From rkmoore@iol.ie Mon Sep 2 00:58:28 1996 Mon, 2 Sep 1996 07:57:49 +0100 (BST) Date: Mon, 2 Sep 1996 07:57:49 +0100 (BST) To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: article: Exorcising Capitalism Any understanding of contemporary "world systems" naturally must look at corporations and at capitalism at least as much as it looks at governments, social forces, religious alignments, etc. In that regard, and also as a continuation of the "global praxis and the future of the world-system" discussion, I offer the following for your consideration... -rkm ________________________________________________________________ ******************************** This article may be posted in entirety for non-commercial use. ******************************** EXORCISING CAPITALISM -- A SURGICAL STRIKE FOR HUMAN SURVIVAL Richard K. Moore 30 August 1996 Copyright 1996 by Richard K. Moore The New Populism There is a New Populism at large in America, exemplified by the Nader/Green campaign, articulated in Ronnie Dugger's "A Call For Real Populists to Stand Up" (The Nation, August 14/21, 1995), and evidenced perhaps even by those who flocked to Buchanan's short-lived campaign or to Perot's Reform Party. Central to this populism is a recognition that the democratic process has been deeply corrupted, and that corporate wealth and power is somehow at the heart of what's wrong. This new populism is just getting off the ground, and has a long way to go in accomplishing the grass-roots organizing and coalition building that will be necessary to achieve any significant degree of popular political power. The road is especially difficult given an election system rigged to favor the established parties, and a corporate-controlled media which frames "public debate" on a narrow, slanted field of discourse. But success of such a movement is not unprecedented in American history. The original agrarian Populists, for example, achieved remarkable influence in a political environment fully as hostile to popular movements as is today's. One can hope that the new populists will learn from history, adapt what they learn to modern conditions, and succeed in mobilizing a broad constituency dedicated to radical reform of our decaying system. Organizational success can be translated into societal progress, however, only if the movement is able to articulate a coherent societal vision, and back it up with a workable legislative agenda. In the area of democracy reform, the movement seems to be on the right track, with campaign finance reform and other such initiatives. Indeed, it may be fair to say "The Movement IS the Reform" -- in that the essence of democracy is really active citizen participation more than it is any particular set of formal rules. But in the area of economic reform, the movement seems to be sadly lacking in both understanding and vision. One cannot simply wish a chicken in every pot (for example), a job for every worker, and funding for needed social programs -- there must be an economic analysis that takes into account the realities of today's economy, and a well thought-out Business Plan for a New America (if you will) that is practical and realistic. The absence of a coherent economic vision must be seen as a fatal weakness in the current movement, and progressive-minded leaders and thinkers must strive with all due haste to provide that missing vision. Otherwise the most conscientious, progressive-minded leaders, even if elected to office, will not have the means to provide us with other than more-of-the-same as regards our livelihood and the scourges of of wrong-headed economic "development." Toward an Economics for The New Populism The first order of business re/ economic policy must of course be the establishment of goals. Do we want full employment? A balanced budget? Adequate financing of government? Sustainable development? Reform of the Federal Reserve? Reduction in armaments? Single-payer health care? Without a set of goals, how can we attract massive popular support? People must have some reason to hope for relief from our economic quagmire if they are going to rally to any new movement. We can't be like Perot in the last election, saying "Give me power, and then I'll think about what I'm going to do." That approach didn't sell then and won't sell in the future, and rightly so. The fact is, perhaps unfortunately, that those who are out of power have the burden of proof forced on them: they must articulate coherent plans if they expect to attract a constituency. The incumbent parties, unfortunately indeed, are allowed to get by with hand-waving promises to do better next time. They have the credibility of experience on their side, to the extent that they've proven they can at least govern without outright economic chaos. Progressive leadership must begin to address the question of economic goals and objectives. Having made some efforts in that direction myself, in previous articles, I've been forced to do some soul searching about the root economic causes of our societal crisis. I now believe, and will endeavor to demonstrate, that we must discuss the taboo "C" word -- Capitalism -- and that our attitude toward the other dreaded "C" word -- Corporations -- needs to be radically reconsidered. Corporations may indeed be potent allies in the progressive cause, rather than the arch enemy of democracy. We must face the fact that capitalism must always demand unlimited growth to feed its inherent insatiable appetite -- that is its defining nature and no one disputes it. We must also recognize that unlimited growth of corporations is inconsistent with a sustainable environment or with human welfare. This is being made abundantly clear by the neo-liberal assault on our society in pursuit of greater global corporate growth. Our pivotal point of leverage is to notice that capitalism and corporations are not actually the same thing -- capital owns corporations, but it is corporations that actually run the wheels of our economy -- not capitalism. This may turn out to be a strategically momentous observation, as I hope you'll agree from what follows. Commerce and Capitalism Are Two Different Things Both commerce (meaning business and industry in general, both large and small) and capitalism employ trade and manufacturing to create profit, and in both cases, profit is an important "invisible hand" driving-force of system operation and optimization. Commerce preceded capitalism, capitalism grew out of commerce, but capitalism operates at a higher level than commerce. What is special about capitalism -- and this creates a qualitative difference in its fundamental structure -- is that capitalism is concerned not primarily with making a profit from commerce, but with increasing the value of an investment. This may sound like a subtle distinction, but the consequences are profound. Suppose you have a commercial operator who has a $1 million to make use of. He will presumably start a business, operate it, and then enjoy and live off the profits. It is not essential that the business grow and expand, only that it keeps operating and continues to generate a reasonable profit. If the operator happens to be personally greedy and aggrandizing, he might make growth an objective, but that is not essential to commerce itself. Think of a mom & pop grocery store, or a family farm. A capitalist, on the other hand, with $1 million to work with, is interested only in having $2 million in hand (arising from investing the $1 million) in, say, five years time. This is accomplished, to put it simply, by investing the $1 million in a commercial enterprise (a corporation) which is likely to increase in its market value, that is: the corporation, as an operating asset, can be sold for twice as much after five years pass. Capitalist Funding Distorts Commerce When a corporation depends on capitalism for its funding, there is then an imperative placed on the corporation that it expand and grow (by cutting costs, increasing market size, diversifying into new products, wiping out competitors, subverting regulations, etc.). Otherwise it will not attract capitalist investors. The capitalist economic system we currently live under is one where nearly ALL commercial ventures are corporations which are funded by capitalist investors (some big, some small) who are collectively concerned only with the growth of their investments. There is thus created a situation where nearly all commercial operations have the primary goal of growth, not merely profitability. Profit is valued primarily as a source of internal funding for growth, and profit is largely siphoned off to support growth, in preference to better salaries and working conditions, refurbishment of existing plant, or better servicing of existing customers. The classic case is the American auto industry, which purposely allowed its plant to decline, and its product lines to become outmoded -- while domestic operations were milked to provide funding for offshore ventures. This was a move which benefitted industry stockholders, but which abandoned industry employees as well as the market for quality domestic products. It was also a move which helped wreck the U.S. balance of payments picture. This commerce-distorting growth imperative is imposed on corporations from the outside, and is frequently in opposition to the natural pursuits of managers and workers. No matter how hard they work, or how successful their business is, they find themselves always on a treadmill, always required to work still harder just to keep pace with investor expectation, while the fruits of their labor is siphoned off for the benefit of outsiders. Corporations and their employees thus suffer from capital-induced stress. Capitalism Is a Cancer Infecting Our Economy Our economy is not a commercial system that pursues profit, but a capitalist system that pursues growth. A commercial economy is like an animal's regulatory system, which moves nutrients around the body and keeps the host (society) healthy. A capitalist economy is like a cancer, which sucks nutrients out of the body and consumes the host. The cancer cells in our societal body are capital-owned corporations, which as we've seen, are corporations infected from the outside by an insatiable growth hormone. It is not corporations per se which consume the host, but the effects of the growth hormone. If the cancer epidemic continues -- if capitalism proceeds on its current course -- the inevitable consequences are widespread poverty and suffering, environmental devastation, and global feudalism, as the host (humanity) succumbs to its terminal disease and as capitalists work ever harder to squeeze the last nutrients out of the failing host. This is not theory (marxist or otherwise), this is based on empirical observation of the current global economic crisis, as capital scours the finite earth for ever-cheaper labor, ever-new markets, ever-fewer constraints on operations, and ever-greater control over setting the rules of the game. Increasing the size of the already-immense horde of capitalist wealth becomes ever-more difficult year by year, and capital's desperate grasping becomes necessarily ever-more host-threatening. A Surgical Strike on Capitalism Is Possible If we could sever the link between corporations and the capitalist-outside-investor system, while allowing the corporations to continue operating as commercial entities, we could exorcise the cancer from our economic system, without needing to disrupt it and start over (with socialism or whatever). This seems to be a prudent path to explore. We would then have a commercial economy instead of a capitalist economy, and the growth hormone would be eliminated. Purely commercial enterprises would be far less resistant to reasonable regulations, could be more responsive to consumers, more focused on quality of product, and more adaptable to reasonable demands of labor for adequate remuneration and favorable working conditions. This is because commercial enterprises are part of the fabric of the environment they live within -- members of the community if you will -- instead of being the tools of outside-the-community, value-extracting investors. Effecting this change -- severing the capitalist link -- requires two things, from a strategic point of view. First it is necessary to define the legislation/rules that would implement the change, and second, it is necessary to analyze the self-interests of the various players in order to determine how they can be incented to cooperate. It seems that the legislation/rule-making required would be to eliminate outside ownership of corporations. Instead a corporation would be owned by its employees (including managers.) To get funding, they could not sell shares in the corporation, instead they could issue bonds, solicit loans, dig in their own pockets, or re-invest profits. Outside investors, if any, would then be looking for dividends from their investments, rather than growth, and their interests would be identical to those of the corporate operators: continued profitable operations. The growth-imperative cancerous hormone would be removed. What the transition would amount to would be the expropriation by each corporation of its own stock, exchanging it instead for corporate bonds or annuities. This change could be called the "enfranchisement" of corporations. You might think of corporations as serfs -- working for a landowner. What is being proposed is that the serfs be given ownership of their plot of land -- and that their rents be converted into mortgage payments. The hope is that enfranchised corporations can be more easily induced to become good citizens -- once they are unchained from anonymous outside interests, interests whose only role in operations is to tug the chain blindly and irresponsibly in the direction of growth. There Need Be No Losers This brings us to the question of the various players and their self-interests. Interestingly enough, managers, employees, and customers of corporations could all be expected to benefit from the change to "commercialism." Ending capitalism, ironically, can actually be framed as corporate liberation. This would seem to open up the possibility of a very large progressive constituency indeed. Stockholders could be expected to have mixed reactions, with the more enlightened perhaps welcoming the enhanced stability that could be expected from a healthier, cancer-free economy. But a difficult compromise formula would need to be worked out so that investors would accept the terms of their debt instruments, while not so saddling corporations with debt that they couldn't operate effectively. A narrow wicket, this, but not impassable. Within these enfranchised corporations, there arise the questions of how ownership is to be distributed within the internal corporate community, who it is management "reports to," and how employment is granted and terminated. These questions are a topic unto themselves. But it is fair to say that robust solutions are possible, and that we can look to existing employee-owned firms, and other self-managed organizations, for instructive models. Enfranchisement Makes Progress Possible for Humanity All of these considerations assume the context of a greatly revitalized political democracy, driven by a mobilized and organized citizenry. By means of corporate enfranchisement, the cancerous growth hormones would be removed from the corporate gene pool, but corporations would continue to be formidable entities for society to deal with. And there would still be compulsive aggrandizers whose personal ambition would generate the hormones spontaneously. Hence corporate regulation, anti-trust laws, environmental safeguards, appropriate corporate taxes, etc. would continue to be as important as ever, and still problematic to negotiate. But a solution would have become possible! There is no inherent reason why a healthy society and enfranchised corporations cannot co-exist symbiotically, to their mutual benefit. A corporation lives within an economic ecosystem. It has its appetites and its competitors, and can work out its niche in the marketplace. Some will die, some will thrive, and new ones will arise. Reasonable stability and harmony are achievable. But a corporation infected with capitalist growth hormones can never be happy with its niche. It must always have a larger niche. It can never be satisfied, but only temporarily appeased. The capitalist infection should be stamped out for the benefit of society, the health of the economic ecosystem, and to relieve the treadmill stress under which corporations currently operate. Everyone benefits. ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ Posted by Richard K. Moore - rkmoore@iol.ie - Wexford, Ireland Cyberlib: www | ftp --> ftp://ftp.iol.ie/users/rkmoore/cyberlib ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ From U17043@UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU Tue Sep 3 22:22:38 1996 Date: Tue, 03 Sep 96 21:05:34 CDT From: U17043@UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU Subject: go back go back where once we all belonged To: World Systems Network I come to you tonight to summon you to your true vocation, Living In The Past, which you indisputably do far better than The Other Thing(s). Of the present, where we nominally dwell for document-reception purposes, subsuming thereunder currency debiting, crediting, and dunning beyond our remotest capacity to pay up, we thereby attain wisdom in one respect. At the level of Organism, capitalism enforces, as Primordial Moral Principal, Principle, plus interest, of no intrinsic interest by itself but intensely stimulative in its nonintrinsically interesting, insufferably boring, that is, quality of simultaneous deductibility and being situate beyond our means, nay, beyond all reason. Whilst on the aggregate level, it be duly required that the system be in such debt to itself, no greater calamity may befall than it pay itself back. For the nonce, let us indulge the "theologians," as E.J. Hobsbawm felicitably called the Economics Profession, in their certainty of knowing the Meaning and Purpose of Existence, as this delusion must be held dear by someone or some Thing; Else, who darest think on the level and quantity of hyposemia to ensue. An Oecumenical Movement, extending from Krugman to Friedman, has unified the sects; all we hold, with reasonable certainty, is that the regnant (Foo on "hegemonic," we have heard, read, writ, and thunk it far too much/often.) Grand Unity of Unthinking Thought, or should one perhaps venture, rather, Overthought Unthinkable (by which is meant, where there's Broadest Agreement, there's something most sedulously-ignored impending-doomwise ticking away such that, in the immortal - qua 2000 year old man - words of Carl Reiner, "*Who knew*?"). So much for the present. We're no good at it; and we mix up such wonderful metaphors, undrinkable as they are. I shall not mention names, as I'm not unkind as once I was. Still unkind enough, of course. "...the cancerous growth hormones would be removed from the corporate gene pool." I love that, it sings to me. Understand, that's not the worst of the genre; it's merely the latest. What's more, it's at the very end of the text of said latest. The end continued: > A corporation lives within an economic ecosystem. ....WHOA! A corporation is not a protoplasmic entity. Not, I think, if it's chartered under the laws of New York State. Delaware may be different. Must check that. What are protoplasmic are corporate lawyers. Who are not of the same vested interest; though vested the suits may be. Suits of clothes, not of law. Suits of cards after work. Excuse me, too much of a bad joke is even worse than too much of no joke at all; sorry. Next thing I see, there's two words which cannot be found together, Else the language needs be traded in; but who's buying. I'm pretty sure there's an Indo-European Corporation which owns the rights to the language; isn't it so that, if this is capitalism, some body or Thing owns the rights to anything. Which must, therefore, charge by the word for this post. Or by the byte, full or fractional, ie, bitwise. Ion Ascii, a good Communist, would turn over in his grave. [Warning: Not serious. Trouble with this list, too few have the foggiest about what isn't serious, by intent of by substance.] Stretching it, there's one commonality as between an ecosystem, say, a swamp, and a capitalist economy. This is, that the green scum on the top suffocates and strangles the already tough life of the organisms once much better off without that covering of green scum, but now by some inverted telos are found having as their be-all and end-all supporting the green- scum's parasitism. Gordian-knotted analogies, along with reddiwip-metaphors don't help, so forget the preceding. I am getting reminded *very much* of an oldtime horror movie called NIGHT OF THE REIFICATIONS. The latter, who made the boxoffice profits, started out just plain old Living Dead, then got worse. You could see, for example, a Pepsi bottling plant eating people. Why, it was hungry, of course. Why not. The author of the quoted text to whom I profusely apologize, having had no idea when I started in on the discourse that I'd get so heavy into it, says right out that a corporation, just like you and you, and the other one, gets hunger pangs, "It has its appetites." Gwan. Let's consider appetites. It is an indisputable fact that corporate executives have far better table manners than I do. Few are ignorant of how to hold a fork. Have any among you ever seen me use a fork? Of course not; and that's because I have sense enough to not let any of you, or anyone, period, look at me while eating. Especially when fork-lift is called for. Don't believe me? Watch: >It has its >appetites and its competitors, and can work out its niche in the >marketplace. Some will die, some will thrive, and new ones will >arise. Reasonable stability and harmony are achievable. > There's an orthogonally related problem with agreement, rather, lack thereof, in grammatical number, but the protoplasmic business enterprise is more alive in the above than I am, generally speaking. Cigarettes did me in. Finally, something did. Yahoo. Truth to tell, it was the judicial construction of the fourteenth amendment to the US constitution, supplemented by anaologous treatment of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, which got corporations recognized as mock-persons under the law, which differ, most notably, from protoplasmic life in that they cannot die. Go broke, yes; plotz, no, no, no. The final passage of the end of the text, I throw up my hands. I didn't say, throw up. Those who mistake an infection by microorganisms for an HGH deficiency may, however, do so; that's not under my control. Nothing is, actually. Of any kind whatsoever. Who can tell what sort of damnation for Internet decorum violations this'll get me. After all, didn't there used to be peace and quiet? But I wallow in selfpity. > But a corporation infected with capitalist growth hormones >can never be happy with its niche. It must always have a larger >niche. It can never be satisfied, but only temporarily appeased. >The capitalist infection should be stamped out for the benefit of >society, the health of the economic ecosystem, and to relieve the >treadmill stress under which corporations currently operate. >Everyone benefits. If only it'd been so easy, the Thing was all along just a bacterial or viral infection, doing nothing much, and that repetitively; that's what the treadmill image says. Business suffers so from stress, how sad. Not anyone else. Clearly, if we know anything at all, it's the employees of the Thing who've got forcibly emplaced without hope of escape on the selfsame treadmill, and they are the Stressed. What would the Broad Masses do without wives to abuse. Start in on children and pets, perhaps. All pity for the tormented rich and-or powerful is rendered ludicrous by the most obvious of all principles of social-hierarchical inequality cum differential distribution of privilege: IF MONEY DID NOT BUY HAPPINESS, WHAT'S THE SENSE OF HAVING ARMENIA. What's more: Rare and ill-documented cases are rumoured about wherein or whereby money failed to adequately purchase love. No such instance, however, has ever been adduced such that the lack of money failed to buy unlove. Let us all flunk ourselves, I mean, mark a big red F on our report cards, in matters present. We don't know what is, and we damned well have no adequate incentive to find out. In a couple of centuries, maybe, the digging around in musty archives, computerized-database and website variants, that is, will show the Thing for the disgusting charnel house it is/was. I've been around for five thousand years of history, and it always happens, the going grand and glorious Civilized world of the time is found jsut a bit later to be crawling creepy worms, nothing more. What's Out There's nothing less than the mostest and worstest irrationalest Thingie ever, anywhere, whose sole meaning and purpose of existence is sustaining the emotionally compelling character of a metaphysical construct called *scarcity*, such that, if the feared erosion of that construct ever eventuated, there would be wild running amok in total primal chaos of those who'd been forcibly deprived of societal resources, material or elsewise, on account of that whereof they'd been deprived having been supposed to have been SCARCE RESOURCES. Which was illusionary in the lowest. And on this basis, a terroristic horror of social discipline for social discipline's sake was erected. Where there was a Them who accorded you the accolade of Normality if and only if they were positive of the physical location of your corporeal, protoplasmic body at any time of the day, which is called "functioning." And where 90% had their humanity defined away by getting defined Stupid so the other 10% at most could have their attribution of Smartness, notwithstanding we are all the same and the Stupidity is made in and by society to make meaningful (not objectively real of course) the existence of the Smartness. 90-10 is usual for Civilizations; they never show the slightest improvement. Cruel, savage, the Romans and their arena games aren't so different. You know what that "wild running amok in primal chaos" is about, what it *really is* or, in the best-case scenario is gonna be? Freedom. Just a word you can't pin a meaning to if you got your arms twisted. Something associated with introductory offers of products, or have the meaning, without pecuniary cost or, worse, *cannot be sold in any market at any price above zero*. Garbage. Human included. Anybody out there got any idea of what They do to Human Garbage who entertain the selfevidently psychotic delusion they can Think? Horrible. Don't even think about it. We all wanna sleep tonight. What I'm saying is, IT'S ALL GOTTA GO BEFORE WE KNOW WHY IT HAD TO GO. Elsewise, the delusions, the fantastic miasmas, the misrepresentation of life to the allegedly living (and this allegation has gotta be searchingly picked apart), all the other artifical colourings and packagings, the media, the tinkertoys, are just what fakes you out. Wait a coupla hundred years, and it'll all be clear. Provided, of course, what's going on now doesn't become the Tradition for those a coupla centuries hence. In which case, you can be damned sure They will fix up the Dirty Parts; you'll never know until you fit the pieces together as if the Dirty Parts were still there. Like Tom Jefferson's sex life. Truly the Father Of His People. Taking loving care of his private property, little Sally, from age 14 or before. "Let us not go backwards into the future, but forwards, into the past." I said that in 1971, and it's as true today as it was back then. Now, I was gonna talk some past tonight, but there is no spacetime for it. You lucked out, I guess. Daniel A. Foss From timmons@mailhost.tcs.tulane.edu Fri Sep 6 16:52:52 1996 Date: Fri, 6 Sep 1996 17:55:13 -0500 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: timmons@mailhost.tcs.tulane.edu (J. Timmons Roberts) Subject: NOW would be a good time/ASA E+T Membership PEWS, WSN and Sociology people: I am forwarding below a message about membership in the Environment and Technology section of the American Sociological Association. I hope PEWS, WSN and Sociology Department(s) people with be interested because E+T is an excellent section of ASA and well worth it. STUDENTS especially note the free membership offer below. Timmons Roberts Asst. Prof. Tulane Sociology >From: gguagnan@gmu.edu (Greg Guagnano) >To: ENVIRONMENT TECHNOLOGY and SOCIETY > > > NOW WOULD BE A GREAT TIME! > >The American Sociological Association is about to begin the process of >allocating sessions for the 1997 meetings in Toronto. The most important >factor in session allocation is section membership. For the Section on >Environment and Technology, the number of members is SLIGHTLY below the >amount needed to maintain our current allocation of three sessions. So >now would be a great time to join! If you have never been a member, have >let your membership expire or are currently an ASA member but not a member >of our section, we can use your support. > >The membership process is easier than ever. You can obtain a membership >form by visiting the ASA home page (http://www.asanet.org) or by having a >copy faxed to you using the ASA fax on demand (Phone 888-395-1037 and >request document number 210). Or you can call ASA at 202-833-3410 >(ext. 389) to receive a copy in the mail. > >If you are a STUDENT and are joining for the first time, the membership >deal is even better. ASA will subsidize $5 of the $34 membership fee, and >your membership fee for the Section on Environment and Technology is free. >So for $29, you become a member of ASA and our section. Simply include a >statement with your membership application indicating that you want to take >advantage of this offer. > >Please join now and join often, pass along this message, and sponsor your students and friends. > >Thanks! > >Greg Guagnano > > >************************************************************** > >Dr. Gregory A. Guagnano > Director, Northern Virginia Survey Research Laboratory > Associate Professor, Department of Sociology & Anthropology > > George Mason University > Fairfax, Virginia 22030-4444 > > Phone: (703) 993-1445 > Fax: (703) 993-1446 > Lab phone: (703) 993-2993 > > IP: Gguagnan@gmu.edu > >************************************************************** > > > > From U17043@UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU Sun Sep 8 19:57:44 1996 Date: Sun, 08 Sep 96 20:28:47 CDT From: U17043@UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU Subject: curious fact wishing to meet compatible facts for meaning To: World Systems Network The curious fact was that the Bubonic Plague pandemic known as the Plague of Justinian, which broke out in Constantinople in 542, reaching England by 549 (where it may have decided that this is in English), decimated population levels throughout the Eurasian landmass *except* for East Asia. We know that the effect on Europe was so complex and confusing that, in general, we don't know what happened. The result has been the European Backwardness thesis, attributed to everything *but* the Bubonic Plague, where the canonical orthodoxy, once upon a time, was to blame European Backwardness on the Rise of Islam by way of closing off the Mediterranean (the Pirenne argument, in Mohammed and Charlemagne). Countering the European Backwardness thesis is the European Development thesis, promoted by the self-styled heretic, Christopher I Beckwith, in The Tibetan Empire In Central Asia, 1987[reprinted with a new postscript, 1992]. The differential impact of disease would of course logically affect different core and periphery regions variously. The Byzantine Empire, for instance, became a "demographic sink," a huge area reduced in productive labour supply and military-recruitment resources relative to the territory the state was called upon to defend. Moreover, the Byzantine state was aggressively conquering still more indefensible territory at the very time the Plague struck, but increasingly overtly waged war for the purpose of predatory taxation of former subjects of Arian Vandals, Ostrogoths, and Visigoths it had originally made Holy War to, as we would say, Liberate. As a "demographic sink," it lost all of its Near Eastern provinces, except for two-thirds of Asia Minor, to Aarabs; the Balkans to Slavs and Avars; Italy, most of it, to Lombards; North Africa, to Arabs and Berbers; and the slice of Spain to Visigoths. Sassanid Persia, also a "demographic sink," gambled everything on predatory war against the Byzantines, at first limited (Yemen, Lazica), then total; and lost, being in short order completely overrun by Arabs. The Frankish Kingdom(s) showed drastic labour shourtages which were remedied by some combination of labour- saving devices introduced by Romans but not much used hitherto, and by predatory roundups of Slavs, whose name relaced the Latin *servus* as the word for "slave" in various European languages. Colder climates being more salubrious, when even feebly exploited by improved agricultural techniques, the soils of Northwest Europe were so superior to the old Mediterranean ones that they provided the basis for a new core area. Sheer guesswork goes a long way, the seventh century reaching a new low in surviving documentation. Historians' monotonous usage of the words "devastated," "pillaged," "laid waste," or "annihilated" suggests that new, newish, or emergent core areas had rough going for a while. Even later, the exulting of a Beckwith over the glories of the Carolingians at their height ignores the superficiality of the edifice. At the Carolingian peak, nobody would have imagined any such entities as France or Germany. Austrasians and Neustrians occasionally had their differences, surely; but a Frank was not constitued as a Frank by speaking Franconian; and a Romance-speaking Frank was every bit as Frankish as the Germanic- speaker. Both were Germans and Frankish. One of the enduring superstitions of European nationalism, until recently, was the notion that Charlemagne could be a National Hero of France *or* Germany, not both; which one he was having been contingent on the French or German nationality of the deluded. In 589, Wen Di of the Sui dynasty, who had, as General Yang Jian, a half- Mongol nobleman, seized power from the Northern Zhou in 581, the latter having only in 577 destroyed the Northern Qi and unified North China with Sichuan, defeated and captured the hapless Chen Shubao, last ruler of the Southern dynasties ruling in Jiankang since 317. This meant that, for the first time since the third century crisis (Chinese version, recall that Cao Cao was the exact contemporary of Septimius Severus), a single political regime controlled both the export route by land (the old Silk Route, out of Northwest China), and that by sea (the route to India via Guangzhou and Hanoi). There is every reason to beliieve that Chinese exports were inelastic. Imagine millions of peasant women feeding silkworms on mulberry leaves, one of the most idiotic forms of women's work ever concocted by the mind of Man. For everyday apparel, of course, the still-more-cretinizing hemp splicing was available. If East Asia was spared the Bubonic Plague, it should follow that China was a "demographic mound." It undoubtedly had abundant population available for labour and military recruitment. At the same time, it was, assuming price-inelastic exports, it was dumping at least as much silk onto the export markets, by sea to India, thence to Sassanid Persia prior to 637, and from Sassanid Persia prior to 629, to Yemen, South Arabia, at that time under Persian rule, quite possibly for smuggling into Byzantine Antioch. From Antioch, so long as that city held onto its silk manufacturing industry, the finished goods might be smuggled back to Arabia by the very Arabians who'd smuggled the raw silk in, since the Saracens were losing subsidies formerly paid by both Byzantines and Sassanids. This trade, being illegal, would be ill-documented; and anyway, it would get ruined by the conseqences of the all-out war in the Near East between the superpowers, won by the newly- Muslim Arabs pouring out of relatively germ-free Arabia into the demographic sinks which both empires had become. In China, the effect of this would merely heighten the tendency already visible under the Sui (581-618), that is, military predation. The interest of the Chinese state in peaceful commerce was reduced by declining profits from exports. These profits might be recouped by outright conquest of the former Chinese export markets, Korea and Central Asia, even Persia: In 662, the Tang (618-907), the half- Turkish dynasty founded by Li Yuan in a coup which overthrew the Sui after the second ruler of that dynasty, Yang Di, was assassinated the previous year, made a symbolic intervention in the former Sassanid lands on behalf of Peroz, son of Yazdigird III, last Sassanid king. The Sui, it is widely believed, had made themselves unpopular by reason of three idiotic wars against Korea. The Tang continued the policy of invading Korea with equal lack of success until the reign of Gaozong, third Tang ruler. Wars of expansion in Central Asia were expensive for the state if glorious for the military aristocracy of Northwest China until after 680. At that point, power was seized by Wu Zhao, concubine of Gaozong (and also his father, Taizong), who ruled from 690-705 as Emperor (the Son of Heaven by definition was male) Cetian of the Zhou dynasty, that is, in her own name, the only woman in Chinese history to turn this trick. She conducted massive blood purges of the turbulent aristocrats, who were typically lance-knights who fought in plate-armour. To this period belongs the first recruitments to office by civil-service examinations, the policy-objective having been to weed out militarism. If failed. The first half of the eighth century witnessed the zenity of predatory imperialist expansion, halted only by disastrous defeat at the hands of the newly founded Abassid Caliphate. Daniel A. Foss From rross@vax.clarku.edu Mon Sep 9 08:53:06 1996 Date: Mon, 09 Sep 1996 10:52:32 -0500 (EST) From: "ROBERT J.S. (BOB) ROSS, CHAIR OF SOCIOLOGY" Subject: Forwarded mail.... To: Progressive Sociology Network , WORLD SYSTEMS Network , Dick Flacks , Eric Foner , pewick , dmerrill , blondon , pderr , mtamarkin , swapner , bcook , jblydenburg ***************************************************************************** Robert J.S. Ross 508 793 7243 Department of Sociology fax: 508 793 8816 Clark University 950 Main Street Worcester, MA 01610 ******************************************************************************* ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 08 Sep 1996 19:24:08 -0500 (EST) From: gamson@umbsky.cc.umb.edu To: rross@vax.clarku.edu From: MX%"feingold@sph.umich.edu" 22-AUG-1996 11:14:53.17 To: MX%"wilkap@math.lsa.umich.edu",MX%"slCCS@hamp.hampshire.edu",MX%"bms1@cicero.spc.uchicago.edu",MX%"gamson@umbsky.cc.umb.edu" CC: Subj: TIAA-CREF tobacco divestment Return-Path: Date: Thu, 22 Aug 1996 11:14:07 -0400 (EDT) From: Eugene Feingold To: wilkap@math.lsa.umich.edu, Sura Levine , bms1@cicero.spc.uchicago.edu, Zelda Gamson Subject: TIAA-CREF tobacco divestment Here is a chain letter that you can forward to your friends and acquaintances on your campus and other campuses. Obviously, it can be revised to suit your taste. I'm writing to you and to other colleagues who are participants in TIAA-CREF to let you know that this October you will have an opportunity to vote for getting CREF out of the lethal tobacco business. Did you know that CREF has nearly $2 Billion in tobacco industry investments? They are increasingly risky financially, and ethically outrageous seeking profit from the addiction to tobacco of the students we teach, and of millions of other men and women, huge numbers of whom die prematurely as a direct result of their addiction. I'm supporting a CREF shareholder resolution to be voted on by proxy forms which TIAA CREF will mail out in October. The resolution calls on the CREF board of directors: 1 ) to announce that CREF will make no additional tobacco related investments, and 2) to begin an orderly divestment of all tobacco investments. The supporting statement (which will accompany the resolution in the October mailing) is at the end of this message. We expect the resolution and statement to appear in the final pages of the CREF booklet listing candidates for the CREF board. We're told it will be mailed to you in the first two weeks of October the CREF annual meeting will be in New York City, November 11. Please forward this message via e-mail to faculty and staff on your campus, to your friends on other campuses, and to your campus newspaper. Get the resolution discussed in meetings and endorsed by campus organizations. Any other efforts to alert friends and colleagues to this important vote will be much appreciated. Together we can help defeat the Tobacco Lobby, by ending the collegiate camouflage CREF now provides for the tobacco industry's cancer breeding products. Supporting statement (to be included in Oct.'96 proxy mailing): The Maryland Retirement and Pension System announced that its decision to shed tobacco investments was for "business," not "social reasons." According to the Wall Street Journal (4/24/96), Richard Dixon, state treasurer and vice chairman of Maryland Retirement's board, says tobacco companies have been good at fighting legal battles over the years, but 'sooner or later, they are going to lose.' " Fourteen states are now suing the tobacco industry for the hundreds of millions of dollars they have spent caring for smokers' diseases through Medicaid and other government programs. The New York State Teachers Retirement System has also, by unanimous board vote, for financial reasons, begun divestment of tobacco stocks, selling the first 25%. CREF's management has argued that cigarette investments increase the safety of the funds. Yet even Liggett & Myers stated (March 13, '96) that tobacco lives under the threat of financial catastrophe under the impact of product liability lawsuits." Financial prudence and ethical concerns alike call for replacing tobacco with more promising investments. As of late August, tobacco industry stocks are dropping precipitously. This may be a short-term problem, but is likely to recur. On April 23 the American Medical Association urged all investors "interested in the health and welfare of our children" to "divest tobacco," which AMA's spokesman called "an economically ruinous and enslaving product." In response to a CREF shareholder question, "Are there any social responsibility policy restrictions whatsoever on the selection of CREF investments?" CREF's policy was stated: "Apart from Social Choice, CREF does not define or suggest social restrictions in any of its accounts." We believe few educators desire a "Let the public interest be damned" investment policy. The existence of CREF's Social Choice Fund (not wholly an equity fund, and thus more vulnerable to inflation) does not absolve us of responsibility to consider the impact on society of CREF's more massive investment decisions. According to its Dec. 31 '95 annual report CREF is the largest institutional investor in Philip Morris (holding $936,294,900 in Philip Morris stock and another $34,579,304 in Philip Morris commercial paper), and invests in eighteen other tobacco industry corporations. A Philip Morris director sits on the CREF board. Thus we are providing well over 1.3 Billion Dollars of respectable collegiate camouflage for cancer, contributing to the spread of what the American Cancer Society calls "a pediatric epidemic." Educators are being put in a position of seeking to profit from children's addiction to a product likely to shorten their lives. Supporting this resolution asking CREF to replace tobacco investments is the prudent and ethical choice. __________________________________________________________________________ Eugene Feingold University of Michigan School of Public Health 352 Hilldale Drive, Ann Arbor MI 48105 (313) 662-8788 Fax (313)662-2713 __________________________________________________________________________ From dale.wimberley@vt.edu Mon Sep 9 09:26:10 1996 Date: Mon, 9 Sep 1996 11:25:43 -0400 To: World-System Network From: dale.wimberley@vt.edu (Dale W Wimberley) Subject: PEWS Section membership Rich Appelbaum The Political Economy of the World-System section (PEWS) of the American Sociological Association must have *400* members by Sept. 30 (or a few days earlier, to be assured of record entry by Sept. 30) to have 3 paper sessions at next year's ASA meeting in Toronto. As of Friday Sept. 6, we had *383* members on record or in process of being recorded. We need 17 more members as quickly as possible so that we'll have more than 2 paper sessions in 1997. If you are a lapsed member, or if you have thought of joining PEWS before, now is a most excellent time to join/rejoin! (You must be an ASA member to join PEWS.) Also, I suggest that if you have graduate students interested in world-systems, development, global political economy, etc., you might pay for their membership in PEWS (only $5 for students). To join PEWS, please send your application to ASA in Washington, and send me a note so I can know what the current count is! Application follows: ******************************************************************************** [ ] I am an ASA member and wish to join the Section on the Political Economy of the World-System. Enclosed is my check. [ ] I want to join the ASA and the Political Economy of the World-System Section. Please send me a 1996 membership application. Name _________________________________________________________________________ Address _______________________________________________________________________ City ___________________________ State/Province _________________ Zip/Postal Code ____________ Country __________________ PEWS Section dues are $10 for regular members, $5 for student members, and $8 for low income members. Make checks payable to ASA and mail to American Sociological Association, Membership Services, 1722 N Street, NW, Washington, DC 20035-2981. ******************************************************************************** Dale Wimberley PEWS Sec.-Treasurer Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University From U17043@UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU Mon Sep 9 23:13:12 1996 Date: Mon, 09 Sep 96 18:23:10 CDT From: U17043@UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU Subject: insane beyond belief but not at the time [cont'd] To: World Systems Network With yesterday's post, I was continuing a line of argument which I started some time back with a discussion of Roman expansion to the east, along the Silk Route originating, ultimately, in Northwest China. The Roman military rulers were, for the time being, however, preoccupied with the more limited objective of the portion of the Silk Route through Mesopotamia, half of which they succeeded in conquering by the time of Septimius Severus (193-207) and Alexander Severus (222-235); part of which they then lost in an aggressive war under Julian (361-363). For those of us indoctrinated in the narrative of The Decline And Fall Of The Roman Empire, the very idea that the Romans were ready to give up on Western Europe, were Germans were coming in the window and through the door, even to relinquish Rome itself, as they did, or at least put Rome on rollers and move it to the Bosphorus, closer to their Real Interests in the Near East, makes us recoil in horror. Time and again, in 359-363, Persia offered Constantius II and Julian peace in exchange for Roman evacuation of Northern Mesopotamia. But not one square inch would they consider giving up; why should they not have the whole of Mesopotamia. After all, it was in 197 that Septimius Severus sacked Ctesiphon, enslaving 100,000. Between 115 and 117 Trajan, before that, had annexed all of Mesopotamia (whence the Romans were driven out by indigenous revolt). Even further back, and every halfway successful Roman general mentioned it, there were the astonishing deeds of Alexander. Either the Roman policy was insane, or our narrative of the Decline And Fall of the Roman Empire is contaminated with Eurocentric illusion, or both of these were true. Weren't the Romans supposed to be scrounging every last soldier and *denarius* to shore up a collapsing Western Europe? Apparently not. The Paranoid Constantius II sent Julian, as a newly-minted Caesar, but without military experience, to Trier to stop a huge invasion by Alemanni. This was a dumping-ground assignment; perhaps Julian would get killed. As luck had it, it was Julian's account of what happened that stuck. In 360, he smashed the Alemanni at Strasbourg, capturing 30,000. He pulled this off by shipping supplies from Britain, he said. Why was this necessary; what sort of condition was Gaul in at the time, or what was going unusually right in Britain? Once back in Paris, with a loyal army at his back, he was in a position to get even with Constantius for attempted political murder by allowing his overenthusiastic, sure, sure, troops to proclaim him emperor, whereupon he marched on Constantinople, sufficiently remote in space and time that his enemy was safely dead of natural causes, permitting a peaceful transfer of power and planning aggressive war to the East. In 751, China intervened in a war between the kings of Tashkent and Ferghana. As both of these caravan cities were on a major trade route, China had clear and imperative vested interests in intervention. Is this not the usual logical conclusion of a policy where Normal material vested interests are not operative, hence the subjective and imaginative element in policy-making runs riot? I do believe this is possible. To put the crisis of 751 into perspective, let's review the previous several hundred years' struggles for control of the Silk Route. Since the first century, a strong regime in North China would find it imperative to control a string of towns called The Four Garrisons. The westernmost of these was Kucha, site of the Stone Pillar, where caravans from China turned around, exchanging goods with caravans from Parthia/Persia. We are now in Uzbekistan, a long distance south and west of the Four Garrisons. The decisive battle of Atlakh, or Battle of the Talas River, took place still further to the west, near Samarkand. This was extraordinary imperialism for China. Though the Qing, in the eighteenth century, encompassed more territory than the Tang, the Qing had firearms and about eight times the population as did the Tang. The Tang period has gone down in Chinese folk memory as a time of glory and victory. The subsequent Song era, despite vastly superior economic and technical development, is recalled, by contrast, as a time of arid cheapskate moneygrubbers, as in large measure it was. One, but only one, possible cause of the failure of commercialism in the early Tang is the "demographic mound" effect discussed yesterday. If the Near Eastern, European, and Byzantine civilization areas to the west had suffered population decimation and material losses from the Plague, and China had not, there was a shortage of consumers for Chinese exports, luxury goods like silk, lacquerware, and now porcelain. The balance of payments in religious texts and artifacts is unclear. Buddhist statuary and painting was exported to Korea and Japan; scriptures were imported at huge effort and expense from India. But China was now becoming a major exporter of scripture on its own, as the intellectual center of Mahayana and especially Chan Buddhism. New Sutras of entirely Chinese origin, that is, with no Indian originals, were proliferating. Trade, as it would turn out, increased by leaps and bounds after the mid- Tang crisis. As previously mentioned, the Chinese state, like some other pre-capitalist empires, promoted trade, or at least dismantled regulation, to ease the crisis of state finance brought on by inability to collect land tax from its own privileged class. Collection of commercial taxes was vastly easier: Recall Gaozong of the Southern Song, reigned 1127-1162: "Commercial taxes bring in millions. Why tax the people?" By which he meant, the regime had lost the land-tax-vulnerable regions of North China; it was thrown back on the landlordism-rife Yanzi Valley economic core; and those serf-driving landlords were in a state of semi-permanent tax-insurrection. But we're way out of our period. The disastrous defeats of 751-755, followed by the army revolts, civil wars, and Tibetan occupation of the capital, 755-763, had broken the back of the state apparatus. Regional warlordism prevented revenues reaching the capitals in North China; and the elaborate machinery theoretically in place to regulate commerce simply collapsed. Curiously, trade started to proliferate or even boom, except of course where revolts, invasions, or ambitious warlords made this impossible. Bills of exchange, called "flying money," started to circulate among merchants, based on deposits of funds with the state salt monopoly. (In subsequent periods the backing of printed paper money came to be secured upon government salt stocks, under the assumption that, as a necessity of life, the salt was saleable. When this assumption failed, in 1355, the state apparatus disappeared overnight.) The main port of entry in the south, Guangzhou (Canton) first reached enormous size in the late Tang. As the salt smuggler Huang Zhao is said to have killed 200,000 foreigners in Guangzhou in 878, it is plausible that the total population was larger. (Just as the state salt monopoly had huge importance in public finance and economic life as a whole, so did salt smugglers attain vast importance, at times, in politics. Huang Zhao, in his revolutionary career, 865-880, pillaged the country from end to end, capturing both capitals, Changan and Loyang, only to be caught and killed. A deserter from the rebels, Zhu Wen, commanding ex-rebels in a pacification program analogous to the South Vietnamese "Open Arms," *chieu hoi*, finished off the Tang in 907.) Another brake on mere- moneygrubbing, or the spirit of enterprise, was the deep-dyed religious piety which went with the social dominance of the armoured knightly class in China as in Europe. Secularization was both cause and effect. That caustic xenophobe, Han Yu, 768-824, decided by the later Tang that Buddhist monks were bizarre-looking and fundamentally un-Chinese. Such thoughts were, earlier than this, not thinkable. The Tang state did not expropriate the Buddhist Church between 841 and 845 to promote economic development and counteract social parasitism. It did so because it was flat broke. But earlier, it would not have dared, vastly more powerful as it had been. Social causaliy is that tangled mess we weave/When ourselves we set out to deceive. If mutually reinforcing factors were promoting trade internally in the late Tang, how might this have been abetted by causal factors outside China? Obviously, the "demographic mound" was being levelled, as "demographic sinks" outside were being filled up. Warren Tradgold's book title, The Byzantine Revival: 780-843 says it all in terms of the temporal correspondence between the filling in of demographic "potholes" deriving from the Plague of Justinian and its recurrences (about every eleven years). The subsequent pandemic of 1348-1350, after all, continued to ravage cities into the seventeenth century, in Europe and China alike. Make that "early eighteenth" to cover the Marseilles outbreak. So, once again, allowing three hundred years for demographic recuperation, we have world-systemic economic conditions which suffice to bring hundreds of thousands of foreigners to Guangzhou *just in time* to get massacred by xenophobic antielitist anticommercial peasants. The wonderful thing about the process of capitalist development is how *neatly* it all works out, and conveniently, too. I am, of course, being ironic. I've considered the mutually reinforcing variables involved in the late- Tang commercial expansion first to get a better grasp on the pre-existing early-Tang militaristic state. In my own mind, that is. Honestly, I am assuming that anyone considering him her it self qua conscious entity a unit or subsystem of Western Civilization should at this time be watching Monday Night Football. Inclusive of New Zealand, where it is Tuesday Night, all are drunk, all are tight. Seriously now, Tang was a Mediaeval society, military and religious. It was not, however, feudal. It had a state every inch a state, which intervened actively in the economy for moral reasons, ie, without counting the cost (unless belatedly). The social core of the ruling class was the Great Families of Northwest China, on the economic periphery, but in a *political* core region, as it had been since the Qin unification. As I mentioned in an earlier post, one almost *never* finds political cores corresponding with economic cores in pre-capitalist empires ensuing from the unification of state-systems. Exceptions, such as the shift of the capital from Rome to the Bosporus by the Albanian Emperors, need to be explained. The economic core was becoming the rice-rich Yanzi Valley, which was made to feed the enormous capital, misnamed Chang'an, Eternally Safe, population 2 million, via the Grand Canal. Both were built by the Sui, 581-618, whom the Tang overthrew. The Sui and Tang are credited with "pure-Chineseness," which is spurious. They followed, from 317, a period during which all ruling families were, with brief interruptions, Hun (Xiongnu), Mongol, or Turkish in origin, and self- consciously so, in North China. There were some other ingredients to the ethnic stew, proto-Tibetans, etc; all these collectively called The Sixteen Kingdoms of the Five Barbarians. An anthropologist from the European Dark Ages would have been at home. That's to say, ethnogenesis delusions and faith in the miraculous was everywhere. Including the Southern Empire, whose capital, Jiankang, was home to the Six Dynasties, each successively claiming to embody the Authentic Chinese Experience. Which is about as true as claims to Hunanese origins of the Cantonese who run your local Hunanese restaurant. Between the cultural particularism indigenous to the Yangzi valley and the 1949-Guomindong-esque flight from the Huns in the period around 317, Chinese Tradition was a figment of the imagination, and historians cannot, have not since Sui-Tang times, found anything Chinese about it. The Southern Empire was derided as "decadent," "licentious," "perverted," "debased," and other obvious tipoffs to anomalously high status of women. Most of this criticism is unfair. It is true that the second ruler of the Liu Song dynasty (420-479), who reigned 424-463, had a sister who demanded, and got, a "harem" of thirty young male hunks. Mostly, the Southern Empire was a sleazy, hedonistic place, for the privileged few. There are few cases known to equal the Southern Empire for laxity in state service, selfish greediness in exploitation of the poor, tax avoidance, and lawlessness in the history of ruling classes. During the Eastern Jin (317-420), the Great Families would collect official titles and salaries, doing no work in return: the meaning and purpose of existence was aesthetic refinement, pure coversation, and metaphysical speculation. To be fair, life expectancy, from pandemics of smallpox and measles and from endemic malaria, was much shorter. (On first reading of these times, I called it The Empire of the Hippies.) Legends were actually current to the effect that, in the flight south, the people freely elected the Lords, and volunteered to be their serfs. Any Marxist out there knows what to make of that. There is no god, and she's unjust, but there was a Daoist peasant war in 399-402 which failed, and a major social revolution, which succeeded by accident, in 549-552. The Great Families, deserted by slaves and serfs, were left alone in their palaces wearing Fine Vestments; the doors were nailed shut from the outside, and there was no food had anyone been there to cook it. A General Chen returned from suppressing revolt in Hanoi, took power, and founded a dynasty named after himself, whose last representative was carted off to Chang'an by the Sui founder as a housepet. To be honest, I have recounted this in excessive detail as it is too weird not to tell. In its day, Jiankang must have been a great place to do business, as it benefited from centuries of apathetic, crooked, and slovenly government. It was complained by the Great Families that people ran away to engage in trade for being too lazy to do honest labour as serf-slaves; and this must have entered into it. The finest proof that Jiankang must have thriven commercially is that, when permitted to revive, it became, as Nanjing, a great commercial city, and has remained so ever since when someone wasn't "cutting off the rotten tails of capitalism." At the time (589), however, the Sui ordered the place levelled to the ground for presumed ideological motives; and built another regional capital in its stead, some distance downriver, where the second Sui ruler was murdered. The effect of this morality story is to heighten, for me, the sense of the Sui moralistic loathing of Southern luxurious vice, only to fall victim to its seductiveness themselves. As that's the sense Chinese moralists have made of it, too. For reasons ostensibly cosmological (the ruler is he, always by definition he, who "faces south," and vice versa), more likely politco-military, the capital of China is normatively in the North. Two attempts to break this rule, in 1368-1402 and 1927-1949, have attracted ghosts, demons, and reaction- aries. The ghosts and demons I have from official sources of the 1960s, if you recall, also. The ghost of the emperor who died in the civil war ending in 1402 was hunted all over the Indian Ocean. Anyhow, there was no question but that the capital would be moved back to where it had been since the Unification of 221 BC, with exceptions. The likely reason is the security of the Silk Road and the Four Garrisons, due west. Next only to the Great Wall, the Grand Canal built to feed this place was the most enormous public works project built in China prior to the next canal, required by the shift of the capital to the east, and the one after that, by the shift to Beijing. What I am trying to indicate is the symbolically important indifference to pecuniary and human cost in the site selection. Grandiosity of public works was matched by that of expenditure on the military. At their height, under Xuanzong, 710-756, the Tang stud farms bred 400,000 horses for the military. The typical soldier of the Tang, not quantitatively but ideologically, was the mounted warrior, bearing a lance with pennant, and clad in what looks to me, from a tomb statue, like plate armour. (European analogues were making do with chain mail at this time.) To repeat, though trained like a European feudal warrior, the Tang version belonged to a regular army unit. This fought in disciplined formation, with none of the single-combat heroics of Europe and Japan. At the Battle of the Paekche River, in Korea, the Japanese expeditionary force was so soundly thrashed by Tang discipline that major military reforms, imitating China, were introduced. I should remind you, though, that the cavalryman was not necessarily a member of the ruling class. Only pedigreed members of the Great Families of Northwest China, in the region of Chang'an, merited this distinction. The ruling class was as "pure Chinese" as the Carolingians were "pure French," social purity of any sort being spurious when not pernicious. (By "pure French," I mean to hint that the half-Turkish descent of the Tang was perhaps more decisive than the half-Chinese.) Turks, Mongols, etc, were heavily intermixed with each other and Chinese, with surnames and spoken languages changed as social climbing and "Restoration Movements" may have dictated (eg, when the Northern Wei split into neo-Turkist and Chinesizing factions in 535). Tang court culture was suffused by the rhythms of Turkish folk music, without awareness of which, I'm told, much poetry makes no sense. The second Tang ruler, Taizong, erected Turkish-style images celebratory of his killing the enemy imaged. The Tang is recalled as glorious in its provision of stable government. This is lying propaganda, intentional from the outset. Li Yuan, emperor Gaozi, was a usurping general who staged a coup against the Sui as the Sui had ousted the Northern Zhou. He initiated the peculiar, obsessive Tang concern with legitimation ritual. (See Howard J. Wechsler, Offerings of Jade and Silk: ritual and symbol in the legitimation of the Tang dynasty, Yale, 1985). In 627, Li Shimin, second in line for the succession, had the crown prince and brother fourth-in-line murdered; then forced his own father's abdication. Confucianization, we're all for filial piety and brotherly solidarity, and legitimization-ritual proliferation picked up speed. Li Shimin, emperor Taizong, was succeeded by his fourth son, notable for weak character, Gaozong, without poliical violence because: The Joy Of Taizong's Declining Years (cf Abishag The Shunamite) was also Gaozong's "Main Squeeze," as the armenians say, Wu Zhao, mentioned yesterday. Two sons, Chongzong and Ruizong, were successively discarded after Gaozong's death in 680; then came the dynasty whose sole ruler was a woman, the Zhou. A pious Buddhist, Emperor Wu Cetian was never a nun in any sense, and with age, her Conduct Unbecoming was such as to provoke her removal by coup, February 5, 705; her death was announced due to natural causes. The real grudge was resentment in the ruling class of her mass beheadings of Overmighty Subjects. The effects of this had at one time made her popular, since the estates of the ruling class grew at the expense of the allotments of peasants. Oh, goodgrief, I've forgot to explain. Sorry. By the Tang code, every able-bodied male peasant received a guaranteed land allotment for life, on condition he was responsible for taxation and served in the military. Commoner peasants fought in the infantry or did forced labour in the logistics branch. Every dependent, ie, wife, children, aged parents or gradparents, received a fractional allotment. This sounded utopian, but it worked for a century. Sufficiently vigorous use of repressive state power ensured this; and there was a precedent in the allotment system of the Turkish-Mongol Northern Wei (386-535). That regime had been Harsh yet Firm. In principle, the allotments were non-alienable. As state control of the economy eroded or collapsed after the mid-Tang civil wars, the allotments became fully heritable and alienable private property. The military and state finance were in a correspondingly hopeless mess by that time. The land allotment system either was not extended to or disappeared fastest in the Yanzi Valley economic core, where serf-landlordism was entrenched. As one historian said of a much later period, "Differences between serfs and tenants were real, but were not important." The coup of 705 had restored the previously-deposed Chongzong, who was not permitted to do anything without the permission of his wife, the Empress Wei. Whether the latter's adulteries were politically strategic or hedonically motivated screwing around, this was unconcealed not only from Chongzong himself, but more importantly, from the Censorate, whose sworn duty was to sniff out and impeach all those guilty of criminality or moral wrongdoing; if necessary, to admonish the Son of Heaven at risk of life, "on the palace steps," as a later slogan had it. A memorial was sent to Chongzong stating that matters had reached such a pass that something unspecified would have to be done by person or persons unnnamed; see CP Fitzgerald, The Empress Wu, 1967. On July 8, 710, Empress Wei and Princess An Lo fed Chongzong some yummy Chinese dumplings; these were laced with deadly poison. In the coup of July 21-22, 710, the future emperor Xuanzong, as a card- carrying male, hence able to command troops, collaborated with Princess Tai Ping, daughter of Wu Cetian and finest political mind in the capital, who spread her money around, via the future Xuanzong, to the Palace Guard to murder their officers (all of the Wu and Wei families). There ensued a night of headhunting familiar in the Chinese Histories. The Empress Wei exhibited disgraceful lack of aristocratic compusure by running for her life, straight into a bunch of rebels who beheaded her. The Princess An Lo should be credited with Real Class by calmly painting her eyebrows in front of her mirror until beheaded. The third woman target, Shang-kan Wan'er, legal expert and former Private Secretary to Wu Zhao/Cetian, was trying to tell a story about how she was Really Working For the Opposition when beheaded by the future Xuznzong personally. These sickening details (a) illustrate the substance of power politics in the Tang; (b) emphasize the importance of women in the contest for power; and (c) indicate the probable depths of both macho megalomaniacal bravado *and* insecurity over holding power that rendered Xuanzong's reign, ended July 16, 756, by forced abdication, so crazy. We have reached the place in the analysis where the irrationality of the polity has generated the irrational mind of the scope the Soviets used to call "World-Historical." The principal activity of the Tang state in the reign of Xuanzong became the legimation of its own existence, and the that of the exalted ruler, called *minghuang*, "brilliant emperor." Exclusive of aggressive expansionist imperialist war. Without the latter, it would tempt some scholars to compare Xuanzong's reign to Bali: "At first sight, Tang China seems indeed to be close to the Balinese case. The time, energy and expense and the intellectual priority accorded to state ritual in the period in which the code was produced was such as to suggest that Tang imperial ceremonials, far from being secondary, might indeed constitute the most important function of the state. (David McMullen, "Bureaucrats and cosmology: the ritual code of T'ang China," in David Cannadine and Simon Price (Eds.), Rituals of Royalty: Power and Ceremonial in Traditional Societies. Past and Present Publications, Cambridge University Press, 1987[1992].) This compendium, issued in 732 and covering 150 different, invariably complex and expensive, court rituals for every, literally, every occasion, was confined to those real or spurious ceremonies found in the Classics and sanctioned by Confucian scholars as consistent with suppositiously authentic texts alleged to predate the Qin unification of 221 BC or accepted as canonical thereafter, including ceremonies in honour of Confucius himself. It does not cover, include, or mention ceremonies of the Buddhist and Daoist faiths; nor of course does it mention the very numerous deities, even those state-sanctioned, worshipped at shrines of the Chinese popular religion. Xuanzong himself claimed direct descent from the imaginary Laozi, alleged author of the oldest canonical Daoist text, Dao De Jing, whose name, translated as Old Master, indicates antiquity comparable to Confucius. Though nominally an adherent of Daoism, Xunzong had responsibilities to protect and uphold the priviliges, increasingly ostentatious and abusive, of the Buddhist clergy; China was at this time as Buddhist as Europe was Christian. All these legitimating rites, incantations, and supernatural faiths availed naught in the face of Xuanzong's intractable stupidity mixed with blind persistence. When he failed, he tried, tried again. These traits, once he commenced to lose, cumulated his losses, first against Arabs, then against the alliance of Tibet and Nan Zhao (in what is now Yunnan), finally against army generals handpicked by himself. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Due to the inclusion of fiction in World Systems Theory, this writer feels impelled to include a selection from the fictitious diary of Lady Yang Gueifei, who attained to the goal of all Daoists, Immortality, by sharing the bed of Xuanzong. Thanks to which, when Xuanzong's remaining soldiers mutinied, she was handed her silk scarf and told to go yang yourself, at which Xuanzong, with typical feeling for those who loved him, heaved a sigh of relief that it wasn't him they were doing in. As I honour hereditary aristocracy for having been born in New York City rather than Kiev Guberniya in the Evil Empire when there were Evil Emperors, I weep that Lady Yang's elegant neck fell into the hands of such roughnecks; but then, consider the compensations. She has been a staple of Chinese folktales as well as High Culture, having become at once The Greatest Slut in Chinese History *and* a Tragic Romantic Heroine. Unfortunately, when I reread my fictional scene, where Lady Yang upraids the Ruler of All Under Heaven for sending an army straight at the Iranian border at a time when the Iranians have just had a revolution, which was led by a man code-named abu-Muslim Muhammad ibn- Muslim al-Khurasani, "which sounds pretty Fundamentalistic to me, so if these Mulims weren't religious maniacs before when we were calling them that, they sure as hell are now," accusing China of Eastern Imperialism, making war against God, and restoration of heathenism, "all of which is true, you know," etc, I have Xuanzong saying, "th' fuck, yuou think I'm Jimmy Carter, stupid bitch." Which is entirely in character, but the use of such language here and elsewhere compels the suppression of the text in respect of the tender sensibilities of the viewing audience. Such was also the fate of a bit of fiction I wrote when, after writing an innocent joke about threats of "retrograde consciouness" represented by "women of the semiperiphery," I was horrified to find the very thing spoofed, as extreme, you know, on sale at a real newsstand, called World Wide Nudes: Sexy Girls From Planet Playboy, pictures from Mexico, Brazil, Czech Republic, Poland, Russian Federation, and The New South Africa. The result was "Who The World Wide Naked Are And How They Fight The World Party," stolen from V.I. Lenin, in which young Manfred Greenblatt, due to immaature conscious- ness, fails to radicalize the Mexican coverperson, a Chiapas Maya, into the arms of Subcommandante Marcos, but instead runs off with her to New Zealand, where they stay drunk shearing sheep till he is called to the colours in the War of the Bougainville Secession (from Papua New Guinea), now in progress, where he dies childless, so does not become the grandfather of Danny Greenblatt, World Party hero of 2044 in New Zealand, "partly for this reason." Which was not merely too dirty but, according to the artistic canons of Socialist Reality-Impairment, fails to provide the World Party with a Positive Hero. This much at least we owe to WWW's admirable effort at transition to the Higher Stage of the Critique of the Gotha Programme. Daniel A. Foss From chriscd@jhu.edu Tue Sep 10 12:58:00 1996 10 Sep 1996 14:49:03 -0400 (EDT) 10 Sep 1996 14:40:02 -0400 (EDT) Date: Tue, 10 Sep 1996 14:42:23 -0700 From: chris chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: European Sociological Association] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Organization: Sociology, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD.21218 USA Mon, 09 Sep 1996 12:58:53 -0400 (EDT) Mon, 09 Sep 1996 12:56:52 -0400 (EDT) Date: Mon, 9 Sep 1996 12:55:03 -0400 From: isa@sis.ucm.es (International Sociological Association) Subject: European Sociological Association Apparently-to: chriscd@jhu.edu To: chriscd@jhu.edu Reply-to: isa@sis.ucm.es Distributed by the International Sociological Association on behalf of the European Sociological Association. All inquiries should be directed to the ESA at e-mail: ESA97@essex.ac.uk EUROPEAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION 3rd EUROPEAN CONFERENCE 20th CENTURY EUROPE: Inclusions/Exclusions CALL FOR PAPERS The European Sociological Association hosts its Third European Conference on August 27-30 1997 at the University of Essex in Colchester, north of London. The conference theme is: "20th Century Europe: Inclusions/Exclusions". The theme will be explored focusing particularly on the issues of gender, ethnicity, class and age in the restructuring of European societies throughout this century and the role of European sociological insights in the understanding of inclusionary and exclusionary changes. Sessions will be organized around the following themes: Revisiting Classical Theory - Modernity and Post modernism - Feminist Theory Meets the Classics - A Sunset of Socialism? Work, Welfare and Citizenship - Welfare States, Welfare Societies - Gender and Citizenship - Inclusions/Exclusions: Power and Ethnicity - Gender Relations in the Labour Market and the Welfare State (RN) - Industrial Relations, Labour Market Institutions and Employment and Employment (RN) Inequalities Old and New - New Forms of Patriarchy - Generational Contracts and Conflicts - A Future for Social Class? - Ethnicities, Racism and nations (RN) - Youth and Generations in Europe (RN) Globalizations - Globalization, Social and Economic Restructuring - Migration and Fortress Europe - Globalization: Technologies, Environments and Futures European Processes, Boundaries and Institutions - East Meets West - Social Rights and Economic Powers - Europe of the Regions - Europe in Process: Social Movements - Democracy in Europe: Institutions and citizenship Cultures and Identities - Sexual citizenship - Cultural Identities and Homogenisation? - Technology and Culture - Euopean Values in Transition - Biographical Perspectives on European Societies (RN) - Families in Europe (RN) - Consumption (RN) - Sociology of Mass Media and Communication (RN) (RN) = Existing Research Networks Suggestions are also welcome for round-table luncheon sessions. The European Sociological Association invites scholars working on European questions to submit ideas for papers (Abstract of 250 words - Deadline 15 January 1997, including an indication of which thematic group they would prefer), and expressions of interest to: Conference Organiser - ESA Conference Department of Sociology University of Essex Wivenhoe Park Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ United Kingdom e-mail: ESA97@essex.ac.uk Fax: +44 (1206) 873410 --------------------------------------------------------------- REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FORM EUROPEAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION 3RD CONFERENCE UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX AUGUST 27-30 1997 Return to: Conference Organiser - ESA Conference Department of Sociology University of Essex Wivenhoe Park Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ United Kingdom e-mail: ESA97@essex.ac.uk Fax: +44 (1206) 873410 NAME: _______________________________________________________ INSTITUTION: ________________________________________________ ADDRESS: ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ CITY: _______________________________________________________ POSTAL CODE: ______________ COUNTRY: _______________________ FAX: ______________________ PHONE: _________________________ E-MAIL: _____________________________________________________ _______ I would be interested in receiving further information about the European Sociological Association 3rd Conference. _______ I anticipate presenting a paper. Preliminary Title: __________________________________ _____________________________________________________ . . . which would be appropriate for the following themes(s): _____________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________ From U17043@UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU Tue Sep 10 19:14:55 1996 Date: Tue, 10 Sep 96 19:17:06 CDT From: U17043@UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU Subject: the bizarre in history as routine and crisis To: World Systems Network One reader of last night's post was so offended by the flippant tone I took that he sent a >'d copy back in a huff. This can't be helped. *All historic social orders* look bizarre when they have passed away. That goes for the one we are living in as well as those that have already gone. I sat through the discussion on Opposing The Existing Global Order for weeks, and got the distinct impression there is a consensus among you that there is something *sensible* about world capitalism at this time, though it may have certain obnoxious features. It is quite impossible that this is true. Marx foretold that capitalism, being built-in crisis-prone, would destroy itself. He was correct. It destroyed itself three times, two world wars with the Great Depression sandwiched in between, in forty years (including postwar wars). When it's finally gone and all the rocks are turned over, we'll finally know what almost got us, but right now my favourite mind game is: What is it I am not worrying about? That is what there is to worry about. When we look at historical societies and world systems, we are always observing very strange, suboptimally performing, wasteful, often blindly murderous self-destruction machines, which can perpetuate themselves, sometimes for centuries, before they are done in. Sometimes the replacement is an improvement, sometimes it is worse, all too often it is more of the same under other names. When, moreover, some key variable, like relative populations, gets drastically altered by epidemic disease or other catastrophe, crises spiral all over the place from one end of the world system to the other. Societies seemingly placidly decomposing for centuries suddenly seem very much stranger over shorter periods. There are spectacular social explosions, sometimes in chain reaction. We find these things with the smallpox-measles epidemics of the late second and third centuries. With the Bubonic Plague in the Early Middle Ages, and again in the Late Middle Ages. Just think about the first one, for example. One morning, the people of Rome woke up to find the city occupied by Albanians under the command of Septimius Severus. *Please note*: I deliberately use "Albanians" in preference to "Illyrians" because (a) We *know* Albania is the most backward country in Europe; where we have no standard to evaluate "Illyrians" by except the mythologizing of some historians about the noble, dutiful Illyrian Emperors who Saved Civilization. Who were actually bullet-headed military thugs. And (b) Classical Illyrian was ancestral, in the historical linguistic sense, to modern Albanian. That morning was 9 April, 193. "The impression made by the troops of Severus on the people of Rome is described by the historian Cassius Dio, Roman senator and eye-witness of these events: 'Severus filled the city with a throng of motley soldiers most savage in appearance, most terrifying in speech, and most boorish in conversation' (75.2.6)." (John Wilkes, The Illyrians, Blackwell, 1992.) *At the other end* of the world system of Antiquity, the same sort of rulership appeared in the dictatorship of Cao Cao, China's greatest military genius, who however fought exclusively against other Chinese. Like Severus on his end, Cao Cao was trying to kick some law-and-order into an empire and social order showing rapid signs of indisciplined crumbling due to ill-understood social and economic effects of diseases which, for all anyone knew, might themselves have just fallen out of the sky. Complicated, as tended to happen in China, but not the Mediterranean or Europe, by a Daoist peasant war usually called the Yellow Turbans, but actually two separate revolts, the Great Peace Daoists in the northeast and the Five Pecks of Rice (= the tithe assessment) Daoists in Sichuan. That peasant war broke out in 189, and by 193, when Severus occupied Rome, the Han dynasty emperor was Cao Cao's prisoner. What happened after 542, when the Plague of Justinian appeared, was every bit as drastic in East Asia, where the plague did *not* appear as where it did, because the stable relations between China, the Near East, and the Mediterranean/Europe were disrupted for centuries. Nor can this be a monocausal analysis, because there were social, political, religious, and other kinds of revolutions going on from one end of the Eurasian land mass plus North Africa to the other, maybe beyond, and these are all of vast complexity and importance. Tibetan and Turkish empires were built in Central Asia, for instance. Or, say, in 551, a people called the Juan Juan (spelling varies) was driven out of North China. In 626, a people called the Avars was besieging Constantinople. These two things are related, nobody is exactly sure how directly. That the Avars represented exactly the same gene pool as the Juan Juan is ridiculous. It was not just bad luck that social revolution, known as the Abbasid Revolution, broke out in Khurasan in 747, overthrowing the Umayyads by 750; and that *at this very time by sheer chance it just happened* that Xuznzong sent his army in the direction of abu-Muslim's headquarters in Samarkand. Xuanzong's conquests had expanded Chinese control over millions of Iranians, Turks, Irano-Turks (as it happened, the rebel An Lushan had a Sogdian, ie, Iranian, father and Turkish mother; another general had a Turkish father and Iranian mother), and Others & Miscellaneous, of pagan, Buddhist, Manichaean, Nestorian, and even Muslim faiths. Where political control shifted, apostasy was to be expected. The Umayyads had proved flabby in defending Iranians as well as the Faith. To suppose that someone would be loyal to a Chinese colonial government rather than feeling a sense of kinship with members of the same linguistic group across a political frontier is crazy, which is just what Xuanzong was. Not even if you made a Sogdian commander of the military district of the capital of the Chinese Empire would you assure his loyalty to what is still, after all, a foreign country who is paying him off. This was precisely the post to which An Lushan was appointed. We are getting just a bit ahead of ourselves. Look at the war of 751 again. The commander of the army beaten at the Talas River was a Korean, Gao Hsianji. As it happened, he had a very good won-lost record to this point. Unfortunately, we are not talking about a pitcher for the Chicago Cubs. Had the Chinese been capable of taking opinion polls, they would have found that half the population of Korea wanted Xuanzong dead, and the other half would have killed him personally if they had the opportunity. That is, the people of Korea regarded China not much more favourably in the eighth century than they did Japan in the twentieth. What this predicts is that Gao was not going to fight to the death for China; and as it happened, he ran fast enough, killing anyone in his path if he had to, that he was one of the very few to escape. Yang Gaozhong, Lady Yang's evil cousin, was Minister of Revenue, for which reason he insinuated the Lady into the imperial harem. To take the heat off himself. Yang himself was paradigmatic of the featherbrained pedigreed aristocrats who rose under the Tang system by hereditary right. He was crooked and greedy. By 753, he was Prime Minister. To cover up the disaster in Central Asia, he argued, a victorious war nearer home was necessary. The target was Nan Zhao, a kingdom south of Sichuan, and hitherto on good terms with the Tang. The Nan Zhao ruler threw himself into the arms of Tibet, the only Major Power at war with the Tang. This made it an even struggle, and the Tang, hitherto beating Tibet, started to lose. After a disastrous defeat, the second, in Nan Zhao, An Lushan revolted. It was over. When a bizarre social order/formation hits the skids, all sorts of weird details acquire political weight. I tried to make this point yesterday, but it was difficult, the whole subject was too messy. Rumours, for example. Anyone recall the politcal consequences of the Tsarina of Russia's faith in Rasputin? Of the buzz about Marie Antoinette? In routine politics, sex scandals, real or imaginary, have entertainment value. When society as a whole is going Over The Edge, they become something more. Xuanzong hated women. He was scarred from youth due to struggles to the death with women smarter than himself. The last of these was with his co-conspirator, Princess Tai Ping, who was graciously allowed to commit suicide five years after the coup of July 21-22, 710. Due in part to these troubles, he had a tendency to favour macho He-Man-Looking military men for appointments to key commands. In the USA this would raise homophobic suspicion today. The early eighth century was an age when brawn counted for something. An Lushan was a hunk. The logic went, Lady Yang liked sex, surprise, surprise. It followed that There Was Something Between Them. So Xuanzong became the stereotype of the old fool who fell for a beautiful woman who ran around on him behind his back. When society is blowing up, all sorts of imaginary beings, supernatural entities, and casual meetings on the street are Seen and Interpreted and given imputed meaning. It was an argument over Who Lost China among Chinese, where the understanding of what was available to win or lose was dim. This is *typical* of revolutionary situations. To his Turkish and Iranian subjects, in the capital as well as Central Asia, Xuanzong was a Chinese. To the mass of Chinese, he increasingly became a Turk. *Nobody knew it at the time*, but what happened in the uprising of December 11, 755 was Phase One of which Phase Two was the peasant war led by Huang Zhao: a social revolution. The pedigreed aristocracy was increasingly hated as (1) foreign, ie, of Barbarian ancestry. This was proven by (2) their mounted lifestyle, and (3) their women, whose habits were distinctly unChinese. They were distinctive personalities, often of political importance. They rode horses. They had big feet, which their menfolk prized, as it was conducive to staying on a horse. Stories were told of how a Noble Lady would borrow her husband's boots when she rode his horse. Noble Ladies played polo, a game imported from Persia, and are portrayed in tomb sculptures playing it on horseback, of course. This to Chinese smacked of Turkish, or even Mongol women, who were as tough as their men. All sorts of stories were told about Court sex scandals, some of them true. There were alleged to be Daoist orders of monks and nuns devoted to practices of perpetual sexual intercourse. Better documented is the extraction by Daoist alchemists of human sex hormones from urine. Practices of Courtly Love developed and spread to Japan, where texts which disappeared in China itself in Phase Two of the revolution were preserved. The social revolution which exterminated the aristocracy as a class was also a revolution *against* women and *for* prudery. One of its consequences was footbinding, which spread as a customary practice during the Five Dynasties (907-960). If you do not maintain a sense of the bizarre, you will not, cannot understand history. There is no such thing possible as a rational class society, so there cannot be such a thing as a rational revolutionary practice against class society *without great compromise*. Most societies have had at most one social revolution sometime in their past, and that is more than enough, thank you. There was *the* Russian or *the* French Revolution. The Chinese have had four society-wide social revolutions, and at least one or two more in North or South China during political division. One argument against this is, there was more historical time in China. But there was even more in Egypt. For Egypt, we have exactly one, in 968, made by Isma'ili Islam. Which, by the way, gave Egypt the best and most honest government it ever had, and was, moreover, the longest-lasting political regime ever established by a vanguard revolutionary party run along lines not dissimilar to Leninism. Wagar is right about one thing. The capitalist world-system will all go together at once. The nation-state is no longer a viable unit for social revoution, or social revolution will take some new form, possibly one which is Not Nice. Nobody now can say for sure what politics is, and even less may be said about what politics is going to be. You wish to Get Through The Day, then you wish to be deluded. Ideology works like this. Consider that, for the Cold War Period there were two motors of the USA economy. One of these was selling houses on thirty-year mortgages, along with automobiles on credit to get from the mortgaged house to the place of employment requisite to pay the consumer debt off, for where the US state may go indefinitely into debt, for the consumer, every mindless bit of work must be done till the last senseless bill is paid. the second is making thermonuclear weapons and all the other war toys that help to make thermo- nuclear weapons meaningful as well as the national security apparatus whereto they have most meaning. From this it follows that, if a politico-military crisis sufficiently grave would remind the masses of the existence of the nuclear weapons, this would call into serious question the continued existence of social life as we know it for another thirty years, hence render problematic the reproduction of the consumer sector. When such a crisis transpired in 1962, the theory predicts that there would have to be a Peace Offensive forthwith to sustain the fantasy that there would be another thirty years. As it happened, President Kennedy did launch such a Peace Offensive, while as we know he was waging the Vietnam war. My suspicion is, that if the conditional probabilities of thermonuclear war were aggregated in the mathematically appropriate way, it can be shown that, probabilistically, we are likelier all dead than Elsewise; so we should congratulate ourselves on our good fortune. But the point is, that ideologically, we cannot have thriven in the suboptimal, deplorable way that we have *without systematically unknowing what exists*. This will always occur in societies with class, gender, and race hierarchies; and the nastiest data may not come down to us. For instance, on what kinds of fantasies did the comfortably-off Roman get off? It might explain a lot. As it happens, a statue now in the Louvre was dug up in North Africa. It shows a woman naked except for brief panties mounted upright on a bull while a leopard tears her face off. Behind a shield, an executioner crouches, prepared to make the final kill, of the woman, when even he gets disgusted. It was thanks to the kind of conscious- ness that got aroused by fantasies like this that St Augustine formulated the Docrine of Free Will in the form that got it off the ground, but that's another story. If I thought social life were inevitably as disgusting as I tell you it is, I wouldn't bother telling you. But it is. So, therefore, let the bizarre be the System Default for the interpretation of past, ie, historical, societies/world systems. And why should this be the exception. Daniel A. Foss From B.K.Gills@newcastle.ac.uk Thu Sep 12 09:56:02 1996 From: "Barry Gills" To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK , U17043@UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU Date: Thu, 12 Sep 1996 16:55:38 GMT0BST Subject: Re: curious fact wishing to meet compatible facts for meaning Dear Daniel, What I find extremely interesting about your facts is the implicit way in which you refer to Eurasian sequentialisation of events in a way that implies a systemic relationship across Eurasia. Secondly, I like your emphasis on underlying economic motives whether they be conquest of new tax areas or the simultaneous control of land and sea long distance trade routes after political unification in China. This sort of question has a long history going back to F. Teggart of course, but your ideas on disease are interesting as a factor influencing the demise of the first Byzantine empire and Sassanid Persia. Presumably it was not just manpower/labour shortage that ensued from a disease calamity demographically speaking, but we might assume that this was accompanied by very serious economic weakening, perhaps especially in the urban economy. In this framework, the rise of Islam can be understood within the context of a more general economic crisis, in which the disease/demographic element is part and perhaps more symptomatic than causal? In any event, I would add that the sophistication of state formation among the Franks was fairly primitive compared to what took place in the major states eastwards in Eurasia, so I agree that the achievements of the Carolingians are too often distorted. As you note, the more central action took place with the quick consolidation of the Arab empire/caliphate and the Tang consolidation in East and Central Asia- followed by their subsequent clash in CEntral Asia, Talas, etc. To this backdrop, events in Western Farnkish Europe were a mere side show, though not, as before, entirely isolated from Eurasian wide rhythms , something Frank and I have tried to point out, among others. As a final note, I hope you have corresponded with W.H. McNeill in Colebrook Connecticutt on these ideas about disease and the issue of "ascent and decline" on a Eurasian scale. He is quite active. HOpe this reply was of interest. I am currently working on a book which includes modeling the historical development of the world economic system. I hope we communicate in the future. Yours, B. K. Gills Newcastle University UK From U17043@UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU Fri Sep 13 00:59:31 1996 Date: Fri, 13 Sep 96 00:02:29 CDT From: "Daniel A. Foss" Subject: specifying the beckwith thesis and what's wrong with it To: World Systems Network Dear Barry, In a 1992 postscript of epic sweep and grandeur to his 1987 The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia, Christopher I. Beckwith is at pains to compare the Carolingians favourably with other civilizations. But we know that the Carolingian emergent-core-area around Aachen was a new-ish Growth Area, only beginning to get the technical development necessary to put it into full production as "Champion" agriculture, the three-field system, heavy plow, horse collar, watermills, and other characteristic elements of the Mediaeval technical complex. To make the Carolingians look relatively good, Beckwith makes the Byzantines look relatively bad. He tells us that the Byzantines were, during the seventh and eighth centuries, an economic backwater. That the new trade routes went *around* the Byzantine empire, as if this was an economic no-go zone, of little profitable prospect. Beckwith makes no mention of disease and relative population changes. Remarkably few people do, actually. I cannot, for this reason, recall where, it must have been years ago, I first (and last) read that the Plague of Justinian spread everywhere in the Eurasian landmass "except East Asia." I recall the words "except East Asia" very vividly, however. One of the minority of historians who do mention the aftereffects of the Bubonic Plague is Warren Treadgold, who dates, in his book title, The Byzantine Revival: 780-843. This is, actually, later than the period Beckwith finds most interesting, that is, seventh and eighth centuries; but Treadgold says that the demographic effect of Plague recurrences was such as to preclude politico-military resurgence before those dates. Beckwith is important because he specifically mentions that his work was of interest, between 1987 and 1992, to "the world systems historians," specifically mentioning Andre Gunder Frank, The Centrality of Central Asia. What, therefore, is Beckwith trying to do, and are we getting out of his book what we should? In my opinion, he is trying to make the Turkish expansion of the sixth century analogous to the Mongol expansion of the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries. This makes him disposed to see a spread of development, at a very high level, all along the immense swath of territory into which people speaking Turkic and related languages spread, and to contiguous regions. These regions include the Tibetans and Iranians of central Asia. (I have already mentioned, but failed to cite Beckwith as my source, two generals of the Tang dynasty in China who were offspring of mixed Iranian [Sogdian] and Turkish marriages.) Narrowing this still-vast subject matter down, Beckwith concentrates on the Tibetan empire of the seventh and eighth centuries. Which he finds remarkably advanced technically, producing iron chain-mail armour and suspension bridges, for example, superior to those of the Chinese. (Though the Chinese may not have admired the Tibetan chain mail armour because they used plate armour and mass- produced cast-iron, the latter trick the Europeans were still very far from turning.) Is there some reason not considered by Beckwith why the trade routes out of Asia might have avoided or gone around the rump Byzantine Empire? What about, say, the fact that, thanks to a commercial espionage expedition sent by Justinian, in or about the year 555, to either Sri Lanka or Central Asia, the stories vary, the Byzantines had obtained silkworm eggs, consequently were the only state outside China which had its own domestic silk industry at this time. What is silk? A sideline industry of East Asian peasants, whereby, for about 3,000 years, women fed silkworm larvae mulberry-tree leaves. The larvae pupate, and the material of the cocoons is unwound by these same women into fibers. This is raw silk. It is tedious, tiresome, labour- intensive work. The direct producers of raw silk almost never wear finished silk. They wear hemp, or marijuana. There is a bronze-age Chinese character meaning both "textile" and "crazy" or "stoned." As did European peasants, Near Eastern peasants (sackcloth, as with ashes), and wherever. By the time of the Plague of Justinian, silk had been the principal export, for hundreds of years, of China, in the year 542 divided into three states, Eastern Wei, Western Wei, and Liang in the Yangzi valley to Sichuan and points south to Vietnam. Anyone predicting imminent unification of China in 542 would have been as crazy as anyone denying the prospect of Justinian's unifying the disparately governed territories formerly under the sway of a single state. The census records of the Han dynasty give us a population of about sixty million. The Roman empire we can estimate at about sixty million. Then came the smallpox-measles pandemics of the second and third centuries, which rendered, for example, the western part of the Roman Empire, in the crudest possible terms, too sparse to make money for the state and support urban life for the ruling elite. The elite either had to ruralize, by fortifying itself in the countryside, recruiting its private gangs of nasties and bullyboys, and collect small incomes in bits and pieces over huge properties, or go out of business where there was just to much *agres vacantes* to make money out of. These conditions were not as severe in the previously more densely populated eastern part of the Roman Empire, which henceforth recovers farthest and fastest. In China, where I am on less sure ground, I believe the Northwest was more like the west of the Roman Empire, and the eastern part of North China may have been more like the east of the Roman Empire, in terms of elite exploitation patterns, but the crisis was as severe at one end of Eurasia as it was at the other. By the earlier part of the Tang dynasty, the population was still between fifty and sixty millions. Meanwhile, Europe had taken it on the chin from the Plague of Justinian, so the population was even lower; and here even guesswork fails me. We should recognize why the seventh century is the worst in terms of written documentation of any century since Classical Antiquity. There were fewer people. There was generalised labour shortage. Now, back to those women feeding mulberry-tree leaves to silkworm larvae. When the ultimate consumers dwindle in numbers and purchasing power, can they adjust for diminution in the income formerly paid them in the form of pieces of copper by a merchant penetrating the back areas on behalf of a chain of purchasers ultimately leading to the export route? Yes, they can feed more mulberry leaves to more silkworm larvae; or ultimately, they may find some other sideline. The latter is likelier if the landlord forces them to than if there is no landlord or the landlord does not. This is what is happening. Ultimately, very ultimately, the prospects, possibilities, and profits of commerce react back upon the sort of elite which will dominate society politically, culturally, and militarily, as well of course as economically. Does society come to be morally and mentally dominated by pedigreed bluebloods, thuggish warlords, or refined gentlemen who have studied all sorts of irrelevant matter for years in order to become the sort of scholars entitled to become magistrates. Making precise connection between peasant women feeding silkworms and why China "went supernova," exhibiting an orgy of militarism even by comparison with the Han era in the past or the Song to come, is difficult if not impossible. We don't know how determined *everything* is, that is to say, by something. Even testosterone explains a little bit, for example. Empress Wu had a more sensible foreign policy than did Taizong or Xuanzong, before and after. Personality explains a little bit. But it still takes imagination, which must often be dead wrong, to get beyond such things. Once we have identified a privileged class of bluebloods, what about these are causes and what are effects? Recall Shakespeare's line, in Macbeth, about the executed Thane of Cawdor: "Nothing about his life became him as did leaving it." Then recall the Princess An Lo, calmly sitting before her mirror in Chang'an, painting the huge mothwing-shaped eyebrows which were the fashion in the early eighth century, until she was beheaded. When your time is up, get killed with style and grace, without making any trouble. Which is deemed to have excused all manner of featherbrained living before that. And if the privileged class does not have privileges, what's the sense of having a privileged class. Why does this happen, as it is obviously not necessary. Tang dynasty China was a place where it happened, and had been happening for centuries, when competent government was not possible. In the Tang period, it was possible but not permitted. A revolution took place against that sort of thing, replacing hereditary privilege with hereditary transmission of property mediated by holding of magistracies by competitive examinations, abetting the accumulation of hereditary property. Why did China have the sort of government it did when it did, and who knew what choices there were? How direct an influence, if any, on this is the profitability of international trade? The Tang system was spectacularly bad. Xuanzong, in prorated terms, wasted the time of more people on more idiotic public rituals than any Chinese ruler before Mao Zedong. While raising very large armies with very little results, in relative terms, to show for it: The pattern of Tang warfare was slow but steady gains at terrible cost, against outnumbered enemies. At times, the gains were faster than at others; but winning streaks were followed by losing streaks. Xuanzong lost everything he himself *and his predecessors* had won. One of the principal legitimating devices of privileged bluebloods is service as military officers. The Tang version were so poor at this that the antimilitarist reaction associated with the destruction of the bluebloods ensured the Song regime (960-1279, with North China lost in 1126) could not defend the country. Or am I making something out of nothing, as this is what I am on principle always trying to do. Daniel A. Foss From thall@DEPAUW.EDU Fri Sep 13 09:39:45 1996 13 Sep 1996 10:39:36 -0500 (EST) Date: Fri, 13 Sep 1996 10:39:36 -0500 (EST) From: "Thomas D. [Tom] Hall, THALL@DEPAUW.EDU" Subject: new book To: Network World-Systems I received this announcement as response to posting TOC [table of contents of JWSR 2 to several worldhistory lists]. Turn about is fair play. NEW BOOK ANNOUNCEMENT Graeme Donald Snooks 'THE DYNAMIC SOCIETY. Exploring the Sources of Global Change' Routledge, London and New York, 1996, pp. xvii + 491. Dynamic Society explores the driving force of global change over the past 2 million years. It is divided into three parts: - Part 1 - outlines and explains the entire history of life on earth, by developing a fully dynamic model, not just of genetic change, but of the broader wave-like fluctuations of biological activity. Central to this is the dynamic role of the individual operating in a competitive environment. - Part II - provides a critical review of current interpretations about the course of history and the forces driving it. - Part III - develops an entirely new interpretation of the dynamics of human society over the past 2 million years. It analyses how individuals in a competitive environment generate growth by investing in the dynamic strategies of family multiplication, conquest, commerce, and technological change. It argues that the rise and fall of societies is an outcome of the development and exhaustion of these strategies. The author also employs his dynamic-strategy model to discuss future outcomes for human society, controversially arguing that far from leading to ecological destruction, growth-inducing technological change is both necessary and liberating. Ultimately, the book demonstrates that dynamism, not stasis, is the essential condition of human society, as it is of life. Douglass C. North, Nobel Laureate in Economics, has written of this book: 'Professor Snooks has undertaken as ambitious a project as one could possibly conceive of . . . it is a stimulating work, and one which shows an immense amount of reading, and an organization of the material into an interesting and highly speculative, but fascinating structure.' G.D. Snooks Coghlan Professor and Head Phone: 61 6 2493226 Department of Economic History Fax: 61 6 2490395 Research School of Social Sciences Institute of Advanced Studies Australian National University Canberra ACT 0200 From U17043@UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU Fri Sep 13 19:02:41 1996 Date: Fri, 13 Sep 96 19:45:06 CDT From: "Daniel A. Foss" Subject: balkan slav states and disease To: World Systems Network Dear Barry, Forgot to mention yesterday that the "demographic sink" notion bears not only on the rise of Islam but on that of the Slav states in the Early Mediaeval Balkans. The Bubonic Plague killed a larger portion of the population in regions which were warm and moist climatically, or were fairly highly urbanized, than it did peoples in hot and dry, or colder, climates and which were comparatively sparsely urbanized. As populations decline, relatively, behind Byzantine frontiers and state resources become incommensurate with defending them, "Barbarian Invasion" threats tend to build up. As they had during and after the smallpox-measles pandemics. One solution to the problem, in theory, is to admit migrants to compensate for labour depletion. Which is always tricky; ask Emperor Valens (d. 378) about that. Of course, he was a fool whose regime was suicidally crooked. But the same was true of other rulers who admitted Germans and Slavs, and had no means to keep mobile Saracens out. The problem becomes hopeless when even a competent political regime cannot defend all its frontiers with the available resources. This is what happened to Emperor Maurice (580-602), who was finally killed by his own weary troops. Enemies which cannot be defeated permanently because they lack cohesive state structures induce "political fatigue" in armies which are coup-prone, anyway. By the time the Persians invaded, during the "superpower showdown" after 602, and especially after about 615, the Balkans had been already overrun. Sincerely, Daniel A. Foss From rkmoore@iol.ie Sat Sep 14 03:58:27 1996 Sat, 14 Sep 1996 10:57:56 +0100 (BST) Date: Sat, 14 Sep 1996 10:57:56 +0100 (BST) To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Re: new book 9/13/96, Thomas D. [Tom] Hall, THALL@DEPAUW.EDU wrote: >The author also employs his dynamic-strategy model to discuss future >outcomes for human society, controversially arguing that far from leading >to ecological destruction, growth-inducing technological change is both >necessary and liberating. Ye Gods! Yet another neoliberal-funded revisionist propaganda piece. Does genuine research exist anywhere anymore?? -rkm From rkmoore@iol.ie Sat Sep 14 06:47:14 1996 Sat, 14 Sep 1996 13:46:36 +0100 (BST) Date: Sat, 14 Sep 1996 13:46:36 +0100 (BST) To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Re: disease & evolution 9/14/96, Daniel A. Foss wrote: >The Bubonic Plague killed a larger portion >of the population in regions which were warm and moist climatically, >or were fairly highly urbanized, than it did peoples in hot and dry, >or colder, climates In evolution, stress (such as an ice-age) is known to accelerate speciation -- genetic adaptation to harsh conditions and new niche opportunities. That might suggest that those regions more affected by plague might experience acclerated social evolution. Is there any evidence for such? Curious, rkm From U17043@UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU Sun Sep 15 18:22:44 1996 Date: Sun, 15 Sep 96 19:11:15 CDT From: "Daniel A. Foss" Subject: epidemics and social change To: World Systems Network Robert K. Moore wondered whether epidemics speed up "social evolution," whatever that is. Actually, there is no general answer. Epidemics always create short-term labour shortages. The condition of the direct producers may improve along with their bargaining position; or it may deteriorate due to enserfment. Society and economy may stagnate due to too few people to do essential work, or defend against external invaders. What's more, you need to specify the pre-existing social conditions in order to understand how the epidemic impacted. When the Bubonic Plague hit both Europe and China in the fourteenth century, it had the effect of speeding up change in Europe, but slowing it down in China. This is a very complex problem which I tried to discuss on this list about two or three years ago. Daniel A. Foss From chriscd@jhu.edu Mon Sep 16 11:47:24 1996 16 Sep 1996 13:43:11 -0400 (EDT) 16 Sep 1996 13:41:53 -0400 (EDT) Date: Mon, 16 Sep 1996 13:44:15 -0700 From: chris chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: Exam Copies] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Organization: Sociology, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD.21218 USA Sat, 14 Sep 1996 03:00:40 -0400 (EDT) Sat, 14 Sep 1996 03:00:35 -0400 (EDT) 14 Sep 1996 01:56:03 -0500 (CDT) by mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu (8.7.5/8.7.3/mcfeeley.mc-1.16) 14 Sep 1996 01:46:06 -0500 (CDT) ; Fri, 13 Sep 1996 23:41:48 -0700 (PDT) ; Fri, 13 Sep 1996 23:38:44 -0700 (PDT) Date: Sat, 14 Sep 1996 02:38:44 -0400 From: mreview@igc.apc.org Subject: Exam Copies Sender: owner-lasnet@mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu To: lasnet@mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu Reply-to: mreview@igc.apc.org Dear Educator: Monthly Review Press has a new title that we think you will find of interest. Exam copies are available. Please contact Renee Pendergrass at mreview@igc.apc.org, Monthly Review Press,=20 122 West 27th Street, New York, NY 10001, Tel: 1-800-670-9499,=20 Fax: (212) 727-3676. GREEN GUERRILLAS Environmental Conflicts and Initiatives in Latin America=20 and the Caribbean, A Reader edited by Helen Collinson "This remarkable collection is just what we needed.=20 Its diverse viewpoints share a respect for the rich=20 complexity of the social/natural environment and a=20 willingness to challenge received wisdom." =20 --Richard Levins, Professor of Population Sciences,=20 Harvard School of Public Health Green Guerrillas brings together leading environmental writers on both sides of the Atlantic to highlight the many imaginative and sustainable grassroots alternatives and the extent to which they are influencing state and corporate policies in Latin America. Vivid reports profiling community initiatives--from a Salvadoran coffee coop fighting for a forest threatened by a deluxe housing development to an innovative plan implemented in Brazil to reduce traffic congestion and pollution--make this wide-ranging anthology an authoritative volume on the continent's environmental movement. Helen Collinson is an editor at the Latin America Bureau in London. She is editor of, and contributor to, Women and Revolution in Nicaragua (Zed Books, 1990) and the author of Death on Delivery: The Impact of the Arms Trade on the Third World (CAAT, 1989).=20 A Latin America Bureau book distributed by Monthly Review Press 0-85345-980-0 paper/$19.00/244 pp. environment/development/Latin America CONTENTS 1. THE CRISIS AND THE MOVEMENT: CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVES The Growing Ecological Crisis in Latin America, Elizabeth Dore Social Pressure for Environmental Reform in Latin America, David Kaimovitz 2. INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES AND THEIR ENVIRONMENTS Native Peoples and Sustainable Development, Al Gedicks The Land of Our Ancestors' Bones: Wich=A1 Peoples' Struggle in the Argentine Chaco, Aidan Rankin Unravelling the Pristine Myth, Elizabeth Dore Debating "Indigenous" Agricultural Development: Indian Organizations in the Central Andes of Ecuador, Anthony Bebbington Oil, Lawlessness, and Indigenous Struggles in Ecuador's Oriente,Judith Kimerling Colombia's Plan Pac=A1fico: Indigenous and Afro-Colombian Communities Challenge the Developers, Lucy Alexander=20 3. FIGHT FOR THE FOREST Amazonian Indians and Peasants: Coping in the Age of Development, Stephen Nugent Did Chico Mendes Die in Vain? Brazilian Rubber Tappers in the 1990s, Anthony Hall Fruit Farming in the Brazilian Amazon: A Sustainable Alternative, Catherine Matheson Pioneer Women and the Destruction of the Rainforests, Janet Townsend Can Ecotourism Save Ecuador's Cloud Forests? James Fair 4. MODERNIZATION: ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS AND POPULAR RESPONSES=20 New Harvests, Old Problems: The Challenges Facing Latin America's Agro-export Boom, Lori Ann Thrupp The Price of a Perfect Flower: Environmental Destruction and Health Hazards in the Colombian Flower Industry, Sarah Stewart David vs. Goliath: Fishermen Conflicts with Mariculturalists in Honduras, Denise Stanley Confronting Haiti's Environmental Crisis: A Tale of Two Visions, Charles Arthur The Greening of Cuba, Peter Rosset Puerto Rico's Energy Fix, Marianne Meyn Green Crime, Green Redemption: The Environment and Ecotourism in the Caribbean, Polly Pattullo Where Will All the Garbage Go?: Tourism, Politics, and the Environment in Barbados, Hilary McD. Beckles 5. URBAN ECOWARRIORS: CONFLICTS AND INITIATIVES IN LATIN AMERICAN CITIES Enlightened Cities: The Urban Environment in Latin America, Julio D.=A0vila San Salvador: The City Versus the Forest, Nick Caistor Colombia's Independent Recyclers' Union: A Model for Urban Waste Management, Margarita Pacheco Santo Domingo: An Alternative City Plan, Jorge Cela Curitiba: Towards Sustainable Urban Development, Jonas Rabinovitch From chriscd@jhu.edu Mon Sep 16 14:54:53 1996 16 Sep 1996 13:49:14 -0400 (EDT) 16 Sep 1996 13:48:08 -0400 (EDT) Date: Mon, 16 Sep 1996 13:50:30 -0700 From: chris chase-dunn Subject: Gunder Frank on Lauren Benton To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Organization: Sociology, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD.21218 USA chriscd@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu; Sun, 15 Sep 1996 13:12:27 -0400 (EDT) chriscd@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu; Sun, 15 Sep 1996 13:12:26 -0400 (EDT) Date: Sun, 15 Sep 1996 13:11:20 -0400 From: "A. Gunder Frank" Subject: Benton comment (fwd) To: Chris Chase-Dunn Any comment? YOU all also appear in Benton's "review"!! g/ ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 15 Sep 1996 12:51:51 -0400 (EDT) From: FRANK@husc3.harvard.edu To: agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Subject: Benton comment Alas, the recent invitation on this net to discuss Lauren Benton's interesting article in THE JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY 7,2,fall 1996 on "From World-Systems Perspective to Institutional World History" has had no takers, perhaps because everybody is busy starting a new school year. Alas, I am not so busy. So after waiting a prudent time for someone else to start a debate, I reluctantly do so myself, because I regard Benton's challenge as important if only because it seems designed to head us in the WRONG direction. Alas! Benton usefully reviews world system theory [WST], its critiques, and its extensions/modifications, before presenting Benton's alternative "institutionalist" theory-of-the-middle-range, as counselled long ago by Merton. Four previous "alternative" modification/extension are considered and rejected. Their partisans of may wish to rise to defend the other three. I rise to the defense of the fourth, which Benton attributes to me and rejects on grounds that are not well defended by Benton, if the are not altogether indefensible. The fourth variant considered by Benton "has been to broaden the historical range of application of the world-systems perspective .... [as] argued by Frank" [p.272]. Benton first rejects this as "of course ... flawed ... [because it] produces such a stripped- down version of WST that the power and originality of the perspective is lost" [273]. I don't know if the "originality" is lost, since I have been working within this perspective and publishing with this terminology since the mid 1960s. But I do know that its power, far from being lost, is quantitatively deepened and broadened, indeed qualitatively transformed. That is demonstrably so both where the "broadened...stripped-down version" subtracts some alleged power from the "original" and where and how the scope and therefore the real power of the latter is significantly increased. Indeed far from being a loss, it is an all to the good gain to strip the original procrustean bed of some of its "comforts" by broadening it. An important case in point is already exemplified by the alleged core-periphery structure Benton mentions and its alleged relation to hegemony/rivalry. For both the [incidentally different! ] political ECONOMIC hegemonies "identified" by Braudel and Wallerstein and the POLITICAL economic ones that have been prominent in the international relations literature are no more than optical illusions. They are the result precisely of a [lack of world] perspective that confines the "World-System" to a procrustean one that allegedly originated and centered in the European "core," from which first Portugal and then the Netherlands allegedly exercised "world hegemony." But these little countries were geographically and structurally located at the very margin of the real world economy and system and of course lacked even the slightest power to impose any "hegemony" whatsoever on Mughal India and much less on Ming/Qing China, or even on "Dutch" Southeast Asia or on Safavid and Ottoman West Asia. Each of these individually and a fortiori all of them collectively were very much more in the "core" of the world economy than any part of Europe or even all of Europe put together [which it was NOT, since it only contained rivals that bickered among each other]. So contrary to Benton, to divest ourselves of these illusory notions about Europe and its world "system" can only be a GAIN for real world history and a loss at BEST for the Eurocentrism that we need to divest ourselves of anyway. The positive gain from a "broader perspective" can also be easily demonstrated by citing Benton further on in the same paragraph: "the search for continuity [and further down] ... a single world system with characteristics so broad that one would be hard pressed not to find them ... distracts from an understanding of real historical change, even fundamental change in economic organization and productive capacity" [273]. Alas for Benton but fortunately for historiography and social theory, the very opposite is true: Extending the European based "world-system" [with a hyphen] to a global REAL WORLD system [without a hyphen] permits us to see that two centuries of Eurocentric historiography and social theory have been [based on] no more than ethnocentric ideological myths. These myths about "The Rise of the West" in and out of Europe and its alleged "exceptionalism" were recently denounced as a COLONIZERS MODEL by Jim Blaut. A "single world system" perspective permits us to see instead the predominance of ASIA and especially of China and India in the world economy until at least 1800, while Europe [and its "world-economy"!] remained entirely marginal in the REAL WORLD economy. Additionally moreover, study of this single world economy is NECESSARY if not sufficient for any REAL "understanding of real historical change," which took place IN and because of the WORLD economy, and not primarily or even simply in Europe. Indeed, "even the fundamental change in economic organization and productive capacity" that Benton wants to understand can be understood ONLY as a function of the structure and development of this SINGLE WORLD ECONOMY -- and not of or in Europe! - both in Asia before 1750 and in Europe after that. My forthcoming book on the global economy 1400-1800 analyses [at least some ways] HOW this was the case. I will not try here to reproduce the substantive argument of a whole book. However, I do insist on some revealing theoretical and empirical/historiographic implications, for they are the exact opposite of those claimed by Benton: "The search for continuity [in] a single world system" reveals NOT "characteristics so broad that one would be hard pressed not to find them," but precisely the characteristics in the system as a whole that generate "the fundamental change in economic organization and productive capacity" in the world economy. Yet the real world economic reasons for and even evidence of these changes seems to have escaped the attention of Marx, Weber, Tawney, Toynbee, Polanyi, Braudel, and Wallerstein, and their many disciples, not to mention almost all historians and especially all economic historians, as well as apparently still of Benton. They all look for their watch under the European/centric streetlight [or alternatively an "institutional" lantern somewhere in Asia], when the only way to "find" it is to look at the whole world economy/ system and especially in its Asian parts, with the illumination of a "perspective" that Benton rejects as "of course flawed." Well, it may well be flawed. However, the world system approach is vastly more illuminating than any "institutionalist" ALTERNATIVE. Granted that some "institutionalism" can be locally illuminating as a COMPLEMENT to WST. However, as an ALTERNATIVE to WST the "institutionalism" can only OBSCURE what happened. How so? Benton rightly observes that "the institutional approach does not offer an alternative to supplant world-systems analysis in part because it is not truly a global perspective" [278]. Quite so. For notwithstanding the Eurocentrist analysis of institutions by economic Nobel prize laureate Douglass North, Steve Stern and others cited in support by Benton, all the examples of institutional forms and their function and adaptation are due far more to GLOBAL relations than to any of the local "cultural" factors cited by these authors and Benton. However contrary to Benton, there was NOT "a global institutional matrix controlled by Europe while institutional ties to Asia would be much thinner." For a Europe that remained entirely marginal in and to the world economy was unable to control anything in the world before 1800. Even the plantation and other institutions mentioned by Benton that Europe forged in the Americas were a function of Europe's subordinate place and role in the world economy, in which several parts of Asia remained far more dominant than Europe. Indeed, Europe's American enterprise was after all itself an attempt to buy itself into the vastly bigger and more attractive Asian market. And only its supply of American money permitted Europe to become even a bit player in the world economy and market dominated by Asia. The NOT sufficiently global perspective of Benton, not to mention those of the cited Eurocentric "authorities," itself prevents them from "finding" the whole real or real whole world sources of what they see in any part thereof. We may agree with Benton's reservation that "institutional analysis has proven far more productive for complex regional and subnational analysis than for global analysis" [278]. Of course. But the real point is that regional or [sub]national institutional analysis that is not complementary to and embedded in global analysis can NOT even understand the regional institutions it "analyzes." For the whole [world system] is not only more than the sum of its [regional/national/sectoral] parts. The whole also shapes its parts and generates both similarities and differences among them. Therefore, no "institutional analysis" alone in or of any part -- and certainly not of a minor European part -- can possibly account for or understand even its own [partial] history or of any "fundamental change" therein. ONLY world history can do that. Yet the entire globus of "institutional analysis" of the "Rise of the West" and of "capitalism" in Europe by Marx, Weber, and still by Braudel and Wallerstein and all their followers is ample proof of how their and still most of our historiography and social theory is vitiated by the original sin of Eurocentrism. It still blinds us to the globalism we need to recognize [institutional and cultural] diversity in unity and unity in diversity. Yet even some European historians recognized as much. Not for nothing did Herodotus write that history is marked by alternating movements across the IMAGINARY line that separates "East" from West in Eurasia. Or more recently as Marc Bloch still recognized, "il n'y a pas d'histoire de l'Europe, il y a une histoire du MONDE!" And many remember Leopold von Ranke's plea for writing history "wie es eigentlich gewesen ist" but like to forget that he also said that what REALLY was so is that "there is no history but UNIVERSAL history." From andrei@rsuh.ru Tue Sep 17 06:30:17 1996 From: "Korotaev A." Organization: rsuh To: wsn@CSF.COLORADO.EDU Date: Tue, 17 Sep 1996 16:30:21 +0300 Subject: 1/Foss, Gills and the 6th century AD World System crisis Reply-to: andrei@rsuh.ru FOSS, GILLS AND THE 6TH CENTURY AD WORLD SYSTEM CRISIS Daniel Foss and Barry Gills have drawn recently our attention to the 6th century AD World System crisis and the role of epidimics in it. I agree with Daniel that the role of epidimics seems to have been extremely important here, but I am afraid that this is rather a secondary (notwithstanding all its importance) factor, though I would look for at least one of its primary causes not quite in the same direction as Barry does. Naturally, I would start with South Arabia. Part 1. SOUTH ARABIAN PUZZLE I was for many years a bit puzzled by a strangely quick collapse of the South Arabian Empire of the Kings of Saba and dhu:-Rayda:n and Hadramawt and Yamanat and Their Arabs in the Highland and the Coastal Plain in the second half of the 6th century AD. Yes, at the beginning of this century South Arabia experienced a series of rather turbulent events: dhu:-Nuwa:s coup, violent persecutions of the Christians, Ethiopian invasions and conquest, rebellion (successful) of the Ethiopian soldiers deployed in Yemen, their leader (Abraha) getting the royal power &c. Then, however, under Abrahas rule the Empire seems to have stabilized and achieved reasonable florescence by the end of the 40s: Abraha managed to organize the successful repairs of the famous Ma:rib Damm (`Rmn), campaigns to Central and Northern Arabia &c. And then in the second half of the Century the Empire simply collapses without any apparent reason. The study of this collapse is further complicated by the fact that the catastrophe appears to have been so profound that the written texts seem to have stopped to be produced in South Arabia - since the 7th decade of the 6th century (this decade including) we have no authentic dated South Arabian texts up to the Islamic Age - which stands in a sharp contrast with the comparatively well documented first 5 decades of the Century. The collapse seems to have been so profound that when in the 70s Khusraw [I] Parwe:z reluctantly sent (as a sort of punishment) a few hundred convicted criminals to conquer Yemen (considering this such an adventure that it would be wiser not to risk with the proper troops), they (the convicted criminals) did manage to conquer it. Of course, this has something to do with the 6th century AD World System crisis. But in which way? I think I know the answer. But, as I have to go to the classes now I shall give it in my next posting. Yet before this I would be glad to get to know any suggestions of the others. Yours, (Dr) Andrey Korotayev, Senior Research Fellow Oriental Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Sector of Theoretical Problems of Oriental History) 12 Rozhdesrvenka, Moscow 103753, RUSSIA Fax: (7) (095) 975 2396; E-MAIL: andrei@rsuh.ru From rross@vax.clarku.edu Tue Sep 17 14:31:38 1996 Tue, 17 Sep 1996 16:29:21 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 17 Sep 1996 16:29:45 -0400 From: "Robert J.S. Bob Ross" Subject: A LIST TO GET OFF OF To: Steve Levenson <" levenson"@ns1.psa.net>, Rachel Ross , lawyerlen@aol.com, Mijllab@aol.com, Harry Grill , Gabriel Ross , "Daniel D. Derezinski" <102766.420@CompuServe.COM>, Charlie Crabb , "Apfel, Jeff" , psn@csf.colorado.edu, wsn@csf.colorado.edu Organization: Prof. and Chair of Sociology, Clark University > >Your name, social security number, current address, previous addresses, >mother's maiden name, birth date and other personal information are now >available to anyone with a credit card through a new Lexis database called >P-Trax. As I am sure you are aware, this information could be used to commit >credit card fraud or otherwise allow someone else to use your identity. > >You can have your name and information removed from this list by making a >telephone request. Call (800)543-6862, select option 4 and then option 3 >("all other questions") and tell the representative answering that you wish >to remove your name from the P-trax database. You must also send a fax to >(513) 865-7360 (or 513-865-1930), or physical mail to LEXIS-NEXIS / Attn: >P-trax/ P.O. Box 933 / Dayton, Ohio 45401-0933. Sending physical mail to >confirm your name has been removed is always a good idea. > >As word of the existence of this database has spread on the net, Lexis-Nexis >has been inundated with calls, and has set up a special set of operators to >handle the volume. In addition, Andrew Bleh (rhymes with "Play") is a manager >responsible for this product, and is the person to whom complaints about the >service could be directed. He can be reached at the above 800 number. Ask for >extension 3385. According to Lexis, the manager responsible is Bill Fister at >extension 1364. > >I called this morning and had my name removed. The representative will need >your name and social security number to remove you from the list. I suggest >that we inundate these people with requests to remove our info from the list >and forward this e-mail to everyone we know. >Terry Allen, editor, CAQ >1500 Massachusetts Ave #732 >Washington, DC 20005 >202-331-9763 voice >202-331-9751 fax >web page: www.mediafilter.org/caq > > From mjhudson@cc.okayama-u.ac.jp Wed Sep 18 04:13:27 1996 Date: Wed, 18 Sep 1996 18:26:01 +0900 To: WSN@csf.colorado.edu From: mjhudson@cc.okayama-u.ac.jp (Mark Hudson) Subject: Iron I suspect that one reason people have been slow to discuss the Benton article is that some of us haven't actually seen it yet. On the day the original call went out I had just received the SPRING issue of _Asian Perspectives_ (another U. Hawaii Press journal). Anyway, that issue (35,1) contains an interesting review article by Vincent Pigott of Donald Wagner's new book on Chinese iron. Though Wagner himself favours an indigenous origin for Chinese iron, Pigott points out that there in now growing evidence that both bronze and iron working may have spread from a single centre of origin in West Asia. Even Chinese archaeologists are beginning to seriously consider this possibility. The Caucasoid mummies from the Tarim basin may be an important link in the west-east spread of technology. Mark Hudson History & Culture Okayama University Tsushima, Okayama Japan 700 From rross@vax.clarku.edu Wed Sep 18 10:44:40 1996 for wsn@csf.colorado.edu; Wed, 18 Sep 1996 12:44:43 -0500 (EST) Date: Wed, 18 Sep 1996 12:45:07 -0400 From: "Robert J.S. Bob Ross" Subject: [Fwd: NEW LABOR LISTSERV] To: World Systems Network Organization: Prof. and Chair of Sociology, Clark University This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------5DEE8E82F1D -- Robert J. S. Ross 508 793 7243 Professor and Chair of Sociology fax: 508 793 8816 Clark University Rross@vax.clarku.edu 950 Main Street Worcester, Massachusetts 01610 --------------5DEE8E82F1D Return-path: 17 Sep 1996 09:20:43 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 17 Sep 1996 09:16:29 -0400 From: dcroteau@saturn.vcu.edu (david croteau) Subject: NEW LABOR LISTSERV To: projectsouth@igc.apc.org, rfantasi@smith.smith.edu, rkoppel@sas.upenn.edu, rlevine@center.colgate.edu, rnsl@cornell.edu, roby@cats.uscs.edu, romerom@asuvm.inre.asu.edu, rross@vax.clarku.edu, rspalter@aol.com, scamp@access.digex.net 9/17/96 Re: (1) LABOR-RAP (Labor Research & Action Project) (2) Minutes from ASA meeting on Academics and the Labor Movement Greetings, You're receiving this note because you've expressed an interest in working on issues related to the labor movement. There is now a discussion list (listserv) set up for academics and others interested in this area. The list comes out of the Sociology Labor Network and is called LABOR-RAP, for Labor Research & Action Project. To join the list, follow the directions below: 1) Send an e-mail message to: listproc@csf.colorado.edu 2) leave the subject line of your e-mail BLANK 3) in the BODY of the message type: subscribe LABOR-RAP (For example: subscribe LABOR-RAP Jane Doe) 4) send the message When you subscribe you will receive confirmation of your subscription along with more information about the list. The list is just getting off the ground in the last half of September so please be patient! New subscribers will gradually be joining. The listowner for LABOR-RAP is David Croteau at Virginia Commonwealth University. He can be reached at dcroteau@saturn.vcu.edu. To get discussion started, we're attaching the minutes to the ASA's meeting on Academics and the Labor Movement. These were prepared by Dan Clawson. We look forward to hearing from you via LABOR-RAP! |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SUMMARY OF THE ASA MEETING ON "ACADEMICS AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT" MAIN RECEPTION The AFL-CIO Organizing Institute enthusiastically welcomed the creation of a Sociology Labor Nework. In response the OI sponsored a reception at the sociology convention in New York (Sunday evening August 18, 1996). We had told the AFL-CIO to expect 75 people; 200 attended. The attendance was only one part of the success; equally impressive was the enthusiasm of the audience and what the speeches indicated about the direction of the new labor movement. Frances Fox Piven noted that, like many of the participants in 1960s social movements, her views of the labor movement had changed over the years. Richard Bensinger, the AFL-CIO's Director of Organizing, talked about the ways the labor movement is changing. The labor laws need to be changed, and the AFL-CIO is preparing a campaign to change the laws, but labor can't wait for the law to be changed. Labor is adopting new and innovative tactics, even if that means organizing outside the protections of the NLRB. The labor movement, Bensinger said, must be more than just trade unions; people like us are a vital part of a rejuvenated labor movement. This is, he said, one of the two most exciting times in the history of U.S. labor. (The other, obviously was the 1930s.) What happens in the next few years will determine whether labor can be transformed. Both speakers emphasized that women, people of color, and low wage workers must be central to labor activities. That point was reiterated in comments by several sociology students who had participated in Union Summer. In addition to the reception, about 70 (?) sociologists had one-on-one meetings with Organizing Institute staff on Sunday and Monday of the convention. Both the sociologists who participated and the Organizing Institute staff were energized by these meetings. FUTURE ACTIVITIES After the main reception, a group of about 35 stayed for an additional hour to talk about next steps, ideas of things we can do either on our own campuses or through the A.S.A. What follows is my attempt to summarize some of the high points of that discussion, but I (Dan Clawson) did not take full notes at the time and may easily have missed some key ideas, so I hope others (whether or not they were at the New York meeting) will write in to supplement and extend these proposals. COMMUNICATION People felt we needed ways to communicate with each other. The first priority was creating an electronic list-serve. David Croteau volunteered to do so and (as of September 15) already has it up and running. Others suggested the creation of a Homepage (any volunteers?) and of a newsletter, or perhaps a series of regional newsletters, reporting about activities in various areas, and providing means to connect to other movements. STUDENT LABOR ACTION Organizing Institute staff -- especially Chris Woods, national recruitment director -- reported that a priority for the coming year is to build on Union Summer by creating Student Labor Action Committees (or SLACs) on as many campuses as possible. The lead in organizing these will probably be taken by Union Summer graduates, especially on campuses where there is a critical mass. But SLACs often need faculty advisers, and faculty can help provide resources, advice, contacts. SLACs will work on both national and local labor activities. A major national focus will be the Strawberry Campaign. Actions can also be mounted around international campaigns, mobilizing against sweatshops, working to build coalitions with community and religious activists interested in these issues. Where there are unions on campus, it is important to connect to them. And campus based personnel, whether students or faculty, need to reach out to Central Labor Councils and local unions. Perhaps not all of labor will welcome our participation, but many will, and it is important to make the effort. A professor in the Claremont College system, Nigel Boyle (a historian?), taught a public service course on organizing. Students enrolled for the course, attended a 2 day session taught by staff from the Organizing Institute, were matched with unions that needed student workers, and then worked 10 (15, 20) hours a week for the union while earning college credit. Others could also create such courses; we could share information about doing so. Lots of people do a "junior year abroad" as a broadening experience. We should each work to see that our campus offers a "junior year abroad" of working with labor in some kind of internship. In whatever we do, we need to be aware of and be sensitive to the existence of sectarian movements who are much less concerned about building the labor movement than they are about building their own sectarian movement, who will attempt to take over any group, who will disrupt meetings and insist the group focus on the agenda of their sectarian group. INFORMATION SHARING To the extent we have an active communications system, whether a list-serve or a newsletter, we can use it to share ideas. Some possibilities: 1. Share information about speakers -- who are good people to invite, people's experiences with different speakers, the situations for which they are most appropriate and where they might have more difficulty, ways of connecting with local labor. 2. Develop a labor film series at your college; we can share curriculum ideas, develop an annotated list of films and ways of organizing the series 3. Share information about research projects -- academics can report on what we and others are doing. Anyone could indicate what unions or other labor groups need done, of research that would benefit labor activities in your area. This could become a way for unions to get answers to pressing problems, or to get leads to who could answer, and for people to take on the most needed research. 4. Create a job listing service. For example, sometimes person A knows of a union or other labor group who needs an intern, but does not know anyone who has the needed qualifications and is interested; if person A could post the job, perhaps other students would be eager to apply for the job, or other faculty would know of interested students. 5. We should copy the conservatives: people could write generic op-ed pieces and letters-to-the-editor, and put them on a Homepage or list-serve. Other people could then download those, adapt them to their local area by filling in local names or examples, sign their own names and send them to their local newspapers. In general, whenever labor related material appears in the press (or should have appeared, but doesn't), write a letter to the editor about it making some pro-labor point. Conservatives and anti-labor people are much more visible and active than pro-labor people. Chris Woods of the Organizing Institute pointed out that when Time magazine did a good article on Union Summer, the next issue had several anti-labor responses, but no pro-labor statements. START AN A.S.A. SECTION Some felt we should create an ASA section on labor movements, and use that as a means to get a newsletter, be assurred of a session at each ASA meeting, regularly elect a set of officers who will be responsible for seeing that things get done, etc. (Coming soon on a list-serve near you: the pros and cons of starting an A.S.A. section.) ~^~^~^~^~^~^~^~^~^~^~^~^~^~^~^~^~^~^~^~^ David Croteau Sociology/ Virginia Commonwealth University E-mail: dcroteau@saturn.vcu.edu --------------5DEE8E82F1D-- From rross@vax.clarku.edu Thu Sep 19 09:20:10 1996 Thu, 19 Sep 1996 11:20:11 -0500 (EST) Date: Thu, 19 Sep 1996 11:20:30 -0400 From: "Robert J.S. Bob Ross" Subject: Oct. 3/4: Clark University Sweatshop Conference To: Labor List , World Systems Network , Progressive Sociology Network Organization: Prof. and Chair of Sociology, Clark University Memo To: Concerned Colleagues From: Robert J.S. Ross, Prof and Chair of Sociology Subject: Sweatshop Conference Date: September 18, 1996 On October 3rd and 4th we will hold a conference on sweatshops and the apparel industry here at Clark University. The main audience will be students in our International Studies Stream, but I expect heavy press attendance and other students as well. I am also making the event known to the Jobs with Justice group in the labor movement. The public is invited, as are all recipients of this message. As of my last conversation, with David Angel of our Geography School who heads the International Program and is funding the conference, there will be three panels on Friday the 4th, after Charles Kerneghan's opening speech which is scheduled for Thursday evening. The precise time will be available from Clark's switchboard at 793 7711. FRIDAY OCT. 4 PANEL I: Sweatshops in the U.S. (First time slot Friday morning) Conditions in US sweatshops: Ginny Coughlin, head of the Sweatshop Project of UNITE, the union of needletrades, industrial and textile employees. Causes of sweatshops in the United States: Robert J.S. Ross, Professor and Chair of Sociology Clark University Strategies for Change: Richard Rothstein, Economic Policy Institute PANEL II: Perspectives from Abroad (Second time slot, Friday morning) Speakers from or about the maquiladora and China. The international apparel trade: Ellen Rosen, Professor of Sociology, Nichols College PANEL III: The Politics of Consumerism facilitated by Prof. Cynthia Enloe, Government Department, Clark University -- Robert J. S. Ross 508 793 7243 Professor and Chair of Sociology fax: 508 793 8816 Clark University Rross@vax.clarku.edu 950 Main Street Worcester, Massachusetts 01610 From dasmith@orion.oac.uci.edu Fri Sep 20 00:25:45 1996 Date: Thu, 19 Sep 1996 23:25:43 -0700 (PDT) From: David Smith To: world-system network Subject: Panel at Pacific Sociological Association meetings I will be chairing a panel at the PSA annual meetings next spring entitled, "Reorganizing Pacific Rim Economies: Theories and Strategies." The conference will be held at the Holiday Inn on the Bay in San Diego, April 17-20, 1997. The program includes a number of other sessions that are of interest to folks interested in global political economy -- including a number of panels on immigration, international labor organizing, gender and globalization, development, comparative revolutions, etc. Deadline for submission of ideas, abstracts, and papers to organizers is supposed to be October 15th, and they expect us to have complete information on the panels in by early November. If you are interested in submitting something for the PacRim Economies sessions, please contact me via e-mail (dasmith@uci.edu), phone (714-824-7292), FAX (714-824-4717) or at my office address: David A. Smith Department of Sociology University of California Irvine, CA 92697 thanx, dave smith sociology, uci From thall@DEPAUW.EDU Fri Sep 20 12:34:16 1996 20 Sep 1996 13:34:13 -0500 (EST) Date: Fri, 20 Sep 1996 13:34:13 -0500 (EST) From: "Thomas D. [Tom] Hall, THALL@DEPAUW.EDU" Subject: CFP: Environmental History (fwd) To: Network World-Systems If this has not come by, it may be of interest those doing environmental work. I picked it up from H-West tom hall ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 20 Sep 1996 10:58:09 -0500 From: Elliott West Subject: CFP: Environmental History XIIth International Economic History Conference, Seville 1998 ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY: AN EMERGING SYNTHESIS? Call for Papers This is a call for papers for a C-Session at the Twelfth International Economic History Congress, to be held in Seville, Spain, in August, 1998. During a preparatory meeting at the XIth International Economic History Conference in September 1994 in Milan a number of researchers agreed that historians and economists had not contributed enough to the field of environmental history. Although in the United States an Environ- mental History Society and Journal have existed for almost 20 years, it was felt that topics thus far had been limited to the United States and that additional approaches would be enriching. Worldwide interest in environmental history is increasing and in recent years many successful books on this subject have been published. Nevertheless, the body of historical research on which these books are based has been rather narrow. We are eager to stimulate additional research in this field in order to answer fundamental questions on the history of the relationship between mankind and the natural environment. What have been the effects during the last few centuries of the spread of industry and scientific agriculture and forestry over the world? What were the importance and relevance of early environmental groups? What were the social, political, economic and intelectual factors that influenced pressure on the environment? What role have aesthetic and ethical viewpoints had in making environmental policy? With regard to our thinking about environmental problems, should the environmental pessimism of the 1970s be considered outdated? For the C-Session on Environmental History at the 1998 XIIth Inter- national Economic History Conference in Seville we invite papers on environmental history concentrated on these five main themes, but not limited to them: 1. Methodological and theoretical aspects of environmental history. 2. The impact of agriculture and forestry on land. 3. Industrialization and its consequences for land, air and water. 4. Water use and the fate of streams and bodies of water. 5. Social and Demographic Aspects of Environmental Issues. We encourage participation from historians writing about all areas of the globe. If you would like to participate in what promises to be a most stimulating session please send a one page summary of your paper to one of the following correspondents: Central and South America, and Asia: Dr. Albert Schram P.O. Box 112-2400 San Jose, Costa Rica email: aschram@cariari.ucr.ac.cr telephone: +506 234 8706 North America, Australia, and New Zealand: Professor Myron Gutmann Department of History University of Texas at Austin Austin, Texas 78712 USA email: myron@prc.utexas.edu phone: 512-471-8358 fax: 512-471-4886 Europe, Russia, and Africa: Mr. Sakari Virtanen University of Oulu Research and Development Centre of Kajaani P.O. Box 51 87101 Kajaani, Finland email: sakari.virtanen@oulu.fi telephone: +358 86 632 4858 (after 12 Oct 96: +358 8 632 4858) fax: +358 86 632 4865 (after 12 Oct 96: +358 8 632 4865) Deadline for proposals: All proposals must reach one of the correspondents by December 1, 1996. We expect to choose the final program by January 31, 1997. All papers will be due by December 31, 1997. ************************************************************ Myron P. Gutmann Professor of History Department of History The University of Texas at Austin Austin, Texas 78712 ************************************************************ Office Phone: 512-471-8358 Fax: 512-471-4886 Home Phone: 713-556-1895 Fax: 713-556-8912 myron@prc.utexas.edu From OWENJACK@FS.isu.edu Sat Sep 21 14:41:38 1996 From: "J B Owens" Organization: Idaho State University To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Sat, 21 Sep 1996 14:44:03 -0600, MDT Subject: world history seminar--Boston ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date: Sat, 21 Sep 1996 16:24:33 -0500 Reply-to: H-NET List for World History From: "Patrick Manning, Northeastern University" Subject: world history seminar--Boston From: Pat Manning, Northeastern University manning@neu.edu This is to announce the 1996-97 schedule of the World History Seminar in Boston, sponsored by the World History Center of the Department of History at Northeastern University. Seminar presentations address issues in research and curriculum in world history, and are open to any who wish to participate. The seminar meets on Friday afternoons from 3:00 to 4:30 p.m., in Room 420 of the Classroom Building at Northeastern University. For further information contact me at the address above, or the World History Center by phone at (617) 373-4060. October 18, 1996 Alfred Andrea, University of Vermont "The Crusades in global perspective" November 15, 1996 Maghan Keita, Villanova University "Africa in world history" November 22, 1996 Richard Rath, Brandeis University "Creolization as a way to do global history at a local level" December 6, 1996 Suzanne Blier, Harvard University "African Amazons and art in late-19th-century world popular culture" January 24, 1997 Hector Melo, Northeastern University "Population, territory, and state: Latin America in the 20th century" February 7, 1997 Christine Ward Gailey, Northeastern University "Gender and State Formation" February 21, 1997 William Green, College of the Holy Cross "The intersection of world history and environmental history" March 7, 1997 Pamela Brooks, Northeastern University "Black women's postwar resistance in South Africa and the U.S. South" March 21, 1997 Eric Martin, Northeastern University "Global responses to British imperialism" April 4, 1997 Yinghong Cheng, Northeastern University "'New People.' Communist experiments in reshaping human beings: the Russian and Chinese revolutions as examples." April 18, 1997 David Northrup, Boston College "The nineteenth-century indentured labor trade: a new slavery or forgotten immigrants?" May 2, 1997 Jean-Marie Makang, Frostburg State College "Cheikh-Anta Diop on revolutions in history and African revolution" May 16, 1997 Parker James, Tufts University "Education or entertainment? Multimedia software for the high school world history curriculum" From spector@calumet.purdue.edu Tue Sep 24 14:19:32 1996 X-NUPop-Charset: English Date: Sun, 22 Sep 1996 15:17:18 -0600 (CST) From: "Alan Spector" Sender: spector@calumet.purdue.edu Reply-To: spector@calumet.purdue.edu To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: SMxS/PEWS Membership Drive =============================================================== The Section on Marxist Sociology of the ASA is having its annual membership drive. We are still a couple of dozen members short of 400. We need to reach 400 by September 30 in order to be able to have three sessions at the 1996 ASA convention in August, 1997, Toronto. There is NO TIME TO WASTE on this. DON'T put it off "another week or so", or we will lose a session. If you are a graduate student who has never been a member of the SMxS, this fee can be waived for the first year; please contact me as soon as possible (spector@calumet.purdue.edu) if you are eligible for that and would like to join. There are many readers of this list who are ASA members and plan to sign into the SMxS but haven't gotten around to it. Please do it now. In addition to sponsoring three sessions, which gives a dozen or so people the experience of presenting a paper at ASA, the SMxS is well known for its very informative, stimulating roundtable sessions. These sessions provide the opportunity for another several dozen people to share their ideas and gain experience at making an official presentation at an ASA convention. For sociologists and grad students working in the Marxist tradition this is especially important, because the availability of grant money and the ability to "latch onto" the work of a "famous" professor while in grad school or as a beginning faculty member is much more limited for us. Section membership gives you the opportunity to meet others, exchange ideas, develop possible collaborative projects, discuss strategies for teaching etc. Building the membership up is extremely important. In particular, grad students can overcome the isolation they sometimes feel; special efforts should be made to encourage grad students to sign up. Finally, the Section on Political Economy of World Systems (PEWS) has been something of a sibling section to SMxS, hosting important sessions analyzing international trends and occasionally co-sponsoring sessions with SMxS. They too are having a membership drive, and we have agreed to encourage our members to join both sections. So, if you are a member of either section and would like to join the other, please do so now. For as much as we pay to belong to ASA, it is certainly worth the slight incremental cost of supporting these sections, which make the ASA experience much more valuable for many people. But do it now.... Here's how..... Application follows: ******************************************************************************** [ ] I am an ASA member and wish to join the Section on Marxist Sociology. Enclosed is my check. [ ] I am an ASA member and wish to join the Section on Political Economy of World Systems. Enclosed is my check. [ ] I want to join the ASA and also one or both of the above sections. Please send me a 1996 membership application. Name __________________________________________________________________ Address ________________________________________________________________ City ___________________________ State/Province _________________ Zip/Postal Code ____________ Country __________________ Section on Marxist Sociology Section dues are $10 for regular members, $7 for student members, and $8 for low income members. Make checks payable to ASA and mail to American Sociological Association, Membership Services, 1722 N Street, NW, Washington, DC 20035-2981. PEWS Section dues are $10 for regular members, $5 for student members, and $8 for low income members. Make checks payable to ASA and mail to American Sociological Association, Membership Services, 1722 N Street, NW, Washington, DC 20035-2981. They take Visa/MasterCard for those of us who don't mind contributing to the world debt. ASA Sections can be contacted via e-mail at: sections@asanet.org PLEASE DON'T DELAY. The Sept. 30 deadline is INFLEXIBLE. **************************************************************************** From andrei@rsuh.ru Fri Sep 27 03:30:13 1996 From: "Korotaev A." Organization: rsuh To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Fri, 27 Sep 1996 13:29:59 +0300 Subject: 2/FOSS, GILLS AND THE 6TH CENTURY AD WORLD SYSTEM CRISIS Reply-to: andrei@rsuh.ru FOSS, GILLS AND THE 6TH CENTURY AD WORLD SYSTEM CRISIS/2 I have finished my previous posting by an invitation of the others suggestions of the probable explanation of the 6th century AD Arabian enigma. I have received some, actually (not really surprisingly) just from Foss and Gills. In order to go on I have to quote these suggestions (I hope my correspondents will not be against this). As Daniel Foss sees it: It seems to me that you have presented, in South Arabia, an excellent example of the social impact of the Plague of Justinian. This, you recall, broke out in Constantinople and Antioch in 542. South Arabia was the only part of the peninsula with a dense peasant population and significant urban life. The margin between the level of population adequate to support a state and a literate elite and one which was too low may not, however, have been very great. Not so surprisingly Barry Gills offers a significantly different perspective: Are you saying that you think epidemic disease is a symptom rather than a cuase of such a crisis? (e.g. the way an outbreak of cholera in present day Peru, or Mexico City is reflective of La Crisis rather than causative of it.) You mentioned looking for a primary cause of the 6th century AD world system crisis, but not in the same direction as myself. Does the South Arabian crisis in your view figure as part of of the genesis of the larger world economic crisis, or was the South Arabian collapse precipitated by the general crisis hiting Arabia's international commerce? These are formally questions, but some perspective is presented in them quite clearly. In any case my correspondents have persuaded me unintentionally that what I am going to present is not quite self-evident. However, though this might appear a bit noghty (perhaps, not without some justification), before doing this I shall spell out another Arabian 6th century enigma - the North Arabian one. Part 2. NORTH ARABIAN PUZZLE Of course, it is evident that what happened in the 6th century Yemen was not an isolated event. Already if we look at Arabia as a whole we shall get a bit different perspective. To begin with, in the Soviet islamology up to the 1980s the dominant theory of the origins of Islam connected it with the crisis and degeneration of the clan-tribal system in the 6th - early 7th century Arabia, the state and class formation. A bit strange theory, I am afraid, as the very well-known facts show quite clearly that the actual processes were simply contrary to the ones described above. The clan-tribal systems in Pre-Islamic Arabia were strengthening and consolidating, whereas these were precisely the state structures which degenerated and desintegrated in the first century before al- Hijrah. Indeed at the beginning of the 6th century we see a few kingdoms controlling most of the Arabian territory: the already mentioned huge Taba:bi`ah Kingdom in Yemen (dominant not only over the whole Arabian South but also considerable parts of Central Arabia), the second Kindite Kingdom (the vassal of the first one) in Central Arabia, the Lakhmid Kingdom (dependent on the Sassanid Empire) in the Arabian North-West (controlling also a considerable part of Northern and Central Arabia), and the Ghassanid Kingdom (dependent on the Byzantian Empire) in the North-West. What is more, even in the territories outside the direct control of the above-mentioned kingdoms we normally find what should be more correctly described as chiefdoms rather than true tribes. Their heads often explicitely call themselves amla:k (sg. malik) kings. The situation at the beginning of the next century (say, at the time of the beginning of Muh*ammads Prophecy) differs dramatically. ALL the above-mentioned great Arabian kingdoms had disappeared together with most smaller ones. There was almost no kings left in Arabia; and where there were chiefdoms a century before now we see true free tribes. This seems to support Gills rather than Foss. To quote Daniel Foss again: It seems to me that you have presented, in South Arabia, an excellent example of the social impact of the Plague of Justinian. This, you recall, broke out in Constantinople and Antioch in 542. South Arabia was the only part of the peninsula with a dense peasant population and significant urban life. South Arabia was no doubt affected by the Plague of Justinian (I hope to mention some details in my following postings). But as we could see very similar processes appear to have taken place in the nomadic communities of the Arabian Desert, i.e. in the areas and among the populations which unlike the Arabian South are one of the best protected from the spread of the epidemics (one may recall some early Muslim rulers who would move to the Desert at the time of the epidemics spending the dangerous time in a sort of bedouin camp). I hope to present my suggestions for some of the probable fundamental causes of the 6th century AD world system crisis (no accounted to by either Foss or Gills) in my following posting. Yours, (Dr) Andrey Korotayev, Senior Research Fellow Oriental Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Sector of Theoretical Problems of Oriental History) 12 Rozhdesrvenka, Moscow 103753, RUSSIA Fax: (7) (095) 975 2396; E-MAIL: andrei@rsuh.ru From myhre@lclark.edu Fri Sep 27 19:13:26 1996 Date: Fri, 27 Sep 1996 18:12:15 -0700 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: David Myhre Subject: ASA Economic Sociology Syllabi Set Now Available Members of WSN: It gives me great pleasure to announce that the Teaching Resource Center of the American Sociological Association has just published ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY: SYLLABI AND INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS. Several members of this list contributed copies of their syllabi. The set is $11.50 for ASA members and $15.50 for non-members. The stock number is #358.E96. To order, send a check to ASA Teaching Resources Center, 1722 N Street NW, Washington, DC 20036. The price includes 1st class shipping and handling within the USA. For foreign pricing and shipping information, please write to the attention of the ASA Teaching Resource Center at asa@asanet.org. Here is the volume's outline: ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY Syllabi and Instructional Materials Edited by Gary P. Green University of Wisconsin, Madison and David Myhre Lewis and Clark College THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION WASHINGTON, D.C. =A9 1996 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of Contents Foreword v Undergraduate-Level Syllabi 1 J=F3zsef B=F6r=F6cz 2 Bruce Carruthers 7 Mark Granovetter 9 David Myhre 11 Victor Nee 15 Akos Rona-Tas 18 Richard Swedberg 22 Peter Leigh Taylor 24 Patricia H. Thornton 27 Graduate-Level Syllabi 32 Michael Blim 33 Fred Block 36 J=F3zsef B=F6r=F6cz 38 Severyn Bruyn 43 John Campbell 47 Gary Green 51 Luis E. Guarnizo 58 Patrick McGuire 60 Alfonso Morales 64 Beth Rubin 69 Don Slater 75 Erik Wright 81 Erik Wright (Syllabus prepared with Joel Rogers, Wolfgang Streeck) 87 Other Resources 92 Collections for Use in Courses in Economic Sociology 93 Bibliography 95 Internet Resources 101 E-mail Discussion Lists for Economic Sociologists 101 World Wide Web Sites for Economic Sociologists 102 Professional Associations and Groups in Economic Sociology 104 International Sociological AssociationResearch=20 Committee on Economy and Society (RC02) 104 Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics 105 List of Contributors 106 Contribute to the Next Edition of Economic Sociology Syllabi and Instructional Materials 107 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ****************************************** David Myhre Department of Sociology and Anthropology Lewis and Clark College 0605 S.W. Palatine Hill Road Portland, OR 97219-7899 USA tel: 503-768-7607 (direct) 503-768-7660 (dept.) fax: 503-768-7620 email: myhre@lclark.edu ****************************************** From teivaine@cc.helsinki.fi Sat Sep 28 14:28:00 1996 Date: Sat, 28 Sep 1996 23:27:53 +0300 (EET DST) From: Teivo Teivainen To: WSN@csf.colorado.edu Subject: EMU & democracy Dear World-Systemites, I am looking for material on the implications of EU`s Economic and Monetary Union - especially the plans about the European Central Bank and its independence - on democratic governance. Any suggestions? Many thanks in advance, teivo Teivo Teivainen Iberoamerican Center PO Box 49, 00014 University of Helsinki teivo.teivainen@helsinki.fi From U17043@UICVM.CC.UIC.EDU Sun Sep 29 19:58:06 1996 Date: Sun, 29 Sep 96 17:41:44 CDT From: "Daniel A. Foss" Subject: miles gloriosus and the eurasian world system [cont'd] To: World Systems Network Firstly, thank you, Andrey Korotayev, for permitting the mention of my name in this august forum (and apologies for mispelling yours in the header). Over the years, I have evolved both conspiratorial and nonconspiratorial theories to account for the aforementioned conditions of existence; but as this wasted much time, I settled upon the strategy of Maximum Unspeakability. The general-ish subject matter at hand is *noneconomic motives* in world- system exchange, and behind exchange, production. This, technically, is called *embeddedness*. For elaboration, consult the voluminous writings of Mark Granovetter on economic sociology. For calculus-challenged, like me, you may surely write to Mark Granovetter ; he is helpful to a fault (in case of systemcrash, etc, try granov@LELAND.STANFORD. EDU>). In a previous post, I mused (where "muse" is a fairy with wings, like the White Rock Girl) about the indubitable facts that (a) Romans expanded aggress- ively to the East, not merely against the hapless Parthians, but against the far more formidable (Persian) Sassanids, even, as I put it, as far as regarding with complaisance, apathy, or worse, the suppositiously Dire Peril of "the Germans coming through the window." (b) The direction of expansion reflected the control of greater or, when the Romans lost, lesser lenghts of the western end of the Silk Route from China. The vast riches derivable from Silk Route commerce, via Persia to the frontier, then via Euphrates riverboat or caravan, was amply demonstrated by the Empire of Palmyra, "the city state which got grandiosity delusions," and, by paying vast sums of money where it'd do the most good, bribery qua economic good as yet inadequately theorized in terms of the sinequanonish firstorder differential equations, took over one third of the Roman Empire without striking a blow during 268-270. (Alas, it goes to show you what happens when effeminate women are in charge; the Virile Albanian, Aurelian, gave Zenobia of Palmyra what was coming to her, bondage, golden chains from the kinkiest sexshop in Syria, and exhibited the lady in a human zoo in Rome, selling tickets to get in. Those interested in that sort of thing will find solid gold handcuffs, slavebracelets, and such, sold in Neiman Marcus and wherever expensive femininity is pushed. Far more importantly, Aurelian by decreeing the birthday of Sol Invictus of Emesa as a legal holiday, compelled Jesus Christ and Mithra to have been born on the same day, which is today called "market share.") [Note: Zenobia's likeness formerly appeared on the Syrian Arab Republic One Hundred Pound note; however, antiArab fanaticism precludes at this time my looking up in Section 3, Monkey Business, of the NY Times to ascertain if it's worth the paper it's printed on. The Syrian money, I mean. (c) and most interestingly, the Roman wars against Persia, however indubi- tably, indissolubly associated with Silk Route control, never broke out with that control uppermost, or even, possibly, in the Top 40. Scholars considering themselves part of Western Civilization, yet unsure as to what is meant by Top 40, sit tight, and a transistor radio will arrive on your doorstep: The sound quality is atrocious, as this is called AM, albeit having nothing to do with the prenoon hours; the Top 40 is played round the clock. In short, The Decline And Fall of the Roman Empire is nothing but a Euro- centric narrative, or worse (try, eurocentric selfdeceptive delusion cum idelogical misrepresentation having the function of grandiosity facilitation as in eg Rise Of The West.) All the evidence for the above, and much much more, is found in: Benjamin Isaac, The Limits of Empire: The Roman Army in the East, 1990. Fergus Millar, The Roman Near East, 1993. Neither of these authors denounce The Decline And Fall Of The Roman Empire as such. There are other ways to do it which Decent historians may use. Isaac, for his part, takes out after the once-fashionable (at the height of the US National-Security State) anachronism, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire. There exists a "Classic Comic," ie, readable by a dyslexic in an hour, by Arther (no typo) Ferrill, Prof of History, U of Washington (State), The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire. The trouble with Littwak & epigones' conjectures, suppositions, and rational calculations of strategic interest based upon ideological domain assumptions wherein "interest" is embedded which are of extremely recent origin, is that the basic concepts of the Grand Strategy doctrine did not exist in antiquity. Such as, eg, Interstate Frontiers. Cost-benefit analyses. Accurate maps with corresponding topographical knowledge. Cohesive and collegial General Staff body charged with overall disposition of forces in proportion to salience of needs or interests, strategic or tactical. Unquestioned and unchallenged paramountcy of military-strategic imperatives in terms of the inner logic of cost-benefit peculiar to the military art itself. There's more. What has no place in any Grand Strategy is commanders' egotripping. (In former Communist states, substitute "cult of personality.") The latter, however, is the foremost among what lame excuses for casus belli were recorded. There follows the war. At the close of the war, there is Peace made, intended, piously stated, to endure for a length of time anticipated by nobody with any sense. In the Peace, as signed, is a provision moving the place of uniquely approved, by Roman and Persian governments, trafficking between Romans on one side of the line and Persian subjects on the other. Now, I've just sort of read yet another book on the period, which has the inestima- ble virtue of being, basically, about Spiritual Matters; warfare is mentioned en passant, as the protagonists, Constantine The Great and his mouthpiece Eusebius of Caesaraea, were up to their eyeballs in The Rise of Christianity, hence might well do without needless distractions of Principalities and Powers. Even if, by now, this was them. We look, consequently, for the following telltale signs: (a) War against "Barbarian" Germans, inconclusive and quickly forgotten. (b) Serious, glory-conferring manly strife against the Persian foe. (c) The occurrence of (b), preferably, in close temporal propinquity to (a). (d) The motive for (b), especially where or wherein it occurs in the guise of temper tantrums, spitework (ie, intra-elite or intra-oligarchical intrigue). (e) Thrust of Roman military activity in direction of Persian capital, Ctesiphon. Notably important when Germans are at the time coming through the window. (f) Roman annexation of territory, adding to North Mesopotamian base, extending power eastward, even beyond the Tigris; or southward, to Ctesiphon; or both. While the Germans are coming through door and window both, unless, of course, they are fighting on the Persian front. (g) Tsarist Ploys, ie, after 325, the posturing by the Roman Emperor as Protector of All The Christians of the East, wherever these may be found, whether they like it or not. My sample, unwitting. source is Timothy D. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, Harvard University Press, 1981; Fifth Printing, 1996. Page 4. Carus, in 282, overthrows Probus (275-282), who is of course killed. Two sons, Carinus and Numerianus, made Caesars. Plans for aggressive war on Persia begin. Carinus, in West, declares victory over Germans, no facts about war or peace survive. Carus and Numerianus marched to Ctesiphon "without meeting serious opposition" due to Persian civil war; all three emperors styled *Persici maximi*. Carus "killed by lightning" near Ctesiphon; Romans retreat. Numerianus, sick, does not appear in public; found murdered in litter in accordance with Roman political tradition. Diocletian seizes power, November 284. Carinus quickly stomped in West. Page 6. Diocletian makes sluggish war on Sarmatians. Turns with greater interest to war on Persia. War with Persia, 287; Persians chicken out, send tribute and lavish gifts; invite Diocletian to "summit meeting," yield territory west and south of Tigris, give up all claim to Armenia. Maximian, in Gaul, meanwhile, has rough going with Bagaudae peasant war. Opportunistic German raids by Burgundians, Alamanni, Chaibones, Heruli cross Rhine, invade Gaul. Victory declared. Germans appointed commanders of Germans (Franks and Saxons) committing "harassment" on Northwest Gaul. No mention of suit filed with EEOC or of lewd jokes, girlie calanders, &c. Maximian hangs out in Milan, picks new leader against one or another of the Enemies; name of Carausius. Soon rises, himself, to top of Enemies List. Page 7. Carausius, in command of Britain plus Western Gaul, secedes from Empire, 286. Rebels raid in direction of Italy, cause embarassing interruption of installation of new consuls, 1 January, 287. Maximian smites rebels into retreat, a skirmish of no consequence; then celebrates Triumph for himself. Maximian devotes year 287 to inconclusive campaigns against Germans, who obstinately refuse to stand and get decisively beaten. Franks, allied with Carausius, make peace with Maximian, which makes no difference and changes nothing; Frankish king Gennoboudes handed huge tracts of *agri deserti* near Trier. Page 10 ff. 287-296. Maximinus fails to suppress Carausius. 296, Carausius murdered. Suceeded by Allectus, beaten by Constantius, 296. Page 17. 296. Diocletian in East, where he always wanted to be: Persia at war with Rome, scores initial successes. Narseh defeats Roman army, recovers Mesopotamian territory lost to Rome in 287. Narseh forced to retreat, however, notwithstanding tactical victory. Galerius blamed for defeat; "publicly humiliated" in Diocletian's Triumph when latter rode in chariot whilst Galerius was forced to follow on foot. This was a grave "head trip" by Diocletian. But Galerius *gets even* with spectacular victory, capturing Narseh's wife, harem, and treasury. Nisibis captured, 1 October, 298. Ctesiphon captured soon after. Page 18: Treaty of 299. (a) Persia cedes territory to Rome. Tigris now the boundary. (b) Nisibis sole legal "place of commercial exchange between Roman and Persian traders. (c) Roman protectorate extended over all Armenia. (d) King of Iberia (modern Georgia) to be Roman apointee; country becomes Roman protectorate. (e) Five Persian satrapies between Tigris and Armenia become de facto Roman protectorates. ------------------ There is much more, and it is just as boring. The question becomes, why is it that, if military glory motivates conquest in the direction of the Silk Road, which is no accident, why is this particular direction of expansion so glorious? The answer must lie in the character of Persia as a major power with an organized, structured, hierarchical state and social order, basking, it might have seemed from the Roman side, in the vast riches of the East. Great Kings, King-of-Kings, with Ancestors in Hoary Antiquity, sitting on top of the route to India onceuponatime stomped by Alexander The Great, emulation-object of each and every would-be Roman conqueror in the same direction. In theery or in principle, it would, should, have been possible, at least imaginable, to smite such a foe in the central neural ganglion, ie, its power elite, ruling circles, most sacred and holy mythosymbolic shrinery. As an enemy, the Persian possessed that most highly prized character of being *almost as good*, though not all that often, thanks be to Jupiter and the boys; and what's at least as delightful, the Persian stands and fights like a man, not to say a man like Our kind of man, but sort of, well, almost, uh.... The German, contrariwise, can neither be easily victorious nor easily defeated, in the best of circumstances. In less ideal circumstances, the German may even roll right over us, Romans, as if we weren't there at all. But, suppose the best, anyway. Should we Romans win, what we have won is boring wasteland, thinly populated; nearly so, in fact, as the *agri deserti* on our side of the river. We've necessarily got to sit tight, wait for some considerable mass of would-be marauders to assemble, then in the event of even the most magnificent victory, in terms of Body Count, we're talking Vietcong of Antiquity, remember, that's allowed in this sort of perpetual futility in the guise of War, we can do no better than offer the survivors Honest Jobs in our *agri deserti* which will get repopulated, were we Christians, we'd say, "When hell freezes over." At least, it may be supposed, the warfare over the Silk Route is not, in direct fashion, motivated by glory appertaining to the silk qua silk. Thus far, no cataclysmic heresy has cropped up to threaten World System Theory. But suppose now we consider the defensible proposition that the vast bulk of human commerce is not motivated by commercial considerations per se. That's to say, it doesn't go on by reason of some instinct to truck, barter, exchange, or make money (not yet invented when world systems got started, right, AGF?). Commerce is *embedded* in culture, and is driven, prior to capitalist times, by RELIGION, SEX, DRUGS, DISEASE, and *CHACHKAS*. [Note: An Afghan carpet on a Jewish living room is a *chachka*, pricey, perhaps, but *chachka* nonetheless. As another form of "embeddedness," *warfare drives trade as much as trade drives warfare* or anything else. SEX includes not merely sex practices, such as the accumulation of human zoos of women by the elite (with concomitant consumption patterns impinging upon trade); also, kinship, marriage, and whatever might be related thereto, but long-distance trade in women, for example. The commodification of China during the Song period (960-1279), for example, led to the mass-marketing and long-distance transport of women as commodities in their own right, replete with Brokers, Brochures, Catalogues, and the whole paraphanelia of what'd be called "white slavery," except that the victims weren't white. This evil has persisted for a thousand years, with the difference, today, in the Peoples Republic, that it's not *nominally* illegal. Big ****** deal. DRUGS subsume, not merely tea, coffee, opium, or *narcotrafico*, but half the foreign trade of the Song dynasty maratime efflorescence, about a thousand years ago. (Shiba Yoshinobu, "Sung Foreign Trade: Its Scope and Organization," In Morris Rossabi (Ed.), China Among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th-14th Centuries. University of California Press, 1983. DISEASE is often considered as a variable of secondary importance; it is rightly pointed out that the highest deathrates in pandemics are found among those on the verge of starvation anyway, or enfeebled due to pressure of population on resources. Yet, who dare cite a case of precapitalist society, barely-subsisting on what passes for good crops in some years, with worse for average performance. Life, until very recently, and then in the most scattered locations, was, let's face it, crap. The impact of commercialism itself may have impinged upon the nutritional level attributable to pandemics. In China, peasants subsisting as tenants on commercial estates selling food, fiber, and industrial crops to cities (where bubonic plague death rates are invariably highest) died like flies from famine with the absence of consuming populations, already dead. In relatively more backward Europe, with smaller cities and lesser commercialization, rates paid by landlords for wage labour rose almost immediately (Statute of Labourers, 1349). ------------------------------------------- Sorry. This, I believed, was the last day I'd be able to use the computer, hence I failed to write the smallest fraction of what was intended. Now for the good news. I'm leaving Chicago, and with any luck, will not be subscribing to any more e-mail lists. Daniel A. Foss