From gehrig@banyan.doc.gov Mon Jun 3 08:46:10 1996 Date: Mon, 3 Jun 1996 08:46:08 -0600 (MDT) From: Mark Shields To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Call for Papers X-Incognito-SN: 234 X-Incognito-Format: VERSION=1.60g ENCRYPTED=NO Forwarded to: i[wsn@csf.colorado.edu] cc: Comments by: Greg Ehrig@USOTP@TA -------------------------- [Original Message] ------------------------- Call for Papers on "Equality and Inequality in Information Societies" A Special Issue of *Social Science Computer Review* (1998 volume) Manuscript Submission Deadline: September 1, 1997 Social Science Computer Review invites submissions for a special thematic issue on "Equality and Inequality in Information Societies." Contributions are welcome from a broad range of disciplinary, theoretical, and research-methodological perspectives, addressing domestic and/or cross-national dimensions of stratification such as class, education, ethnicity, gender, income, race, politics, and status. Papers that combine empirical, theoretical, and/or policy analysis are especially welcome, as are historical and/or contemporary comparative analyses. Authors are encouraged to contact the editor before submitting formal manuscripts. Manuscripts should be 25-35 double-spaced pages, with footnotes, references, tables, and charts on separate pages, and should follow the journal's current style. An abstract of no more than 250 words, and a brief biographical paragraph, should accompany the manuscript. Deadline for manuscript submission: September 1, 1997. Send 3 copies to Mark A. Shields, Division of Technology, Culture, and Communication, School of Engineering and Applied Science, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22903, (804) 924-3234, Fax (804) 924-4306; E-mail, mas4n@virginia.edu. SSCR is a quarterly journal of Sage Publications devoted to social science research and applications in computing and information technology. For more information about the journal, including style guide and contents of recent issues, see SSCR's Web site: http://hcl.chass.ncsu.edu/sscore/sscore.htm ---------------------------------------------- Mark A. Shields Division of Technology, Culture, and Communication Thornton Hall/SEAS University of Virginia Charlottesville, VA 22903 Phone: (804) 924-3234 Fax: (804) 924-4306 ---------------------------------------------- From andrei@rsuh.ru Mon Jun 3 09:52:36 1996 From: "Korotaev A." Organization: rsuh To: David Lloyd-Jones Date: Mon, 3 Jun 1996 19:41:20 +0300 Subject: Re: AXIAL AGE WORLD SYSTEM Reply-to: andrei@rsuh.ru On Tue, 28 May 1996 20:42:59 David Lloyd-Jones wrote: > I think your problem is that the proposition that the South Arabian > frankincence monopoly was exploitative of the metropolitan centre looked > like satire. I mean _frankincense_? Wasn't the stuff cross elastic with > myrrh, fer goshsakes? How can you run a monopoly when there are substitutes > on every bush? To say nothing of the guy with the funny complexion and the > tired camel selling something he calls tiger balm... > > Look at it this way: if somebody had set out deliberately to write a send-up > on this inbred flock of loons, could they possibly have come up with > anything as wonderful as your story? If there are any doubts about the very possibility of effective frankincense monopoly (and, hence, the "core-exploiting periphery of the South Arabian type"), I have to quote a bit from some original (Classical) sources: "Adjacent to the Astramitae is another district, the Minaei, through whose territory the transit for the export of the frankincense is along one narrow track. It was these people who originated the trade and who chiefly practise it, and from them the perfume takes the name of "Minaean"; none of the Arabs beside these have ever seen an incense-tree, and not even all of these, and it is said that there are not more than 3000 families who retain the right of trading in it as a hereditary property..." (Pliny XII.xxx.54; transl. by H.Rackham). "Frankincense after being collected is conveyed to Sabota [the Hadrami capital Shabwah - A.K.] on camels, one of the gates of the city being opened for its admission; the kings have made it a capital offence for camels so laden to turn aside from the high road" (Pliny XII.xxxii.63; transl. by H.Rackham). "After these, a designated harbour for loading the Sachalite frankincense, called Moscha Limen... Neither covertly nor overtly can frankincense be loaded aboard a ship without royal permission..." (Periplus Maris Erythraei, 34; 1st cent.CE; transl. by L.Casson). Agatharchides on the South Arabians ("Sabaeans"; 3rd cent.BC; transl. by St.M.Burstein): "They transport cargoes of various sorts including specially an aromatic plant which grows in the interior..." (apud Photius, Cod. 250.101, 459a). "No nation seems to be more prosperous than the Sabaeans and Gerrhaeans since they the ones who distribute everything from Asia and Europe that is considered valuable... In general, there is a great difference between their wealth and that of others." (apud Photius, Cod. 250.102, 459a-459b). "This tribe surpasses in wealth ... not only the nearby Arabs but also the rest of the mankind. For in the exchange and sale of their wares, they, of all people who engage in trade for the sake of the exchange of silver, receive the highest price for goods of the smallest bulk" (Diodorus 3.47.5-8). See also e.g. Strabo 26.4.19, C778 &c. "...They are the richest races in the world, because vast wealth from Rome and Parthia accumulates in their hands, as they sell the produce they obtain from the sea or their forests and buy nothing in return" (Pliny VI.xxxii.162; transl. by H.Rackham). Cp. Periplus' description of trade in the South Arabian port Muza: "Merchandise for which it offers a market are: purple cloth, ... Arab sleeved clothing, ... blankets, in limited number, ....unguent, moderate amount; MONEY, CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT; wine and grain, limited quantity because the region produces wheat in moderate quantity and wine in greater" (Periplus Maris Erythraei, 24; 1st cent.CE; transl. by L.Casson; emphasis added - A.K.). "Frankincense, myrrh, cassia, cinnamon, and ladanum grow in Arabia alone of all countries. ... Over the trees that bear frankincense winged snakes stand guard, small in size and varied in appearance, a mass of them about each tree" (Herodotus 3.107; 5th cent.BC; transl. by L.Casson). See also similar stories in Photius, Cod. 250.98, 458b; Diodorus 3.47.1-2; Strabo 16.4.19, C778; Pliny XII. xvii. 85 &c. Of special interest is Pliny's (1st CE) commentary on such stories: "... these tales having been invented by the natives to raise the price of their commodities" (Pliny XII.xvii.85-86; transl. by H.Rackham). See also e.g. Pliny XII.xxx.51-52 (transl. by H.Rackham): "The chief products of Arabia then are frankincense and myrrh; the latter it shares also with the Cave-dwellers Country [in the African Horn region - A.K.], but no country beside Arabia produces frankincense, and not even the whole of Arabia". - Of course frankincense is also produced in the African Horn area, and the South Arabians must have known this very well due to their colonization of this area and control over this area's trade (see below). Hence, Pliny's (and many others') data look very much like another piece of the rather effective South Arabian "monopoly procuring disinformation" of the Mediterranneans. Also with respect to the possible South Arabian (Qatabanian?) monopoly on the cinnamon of the African Horn (one should take into consideration that the Ancient cinnamon was not the South-East Asian product we know now, but rather bark of another plant endemic to the African Horn, as has been convincingly shown by P.Crone [Crone, P., Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987]): "Cinnamomum, which is the same thing as cinnamon, grows in Ethiopia, which is linked by intermarriage with the Cave- dwellers [Troglodytis - A.K.]. The latter buy it from their neighbours and convey it over the wide seas... A west-north-west wind brings them to the harbour of the Gebbanitae [Qatabanians? The Minaean- Qatabanian Ahl Gab'a:n merchant league? - A.K.] called Ocilia [the present day Shaykh Sa`u:d Harbour on the Arabian Red Sea coast near Ba:b al-Mandab - A.K.]... In return for their wares they bring back articles of glass and copper, clothing, and buckles, bracelets and necklaces..." (Pliny XII.xvii.86-88; transl. by H.Rackham). "The right of controlling the sale of cinnamon is vested solely in the king of the Gebbanitae" (Pliny XII.xvii.86-88; transl. by H.Rackham). On some East African regions as a periphery of the South Arabian "world- system": "Two runs beyond this island comes the very last port of trade on the coast of Azania, called Rhapta [on the present-day Tanzanian coast - A.K.]... The region is under the rule of the governor of Mapharites [al-Ma`a:fir/M`FRm area in the South West of the Yemen Highlands - A.K.], since by some ancient right it is subject to the kingdom of Arabia as first constituted. The merchants of Muza [most likely the predecessor of the famous Medieval Mocca/al-Mukha:' - A.K.] hold it through a grant from the king and collect taxes from it. They send out to it merchant craft that they staff mostly with Arab skippers and agents who, through continual intercourse and intermarriage, are familiar with the area and its language. The principal imports into these ports of trade are: spears from Muza OF LOCAL WORKMANSHIP; axes; knives..." (Periplus Maris Erythraei, 16-17; 1st cent.CE; transl. by L.Casson; emphasis added - A.K.). See also Pliny: "A kind [of myrrh - A.K.] highly spoken of is also imported from islands, and the Sabaei even cross the sea to the Cave- dwellers' Country [in the African Horn region - A.K.]to procure it" (Pliny XII.xxxiii.66; transl. by H.Rackham). From chriscd@jhu.edu Tue Jun 4 15:03:54 1996 04 Jun 1996 16:33:03 -0500 (EST) 04 Jun 1996 16:10:35 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 04 Jun 1996 14:56:34 -0600 (CST) From: chris chase-dunn Subject: Re: pearson et al. Sender: chriscd@jhu.edu To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu X-NUPop-Charset: English ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 29 May 1996 20:42:43 +0000 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: Immanuel Wallerstein Subject: pearson et al. may 30, 1996 dear colleagues: mike pearson and i are in greater accord than he thinks, since where he says he disagrees he misinterprets my position. i believe that unequal exchange only exists within systems, and when trade is between systems, it is equal, and therefore non-exploitative. and i believe with him that . indeed, i believe that is what constitutes trade between systems. such trade i call trade in luxuries. luxury lends itself to misunderstanding since it has such a loaded meaning within our own culture. all i mean by luxury is something highly valued by buyer (thus luxury in sense of highly valued) and not valued by seller (hence, luxury in sense of dispensable); thus what pearson calls "differing use value", which he acknowledges is a point i made in my article on the ottoman empire. incidentally, the term is also subject to misinterpretation. an has location only with respect to another system, and always implies reciprocity. hence, in the seventeenth century, in my view, the mughal empire was in the of the european world-economy, but that means, ex definitio, that was in the external arena of the mughal empire. if one is discussing the functioning of the european world-economy, we can speak of the mughal empire as being in ITS external arena. but if we are discussing the mughal empire, obviously then we refer to portugal as being in ITS external arena. external arena implies no hierarchy whatsoever. that is precisely its difference with . i am pleased to learn from salvatore babones that i, along with gunder frank, am a "discoverer". if gunder will play columbus, i'll be happy to be americus vespucius. it seems discoverers discover facts; it then remains to integrate them into a theoretical whole. here, i fear i agree 100% with gunder: history IS theory. these are not and never can be two separate activities. this is the old idiographic-nomothetic split, which we must bury, bury, bury. in any case, babones has me wrong on world-systems. ALL human activity takes place within systems, the kind of systems i call . all systems have limited lives (hence my disagreement with gunder). my position has always been that there have been three known types of systems, and a fourth type one might deduce but we have never seen. one type is what i called and which no longer exist anywhere. all three other types are : to wit, world-empires, world-economies, and world government (the theorized type). world-empires are of course systems, have unequal structures and know exploitation, but function according to different rules than world-economies. i have never done extensive analysis of world-empires. others have. i have studied . there have been many world-economies, but only one that survived long enough to institutionalize its necessary mode of production, capitalism. that is the . having survived, it did transform the world, and we are living in it. why the modern world-system could survive whereas previous versions did not is a difficult question, which i attempted most recently to answer in an article in REVIEW (vol. xv, 4, 1992). i won't repeat the explanation, except to say that the argument is that it reflects not the success of the west, but its failure in preventing the virus from escaping. yours/immanuel wallerstein Prof. Immanuel Wallerstein Maison des Sciences de l'Homme 54, boul. Raspail 75270 Paris Cedex 06 France Tel: (33) (1) 49.54.20.48 FAX: (33) (1) 45.48.83.53 Email: From andrei@rsuh.ru Wed Jun 5 05:46:59 1996 From: "Korotaev A." Organization: rsuh To: iwaller@msh-paris.fr Date: Wed, 5 Jun 1996 15:36:09 +0300 Subject: wallerstein, pearson et al. Reply-to: andrei@rsuh.ru In my first ever posting to WSN (of Thu, 23 May 1996 19:06:08) I maintained: I think Pearson has completely succeded in drawing our attention precisely to real WSN issues raising most pressing question of reconstructing the traditional world system approach which looks now more and more defective, especially clearly with the treatment of the pre-Modern intersocietal communiction networks (and of course [though it appears a bit less self-evident] with respect to the Modern one).Pearson paper calls again for the substitution of the primitive and simplistic core - s/periphery-periphery scheme with more sophisticated and appropriate categories, or at least for a radical reconstruction of these categories. After presenting some relevant South Arabian data (to which I added some more data in my postings of 28, 31 May and 3 June) I concluded: I just find the traditional world system categories and approaches completely inapproprite to deal with the material I work with and completely support the call (inherent in Perason's paper) for the radical reconstruction of the WS theory. Hence, instead of discussing secondary parapolitical points basing ourselves on the assumption that the WS theory is something finally proved and established and it could be considered a firm ground to discuss anything it seems more appropriate to think if this ground is really firm, if it is safe to discuss anything on it. May be it is more reasonable to create such a ground first? Now I must say that all the discussion which has followed the original Pearson's posting has just convinsed me that I was right. All the attempts to fit the uncomfortable data into the old scheme does not appear successful at all. E.g. Wallerstein wrote on Thu May 30 00:51:02 1996: > i believe that unequal exchange > only exists within systems, and when trade is between systems, it is equal, > and therefore non-exploitative. and i believe with him that export products which it does not value, but which are valued in other > areas>. indeed, i believe that is what constitutes trade between systems. This is actually rather similar to one of the propositions which I suggeated for the interpretation of the "uncomfortable" South Arabian data. However, this is not sufficient at all and could only be regarded as a first step towards a more reasonable theoretical model. Yes, South Arabia of the second half of the 1st mil. BC could be regarded as a "world-system" or "world-economy" (if we use the set of definitions proposed by Wallerstein). But if we use the normal system definitions ((not the ideosyncratic "world" ones), e.g. , we should consider South Arabia as an element of the Circum-Mediterranean system (which in its terms might be regarded as an element of the World System) . Again if we use normal (not "world") system categories (see my previous postings) South Arabia should be regarded as its periphery. However, it appears to have been "core-exploiting", "capital-accumulating" periphery (for which I have already provided a selection of data of the original sources). By the moment nobody has shown how all this could be accomodated by the traditional WS theory without its radical reconstruction. P.S. I finished my first posting to the WSN with a post scriptum which I shall repeat again: I would not like anyone to think that what was said could be only relevant for exotic old times - take e.g. the modern Arabian oil exporting countries exploiting the "core" ones. Dr Andrey Korotayev, Senior Research Fellow Oriental Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences 12 Rozhdestvenka, Moscow 103753, Russia ANDREI@RSUH.RU From andrei@rsuh.ru Thu Jun 6 04:57:00 1996 From: "Korotaev A." Organization: rsuh To: iwaller@msh-paris.fr Date: Thu, 6 Jun 1996 14:46:53 +0300 Subject: A critique of the "founding fathers" / ADDENDA to: wallerstein, Reply-to: andrei@rsuh.ru ADDENDA 1. One might soppose that the "uncomfortable data" of South Arabian type could be fitted into the traditional WS models through Frank&Gills' notion of "hinterland" (e.g. Frank, Gills 1993: 94-96). However, this cannot be considered to be entirely satisfactory. The problem here is that if we drop the "exploitation-by-the-core" criterium, by all the other possible system criteria South Arabia was an integral part of the Circum-Mideterranean WS. On the other hand, one should not neglect some "center-like" "capital-accumilating" properties of the South Arabian element of the WS. The real problem here is that this element had properties of "centre", "periphery" and "hinterland" at the same time. And that is one of the main points why I suggested to think together about the working out of some less primitive categories, more appropriate for the description (without the current oversimplification) of the real complexity of the real world-systems whose structure now appears to be far more complex than the "founding fathers" suggest. 2. Now I shall have to quote again from the previous Wallerstein's posting: Wallerstein wrote on Thu May 30 00:51:02 1996: > i believe that unequal exchange > only exists within systems, and when trade is between systems, it is equal, > and therefore non-exploitative. and i believe with him that export products which it does not value, but which are valued in other > areas>. indeed, i believe that is what constitutes trade between systems. I think irrespective of all the disagreements between Frank and Wallerstein and all the differences in their terminology they both have the same misleading underlying logic. This logic is that if you get across a system which does not "behave" as you think it must behave, than this system is simply not a system. A very easy solution indeed. I am afraid this attitude of the "founding fathers" is very misleading, dangerous and harmful. It actually blocks any serious study of the world-systems which differ from the type which they initially described ("core exploits periphery") but the study of which is not less important. I mean "non-exploitative" world-systems. I think this initial attitude has affected rather badly the WS research producing e.g. an unjustifiably pessimistic and "negativistic" perception of the WS. Of course if you neglected the study of the "non-exploitative" world-systems (by simply declaring them to be non-systems) how can you reasonably study the realistic ways of making our own WS less exploitative? 3. Of course, one might say that the data which I presented (in my posting of 3 June 1996) in support of my thesis of South Arabian peripheral center exploiting the Mediterranean core one do not constitute any rigorous proof of that this exploitation actually took place. I am entirely ready to agree with this. To be more cautious I would rather interprete these data in another way: if there was any exploitation in the South Arabian - Mediterranean relations, it was the exploitation of the Mediterranean core by the South Arabian periphery, but not the other way round. However, one should not exclude the "non-exploitative" interpretation here either. However, I would stress that this could be said about practically any cases of "core-exploits-periphery" too. I would stress that the "core-exploits-periphery" thesis must be treated in most cases only as a hypothesis which should be corroborated for any separate case again and again. Actually, up to my knowledge nobody has ever proved this in a really rigorous way (even with respect to the Modern world-system). Even in the apparently evident cases this is not really evident. Take for example the Roman world-empire of the 2nd cent. CE. The Roman center apparently exploited the provinces through taxes. But did the provinces get anything in return for their taxes. Yes they did. E.g. the level of safety and stability incomparable with any pre-imperial situation, incredibly improved communication infrastructure &c &c. Did all this cost the taxes? Maibe, yes. Maybe, not. Up tp my knowledge nobody has ever shown how the value of the taxes and the value of the "state services" could be really rigourously compared. One could even doubt that this will be ever possible. Hence, I do not understand why the "core-exploits-periphery" thesis is so often treated as a proved truth. Anyhow, I am strongly against the current attitude that one should start the study of any world-system with the a priori assumption that its core must be found to exploit its periphery. It should be rigorously proved again and again for any new case (and incidentally for all the "old cases" too). And the alternative possibilities should never be neglected. 4. The "capital-accumulation" assumption of the WST looks for me as a much more sound, much less shaky one. However, one doubts why the capital accumulation should nessesarily imply exploitation. If we use with Ekholm&Friedman "the word 'capital' to refer to the form of absract wealth represented in the concrete form of metal or even money that can be accumilated in itself and converted into other forms of wealth" (1993 /1982/: 68), why capital accumilation could not be conducted through the systematic equal exchange of "other forms of wealth" and services in return for the "abstract wealth"? 5. Incidentally, I have just received (from Marc W.D. Tyrrell [mwtyrrel@ccs.carleton.ca]) a rather interesting suggestion on the possible ways of the WST reconstruction which I cannot avoid quoting: >You might want to considered a >remodeling based on interlocking cybernetic systems, where the "world" >component refers to the perceptual world of the cultures involved. If >transport and communications technologies serve to store, transmit, >and remodel cultural (quasi-independant cybernetic) perceptual >systems, "worlds", then it may well follow that the model proposed by >Chris Chase-Dunn (luxury exchange, military exchange, bulk good >exchange) works, except that "exchange" serves to stabilize and >regularize the "world" (cf Sahlins, "Stone Age Economics", ch. 6). Yours, Andrey Dr Andrey Korotayev, Senior Research Fellow Oriental Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences 12 Rozhdestvenka, Moscow 103753, Russia ANDREI@RSUH.RU From craig.harris@ssc.msu.edu Thu Jun 6 07:13:53 1996 From: craig.harris@ssc.msu.edu Date: Thu, 6 Jun 96 9:14:18 EDT To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: re: founding fathers on 6 jun 96 korotaev wrote: 4. The "capital-accumulation" assumption of the WST looks for me as a much more sound, much less shaky one. However, one doubts why the capital accumulation should nessesarily imply exploitation. If we use with Ekholm&Friedman "the word 'capital' to refer to the form of absract wealth represented in the concrete form of metal or even money that can be accumilated in itself and converted into other forms of wealth" (1993 /1982/: 68), why capital accumilation could not be conducted through the systematic equal exchange of "other forms of wealth" and services in return for the "abstract wealth"? there is a part of the logic that i'm not understanding here . . . if accumulation means having more of something at the end of the period than at the beginning, and if 'abstract wealth' is being used in 'equal exchange' for 'other forms of wealth and services', how can capital accumulate in one of the exchanging parts of the system thanks in advance for the clarification and explanation cheers, craig craig k harris dept of sociology michigan state university east lansing michigan 48824-1111 tel: 517-355-5048 fax: 517-432-2856 From chriscd@jhu.edu Thu Jun 6 07:41:33 1996 06 Jun 1996 09:39:38 -0500 (EST) 06 Jun 1996 09:39:22 -0500 (EST) Date: Thu, 06 Jun 1996 08:25:09 -0600 (CST) From: chris chase-dunn Subject: RE: A critique of the "founding fathers" / ADDENDA to: wallerstein, Sender: chriscd@jhu.edu To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu X-NUPop-Charset: English I would like to respond to some of the points made by Andre Kortaev despite the fact that i have missed the earlier contributions to this string and have not had time to read the wsn archive. In general I would say that the comparative world-systems approach that Tom Hall and I have formulated solves the important problems raised by Kortaev. Hall and I make core/periphery structures an empirical question in each case, not a defining feature of all world-systems. This allows for systems based on equal exchange, and indeed there have been such systems. Systemness is defined in terms of regularized interaction. Only after the interaction nets have been mapped is the question of core/periphery relations raised. Groups that are not interacting are not in the same system and so cannot be in a core/periphery relationship. We also distinguish between two aspects of core/periphery relations. The first we call core/periphery differentiation. This refers to two interacting groups in which one has greater population density than the other. The second (termed core/periphery hierarchy) refers to a relationship of exploitation or domination between groups. These two aspects often go together because groups with greater population density frequently have more power than less dense groups. But there have been important instances where less dense groups exploit more dense groups. The pastoral nomads of the Central Asian steppes cyclically formed states that allowed them to extract resources from more dense agrarian societies. Our conceptual approach allows for a comparative study of the formation of core/periphery relations that can produce an understanding of why core/periphery exploitation emerges in some cases but not in others. All this is made opaque by the inclusion of core/periphery relations as a defining feature of world-systems. We also have found whole systems in which there was very little in the way of intergroup exploitation or domination. In prehistoric Northern California there was a very small world-system composed of sedentary foragers. Despite some core/periphery differentiation there was very little core/periphery hierarchy. This case is detailed in my forthcoming _The Wintu and Their Neighbors_. Regarding the suggestion to define world-systems in terms of cybernetic systems of conscious awareness, I would say this. Conscious awareness, what we call cosmography, is partial and misrepresents the real material interactions that are present in all the world-systems we have examined. Generally the spatial scope of conscious awareness of interactions is smaller than the scope of the real material indirect interactions. Thus it would be a mistake to make consciousness a central defining characteristic of systemness. But Hall and I do think that information networks are important sources of stability and change in world-systems. We indicate this by designating Information Networks as one of our types of interaction, along with Bulk Goods Nets, Political-Military Nets, and Prestige Goods Nets. All this is explained more fully in our forthcoming _Rise and Demise: Comparing World-Systems_ (Westview Press 1996) chris Prof. Chris Chase-Dunn Department of Sociology Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, MD. 21218 USA tel 410 516 7633 fax 410 516 7590 email chriscd@jhu.edu From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Thu Jun 6 07:58:26 1996 Date: Thu, 6 Jun 1996 09:58:03 -0400 (EDT) From: "A. Gunder Frank" To: "Korotaev A." Subject: Re: A critique of the "founding fathers" / ADDENDA to: wallerstein, AndreI or AndreY MISrepresents my position on WS. For me there is only ONE relevant one at his time/place and it already covers most of Eurasia, INCLUDING A's Arabia. There is no single center-periph structure in this WS,[as indeed my 1400-1800 AD book shows that there still was not only one in the whole world econ in the early modern period!] Whetehr there was what kind of center/periph exploitation on this or that regional level is an EMPIRICAL question to be answered on the evidence, not one of "theoretical principle". Therefore, i cannot accept A's accusation that i try to squeeze reality into a pre-defined procrustean bed. respectfully submitted gunder frank From ROZOV@cnit.nsu.ru Thu Jun 6 08:12:19 1996 6 Jun 96 21:08:34 NSK-6 From: "Nikolai S. Rozov" Organization: Center of New Informational Tech. To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Thu, 6 Jun 1996 21:08:20 -0600 (NSK) Subject: Re: A critique of the WST "founding fathers" Some notes in defence of classical ws paradigm and possibilities of its conceptual development in front of challenging well-argumented criticisms of Andrey Korotaev. As far as I know w-system in basic texts of I.Wallerstein never toughly connected with core-exploits-periphery thesis. Definition of world-economy (evidently relevant for Andrey-s South Arabia example) included long transboundary chains of non-equal exchange with shifting monopolies. Well, if ancient Arabia had some monopoly in providing spices for Mesopotamia and Mediterranian (just as modern Arabia in oil export) - why not to name the whole system 'w-economy' neglecting here core-periphery and exploitation terms at all? Typical destiny of such cases was military envasion of such regions and transforming system into w-empire (take f.e. ancient iron production in Anatolia) but here some factors (mainly geographical, I suppose), defended Arabia from this misfortune for rather long historical time. I agree with Andrey that we should also be very cautious in using such moral- charged terms as exploitation. Here I prefer to follow S.Sanderson when he (if I remember well) means by exploitation situations of inequal exchange necessarily caused by coersion and incapability of losing side to avoid such relations. Ancient people in principle could cease buy spices from Arabia, so they were not exploited. India, China since XVIII-XIX c. as well as other Western colonies could not stop 'exchange' and were evidently exploited. The West now is really highly dependant of Arabian oil, but being a true core now the West uses all its other monopolies in finance, world trade rules, conflict resolution (Israel-Arab countries), security regime (remember Iraque 1993- 4) for balancing its lack of full monopoly for oil resources. So it is surely nonsense to maintain that South Arabia or Kuveit exploit USA in oil trade now. Although they have real significant control of prices and the West allows it! World-Empire (such as USSR as I still believe following here D.Chirot) never would allow such thing to its periphery. That's why I strongly disagree with I.Wallerstein's thesis of modern w-economy as a virus desease, at least I insist that other main 'historical desease' (w- empires) was usually much more violent, cruel, and disfunctional than w- economies. By core we can mean only those parts of w- economy that managed to collect major monopolies by grasping initiative in trade, money and prices control, transportation, markets organizing (later technological progress, etc.) Dear Andrey, really did such core exist in 1st mellenium BC ? I suppose not, it seems various parts of w-economy had their own monopolies (take Greek olive oil and amphores, Syrian wood for sailing, etc.) but you can make it more clear. thank you. Nikolai Rozov rozov@cnit.nsu.ru From chriscd@jhu.edu Thu Jun 6 08:38:19 1996 06 Jun 1996 10:37:13 -0500 (EST) 06 Jun 1996 10:37:08 -0500 (EST) Date: Thu, 06 Jun 1996 09:22:58 -0600 (CST) From: chris chase-dunn Subject: graduate program in world historical change at Binghamton University Sender: chriscd@jhu.edu To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu X-NUPop-Charset: English An announcement with information about the Graduate Program in World Historical Change in the Sociology Department at Binghamton University has been included in the World-Systems Archive in the "graduate_programs" subdirectory. the address for gopher or ftp is csf.colorado.edu/wsystems/graduate_programs for the world wide web the address is http://csf.colorado.edu/wsystems/wsarch.html chris Prof. Chris Chase-Dunn Department of Sociology Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, MD. 21218 USA tel 410 516 7633 fax 410 516 7590 email chriscd@jhu.edu From andrei@rsuh.ru Thu Jun 6 08:43:09 1996 From: "Korotaev A." Organization: rsuh To: craig.harris@ssc.msu.edu Date: Thu, 6 Jun 1996 18:30:36 +0300 Subject: re:re: founding fathers Reply-to: andrei@rsuh.ru To: craig k harris > dept of sociology michigan state university east lansing > michigan 48824-1111 tel: 517-355-5048 fax: 517-432-2856 > > on 6 jun 96 korotaev wrote: > 4. The "capital-accumulation" assumption of the WST looks for me as a much > more sound, much less shaky one. However, one doubts why the capital > accumulation should nessesarily imply exploitation. If we use with > Ekholm&Friedman "the word 'capital' to refer to the form of absract wealth > represented in the concrete form of metal or even money that can be > accumilated in itself and converted into other forms of wealth" (1993 /1982/: > 68), why capital accumilation could not be conducted through the systematic > equal exchange of "other forms of wealth" and services in return for the > "abstract wealth"? > > there is a part of the logic that i'm not understanding here . . . if > accumulation means having more of something at the end of the period than at > the beginning, and if 'abstract wealth' is being used in 'equal exchange' for > 'other forms of wealth and services', how can capital accumulate in one of the > exchanging parts of the system > thanks in advance for the clarification and explanation Never mind! Take for example my South Arabian example. I would insist that the capital accumilating entity of this type could function even if there were no exploitation of the Mediterranean "core" on the part of the South Arabian "periphery". Actually, what we have here: South Arabians systematically export to the Mediterrania say 50 000 000 sist. worth quantity of insence and import only 20 000 000 sist. worth of the Mediterranean commodities, taking 30 000 000 sist. back as the bullion (Classical authors suggest the arrangement was something like that). Even if this exchange is equal, there is capital accumulation in Ekholm&Friedman's sense. South Arabians simply export "other forms of wealth", consumption commodities and import "abstract wealth ... that can be accumulated in itself and converted into other forms of wealth". Hence, the capital accumulation occurs here mainly because the import and export flows have different structures, export consisting of mainly "concrete wealth" and import consisting mainly of "abstract wealth". Putting it more generally, the element of system which gives the other elements "concrete wealth" (CW) and taking from them "abstract wealth" (AW) in return, can accumilate the capital even if the value of CW = AW, hence, equal exchange, hence, no exploitation. Yours, Andrey P.S. Just to remind how it looks "on the ground" I would quote from one of my previous postings: Agatharchides on the South Arabians ("Sabaeans"; 3rd cent.BC; transl. by St.M.Burstein): "They transport cargoes of various sorts including specially an aromatic plant which grows in the interior..." (apud Photius, Cod. 250.101, 459a). "No nation seems to be more prosperous than the Sabaeans and Gerrhaeans since they the ones who distribute everything from Asia and Europe that is considered valuable... In general, there is a great difference between their wealth and that of others." (apud Photius, Cod. 250.102, 459a-459b). "This tribe surpasses in wealth ... not only the nearby Arabs but also the rest of the mankind. For in the exchange and sale of their wares, they, of all people who engage in trade for the sake of the exchange of silver, receive the highest price for goods of the smallest bulk" (Diodorus 3.47.5-8). See also e.g. Strabo 26.4.19, C778 &c. "...They are the richest races in the world, because vast wealth from Rome and Parthia accumulates in their hands, as they sell the produce they obtain from the sea or their forests and buy nothing in return" (Pliny VI.xxxii.162; transl. by H.Rackham). Cp. Periplus' description of trade in the South Arabian port Muza: "Merchandise for which it offers a market are: purple cloth, ... Arab sleeved clothing, ... blankets, in limited number, ....unguent, moderate amount; MONEY, CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT; wine and grain, limited quantity because the region produces wheat in moderate quantity and wine in greater" (Periplus Maris Erythraei, 24; 1st cent.CE; transl. by L.Casson; emphasis added - A.K.). From chriscd@jhu.edu Thu Jun 6 08:44:34 1996 06 Jun 1996 10:41:41 -0500 (EST) 06 Jun 1996 10:41:32 -0500 (EST) Date: Thu, 06 Jun 1996 09:27:27 -0600 (CST) From: chris chase-dunn Subject: Re: AXIAL AGE WORLD SYSTEM Sender: chriscd@jhu.edu To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu X-NUPop-Charset: English ------------------------------------------------------------ Date: Mon, 3 Jun 1996 14:49:55 GMT To: andrei@rsuh.ru From: Mitch Allen Subject: Re: AXIAL AGE WORLD SYSTEM No question that spices from South Arabia, both those that originated there and those that travelled through Arabia from South Asia and East Africa, were clearly one of the more important trade goods circulating through the Bronze and Iron Age Near East. Assyrians and Romans alike used them in religious rituals and as elite goods. I'm not sure what Dr. Lloyd-Jones' problem is with that. Whether this allowed S. ARabia to "exploit" from the periphery is a different question, but that would be no different than the Phoenicians exploiting the Assyrian empire with tons of silver from Spain or the people of the Iranian plateau exploiting ED Mesopotamia with tin, gold, and lapis from Afghanistan. I think the power dynamics would have more likely gone the other way in the case of S. Arabia (from Meso/Levant ---> S. Arabia), but that spices had critical social and economic functions in the Ancient Near East system is unquestionable. mitch At 07:41 PM 6/3/96 +0300, Korotaev A. wrote: >On Tue, 28 May 1996 20:42:59 David Lloyd-Jones wrote: > >> I think your problem is that the proposition that the South Arabian >> frankincence monopoly was exploitative of the metropolitan centre looked >> like satire. I mean _frankincense_? Wasn't the stuff cross elastic with >> myrrh, fer goshsakes? How can you run a monopoly when there are substitutes >> on every bush? To say nothing of the guy with the funny complexion and the >> tired camel selling something he calls tiger balm... >> >> Look at it this way: if somebody had set out deliberately to write a send-up >> on this inbred flock of loons, could they possibly have come up with >> anything as wonderful as your story? > Mitch Allen Publisher AltaMira Press 1630 North Main Street, Suite 367 Walnut Creek, California 94596 510 938-7243 (voice) 933-9720 (fax) mitch@altamira.sagepub.com From mwtyrrel@ccs.carleton.ca Thu Jun 6 08:58:51 1996 Date: Thu, 6 Jun 96 10:58:37 EDT To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: mwtyrrel@ccs.carleton.ca (Marc W.D. Tyrrell) Subject: Re: A critique of the "founding fathers" Just a short note: points 1. & 2., concerning "exploitation". It seems to me that this term, along with its variant forms, is used as if it were an absolute, whereas it is a culturally, and morally, relative term, as Andrey alludes to: >Take for example the Roman world-empire of the 2nd cent. CE. The Roman >center apparently exploited the provinces through taxes. But did the >provinces get anything in return for their taxes. Yes they did. E.g. the >level of safety and stability incomparable with any pre-imperial situation, >incredibly improved communication infrastructure &c &c. Did all this cost >the taxes? Maybe, yes. Maybe, not. Up to my knowledge nobody has >ever shown how the value of the taxes and the value of the "state >services" could be really rigourously compared. An example of just such an analysis, considering the Athenian Thalassocracy, is presented by John Adams ("The Institutional Theory of Trade and the Organization of Intersocial Commerce in Ancient Athens", ch. 4 in From Political Economy to Anthropology, Colin M. Duncan and David W. Tandy (eds.), Black Rose Books, 1994, Montreal). Possibly, a better term/concept to use, rather than exploitation, would be the greek term "imperium". While the term has come to connotean "empire" in English, this is actually a somewhat misleading meaning. "Sphere of influence" would be a better translation, and would certainly seem to have a better fit with WS theory on the whole. "Exploitation", on the other hand, would require the development of a theory of moral action that was defensible and consistent across human cultures. And, while it is certainly possible to construct such a theory, I fully suspect that it would be emotionally repulsive to many people. >3. [snip]... if there was any exploitation in the South >Arabian - Mediterranean relations, it was the exploitation of the >Mediterranean core by the South Arabian periphery, but not the other >way round. However, one should not exclude the "non-exploitative" >interpretation here either. Good point, and both would "fit". It seems to me that core-periphery = exploiter-exploited equation is only one of a number of possible symbiotic relationships. There is also the interesting pattern of peripheral cultures using core states as a source of income/population reduction. Examples of this type of interaction would include the use of German tribesmen as legionaires in the Roman Empire, the Varangian Guards of Byzantium, and the French "Scottish" Regiments. >4. The "capital-accumulation" assumption of the WST looks for me as a >much more sound, much less shaky one. However, one doubts why the >capital accumulation should nessesarily imply exploitation. If we >use with Ekholm&Friedman "the word 'capital' to refer to the form of >absract wealth represented in the concrete form of metal or even >money that can be accumilated in itself and converted into other >forms of wealth" (1993 /1982/: 68), why capital accumilation could >not be conducted through the systematic equal exchange of "other forms >of wealth" and services in return for the "abstract wealth"? A good point, and one noted by Sahlins (Stone Age Economics) in regard to reciprocity systems. I suspect that at the root of this problem is a reification of the concept of "capital". If capital is "abstract wealth" then their is no necessity that it have a material form. Indeed, if by "wealth" we include in the meaning a sense of "power to shape the perceptible world", then the status accumulated in reciprocity exchanges such as the Kula Ring and the Potlatch are forms of capital accumulation. If we assume that capital is a scarce commodity, then the "exploitative" position is the only logical ("rational") interpretation. If, however, we assume that capital may also be a non-scarce commodity, then "exploitation", as a strategy for capital accumulation, is non-sensical. In effect, the first position assumes the position that the world operates in an economy of scarcity, while the second assumes that some parts of the world operate in an economy of abundance - a position that appears to apply much more to both reciprocity systems of exchange and the development of the knowledge economy. >5. Incidentally, I have just received >(from Marc W.D. Tyrrell [mwtyrrel@ccs.carleton.ca]) > a rather interesting suggestion on the possible ways of the WST >reconstruction which I cannot avoid quoting: Thanks . Marc Marc W.D. Tyrrell Department of Sociology and Anthropology, 7th Floor, Loeb Building, Carleton University, Vox: (613) 236-4349 1125 Colonel By Drive, Fax: (613) 520-4062 Ottawa, Ontario email: mwtyrrel@ccs.carleton.ca Canada K1S 5B6 Centre for Online Studies International http://www.carleton.ca/~hbromber/cosi.html From andrei@rsuh.ru Thu Jun 6 10:36:38 1996 From: "Korotaev A." Organization: rsuh To: "A. Gunder Frank" Date: Thu, 6 Jun 1996 20:25:39 +0300 Subject: Re:Re: A critique of the "founding fathers" / ADDENDA to: wall Reply-to: andrei@rsuh.ru On Thu, 6 Jun 1996 09:58 A. Gunder Frank wrote: > AndreI or AndreY MISrepresents my position on WS. For me there is only ONE > relevant one at his time/place and it already covers most of Eurasia, > INCLUDING A's Arabia. There is no single center-periph structure in this > WS,[as indeed my 1400-1800 AD book shows that there still was not only one > in the whole world econ in the early modern period!] Whetehr there was > what kind of center/periph exploitation on this or that regional level is > an EMPIRICAL question to be answered on the evidence, not one of > "theoretical principle". Actually, one I wrote my message I had in front of me pages 94-96 of Frank&Gills 1993, where the pre-Modern World System is considered to consist of center-periphery-hinterland complexes, where center always exploits periphery, and the only chance not to be center and not be exploited is to be in the "hinterland" (e.g. "what distinguishes the hinterland from the periphery is that the peoples of the hinterland are not fully, institutionally, subordinate to the center in terms of surplus extraction" [p.95]). It was this against which I argued. If Prof. Frank has changed up his mind since 1993, and considers now his position of 1993 to be wrong (stating now that ), then I am really glad to hear about this. Yours Andrey . Fine, if this is really so, there does not appear much to argue against with Prof.Wallerstein either. But does everybody agree with ROZOV's statement? From wilkinso@polisci.sscnet.ucla.edu Thu Jun 6 12:32:04 1996 From: "Wilkinson, David POLI SCI" To: andrei@rsuh.ru Subject: South Arabian world system/civilization? Date: Thu, 06 Jun 96 11:31:00 PDT Encoding: 11 TEXT >"by all >the other possible system criteria South Arabia was an integral part >of the Circum-Mideterranean WS." How much is known as to the political-military-diplomatic transactions of the South Arabian cities/states with the (other?) cities and states of the Central world system/civilization? Was South Arabia an integral part of the "Circum-Mediterranean WS" on that system criterion? David Wilkinson From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Thu Jun 6 18:08:09 1996 Date: Thu, 6 Jun 1996 20:08:02 -0400 (EDT) From: "A. Gunder Frank" To: "Korotaev A." Subject: Re:Re: A critique of the "founding fathers" / ADDENDA to: wall In-Reply-To: <199606061735.UAA00711@gw.rsuh.ru> I have changed my mind, but not on this, since on THIS i made no pronouncments. it said nothning on the pop you cite about whether Arabia was a center or a periph or whatr explitaiton there was or not, shichi insist again is an empirical question, and i am gald to see that Chris C-D backs me up on that! agf On Thu, 6 Jun 1996, Korotaev A. wrote: > On Thu, 6 Jun 1996 09:58 A. Gunder Frank > wrote: > > > AndreI or AndreY MISrepresents my position on WS. For me there is only ONE > > relevant one at his time/place and it already covers most of Eurasia, > > INCLUDING A's Arabia. There is no single center-periph structure in this > > WS,[as indeed my 1400-1800 AD book shows that there still was not only one > > in the whole world econ in the early modern period!] Whetehr there was > > what kind of center/periph exploitation on this or that regional level is > > an EMPIRICAL question to be answered on the evidence, not one of > > "theoretical principle". > > Actually, one I wrote my message I had in front of me pages 94-96 of > Frank&Gills 1993, where the pre-Modern World System is considered to > consist of center-periphery-hinterland complexes, where center always > exploits periphery, and the only chance not to be center and not be > exploited is to be in the "hinterland" (e.g. "what distinguishes the > hinterland from the periphery is that the peoples of the hinterland > are not fully, institutionally, subordinate to the center in terms of > surplus extraction" [p.95]). It was this against which I argued. > If Prof. Frank has changed up his mind since 1993, > and considers now his position of 1993 to be wrong (stating now that > what kind of center/periph exploitation on this or that regional > level is an EMPIRICAL question to be answered on the evidence, not > one of "theoretical principle">), then I am really glad to hear > about this. > Yours > Andrey when they gave me e-mail number, so they decided that I should be > andreI in order to be distinguished from andreY). > > P.S. Nikolay ROZOV has just wrote on PHILOFHI: > toughly connected with core-exploits-periphery thesis>. > > Fine, if this is really so, there does not appear much to argue > against with Prof.Wallerstein either. But does everybody agree with > ROZOV's statement? > From ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au Thu Jun 6 20:38:37 1996 07 Jun 1996 12:37:39 +1000 Date: Fri, 07 Jun 1996 12:37:39 +1000 From: "Bruce R. McFarling" Subject: A technical interuption In-reply-to: To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK I'm sorry to put this onto the list, but I seem to have deleted the relevant address for sending this by direct e-mail. Some time back, someone mentioned on WSN the problem of converting a word processor document to an ASCII text format without loosing text and formatting. I replied (offlist) that I thought I had seen a solution for this for WordPerfect in the form of a printer driver that 'prints' an ASCII file with _underline_ and *boldface* in the normal e-mail style, some efforts to suggest characters not in the 7-bit ASCII character set, and retention of footnote / endnote text. I have finally run across this little tool, but now I have lost the address of my correspondent, so if he would contact me I can forward it to him. Sorry for the interuption. Virtually, Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au From andrei@rsuh.ru Fri Jun 7 07:02:26 1996 From: "Korotaev A." Organization: rsuh To: wilkinso@polisci.sscnet.ucla.edu Date: Fri, 7 Jun 1996 16:43:45 +0300 Subject: Re: South Arabian world system/civilization? Reply-to: andrei@rsuh.ru > Date: Thu, 06 Jun 96 11:31:00 PDT > Reply-to: wilkinso@polisci.sscnet.ucla.edu > From: "Wilkinson, David POLI SCI" > To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK > Subject: South Arabian world system/civilization? > >"by all > >the other possible system criteria South Arabia was an integral part > >of the Circum-Mideterranean WS." > > How much is known as to the political-military-diplomatic transactions of the > South Arabian cities/states with the (other?) cities and states of the > Central world system/civilization? Was South Arabia an integral part of the > "Circum-Mediterranean WS" on that system criterion? > > David Wilkinson Actually, the most important data which led me to the conclusion you mention are: The introduction by the Hadramis of the second harvest of frankinsence in Dhofa:r in response for the growing demand for frankinsence in Mediterrania + a few dozen million sist. which went from there to Yemen (both mentioned by Pliny) + restructuring of a significant part of SArabia under the influence of the frankinsence trade (Minaean inscriptions &c ). With respect to the political-military-diplomatic transactions you specifically ask about we know e.g. the following (in addition to the famous trip by the Queen of Sheba (= Saba') to Solomon: 1. The Sabaean embassies to Assyria (the end of the 7th - beg.6 cent. BC) [Assyrian royal inscriptions]. 2. The Roman attempt to conquer SA in 26 BC (Strabo, Pliny &c). 3. Continuous embassies by which the (Himyarite?) kings in Zafa:r made themselves friends of the Roman Emperors (mentioned by Periplus). 4. The events of the 6th century CE in South Arabia greatly influenced by the SA involvement in the the political-military-diplomatic game of that age (involving first of all Byzantine, Persia and Ethiopia) &c. Generally, my conclusion was based on the economic influence of the Mediterranean centre on SA rather than "the political-military-diplomatic transactions". Yours, Andrey. From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Fri Jun 7 08:52:11 1996 Date: Fri, 7 Jun 1996 10:51:57 -0400 (EDT) From: "A. Gunder Frank" To: "Bruce R. McFarling" Subject: Re: A technical interuption Wel, others of us might be interested too! On Fri, 7 Jun 1996, Bruce R. McFarling wrote: > I'm sorry to put this onto the list, but I seem to > have deleted the relevant address for sending this by > direct e-mail. Some time back, someone mentioned on WSN > the problem of converting a word processor document to > an ASCII text format without loosing text and formatting. > I replied (offlist) that I thought I had seen a solution > for this for WordPerfect in the form of a printer driver > that 'prints' an ASCII file with _underline_ and *boldface* > in the normal e-mail style, some efforts to suggest > characters not in the 7-bit ASCII character set, and > retention of footnote / endnote text. > I have finally run across this little tool, but > now I have lost the address of my correspondent, so if > he would contact me I can forward it to him. Sorry for > the interuption. > > Virtually, > > Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW > ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au > From wilkinso@polisci.sscnet.ucla.edu Fri Jun 7 14:47:22 1996 From: "Wilkinson, David POLI SCI" To: andrei@rsuh.ru Subject: Re: South Arabian world system/civilizat Date: Fri, 07 Jun 96 13:47:00 PDT Encoding: 25 TEXT Thank you for the reply to my query about the politico-diplomatic-military linkages of South Arabia; as I regard such linkage, of a sustained and continuing character, as the essential criterion for an area's inclusion/exclusion in a civilization/world system, the status of South Arabia on that score would appear to be intriguingly ambiguous until at least 26 BC. "[C]ontinuous embassies...made themselves the friends of..." would for me be language decisively descriptive of South Arabian membership in the Central system, probably from the first such embassy. The duration and content of the embassies to Assyria, and the reasons to believe or disbelieve in the continuation of such contact with the empires that succeeded Assyria, would be important, from my perspective, in determining when South Arabia first entered the Central system. (I would use trade ties as evidence of entry into the trade network which I call the Old Oikumene, which entirely includes but is larger than the Central Civilization/world system.) For me, another important form of social-taxonomical data is city sizes and numbers. Can you say what range of estimates you would consider currently persuasive for the number and size (population or area) of any urban centers of South Arabia for any dates or range of dates down to say the embassies to the Roman emperors? David Wilkinson From U17043@UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU Fri Jun 7 17:31:51 1996 Date: Fri, 07 Jun 96 18:10:44 CDT From: U17043@UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU Subject: tough tribes cities of fabulous riches and world empires To: World System Network I am having dificulty recognizing historical reality in the current discussion, so please consider this being written for my own self- clarification, so you needn't unless you have the same difficulty in defining "core" and "periphery" for pre-capitalist world-empires. In the precapitalist agrarian civilizations, the world-empires formed in the respective civilization-areas as a rule, perhaps *never*, had their economic cores coinciding with their politico-military cores. This occurred for two reasons. 1. World-empires were invariably formed from the unification of state- systems. As we know, states never come into existence singly; only as state- systems. They interact, fight, struggle for power, perhaps in equilibrium for centuries, perhaps unstably and susceptible to quite rapid unification, perhaps until they all more or less coevally undergo "system collapse," bad archeologibberish shorthand for a withdrawal of resources previously rendered by direct producers or tributaries or both from parasitic, militaristic elites hitherto "paid for," eventuating in "the end of civilization," which for those rid of "macroparasites" may not be such a Bad Thing. The Maya are one instance. State systems are unified by military innovators also commanding newly- developed economic resources. They are marcher-states, not accepted as part of the "Civilized" community until their conquest-hegemony entails their right to define their civilized condition unhindered by preexisting snobberies. To this day, not even North Americans and others remote from the Balkans dare call Alexander The Great an "Albanian," and I daresay any Albanian resident of contemporary Hellas would be in danger if he or she did so. Analogously, Rome. Analogously, the Chinese Empire, unified by the King of Qin, a marcher state on the western "barbarian" frontier. The key to the latter achievement, in 221 BC, was the conquest, in 315, of the non-Chinese (ie "barbarian") Kingdom of Shu, in Sichuan, whose vast food resources permitted the long-range mobility of Qin's armies. (See Steven V. Snyder, Sichuan and the Unification of China, Stanford, 1992.) We can go backward through Achaemenids, Assyrians, etc, to Sargon of Akkad; or ahead to the Islamic conquests in the formerly-divided civiliza- tion-areas of the Near East which, however, had hitherto comprised a single state-system. It is a curious fact that, where state systems are stable notwithstanding continuous interstate warfare, there prevails a conservatism in military technique, replete with etiquettes and proprieties, with potential areas of innovation, eg, cavalry in the context of Greek hoplite infantry warfare, neglected for reasons other than military efficiency; howbeit the naval forces of the same period underwent extremely rapid development in tactics and maneuver though not in size and technique (which characterized the later Hellenistic state system). 2. The second reason is that a world-empire requires, simultaneously, ferociously-motivated soldiers for military efficiency *and* thoroughly- domesticated, inured-to-toil direct producers. The latter are excessively "civilianized"; if independent within state systems, they hire mercenaries, turn the latter if possible, into hereditary *cleruch*s, and enroll the locals only in the direst emergencies. (Allusion to Ptolemaic Egypt, but applicable to Chinese Conquest Dynasties, domination of Indian states by Muslim Afghan or Khwarizmian tribals, Persian and Arab Muslims by Turkish tribals, and numerous other familiar cases. What renders this intractable problem especially interesting is the unity in the same persons of the economic-exploiter and rulership roles. The same persons appearing as *owners* or *fiefholders* also appear as *officeholders*, *magistrates*, *generals*, *dictators*, *bureucrats*, and *warriors* (in feudal polities). What is maximized is not wealth, but military power, which guarantees accumulation of wealth. This may be maximized as well through the holding of a Chinese magistracy entitlement whereto is conferred by holding of the *jinshi* degree from the Northern Song period on, for a thousand years, as by the direct holding of a great lordship in Europe of the period coeval with the Northern Song (960-1126). Loss of access to the means of violence endangers ownership or other controlling rights in property; and property accumulation is far more easily rendered by maximizing office or household-warrior-retinue than is accumulated wealth convertible into political power, state or feudal variety. This holds even for European protocapitalism: You lost your political rights in Mediaeval Italian cities, you lost your money. The other causal linkage to downward mobility was slower. By contrast, compare capitalism: The economic cores even within nation- states correspond geographically to politico-military cores. (Even in the USA, where enormous, and a trifle weird, efforts were made to eschew urbanization qua moral corruption, the surest method of making oneself president*abile* has been via the governorship of New York, Ohio, Illinois, California. I cannot account for Arkansas, frankly.) While the capitalist class is bifurcated into specialized, at times even mutually hostile, but heavily intermarried, wings of entrepreneurial specialists and politco-military specialists. As Beijing now becomes for the first time a great center of Big Business, we now know that the answer to whether an entrepreneurial culture can coexist with the domination of a totalitarian Communist party is Yes! Now, let's look at the Roman Empire, and its relations with the Near East, as an instance of dissociated cores, associated ruling-class roles in actual history. The Roman Empire is the unification stage of the Hellen- istic state system in the Eastern Mediterranean, overlapping toward the Western Mediterranean with Hellenistic kingdoms in Sicily in unstable equilibrium with Carthage, with a new state system forming in the interior of Gaul as the unintended consequence of massive slave-trading by Massaliots. (There's an article in Rich & Shipley (Eds.), War and Society in Greece, Routledge, 1992, 1994 I forgot to bring in. What's more, I forgot to bring in my Post-It Notes. What's more, I forgot to bring in the parallels in the literature with state-formation in Africa during Euro slave trade. Shoot me. I'm irresponsible.) What the Roman state didn't know, under the Republic, was how much money it was making on what, inclusive of its partly-private, partly-state chicanerous citizenry abroad whose potential for furnishing of *casus belli* by fleecing and skinning the provincials beyond endurance to revolt and massacre these people deserving of said fate was only nominally unwelcome. What was the common crook's loss in the Mithridatic War was Sulla's gain. Warfare and conquest, in the late republic had an exessively "short-run time-perspective," where, say, the looting of Gaul by Caesar's proconsular army was the one-shot deal required for the binding of the men's loyalty to Caesar himself; whereto was added his payoff of campaign debts incurred in winning election as consul in 59 BC; these notably included one million or one and a half million sesterces for a necklace required for a spectacular seduction, these things having the opposite electoral impact from that thought usual in the USA. This is dwelt on to indicate the perhaps frivolous motives for expansion, slaves aside, they were a dependable byproduct in any event, which were possible, so long as an aggregate ruin of state finance was not possible. This only entered the realm of theoretical possibility with the expansion of the legions to half a million men in the civil wars from 44 to 31 BC. Augustus, in founding the principate, ensured that he, and his successors, could, would, if they were curious, have some vague idea of how much revenue versus the relative magnitude of expenditure each province represented. The glory-and-grandeur motive was not, however, easily extinguished; for when Germany was given up as a growth-point, Claudius, in 44, conquered Britain. He had no way of knowing at this time how profitable an investment he'd just made; and the cleanup of the administration following Boudicca's revolt, in 60, which had the salutary impact, moreover, of the massacre of the leeches and speculators found in every instance ofnew conquest. Palmer, in The Roman Legions, 1926, remarked that units recruited in the Latin west routinely defeated those raised in the Greek east; but a citation is hardly necessary. The Roman army was recruited from tough tribes. Some of these empirically demonstrated their toughness in fighting Romans. Asturii and Cantabrii revolted in 22BC; too few were left unenslaved for their language to remain unRomanced, as was Basque. Other examples are Welsh, Berber, Armenian, and of course Albanian. My curiosity about the latter was not piqued when I first read Perry Anderson's characterization of "Illyria," in Passages From Antiquity To Feudalism, as "the last refuge of *latinitas*," for in 1973 I was wallowing in cults of personality and reverence for authority figures. Show me a pre-Roman language spoken to this day, and I'll show you a tribe so tough, the Romans durst not mess with them, and furthermore welcomed them most warmly as soldier material. Who rose like the veritable cream to senators and emperors. Trajan (98-117) , a Spaniard, added his easy conquest, the Nabataean Arab kingdom, to the empire, along with grandiosely expanded possessions in Mesopotamia. These, Hadrian (117-142) prudently withdrew from; but then, his rear was threatened, unrest among the Jews having already recrudesced under his predecessor, in Alexandria, in 115. Tha Bar Kokhba War (132-135) saw a vast improvement in tactics by the rebels over the effort in 66-73. Another of Hadrian's achievements, the Wall in Britain, contributed to later prosperity of that province; he also erected baths in London. By this time, the conquests of Ban Chao in Central Asia had led to Chinese control even farther to the west of the Stone Pillar at Kucha. (The Kuchans are also known as Tocharians.) At the Stone Pillar, the caravans from Changan and North China - the Later Han had moved the capital from Changan eastward to Loyang - turned back, having completed exhange of trade goods with dromedary caravans from the Parthian Empire, An Pi, in Chinese, through Afghanistan, to the rendevous point. To the west of the Parthian empire the caravans exchanged trade goods with those from Antioch, in the Roman Empire, An Pu in Chinese, at the sole legal exchange point, Nisibis, once this had been wrested from feeble Parthia. Antioch, in Syria, became the third, then second, largest city in the Roman Empire, whose specialty was the silk industry; and as a huge city, it was the de facto headquarters of Christianity. Original Sin vied with conspicuous "decadence," as fashionable young women affected the "naked look" in silk gauze in the second century. Septimus Severus was the first emperor to indisputably launch predatory expansion to the east, at Parthia's expense; the groundwork had been laid by his predecessors, of course. His victories culminated in the occupation of the Parthian royal capital, Ctesiphon, and the enslavement of 100,000 people. One third of the Roman legions were permanently on station in the East, and the reason was the control of ever longer stretches of Silk Road made money. What about the Marcomanni and Quadi, whom Marcus Aurelius had fought to his dying breath up in Dacia? Reprioritized. Severus was "a native of Leptis Magna in Africa and married to a Syrian princess," (Wilkes, The Illyrians) commanding Balkan troops, using the latter to expand the Roman East. The oriental influences on the Severan family, including dabbling in Christianity, are well-known. The latter was true of Philip The Arab, 244-249, whose demise was the single most precipitate step toward the Third Century Crisis. Here was an actual eastern native as emperor, and though the question as to, in what sense the Romans might be said to have been animated by "racism," as recognizable to us, is obscure, given that Antiquity employed discourse most *unrecognizable* to us, the assassination of Philip looks like a case of it. The frontier in Dacia was crumbling, and the legions defending the Danube were Balkan tribals. "During the early decades of the third century the army of Illyricum became more reluctant to commit its strength elsewhere, while insisting that resources were contributed from other areas of the Empire to sustain the exposed frontier on the Danube....(Wilkes, p. 261) Or, in plain English, the currency was worthless, and the troops were going nowhere without guaranteed loot and power in some combination. Two successive field commanders at Sirmium, Pacatanius, removed in time, and Decius, who wasn't, bid for power. Messius Decius, best known for persecuting Christians and getting stupidly ambushed and killed by Goths (249-251) personally assassinated Philip, issuing "coins bearing the legend 'virtus Illyrici.'" The worm turned in Mesopotamia. The Sassanid founder Ardashir had promised revenge, and Shapur I invaded the Roman Near East three times, sacking Antioch in 252, reducing Dura Europus in 254 (hence preserving the place for later archeological research), and capturing Valerian in 260, using the latter for footrest. The circumstances of a power vacuum on the Roman side obscured the altered cost-benefit ratio of wars in Mesopotamia. Epidemics of smallpox and measles (see McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, 1976) rendered the Mediterranean (and North China at the same time) a "demographic sink," by which I mean, the reduction of a dense population of a deasease- infested region to a level too low to support its previous labour-system, or "mode of production," if only in the style whereto it was accustomed. Mortality rates were highest in cities; and the cities of Roman Gaul, and to a lesser degree Spain, were so reduced in population that the commercial and agricultural estates supplying them, and if worked by slave gang labour most likely of declining profitability already, went out of business very quickly, becoming *agres vacantes*. As did peasants, free and slave, who weren't replaced. The cities were shrunken to tiny garrisons, a tenth of their former walled areas. Coinage went out of circulation. Usurpers did their usual usurping; as usurpers are paid to do. One of those who won, Gallienus, 260-268), led an army of Welsh and Germans to take over after the dubious loss of Valerian. He managed to get killed in ambush by a bunch of beaten Goths hiding out in a swamp, leaving it to the Illyrian, M. Aurelius Claudius [II] Gothicus, to mop up this wretched tribe; but meanwhile the most fantastic thing seemed to be happening in the east, a city-state had got grandiosity delusions, taking over a third of what had used to be the Roman Empire. The Roman Mesopotamian town of Palmyra, calling itself Tadmor, was vastly rich from the China trade in silk and the Indian trade in spices. It kept its own fleet on the Euphrates; citizens owned vast, immense numbers of dromedaries for the caravan trade. What happened was obscure, unplanned, and its consequences were unintended. This is the only way it could've happened. A Roman Senator, meaning in context a quite rich personage, S. Oedanathus, proclaimed himself emperor. Nobody much out of town paid attention. Usurpers were usurping everywhere, and purely local talent was a favourite-son candidate, nothing more. He died in 268, with his claim passing to his son, Wahabalat [sp?], in whose name power was exercised by his mother, Zanab [Zenobia]. There being as noted a Power Vaccum, Palmyrene money was deployed in masses to secure the allegiance of Roman Syria, Egypt, Arabia, Palestine, and most of Asia Minor. Claudius died in an epidemic in 270; an Illyrian from south Illyria, Albania proper, Domitius Aurelianus, seized power and marched on Palmyra in 272, promising that he'd do something really nice for the Syrian sun god, Sol Invictus of Emesa, if he won; hence made the god's birthday, Dec 25, a legal holiday, as it remains. This was all preparatory to the final takeover by C. Valerius Diocles and his junta of Albanians, in 284. Diocletian, as he is commonly known, is best known for his work in the Roman East. There remain remains, for instance, of the Strata Diocletiana, a military supply route along the obscurely defined Persian frontier. Also, whist he is roundly condemned for issuing the Edict of Diocletian at Antioch, in 303, it is nearly always forgotten by the accusers that the Antioch populace was the most riot-prone in the Roman Empire, as they proved under Theodosius I, in 383, the Day of the Statues, when every statue of every emperor was smashed because the food supply ran out. The ruling Albanian coterie, commanding the legions, filled with Albanians and Welsh, when they weren't filled with Germans, made a ruthless analysis of costs and benefits; in the course of which, we know, the monumental decision was made to move the political core of the Roman Empire to the East. From Naissa (Nish), home of Diocletian, and Nicomedia, in Asia Minor, the capital was shifted to the world's most famous naval choke-point, renamed Constantinople from Byzantium. Constantine was a second-generation Albanian general, leading his father's Welsh troops in what amounted to an Albanian blood feud against Maxentius, where the policy switch associated with the supremacy of eastern over western interests, ruthless and rational as it may have been in substance was, withal, guided by sheer superstition, signs and portents in the heavens, in 312 at the Milvian Bridge. The implications for this, ie, Christinization, were foreseeably relevant to the east, not the west, as the latter was deficient in urbanism, hence of Christians. How the east was won (324) is not important; a few months later, in 325, in Nicaea, across Marmora, the assembled prelates were told, after three centuries of denouncing principalities and powers, that the Church was to be run the army way; and Constantine hadn't even any right to call the Council; he had no right to be there; he wasn't even to be baptized till his deathbed due to his mass-murders. The dynasty of Constantine ended with Julian, called the Apostate, 361-363. Without military experience, he'd won the battle of Strasbourg, 360, against the Alemanni by *having the armies of Gaul supplied from Britain*. In the latter, the *villa* economy was flourishing. In Gaul, it was in ruins. Was this possibly related to the raiding for slaves in Caledonia, north of Hadrian's wall? No written evidence exists. If the slaves on the *villae* were Picts from Caledonia, this makes a horse of a different kettle of fish after what happened after the mutiny of the Saxon mercenaries blamed on "Vortigern." Conquerors don't conquer because they desire freedom, equality, liberty, and yeoman status; the do so to watch somebody else do the work. So the Romans held onto the Welsh recruiting grounds, a nursery of usurpers however, as long as they could, pulling out only after the crossing of the Rhine by whole German peoples on Christmas Eve, 406. The rest of Western Europe could revert, so long as the military cared, to the condition of Fierce and Warlike Tribes, or Wild West, so long as the high command cared; the State was them. They had packed up and moved any people who counted. When the Empire was divided into separate but unequal halves, it turned out, it was especially important to the East, where the empire was in flourishing condition, relatively and at times even absolutely, right up to the Plague of Justinian, in 542, which made the most densely-populated areas of the economic core into another, worse, demographic sink, even though the East had Armenians to draw upon. The dynasty of Heraclius (610-641), which lasted until Justinian II, d. 711, was of Armenian origin; and the Armenians were the only Monophysite Christians ever appeased by the Late Romans/Byzantines. (Nobody ever mentioned skin colour, but something applied to the Syrians and Egyptians which did not to Armenians. Late Romans/Byzantines fought Sassanids over Mesopotamia until both sides forgot about it, for a long time, due to the fact that the rewards from political rent over the Silk Route could not support the wars of both powers; only that of one of them in fairly uneventful control for extended periods. Once this had been grasped, both powers fought by using proxies, the Ghassanids for the Late Romans/Byzantines, Lakhmids for the Sassanids. This relatively happy and cheap state of affairs was terminated by the Plague of Justinian and its aftermath, when both powers attempted, the Sassanids following Justinian's example, of recouping revenue shortfalls from demographic collapse from foreign predation, first under Khushraw I Anushirwan, who sacked Antioch in 540 while Justinian's "reconquest" was on, then under Khushraw II, who'd owed his throne to Maurice (580-602). The effect was something like if both Allies and Central Powers had been replaced by Communism; but who knew. The curious thing about that outcome was, the Hijaz route from Yemen, which all the learned scholars here have been arguing about, was not sufficiently profitable from the carrying trade in frankincence and myrrh; this had anyway been drastically reduced by Constantine's religious policy's effect upon the Roman balance of payments, ie, by substiting inhumation, relatively odour-free, for cremation, which stinks, requiring vast quantities of frankincense and myrrh to cover it up; the same is true of the abolition of animal sacrifices in Christian areas over the period required for conversion of the population, which had been underway since the economic collapse of the pagan cults in the third century. What made the Hijaz route profitable, extremely profitable, was the closure of the Roman-Persian frontier, as normally occurred in times of war; and by annihilating the former boundary, the Arabs doomed the trade prosperity of Arabia. But they, like the Romans before them, packed up and moved Arabia to where they went, a better life on Earth, let alone Paradise. Daniel A. Foss From ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au Sat Jun 8 23:37:11 1996 09 Jun 1996 15:36:56 +1000 Date: Sun, 09 Jun 1996 15:36:56 +1000 From: "Bruce R. McFarling" Subject: A further technical interuption To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu I have forwarded a uuencoded version of the zipped archive I obtained with the WordPerfect printer driver to those who responded to my original interuption. I'll be happy to do the same for anyone else who asks -- and if that particular packaging doesn't work for someone, let me know whether uuencoding the two pieces or sending the two pieces as a MIME attachment is preferable, and I can do that. It is a fairly small tool, but handy if it works. Note that whether you are using this tool, or using Word for Window's 'MS-DOS with Layout' option, a useful addition is to define a special e-mail footnote format that is [1] (for number in both the text and the footnote) instead of 1 or 1 or 1. [1] is both easier to catch as an footnote in e-mail, and also easier to search for -- whether this is 'looking up' the foonote with a search function and 'returning to the text' with a backward search, or getting the document translated from ASCII text back into a word processor document format. Virtually, Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au From hnashe@hnashe.com Thu Jun 13 08:13:53 1996 Date: Thu, 13 Jun 1996 13:56:07 +0100 To: WSN@csf.colorado.edu From: Philip Marshall Subject: Contributors Wanted Contributors Wanted In the summer of 1996, The International Guide for Environmental Solutions will be completed. We require all information/input in the way of editorial, reference material etc mailing lists WWW sites usenet groups etc... for this free service Please visit our test site at www.hnashe.com and e-mail us with your suggestions and what you think should be included. -- Philip Marshall Turnpike evaluation. For information, see http://www.turnpike.com/ From chriscd@jhu.edu Thu Jun 13 15:45:00 1996 13 Jun 1996 17:00:49 -0400 (EDT) 13 Jun 1996 15:27:09 -0400 (EDT) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 1996 14:12:51 -0600 (CST) From: chris chase-dunn Subject: wsn use of ftp or gopher Sender: chriscd@jhu.edu To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu X-NUPop-Charset: English are any wsn subscribers using ftp or gopher to access the _Journal of World-Systems Research_ instead of the World Wide Web or lynx? Please send me a personal message if you need ftp or gopher access to JWSR. chris Prof. Chris Chase-Dunn Department of Sociology Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, MD. 21218 USA tel 410 516 7633 fax 410 516 7590 email chriscd@jhu.edu From chriscd@jhu.edu Thu Jun 13 15:45:47 1996 13 Jun 1996 17:04:15 -0400 (EDT) 13 Jun 1996 15:17:08 -0400 (EDT) Date: Thu, 13 Jun 1996 14:02:54 -0600 (CST) From: chris chase-dunn Subject: global praxis and the future of the world-system Sender: chriscd@jhu.edu To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu X-NUPop-Charset: English We have begun to publish Volume 2 of the _Journal of World-Systems Research_. The next batch includes an article by Political Scientist Daniel Whiteneck on epistemic communities and an article by Historian W. Warren Wagar on his ideas about the future of the world-system and political practice. Wagar proposes the formation of a World Party to carry through the project of global democratic socialism. Included with his article are thirteen comments by Sociologists, Political Scientists and activists. Perhaps Wagar's article and the comments might serve as a topic for discussion on wsn. JWSR is primarily an outlet for research articles on world-systems, but Wagar's ideas are so important that we have included them despite our determination that JWSR not become a political magazine. Volume 2 of JWSR is available for free from http://csf.colorado.edu/wsystems/jwsr.html chris Prof. Chris Chase-Dunn Department of Sociology Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, MD. 21218 USA tel 410 516 7633 fax 410 516 7590 email chriscd@jhu.edu From BAMYEHM@woods.uml.edu Fri Jun 14 07:30:42 1996 From: BAMYEHM@woods.uml.edu Date: Fri, 14 Jun 1996 09:28:52 EDT To: WSN@CSF.COLORADO.EDU Subject: announcing a new journal ANNOUNCING A NEW JOURNAL... Passages: A Journal of Transnational and Transcultural Studies is a new, interdisciplinary journal published by World Heritage Press. The journal seeks to act as a focal point for the burgeoning literature on transnational phenomena and cross-cultural encounters. As a journal of transnational and transcultural studies, Passages regards both terms not as doctrines, principles or namesakes of identifiable schools of thought, but rather as terms that act as place-holders for interconnected dynamics. It regards these social, textual, political, cultural, and economic dynamics as the grounds from which the world of the twenty first century is emerging. At the same time, it is also attentive to their historical genesis, parallels and trajectories. Passages is committed to the belief that the nation-state has become exhausted as a frame of political, cultural or economic reference. Such an exhaustion manifests itself in the challenges that confront this unit from within its proclaimed boundaries as well as from without. Passages seeks to examine all facets of the contested terrains of transnational and transcultural experiences, movements, ideologies, histories, economies. It is not committed to any program or school of thought. It does, however, encourage interdisciplinary investigation. The journal seeks to connect economic analysis to cultural awareness, political commentary to historical depth, literary analysis to contexts of textual production, and so on. The journal thus seeks to contribute to moving transnational studies beyond the confines of policy recommendations, narrow economism or grand cultural totalizations. Similarly, it seeks to contribute to moving multiculturalism beyond its current status as a "slogan" with few historical or theoretical frames of presentation. In sum, Passages seeks to examine the role of both transnationalism and cross-cultural knowledge systems in producing social knowledge, memory, facts, histories, and dynamics of coexistence and conflict. Passages welcomes submissions of scholarly articles, as well as of writings in other formats, such as personal narratives, interviews, survey articles and summaries of material available in foreign languages. Address before August 5: Send manuscripts and queries to the editor, Mohammed A. Bamyeh, Dept of Sociology, University of Massachusetts, Lowell, MA 01854. Phone (508) 934-4305. Fax (508) 934-3023. email: bamyehm@woods.uml.edu. After August 5: Mohammed A. Bamyeh, Editor, New York University, The Gallatin School, 715 Broadway, New York, NY 10003-6806, USA. Advisory Board of Passages includes: Houston Baker, Jr., Homi Bhabha, Pierre Bourdieu, Johannes Fabian, Richard Falk, Andre Gunder Frank, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Henry Giroux, J|rgen Habermas, Anthony D. King, Dominick LaCapra, Mary Layoun, Ashis Nandy, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Mark Poster, Amartya Sen, Wolfgang Streeck, Charles Taylor, Immanuel Wallerstein. From smarwah@osf1.gmu.edu Sun Jun 16 10:23:17 1996 Date: Sun, 16 Jun 1996 12:23:14 -0400 (EDT) From: Sanjay Marwah To: WSn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Economic Cooperation I was interested in getting suggestions on the future of economic cooperation between countries not included in the three major regional blocs of Europe, Japan and East Assia, and NAFTA. Specifically, I had in mind countries in the Indian Ocean rim including large countries like India, South Africa, and Australia. Each of them seems somewhat left out of these alrge three blocs. Is there any literature addressing the cooperation between middle range countries in trade and economic cooperation. Much of the political economy and trade related literature seems to have focused on the three large bocs mentioned above, talked also in general terms about the form and structure of cooperation in the post Cold War environment, and dominated by regime theory and the like. Obviously, no country would like to be left out of these major blocs, but the marginalization factor may possibly encourage closer ties to try to consolidate and assert some more bargaining power. Obviously, there can be no cut and dry answer to these scenarios, but the lack of attention to basic issues in political economy on how the post war environment changes for smaller and more long term powers is surprising. Sanjay Marwah From ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au Sun Jun 16 11:27:51 1996 Date: Mon, 17 Jun 1996 03:26:42 +1000 From: "Bruce R. McFarling" Subject: Re: Economic Cooperation In-reply-to: To: Sanjay Marwah On Sun, 16 Jun 1996, Sanjay Marwah wrote: > I was interested in getting suggestions on the future of economic > cooperation between countries not included in the three major regional > blocs of Europe, Japan and East Assia, and NAFTA. Specifically, I had in > mind countries in the Indian Ocean rim including large countries like > India, South Africa, and Australia. First, I wonder if you are getting 'large size' from land are, population, GDP, or ... well, precisely what? With one large population and two medium - to - small population countries, India and Australia substantially larger in land area than South Africa, it's a bit of a mix. Of course, there's nothing necessarily wrong with that: looking at a mixture of cases may help balance the discussion. > Each of them seems somewhat left out of these large three blocs. I would agree with India and sub-Saharan Africa seemingly being left out of these emerging blocs. I found the paper in JWSR #1 on 'Life Spaces' by Tieting Su quite useful for these, and from his arguments and from looking at Australia's trade figures for the last thirty years, I'd say that far from being left out of these blocs, Australia is part of the overlap between the US-centered and East Asian - centered blocs. And this is growing stronger, not weaker: as Australia's position generating positive net exports with Japan has softened (in large part these surpluses help finance negative net exports with the US -- to a modest extent the US / Japanese trade imbalance is exageragated by looking at two partners in a triangular trade relationship), trade with the Republic of Korea has taken off. Indeed, currently the top eight trade partners of Australia are Japan, the US, New Zealand, and Great Britain, among high income countries, and the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and China, among middle and low income countries. And trade with GBR is in a forty-year long slide in relative terms, So Australia does not look like it is being left out of the trade bloc relationships. Of course, it retains the advantage of not having much water per acre, which translates into a lot more minerals per capita than a lot of countries enjoy. > Is there any literature addressing the cooperation between middle > range countries in trade and economic cooperation. It seems to me that this is what the economic development literature on regional economic cooperation focuses on. And, BTW, the incorporation of CARICOM, CACM, the Andean Pact and the southern cone group into NAFTA is by no means a done deal yet. > ... Obviously, there can be no cut and dry answer to these > scenarios, but the lack of attention to basic issues in > political economy on how the post war environment changes > for smaller and more long term powers is surprising. I agree that its an important question. Of course, there may be an impression that little is being done simply because those who would like to know have not raised the question, and those who are aware of what has been done have not been discussing it in this forum. Since I consider myself one of the former, I'm glad the issue was raised and look forwward to hearing from the latter. Virtually, Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au From andrei@rsuh.ru Tue Jun 18 09:47:34 1996 From: "Korotaev A." Organization: rsuh To: wilkinso@polisci.sscnet.ucla.edu Date: Tue, 18 Jun 1996 19:35:38 +0300 Subject: Re:Re: South Arabian world system/civilizat Reply-to: andrei@rsuh.ru > Date: Fri, 07 Jun 96 13:47:00 PDT > Reply-to: wilkinso@polisci.sscnet.ucla.edu > From: "Wilkinson, David POLI SCI" > To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK > Subject: Re: South Arabian world system/civilizat > X-To: andrei@rsuh.ru > Thank you for the reply to my query about the politico-diplomatic-military > linkages of South Arabia; as I regard such linkage, of a sustained and > continuing character, as the essential criterion for an area's > inclusion/exclusion in a civilization/world system, the status of > South Arabia on that score would appear to be intriguingly ambiguous until at > least 26 BC. "[C]ontinuous embassies...made themselves the friends of..." > would for me be language decisively descriptive of South Arabian > membership in the Central system, probably from the first such embassy. > > The duration and content of the embassies to Assyria, and the reasons to > believe or disbelieve in the continuation of such contact with the empires > that succeeded Assyria, would be important, from my perspective, in > determining when South Arabia first entered the Central system. (I would use > trade ties as evidence of entry into the trade network which I call the Old > Oikumene, which entirely includes but is larger than the Central > Civilization/world system.) > > For me, another important form of social-taxonomical data is city sizes > and numbers. Can you say what range of estimates you would consider > currently persuasive for the number and size (population or area) of any > urban centers of South Arabia for any dates or range of dates down to say the > embassies to the Roman emperors? > > David Wilkinson > > >` I agree with you completely that for the 1st mil. BC in your terminology South Arabia should be considered as a part of the Old Oikumene rather than the Central Civilization. With respect to the date of its absorbtion by the Central Civilization I would be more cautious. I would date it for sure by the 4th cent. AD (the transition to Monotheism in Yemen) - since that time we have really intence political-military-diplimatic-ideological interconnections between SA and the CC core. Between the 1st BC and the 4th century AD SA seems to have been just on the brink to have been incorporated into the CC - I would refer to the "Indian" and "Chaldaean"ambassodors mentioned as participants in the "coronation" ceremonies of a Hadrami king of the 3rd cent. AD, remarkable diplomatic "northward" activities of the Sabaean and then Himyarite king in the 3rd-4th centuries (aimed mainly at ther Central and North Arabian "kings"['mlk], but eventually reaching as far as Persia [Sharafaddi:n 31 inscription of the end of the 3rd cent.AD]), coupled with the military activities firstly by the 3rd AD Sabaean kings reaching Central Arabia and then by the 4th AD Himyarite kings getting to North Arabia [see especially the newly published [by Robin and Gaida] `ábada:n inscription] &c &c. In general the impression is that South Arabia was incorporated into the Central Civilization mainly through the activities of the South Arabians themselves, rather than by the activities of the Central Civilization - a possibility which does not seem to have been seriously treated in your account of the Central Civilization theory. Yours, Andrey. From andrei@rsuh.ru Tue Jun 18 10:07:45 1996 From: "Korotaev A." Organization: rsuh To: David Lloyd-Jones Date: Tue, 18 Jun 1996 19:56:10 +0300 Subject: Re: South Arabian world system/civilization? Reply-to: andrei@rsuh.ru > Date: Fri, 7 Jun 1996 10:22:00 -0400 (EDT) > To: andrei@rsuh.ru > From: David Lloyd-Jones > Subject: Re: South Arabian world system/civilization? > Cc: wsn@csf.colorado.edu > At 04:43 PM 07/06/96 +0300, Andrey wrote: > > >With respect to the political-military-diplomatic transactions > >you specifically ask about we know e.g. the following (in addition to the > >famous trip by the Queen of Sheba (= Saba') to Solomon: > >1. The Sabaean embassies to Assyria (the end of the 7th - beg.6 cent. > >BC) [Assyrian royal inscriptions]. > >2. The Roman attempt to conquer SA in 26 BC (Strabo, Pliny &c). > >3. Continuous embassies by which the (Himyarite?) kings in Zafa:r > >made themselves friends of the Roman Emperors (mentioned by > >Periplus). > >4. The events of the 6th century CE in South Arabia greatly > >influenced by the SA involvement in the the political-military-diplomatic > >game of that age (involving first of all Byzantine, Persia and > >Ethiopia) &c. > > Andrey, > > You jump the Red Sea from time to time. Does your "South Arabia" include > the Meroitic Empire? > > We have here in New York a Professor Leonard Jeffries, universally denounced > by whites as an antisemite, but who in fact trades in a number of popular > African cultural themes, some of them philosemitic, some of them > nationalistic, some of them folklorique. The problem critics of Jeffries > face is that scholarship on Africa is thin on the ground, and he makes > enough claims and good guesses that he is bound to be proved right on a > great deal of what he says over the next few years. > > To what degree do you think you are laying the groundwork for a Red Sea > centered culture and trade (in that order, for the religious liturgy > determines the price of the francinsense)? Is it to parallel the > Mediterranean, and then succumb, rather than being ancillary to it? > > Speculatively, > > -dlj. > > > > According to the archaeological materials recently (1994-96) excavated by the German-Russian team at Sabir (near Aden) it seems possible to speak about the WS of the type you mention (East Africa centered, including South Arabia) with respect to the 2nd mil.BC - the very beginning of the 1st mil.BC). However, with respect to the most of the 1st mil.BC and after) it seems to have been the other way round (i.e. a SA centered WS, including parts of East Africa [ - but excluding Meroe with which it however had some contacts - studied by Berzina]). Yours, Andrey. From andrei@rsuh.ru Tue Jun 18 11:03:51 1996 From: "Korotaev A." Organization: rsuh To: PHILOFHI@YORKU.CA Date: Tue, 18 Jun 1996 20:52:14 +0300 Subject: Re:Re: A critique of the WST "founding fathers" Reply-to: andrei@rsuh.ru So it is surely nonsense to maintain that South > Arabia or Kuveit exploit USA in oil trade now. Although they have real > significant control of prices and the West allows it! > thank you. Nikolai Rozov > rozov@cnit.nsu.ru If this is really such a nonsense, why then the United Arab Emirates have per capita income higher than the USA? Dear Nukolay, do you really believe that this is actually due to the fact that the industrious population of the UAE work harder and more productive than the population of the USA? Why are the WS theorists so ready to accept everywhere (mostly alleged) exploitation of the periphery by the core, whereas being so reluctant to notice quite real facts of the exploitation of the core by the periphery?! Yours Andrey (Moscow, Russia). From ROZOV@cnit.nsu.ru Wed Jun 19 05:55:35 1996 19 Jun 96 18:50:53 NSK-6 From: "Nikolai S. Rozov" Organization: Center of New Informational Tech. To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Wed, 19 Jun 1996 18:50:27 -0600 (NSK) Subject: Re:Re: A critique of the WST "founding fathers" Dear Andrei, the matter is we have different notions of exploitation. For you: 1) A exploits B if A gains more in unequal exchange with B than B does. For me (following here S.Sanderson) new options should be added: namely 2) some kind of coercion (military, political, ideological, economic) of A over B (including special depriving of resources previously attainable by B: f.e.depriving peasants of their land during industrialization, see Marx), and 3) incapability of B to avoid these relations with A. By these additional criteria the advantages of U.A.Emirates in oil trade over US do not mean exploitation (no coercion, no special depriving of previous resources, existing of capability of US to cease relations). How can be qualified this exchange? Just as successful use by SEMIperipheral country of its natural monopoly over its natural resources, highly needed by rich core states (which became fortunately free of previous long-live tradition of grasping such needed resources by military invasion!). If in pre-Muslim times S. Arabia in its profitable spices trade was defended only geographically by the barrier of desert, now these countries are defended by real moral progress in world politics (I foresee here a storm of left protests, but tell me please what besides new moral norms stops the West or 5 nuclear countries to invade and divide for colonies all Arabian oil territories?). Trying to be more clear: in which case we would reveal exploitation in this situation? Only if we see the following events (just imagine!): United Arabian Emirates (UAE) managed to grasp monopoly over almost all oil resources in the world, including S.Arabian, Kuweitian, Iranian, Iraquian, Siberian, Kaspian, American oil, etc. (depriving and coercion), UAE managed to grasp military-political hegemony for defending this oil monopoly and dictating high monopolical prices (incapability of all others to avoid or change these relations). Only in this case nobody who needs oil would avoid this unequal exchange and everybody who buy oil would be really exploited. Isn't it sufficiently evident now? Thank you, best regards, yours Nikolai > From: "Korotaev A." > If this is really such a nonsense, why then the United Arab Emirates > have per capita income higher than the USA? Dear Nukolay, do you > really believe that this is actually due to the fact that the > industrious population of the UAE work harder and more productive > than the population of the USA? Why are the WS theorists so ready to > accept everywhere (mostly alleged) exploitation of the periphery by > the core, whereas being so reluctant to notice quite real facts of > the exploitation of the core by the periphery?! > Yours Andrey (Moscow, Russia). > From rkmoore@iol.ie Thu Jun 20 04:26:12 1996 Thu, 20 Jun 1996 11:25:30 +0100 (BST) Date: Thu, 20 Jun 1996 11:25:30 +0100 (BST) To: cyberjournal@cpsr.org From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: cj#547> The Rise & Fall of Democracy Consider the dance which has been been going on between what I would call the _elite_ and the _people_ since the middle of the 18th century. As the feudal era was ending, the elites included royalty, the churches, the land-aristocracy, and the business-wealthy -- and their hold over the people was essentially total. This is the context out of which democracy arose. What happened is that certain elites were out to re-divide the elite pie, cutting themselves the lion's share, and cutting out others altogether. Essentially, the emerging business-wealthy were tired of butting up against the established hierarchies, and began to favor republics as a better environment for the further development of capitalism. But this business-oriented sub-elite needed allies in order to make a grab for power. They turned to the people themselves, and offered them a partnership in a new regime. The people provided the troops to overthrow the old regimes, and received in return the promise of a democratic republic -- liberty, equality, fraternity, and all that. The United States and France led the way, and demonstrated two quite-different paths to a modern republic. Eventually, the rest of the "western world" followed suit, and the "modern democracy" has become a seemingly permanent -- and dominant -- political structure. Once the other elites were ousted, what remained was an uneasy partnership between the business-elite and the people. It was the surviving elites who drafted the new constitutions, and became the political and economic leaders of the new republics. They made sure royalty, nobility, and the church were dislodged from power -- by the pen in the States, and by the guillotine in France. The adversarial nature of this "partnership" became clear right away -- when the U.S. Constitution was first drafted in 1789 -- WITHOUT a bill of rights. The elite had shafted the people, and the people had to rise up to demand their promised democratic guarantees. Ever since, there's been a tug-of-war for control. Sometimes the elite reigns supreme, as in late 19th century America. Other times people manage to elect effective representatives, as in Britain during the 1950s. The partnership continued as long as the elites needed the people on their side -- to provide labor for the factories and fodder for the cannons. But the current global situation -- really since the end of WWII, but more obviously since the end of the Cold War -- is a whole new ball game. With modern hi-tech weapons (including nuclear), massive armies are no longer necessary or cost-effective as a means of maintaining imperialistic arrangements in the Third World. And with modern corporate globalism, today's business-elite does not need "home base national fortresses" to defend their plants, markets, and access to resources. This "business protection" function -- formerly carried out on a push-and-shove basis by the "great powers" -- is increasingly being carried out systematically by internationalised institutions: IMF, NATO, Brussels, etc. Consequently, the nation state has become more of a hindrance than a benefit to the modern mega-corporation. It's the dominant nations which advance the standards in environmental protection, worker's rights, and other such "emotional" and "wasteful" measures. Small, weak nations are more amenable to rape and pillage by corporate developers, and the Third World is the elite's prototype of how they'd like the whole world to operate. Thus a decision has been made by the elite to dump the strong nation state, dissolve the partnership with people, and return to a neo-feudal system with an all-powerful corporate elite and an essentially disenfranchised people. This is what is behind the whole Reagan/Thather/Friedman mythology of free-trade, government "inefficiency" and "corruption", privatization, market forces, downsizing, etc. etc. Public infrastructures and institutions are being dismantled, and control is being turned over to elite corporate hands. This is an historic and radical _political_ revolution -- on a scale with the American or French Revolutions -- but its existence is covered over in the media by smokescreen discussions of secondary and short-term economic issues. Big-time history is happening in front of our eyes, and only the collatoral changes are being noted. The elite scheme is to make governments weaker, nations smaller, and to eliminate political rights and social entitlements -- essentially to eradicate the structures that support democracy. Citizenship is to be replaced by the roles of employee and consumer. Political and economic control of the world will devolve to faceless bureaucratic commissions, set up to further the interests of the corporate elite, and backed up by a U.S./NATO/Judge Dredd, media-praised Strike Force. "We bombed Lower Slobovia to make it more competitive" will be the standard battle report in this new regime. We've seen test runs of the Judge Dredd judge-jury-executioner machinery in Panama, Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia. * * * Maastricht, Scottish independence, ethnic or regional autonomy, stronger international peace arrangements -- these are all developments which might have much to be said for them taken in isolation, or if implemented within a democratic framework. But within the context of the corporate elite storming the bastille of democracy, it is necessary to re-examine _all_ changes and reforms from the perspective of whether they strengthen or weaken our fundamental democratic institutions. If we don't look at the big picture, then we'll be like the frog who submits to being cooked -- the victim of a sneaky slow-boiling policy. The fact is that the modern nation state is the most effective democratic institution mankind has been able to come up with since outgrowing the small-scale city-state. With all its defects and corruptions, this gift from the Enlightenment -- the national republic -- is the only effective channel the people have to power-sharing with the elites. If the strong nation-state withers away, we will not -- be assured -- enter an era of freedom and prosperity, with the "shackles of wasteful governments off our backs". No indeed. If you want to see the future -- in which weak nations must deal as-best-they-can with mega-corporations -- then look at the Third World. The last thing you see in Third-World countries is freedom and prosperity. What you in fact see are governments which increasingly specialize in two functions: suppressing the population, on the one hand, while on the other hand they negotiate with the international investment community and corporate investors. When all nations have been whittled down and made weak, then the world will have become essentially a patchwork of plantation-states. We'll have a neo-feudal global system where the corporate elite act as a kind of royalty, extracting tribute from all the little competing nation-fiefdoms. There is a brief window of opportunity -- while modern democracies continue to survive -- in which the people can wake up and peacefully seize control of their governments. After those governments have been devolved/downsized, it will be too late. And with modern weaponry under the command of the elite, there will be no possibility of the people arising anew in revolution. If the people in any of the little fiefdoms try it, they'll be dealt with as Iraq has been in the Gulf War and its aftermath: demonized by the global media, bombed by Judge Dredd, and left to starve under embargoes. It won't be nice to mess with Earth Inc.! Preservation of strong national sovereignty in the modern democracies is the rock-bottom foundation needed by the people -- without it democracy will without doubt disappear from the world. * * * ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ Posted by Richard K. Moore - rkmoore@iol.ie - Wexford, Ireland Cyberlib: www | ftp --> ftp://ftp.iol.ie/users/rkmoore/cyberlib ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ From rkmoore@iol.ie Sat Jun 22 06:39:24 1996 Sat, 22 Jun 1996 13:38:59 +0100 (BST) Date: Sat, 22 Jun 1996 13:38:59 +0100 (BST) To: From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Re: A critique of the WST "founding fathers" Dr. Rozov asked: >"what besides new moral norms stops the West or 5 nuclear >countries to invade and divide for colonies all Arabian oil >territories?" to which, Vladimir Bilenkin commented: >First and foremost, the contradictions between the bullies do... Another answer is the changing nature of imperialism. From such a perspective one can see that the oil countries are quite nicely under control already. Israel provides a tension/threat situation, maintaining an excuse for continual U.S. diplomatic and military involvement. Fundamentalists and counter-factions -- all encouraged and assisted (overtly or covertly, directly or indirectly) by the U.S. -- maintain further tension, disunity, and lack of progress toward democractic institutions. When oil supplies are in excess, wars can be stirred up or excuses found to boycott one or another nation. If anyone tries to "go independent" (like Iraq or Libya), they can be media-demonized and militarily threatened by stealth-blitzkrieg or boycott-starvation. I ask Dr. Rozov -- Why would modern imperial managers want to revert to expensive 19th Century techniques? Yours, Richard Moore From ROZOV@cnit.nsu.ru Tue Jun 25 08:48:36 1996 25 Jun 96 21:46:49 NSK-6 From: "Nikolai S. Rozov" Organization: Center of New Informational Tech. To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Tue, 25 Jun 1996 21:46:37 -0600 (NSK) Subject: Where World Capitalism is going? We have gone far away from criticism of WS fathers. While reflecting on Richard Moore's arguments I decided to suggest a new subject concerning objective long-term trends of World Capitalism and possible alternative evaluations of them. Three main views on this point can be seen: a) the liberal 'mainstream' position: "free market economy and democracy are winning, they are becoming stronger and stronger and they are really worthy this victory" (Fukuyama, etc) I think nobody in wsn needs arguments against this position. b) the left expectations of world capitalism's decline: it's a world desease ("virus") and it is worthy its forthcoming failure (Wallerstein, Chase-Dann) My question: What are real visible signs of decline or crisis, which should be stronger than all those problems and crises that world capitalism successfully prevailed in the past (f.e. in 1810-15, 1848-9, 1914-18, 1930-32, 1939-45, 1968-69)? c) the left appeals for struggle against strong and threatening world capitalism (appeals by Maoism, Trotskism in Latin America, etc, Russian Communism, maybe in wsn by R.Moore in his struggle against 'imperialism' and TNC) My doubts and questions: Historical facts tell us that in most cases of open 'hot' struggle against world capitalism did not succeed, but ALL the local national 'successes' (f.e. in Russia since 1917, China, Cuba, N.Korea, Iran, Albania) led inevitably to mass social disasters, poverty, frequently - mass terror. On the contrary most "soft" and interior attemps to ameliorate capitalism were successful, or at least, harmless (Second International and Social-Democratic reforms in Europe in the beginning of XX, laborists in Great Britain, socialists in Sweden, promotion of social programs in US, France, Germany, etc). Well, WS-theory can tell that it was possible only for core or semipripheral countries, not for periphery. Great, but in this case the imperative should be not a struggle against 'imperialism' (ie core countries) transforming them to less democratric and tolerant regimes, but vice versa - the imperative should be to try to rise the status (from periphery to semipheriphery) of most exploited countries and peoples. Is the last task possible without support of world capital, without IMF, TNC, Big- 7 and all other 'devils', without appeal to moral norms of humanism, justice,etc, even if we see so much hypocrisy in proclaiming these values by mainstream leaders? My position in brief on the question posed in the subject above: - World Capitalism seems to strengthen (not decline), - it is not a monolite, it is rather open for reforms (much more than all non-capitalist social regimes!), - many long-term trends of its transformation during last 500 years should be morally appreciated, - the task is not to unmask hypocrisy of its social-moral ideology, but to use this ideology as a support for 'soft' promotion of reforms for humanizing Capitalism (first of all to work out the correspondent norms of world legal system in international trade, debts, raw resources, etc) now some comments to Richard Moore's msg: > From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) > Another answer is the changing nature of imperialism. From such a > perspective one can see that the oil countries are quite nicely under > control already. Israel provides a tension/threat situation, maintaining > an excuse for continual U.S. diplomatic and military involvement. > Fundamentalists and counter-factions -- all encouraged and assisted > (overtly or covertly, directly or indirectly) by the U.S. -- maintain > further tension, disunity, and lack of progress toward democractic > institutions. Dear Richard, I agree, but would you prefer US military invasion with mass eliminating of native peoples, like Hitler would do? If not - the changed nature of imperialism must be morally appreciated. > When oil supplies are in excess, wars can be stirred up it is a serious blame which needs arguments > or excuses > found to boycott one or another nation. If anyone tries to "go > independent" (like Iraq well, I regret nobody from Kuweit is here in wsn. I was out of CNN, according to information of our correspondents just in the first days of August 1993 invasion... no need to demonize it specially The European equivalent of this Iraque's "independance" would be f.e. invasion of London by Irish tank divisions, mass robbing of all Londoners, crushing of all infra-structure, etc, etc > or Libya), they can be media-demonized and > militarily threatened by stealth-blitzkrieg or boycott-starvation. > > I ask Dr. Rozov -- Why would modern imperial managers want to > revert to expensive 19th Century techniques? I answer to Richard: bless God, they do not want: to be humanistic sometimes occurs to be more profitable. And I ask now everybody: 1) Where World Capitalism is going from your viewpoint? 2) Isn't it possible and reasonable to create options for further prolongation of these humanistic-profitable trends of World Capitalism instead of its demonizing? Greetings from Siberia, Nikolai Nikolai S. Rozov # Address:Dept. of Philosophy Prof.of Philosophy # Novosibirsk State University rozov@cnit.nsu.ru # 630090, Novosibirsk Fax: (3832) 355237 # Pirogova 2, RUSSIA Moderator of the mailing list PHILOFHI (PHILosophy OF HIstory and theoretical history) http://darwin.clas.virginia.edu/~dew7e/anthronet/subscribe /philofhi.html From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Tue Jun 25 16:11:25 1996 Date: Tue, 25 Jun 1996 18:11:20 -0400 (EDT) From: "A. Gunder Frank" To: "Nikolai S. Rozov" Subject: Re: Where World Capitalism is going? In-Reply-To: <65485249CA@cnit.nsu.ru> 1.oil. my reply sent to Nikolai directly. summary: US more thsan invaded Iraq when convenient, and maintains/adjusts embargo for oil price reasons. I agree with the other posting on this. 2. capitalism. another "solution" - not for the world, but for our discussion: eliminate the word/concept of "capitalism". look at/see world as it really is and wie es eigentlich gewesen ist. gunder frank From ROZOV@cnit.nsu.ru Tue Jun 25 20:59:29 1996 26 Jun 96 09:54:23 NSK-6 From: "Nikolai S. Rozov" Organization: Center of New Informational Tech. To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Wed, 26 Jun 1996 09:54:03 -0600 (NSK) Subject: sorry, red flags sorry for miswriting the year of Iraque's invasion Kuweit, (not 1993,but 1990) 1990 was the year before collapse of USSR with state red flag. The strongest reaction of our journalists was caused by the combination of 2- 3 days long crash of modern European Al-Kuweit city (no water, no electricity, crashed and robbed shops, mountains of rubbish, hunger, terror, violence on streets) with red flags on Iraque tanks, it's just a detail, no sympathy to modern really strong and sometimes cruel core control of resource territories (agree with R.Moore and Gunder Frank), but much less sympathy to such red "independance" of this control regards, Nikolai From cns@cats.ucsc.edu Wed Jun 26 11:54:37 1996 From: cns@cats.ucsc.edu Date: Wed, 26 Jun 1996 10:54:22 -0700 To: ecol-econ@csf.colorado.edu, envst-l@brownvm.brown.edu, envtecsoc@csf.colorado.edu, et-ann@searn.sunet.se, ipe@csf.colorado.edu, pen-l@anthrax.ecst.csuchico.edu, psn@csf.colorado.edu, wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: CNS on WWW CNS, the journal CAPTALISM, NATURE SOCIALISM, is pleased to announce the launching of its Worldwide Web site: http: //www.cruzio.com/~cns/ Contents include: * CNS - current issue * CNS - complete tables of contents * Center for Political Ecology * Other CNS/CPE publications * Teaching resources Your comments and suggestions welcome! Thank you. From ROZOV@cnit.nsu.ru Thu Jun 27 07:36:20 1996 27 Jun 96 20:34:44 NSK-6 From: "Nikolai S. Rozov" Organization: Center of New Informational Tech. To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Thu, 27 Jun 1996 20:34:16 -0600 (NSK) Subject: Fwd:Re:Where the World Capitalism is going? I am forwarding a feedback of Dr.Georgi Derluguian who has been working for more than 5 years with I.Wallerstein and is an expert in rather wide range of ws-theory and history issues. Mostly I agree with Georgi, just one note on misunderstanding my position (see below). Nobody more (besides Gunder Frank and Georgi) wishes to discuss the current and expected trajectory of the Modern Capitalist World System? Nikolai Rozov rozov@cnit.nsu.ru From: Georgi Derluguian : 1. So, everything is clear with Mr. Fukuyama-sensei, eh? I recall vividly Larry Diamond from the Hoover Inst., and a crowd at Berkeley (sic!) seriously nodding to his words: "The ideas of Wallerstein and Gunder Frank were irrelevant back in the 1970s, but today it is actually incredible to find someone talking in that lefty jargon. Tell me, if you know, what is a better program for any people in the world than democracy, what is better for any government than free market economy?" Last May I heard the same pronounced very strongly by the top folks from the SSRC and the MacArthur Foundation. Will you, please, supply some arguments aside from anti-imperialist rethoric? 2. As to Nikolai Rozov's words -- I suggest to read Wallerstein's essays from the latest collection, After Liberalism. The problem with IW style is that he increasingly disregards detailed argumentation and makes almost prophetic statements. He also, as usual, disregards his critics (don't tell me he once scoulded Chase Dunn, that's an exception that proves the rule -- IW never attacked Fukuyama, who incidentally did a good job of summarizing After Liberalism in several reviews, then dismissing the whole argument instead of attacking it, just like we often do with the liberal mainstream) Yet, this doesn't mean IW's recent writing has no value. Personally, I have near mystic experiences with IW predictive powers. I know him long enough to recall some of the predictions. Of course, he is no crystall-ball gazer. he is a scholar with superb intuition which means his mind captures connections and makes generalizations at some deeper level that is difficult to substantiate in a normal scientific morose way. This is what in the history of science is called almost religiously "revelations" (light bulbs suddenly going ablaze in someone's head) that remains a marginal and suspicious territory. It is certainly worth trying to see what kind of arguments and prediction IW makes, bearing in mind that IW himself is a deeply historical personality with his personal and his circle of old friends' whims playing an interfering role (that's where we often get some of his most embarrassing political recepies -- to a large extent IW still lives in the New York left-liberal intelligentsia of Central European origins of the 1930-1940s, and in the African and Tiers Mondiste liberation euphoria of the late 1950s-1960s. To IW Polanyi and Marcuse, Myrdal and Margaret Mead, Schumpeter and Arendt,Castro and Che Guevara, Nyerere and Cabral are contemporaries and most important voices, an internal filter of ideas. Please, treat this with respect -- IW was formed in a far more fascinating intellectual world that ours, he saw truly great transformations, he apparently had great hopes and moments of triumph as well as experienced greatest disullisionments and political failures. he squarely belongs to the last great generation of the "sixtiers", after that -- only postmodernist pygmiization in arts, sciences, and the politics) This diatribe goes primarily to Nikolai Rozov, the militant Siberianist who lives in the underground with retro-Stalinists reigning over Akademgorodok, as the last week's New York Times beautifully described, citing the very philosophy dean and his iron hand. Now, back to IW vision. Lately he was giving basically the following picture: The modern world-system is still in its normal mode and will remain within its historical asymptotes for another decade or so. We shall expect a kondratieff A-phase with further expansion of production based on new technologies and further wealth generated. The question of another hegemony is unclear -- Japan is evidently short of making it, and IW recognizes the problem when he says "Japan is really the old American Dream recycled". Bruce Cumings has intriguing argument for another cycle of the US hegemony, this time truly uni-polar, Wilsonian-Rooseveltian. Arrighi tends to agree saying that institutional "fat" was growing with every new hegemony, making it difficult for an ascending hegemon to break through (see Japan imitating America, not creating a separate cultural-ideological appeal). The latter actually means trouble -- the Schumpeterian mechanism of cleansing the system through periodical destruction seems to have stopped working at the level of interstate competition (but not the inter-firm level). Liberal ideology scored total political victory. Indeed, there is no other hope left. At some point everyone would like to live under capitalism, but core capitalism, bien sur! Either the educated masses from the peripheries will move to the core (recall the tremendous expansion of higher education after 1945) or they will try to imitate the core conditions in their states. We now observe both tendencies -- I am enjoying the tenure-track privileges in a highly-paid US university and watch with awe my children growing American, while my classmates in the Russian parliament and the yuppie-to-be newspapers Segodnia and Kommersant-Daily promote Gen. Lebed and fight against "economic idiotism" of the "lumpenized loosers" who don't share the neo-liberal vision of the Heritage Foundations. They are winning so far over the "econoidiots". This is when the trouble really begins. Russia (not to mention China) will emerge in ten years as major locus of production withing the world-economy. No more isolationism and delinking (but, surely, very strong protectionism of Russia's internal market -- it's too big and vital an inherited asset to be shared with TNCs thoughtlessly -- and Lebed knows that well, or was told by the supply-side whiz-kid Naishul from the heritage found. and the commentators of segodnia). Once the new Kondratieff-A arrives at earnest, we shall competition increased, not decreased. because now we have many more producers and a really more integrated world market. The liberal promise is that everyone will have enough investment and share for their products, if their governments and societies attract enough capital by being capital-friendly. IW has doubts. Vast territories of the world will be unemployed, kept on some UN or other form of aid-dole. They will try to be nasty then, and there is no more orderly communism to channel this anger. Their protests will be truly appalling, Khomeini or Saddam like, unless new humanistic antisystemic movements arise -- but this remains IW's distant hope. What Nikolai Rozov suggests is a world-scale welfare state and liberal reform. Nikolai Rozov: Sic! I suggested a radically different things. I think WSN members remember my postings on: World Law versus World State Georgi continues: IW thinks that this is way too much for the capitalist world-economy to sustain. The previously unwashed masses and then the classes dangereaux could be successfully tamed because that was just 10 to 15% of the world population. What about 50 or 75%? In a condensed form, IW argues that the MWS was successfull in deflecting the crises mentioned by Nikolai and many other threats (primarily from the disgruntled and eventually organized masses). The seminal success of the demise of communism brings two kinds of trouble -- no more orderly counterpart, sort of responsible bad guys who play by the rules even when they try to cheat a little -- but, as George Kennan said in 1946, "Soviets know that they have a lot to loose and every possibility to enjoy their acquisitions if they do not behave recklessly so they are not desperate". No more such relaxed opponents with still enormous though misleading popular appeal in the Third World. Secondly, huge, densely populated China and Russia with educated cheap workforce and industrial potential enter the world markets. Who needs Sierra Leone then? The loop of capital accumulation will function well without much of the Third World. Once the anticapitalism lure is gone, many middle classes (state-produced cadres especially) will try to live like the core. This will overburden the system, for no system can consist of core alone. least of all such a historical system as the capitalist one. There are two alternatives -- either peripheries become equal to the core and this finishes the MWS peacefully transforming it into a social-democratic global success, or the system crumbles down under the weight of growing demands. Democracy is actually a very subversive thing in this perspective -- Liberalism was about the rule of the competent and meritorious, not the "demagogues" from the streets. Democracy allows social groups to organize and struggle politically pressing their demands upon governments. This might not necessarily be what we like -- Nikolai should look around himself. I presume, it was Comrade Zyuganov, the Russian fundamentalist, who won in Novosibirsk, in a fairly democratic manner, n'est-ce pas? Democracy makes governing institutions more open to popular influences. The problem then is political -- what and who those influences will be? From sbabones@jhu.edu Thu Jun 27 16:33:26 1996 27 Jun 1996 18:32:56 -0400 (EDT) 27 Jun 1996 18:32:54 -0400 (EDT) Date: Thu, 27 Jun 1996 18:32:32 -0400 From: Salvatore Babones Subject: Rozov, Derluguian, and Where the World Capitalism is going? In-reply-to: <94182835D1@cnit.nsu.ru> To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: Salvatore Babones In regard to the cheering that greeted Larry Diamond at Berkeley, maybe I can offer an explanation from the younger generation (Andy A. are you out there?): the sixties and seventies radicals called the depression too early. The U.S., Europe, the NICs of Asia, and the rest of the world as well never had it so good as in the seventies. Growth rates SLOWED, real income growth SLOWED, but more and more people became more and more prosperous around the world. Prosperity faltered in the eighties in the third world, but not in the first. What I would give to have graduated from college in 1981 instead of 1991 . . . . To the extent that there are long cycles, I think that 1987 is definitely the break point from prosperity to decline (as, by the way, I think it is clear that 1929 is the previous apex). I'm speaking about the U.S. here; whether or not long cycles are systemic as opposed to partially synchronized national phenomena is still to be demonstrated. Now, radicals are notoriously negative about the times in which they live (reserving prosperity for the prospective future) and I really think that Wallerstein, Frank, et al have got it all wrong by timing a world depression starting in 1973. Those, my friends, were the good ole days. Stock market performances aside,*see footnote* I think that a very good case can be made that NOW is the down phase. Look at it: price is the clearest long wave variable, and 1973 - 1983 was the greatest period of inflation in the U.S. and around the world since -- you guessed it -- the 1920s. The mid-eighties witnessed a rash of bank failures and primary-producer bankruptcies. The international debt crisis. Now, in the nineties: zero inflation, DEflation in many goods, especially primary products, a very very tight employment market (in the private sector as well as in academia, no matter what the official unemployment statistics say), corporate and government "downsizing", union-busting, miserly treatment of the poor . . . you name it. THIS is the depression. Nonetheless, in a way Wallerstein's prophesies will come true, however. The long wave is extensively misunderstood. It's not 30 years bad / 30 years good. It's: year year year year year year year year year year year year 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 awfulawful bad bad so-so so-so good good great super wow! !!PANIC!! --> (I hope you like my artwork.) Now look: if you dichotomize at year 30 and impose phases, all you're doing is making an ordinal variable nominal, and of course you will find phases. And if any time after year 1 of the cycle you predict improvement ten years in the future, you will be right. I'll even hazard a prediction: twenty years of prosperity from 2025 through 2045. And I might even be around to find out if I'm right! (Sorry, Prof. Thompson, I couldn't resist.) ********** As for liberalism, I repeat my previous protest in this forum: I'm still waiting for it. "Liberalism" has spread around the world as nothing more than a word, not even an empty idea. Where is unilateral free trade? Where is the abnegation of state powers in preference to individual liberties? Where is the state with no draft, no special favors for well-connected groups, no political parties, no corporate limited liability, no immigration or emigration restictions? Democracy is not liberalism, is not even particularly well correlated with liberalism. There is not one liberal regime on this planet. Thus spake Salvatore. ********** Footnote: I think that the recent stock market surge (at least in the U.S.) can be traced to the granting of federal insurance on bank deposits. In the last crash (1929), enormous amounts of bank money were destroyed when banks went under, leading to a huge contraciton in the nation's money supply. This time, around the same time that the stock market crashed (1987), banks were going under in droves -- does anyone out there still remember the S & L crisis and Continental Illinois? -- but no bank money was destroyed, because of FDIC/FSLIC insurance. Investment opportunities disappeared with the coming of the long-wave trough, but money in circulation did not disappear. As a result, interest rates collapsed. Money poured into stocks, driving up stock prices to truly unprecedented levels (remember the excitement back when the Dow was flirting with 1000? I barely do). This was a necessary equilibrium mechanism: stock prices had to rise in order to bring returns on equity back in line with interest rates. Just like bond prices rise when interest rates decline, only less direct. Salvatore Babones Department of Sociology Johns Hopkins University sbabones@jhu.edu (Ph.D. expected Spring '98) From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Thu Jun 27 21:02:54 1996 Date: Thu, 27 Jun 1996 23:02:46 -0400 (EDT) From: "A. Gunder Frank" To: Salvatore Babones Subject: Re: Rozov, Derluguian, and Where the World Capitalism is going? In-Reply-To: Seems like more of a generational dispute with Salvatore, like about music! the fact that things have been pretty bad of late is NO argument or sign that they did not start getting bad in 1973, or even 1967 as AGF claims. Evidence? Productivity growth rates dropped from 3%/year to 1% after 1973, and the avergage real wage has never recovered the 1973 level, also in the US that is. The series of recessions, each deeper than the previous one, started in 1967, then 69-70, then 73-75, 79-82, 89-92 and elsewhere still, and thats right DEPRESSION for East Europe among others, and the new - now 6th- recession seems already here again. Enohgh for now, I went all throughh that in my 1980 books and 1986 ff articles, which not only redicted what would happen but also why and how, asnd have been borne out by events since, alas. no cheers [and i am not into things today any more but have retreted into history!] gunder frank From sbabones@jhu.edu Thu Jun 27 22:47:26 1996 28 Jun 1996 00:45:08 -0400 (EDT) 28 Jun 1996 00:45:06 -0400 (EDT) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 1996 00:44:53 -0400 From: Salvatore Babones Subject: Re: Rozov, Derluguian, and Where the World Capitalism is going? In-reply-to: To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: Salvatore Babones Where I differ with both Goldstein and Frank is on the nature of long cycles themselves. I have of course read Goldstein's account -- several times. But I think that the consensus opinion on this matter is wrong. In my reading long waves are primarily financial phenomena. The U.S. and U.K. have long operated on a fractional reserve banking system -- England at least since 1694, Scotland from 1695, and the U.S. since the beginning of its history. Now, it has been the tendency of banks to extend themselves ever-more-slightly year after year, to follow the incentive to be just a little -- preferably imperceptibly -- riskier than their fellow banks, with the result that the banking system as a whole is less and less sound every year, until . . . a crash occurs. In U.S. history, the massive banking system crashes have been around 1873, 1929, and 1987. Other things being equal, the effect of banking expansion (the reduction of bank reserves as a persentage of total deposits) is price inflation. This is regardless of other causes; as Tarascio has pointed out, the WWII inflation in the U.S. didn't disrupt the trend line of U.S. inflation running from the 30s through to tht 50s. While I agree that there was greater variability in U.S. economic growth after 1973, I object that 1. It is unknown to what extent post-war U.S. economic growth was long-wave driven and to what extent it was driven by other factors. 2. It has not been established that there exists a long wave in economic growth. 3. No causal mechanism offered for a long wave in economic growth has ever sustained a rigorous hypothesis test. I have some ideas for hypothesis testing, but I have not yet had the time or resources to follow them up. For all the talk of stagflation, the 70s and 80s can only be seen as a period of slow growth from the perspective of the 1960s. I realize that for many of my older colleagues the seventies must have seemed like a real let-down, but on the one most distinctive feature of the long wave -- price inflation -- it seems incredible to me that the consensus opinion places the late seventies and early eighties on a par with the Great Depression. Outside the U.S., there was hyperinflation. By contrast, today we have "the lowest interest rates in 60 years", no inflation, and unemployment that is low only because of the way we count it. Having worked for two years as an "employed" office temp, I can testify to that. People are working, but people don't have jobs, and that's not a dynamic, labor-short economy. How many of you temped straight out of college because you couldn't find a job and weren't eligible for unemployment insurance because you had never had a job? Not many of you who graduated before 1987, I bet. I apologize for making this so personal; it's just that I've only now begun to collect the systematic data. I'll be more convincing in a few years. :) Yours, Salvatore Babones Department of Sociology Johns Hopkins University (Ph.D. expected Spring '98) From ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au Thu Jun 27 23:45:19 1996 28 Jun 1996 15:43:51 +1000 Date: Fri, 28 Jun 1996 15:43:51 +1000 From: "Bruce R. McFarling" Subject: Re: Rozov, Derluguian, and Where the World Capitalism is going? In-reply-to: To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK On Fri, 28 Jun 1996, Salvatore Babones wrote: > Where I differ with both Goldstein and Frank is on the nature of long > cycles themselves. I have of course read Goldstein's account -- several > times. But I think that the consensus opinion on this matter is wrong. > In my reading long waves are primarily financial phenomena. Just on a general systems note, it is dangeruous to move from evidence that long waves are financial phenomena to conclusions that they are primarily financial phenomena. As the MIT dynamic systems group argue, in a system with a mix of positive and negative feedbacks, cycles tend to 'entrain', so that a shorter cycle that is in the neighborhood of half of a longer cycle will, in interaction with the longer cycle, come to approximate half of the longer cycle -- both by the longer cycle modifying chort cycle turning points and by the shorter cycle moidifying long cycle turning points. .... > While I agree that there was greater variability in U.S. economic growth > after 1973, I object that > 1. It is unknown to what extent post-war U.S. economic growth was > long-wave driven and to what extent it was driven by other factors. If the system is 'overdetermined', waiting for the degree to which the different factors drove changes in US GDP might well involve waiting forever. > 2. It has not been established that there exists a long wave in economic > growth. I'm curious what the standard for establishing 'a long wave in economic growth' would be. > 3. No causal mechanism offered for a long wave in economic growth has > ever sustained a rigorous hypothesis test. I'm wondering about the standard here, as well. The most common explanations for long wave phenomenon in economic growth involve technological evolution. What other observed aspect of technological evolution has sustained a rigorous hypothesis test? Virtually, Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au From ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au Fri Jun 28 01:39:50 1996 28 Jun 1996 17:38:34 +1000 Date: Fri, 28 Jun 1996 17:38:33 +1000 From: "Bruce R. McFarling" Subject: A technical interuption, redux To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu I offered to send email.prs for WordPerfect to anyone who requested it. There were a number of requests, both on and off the list, but I have not had success in getting a version into this VAX that will MIME properly. I've just tested the uuencoded version, and it seems OK. It's just a bit more than 4K uuencoded, so I'll just post it here, and anyone who needs to translate WordPerfect files into text more appropriate for this forum can then access the tool from the archives. Virtually, Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au ___________________________________ Instructions: I do not know whether *.prs files are portable between systems, no how to port them if they are. I have used this with WordPerfect 5.1 and an MS-DOS compatible. Step 1. Export the text to the target computer, by whatever means you normally use to get text from your email to the target computer. Step 2. Use a text editor to cut out all the text down to the line below that says "----- cut here -----". This is an optional step with some uudecode software, required for others. Be sure the result is an ordinary text file, not a word processor file, and save it with a name like "emailprs.uue". Step 3. Find a utility that will 'uudecode' a file, translating it from the mailable format below to a binary file. Then the command will be something like "uudecode emailprs.uue". If this step is successful, you will have a file called "emailprs.zip". Step 4. Find a utility that can 'unzip' a file, either PKWare's pkunzip, or the freely distributable 'unzip'. Unzip the file with a command such as "unzip emailprs.zip". If this step is successful, you will have a file called "email.prs" and a text file explaining how to use it. Step 5. Copy the "email.prs" file into your WordPerfect directory, and select it as a printer driver in WordPerfect. This is explained in the text file that accompanies the driver. 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M[-=5G2M6+;!@F0C?''U4M;A!U(,W?`H7O8#(#P=X3*!O8^XEG;;F@WVNXRY,R_3UW3USM/>SM)VYV'!7;WN<7Z^,8 MV)HW>>(H;/F\M^\2'WR8O+T=AY9C(02ASF#,$:J"2Z7 To: Salvatore Babones Subject: Re: Rozov, Derluguian, and Where the World Capitalism is going? In-Reply-To: In re Salvatore's answer: I happen to be aon a K long wave, but that question need not be settled to discuss the question about recessin/depression that S B raised and still discusses. The data "speak for themselves" on recent times. and of course even in K terms if the B started some time ago, that is no reasons why it should not turn down even more lately. after all the previous B sarted in 1913, or some say later, and the deprssion was not till the 30s! but never mind the K. the quesatiion is wherhter the good ol days continued past 1973 or not. S says yes, I say no, i'm glad S also recognoizes a generational difference in perception. but speaking of generations, not on;ly in Us but also elsewhere in the West - even if thers is a K and a new A is in the offincg- so far nobody in S's generation or in generation X generaly can even aspire to matching, let alone improving on, their parents standard of living. or does SB have some especialy priviledged position and therefrom derived outlook. Isympahtise with SB's scepticism about Ks after his colleague at JH spent over 10 years looking for aworldwide productive K and couild not find one. last i heard thougn Peter still kept the faith, never mind that he couldnt find the evidence. K himself was into prices, etc.but since then we have all been into REAL econ, and not just prices. and SB contradicts himslef. for the price history has not bveen so rosy since the early 70s, and of course the real one also not. Incientaly, SB should take acount of HOW Reaganomics kept not only the US but the whole west afloat during the 80s, and at WAHT/WHOSE cost in the world! Starwars military Keynseanism kept the west afloat, but sank LAT Am, Africa, and the "socialist" countries into depression. Keeping the dollar up after the FEd changed its policy in Oct 79, sank everyvbody else and CREATED the debt crisis. so SB's perspectrive from the heartland - just down from the beltway - is a bit skewed! cheers gunder frank From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Fri Jun 28 08:52:03 1996 Date: Fri, 28 Jun 1996 10:51:59 -0400 (EDT) From: "A. Gunder Frank" To: Salvatore Babones Subject: Re: Rozov, Derluguian, and Where the World Capitalism is going? In-Reply-To: apologies for snmall addendum to my prevous note on SB: he says "hyperinflation" elsehwere. NO, thats just in their local currencies, which became worthless. In fact already then they suiffered DEflation, in strong dollar/mark/yen terms, and those who had those currencies were able to and did buy up resources and labor at bargain basement prices elsewhere. vide what is happening in the ex Sovc Union today! And i hesitate - not really? - to poiunt out that in 1986 already I wrote that the coming problem is NOT INflation, but DEflation - see eg even my titles in the URPE stuff - and that everybody esle except Tobin was wrong about that. of course this DEflation is the reflection of the DEpression, which I also forewarned against, that SB now evokes. cheers gunder frank. From JGOLDST@american.edu Fri Jun 28 08:59:48 1996 Date: Fri, 28 Jun 96 10:53:23 EDT From: "Joshua S. Goldstein" Organization: The American University Subject: Long waves To: wsn@CSF.COLORADO.EDU Now that the long wave question is turning into a discussion, I will send (to the list) the point I made earlier in a direct email reply. It is that for dating the phases, you can't just use prices and assume they are synchronous with production phases. Typically turning points in production precede price turning-points by 10-15 years. The breaking of inflation is easy to identify at around 1980, and the downturn in production growth rates precedes that somewhat -- which is consistent with "stagflation" in the 70s. Currently, then, we are in a phase of stagnant production and low inflation. Coming up not far in the future should be an upturn in production but not in inflation, a kind of "rebirth" phase in the world economy (but not necessarily in the same places as before, so I can't guarantee employment for Hopkins grad students). From sbabones@jhu.edu Fri Jun 28 14:09:45 1996 28 Jun 1996 16:08:39 -0400 (EDT) 28 Jun 1996 16:08:33 -0400 (EDT) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 1996 16:08:24 -0400 From: Salvatore Babones Subject: Re: Rozov, Derluguian, and Where the World Capitalism is going? In-reply-to: To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu First, I would like to thank all of you who have responded to my original posting. It is a tribute to the high academic and intellectual integrity of the PEWS section and the WSN that I have been seriously read and responded to despite my inexperience and lack of credentials. Second, in response to the criticisms of my reading of (what is for me) history and my attempts to treat it nomothtically, I would like to present a testable (rejectable) model of long cycles to the readers of this list. I will be away this weekend, but I should be able to write up my model before the July 4 holiday. I hope that it will be as "well"-received as have been my recent postings. Once again, thank you all for your nterest and critcisms. Yours, Salvatore Babones Department of Sociology Johns Hopkins University (Ph.D. expected Spring '98) From SKSANDER@grove.iup.edu Fri Jun 28 14:20:36 1996 28 Jun 1996 16:20:31 -0400 (EDT) Date: Fri, 28 Jun 1996 16:20:31 -0400 (EDT) From: s_sanderson To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Organization: Indiana University of Pennsylvania Sorry to bother the net with this, but Dale Wimberley, can you send me your email address so I can send you a message. I had it but lost it. Thanks. Stephen Sanderson From ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au Fri Jun 28 22:48:18 1996 29 Jun 1996 14:47:33 +1000 Date: Sat, 29 Jun 1996 14:47:33 +1000 From: "Bruce R. McFarling" Subject: Re: Rozov, Derluguian, and Where the World Capitalism is going? In-reply-to: To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK On Fri, 28 Jun 1996, A. Gunder Frank wrote: > In re Salvatore's answer: > I happen to be aon a K long wave, but that question need not be settled > to discuss the question about recessin/depression that S B raised and > still discusses. The data "speak for themselves" on recent times. > and of course even in K terms if the B started some time ago, that is no > reasons why it should not turn down even more lately. after all the > previous B sarted in 1913, or some say later, and the depression was not > till the 30s! but never mind the K. the question is whether the good > ol days continued past 1973 or not. S says yes, I say no, ... There is an element of this that might be a semantic dispute. In a story of an endogenous cycle that depends on some kind of 'saturation' or 'playing out' of a given growth regime, there will be the stage after the signs of the growth regime having played itself out will appear (cf. "The Great U-Turn" for additional arguments that this set in on or around 1973), and the succeeding downturn. Call that phase "the end of the upturn", and the post WWII upturn *did not* end in the early 70's; call it "the beginning of the downturn", and the post WWII upturn may well have ended in the early 1970's. And current reporting is typically not based on such a long frame of reference, so then-current US perspective, for example, on the US 'roaring twenties' tended to omit income inequalities and the dismal performance of, for example, the UK in its fight to restore the pre-WWI sterling / gold conversion. Just as... > ... SB should take acount of HOW Reaganomics kept not only the US > but the whole west afloat during the 80s, ... Don't forget the Latin American debt crisis, and the way that the *real* losses of US banks in their speculative lending backed by the prospective export performance of Latin American countries were in part covered by a draconian increase in the share of Latin American export earnings dedicated to debt repayment rather than to current trade. US Banks and Latin American elites bet on the ability of Latin American countries to service debt, and when exports to the US went south and interest rates on the loans went north ( on a graph, not in a geographical sense ;) a substantial portion of the burden of the failed speculation was placed on the back of Latin American consumers. Virtually, Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au From ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au Sun Jun 30 16:24:34 1996 Received: from BROLGA.NEWCASTLE.EDU.AU (cc.newcastle.edu.au [134.148.4.24]) by csf.Colorado.EDU (8.7.5/8.7.3/CNS-4.0p) with ESMTP id QAA21443 for ; Sun, 30 Jun 1996 16:24:31 -0600 (MDT) Received: from cc.newcastle.edu.au by cc.newcastle.edu.au (PMDF V5.0-7 #10124) id <01I6JVQF0LY88XHO7C@cc.newcastle.edu.au> for wsn@csf.colorado.edu; Mon, 01 Jul 1996 08:23:22 +1000 Date: Mon, 01 Jul 1996 08:23:22 +1000 From: "Bruce R. McFarling" Subject: Re: Where World Capitalism is going? In-reply-to: <65485249CA@cnit.nsu.ru> To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT On Tue, 25 Jun 1996, Nikolai S. Rozov wrote: > ... I decided to suggest a new subject concerning objective > long-term trends of World Capitalism and possible alternative > evaluations of them. > Three main views on this point can be seen: > a) the liberal 'mainstream' position: "free market economy and > democracy are winning, they are becoming stronger and stronger > and they are really worthy [of] this victory" (Fukuyama, etc) > I think nobody in wsn needs arguments against this position. > b) the left expectations of world capitalism's decline: > it's a world disease ("virus") and it is worthy its forthcoming > failure (Wallerstein, Chase-Dann) > My question: What are real visible signs of decline or crisis, > which should be stronger than all those problems and crises that > world capitalism successfully prevailed in the past (f.e. in 1810-15, > 1848-9, 1914-18, 1930-32, 1939-45, 1968-69)? This suggests a view of 'world capitalism' that is a bit too idealized for me. By the nature of the term, there would only be one 'world capitalism' as a time, but observing a 'world capitalism' in the late 18th century and observing a 'world capitalism' in the late 20th centruy is a far stretch from the two 'world capitalisms' being the *same* world capitalism. That identification requires support. > c) the left appeals for struggle against strong and > threatening world capitalism (appeals by Maoism, Trotskism > in Latin America, etc, Russian Communism, maybe in wsn by > R.Moore in his struggle against 'imperialism' and TNC) > My doubts and questions: > Historical facts tell us that in most cases of open 'hot' > struggle against world capitalism did not succeed, but ALL > the local national 'successes' (f.e. in Russia since 1917, > China, Cuba, N.Korea, Iran, Albania, led inevitably to mass > social disasters, poverty, frequently - mass terror. I find it hard to credit Castro's regime with leading to poverty in Cuba. I don't much favor hypotheses with consequences leading causes by that length of time. And there's a bit of a post-hoc ergo propter-hoc problem, as well, particularly if you note the tremendous economic growth (sic) of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica over this time. > On the contrary most "soft" and interior attemps to > ameliorate capitalism were successful, or at least, harmless > (Second International and Social-Democratic reforms in Europe > in the beginning of XX, laborists in Great Britain, socialists > in Sweden, promotion of social programs in US, France, Germany, > etc). > Well, WS-theory can tell that it was possible only for core > or semipripheral countries, not for periphery. Great, but in this > case the imperative should be not a struggle against 'imperialism' > (ie core countries) transforming them to less democratric and > tolerant regimes, but vice versa - the imperative should be to try > to rise the status (from periphery to semipheriphery) of most > exploited countries and peoples. > Is the last task possible without support of world capital, > without IMF, TNC, Big- 7 and all other 'devils', without appeal > to moral norms of humanism, justice,etc, even if we see so much > hypocrisy in proclaiming these values by mainstream leaders? The question supposes that it's possible *with* the support of 'world capital'. Whatever that means, and if it means anything *besides* the IMF/WorldBank/TNC's or the Big7. > > My position in brief on the question posed in the subject above: > - World Capitalism seems to strengthen (not decline), > - it is not a monolith, it is rather open for reforms > (much more than all non-capitalist social regimes!), > - many long-term trends of its transformation during last 500 > years should be morally appreciated, > - the task is not to unmask hypocrisy of its social-moral > ideology, but to use this ideology as a support for 'soft' > promotion of reforms for humanizing Capitalism (first of > all to work out the correspondent norms of world legal > system in international trade, debts, raw resources, etc) Primarily, however, I find it very striking to find a position that 'World Capitalism' is *not* a monolith. To say that it's not a monolith, is to say that it is useful to consider it as not really an *it*, but instead as a collection of institutions and polities. Which implies that at a less course resolution, we are talking about capitalisms (and other economic systems) in interaction. So, for example, someone could identify TNC's as a serious problem area for an issue such as sustainable development, without *automatically* taking a position for or against other aspects or types (or whatever) of capitalism. Or, in other words, 'World Capitalism' implies 'a direction'; 'capitalisms in the world' admits 'directions'. Virtually, Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au From esommer@direct.ca Sun Jun 30 18:33:04 1996 Received: from aphex.direct.ca (aphex.direct.ca [199.60.229.6]) by csf.Colorado.EDU (8.7.5/8.7.3/CNS-4.0p) with ESMTP id SAA23191 for ; Sun, 30 Jun 1996 18:33:01 -0600 (MDT) Received: from van-pm-0308.direct.ca ([204.174.243.68]) by aphex.direct.ca with SMTP id <268653-233>; Sun, 30 Jun 1996 17:25:57 -0700 X-Sender: esommer@direct.ca X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Version 1.4.4 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Sun, 30 Jun 1996 16:21:53 -0700 To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: esommer@direct.ca (eric steven sommer) Subject: ADDENDA to: wallerstein, Chris Message-Id: <96Jun30.172557-0700pdt.268653-233+74@aphex.direct.ca> Hi Chris, I was struck by your argument below, particularly your point that social actors mental models generally underestimate the quantity of indirect interaction between their own system(s) and the system(s) of others. I personally find it difficult to imagine all the interactions which lead to a sandwhich being put in front of me in a restaurant, let alone the detailed commodity and other interactions in the current world system. Incidentally, can you unpack slightly the meaning of your statement below regarding "Information Networks...Bulk Goods Nets, Political-Military Nets, and Prestige Goods Nets"? By `networks', do you mean simply networks of interactions related to particular social dimensions - economic, military, and so forth; or by `networks', do you mean the infrastructures which allow for these interactions (highway networks to transport troops or goods, mail-services or telecommunications grids to carry inforamtion; etc.) Thanks for your help with this, Eric. >I would like to respond to some of the points made by Andre Kortaev despite >the fact that i have missed the earlier contributions to this string and >have not had time to read the wsn archive. > >In general I would say that the comparative world-systems approach that Tom >Hall and I have formulated solves the important problems raised by Kortaev. >Hall and I make core/periphery structures an empirical question in each >case, not a defining feature of all world-systems. This allows for systems >based on equal exchange, and indeed there have been such systems. Systemness >is defined in terms of regularized interaction. Only after the interaction nets >have been mapped is the question of core/periphery relations raised. > Groups that are not >interacting are not in the same system and so cannot be in a core/periphery >relationship. > > We also distinguish between two aspects of core/periphery >relations. The first we call core/periphery differentiation. This refers to >two interacting groups in which one has greater population density than the >other. The second (termed core/periphery hierarchy) refers to a relationship > of exploitation or domination >between groups. These two aspects often go together because groups > with greater >population density frequently have more power than less dense groups. But >there have been important instances where less dense groups exploit > more dense >groups. The pastoral nomads of the Central Asian steppes cyclically formed >states that allowed them to extract resources from more dense agrarian >societies. Our conceptual approach allows for a comparative study of the >formation of core/periphery relations that can produce an understanding of >why core/periphery exploitation emerges in some cases but not in others. All >this is made opaque by the inclusion of core/periphery relations as a >defining feature of world-systems. > > > We also have found whole systems in which there was very little in the >way of intergroup exploitation or domination. In prehistoric Northern >California there was a very small world-system composed of sedentary >foragers. Despite some core/periphery differentiation there was very little >core/periphery hierarchy. This case is detailed in my forthcoming _The >Wintu and Their Neighbors_. > > Regarding the suggestion to define world-systems in terms of cybernetic >systems of conscious awareness, I would say this. Conscious awareness, what >we call cosmography, is partial and misrepresents the real material >interactions that are present in all the world-systems we have examined. >Generally the spatial scope of conscious awareness of interactions is >smaller than the scope of the real material indirect interactions. Thus it >would be a mistake to make consciousness a central defining characteristic >of systemness. But Hall and I do think that information networks are >important sources of stability and change in world-systems. We indicate this >by designating Information Networks as one of our types of interaction, >along with Bulk Goods Nets, Political-Military Nets, and Prestige Goods >Nets. > >All this is explained more fully in our forthcoming _Rise and Demise: >Comparing World-Systems_ (Westview Press 1996) > >chris >Prof. Chris Chase-Dunn >Department of Sociology >Johns Hopkins University >Baltimore, MD. 21218 USA >tel 410 516 7633 fax 410 516 7590 email chriscd@jhu.edu > >