minaean-Hadrami frankincense monopoly appears to have been sometimes challenged by the Sabaeans, though without any stable success. The Qatabanians seem to have counteracted by the subjugating of the myrrh-producing areas of the Arabian South West corner and apparently by resuming the exploitation of the very reach East African frankincense sources. 4. At the end of the 1st mil.BC the main incense trade routes appear to have been transferred from land to sea (in direct connection with the development of the Greek navigation in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean). The Hadramis established their colony SMHRm at the most reach frankincense region on the far-away Dhofar coast (evidenced both by the Classical sources and Hadrami inscriptions). Greeks moved beyond Aden (where they previously met with the Indian merchants) and established direct connections with India (though continuing the active use of the South Arabian ports). At the end of the first century BC the newly founded (Himyarite?) Kingdom of Saba' and dhu:-Rayda:n subjugate most of the South Arabian West. As it could not be bypassed within the sea-borne pattern, it starts to play an important role in the emergent Mediterranean - Arabian - Indian transocean network. For the late 1st mil.BC - 1st century CE we have the best evidence for the patterns of the South Arabian WS participation (both through the land and sea communication lines) - mainly from the Classical sources (Agatharkhides, Strabo, Periplus Maris Erythraei, Pliny the Elder &c) covering both land-borne and sea-borne patterns. The most important points which these data elucidate: 4.a. The land-borne incense trade being controlled on the last stage by an extraterritorial merchant league led by a Minaean merchant house of the Gebbanites (= GB'N?) with the headquarters in the Qatabanian capital Timna` (according to Beeston's interpretation of Pliny which still remains to be finally proved). 4.b. The Hadrami state frankincense monopoly. 4.c. Extensive use of coerced labour in the main frankincense producing region in Dhofar (not attested for any other parts of South Arabia). 4.d. Introduction of the second harvest of frankincense by the Hadramis to increase the yields of this cash-crop to be sold on the Mediterranean markets. 4.e. The massive passive balance of trade of the "Mediterraneans" with South Arabia. 4.f. The "Mediterraneans" being sure that they are "exploited" by the South Arabians. 4.g. A failed attempt to counteract this by the direct conquest of South Arabia (Aelius Gallus campaign in 26 BC). This incidentally shows again that the hypothesis that the pre-1500 world-economies are necessarily transformed into world-empires is not true. 4.h. Important role of South Arabia in the Indian- Mediterranean trade (Periplus even evidences the own transocean trade activity of the merchants of the South Arabian West in India). 4.i. Heavy involvement of the inhabitants of the South Arabian West in the trade with East Africa where an important South Arabian trading colony (in the territory of the present-day Tanzania) under the supreme jurisdiction of the kings of Saba' and dhu:-Rayda:n is attested for the 1st cent.CE. &c. 5. The data of the literary sources is usefully supplemented by the data of other sources - archaeological, numismatic &c, such as: 5.a. The South Arabian coinage emerged in the 2nd half of the 1st mil.BC under the direct Mediterranean influence, the first SA coins being replicas of the Athenian tetradrakhma, to which ancient Yemenites soon time later started adding South Arabian letters (such coins are even found in Asia Minor; incidently South Arabians might have been the first to invent coin nominal, as it was suggested that the SA letters which the Yemenites placed on the Athena's cheek might have been used to distinguish the coins with different weights-values). An extremely strong Roman influence on the coinage of the kings of Saba' and dhu:-Rayda:n of the 1st cent.CE. 5.b. Archaeological material shows a strong hellenistic influence on the South Arabian arts by the end of the 1st mil.BC. 5.c. The recent Russian-Yemenite excavations (led by Alexander Sedov) on the site of the main ancient Hadrami port of Qana' (in the South Arabian East) provide abundant coin findings (which is also true of the Hadrami colony SMHRm in the main frankincense region of Dhofa:r excavated by the American Albright expedition), whereas coins are very rarely found in the internal Hadrami areas &c. 6. A bit (but only apparently) surprisingly the numerous South Arabian (mainly epigraphical) documents themselves provide almost no evidence on the long- distance trade (with the only important exception of the Minaean inscriptions). P.S. The above-traced pattern of the SA involvement into the world system seems to have come to its end in the 2nd century CE apparently due to the occupation of the Red Sea cost by the Ethiopians (incidently this coincides with a dramatic decline of the coinage in the SA West). This, however, does not seem to have effected the Hadrami-controlled trade of the SA East, this rather even stimulated its further development. According to the data of the Qana' expedition the 3rd century layers evidence a significant growth of the port, the appearance of the Indian artefacts not found in the 1st - 2nd cent. layers, the growth of the presence of the Mesopotamian and Gulf products. Surprisingly, the South Arabian - Mediterranean trade does not appear to have been disrupted by the 3rd cent. crisis of the Roman Empire. It might have resulted in the disappearance of the imports from the Western Mediterranean, which is, however, effectively counted by the growth of volume and diversity of imports from the Mediterranean East. Even more surprisingly there is even no direct evidence that Qana' trade has been negatively affected in the 4th century by the Christianization of the Empire (which led to a dramatic fall in the incense consumption), though the Hadrami colony SMHRm was abandoned in the 4th century after the Himyarite conquest of Hadramawt. Some decline of Qana' (and Qana' based trade) might have occurred in the 5th century which evidences some contraction of the port territory, though there no firm data for the actual contraction of the trade, the data rather indicate its restructuring with emerging very strong links with Southern Palestine, the Gulf and possibly Mesopotamia, which might be somehow connected with some evidence for the "judaization" of the town in the 5th century. The 6th century "ethiopization" seems to go hand in hand with the growth of the importance of the East African trade links (all of which fits quite well in the political history of the area known from the written sources). Yet, the economic role of SA in the WS of the 3rd-6th centuries AD remains unclear due to the general scarcity of data (both written and archaeological with the only exception of Qana') on the South Arabian trade for this period and their contradictory character. However, there is no doubt that South Arabia being a part of the WS influenced greatly its evolution - take e.g. the rapid total transition of South Arabia from the polytheistic religions to the monotheistic ones at the end of the 4th century CE, or the spectacular political events in South Arabia of the 6th century caused to a considerable extent by the SA involvement into the WS political-diplomatic networks of the time. Andrey Korotayev, Senior Research Fellow Oriental Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences 12 Rozhdestvenka, Moscow 103753, Russia ANDREI@RSUH.RU From aaustin@mtsu.edu Tue May 28 08:42:21 1996 Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 09:43:17 -0500 (CDT) From: "Andrew W. Austin" To: Salvatore Babones Subject: Re: Michael Pearson and World-Systems In-Reply-To: Salvatore Babones, Thank you for your response. Professional honesty tells me that I should inform the channel that I do not hold a PhD. But I appeciate the promotion! :) I only wish it were that easy! Peace, Andy PS - Prediction is a problematic for my position. From sbabones@jhu.edu Tue May 28 08:57:28 1996 28 May 1996 10:57:00 -0500 (EST) 28 May 1996 10:56:46 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 10:56:29 -0400 From: Salvatore Babones Subject: Re: Michael Pearson and World-Systems In-reply-to: To: "Andrew W. Austin" To Andy and the WSN list, Lest there be any confusion regarding credentials, I do not hold a Ph.D. either -- so this is a fair fight! :) I would, however, welcome comments from Doctors of Philosophy in any case, if you're willing to descend into the minor leagues here. I will (hopefully) attain the rank of Doctor of Philosophy in 1998. If any of you would like to snatch me up before all the job offers come pouring in, I'm open to discussion. Yours, Salvatore From brownii@hal.hahnemann.edu Tue May 28 11:17:41 1996 wsn@csf.colorado.edu; Tue, 28 May 1996 13:24:08 -0400 (EDT) 28 May 1996 13:15:19 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 13:15:19 -0500 (EST) From: "Edward K. Brown II" Subject: Re: Michael Pearson and World-Systems To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Transcendence is not the removal of cognition for a behavoral aesthetic. Transcendence is the removal of fact so that others who do not exist historically or geographically (in time and space) can understand and use the resulting theory or system described. Facts are only locii to a specfic cognition or behaviorism. Nothing more, nothing less. Knowledge can be practiced in theory. Knowledge can be studied in history. Ed Brown II On Mon, 27 May 1996, Andrew W. Austin wrote: > > How can one transcend the "fact" of historicity? Why would someone want > > to? The recognition of historicity is a plus, not a hindrance. To be aware > > of the social construction process (and its roots in the larger world > > construction process of the particular sociohistorical epoch in which that > > awareness is embedded) involved in theorizing about scientific > > constructions of theories and models (all social constructions) provides > > the critical epistemology necessary for generating the most comprehensive > > analysis of the sociohistorical forms under investigation. Luhmann, and > > his mentor, Parsons, both proceeded in their construction of social > > systems theory by simultaneously presenting a comprehensive (general) > > theory of systems. Even though their systems are obviously functional (at > > the theoretical level, it is difficult to substantiate analytical > > categories and complexes of categories, such as systems, as explanatory in > > the sense of cause and effect), their examples provide us with some useful > > groundwork in the areas of systems analysis (or modeling). Habermas' > > further modifications to both Parson's work, and his collaborations with > > Luhmann, are even more productive. This is because Habermas, aware of the > > hermeneutical processes of reality production (including theoretical and > > empirical constructions), provides the necessary critical epistemology to > > carry out the analysis in a self-reflexive manner. > > > > I would argue, that it is not possible to transcend the "fact" of > > historicity, for to do so puts one in a paradoxical position of holding > > things independent of thought (or consciousness, ultimately a product of > > society), which is an obvious impossibility. Even if we could exist in > > this imagined ethereal realm, why would we want to step outside the > > meaningful cognitive space we call knowledge? > > > > AA Edward K Brown II BROWNII@hal.hahnemann.edu From rross@vax.clarku.edu Tue May 28 12:34:53 1996 Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 14:37:32 -0500 (EST) From: "ROBERT J.S. (BOB) ROSS, CHAIR OF SOCIOLOGY" Subject: Position Announcement, Clark University To: Progressive Sociology Network , WORLD SYSTEMS Network Dear PSN, WSN, The attached position announcement is self-explanatory. Please help us by making sure graduate students (or others) see it. The ad is in the ASA Employment Bulletin, and I will be interviewing in NYC during the ASA. Queries may be directed to me by email. Best wishes, Bob _____________________________ Clark University. The Department of Sociology invites applications for a tenure track Assistant Professor position to begin in Fall of 1997. The successful candidate will teach a Classical Theory course and two courses on mass media which are part of an interdisciplinary program in Communication, Culture and Society. One of these should be a Media and Society overview. Teaching duties include five courses per year. Clark University and the Sociology Department are looking for committed, high quality teacher-scholars, with Ph.D. in hand, to carry forward a tradition of collegiate excellence in a University setting. Please send a curriculum vita and a letter describing your teaching and research interests. If available, include sample course syllabi and course evaluations. In addition, have three letters of recommendation forwarded to us. Please send all materials to: Robert J.S. Ross, Chair, Department of Sociology, Clark University, 950 Main Street, Worcester, MA 01610. E-Maill: rross@vax.clarku.edu . Consideration of applications will begin on October 30, 1996, and continue until the position is filled. Clark University is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Employer. Minorities and women are especially encouraged to apply. From TEIVO@desco.org.pe Tue May 28 13:41:03 1996 via sendmail with smtp id for ; Tue, 28 May 96 14:38:52 -0400 (EDT) (/\##/\ Smail3.1.30.13 #30.1 built 18-apr-96) via sendmail with smtp id for ; Tue, 28 May 96 14:30:24 -0400 (WET DST) From: "Teivo Teivainen" Organization: DESCO To: sbabones@jhu.edu, wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 14:45:47 EST -0500 Subject: Re: Michael Pearson and World-Systems >. Wallerstein defines a world-system in terms of the division > of labor, which is a good start, but Wallerstein's definition contains the > all-too-often-forgotten implication that a world-empire is NOT a > world-system, and thus we must talk not of the many world-systems in > history, but of THE world-system, the "Modern World-System". Change -- > really significant sociological change -- only begins in the > Wallersteinian system with the inception of the Modern World-System. As far as I remember (here in Lima, I do not have the books nearby, so correct me if I am wrong), the Wallersteinian scheme does indeed define a world-system in terms of a division of labor, but by no means implies that a world-empire would not be a world-system. Quite the opposite: a world-empire is a world-system with a unified political structure. Thereby (and for other reasons as well), Wallersteinians should be able to talk of many world-systems and systemic changes in history even before the inception of the MWS. Cheers and best of luck, teivo Teivo Teivainen DESCO (Centro de Estudios y Promocion del Desarrollo) Leon de la Fuente 110 Lima 17, Peru fax: (51-1-) 264-0128 tel: (51-1-) 264-1316 (oficina) tel: (51-1-) 440-0354 (domicilio) email: teivo@desco.org.pe From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Tue May 28 15:16:33 1996 Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 17:16:27 -0400 (EDT) From: "A. Gunder Frank" To: Michael Pearson Subject: Re: Gunder Frank and World Systems Well never mind about 5 thousand years for now, but it is simnply not correct that "all the evidence shows that India could not compete with EuropE since all the evidence shows that it OUT competed it on virtually every score. China did even more so. And THAT does bear on the "capitalism" argument. Alas Marx and Weber got it WRONG when the saw/wrote that something like that started in Europe and spread from there to the rest of the world. I dunno what synchronic or wahtever is suposed to mean, but I alos dunno why its suposed to be bad! sort of the opposite of "I dunno what it is, but I know i dont like it!" regards gunder frank From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Tue May 28 15:18:29 1996 Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 17:18:11 -0400 (EDT) From: "A. Gunder Frank" To: Michael Pearson Subject: Re: Gunder Frank and World Systems I should have takne Mike Pearson up on his last sentence. I dont doubt that Gunder Frank falls short, but the poiunt is that Marx, Weber and apparently Mike fall far shorter still! agf From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Tue May 28 15:24:44 1996 Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 17:24:39 -0400 (EDT) From: "A. Gunder Frank" To: Salvatore Babones Subject: Re: Cycles of Hegemony In-Reply-To: The trouble with Salvatore's "hegemony" as with the others is that IF there was any, it was only in the small European w-e/s pond, which was only a small part of the world economic ocean. So that the very terms "hegemony" was sense-less in world political economic terms, eg in the world economy. gunder frank From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Tue May 28 15:32:08 1996 Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 17:31:57 -0400 (EDT) From: "A. Gunder Frank" To: Salvatore Babones Subject: Re: Michael Pearson and World-Systems In-Reply-To: The point Salvatore seems to be misisng is that IF there is any sense to the existence of a w s [long] before 1500 or 1800, then that has implications for what happened AFTER that date too. And one imnplication is that it is NOT "of course true" that we can trace back as per Wallerstein. That is we can, but we risk tracing in the wrong directioin, just backward within Europe. What happened in Europe in 1500, 1800 or whenever can only be accounted for in the WORLD economic terms of its relations primarily with Asia, within the structure/operation of a single world economy! agf From ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au Tue May 28 20:02:08 1996 Date: Wed, 29 May 1996 12:00:37 +1000 From: "Bruce R. McFarling" Subject: Re: Gunder Frank and World Systems In-reply-to: To: "A. Gunder Frank" On Tue, 28 May 1996, A. Gunder Frank wrote: > Well never mind about 5 thousand years for now, but > it is simnply not correct that "all the evidence shows that India could > not compete with EuropE since all the evidence shows that it OUT competed it > on virtually every score. China did even more so. And THAT does bear > on the "capitalism" argument. Alas Marx and Weber got it WRONG when > the saw/wrote that something like that started in Europe and spread from > there to the rest of the world. I am not clear on why the point that in, say, 1500 AD, India and/or China outcompeted Europe affects the evolution of capitalism in Europe argument. It is something of a commonplace in the emergence of technological innovations that they do not tend to come from the core of the current technological regime, nor do they tend to come from the absolute 'middle of nowhere' (from the perspective of the core), but they come from the fringe. For example, the emergence of the U.S. automobile industry in Detroit. If Europe was semi-peripheral (I'm assuming here both that that is the correct temr for this 'fringe', and that there is historical evidence to back this status), how does the pre-eminanence of India and/or China conflict with the following story? Europe starts out developing a complex of technological innovations originally in a drive to gain access to the core, but that then emerges as a crucial strategic technology. Whether or not 'capitalism' is coincidental to this technological regime or an essential part of it, this new found strategic dominance would then result in the spread of capitalist institutions. Oh, and I would note that everyone should feel free to hammer this casual story into whatever shape it has to be hammered in order to fit with the historical evidence. I am entirely out of my depth with all this Asian history (including the Southern and Western subcontinents of Asia). Virtually, Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au From ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au Tue May 28 20:06:58 1996 Date: Wed, 29 May 1996 12:05:30 +1000 From: "Bruce R. McFarling" Subject: Re: Michael Pearson and World-Systems In-reply-to: To: "A. Gunder Frank" On Tue, 28 May 1996, A. Gunder Frank wrote: > The point Salvatore seems to be misisng is that IF there is any sense > to the existence of a w s [long] before 1500 or 1800, then that has > implications for what happened AFTER that date too. > And one imnplication is that it is NOT "of course true" that we can trace > back as per Wallerstein. That is we can, but we risk tracing in the wrong > directioin, just backward within Europe. What happened in Europe in 1500, > 1800 or whenever can only be accounted for in the WORLD economic terms > of its relations primarily with Asia, within the structure/operation of a > single world economy! Is this existence of a World System or World-System? And is it possible, as suggested in the casual story of my last message, that the World System emerges as a result of efforts of participants in a non-pre-eminent World-System to improve their contact with the pre-eminent World-System of the day? In other words, does a new, more encompassing World-System have to emerge due to the expansion of a previous, less encompassing World-System, or can it emerge by accretion of previous, less encompassing, World-Systems? And, of course, my apology if I have got World System and World-System turned around. It should be obvious if I have, so if I have I hope it will be corrected in this forum. Virtually, Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au From harlowc@tidepool.com Wed May 29 02:08:50 1996 Date: Thu, 29 Feb 1996 01:07:46 -0800 From: Christian To: agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: Re: Gunder Frank and World Systems References: In a general sense, we should stop tying to make history some sort of nice anecdote, intetions organized around our own ego/self fulfillment. Theoretical history should be composed of hypothectical/abstract statements that can be utilized to describe historical reality as a process. This process exceeds the repetoire of common knowledge and therefore must have a critical/hermeneutical elelment, designed to see through our foreFathers ideological constructs. Here are mine: Cheers to Frank and Gills for starting and shame on them for not exploring all of the implications of their recent findings. Human beings have existed in a symbolic state for well-over 15,000 yrs. Regarding our condition, I accept some basic sociological understandings: George Herbert Mead has described the process of (socialization) becoming a human better than anyone, irregardless of very valid critigue (especially in regards to the inherently conservative nature of SI). No other has approached the sophistication of Mead. Persons have dug in graves and extrapolated, yet still; one must deal with Meads ontology in order to properly discuss theoretical history. Symbolic experience is primal to humanity. Another who deserves respect is Buddha and Eastern philosophy in a general sense. Life is one interconnected web; we must finally accept this; empirically, theoretically, im lebenswelt! Anyways, now what? This does nothing outside of the existential realm. Isn't there some structures that have been prevalent since the very begining of "human beingness" (Here I'm referring to the symbolic nature of human beings). Symbolism makes us human. This is crucial if we wish to understand history or humanity. Hmm...What is symbolism? Isn't it experiencing the word (mental construct), as oppossed to the thing itself? Yes, and this is humanity's problem. The antecedents of the 15,000 yr world system are planted firmly in the symbolic soil of humaness. We are alienated from our environment and have been since the dawn of symbolism. Alienation is equal to Buddhist "dislocation". We no longer 'experience the thing'. Rather we experience the word. This is not just some tired rant about "cultural mediation of experience". The implications of this thought pattern stretch deep in the very fabric of sociology and every human beings existential experience. If one is desperate, as most are who oppose the capitalist status quo, we can create in our minds a discreet capitalist system! However if we employ a long term/historical the basic structures and patterns of society becom more obvious and clear. You quickly learn that the hierarchical structure of "capitalism" has its roots, if not its genesis, in the neolithic revolution. Some may not be able to deal with the metaphysical aspects of this posting, however, thats alright by me because WST's fundamental flaw is is lack of a metaphysical/political/spiritual orientation. I think most remember Carl Dassbach's inquiry as to whether WST's analysis was losing its criticl element. It should sit in our souls yelling at us until we accept its condemnation of academia. Only Terry Boswell responded. Probably the most important question posed on this list. Who would beg to differ? WST has forgotten the essential element of historical materialism: Class Struggle. I'll leave just this one assertion open because it has the kind of self-evident validity that; so simple that it actually introduces complexity beyond the boundaries of the current disscussion. To put it straight: Gunder is leading a path that even he can't comprehend. Actually Sanderson, Moldeski, Chase-Dunn, McNeil, etc...., have all located structural conditions that prevail throughout human history. The incompleteness of these approaches is probably best explained by the narrow "Western" perspective employed. Yet the Eastern approacches fall short on exaclty the Western strength: Structural Patterns! Once this Juxtapostion has been thouroughly developed, we shall have the richest understanding of our condition possible at this time. I'll suggest a few things: 1. Human beings are alienated/dislocated from their interdependency with their social/natural environments. 2. Alienatiion leads to seperation leading to individualism and self interest. 3. Self-Interest (the result of socializaton-per Mead!) is the micro-level foundation to the neolithic "agrarian" societies and so-called "captitalist" society. 4. The antecedents of structural formation in human beings are to be found in the process of becomin human: Socialization. What are the eschatalogical implications of such a postion? Niether Frank nor Wallerstein have dealt with what WST means to the lives of those who do and don't understand it. How do humans create meaning in This! World System? Whats wrong with the system and and how do we affect it for the better. I don't care what -chronic approach we take, however lets accept commonality in the face of difference (and vice-versa) or we go nowhere. The structural antecedents to accumulation are humanities symbolic nature: and these are the headwaters of the world system. Enlighntenment and Communism look like hand and glove from here! Sincerely, Christian Harlow UC Santa Cruz harlowc@tidepool.com From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Wed May 29 07:31:15 1996 Date: Wed, 29 May 1996 09:31:04 -0400 (EDT) From: "A. Gunder Frank" To: Teivo Teivainen Subject: Re: Michael Pearson and World-Systems In-Reply-To: <1EC05F3F02@desco.org.pe> IMHO two of the most confusing and misleading Wallerstein distinctions are 1. world empire/system 2. luxuries/bulk goods. Both have obfuscated far more than they have clarified. gunder frank From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Wed May 29 08:05:38 1996 Date: Wed, 29 May 1996 10:05:32 -0400 (EDT) From: "A. Gunder Frank" To: "Bruce R. McFarling" Subject: Re: Michael Pearson and World-Systems I would be happy to send to Bruce something of mine that calrifies my position on the related questions he raises. but in brief 1. yes the tech innovation does come from the periphery/margin - but not from outside the system. 2. the periph/margin is pressureds into the tech innov by and takes advantage of crisis in the center to make its NIE move like east asia today. thats waht West Europe did around 1800. 3. that means the "system" was loing pre-exiting, and both Asia and Europe were in it, only in different positions, and these poistions within the system changed after 1800 - temporarily! 4. but thats not because Europe had different or better "institutions" that grew up there between 11/13/1500 and 1800, and still less for "exceptionalist" European reasons, and to call these "capitalist" does not clarify , but instead obscures what happend on a world economic level, and THAT it happend on a world econ level but within Europe and not IN europe and spread to elsewhere. THAT is why what happend in China and India before 1800 is relavant to this story, which was Bruce's first question. regards gunder frank From aaustin@mtsu.edu Wed May 29 22:24:39 1996 Date: Wed, 29 May 1996 23:25:45 -0500 (CDT) From: "Andrew W. Austin" To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: Re: Human Nature, Socialism, Science In-Reply-To: I just thought of a cultural universal. Took a while, I know. But it occurs to me that people from around the world agree: Parmesan cheese smells like human vomit. (Sorry, that was used on me in a discussion on these matters the other day. I thought it was very cute, so I thought I would share it. Okay, okay, a little over the top...) :) Andy Austin From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Thu May 30 09:18:12 1996 Date: Thu, 30 May 1996 11:18:07 -0400 (EDT) From: "A. Gunder Frank" To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: Re: Gunder Frank and World Systems (fwd) ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 30 May 1996 13:35:07 +1000 From: Bruce R. McFarling To: "A. Gunder Frank" Subject: Re: Gunder Frank and World Systems On Wed, 29 May 1996, A. Gunder Frank wrote: > Thanks to Bruce for the clarification, and thgat strengthens my position > i think. I'll note I was trying to send the message offlist, while this appears written for the list. If I succeeded in sending the message offlist, and you simply replied to it, this message came to me directly and not to wsn. > I am prepared to cite and argue at length about why doing > synchronic "horizointally integrative marcohiatory" [the words are from > the late Joe Fletcher] is THE important task in history, and not > the "vertical" "Diachronic" type - unless of course it is > WHOLE world diachrconic! - which means its also synchronic for each > moment/period in time. And, BTW, that's one of the appeals of GST to me compared to a lot of the abstract system theories: 'dynamic' theories with all process and no structure seem to have to import their 'entities' form outside the theory: by assumption, or worse by uncritical reification. The diachronic / synchronic loop, in which all structures are produced and reproduced by processes, while the feasible range of process outcomes are limited by the prevailing system structure, permits the entity of the system analysis to be inside the theory. Uhhm. Well, speaking in a rough sort of way, I mean. Virtually, Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au From ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au Fri May 31 01:39:26 1996 Date: Fri, 31 May 1996 17:39:11 +1000 From: "Bruce R. McFarling" Subject: Re: Michael Pearson and World-Systems In-reply-to: To: "A. Gunder Frank" On Wed, 29 May 1996, A. Gunder Frank wrote: > I would be happy to send to Bruce something of mine that calrifies my > position on the related questions he raises. but in brief > 1. yes the tech innovation does come from the periphery/margin - but > not from outside the system. This gets straight at the heart of the complex of questions: obviously, if with different notion of the intensity and variety of interactions required to identify a world system, then on a stringent criteria what looks like a peripheral world system developing transportation innovations that permit it to link up with a more advanced world-system is, on less stringent criteria, a peripheral area *in* a world system improving its connection to the core. And there is always the question whether saying this is 'either/or' is false reification: one could well see a fractal pattern, where 'the core' and 'the peripheral area', at a more global scale, turn out to be composed of their own cores and peripheries when you look at more local scale. > 2. the periph/margin is pressureds into the tech innov by and takes > advantage of crisis in the center to make its NIE move like east asia > today. thats waht West Europe did around 1800. Does this presuppose that among the peripheral areas there is one with a superior capability to exploit this crisis, or is it just happenstance? > 3. that means the "system" was long pre-existing, and both Asia and > Europe were in it, only in different positions, and these poistions > within the system changed after 1800 - temporarily! Here is a point where there may be a difference between the historical narrative and an argument based upon that narrative. If "that means" is intended to means that points 1 and 2 themselves imply that the system was long-existing -- I don't see that they do. The system could well be relatively novel; the peripheral area concerned could well be a relative newcomer; and dealing with the new configuration could wel be the source of the crisis. I would be highly skeptical that one could draw that specific conclusion on the basis of the first two observations. But, of course, 'that means' could be intended to convey the assertion as a clarifying elaboration, and 'long-existing' refer to historical evidence regarding the duration of the system. > 4. but thats not because Europe had different or better "institutions" > that grew up there between 11/13/1500 and 1800, and still less for > "exceptionalist" European reasons, and to call these "capitalist" does > not clarify , but instead obscures what happend on a world economic > level, and THAT it happend on a world econ level but within Europe and not > IN europe and spread to elsewhere. THAT is why what happend in China and > India before 1800 is relavant to this story, which was Bruce's first > question. Obviously, the most significant innovations for Europe in the three hundred years preceding have to be the transportation innovations, because that's where the Americas come in. And perhaps the boom in agricultural productivity from the potato, maize, the tomato, new legumes, etc. is not explained very successfully in terms of 'capitalism'. But this seems to lead into the same question: if the crisis due to the rise of European power, or is European power due to the crisis? Or both? Or neither? Virtually, Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au From cdemars@voyager.net Fri May 31 05:46:58 1996 Date: Fri, 31 May 1996 07:46:43 -0400 (EDT) To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: cdemars@voyager.net (Curt De Mars-Johnson) Hello, Please remove me from the WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK. Too many "bulk" transmissions. Thanks. curt Demars-Johnson From andrei@rsuh.ru Fri May 31 08:40:50 1996 From: "Korotaev A." Organization: rsuh To: Mitch Allen Date: Fri, 31 May 1996 18:30:48 +0300 Subject: Re:Re: AXIAL AGE WORLD SYSTEM Reply-to: andrei@rsuh.ru On Tue, 28 May 1996 16:24:05 GMT Mitch Allen wrote: > I'm somewhat doubtful of your claim of separate world system [note that I of course spoke about world-system - A.K.] status for > South Arabia, since it seems to have largely grown in response to trade > demands from the Mediterranean and southern Mesopotamia. If anything, it > seems to be peripheral to those states, particularly in light of the > increaseing interest of Assyrian, Babylonian, and Persian kings in S. > Arabian products over the 8th-6th centuries, the very centuries that showed > considerable development in S. Arabian society. That coinage was borrowed > from the north is a good indicator that this is not an indigenous development. I would remind that in the AXIAL AGE WORLD SYSTEM I maintained that: > 0.1. I think, the data mentioned below could be reasonably > interpreted in two ways (which do not exclude each > other): South Arabia could be reasonably described > either as "core-exploiting" periphery of the Long Axial > Age Circum-Mediterranean world-system, or as a second > (or third?)-order centre of the Long Axial Age World System. > 0.2. The first interpretation could be possible if we > consider a periphery not as a system element necessarily > exploited by the system core, but rather as such an > element whose evolution is influenced by the evolution > of the core to a qualitatively greater extent than its > own evolution influences the evolution of the core. Hence, I do not see how Allen's "objections contradict what I said". What I meant when I said that the Axial Age South-Arabia-centered intersocietal network could be also viewed as a (second - third order) world-system (not world system) is as follows: If one insists that the WS periphery cannot by definition be "core-exploiting" "capital-accumilating", then the above-mentioned entity could be rather described as a second (or third?)-order centre of the Long Axial Age World System. hierarchy of centres?). In some sense it appears also possible to say that within the LAA World System the South Arabians managed to create their own second (or third?) order world-system due to the following additional reasons. At the beginning the emerging South Arabian civilization could be undoubtfully characterized as a peryphery of the Near Eastern world-system (and the World System in general?). But rather soon the South Arabian intersocietal network acquired a considerable degree of autonomy and complexity. It began resembling more and more a "normal" world-economy with its own core, semiperiphery and periphery, hegemony cycles &c. E.g., for most of the second half of the 1st mil.BC one could describe the areas of Shabwah (the Hadrami center), the Wadis Jawf (the Minaean centre) and Bayhan (the Qatabanian center) as the tricentric core of the South Arabian w-s, the Sabaean Kingdom and some adjacent areas as its semi-periphery (sometimes struggling to move to the core), whereas the incense-producing areas of the SW Highlands, Dhofar and East Africa (as well as some areas of the Central and North Arabia) could be regarded as its periphery. Incidentally, this observation resembles very much what Bruce R. McFarling" wrote on Fri, 31 May 1996 17:39: > one could well see a fractal pattern, where 'the core' > and 'the peripheral area', at a more global scale, turn out to be > composed of their own cores and peripheries when you look at more > local scale. Andrey Korotayev, Senior Research Fellow Oriental Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences 12 Rozhdestvenka, Moscow 103753, Russia ANDREI@RSUH.RU