From OWENJACK@FS.isu.edu Sun Nov 2 17:24:31 1997 for ; Sun, 2 Nov 1997 17:23:48 -0700 (MST) From: "J B Owens" To: WSN@csf.colorado.edu Date: Sun, 2 Nov 1997 17:29:21 -0600, MDT Subject: International Congress of Historical Sciences ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date: Sun, 02 Nov 1997 12:23:47 +0000 From: IFES XVIII (Informacion procedente de H-DEMOGR) ----------------- Date: Thu, 30 Oct 1997 23:24:07 +0100 From: Donato Gomez Subject: International Congress of Historical Sciences, 6-13 August 2000 Welcome to Oslo in the year 2000! The International Committee of Historical Sciences has chosen Oslo, the capital of Norway, for the 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences, 6 - 13 August 2000. The largest regular meetings of professional historians from all over the world, these congresses take place every five years. Earlier meetings have attracted up to 4,000 participants. Already now we ask you to reserve the second week of August 2000. The Congress will consist of three major themes of one full day each, 20 specialised themes with half a day each and 25 roundtable discussions. The exact themes of the sessions will be decided on the General Assembly of the International Committee of Historical Sciences in August 1997. The high number of sessions and the numerous suggestions from all over the world will assure that the programme is both varied and stimulating. In addition to the regular sessions, 22 Affiliated International Organisations and 18 Internal Committees will hold their meetings during the Congress. These organisations and committees are dedicated to the study of a wide range of historical fields and topics, from historical demography and numismatics to the history of international relations. English and French will be the official languages of the Congress, and simultaneous translation will be provided for all plenary sessions. Oslo is an excellent site for a millennial Congress, since the city at the same time will be celebrating its 1000 years anniversary. Oslo is beautifully situated on the Oslo Fjord. The city has more than 50 museums and an abundance of galleries - quite a number for a city with less than half a million inhabitants. The 1000 years anniversary celebrations will include a large number of concerts, shows, exhibitions, and other cultural attractions going on simultaneously with the Congress. Oslo in August is warm and sunny, but with a pleasant breeze from the fjord. The International Congresses of Historical Sciences function as comprehensive surveys of new trends and developments within various historical disciplines. They also serve as an arena for critical debate about central themes of current scholarship and the pioneer fronts of historical research. At the same time, the Congress offers an occasion of strengthening professional networks. In order to ensure the widest possible participation from all parts of the world, grants will be available for participants from selected regions. On behalf of all Norwegian historians, the Norwegian Historical Association and the University of Oslo, the Organizing Committee has the pleasure of inviting you to Oslo in the year 2000. Please contact us for further information You may visit our homepage at: http://www.hf.uio.no/hi/prosjekter/verdenskongressen 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences Department of History P.O. Box 1008, Blindern n-0315 Oslo Norway Telephone: +47 22 85 69 07 Fax: +47 22 85 52 78 e-mail: thomas.evensen@hi.uio.no From phuakl@sit.edu.my Mon Nov 3 19:16:37 1997 4 Nov 97 10:18:52 +1100 From: "DR. PHUA KAI LIT" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Tue, 4 Nov 1997 10:18:40 +0000 Subject: (Fwd) [sangkancil] SG: Underground Newspaper Singapore - a foretaste of the authoritarian semi-police, state-sponsored capitalist state of the 21st Century? Thorstein Veblen called for a state run by engineers. It exists in the shape of Singapore - a nation run by economists and engineers with First Class Honors degrees! ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- From: balcan@juno.com To: sangkancil@malaysia.net Raj_Leyl@amrcorp.com, JBALCHAN@CSFBG.CSFB.COM, azizt@mbox2.singnet.com.sg, RVAKIL@sg.oracle.com, narula@singnet.com.sg, SRAJAN@sg.oracle.com, nnb1@doc.ic.ac.uk Date: Mon, 3 Nov 1997 10:39:08 -0600 Subject: [sangkancil] SG: Underground Newspaper Reply-to: balcan@juno.com ________________________________________________ This week's sponsors -The Asia Pacific Internet Company (APIC) Business Internet Services. Some talk. Some do. We talk and do! for instant info ________________________________________________ This is to invite SK readers to a 'new' information source on the net on Singapore. It was started by a group of Singapore dissidents (based outside Sing) to inform citizens of news from different sources on policies that go unquestioned in Singapore. I believe its worth a visit. http://www.singapore-window.org You may find the following answers some of your questions once you have visited the site: Published in Oct 1997 issue: Asiaonline. A website in Singapore. http://www.asia-online.com.sg/aol/features/special/index.html Cyber Rebels Overseas Singaporeans Launch Underground Website Interview a group of self-proclaimed Singaporean dissidents who must remain anonymous and review their 'underground' website? Why not? You can participate in this 'covert' activity, too. by Chris Lydgate One of the remarkable things about Singaporeans is that, fond as they are of mumbling and grumbling about the latest government policy--be it the "be creative" drive, the "get married" push or the "flush-the-toilets" rule--in the end they generally shrug their shoulders, roll up their sleeves, and press on with their lives. Nowhere is this trend more evident than on the Internet. Certainly, the regulations set up last year by the Singapore Broadcasting Authority have attracted their share of criticism--even ridicule--from web-surfers both inside and beyond Singapore. Yet Singapore web sites have generally tried to abide by these regulations, even when many administrators feel they represent an odious interference. But now a small band of overseas Singaporeans have joined together to create the Lion City's first real "underground" website -- Singapore Window. The site fearlessly presents a fascinating catalogue of information that would be difficult or impossible to obtain in Singapore itself. The fledgling site went online in June this year. Since then, SW has received (as of this writing) about 600 visitors. But this is despite considerable obstacles--no advertising, no links from well-established sites and no publicity. Also, it's worth pointing out that SW has nothing about hip restaurants, cool bands, hot sex, fast computers, Moses Lim, or anything else to attract the zany wireheads who populate the web. The people behind the site remain completely anonymous. However, Asia Online did manage to arrange an exclusive online interview with SW editor Justus Semper (That's Latin for "Justice Forever") who explained the anonymity factor this way: "If you refer to us revealing our individual identities, then although you are new in Singapore you must be aware of the climate of fear that exists there. We are free and cannot be touched because we are outside our beloved country. But all of us have family and friends in Singapore who fear harassment, intimidation and/or victimisation. While we love Singapore and are doing this for Singapore, we love our families and care for our friends who are in Singapore. We do what we must do for Singapore but at the same time we cannot endanger our loved ones." "I and the others involved in Singapore Window are Singaporeans and former Singaporeans living outside Singapore. We are in America, Asia, Australia and Europe. We are patriots who love Singapore. We communicate with each other on the web. You could say we are Singaporeans who live on the Net." "We all grew up in Singapore and were educated there. Our ages range from late 30s to early 70s. Most of us went to Christian mission schools and university in Singapore. Among the group are lawyers, lecturers, journalists. Our ethnic composition would be reflective of the ethnic make up of modern Singapore. But we see ourselves as Singaporean rather than Chinese, Malay, Indian or whatever." Perhaps because SW is a seasoned group, the site contains little of the rabid ranting to be found on more-established forums such as soc.culture.singapore. Unlike some political websites, which are long on opinion and short on fact, SW goes to particular lengths to attribute and source its information, so that surfers have some way of assessing its value. "We felt that people overseas, including Singaporeans themselves, know very little about the true situation in Singapore. Almost everyone accepts the government's disinformation, for there are no windows for contrary views and opinions. Even the foreign media, as you well know, increasingly practise self-censorship on their reportage. To redress this situation, we decided to start a group called Singapore Window. [See Mission Statement] The site itself includes a broad spectrum of articles, reports, features and links about Singapore's domestic and international politics. Many of the site's pages--especially reports from the foreign press--are already accessible on the web in one form or another, but seldom in a way that's easy to find. For the researcher, SW is a goldmine. For example, check out the section on the recent defamation trial of J B Jeyaretnam-- surely one of the hottest political topics to hit Singapore this year. Thei nclusion of foreign reports and background material on the Jeyaretnam case makes for fascinating reading (and I'm not just saying that because one of my own pieces is in there). Beyond the Jeyaretnam trial, SW offers special pages on topics that too often seem to get lost in the hury-burly of headlines. There are special pages on the Tang appeal; the AG's controversial ruling on alleged PAP election violations; the issue of Indonesian maids; and relations with Burma, Philippines, and Cambodia. You can also check out New York Times columnist William Safire's most recent attack on the PAP or a special report on protesters heckling PM Goh Chok Tong in Chicago. Perhaps the most poignant page in the whole site is the first-person narrative of Tang Fong Har, a Singapore lawyer who was detained without trial for 85 days under the ISA in 1987 for her role in the so-called "Marxist Conspiracy." First published in 1989, her description of her experiences in detention is remarkably detailed--and moving--not least because it demonstrates an episode like this would strike utter terror into your heart if it happened to you. For critics of the current regime, Singapore-Windows represents a step forward. By making an (not entirely successful) effort to provide documentation and reportage in the place of vague soapbox fulmination, it helps to elevate the debate into the factua lrealm and away from the cab-driver level of baseless rumour, even if some of the facts are themselves debatable. SW could hardly be called a "balanced" site. But its very existence constitutes a refreshing counter-balance to the relentless stream of unthinking coverage provided by Singapore newspapers, radio and TV. The question now is what will happen when web-surfers, both local and foreign, take a look at the strange island SW has provided us a window on. Extracts from the interview with Justus Semper editor of Singapore Window by Chris Lydgate Asia Online: Is the server in Singapore? Justus Semper: Ha ha. Would that be wise the way the media is controlled in Singapore? I cannot but think of PM Goh's cross examination by Carman QC on the Singapore press. I agree with the points Carman made/suggested re: the subtle way of coercing the press into self censorship. From our address you will know that we are certainly outside Singapore. AO: How do you decide what to include? JS: Our editor, Justus Semper, surfs websites of newspapers in Asia, Europe, Australia, the US and Canada for articles about Singapore. Visitors and friends who come across articles they think should be posted on SW send them to Justus. Justus has editing skills and he is guided by our Mission Statement. AO: Why you unwilling to voice your views openly? JS: We are voicing our views openly. Our site is open to all. It is not a secret site. People can find our site via search engines, through friends etc. We ask people to make the site known. AO: Name your first three official acts if you were elected Prime Ministertomorrow. JS: 1. Ensure that the constitution, with all it enshires as it was in 1959, is followed. 2. Ensure freedom of expression. 3. Repeal the ISA. AO: What do you think of the creativity drive? JS: A PAP joke. You cannot legislate creative. For creativity to flourish, there must be a climate in society that encourages it. You cannot order people to be creative. I would agree with articles that have appeared recently in Asiaweek and some HK papers (by people like Barry Porter). We carry these articles in SW. AO: Is Singapore moving in the right direction, whatever that is? JS: !!!! AO: Is Singapore a good place to live? JS: For Singaporeans and those who have a soft spot for Singapore because of family ties and friends, Singapore will remain a good place to live, inspite of its warts, its draconion laws and its big brother system. Also for those who "eschew politics and pursue wealth," Singapore has its attractions, although increasingly Singapore Inc is seen as an unfair and aggressive competitor in the arena of business and commerce. AO: What's the most frustrating thing about Singapore? JS: The controls imposed on the people by a government who thinks it knows best about everything for everyone. AO: What's Singapore's greatest achievement? JS: This stumps me--the standard reply is that Singapore is an economic tiger, has the second highest standard of living in Asia, one of the highest standards of living in the world, etc. but they ring hollow somehow. I venture to say that compared to many parts of the world, Singapore has many achievements that other countries and people would be envious of. Yet, meet Singaporeans overseas and they tell you how fed up they are with things back home. Look at the fact that one in five consider leaving Singapore. Anil Balchandani mailto:balcan@juno.com -________________________________________________ List Owner: M.G.G. Pillai Free Homepages on malaysia.net - send blank Check out the malaysia.net web site on List Postings to ________________________________________________ From gernot.kohler@sheridanc.on.ca Tue Nov 4 10:48:15 1997 for ; Tue, 4 Nov 1997 12:48:12 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 4 Nov 1997 12:48:12 -0500 (EST) To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: Gernot Kohler Subject: Unravelling Global Apartheid (book note) This new book from England may be of interest to some wsn'ers: Titus Alexander, Unravelling Global Apartheid Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996. 302 pages ISBN 0-7456-1353-5 (paperback) This is the most comprehensive analysis to date of the world system through the lenses of the concept of "global apartheid". Similarities and differences between (pre-Mandela) South African apartheid and the world system are clearly laid out. Historical, political, economic and cultural-ideological dimensions are discussed. The book is nicely leftist, modern, global and very well done, but is likely not of interest to old-line Marxists. On the issue of "race": "the concept of race is rejected in this book" (p. x) Contents: Intro: What is GLobal Apartheid and Why does it Matter? ch. 1 The World in One Country ch. 2 The Dynamics of Separate Development ch. 3 The Economics of Global Apartheid ch. 4 Global Privileges of Private Enterprise ch. 5 Managed Markets of Global Apartheid ch. 6 Institutions of Global Apartheid: The United Nations System ch. 7 The Laws of Exclusion ch. 8 The Western Alliance Government ch. 9 The West knows Best: Values and Ideology of Global Apartheid ch. 10 Prospects for Improvement Regards, Gernot Kohler Oakville, Canada From OWENJACK@FS.isu.edu Tue Nov 4 13:27:45 1997 for ; Tue, 4 Nov 1997 13:26:56 -0700 (MST) From: "J B Owens" To: WSN@csf.colorado.edu Date: Tue, 4 Nov 1997 13:32:15 -0600, MDT Subject: SSPHS in St. Louis, 1998 ***PLEASE CROSS-POST TO OTHER LISTS*** CFP & information about the SSPHS annual meeting in St. Louis, 23-26 April 1998. Contact person: Suzanne Burkholder ***************************** CALL FOR PAPERS Society for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies Annual Meeting 23-26 April 1998 St. Louis, Missouri, USA Proposals on any aspect of Spanish and Portuguese historical studies are welcome. Complete sessions (introduction, two or three papers, comment and questions) designed for presentation in ninety minutes are particularly welcome. The program committee also welcomes suggestions for roundtables involving five or six formal participants. Please send program proposals and suggestions by *15 JANUARY 1998* To: Suzanne Burkholder Department of History University of Missouri-St. Louis St. Louis, Missouri 63121 USA Telephone: (314) 516-5700 E-mail: sshburk@umslvma.umsl.edu ------------------------------- Meet Us in St. Louis, 23-26 April 1998 Welcome back to a former frontier of the Spanish Empire. Yes, the organizing committee has responded to popular demand and scheduled another Dixieland Jazz River Dinner Cruise on Friday evening. On Saturday, Saint Louis University's Madrid program will host a reception. The conference hotel, the Drury Inn, is located next to St. Louis' well-known Union Station, a former railroad depot now filled with a variety of shops and restaurants. Union Station is also a stop on the St. Louis Metrolink (light rail) system, a safe and inexpensive (one dollar) way to get from the airport to the hotel and also access the zoo, art and history museums in beautiful Forest Park, riverboat gambling, downtown and the famous St. Louis arched gateway to the West. So make plans now to meet us in St. Louis. From phuakl@sit.edu.my Tue Nov 4 20:46:57 1997 5 Nov 97 11:49:03 +1100 From: "DR. PHUA KAI LIT" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Wed, 5 Nov 1997 11:44:02 +0000 Subject: (Fwd) (Fwd) [sangkancil] SG DAILY: PERC: Singapore Report (fwd ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- To: sangkancil@malaysia.net Date: Wed, 05 Nov 1997 05:40:13 Subject: [sangkancil] SG DAILY: PERC: Singapore Report (fwd) From: pillai@mgg.pc.my (M.G.G. Pillai) Reply-to: pillai@mgg.pc.my (M.G.G. Pillai) ________________________________________________ This week's sponsors -The Asia Pacific Internet Company (APIC) Business Internet Services. Some talk. Some do. We talk and do! for instant info ________________________________________________ FORWARDED MAIL ------- From: forum@sintercom.org (Wynthia Goh) Date: 05 Nov 97 Originally To: sgdaily@list.sintercom.org Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, Ltd. Country Risk Report: Singapore November 4 1997 Executive Summary: Singapore=20 Watch out for any deterioration in relations between Malaysia and Singapore in the near future. Not only have the two countries taken almost diametrically opposite approaches to the current regional financial turmoil, they are also engaged in a quiet game of tit for tat involving the causeway linking Singapore to the southern Malaysian state of Johore. Since late September, stringent customs checks at the Malaysian side, probably to encourage local exporters to use Malaysian ports, have also threatened to damage Singapore=92s electronics output at factories using imported Malaysian components. Singapore=92s response =96 stepped up goods and services tax checks on weekend Singaporean shoppers in the southern Malaysian state of Johore has so far been low key. However, a careless remark by either side could spark off yet another diplomatic spat. By contrast, Singapore is having much more success in its relations with Indonesia. Faced with statements by President Suharto that appeared to suggest that Singapore was prepared to provide Indonesia with up to US$10 billion in aid outside of an IMF rescue package being negotiated by that country, Prime Minister Goh managed to put the record straight without offending Indonesian sensibilities. However, candid remarks by former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew a few days earlier regarding Thailand=92s internal political problems have unnecessarily ruffled feathers in Bangkok.=20 The government may have a more difficult time maintaining the momentum of its current drive to attract more foreigners to live and work in the country in the coming months. With almost daily reports about the regional financial crisis hogging the headlines and local labor unions already warning their members not to expect significant wage rises next year, many citizens are beginning to worry that an open door policy towards foreigners may ultimately cost Singaporean jobs.=20 The decision of Prime Minister Goh to lodge an appeal against the terms of a High Court judgment in his favor over a libel suit he bought against opposition politician Jeyaretnam has ensured that human rights issues will continue to influence foreign perceptions of the country over the short and medium term.=20 Near-Term Outlook: Singapore Testing times The events of the past quarter have revealed Singapore to be more vulnerable to regional developments than has been generally appreciated. Significantly, the stock market fall and recent speculative attacks on the Singapore currency were largely out of the control of the Singapore authorities, and there could be more worrying developments ahead in the coming months. The situation in Thailand could become even worse, for example, encouraging foreign fund managers to worry anew about the political stability of the whole region, or another government leader could make a mistake like Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir did recently when he said things which upset his country's own as well as other stock markets in the region. Domestically, Singapore is in a good position to ride out the current turmoil, but to the extent that the currency and stock market turbulence force an economic slowdown in neighboring countries, Singapore's trade (and by implication its GDP growth) will also be affected.=20 Meanwhile, the financial troubles facing Singapore's neighbors have forced the country to take a far more active role in regional developments. Singapore contributed to the bailout package cobbled together for Thailand, for example, and can probably be expected to take much more interest in political and economic developments in other neighboring countries in the future in order to help prevent similar financial meltdowns in other countries. Inevitably, this will involve some very delicate diplomacy =96 something that has not always been Singapore's forte =96 and could become a source of tension in the future as Singapore attempts to influence other Southeast Asian governments to pursue responsible macroeconomic policies.=20 However, the regional financial crises has also produced at least one very positive outcome for Singapore in the eyes of foreign banks and fund managers. Unlike the authorities in some neighboring countries (which effectively shot themselves in the foot as far as their aspirations to becoming regional financial centers are concerned), Singapore reacted to the crises in a very responsible manner. No threats were made against foreign speculators, the stock market remained relatively liquid, and political leaders declared boldly that they would allow the market to determine the value of the local currency. These are the things that fund managers will remember long after the dust settles on the current crisis. In other words, Singapore=92s behavior has considerably enhanced its position as a major regional financial center. It is easy to talk like a financial center during booming times, but it can be hard to act like one during troubled times. Singapore has once again succeeded in doing so.=20 Singapore was unlucky in that the regional financial crisis took place at a time when the country was experiencing a robust debate within the leadership about the continued usefulness of a range of long-established policies. The uncertainty thus created helps to explain why Singapore was not able to play its traditional role of safe haven in times of crisis.=20 In Singapore=92s tightly controlled political environment, it is often difficult to be certain about just who is supporting what policy changes. The pressure, however, is for institutional change and possibly economic liberalization, although even among those most clearly favoring a re-evaluation of fundamental policies the old instinct for control has not completely disappeared. The main focus at the moment is the financial system, although it is also worth pointing out that a far more wide-ranging review of Singapore=92s competitiveness chaired by Trade and Industry Minister Lee Yock Suan is in the pipeline. Important changes are also being introduced into the education system, and the government has announced a more liberal approach to the use of foreign labor. Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, together with other members of the Lee family, are most closely associated with the drive towards economic liberalization and institutional restructuring, while the widely respected Deputy Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, Koh Beng Seng, appears to be in the conservative camp. Beyond that, however, the closed nature of the Singapore political landscape makes it difficult to be sure just how senior officials are lining up in the= debate.=20 A robust debate is taking place, however. In early August, Mr. Koh submitted his resignation to the MAS. Such was the concern of the government at the potential loss of such a highly regarded figure that Prime Minister Goh felt it necessary to intervene to persuade him to stay on. Soon afterwards, he was named as a member of a high-level committee chaired by Lee Hsien Loong charged with reviewing the financial sector.=20 Meanwhile, the nation has also been treated to a series of unusually public exchanges between ministers regarding the character of the nation=92s financial sector. In mid-August, former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew lamented in a speech to his Tanjong Pagar constituents that Singapore=92s financial sector lacked the 'buzz' of Hong Kong, where foreign and local forex dealers and share brokers socialised much more than they did in Singapore, exchanging information. The message appeared to be that Singapore should encourage such a spread of information by word of mouth by people in the know because it helped alert key players to important new financial developments. In a subsequent interview with a local newspaper, Finance Minister Richard Hu argued that such a 'buzz' was not really needed in Singapore because it did not have a large syndicated loan market. MNCs in the country funded their operations centrally from within the group, while government-linked companies, being largely cash-rich, did not need to resort to raising bonds or bank borrowings. "You don't expect us to go down to Clarke Quay and Boat Quay to drink to create the buzz", he added somewhat scornfully.=20 Just how Singapore leaders hope to encourage local players to exchange information more freely has yet to be explained. According to Trade and Industry Minister Lee Yock Suan, Singapore's draconian Official Secrets Act (OSA) is still necessary, and in any case should not have any bearing on the fact that the financial sector has no 'buzz'. However, it will be a long time before stockbrokers, bankers and journalists working in the island forget the events of 1992, when several people (including stockbrokers and a newspaper editor) were prosecuted under the OSA after an economic growth figure was leaked to the press. The fear of official retribution also extends to other areas. Few businessmen like to be quoted by name in the press when it comes to the possible negative effects of government policy on their business operations, for example.=20 In terms of concrete policy shifts, the internal debate has so far produced few real changes, partly because there are still powerful forces within the government resisting change. The issue getting the most attention at present is whether or not the nine-year-old policy of distinguishing between foreign and locally-held shares in banks and other large companies regarded as strategically important should be abolished. Speculation among stockbrokers and other analysts intensified after August 8, when the government-owned Singapore Technologies Group announced an end to its foreign-local share split. Because the company is headed by Ho Ching, wife of Lee Hsien Loong, the move was initially taken as an indication of a change in government policy. However, repeated statements by the MAS that it did not intend to allow local banks to change their foreign shareholding limits revealed that at least some senior leaders were leery of opening up the financial sector too quickly. Since then, the reformers have backed off. Abolishing the dual share system in other large companies now would inevitably deal a double blow to the portfolios of foreign fund managers (which hold the higher-valued foreign shares) at a time when both the Singapore and regional stock markets are already suffering from a crisis of confidence as a result of turmoil in the foreign exchange market.=20 Market talk has it that other structural changes are also being discussed at senior levels. These include splitting up the functions of regulation and development of the financial sector and transferring some functions to the Economic Development Board. Reformers also argue that a separate agency should be set up to regulate the securities industry, leaving the promotional role with the stock exchange, an idea akin to the current practice in the US and Hong Kong, where the Securities Exchange Commission and the Securities and Futures Commission respectively act as regulators while the exchanges function as promoters. Gerald Corrigan, the US expert hired recently to advise Finance Minister Richard Hu on how to develop the finance sector, appears to agree. In a recent interview, he questioned the wisdom of housing the supervising authority for all financial institutions in one body, arguing that it could develop into a huge lumbering bureaucracy which lacked the ability to act quickly.=20 Just how many of these changes will result in a less-regimented financial sector is more difficult to say. Bankers often complain privately about the pervasive climate of control, noting =96 for example =96 that even the location of automatic teller machines in the island is regulated. For their part, brokers complain about the extent to which the MAS micromanages their operations, and the restrictions which make it difficult for them to get into fund management or launch new products such as stock index futures. Significantly, there are no suggestions that the authorities are considering easing up in any of these areas. Finance Minister Richard Hu has also poured cold water on suggestions that Singapore boldly remove some of the restrictions that currently prevent foreign banks from gaining a larger share of the retail banking business. Officials still see the primary role of foreign banks in the country in terms of their ability to do offshore, not domestic business.=20 Even when a major policy change is announced, the government tends to move cautiously =96 at least in the financial sector. Expectations were high in 1994, for example, when the government announced that government-linked corporations (GLCs) would henceforth be permitted to release more funds to fund managers. However, these GLCs have since proven remarkably slow in awarding such mandates to fund managers in the private sector. Most have continued to park their excess funds in fixed deposits and government bonds.= =20 What is clear, however, is that the government's attitude to the employment of foreign labor has undergone an important transformation. In 1991, Prime Minister Goh warned the nation about the undesirability of an over-dependence on foreign labor. At his national day rally speech in August this year, however, Mr. Goh argued strongly for a far more accommodating approach. The official view now is that foreign talent will be needed across the board =96 not just at the top =96 if Singapore is to remain competitive. From now on, it appears that large numbers of foreign blue-collar laborers, including technicians and even bus drivers, may actually be welcomed instead of grudgingly accepted as necessary to meet local shortages. Singapore's already liberal immigration rules are to be further relaxed, more rental housing made available to foreigners, and more places created in government schools for their children. The move echoes a similar policy shift regarding Singaporeans who choose to emigrate. Once labelled as failures or deserters, senior leaders now encourage former citizens to maintain their links with Singapore in order to help the nation expand regionally.=20 The education system appears to be going through a similar transition. There has always been some form of lip service in Singapore to the need to prevent students focusing too narrowly on one discipline at the expense of wider general knowledge. As far back as 1980 then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew also argued that the objective of local universities should be to produce an 'educated man', which he defined as someone schooled to the point where he could probe, learn and solve problems for himself. However, the resulting public discussion on the need to broaden the knowledge base of students resulted in few significant changes, and the private sector continued to quietly lament the lack of independent thought among locally trained university graduates.=20 In 1993, however, things began to change when the authorities announced that they had begun a pilot foundation skills course designed to expose first year Arts and Social Sciences students to critical and analytical thinking, creative writing and time and stress management. Since then, the drive to re-orientate the education system has been stepped up, with creative thinking programs being implemented in selected secondary schools. After the elections in January, these changes were pursued with renewed vigor by political heavyweight Tony Tan and newly appointed Education Minister Rear Admiral Teo Chee Hean, a rising star in the Cabinet. The move parallels earlier structural changes under which the government has established a system of 'independent' schools where students pay higher fees and principals have greater say over such matters as staffing and class sizes.=20 However, as with many changes now being considered in other areas, at least some officials seem reluctant to depart very far from the old system of controls. Legislation passed by parliament in August this year ostensibly to help 'thinking schools' enhance their management systems, also appears to have introduced new checks into the system to prevent schools departing too far from national norms. In any case, it is not altogether clear how the government intends to overcome the reluctance of students to express their own ideas in the classroom without at the same time encouraging them to challenge aspects of the nation=92s authoritarian political system which the government regards as essential.=20 Return to Country Index=20 Economic Indicators: Singapore=20 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997f =20 Real GDP Growth (%) 6.04 10.10 10.10 8.90 7.00 6.50 Total Exports=20 (fob, US$ bil) 63.40 74.01 96.83 118.27 123.40 126.70 Total Imports=20 (cif US$ bil) 77.10 85.23 102.67 124.51 124.00 133.30 Current Account Balance=20 (US$ bil) 6.10 5.17 11.95 15.10 14.20 12.60 Foreign Exchange Reserves=20 (US$ bil) 39.66 48.07 57.89 68.35 76.50 82.00 Total External Debt=20 (US$ bil) Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Debt Servicing =20 (US$ bil) Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Exchange Rate vs US$=20 (year-end) 1.64 1.61 1.46 1.41 1.40 1.52 Inflation=20 (CPI %) 2.30 2.30 3.10 1.70 1.40 2.20 =20 f PERC forecast Neg negligible =20 Copyright 1997 Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, Ltd.=20 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ All articles are posted here in the public interest. The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the list-owner. To unsubscribe, please send an e-mail to majordomo@list.sintercom.org with the line: unsubscribe sgdaily your@email.address -________________________________________________ List Owner: M.G.G. Pillai Free Homepages on malaysia.net - send blank Check out the malaysia.net web site on List Postings to ________________________________________________ From rkmoore@iol.ie Wed Nov 5 04:33:06 1997 Wed, 5 Nov 1997 11:32:36 GMT Date: Wed, 5 Nov 1997 11:32:36 GMT To: rkmoore@iol.ie (private list) From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Invitation to try cyberjournal list I'd like to an extend an invitation to join the cyberjournal list, at least on a trial basis - the traffic is not heavy. Cj was featured as TipWorld's Mailing List of the Day for 10/23/97. They described the list as follows: CYBERJOURNAL CJ for short, this is one of many lists sponsored by the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. A moderated forum to talk about anything you want, recent posts include juicy conspiracy theories about Princess Diana's death, the increasing emergence of global monopolies, and international corruption. Perspectives from around the world, specially written articles, quotes, and cross-postings of other newsletters are common. In fact cj is more like a "journal" than a "talk forum", and the focus is on globalization, the changing architecture of world systems, political realism, propaganda and mind control, democracy, and the opportunities and challenges for progressive activism. Coming up on cj will be a new series of articles/essays which will make up the first-draft of a book aimed at comprehensively exposing the true nature of globalization: "Globalization and the New World Order - democracy at a crossroads". Interspersed with this series will be items of special interest and responses/contributions from subscribers. To join cyberjournal, simply send: To: listserv@cpsr.org Subject: (ignored) --- sub cyberjournal John Doe <-- your name there ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ Posted by Richard K. Moore - rkmoore@iol.ie - PO Box 26, Wexford, Ireland www.iol.ie/~rkmoore/cyberjournal (USA Citizen) * Please forward this invitation to appropriate lists * ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ From chriscd@jhu.edu Thu Nov 6 14:51:17 1997 Date: Thu, 06 Nov 1997 16:47:48 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: Un poste de professeur ordinaire] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu Date: Thu, 06 Nov 1997 17:07:17 +0100 From: isa@sis.ucm.es (International Sociological Association) Subject: Un poste de professeur ordinaire Apparently-to: chriscd@jhu.edu To: chriscd@jhu.edu Reply-to: isa@sis.ucm.es A: Membres d'Association Internationale de Sociologie Re: Un poste de PROFESSEUR ORDINAIRE DE SOCIOLOGIE UNIVERSITE DE NEUCHATEL (SUISSE) FACULTE DE DROIT ET DES SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES Le candidat devra assumer un enseignement de sociologie de deux heures en 1er cycle et de 5 heures en 2eme cycle (annees III et IV), diriger des recherches et prendre part aux travaux administratifs. Entre en fonction:1er octobre 1998 Titre exige: doctorat en sociologie ou titre juge equivalent Les enseignements et les recherches seront orientes vers des problemes etroitement lies l'economie (inegalites sociales, consommation, insertion..., mais aussi rapports epistemologiques entre economie et sociologie). Les demandes de renseignements peuvent etre adressees au Prof. Franois Hainard Faculte de droit et des sciences economiques, Av. du 1er Mars 26 2000 Neuchatel, Suisse. Les candidatures doivent etre presentees avec curriculum vitae, liste des publications (et publications importantes annexees), projets de recherche et references, au Departement de l'instruction publique et des affaires culturelles,l Chateau, 2001 Neuchatel, Suisse, jusqu'au 15 janvier 1998. Les places mises au concours sont ouvertes indifferemment aux hommes et aux femmes. From phuakl@sit.edu.my Thu Nov 6 19:51:25 1997 7 Nov 97 10:53:26 +1100 From: "DR. PHUA KAI LIT" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Fri, 7 Nov 1997 10:52:58 +0000 Subject: (Fwd) [sangkancil] Malaysia Report ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- From: yfyap@pop.jaring.my (Yap Yok Foo) To: sangkancil@malaysia.net Subject: [sangkancil] Malaysia Report Date: Fri, 07 Nov 1997 01:34:47 GMT Organization: Private Reply-to: yfyap@pop.jaring.my (Yap Yok Foo) ________________________________________________ This week's sponsors -The Asia Pacific Internet Company (APIC) Business Internet Services. Some talk. Some do. We talk and do! for instant info ________________________________________________ Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, Ltd.- PERC Malaysia Country Risk Report: (taken from www.asiarisk.com) Executive Summary oMalaysia may have suffered along with the rest of Asia in the current financial crisis, but its behavior over the last few months may well ensure that it is no longer regarded as part of the crowd when foreign investors eventually return. Instead, fund managers are likely to favor countries such as Singapore and even Indonesia which are perceived to have reacted more appropriately. oGovernment intimidation of local economists and market analysts in recent months has been so effective that the credibility of economic analysis originating from Malaysia is now in serious doubt. The result is that outside observers are in danger of swinging too far in the opposite direction, overlooking genuinely positive developments and focusing on the negative ones instead. oWatch out for further moves to restrict the number of foreign laborers in the country. In addition to the usual arguments about such workers being associated with a rising incidence of crime and communicable diseases, policy-makers now have a powerful economic argument. In recent weeks officials have been pointing out that foreign workers in the country remit an estimated M$4 billion to their home countries each year, thus contributing significantly to the services deficit. oPrime Minister Mahathir's reported remarks about the possible involvement of Jewish financiers in the current financial crisis could encourage more radical Muslim groups in the Middle East to take up the issue in a way that Malaysia finds very uncomfortable indeed. This, in turn, may make it difficult for Malaysia to attract additional foreign investments in the future, particularly from the US. Domestically, however, the issue has been well received in the predominantly Muslim rural areas of the country. Near-Term Outlook Credibility problem When asked to list the main misconceptions held by their head offices, several expatriate businessmen working in Malaysia complained that their superiors mistakenly believed the country to be a backward and unsophisticated place. The most serious misconception about Malaysia held by head offices until very recently, however, was almost exactly the opposite: the idea that Malaysia is a far easier and safer place to do business than it is in reality. Both the regional financial crisis and Dr. Mahathir's sharp reaction to it has served as a timely reminder that personalities rather than formal institutional mechanisms remain the key driving forces in both economic and political affairs in Malaysia, and that the business environment is not quite as transparent as many outside the country would like to believe. This is not the same thing as saying that Malaysia is entirely lacking in sophistication. The country has a very large pool of foreign-educated graduates in fields such as engineering, accountancy and economics who are well suited to working in a Western-style corporate environment. Despite the traffic jams which regularly clog its major cities, Malaysia can also boast of an infrastructure which is very well developed by Asian standards. Moreover, while Malaysia's legal system has its imperfections, in general it really does provide a practical avenue of redress for aggrieved foreign companies - a point which cannot be made with as much confidence about many other countries in the region. It was just these attributes, along with continued political stability, that has enabled the country to sell itself successfully to foreign investors as a good place to do business over the last few years. US-based electronics companies in particular found Malaysia to be a convenient location for their manufacturing plants. Until very recently, important US and Japanese companies also gave serious consideration to several of Dr. Mahathir's ambitious schemes, such as the drive to create a Malaysian version of California's Silicon Valley. Meanwhile, continued strong economic growth encouraged banks and foreign fund managers to toy with the idea of supporting Malaysia's effort to become a major regional financial center. In the euphoria to join the bandwagon, however, many head offices lost sight of some of the less palatable aspects of doing business in the country. Corporate reporting standards and the rights of minority shareholders, for example, fall well below those of most Western nations. It is partly for this reason that many of the more important Malaysian conglomerates were able to take out large bank loans to finance risky projects which now threaten to turn sour. Other issues of concern include the extent to which politically well-connected companies have been able to obtain major contracts in circumstances that are frequently less than transparent. National economic institutions such as the Central Bank, while more sophisticated than in many other countries in the region, are also quite open to manipulation for short-term political purposes. Unfortunately, in times of political stability and strong economic growth, such matters are easily forgotten in the rush to make money. One of the ironies about the recent financial turmoil is that, while Malaysia's financial system is among the more sophisticated in Southeast Asia - certainly far more so than that of Indonesia, for example - it is generally perceived as having responded to the crisis in a particularly crude and inappropriate manner. Of these responses, perhaps the worst was Dr. Mahathir's comment that foreign exchange trading should be banned, or at least severely curtailed. A close second would have to be the threats of arrest made against local stockbrokers and other analysts who produced critical analyses about Malaysia's economic situation. Dr. Mahathir's more recent comment about the possible role of Jewish financiers has also damaged the country's international standing. Even so, it is important not to swing too far to the other extreme and adopt the view that Malaysia is little better than a banana republic. When the dust settles, it may be well to remember that most of the controversies were triggered by one man - Prime Minister Mahathir - and that even he did very little to back up his talk with any real action. Foreign exchange trading continued unabated throughout the crisis, no analysts were actually arrested, and despite the apparent policy flip flops, there were no major changes to economic policy apart from announcements regarding government spending cuts. The nation's continued political stability was not at risk either, despite ill-informed rumors generated outside the country to the effect that Finance Minister Anwar considered using the crisis to attempt to unseat Mahathir. Even so, there is no getting away from the fact that foreign perceptions of Malaysia have changed significantly for the worse over the past few months. Government spending cutbacks, combined with a dramatic fall in share prices, have ensured that foreign investors are now more likely to think twice about claims that a particular well-connected company will necessarily be able to make money easily, despite its heavy borrowings and risky projects. There will also be greater demands for more sophisticated analyses by the broking community and pressure for improved disclosure standards. If all this results in a more balanced head office view of the country, so much the better. Malaysia meanwhile continues to suffer from a credibility problem. When the international mood towards Southeast Asia eventually turns positive once again, Malaysia could find itself being left out in the cold as fund managers favor countries perceived to have acted more appropriately during the crisis. Having been less directly affected by the turmoil, foreign manufacturers and contractors operating in Malaysia probably have a less critical view, but even they will find it difficult not to be influenced by the negative sentiment which has developed over the past few months. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Economic Indicators 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996e 1997f Real GDP Growth (%) 8.65 7.80 8.30 8.70 9.50 8.20 7.20 Total Exports (fob, US$ bil) 34.41 40.63 47.10 58.56 73.81 77.74 74.00 Total Imports (cif US$ bil) 36.75 39.93 45.61 59.41 78.00 77.98 78.00 Current Account Balance (US$ bil) -4.53 -1.60 -2.81 -4.15 -7.46 -5.17 -9.00 Foreign Exchange Reserves (US$ bil) 10.42 16.80 26.81 24.89 22.95 26.16 23.00 Total External Debt (US$ bil) 17.80 19.96 23.30 24.77 27.50 28.70 31.00 Debt Servicing (US$ bil) 2.60 2.92 4.21 5.04 5.50 6.00 6.20 Exchange Rate vs US$ (year-end) 2.72 2.61 2.70 2.56 2.54 2.53 3.20 Inflation (CPI %) 4.40 4.70 3.60 3.70 3.40 3.50 3.80 To send us comments please email us at info@asiarisk.com -________________________________________________ List Owner: M.G.G. Pillai Free Homepages on malaysia.net - send blank Check out the malaysia.net web site on List Postings to ________________________________________________ From chriscd@jhu.edu Fri Nov 7 07:06:59 1997 Date: Fri, 07 Nov 1997 09:03:02 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: International Studies Association :November Newsletter and Preliminary Program To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu (LISTSERV-TCP/IP release 1.8c) Date: Thu, 06 Nov 1997 10:14:22 -0700 From: Lawrence E Imwalle Subject: November Newsletter (Preliminary Program) Sender: International Studies Association News To: ISA-NEWS@LISTSERV.ARIZONA.EDU Reply-to: International Studies Association News Approved-By: Lawrence E Imwalle Dear ISA Members: The November Issue of the ISA Newsletter is now available on the ISA Website: http://www.isanet.org (Follow the links under Newsletter) Included as part of the November newsletter is the Preliminary Program for the Annual Convention in Minneapolis (March 17-21, 1998). The preliminary program can be accessed via the ISA Website at: http://csf.colorado.edu/minn/minn-home.html If you have any questions please contact ISA Headquarters (isa@arizona.edu) Best regards, ISA Staff From rkmoore@iol.ie Fri Nov 7 07:26:36 1997 Fri, 7 Nov 1997 14:26:01 GMT Date: Fri, 7 Nov 1997 14:26:01 GMT To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu (world-system network), philofhi@yorku.ca (philosophy of history) From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Book in development: "Globalization & NWO - democracy at a crossroads" Below are the Summary and Outline for a book I'm currently developing (in collaboratin with Carolyn Ballard) - a book which seeks to put globalization in its appropriate historical perspective as a coherent and profound tranformation of the global political system - so profound as to force comparison with the Enlightenment-inspired revolutions, the Treaty of Westphalia, and even the fall of Rome. Some of the book's themes have been debated on this list - indeed members of the list have contributed (partly via their objections) to the development of the ideas and their presentation. I'd welcome comments regarding the thesis and organization of the book - references, criticisms, encouragements, potential publishers, etc. Who knows - someone may even want to contribute some material as a co-author. As I mentioned a day or two ago, I'll be publishing an abbreviated first draft of the book as a series of essays - following the outline topics point by point, one essay per point. This series will be posted to the cyberjournal list, which anyone is invited to join. I'd be happy to publish the series here as well if there were a groundswell of interest expressed. (:>) Regards, rkm ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~-~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Globalization and the New World Order -- democracy at a crossroads Copyright 1997 by Richard K. Moore ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~-~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ SUMMARY ^^^^^^^ The thesis of this book is that globalization is a political transformation of profound signficance, replacing the nation-state system with an elite-dominated globalist regime - and scuttling in the process two centuries of democratic traditions. Far more than an economic agenda, globalization brings a comprehensive revolution, with new paradigms of international order, commercial enterprise, national sovereignty, and social control. But while rapid and far-reaching, this revolution has been largely a stealth affair - a kind of spread-spectrum blitzkrieg attack, run under cover of official obfuscation. To put the globalist revolution in perspective, the history of the past two centuries is revisited; the modern nation state is interpreted as a partnership-of-mutual-interest between the people (in its democratic aspects) and the elite (in its capitalist aspects). The strained partnership has resulted in a cyclical see-saw struggle for power between elite and popular interests - resulting in a kind of rough-justice approximation of democracy. Since the 1980's, the elite have increasingly enjoyed a high position on the see-saw, as laissez-faire governments have come into power worldwide - particularly in the West. Globalization is the "locking in" of this temporary ascendency - the imposition of a New World Order in which economic, political, and military power are officially and permanently assigned to elite-dominated supra-national institutions. The global elite, to put it broadly, are abandoning the nation-state partnership and the see-saw compromise: they want it all. On this broad canvas, the book examines Western imperialism, the "Free World" era, the growth of transnational corporations, neoliberal policies, corruption of the democratic process, modern interventionism, the threat of police states and the Third-World precedent, elite planning, covert operations, the mass media, propaganda, divide-and-conquer populism, and more. The book closes with an examination of democracy, economics, the nation state, and the prospects for popular political activism. With the nation state having been abandoned by capitalism, the people are being disempowered and disenfranchised; they have a vanshing window of opportunity to make use of the democratic process and rebalance the see-saw. There will be one revolution or the other - but no standing still. ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~-~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= OUTLINE ^^^^^^^ I. Introduction A. Brief review of globalization and world systems B. Introduction of threads to be developed in book C. Positioning of this material in context of other available works and perspectives D. Statement of scope II. The USA - prototype of the republican nation state A. Monarchial origins and competing elites B. The colonial experience: autonomy and commerce C. Independence: dual motivation and dual benefit D. A strained partnership: the see-saw of democracy; elite vs people E. The expansion imperative and the ever-growing pie III. The evolution of the nation-state system and the birth of globalism A. The nation-state system up to WW II B. Uncle Sam as King of the Hill: postwar collective imperialism C. The "Free World" system and the rise of TNC's: redefining "national interests" D. The USA: microcosm and champion of globalization IV. World order under globalism A. The end-of-Cold-War crisis B. The special role of the U.S. in globalism C. The US/NATO police force; the Desert Storm precedent D. "Kulturkampf" and regional proxies: toy geopolitics E. Rounding up the stragglers: the China question F. The role of covert operations: what you don't know won't hurt you V. The neoliberal revolution and the globalist regime A. The neoliberal revolution: the elite abandon the nation state B. Who are "they"?: the reality of elite consciousness C. The globalist regime: a stealth coup d'etat D. Devolution, the EU, and "peacekeeping": a trojan cavalry E. The institutionalization of domination: systematic disempowerment F. Earth, Incorporated: the logic of capital concentration VI. Democracy and the media A. Propaganda and democracy: the poison in the soup B. Conspiracies and cover-ups: it's turtles all the way down C. Privatization and monopoly cliques: cloning the U.S. model D. The modern mass-media industry and scientific mind control E. Globalization, neoliberalism, and cyberspace: case studies in propaganda thought control F. Divide-and-conquer populism: cults and social control G. Cyberspace: the ultimate Orwellian medium VII. National decay and the police state A. Social decline and unrest: predictable consequences of globalism B. The Third-World police-state precedent C. Crossing the Rubicon: First-World police-state apparatus D. Smuggling camels: the "war" on drugs, crime and terrorism E. Corporate-feudalism: governments as "royal governors" F. Cyberspace: global surveillance and centralized control VIII. One revolution or the other A. The center cannot hold: nation-state partnership cancelled B. It can't happen here?... the boiling-frog scenario C. Democracy: realities and deceptions D. Economics: sense and nonsense E. The nation state: precious bastion of popular power F. Political activism: the means are the ends G. The journey of a thousand miles... ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~-~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ Posted by Richard K. Moore - rkmoore@iol.ie - PO Box 26, Wexford, Ireland www.iol.ie/~rkmoore/cyberjournal (USA Citizen) * Non-commercial republication encouraged - Please include this sig * ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ From dgrammen@prairienet.org Fri Nov 7 09:30:59 1997 for ; Fri, 7 Nov 1997 10:30:52 -0600 (CST) Fri, 7 Nov 1997 10:30:52 -0600 (CST) Date: Fri, 7 Nov 1997 10:30:51 -0600 (CST) From: Dennis Grammenos To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Y Y BBBBB CCCCCC TTTTTTTTT AAA BBBBB AAA Y B B CC TTT AA AA B B AA AA YY YY B B CC TTT AA AA B B AA AA YY YY BBBB CC TTT AA AA BBBB AA AA YY YYY B B CC TTT AAAAAAA B B AAAAAAA YY Y YY B B CC TTT AA AA B B AA AA YYY YY BBBBB CCCCCC TTT AA AA BBBBB AA AA YY YY 8 8 0 0 8 8 0 0 8 8 0 0 8888 0 0 8 8 0 0 8 8 0 0 8 8 0 0 From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Fri Nov 7 11:11:49 1997 Date: Fri, 7 Nov 1997 13:12:00 -0500 (EST) From: Gunder Frank AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAA To: "Richard K. Moore" Subject: Re: Book in development: "Globalization & NWO - democracy at a crossroads" In-Reply-To: Congrats and good luck. but 200 years is a rather short and insufficiently braod perspective on contemporary globalization. Even the 600 year one i sue in ReORIENT is not nearly enough - to see whats goin' on here and now. gunder frank On Fri, 7 Nov 1997, Richard K. Moore wrote: > Date: Fri, 7 Nov 1997 14:26:01 GMT > From: "Richard K. Moore" > To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK > Subject: Book in development: "Globalization & NWO - democracy at a crossroads" > > > Below are the Summary and Outline for a book I'm currently developing (in > collaboratin with Carolyn Ballard) - a book which seeks to put > globalization in its appropriate historical perspective as a coherent and > profound tranformation of the global political system - so profound as to > force comparison with the Enlightenment-inspired revolutions, the Treaty of > Westphalia, and even the fall of Rome. > > Some of the book's themes have been debated on this list - indeed members > of the list have contributed (partly via their objections) to the > development of the ideas and their presentation. I'd welcome comments > regarding the thesis and organization of the book - references, criticisms, > encouragements, potential publishers, etc. Who knows - someone may even > want to contribute some material as a co-author. > > As I mentioned a day or two ago, I'll be publishing an abbreviated first > draft of the book as a series of essays - following the outline topics > point by point, one essay per point. This series will be posted to the > cyberjournal list, which anyone is invited to join. I'd be happy to > publish the series here as well if there were a groundswell of interest > expressed. (:>) > > Regards, > rkm > > > ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~-~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= > > Globalization and the New World Order > -- democracy at a crossroads > > Copyright 1997 by Richard K. Moore > > ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~-~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ > > SUMMARY > ^^^^^^^ > > The thesis of this book is that globalization is a political transformation > of profound signficance, replacing the nation-state system with an > elite-dominated globalist regime - and scuttling in the process two > centuries of democratic traditions. Far more than an economic agenda, > globalization brings a comprehensive revolution, with new paradigms of > international order, commercial enterprise, national sovereignty, and > social control. But while rapid and far-reaching, this revolution has been > largely a stealth affair - a kind of spread-spectrum blitzkrieg attack, run > under cover of official obfuscation. > > To put the globalist revolution in perspective, the history of the past two > centuries is revisited; the modern nation state is interpreted as a > partnership-of-mutual-interest between the people (in its democratic > aspects) and the elite (in its capitalist aspects). The strained > partnership has resulted in a cyclical see-saw struggle for power between > elite and popular interests - resulting in a kind of rough-justice > approximation of democracy. > > Since the 1980's, the elite have increasingly enjoyed a high position on > the see-saw, as laissez-faire governments have come into power worldwide - > particularly in the West. Globalization is the "locking in" of this > temporary ascendency - the imposition of a New World Order in which > economic, political, and military power are officially and permanently > assigned to elite-dominated supra-national institutions. The global elite, > to put it broadly, are abandoning the nation-state partnership and the > see-saw compromise: they want it all. > > On this broad canvas, the book examines Western imperialism, the "Free > World" era, the growth of transnational corporations, neoliberal policies, > corruption of the democratic process, modern interventionism, the threat of > police states and the Third-World precedent, elite planning, covert > operations, the mass media, propaganda, divide-and-conquer populism, and > more. > > The book closes with an examination of democracy, economics, the nation > state, and the prospects for popular political activism. With the nation > state having been abandoned by capitalism, the people are being > disempowered and disenfranchised; they have a vanshing window of > opportunity to make use of the democratic process and rebalance the > see-saw. There will be one revolution or the other - but no standing > still. > > ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~-~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= > > OUTLINE > ^^^^^^^ > > > I. Introduction > A. Brief review of globalization and world systems > B. Introduction of threads to be developed in book > C. Positioning of this material in context of other available works > and perspectives > D. Statement of scope > > II. The USA - prototype of the republican nation state > A. Monarchial origins and competing elites > B. The colonial experience: autonomy and commerce > C. Independence: dual motivation and dual benefit > D. A strained partnership: the see-saw of democracy; elite vs people > E. The expansion imperative and the ever-growing pie > > III. The evolution of the nation-state system and the birth of globalism > A. The nation-state system up to WW II > B. Uncle Sam as King of the Hill: postwar collective imperialism > C. The "Free World" system and the rise of TNC's: redefining "national > interests" > D. The USA: microcosm and champion of globalization > > IV. World order under globalism > A. The end-of-Cold-War crisis > B. The special role of the U.S. in globalism > C. The US/NATO police force; the Desert Storm precedent > D. "Kulturkampf" and regional proxies: toy geopolitics > E. Rounding up the stragglers: the China question > F. The role of covert operations: what you don't know won't hurt you > > V. The neoliberal revolution and the globalist regime > A. The neoliberal revolution: the elite abandon the nation state > B. Who are "they"?: the reality of elite consciousness > C. The globalist regime: a stealth coup d'etat > D. Devolution, the EU, and "peacekeeping": a trojan cavalry > E. The institutionalization of domination: systematic disempowerment > F. Earth, Incorporated: the logic of capital concentration > > VI. Democracy and the media > A. Propaganda and democracy: the poison in the soup > B. Conspiracies and cover-ups: it's turtles all the way down > C. Privatization and monopoly cliques: cloning the U.S. model > D. The modern mass-media industry and scientific mind control > E. Globalization, neoliberalism, and cyberspace: case studies in > propaganda thought control > F. Divide-and-conquer populism: cults and social control > G. Cyberspace: the ultimate Orwellian medium > > VII. National decay and the police state > A. Social decline and unrest: predictable consequences of globalism > B. The Third-World police-state precedent > C. Crossing the Rubicon: First-World police-state apparatus > D. Smuggling camels: the "war" on drugs, crime and terrorism > E. Corporate-feudalism: governments as "royal governors" > F. Cyberspace: global surveillance and centralized control > > VIII. One revolution or the other > A. The center cannot hold: nation-state partnership cancelled > B. It can't happen here?... the boiling-frog scenario > C. Democracy: realities and deceptions > D. Economics: sense and nonsense > E. The nation state: precious bastion of popular power > F. Political activism: the means are the ends > G. The journey of a thousand miles... > > ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~-~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= > > ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ > Posted by Richard K. Moore - rkmoore@iol.ie - PO Box 26, Wexford, Ireland > www.iol.ie/~rkmoore/cyberjournal (USA Citizen) > * Non-commercial republication encouraged - Please include this sig * > ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ > > > > From chriscd@jhu.edu Fri Nov 7 11:23:51 1997 Date: Fri, 07 Nov 1997 13:21:15 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: Post for an Americanist] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu 07 Nov 1997 04:09:12 -0600 (CST) by mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu (8.8.5/8.8.5/mcfeeley.mc-1.21) 07 Nov 1997 04:08:11 -0600 (CST) ; Fri, 07 Nov 1997 10:08:06 +0000 (GMT) Date: Fri, 07 Nov 1997 10:07:41 +0000 From: Peter Riviere Subject: Post for an Americanist Sender: owner-lasnet@mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu To: lasnet@mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu Reply-to: peter.riviere@anthropology.oxford.ac.uk The University of Oxford is currently advertising the post of Lecturer in Ethnology and Curator of the Pitt Rivers Museum. Preference may be given to an Americanist and applicants should have expertise in one or more of the following subjects: visual anthropology, technology, material culture, museology. Applications close on December 1st. To receive further particulars contact orient@orinst.ox.ac.uk Peter G Riviere, Institute of Social & Cultural Anthropology, University of Oxford, 51 Banbury Road, Oxford OX2 6PE Direct telephone: 01865-274680; FAX: 01865-274630 E-mail: peter.riviere@anthropology.oxford.ac.uk From dasa3000@mondrian.sgol.it Fri Nov 7 15:27:00 1997 Date: Fri, 07 Nov 1997 23:22:27 +0100 To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: "Danilo D'Antonio" Subject: Only two words on globalism and globalization Best regards at all! I wish only do a modest reflection on globalism and globalization. >From the term "global", in this epoch so indispensable to communicate certain ideas, rise several words whose meaning seems to me still be a subjective one. It is well that we see a distinction, first of all, between the two main terms: globalization and globalism. I think we can use the term globalization to define something fairly similar to a process of world-wide colonization. I refer to particular and widespread economic strategies that aim to draw the greatest immediate gain, often extremely standardizing the economies and the cultures in the various countries in the world. If inside this globalization process there are certain and well recognized advantages (it is well known that through it the wellbeing and the prosperity increase everywhere in the world), nevertheless there are also terrible negative aspects (exhaustion of the natural resources, pollution, overpopulation, great economic and social disparities) that lead us to think be very useful a procedure of careful analysis and discernment, before to blindly continue toward this direction. This moment of reflection could just be defined, in my modest opinion, with the other term: globalism. Usually we use the term globalism to define something similar to a vision of the world: to see how the whole is so deeply interconnected that even the action of few people can influence the life of all the others and of us ourselves, then. It is clear in this the connection with a term and a philosophic concept of fundamental importance in our era, the holism: to consider everything as part of a whole. But globalism remembers us also the concept of universalism: to recognize the common origins of all the peoples on the Earth and to cooperate, as justly as possible, all together in order to reach global common goals. Globalism then immediately leads us to the highest respect and attention for all the peoples and for our very planet. Globalism for example means a good ecology, a widely sustainable from nature economic growth, the interruption of the overpopulation phenomenon and a better distribution of tasks, opportunities and gains. While we can attribute to the term globalization a value of activity, of active intervention, to the term globalism we can correlate processes of analisys and reflection. To the first term we can link the figure of the globalizer, a real colonizer on a planetary scale, a person with great talents but with few free time to deeply reflect; to the second term we can link the figure of the globalist, a researcher, a philosopher who has as object of his thoughts the happy and prosper interaction between the peoples on the planet and with the very planet. It is not casual that we cannot find a verb to link to the terms "globalism" and "globalist", just because at them no action is connected in the material reality. While at the terms "globalization" and "globalizer" we can easily link the verb: to globalize. We can however see globalization and globalism like two complementary tendencies, even mutually indispensable each other. A globalization that does not attain the visions and the reflections of globalism is destined to produce, in the long run, more troubles than benefits. Globalists without globalizers, on the contrary, have knowledge and wisdom without the concrete abilities of the action. It is important have well clear in mind the distinction between these two terms and their respective meanings, as from the good equilibrium of the energies put in movement by them derives our survival and that of our very planet. Many thanks for your kind attention, Danilo D'Antonio --- LABORATORIO EUDEMONIA oO$Oo Cosa seminerai oggi? Via Fonte Regina, 23 - 64100 - Teramo - Italy tel & fax: 0861/415655 - e.mail: dasa3000@sgol.it http://oasi.asti.it/Homes/eudemonia/mappa.htm From phuakl@sit.edu.my Fri Nov 7 18:26:42 1997 8 Nov 97 09:29:38 +1100 From: "DR. PHUA KAI LIT" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Sat, 8 Nov 1997 09:28:47 +0000 Subject: (Fwd) [sangkancil] Najib undermines academic freedom (fw) ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date: Fri, 07 Nov 1997 22:44:48 +1100 To: sangkancil@malaysia.net From: Bala Pillai Subject: [sangkancil] Najib undermines academic freedom (fw) Reply-to: Bala Pillai ________________________________________________ This week's sponsors -The Asia Pacific Internet Company (APIC) Business Internet Services. Some talk. Some do. We talk and do! for instant info ________________________________________________ **bounced msg forwarded** From: "MK Lee" To: sangkancil@malaysia.net Subject: Najib undermines academic freedom Date: Fri, 07 Nov 1997 02:23:17 PST Education Minister Najib Tun Razak's ridiculous gag order on lecturers and researchers pertaining to the haze problem has undermined the already shaky confidence of the people in our local universities. While DPM Anwar Ibrahim was desperately appealing to parents to not to send children to foreign universities (apparently to help cut our current account deficit), Najib has practically put academic freedom in Malaysia to the sword. Anwar said (The Star, Nov. 7): "it is something to be embarrassed about if our parents continue to send their children to take up courses overseas. Our universities have all the requirements, capabilities and skills needed for first degree programmes." "The only thing we need now is to boost parents' confidence in our institutions of higher learning," said Anwar, who is obviously out of sync with his colleague (or perhaps competitor) in the Cabinet who has succeeded in pouring further embarrassment on the country. Foreign educated Najib obviously doesn't have much confidence in the capability of local academics in doing research, especially on "sensitive topics"which can threaten national interest. "We are trying to prevent statements which are not supported by concrete scientific evidence and could easily damage the image of the country,"Najib said in justifying his ban. Perhaps the haze has muddled his thinking processes to the extent that hanging the Sword of Damocles over our poor academics is the price our who higher educational system has to pay for improving Malaysia's image. How can the DPM expect parents to heed his call to send our children to local universities when short-sighted politicians like Najib demands that research and teaching must follow the Government's version of truth? Is it any surprise that many parents dutifully scrap to save enough (make that 25% more with the RM in a mess) just to give their children an education that they deserve. -________________________________________________ List Owner: M.G.G. Pillai Free Homepages on malaysia.net - send blank Check out the malaysia.net web site on List Postings to ________________________________________________ From phuakl@sit.edu.my Fri Nov 7 21:43:37 1997 8 Nov 97 12:45:50 +1100 From: "DR. PHUA KAI LIT" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Sat, 8 Nov 1997 12:45:12 +0000 Subject: (Fwd) [sangkancil] Soeharto and Co: it's time to give a little ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- To: sangkancil@malaysia.net Date: Sat, 08 Nov 1997 08:48:26 Subject: [sangkancil] Soeharto and Co: it's time to give a little (fwd) From: pillai@mgg.pc.my (M.G.G. Pillai) Reply-to: pillai@mgg.pc.my (M.G.G. Pillai) ________________________________________________ This week's sponsors -The Asia Pacific Internet Company (APIC) Business Internet Services. Some talk. Some do. We talk and do! for instant info ________________________________________________ FORWARDED MAIL ------- From: dfiddle@mn.uswest.net (Dennis L. Fiddle) Date: 07 Nov 97 Originally Posted On: alt.culture.indonesia INDONESIA Saturday, November 8, 1997 Soeharto and Co: it's time to give a little By LOUISE WILLIAMS, Herald Correspondent in Jakarta Like a spoilt child, President Soeharto's son Bambang Trihatmodjo pouted across the front pages of Indonesia's newspapers this week, announcing that all he had done was break the law - just like most of the other executives heading Indonesia's banks. The 44-year-old businessman, who heads a three-billion dollar empire, was targeting his father's Finance Minister, Mr Mar'ie Muhammad. He included the Andromeda Bank, in which Bambang holds a 25 per cent stake, in 16 banks wound up this week under the conditions of the $US38 billion ($54 billion) IMF rescue package for the Indonesian economy. "There is a political move to disgrace my family," Bambang said. Had President Soeharto known the details of the bank liquidations, Bambang felt, he would never have approved such a public slap in the face for one of his wealthy children. Within two days of the Andromeda closure, the bank's directors were in court filing a suit against Mr Mar'ie. Yesterday they were followed by lawyers for Bank Jakarta, controlled by the President's half-brother Probasutedjo. Bambang appeared to be unconcerned that the bank had admitted exceeding the legal lending limit by providing $US75 million in depositors' funds to its shareholders, which include his Bimantara group, as well as two other politically well-connected cronies, the timber baron Mr Prajogo Pangestu, and businessman Mr Henry Pribadi, a well-known patron of Melbourne's Crown Casino. Bambang said the money was used to refinance his and Mr Pribadi's giant petrochemical venture, Chandra Asri. The spectacle of a member of Indonesia's first family publicly rowing with the Finance Minister goes beyond the conflict over Andromeda and provides a rare insight into the power-games which have built Indonesia's corporate empires. Bank depositors' funds are used to finance the personal ambitions of the owners and directors, in a world in which proximity to political power equals business access. So widespread is the practice of exceeding the legal lending limit that Bambang announced: "We admit the fault, but we know 90 per cent of national banks must have violated the requirement." His apparent expectation that his father should protect him reveals the confidence the President's children have in their right to preferential treatment. But perhaps this dispute will signal the beginning of something more important, which goes to the heart of the survival of the Soeharto regime, and the legacy the aging President Soeharto will leave behind. The currency crisis has forced economic reforms on Indonesia which demand sacrifices from even the best-connected, and challenge a form of capitalism based on power and connections, not adherence to any set of rules or codes of conduct. A battle is brewing within the political elite between those who know they must change to survive and those bent on defending their privileges, built during decades of economic growth when few questions were asked as long as the national cake continued to grow. General Rudini, a former home affairs minister, this week publicly countered Bambang by saying President Soeharto must have seen Andromeda's name on the bank closure list. Like a growing number of disaffected members of the elite, General Rudini believes it is this kind of favouritism - which the empires of the children have come to symbolise - which has dragged the credibility of Mr Soeharto's New Order to an all-time low, and subverted national goals in favour of personal gain. Even Bambang's eldest sister, Siti "Tutut" Hardyanti Rukmana, came out in support of the bank liquidations, fuelling speculation that the first family was fighting amongst itself. Tutut's bank was not touched by the reforms. Professor Richard Robison, head of Murdoch University's Asia Research Centre, was visiting Jakarta this week. "Things aren't clear yet, but it would seem President Soeharto did agree [to the bank closures]," he said. "We can only assume Soeharto realised some aspects would have to be sacrificed to keep the goose alive." Professor Robison, who has written widely on the links between political power and business in Indonesia, said: "It would seem some of the people who will be sacrificed will resist and groups related to the first family will be split." If Bambang continues to force the issue, he said: "It will give real life to an anti-first family coalition." Professor Robison told a seminar in Jakarta that the financial meltdown in Indonesia showed that once an economy entered the global marketplace it was impossible to avoid the disciplines associated with the demand for transparency, public disclosure, property rights, access to information and freedom of movement. "Just as early forms of industrial capitalism in Britain and the US were transformed from markets without rules dominated by politically powerful industrial barons into highly regulated systems, so Indonesia is being transformed." THE key question now, Professor Robison said, was whether Indonesia's elite would press ahead with reforms and "attempt to reinvent themselves", or try to defend the old system. For ordinary Indonesians there seems to be no choice but to suffer the pain. About 2 million day labourers in the construction industry have been laid off in the Jakarta region, and more retrenchments are expected, along with inflation. With forest fires still producing dangerous smoke haze across much of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Java, and a severe drought preventing rice planting, the national mood is grim. Of President Soeharto's six children, Bambang can most afford to sacrifice. The book Asia's Wealth Club estimated his holdings at $US3 billion, compared with Tutut at $US2billion, youngest son Tommy at $US600 million, eldest son Sigit at $US450million, and the two quieter daughters, Titiek, worth $US200 million and Mimiek, worth $US100 million. This material is subject to copyright and any [Signpost] unauthorised use, copying or mirroring is prohibited. source http://www.smh.com.au/daily/content/971108/world/world3.html -- dfiddle@mn.uswest.net (Dennis L. Fiddle) All news and information postings are in the public interest. The opinions expressed in the postings are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the sender. -________________________________________________ List Owner: M.G.G. Pillai Free Homepages on malaysia.net - send blank Check out the malaysia.net web site on List Postings to ________________________________________________ From phuakl@sit.edu.my Fri Nov 7 21:47:23 1997 8 Nov 97 12:49:21 +1100 From: "DR. PHUA KAI LIT" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Sat, 8 Nov 1997 12:48:48 +0000 Subject: (Fwd) (Fwd) [sangkancil] Political & Economic Risk on Indonesi ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- From: Self To: phuakl@sit.edu.my Subject: (Fwd) [sangkancil] Political & Economic Risk on Indonesia (fwd Date: Sat, 8 Nov 1997 09:02:52 ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- To: sangkancil@malaysia.net Date: Sat, 08 Nov 1997 06:54:09 Subject: [sangkancil] Political & Economic Risk on Indonesia (fwd) From: pillai@mgg.pc.my (M.G.G. Pillai) Reply-to: pillai@mgg.pc.my (M.G.G. Pillai) ________________________________________________ This week's sponsors -The Asia Pacific Internet Company (APIC) Business Internet Services. Some talk. Some do. We talk and do! for instant info ________________________________________________ FORWARDED MAIL ------- From: normx@hotmail.com (Observer) Date: 07 Nov 97 Originally Posted On: soc.culture.indonesia --_í_-------------------------------------------------------- Country Risk Report: Indonesia Last updated: November 4, 1997. If you would like to subscribe to our service so that you receive our latest analysis immediately upon publication, go to our order form now. Click here for a description of the publications we offer and subscription details. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Executive Summary: Indonesia * Indonesia has negotiated seriously with the IMF over the recently-announced financial package and, unlike Thailand, can be expected to keep its side of the bargain. Although the projects of many well-connected companies have been saved for now, it is entirely possible that President Suharto will agree to further economic reforms that impinge upon the interests of the presidentÆs inner circle if this proves to be really necessary to maintain IMF support. * Watch out for a shakeout in the banking sector. The government will probably provide vigorous support for the larger banks (which are generally in better shape) while allowing banks which are experiencing more serious difficulties to either close or merge with larger ones. The 16 banks which have already been singled out for closure may not be the last. Just as important as the banks being closed is that the government is sending out a clear signal that well-connected people will not be spared. The shareholders of PT Bank Andromeda, for example, include the son of President Suharto, while PT Bank Industri is part-owned by the brother-in-law of Bank Indonesia Governor Soedradjad Djiwandono, as well as by Mr. Suharto's daughter. PT Bank Jakarta is owned by President Suharto's half-brother, Probosutedjo. Over the medium term, projects associated with Research and Technology Minister Habibie are also likely to get the axe as part of wider confidence building measures. * Recent warnings by senior military leaders that the armed forces will not tolerate any attempt to disturb the general session of the PeopleÆs Consultative Assembly next March suggest that the government may be preparing to crack down on some of the more prominent non-governmental organizations whose influence has grown rapidly over the last few years. However, senior ministers with economic portfolios in the Cabinet can be expected to oppose such moves vigorously in the coming weeks on the grounds that they would produce more negative international publicity at a time when the restoration of private sector confidence is critical. * After a lull of several months, social tension is set to rise once again as the economy feels the combined effects of the drought and the financial crisis. Higher food prices and a possible run on ailing banks could lead to serious anti-Chinese riots. Strikes in support of demands for higher wages are also possible. However, none of this will have a significant impact on political stability. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Near-Term Outlook: Indonesia Fighting to retain investor and creditor confidence:- Cabinet technocrats won an important battle in early October when they convinced President Suharto to look into the possibility of seeking long-term support funds from the IMF. The significance of the move can be exaggerated, however, raising unrealistic expectations. In the coming months, IMF involvement will be seen by many in the private sector as heralding an official willingness to accept the sort of economic medicine the country has needed for a long time. Expectations now are that the IMF will put muscle behind demands for a clean-up of the banking system and an end to the monopolies and special privileges which still characterize the Indonesian economy. However, it is far from certain that this will actually be the case, or if it is, whether the governmentÆs response will be fast enough to prevent the situation getting worse. Unlike the circumstances which prompted the IMF bailout of Thailand, Indonesia is not desperate û at least not yet. The decision to invite the IMF was aimed more at restoring confidence and macro-economic stability than it was a signal that President Suharto was at last willing to disband the countryÆs remaining monopolies or abandon his support for controversial projects such as the aerospace and national car programs. One of the lessons that has frequently been drawn from the economic crisis of the mid-1980s is that while Indonesia may muddle along during normal times, it still retains the ability to react decisively in economic crises, abandoning long-standing protectionist policies in favor of reformist moves designed to stimulate the economy and lure foreign investors. On the surface, this appears to have been borne out by the way the government has reacted to the financial crisis so far this year. Cabinet technocrats have seen their bargaining power vastly improved, and a series of announcements from Jakarta have suggested that the stagnating economic reform program is about to be reinvigorated. However, there is a very important difference between the current situation and that of the mid-1980s. Whereas the main losers in the economic reforms triggered by the previous economic crisis were government-run monopolies û a fairly easy target û cabinet technocrats now have an influential lobby of well-connected companies and individuals to contend with. The most important of these are run by various members of the presidential family, although there is also a small group of ethnic Chinese with powerful and well-protected business interests who have the presidentÆs ear as well. Added to this are economic nationalists such as Research and Technology Minister Habibie and National Development Minister Ginandjar Kartasasmita who also have their own pet projects to defend. In the mid-1980s, many such companies and individuals could actually profit from the reform process by being handed licenses and being invited to form joint ventures with foreign partners to compete against inefficient government monopolies. Thus, they could present themselves as part of the deregulation process rather than as a drag on economic reform. This is no longer the case, however, and the sort of reforms likely to be demanded by the IMF and its allies in the Cabinet in the coming months could prove very painful for a wide range of well-connected individuals. Judging from the way even banks in which even President Suharto's children have been closed if their financial situation was considered to be too weak, the government is not going to offer blanket protection to people from the "inner circle," which should help to keep the confidence of foreign creditors. JakartaÆs initial reaction to the currency crisis was certainly commendable, and did much to re-assure nervous investors that, when push comes to shove, the government can be relied upon to act appropriately. By floating the rupiah in mid-August, Cabinet technocrats such as Finance Minister Marie Muhammad and Central Bank Governor Sudradjad Djwandono showed themselves willing to learn from the Thai example and avoid an unwinnable battle against foreign speculators. As a result, Indonesia still has about US$20 billion in foreign exchange reserves (equivalent to about five months of imports) that may now be used to help stabilize the currency at much lower levels. New deregulation measures such as allowing foreigners to own up to 49% of the shares of listed companies were also fairly painless, given the parlous state of the stock market and the desperate search for liquidity. Other announcements which appeared equally positive at first glance, also turn out on closer examination to be less forceful. A prime example was the decision in mid-September to shelve a large number of costly projects. The fact is that most of the projects that were postponed were not scheduled to begin for some time anyway. For example, state-owned utility PT Perusahaan Listrik Negara had signed 28 power purchase agreements with private power companies to generate over 10,500 MWs of electricity by the turn of the century. At the time that the dramatic announcement was made that major projects were to be delayed, only six of them had secured financing from local and foreign banks. Announcing the postponement of 14 power projects (worth US$5 billion) and a review of the nine others (worth US$4.9 billion) thus revealed more about the political impotence of Cabinet technocrats than their ability to kick-start an appropriate national response to the currency crisis. It was a similar story in the case of toll roads, with most projects associated with PT Citra Marga, the listed toll-road company run by the presidentÆs daughter, reportedly unaffected on the grounds that the finance had already been obtained. Tellingly, several large projects by well-connected companies funded with high interest debts were given the green light, while other projects financed by low-interest loans under the umbrella of the Consultative Group on Indonesia (creditor consortium) were rescheduled. To some extent, the announcement did suggest that the government regarded the currency crisis as serious and was trying to do something about it. Unfortunately, the impact was blunted several days later when several ministers suggested that projects marked for postponement or re-evaluation could go ahead after all. Several of the big ticket projects still slated to go ahead symbolize exactly what is wrong with the Indonesian economy. They include Tommy SuhartoÆs national car project (made possible by massive tax concessions To a company with little experience in automobile manufacture and no local production facilities), Research and Development Minister HabibieÆs expensive N-250 aircraft development project and plans by Tutut, the presidentÆs daughter, to build a US$2.3 billion triple decker toll road and mass transit railway in Jakarta. These projects could yet be axed, however. Mr. Habibie's projects, in particular, are vulnerable. The government might was for a ruling by the WTO to decide the fate of the car project. So much "face" is involved with this project that Mr. Suharto will be very reluctant to let it go. Depending on how the financial crisis unfolds now that the government has announced tough action with respect to weaker banks, more concession might yet be made, the car project among them, although would be done only if Mr. Suharto perceives there is no alternative. Attempts to shore up international confidence by announcing additional deregulation packages also appear to have run into difficulty. In August, Coordinating Minister for Economy and Finance Saleh Afiff announced that the government intended to scrap the monopoly given to the National Logistics Agency (Bulog) to import certain imported commodities such as sugar and wheat. At the start of November, this reform was carried out, when the government moved to stip Bulog of its status as the sole importer of wheat, wheat flour, soybeans and garlic, from January 1. This move could hit the Salim Group hard, since it has an effective monopoly on flour milling as a result of its agreement with Bulog to supply the company with wheat. Bulog is unlikely to surrender it import monopoly on rice, however. The forest fires which still rage out of control in Sumatra and Kalimantan may not have quite the same financial impact, but they do illustrate the extent to which vested interests can combine with bureaucratic inertia to frustrate policy implementation. The official response to the fires was slow, and when it did come, was largely as a result of diplomatic pressure from Malaysia and Singapore, which were blanketed in a dense and choking haze. On September 9, when President Suharto announced an indefinite ban on the clearing of land by fire, some firms actually stepped up the burning so that they could meet their business targets. A later announcement by the forestry ministry that it was revoking the licenses of companies believed to be responsible for the fires had little impact, most of the subsequent improvement coming instead from light rain and favorable winds. Similar inaction followed Environment Minister SarwonoÆs announcement on September 17 that the government had decided to evacuate 50,000 residents from Rengat, a city in the Riau province where smoke levels were especially hazardous. The ministerÆs complaints about military foot dragging and lack of cooperation from other ministries in fighting the fires also apparently fell on deaf ears. Led by Bob Hasan, a close associate of Suharto, IndonesiaÆs forestry lobby has worked to play down the significance of the fires, which have damaged agriculture, driven away tourists and angered IndonesiaÆs neighbors. Indonesia is in a better macroeconomic position than Thailand before its financial meltdown, but many of the symptoms of economic malaise are very similar. These include the large dollar-denominated foreign debt held by the private sector, a shaky banking system and the general inability of the government to overcome the resistance of vested interests to economic reform. Fortunately, the Indonesian property sector appears better placed than that of Thailand to ride out the storm, the current account deficit as a percentage of GDP is only about half that of Thailand, and Cabinet technocrats have been moving in the right direction, even if they are facing strong resistance. The coming months could also see a rise in of social unrest. Consumer Price inflation is already up, with official figures (which probably underestimate the extent of the problem) checking in at an annual rate of 7.1% in September, up from 5.7% in August. The problem is not merely confined to higher prices for imported goods as a result of the weakened rupiah. The current drought will reduce agricultural production, forcing food prices to surge anyway and obliging the government to spend precious foreign exchange importing additional supplies of rice. The more immediate concern, however, is the possibility that there may be a run on one or more of the nationÆs ailing banks. From this, it is only a short step to further anti-Chinese riots. Significantly higher inflation could also trigger labor disputes by workers demanding higher wages. Faced with such a possibility, the government will be reluctant to take other painful restructuring measures such as a cut in fuel subsidies that could push inflation up even further. The good news is that such social unrest is unlikely to be accompanied by political instability of the sort witnessed in Thailand over the last few months. Suharto is almost certain to be re-elected president at the PeopleÆs Consultative Assembly (MPR) in March. The only political issue of any real significance facing the nation is the identity of the person he will select to serve as his vice-president for his next five-year term. This is an important matter since it bears on the looming political transition. Suharto is into his 70s and it is entirely possible that his nominee could succeed him in the nationÆs top job should he die suddenly or become incapacitated in the next few years. However, this is probably not the issue that most businessmen should be focusing on over the next few months. Of much greater importance is the extent to which the government is able to respond appropriately to the environmental and financial crises now gripping the country. These matters will be effectively decided well before the MPR session, and they will certainly be far more important in setting the tone for medium term economic growth than any decisions made by a body whose carefully selected membership is set to follow a script laid out well in advance by the nationÆs real power holders. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Economic Indicators: Indonesia 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996e 1997f Real GDP Growth(%) 6.62 6.10 7.25 7.48 8.20 7.80 6.00 Total Exports (fob, US$ bil) 29.29 33.97 36.82 40.05 45.42 49.50 52.50 Total Imports (cif US$ bil) 25.87 27.28 28.33 31.99 40.62 44.40 45.10 Current Account Balance (US$ bil) -4.08 -3.70 -2.11 -2.79 -7.50 -8.90 -9.00 Foreign Exchange Reserves (US$ bil) 9.15 10.18 10.99 11.82 13.31 17.82 18.00 Total Outstanding Foreign Debt (US$ bil) 79.78 88.30 89.48 96.50 100.00 110.00 115.00 Debt Servicing (US$ bil) 11.46 12.58 14.27 14.79 15.59 16.30 17.10 Exchange Rate vs US$ (year-end) 1,992 2,062 2,110 2,200 2,308 2,361 3,900 Inflation (CPI %) 9.24 5.00 9.70 8.50 8.60 6.60 7.80 f - PERC Forecast.  ##>B>>B>>¦3+]_^[â-+ìD$jh_ì`úÜ___6(_v_vÜ__jâ>,_vÉ_5 +t¶_v _vìåR_Ph_v_vìå+_Phìål_PhæÜ__ë^·îFnSÜ__-_Ƽ,Ar -¬__++++_-+u%++_z_uïF¦L._öOOï ¶÷_-__+;_sâ_ï Et____+Uï_+nto +tkGN¼< t_< t_< t\ +tX<"t$<\tB__3+A¼<\t·<"t-_+ï--_-¿u-_N¼< t+ +t'<"t¦<\tB__3+A¼<\t·<"t-__ï--_-¿u-_ùë>ÿ+G-_+BÇ__+_ï-úÜï+_+6P6ë7CC6Ä^+üt| +tx6ë?CCN¼< tß< t¦< tb +t^<"t'<\t¬__3+A¼<\t·<"t_\_¬_-_\-__¬s_"¬_+N¼< t. +t*<"t+<\t¬__3+A¼<\t·<"t_\_¬_+_\-__¬sû_"¬_-3+¬¦+u·_+&ë¤]++¦"â·_t+ïw Jë¶B_¦__ëw _Y+ï-÷Gt_QRQSïw.ïö3+ -u_++;w uïw¡â°_tï_$____OOï__+Uï_]++¶- stack overflow - integer divide by 0 - not enough space for environment - unexpected heap error - unexpected QuickWin error - not enough space for arguments - no main procedure - floating-point support not loaded -________________________________________________ List Owner: M.G.G. Pillai Free Homepages on malaysia.net - send blank Check out the malaysia.net web site on List Postings to ________________________________________________ From rkmoore@iol.ie Sat Nov 8 08:06:47 1997 Sat, 8 Nov 1997 15:06:40 GMT Date: Sat, 8 Nov 1997 15:06:40 GMT To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu (world-system network) From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Re: 200 years is a rather short 11/07/97, Gunder Frank Congrats and good luck. >but 200 years is a rather short and insufficiently braod perspective on >contemporary globalization. Even the 600 year one i sue in ReORIENT is >not nearly enough - to see whats goin' on here and now. >gunder frank Dear Gunder, Thanks for the encouragement. To be sure there will be references back to antiquity, but I believe the Enlightenment period onwards can be used successfully as a primary canvas. rkm From rkmoore@iol.ie Sat Nov 8 08:07:02 1997 Sat, 8 Nov 1997 15:06:53 GMT Date: Sat, 8 Nov 1997 15:06:53 GMT To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu (world-system network) From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Re: globalism vs globalization 11/07/97, Danilo D'Antonio wrote: >I wish only do a modest reflection on globalism and globalization. >If inside >this globalization process there are certain and well recognized advantages >(it is well known that through it the wellbeing and the prosperity increase >everywhere in the world)... Whoa!! Allow me to suggest that such an outcome is not at all "well known", unless you mean in the sense of "disinformation widely swallowed". On both empirical and theoretical grounds I find such a characterization dubious at best. >Usually we use the term globalism to define something similar to a vision of >the world: to see how the whole is so deeply interconnected that even the >action of few people can influence the life of all the others... As I'll be using the terms, globalization is the process, globalism is the philosophy, and both refer to a concious elite program of power usurpation. Apologies if this seems like language usurpation. (:>) rkm From gsbarkin@artsci.wustl.edu Sat Nov 8 09:27:12 1997 for ; Sat, 8 Nov 1997 10:27:07 -0600 (CST) Date: Sat, 08 Nov 1997 11:34:11 -0800 From: Gareth Barkin To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: globalism as conscious condition Richard K. Moore wrote: > As I'll be using the terms, globalization is the process, globalism is the > philosophy, and both refer to a concious elite program of power usurpation. > Apologies if this seems like language usurpation. (:>) It seems unlikely that it would in all situations be a conscious process; plenty of the elite have bought their own disinformation, or the disinformation of their predecessors, in such a way as to create what can amount to an entirely unconscious maintenance of the status quo (or worsening there of), as per Gramsci's hegemony (a different concept than everyone's since, although I believe he was first to popularize the term). I would certainly allow for some consciousness in this 'power usurpation,' however, I would be quite surprised not to find some of what those economists call 'path dependency' as well. In other words, we tend to take for granted the power structure of the world we are born into -- I'm sure no one here does, or rather, thinks they do, but we don't comprise the elite, and these processes are instrumentally unconscious to begin with. Gareth Barkin Department of Anthropology Washington University in St. Louis From aaustin@utkux.utcc.utk.edu Sat Nov 8 10:39:31 1997 Date: Sat, 8 Nov 1997 12:38:31 -0500 (EST) From: Andrew Wayne Austin To: Gareth Barkin Subject: Re: globalism as conscious condition In-Reply-To: <3464BEB1.5ACEECCF@artsci.wustl.edu> On Sat, 8 Nov 1997, Gareth Barkin wrote: > Richard K. Moore wrote: > > > As I'll be using the terms, globalization is the process, globalism is the > > philosophy, and both refer to a concious elite program of power usurpation. > > It seems unlikely that it would in all situations be a conscious process I agree. In fact, I don't think very much of it is a conscious process. Globalization is an objective process most of which lies external to consciousness. It is our task to become subjectively aware of these objective processes. Andy From dlj@pobox.com Sat Nov 8 13:32:11 1997 Sat, 8 Nov 1997 15:30:46 -0500 (EST) From: "David Lloyd-Jones" To: , "WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK" Subject: Re: 200 years is a rather short Date: Sat, 8 Nov 1997 15:31:53 -0500 charset="us-ascii" Richard K. Moore tries in the moronic and semi-literate style we have already seen in his book outline:: >>gunder frank >Thanks for the encouragement. To be sure there will be references back to >antiquity, but I believe the Enlightenment period onwards can be used >successfully as a primary canvas. Does poor Moore not know the meaning of condemnation by faint praise? -dlj. From dasa3000@mondrian.sgol.it Sat Nov 8 15:27:20 1997 Date: Sat, 08 Nov 1997 23:22:50 +0100 To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: "Danilo D'Antonio" Subject: Re: globalism vs globalization At 15.06 08/11/97 GMT, you wrote: >>If inside >>this globalization process there are certain and well recognized advantages >>(it is well known that through it the wellbeing and the prosperity increase >>everywhere in the world)... > >Whoa!! Allow me to suggest that such an outcome is not at all "well >known", unless you mean in the sense of "disinformation widely swallowed". >On both empirical and theoretical grounds I find such a characterization >dubious at best. May be that good and bad things are in every our expression. If so many people are now communicating all around the world by the Internet is it not also thanks to some effects of globalization? >As I'll be using the terms, globalization is the process, globalism is the >philosophy, and both refer to a concious elite program of power usurpation. >Apologies if this seems like language usurpation. (:>) Yes, I agree with you that globalism is the reflection, the thought, and globalization is the action. Just as globalization is action without thought, it goes wrong. But I think that just as globalism involve a deeper use of the mind it leads even the worse globalizer to an improvement of his actions. I'm very happy of this occasion, because you are furnishing to me more elements to understand these concepts. I think that it is really necessary to make clearness in this theme because I see everyday a misuse of these words on the mass-media. Then, as there are various and different uses of these terms, there are ecologysts that do not recognize the globalizers and work together with them, and there are also other ecologysts that suspects of other ecologysts because they are defining themselves globalysts. May be that you want to get a glimpse at an article just named "Globalization vs. Globalism" at: http://www.panix.com/~jimcook/globalization/gl_vs_gl.htm My best wishes for your book: I hope to can be one of the first to read it! Danilo D'Antonio --- LABORATORIO EUDEMONIA oO$Oo Cosa seminerai oggi? Via Fonte Regina, 23 - 64100 - Teramo - Italy tel & fax: 0861/415655 - e.mail: dasa3000@sgol.it http://oasi.asti.it/Homes/eudemonia/mappa.htm From cballard@cetlink.net Sat Nov 8 17:58:09 1997 for ; Sat, 8 Nov 1997 19:55:20 -0500 (EST) From: Carolyn Ballard To: "'WSN@csf.colorado.edu'" Subject: Lloyd-Jones comments Date: Sat, 8 Nov 1997 19:49:54 -0500 Richard K. Moore tries in the moronic and semi-literate style we have already seen in his book outline:: Does poor Moore not know the meaning of condemnation by faint praise? -dlj. I regret that it took such a disturbing comment to prod me from my de-lurking mode, but I could not remain silent and let this pass. I have enjoyed the intelligent debates and contributions to this list and have come to expect a certain level of civility and respect among the various "verbal combatants" and contributors. Until Mr. Lloyd-Jones' above comments, I have not been disappointed. I find them snivelling, distasteful and lacking any merit. On the other hand, I have found Mr. Moore's contributions to the list valuable for their insight, well-reasoned, and quite literate. In these sometimes dry and pedantic discussions, Moore's comments have sparked some of the most lively and thought-provoking debates I've seen on the list. For those academics among us, it is good to look outside the ivory tower every once in a while. The rarified air up there has been known to cloud the vision of even the most erudite and sensitive individual. Perhaps such is the case with Mr. Lloyd-Jones?? Regards, Carolyn Ballard ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Carolyn Ballard, freelance writer Email: cballard@cetlink.net "You write in order to change the world, knowing perfectly well that you probably can't...The world changes according to the way people see it, and if you can alter, even by a millimeter, the way...people look at reality, then you can change it." - James Baldwin - ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ From harlowc@cats.ucsc.edu Sun Nov 9 03:38:03 1997 Date: Wed, 09 Nov 1994 02:32:36 -0800 From: Christian Reply-To: harlowc@cats.ucsc.edu To: dlj@pobox.com Subject: Re: 200 years is a rather short References: <01bcec85$5a6c8c40$0100007f@widgette> Is this Jerk DLJ back? I thought he left? He is pathetic, never says anything engaging/intelligent and, clearly, should be moderated out of WSN existence. Ya know? Christian David Lloyd-Jones wrote: > Richard K. Moore tries in the moronic and semi-literate style we have > already seen in his book outline:: > > >>gunder frank > >Thanks for the encouragement. To be sure there will be references back to > >antiquity, but I believe the Enlightenment period onwards can be used > >successfully as a primary canvas. > > Does poor Moore not know the meaning of condemnation by faint praise? > > -dlj. From DASSBACH@MTU.EDU Sun Nov 9 09:42:28 1997 for ; Sun, 9 Nov 1997 11:42:26 -0500 (EST) for ; Sun, 9 Nov 1997 11:42:25 -0500 (EST) for ; Sun, 9 Nov 1997 11:42:22 -0500 (EST) From: "Carl H.A. Dassbach" To: Subject: Re: Lloyd-Jones comments Date: Sun, 9 Nov 1997 11:42:01 -0500 charset="iso-8859-1" -----Original Message----- From: Carolyn Ballard To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Date: Saturday, November 08, 1997 8:03 PM Subject: Lloyd-Jones comments > > >I have enjoyed the intelligent debates and contributions to this list and have come >to expect a certain level of civility and respect among the various "verbal >combatants" and contributors. Until Mr. Lloyd-Jones' above comments, I have >not been disappointed. I find them snivelling, distasteful and lacking any merit. >On the other hand, I have found Mr. Moore's contributions to the list valuable for >their insight, well-reasoned, and quite literate. In these sometimes dry and >pedantic discussions, Moore's comments have sparked some of the most lively >and thought-provoking debates I've seen on the list. I second the above. I would also add that I don't recall dlj on this list but I have seen him on other lists and I do not care for his style or his attitude. I don't support removing people from lists but in dlj's case I would gladly make an exception. Carl Dassbach From phuakl@sit.edu.my Sun Nov 9 18:11:07 1997 10 Nov 97 09:14:07 +1100 From: "DR. PHUA KAI LIT" To: rhubbard@raven.benedictine.edu (Ron Hubbard) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 1997 09:13:48 +0000 Subject: Re: Postings Yes. As long as WSN people do not consider them as being inappropriate to this particular electronic forum. I thought that they would keep you all informed about this corner (South East Asia) of the world capitalist system. Date: Sat, 8 Nov 1997 11:49:53 -1000 To: phuakl@sit.edu.my From: rhubbard@raven.benedictine.edu (Ron Hubbard) Subject: Postings Dear "Dr. Phua Kai Lit", I am enjoying these postings very much. Is it your intention to keep using WSN? Sincerely, Ron From rkmoore@iol.ie Sun Nov 9 18:14:20 1997 Mon, 10 Nov 1997 01:14:12 GMT Date: Mon, 10 Nov 1997 01:14:12 GMT To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu (world-system network) From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Re: elite consciousness; pyramid model 11/08/97, Andrew Wayne Austin wrote: >Globalization is an objective process most of which lies external to >consciousness. It is our task to become subjectively aware of these >objective processes. The question of self-awareness/consciousness of groups or classes is by no means straightforward. Please keep mind that my posting was from the summary of a proposed book - it describes what I intend to establish in the book, not what I expect to be accepted as obvious. From the outline: V. The neoliberal revolution and the globalist regime A. The neoliberal revolution: the elite abandon the nation state B. Who are "they"?: the reality of elite consciousness Class (term used broadly) conciousness certainly varies widely from time to time and circumstance to circumstance. For example, labor class conciousness, at the current moment, would seem to be much more pronounced in France than it is in the U.S. I will be pointing first to the circumstantial evidence for a functional globalist conciousness - not as proof but to establish "pattern", "motive", and "opportunity" (to use detective parlance). This will include the overall pattern and coherence of the globalization process, as well as the coherence of mass media disinformation. Next I will talk about the multi-tiered nature of the "corporate elite", and cite material indicating the world views being promulgated to and accepted by the various tiers. "Foreign Affairs", for example, will be useful in this regard: it promulgates a globalist agenda, but masks it - with exposably shallow deviousness - in terms of "U.S. strategic interests". There will certainly be discussion of the Council on Foreign Relations, Trilateral Commission, Bilderberger Group, corporate-funded think-tanks, Milton Friedman, Samuel P. Huntington, Rockefellers, G7, WTO, etc. In particular the direct connection over the decades between U.S. policy decisions and CFR policy analyses will be examined. And there will be discussion of the "revolving door" that shuttles key techocrats to-and-fro between government, industry, academia, and international institutions. The investigation will endeavor to trace the tiers as close to the top as possible, but with no expectation of finding a single identifiable Illuminati-like clique. I expect to find a pluralistic top to the pyramid, but one that functions with reasonable coherence and whose factions share, to a significant degree, a common sense of identity, perception, and purpose. The futher down the pyramid one goes, the more one approaches an "unconscious maintenance of the status quo", to use Gareth Barkin's phrase. I was at a talk by (now former) Minister of Agricuture (for Ireland) Ivan Yates where he said to a "rural development" planning group: "Big scale farming and forestry are coming; there's no use debating it; you might as well do your planning accordingly" (paraphrase). Mr. Yates may not be privvy to the upper sanctums, and may not foresee what globalization will ultimately mean for Ireland, but he's sufficiently "with the program" to play his required role with enthusiasm as it is needed. 11/08/97, Gareth Barkin wrote: >It seems unlikely that it would in all situations be a conscious process; >plenty of the elite have bought their own disinformation... > I would certainly allow for some consciousness in this 'power usurpation,' >however, I would be quite surprised not to find some of what those economists >call 'path dependency' as well. I believe this is entirely consistent with the pyramid model. rkm From rkmoore@iol.ie Sun Nov 9 18:14:26 1997 Mon, 10 Nov 1997 01:14:18 GMT Date: Mon, 10 Nov 1997 01:14:18 GMT To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu (world-system network) From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Re: globalism vs globalization Danilo D'Antonio had written: >>>(it is well known that through [globalization] the wellbeing and the >>>prosperity increase everywhere in the world)... to which I responded: >>Whoa!! Allow me to suggest that such an outcome is not at all "well >>known", unless you mean in the sense of "disinformation widely swallowed". >>On both empirical and theoretical grounds I find such a characterization >>dubious at best. 11/08/97, Danilo D'Antonio then wrote: >May be that good and bad things are in every our expression. If so many >people are now communicating all around the world by the Internet is it not >also thanks to some effects of globalization? Dear Danilo, I make a strong distinction between generic tendencies toward global infrastructures (a trend directly traceable at least to 1492) and the more specific and somewhat recent set of processes directed toward the replacement of the diverse nation-state system with a world-bureacracy system operating under a laissez-faire philosophy. The worldwide interconnection of telephone systems, enabling global Inernet, is not within my usage of globalization. (I _may_ be forced to adopt a more neutral set of terms). I do include in globalization the current campaign to privatize public communications networks and to open up all telecom and media markets to TNC investment and operations. I do agree, however, that globalization, by anyone's definition, certainly brings various benefits to various classes and regions, at least temporarily. But that is a long way from agreeing that "the wellbeing and the prosperity increase everywhere in the world". >Yes, I agree with you that globalism is the reflection, the thought, and >globalization is the action. Just as globalization is action without >thought, it goes wrong. My thesis is that globalization - even where you and I might agree it goes terribly wrong - is not "action without thought". I intend to establish that there is coherent thought in globalism, but that the ethical tradeoffs in that thought are not ones that you or I would find acceptable. There is an analogy in traditional geopolitics; here's an example. At one point the U.S. was actively supporting the Kurds and encouraging them to pursue armed resitance against the Iraqi government. Subsequently a deal was made at higher levels, and the Kurds were abandoned to revenge reprisals. This might have been interpreted as the U.S. acting "without thought", but we have Mr. Kissinger on record commenting on these events: "You can't make omelletes without breaking eggs". To him it was all pawns on a chess board and a few gassed civilians was a price he didn't mind paying, so to speak. With globalism "market forces" is the doublspeak rubric (the honest term being "TNC dominance") used to justify all excesses in the same way "national interests" is used in geopolitical rhetoric. >But I think that just as globalism involve a deeper >use of the mind it leads even the worse globalizer to an improvement of his >actions. You seem to share Plato's faith in an ideal truth being the eventual outcome of introspection, but I am aware of no credible argument for that belief either on general grounds nor in the case at hand. "Deeper use of mind" has a way, in practice, of being limited to the mastery of assigned tasks, rather than being directed at re-assessing the assumptions of one's milieu. >I'm very happy of this occasion, because you are furnishing to me more >elements to understand these concepts. I think that it is really necessary >to make clearness in this theme because I see everyday a misuse of these >words on the mass-media. I also appreciate the dialog and agree with your media observation. >Then, as there are various and different uses of >these terms, there are ecologysts that do not recognize the globalizers and >work together with them, and there are also other ecologysts that suspects >of other ecologysts because they are defining themselves globalysts. I've noticed a variety of elite initiatives aimed at subverting erstwhile progressive organizations by offering them a collaborative role in projects along with corporate interests. It's kind of like a company boss getting chummy with the union boss, giving him rides in the limo etc. We all know who's going to gain the most from such a transaction. There's power and there's the trappings of power - not to be confused. >May be that you want to get a glimpse at an article just named >"Globalization vs. Globalism" at: >http://www.panix.com/~jimcook/globalization/gl_vs_gl.htm > >My best wishes for your book: I hope to can be one of the first to read it! Many thanks, Richard From phuakl@sit.edu.my Sun Nov 9 19:42:19 1997 10 Nov 97 10:45:26 +1100 From: "DR. PHUA KAI LIT" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Mon, 10 Nov 1997 10:45:16 +0000 Subject: (Fwd) (Fwd) [sangkancil] Asian tail wags US dog ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- From: yfyap@pop.jaring.my (Yap Yok Foo) To: sangkancil@malaysia.net Subject: [sangkancil] Asian tail wags US dog Date: Sat, 08 Nov 1997 01:45:05 GMT Organization: Private Reply-to: yfyap@pop.jaring.my (Yap Yok Foo) ________________________________________________ This week's sponsors -The Asia Pacific Internet Company (APIC) Business Internet Services. Some talk. Some do. We talk and do! for instant info ________________________________________________ Asian tail wags US dog from Financial Times, UK SAT NOVEMBER 8 1997 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Was globalisation really meant to work like this? Certainly something has changed in recent weeks. For most of this decade the world's markets have danced to the tune of American capital. But now a series of small financial earthquakes in south-east Asia has sent surprisingly large shockwaves through the developed world's markets; and the reverberations are becoming increasingly hard to rationalise. Yesterday's renewed fit of nerves in Hong Kong, which rattled Tokyo and caused Wall Street and London to wobble, is an obvious case in point. The trouble in the US and Europe was admittedly exacerbated by stronger than expected US payroll data for October - which the market fears may lead to higher US interest rates at next week's Federal Open Markets Committee meeting. Yet the response still looks disproportionate when the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development secretariat reckons that the south-east Asian financial crisis will knock 0.2 per cent off the combined growth of the organisation's members compared with its earlier forecasts. And a large part of that knock is anyway concentrated in Japan. Asia's troubles are, of course, real enough. The local difficulty that started in Thailand was symptomatic of unsustainable exchange rate policies and poorly supervised bank lending across much of the region. The fallout in Japan was also understandable. Its degree of economic integration with the rest of Asia is by now considerable. Moreover, Japanese banks made a notable contribution to property market bubbles in south-east Asia which will do serious damage to their balance sheets. Japan's current misfortune is that globalisation operates very selectively in its own domestic markets. The spread between the less than 2 per cent yield on Japanese medium-term government bonds and the 6 per cent yield on comparable US Treasuries is far greater than justified by inflation rates in the respective countries. Currency risk Currency risk might, at a pinch, justify the non-equalisation of real rates of return in the global bond market where the comparison is being made between large debtor and creditor nations. An endemic creditor could be expected to command permanently lower interest rates. That is certainly the case with Japan vis à vis the US. Yet this cannot explain a yield spread of well over four percentage points. The conclusion must be that the Japanese bond market is in the grip of a bubble. In contrast, returns on the Japanese equity market, which have been out of line with global market valuation yardsticks since the early 1980s, are beginning to equalise. The mechanics of the equalisation process involve a fall in nominal share prices rather than a combination of stable share prices and increased inflation. The downward slide will further damage the banks, which have large equity stakes in Japanese industry and commerce. Resumption of growth The best hope for short-term relief is that the bond market bubble will be pricked by a more robust resumption of economic growth than most forecasters now expect. This would in turn boost equities. That remains very much the optimistic scenario in a decade that has done few favours for Japan. In the US, meantime, the gyrations of Wall Street over the past fortnight suggest that the Asian crisis brought a straw to the back of an over-bloated camel. Yet equity market losses have been substantially recouped. Perhaps the best way to rationalise such big swings is to quote the words of Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan earlier this year. "We should keep in mind," he said, "that at these relatively low long-term interest rates small changes in long-term earnings expectations could have outsized impacts on equity prices." What has happened in Asia has had just this sort of disproportionate, but apparently brief, impact on expectations. But it is not clear whether the reverberations have settled down, not least because of the threat that the spate of Asian devaluations will increase trade friction between Asia and the US. Could these fluctuations be a hint that the long business cycle that started back in 1991 is nearing its end? Given the exposure of so many Americans to Wall Street through retirement savings, a serious downturn on Wall Street might knock the stuffing out of consumers and bring the upturn to a halt. But the red light is more often signalled by monetary policy. Mr Greenspan is still the man to watch. c Copyright the Financial Times Limited 1997 -________________________________________________ List Owner: M.G.G. Pillai Free Homepages on malaysia.net - send blank Check out the malaysia.net web site on List Postings to ________________________________________________ From phuakl@sit.edu.my Sun Nov 9 19:42:38 1997 10 Nov 97 10:45:37 +1100 From: "DR. PHUA KAI LIT" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Mon, 10 Nov 1997 10:44:51 +0000 Subject: (Fwd) (Fwd) [sangkancil] Nations, Economists Debate Ways To St ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- To: sangkancil@malaysia.net Date: Sun, 09 Nov 1997 09:27:33 Subject: [sangkancil] Nations, Economists Debate Ways To Stem Sudden Flight of Capital (fwd) From: pillai@mgg.pc.my (M.G.G. Pillai) Reply-to: pillai@mgg.pc.my (M.G.G. Pillai) ________________________________________________ This week's sponsors -The Asia Pacific Internet Company (APIC) Business Internet Services. Some talk. Some do. We talk and do! for instant info ________________________________________________ FORWARDED MAIL ------- From: dfiddle@mn.uswest.net (Dennis L. Fiddle) Date: 08 Nov 97 Originally Posted On: alt.culture.indonesia [wsj.com] November 7, 1997 Nations, Economists Debate Ways [Image] To Stem Sudden Flight of Capital ----- By MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS [Image] Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL Can anything be done to slow the lightning-fast movement of capital across international borders? The Southeast Asian currency crisis has brought that question back to the surface, as economists enter into a heated debate over the best way to throw sand in the wheels of the international financial system. Most countries welcome and even encourage foreign direct investment in factories and businesses, which represent longlasting commitments. But some have become leery of financial investments such as bank deposits, short-term debt securities, stocks and bonds, which can pull out of a developing country with the push of a computer button, creating economic havoc and chaos. That is what happened in Italy and the United Kingdom in 1992-93, in Mexico in 1994-95, and this year in Thailand, Malaysia and elsewhere in Asia. Earlier this week, the leaders of Malaysia, Indonesia and 13 other developing countries met in Kuala Lumpur for their annual summit. Amid the fallout from the Southeast Asian financial crisis, they registered "deep concern" about the workings of international currency markets and called for regulation of capital flows. "A world trading system cannot rely entirely on market forces," said Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who has called for a ban on currency trading. "Since the beginning of time, market forces by themselves have been exploitative," he said. Most economists, however, oppose restrictions on capital movements. They argue that the market is the best tool for determining how money should be invested. Global capital markets provide needy countries with funds to grow, while allowing foreign investors to diversify their portfolios. If capital is allowed to flow freely, they say, markets will reward countries that pursue sound economic policies and pressure the rest to do the same. But every few years, when panic and fear hit the foreign-exchange markets, those who favor restricting capital are called upon to present their ideas. Here are two ideas that are getting the most attention: THE TOBIN TAX. Twenty-five years ago, Yale economist James Tobin introduced the idea of imposing a tax on foreign-exchange transactions as a way to slow the movement of capital and prevent vertiginous currency-market swings. Investors who can't swiftly change from one currency to another are less inclined to make short-term investments abroad; they are too nervous about being trapped in the foreign currency. Furthermore, speculators can help drive an overvalued currency into a free fall -- as happened in Mexico and Thailand -- and prompt foreign portfolio investors to pull out before their returns depreciate. Controlling currency markets can therefore act as a brake on capital flows. Prof. Tobin, who later won the economics Nobel prize for other work, wanted to give market participants an incentive to look at long-term economic trends -- not short-term hunches -- when buying and selling foreign exchange and securities. Traders must pay a small amount -- say, 0.1% -- for every transaction, so they won't buy or sell unless expected returns justify the additional expense. Fewer transactions mean less volatility and a thicker buffer between interest rates and currency movements, the argument goes. Prof. Tobin's proposal received virtually no attention from academic economists or policy makers until last year, when the United Nations Development Program sponsored a conference on the tax. There are several controversial aspects of the Tobin tax. One is that it would require all major currency-trading countries -- and perhaps all countries -- to apply the tax at the same time. Otherwise, traders could simply shift operations to tax-free countries. Another key issue is what to do with the revenues such a tax would produce, which Prof. Tobin estimates could reach $100 billion a year for a tax of 0.1% or 0.2%. Some have mentioned it as a possible financing source for the U.N. But that notion drew heavy flak from U.S. conservatives, who labeled it a "U.N. tax." A couple of countries have tried Tobin-like taxes. Brazil imposes a tax on the foreign purchases of stocks and bonds. The Czech Republic tried a unilateral fee on foreign-exchange transactions with banks. Isolating the results is difficult, but in neither case was there a discernible effect on the volume of capital inflows. Overall, however, the prospects for a world-wide Tobin tax seem remote at a time when both taxes and market intervention are anathema in many countries. "I don't think it has much of a chance," admits Prof. Tobin. "It has a certain popularity every time something goes wrong in the exchange markets, but it dies out fairly quickly." CAPITAL CONTROLS. Right now, the tide of history is moving in favor of more liberal capital markets, not more restrictions. The U.S. supports unfettered flows. The International Monetary Fund is encouraging member states to guarantee currency convertibility not just for trade purposes, but also for financial flows. But controls, their backers argue, are justified when the recipient country can't use foreign capital efficiently. Thailand, for example, allowed financial institutions to take out fast-maturing foreign loans. But Thai regulators didn't prevent banks from investing those funds in risky real-estate ventures, and now many Thai banks are insolvent. Had the Thai authorities prevented the banks from taking out short-term foreign loans, the situation might have been quite different. "In many areas the liberalization of financial markets has gotten ahead of the incentive structure and capacity to regulate these markets, which is why people keep coming back to the capital controls," says World Bank economic adviser Amar Bhattacharya. There's a wide range of capital controls that can be used, including licensing requirements on the movement of money across borders. But regulating the outflow of hot money is considered more difficult than controlling its inflow, and Chile's relative immunity to the continent-wide spillover from the Mexican peso crisis has made its inflow controls the most popular model. In Chile, local firms that borrow abroad must keep 30% of that loan on deposit at the central bank -- without interest -- for a year, even if the loan is for a shorter duration. That raises the cost of short-term foreign capital and encourages firms to borrow only for long-term purposes. Colombia is another adherent of the Chilean approach. In another case, Malaysia, facing a surge in short-term capital, temporarily barred the sale of short-term assets to foreigners in 1994 to make sure it wouldn't face a sudden outflow of capital as well. The policy did indeed precipitate a sudden reduction in inflows. Inflow controls may indeed persuade foreigners to swap short-term investments for longer-term deals, says economist Carmen M. Reinhart of the University of Maryland. "These measures can shift the composition, but have not had a significant impact on the overall volume of capital inflows that you get," she says. For many countries, that is exactly the goal. Investors, however, find clever ways to restructure short-term deals to get around the law. Besides, even Chilean-style restrictions aren't likely to protect a country against all speculative attacks if its other economic policies are imprudent. "Maybe other countries will adopt the same thing Chile has, but that's not going to defend them against really outrageous deviations from tenable market exchange rates," says Prof. Tobin. [Toolbar] Copyright _ 1997 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. source: http://www.wsj.com -- dfiddle@mn.uswest.net (Dennis L. Fiddle) All news and information postings are in the public interest. The opinions expressed in the postings are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the sender. -________________________________________________ List Owner: M.G.G. Pillai Free Homepages on malaysia.net - send blank Check out the malaysia.net web site on List Postings to ________________________________________________ From asajh@UAA.ALASKA.EDU Sun Nov 9 20:40:44 1997 Date: Sun, 09 Nov 1997 18:51:36 -0800 From: Andrew Hund Subject: IS THE LEFT NUTS? (OR IS IT ME?) To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu >I thought you would enjoy this :-) > > >The following is from the Nation-November 17, 1997. > >IS THE LEFT NUTS? (OR IS IT ME?) >by Michael Moore > > >Is it me, or is the left completely nuts? I won't bore you with the >details of October's Media and Democracy Congress, but suffice it to say >that the left is still in fine form, completely ignoring anything that >really matters to the American public. I'm convinced there's a good >number of you who are simply addicted to listening to yourselves talk >and talk and talk -- MUMIA! PACIFICA! CUBA! ENOUGH ALREADY! >Speaking of talking to ourselves -- just who the hell is reading this? >Who is the Nation readership? Is it my brother-in-law, Tony, back in >Flint, who last night was installing furnace ducts until 9 o'clock? Is >it the bus driver at the airport who told me he's been cut back to a >thirty-hour week so the airport commission won't have to pay the health >insurance for his asthmatic daughter? Is it the woman at Sears who sells >blouses by day, and then waitresses at Denny's from 8 P.M. to midnight? >No. The person reading this would probably sympathize with the one who >wrote the flier I saw at the media congress announcing a "Stop Police >Brutality Demonstration." The flier promised a rally "from 4 P.M. UNTIL >THE TRUTH COMES OUT!" Until the truth comes out? Let me tell you, >friend, the truth ain't ever coming out at your rally, and neither is >Tony the furnace installer, 'cause he's got mouths to feed. But you >don't really mean by saying that the demonstration is going to last >"until the truth comes out" is that it will go deep into the night, >until all self-serving, attention-starved "lefties" have had their hour >and fifteen minutes at the podium. Get a clue! Go away! >Is it true what they say about "the left" -- that it loves humanity but >loathes people? I want to let you in on a little secret I've discovered: >"The people" are already way ahead of "the left." After years of being >downsized, rightsized, re-engineered and forced to work longer hours for >less pay and fewer benefits, they already know from their personal >experience that our economic system is unfair, unjust and undemocratic. >They know the evil it does and the havoc it wreaks on their lives. They >know that corporate America is the enemy, that the media are telling >them lies and that the Democrats and the Republicans are actually the >same party, and that neither is worth voting for. Look at any Gallup >poll and you'll see that the public is very "left" on all the issues -- >the majority are pro-choice, pro-environment, pro-labor. >Yet they despise liberals. If they knew where to find the nutty left, >they'd despise them, too. They see liberals, progressives and lefties as >arrogant, self-righteous and dreadfully predictable. They know you won't >ever go have a beer with them, or talk to them about how the Indians did >in teh Series. Christ, can you even name a single Cleveland Indian? >And why should you? You've got The Nation and Pacifica, and food co-op >and your Working Assets credit card. Don't get me wrong -- I love The >Nation and Pacifica and food co-ops and not supporting Citibank. But if >you stop there and refuse to participate in the real world, how are you >ever going to effect change? Back in the eighties thousands of you went >to Nicaragua in Sandinista brigades. Yes, that was important work; our >government was killing innocent people. But I never saw a single one of >you come to Flint while the world's largest company was destroying the >lives of 30,000 families. Where were you when we needed you? The people >in Flint were ready -- Jesse Jackson beat Dukakis by a 9-to-1 margin >there. In the white suburbs, Jackson beat him by a 4-to-1 margin! You >should have come! The right wing did. They organized the Michigan >Militia. It's no accident that Terry Nichols is from the Flint area. >Here's the part I don't get. Remember the antiwar movement, when we >didn't have the American public on our side and actually had to go out >and convince people the war was wrong? That was tough, but we did it. >These days, the difficult organizing work has already been done for us >by Big Business. It has spent the past decade destroying the middle >class and brutalizing the poor. Beating up on the poor, I get -- that's >the way it's always been. But the middle class? What a stupid error in >judgment -- and now there are millions of Americans waiting to vent >their anger and frustration. >And where are we? Inside New York's Cooper Union chanting for Mumia! I >want Mumia to live, I've signed the petitions, I've helped pay for the >ads -- hell, I'll personally go and kick the butt of the governor of >Pennsylvania! But, for chrissakes, the woman working at Sears just wants >to be able to spend an hour with her kids before she heads off to >Denny's. Can't we help her? Do you want to help her? >It's taken me a while to figure it all out, and after last month's Media >and Democracy Congress I think I have the answer: Because "the left" has >lost so many battles, it now doesn't know how to live any other way. >It's kind of scary, isn't it, to think that we could actually reach a >mass audience. Or that after all these years of failure, real change >could actually occur in our lifetime. Better to fight among ourselves! >It's an uncomfortable, unfamiliar feeling, isn't it, to get a whiff of >real populist progressive movement taking shape. Better that we keep >those furnace installers and bus drivers away from us -- they don't read >Chomsky anyway! >The signs are everywhere, but "the left" can't read a road map. There's >a whole New Politics taking place, and it's being led by UPS drivers and >Borders bookstore workers. I say, with all due affection and >appreciation for all of you and your causes, get over yourselves and >start talking like a real person, then start talking to real people. You >could begin by hitting 0 every time you get a robot when you call 411. >Have a chat with the human operator -- the phone company will eventually >have to hire more of them. Or sponsor a bowling team and put the name of >your local Labor Party or environmental group on their shirts. Or try >bowling yourself. It's where you'll meet Americans. > > Andrew Hund http://cwolf.uaa.alaska.edu/~asajh/Soc/ From rw@hss.iitb.ernet.in Mon Nov 10 01:41:27 1997 Date: Mon, 10 Nov 1997 14:19:32 +0500 (GMT+0500) From: prof rowena robinson To: wsystems@csf.colorado.edu please send me archival material. From athan.kokkinias@utoronto.ca Mon Nov 10 01:41:38 1997 Date: Mon, 10 Nov 1997 03:32:14 -0500 To: asajh@UAA.ALASKA.EDU, WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: "Athanasios (Tom) Kokkinias" Subject: Re: IS THE LEFT NUTS? (OR IS IT ME?) In-Reply-To: <01bced83$8fe54fc0$4762e589@cwolf.alaska.edu> Nice piece, Andrew. I enjoyed it. And so, the following is not directed at you. It's directed at Michael Moore. You see, probably like many of you I have also seen the work of Michael. Nice work. "Roger and Me". Brilliant stuff. I laughed and cried while still having managed to swallow more iced tea. Not beer. I saw and talked about the docu-film with my buddy, a truck driver who only drinks beer and abhors the taste of iced tea. He also abhored the docu-flick. Couldn't grasp its drift if it came 'round and hit 'im upside the head. HE knows all the names of every SINGLE Cleveland Indian. But, as he said, who gives a flyin' fuck about the folks in Flint? Speaking of talking to Real Americans and Real Canadians, as Moore prods us on, I took my buddy out for beer many a nights. I talked to him and many others like him about installing those new lights in front of the garage, fixing the leaking plumbing, more beer, about his theory of how skunks had dug underneath the driveway of his rented 2 by 4 house and now the driveway is collapsing, and God help 'im next time he sees those vermin, they'll wish their papas never met their momas and all....about many different kinds of brew and 'specially 'bout how good ol' Canadian brew is one hellofabetter brew than all them shitty American excuses for swill. 'Bout more beer. And 'bout all them nice joints in Toronto where they serve the best brew at a price a Real Canadian can afford.... Needless to say, we also spoke a mighty good deal 'bout the Cleveland Indians, and the Jays, Hockey, the Leagues, Contact Sports, the Great White North and all of its hardy bunch up there who gulp down ten pints for breakfast and then head off in the silver dusk of dawn atop their mighty Skidoos in search of the shit.... Talk about talking!....Lots there. And the subjects, all finely varied and seemingly inexhaustible, not a stone unturned. From cars, to fixing drywall, to doing up the shed for the kids, getting the hunting license come hell or high water, not having enough moola to get the muffler done, or the brake job, or the tuneup, or...., "...and Tom, check out the new pair of speakers I got today, and check out this over/under rifle, good for bear, only I still gotta get the tag, but this year I'm getting tags for both deer and bear...Say, man, me and you never go hunting together, you know, we head up north, maybe even rent a huntin' lodge, we shack up there and climb on a tree, come 5 am we bag us a bear....I got all the shit, knives, the tags, the ammo..." Yeah, Mr. Moore, I've talked plenty a time with Real Canadians at least. Maybe not Real Americans, but I figure (silly me!), maybe them Real Canucks ain't much different these days than Real Americans...the Real McCoy....See, I talked and talked, with my buddies from the slums in Toronto, the Street People, plubers, Bus drivers, talked with the guy who came and installed my duct work, talked with the cops, buddies at work, people who sell donughts all night, people who eat donughts all night, with my buddy the tow-truck driver from hell (as he likes to call himself), with the folks who pick up the garbage every morning (sadly enough for me, nowadays garbage pick up is not done anymore on some kind of schedule. See, ever since Laidlaw - the company - got the contract from the local government to take care of garbage removal, they have apparently implemented their own schedules; and if we don't so much like that, then the hell with us. These days, our garbage sits and rots for days sometimes, not in a dump somewhere, but right in front of the house...another testament to the efficiencies of 'downloading' on the 'Private' sector by the 'Public' one...)..... Yup. Done that, been there. Problem is, the folks Moore talks about seem to me to be the folks who've helped him make the films he's done, and the shows he's produced. They, like him, drink plenty o' beer and that's good. I'm not saying. It's just that while it's an all-American thing, to drink Beer and Bowl (a favourite pass-time of my hunting buddy - at least when he's not shootin' down on a bear from high up some tree), it's down right fucking disgusting to go bowling and have the nerve to order ICED TEA! At least those are the words of wisdom I've got plenty of times from his all-around Real Canadian lips.... See, the way I've seen (hell, experienced it), many times I whole-heartedly offered my good buddies good times with them, at the local bar, the local baseball diamond, the local truck-monster show, the local gun-club, the local wax-works museum, the local pink-flamingo garden variety show, the local sportsmen extravanganza, the local get together with more buddies like them. Only when time came for mew to introduce some of my other book readin' friends to my sports enthusiastic, hockey lovin' beer swilling compadriots, things turned a tad sour. Nay, things didn't just turn a tad sour. Things got right down fucking ugly. I recall the following fragments. Beer drinking, bear hunting friend of mine (honest joe, pays taxes, raises kids, comforts over-weight wife, talks to her real soft like about the latest Oprah Scandal...) asks me, real covert like: "Say, Tom, this friend of yours..yeah, the guy with the Political something or other...yeah, the Masters, whatever,...say, this guy, last night we were together, this guy kept talking 'bout Pol-it-ics...what's wrong with this fuckin' guy? Is he a fag or something? This guy didn't even know nothin' 'bout bear OR deer tags...I felt like tying the fucker to a tree and use 'im for bear bait..." Am I getting through Moore? Never mind ME talking to my Real Canadian friends (buddies we call it) 'bout Pol-it-ics! That would be the day. They'd stare me down to 'bout the size of a snivelling idiot. Talk about philosophy?!!! Are you for fucking real? Talk about environmental issues, economics, miseconomics, ...Are you joking. It would be about the same as trying to convince a Cleveland Indian to speak the truth about his own emotions, his own feelings, now made morose with years of having been driven almost to extinction by a gargantuan sports industry that caters to my buddy's beer halowed desires of flights of fancy and sports-meriment.... To be sure, dear Michael, as you've already poignantly suggested, I DID try a feeble remark on the state of our great Canadian Nation....After all, silly me, I figured what with all these beers I swallowed with all my Real Americanized-Canadian friends, listening to their kind of bullshit 'bout their Great White North Huntin' Stories and 'bout their genuine Seal-skin leather bindings hanging off the sides of their Kodiac Boots, it was high time they LISTENED to some of MY bullshit 'bout grass-roots action, and 'bout using 0 when dialing 411, so's to give more jobs to fine Joes like my beer swilling buddies....I figured, high time to talk a triffle 'bout Political verve, 'bout the politics of Joe-Blo alienation, 'bout the terrors awaiting their Joe-Blo kids who are growing up being fed day in, day out, the shit on the thousand channels which their beer swilling, bear huntin' papa makes available by spending his/her hard-earned cold cash one day at the local multi-media/TV/Audio/Video/Video-Game, etc, etc. parlour... Dear Michael, do you know what I got in return? My buddy looked at me straight in the eyes, rolled back his red neck, gathered some brewing steam and came back at me with a joke. "Say, Tom, I know you're a smart guy and all, and I know you like readin' them 'phisolophical' books and all, buts you're awright...you are part of the gang...But I bet you never heard this one...tell me ya know whatcha get when ya put a DICK and a POTATO together? (lots a smoke induced coughing laughter here)...You get a DICTATOR you dum-ass!!!!! I betcha you find that funny, dear Mr. Moore. I don't so much blame yas at all. No sira, not one bit. You see, when I heard that joke coming out my friend's mouth, I was drunk too. Not just him. After all I had just finished a long shift listening to him 'bout his latest infidelities with the ladies at work, you know, behind the wife's back - hell, what she don't know won't kill'er - and den when he began talkin' 'bout them fucking politicians (mood change: happens often when you're drunk) and how everyding ishhh shcreewed UP, and how it's all the nigger's fault, and 'bout all we need is a good solid race war to git things done right and set things straight and narrow, poor me, I figured time was ripe for my duty to my friend: to wake 'im up a little before he explodes one day and takes that riffle of his and goes shootin'-'em-upsome place he shouldn't've been and ending up dead from a cop's bullet and leavin' kids and wife behind to mourn a husband who never was to begin with, save for the bi-weekly cash he brought in.... Yeah, and so I figured, I'd put my learned pampered foot down and talk just a tiny itchy bit 'bout pol-it-ics and 'bout taking up some other sport 'sides huntin' and race-warring to ease the pain, when I get as a swift drunken reply the slur 'bout the DICK and the POTATO. Needless to say dear Michael, upon closer reflection later (when not so drunk) I found the joke, and my friend, sadly repugnant. We were friends (hell we grew up together in one of the worst places in Toronto - Parkdale South, home of prostitutes, half-way houses, crack-addicts, Toronto's oldest mental health farm, gangs, etc, etc.- for over 10 years). Together we grew, and together we grew apart. Together both our families grew together and together both our families grew apart. He moved west of town and there he and his family is today. I moved east and am here to this day. In short, dear Michael Moore, me and my dear ol' Real Americanized-Canadian friend grew apart 'cause it was the ol' dictator in me who kept trying to push these fucking pol-it-cal crap down the fine throat of my hardy Canuck friend. In all, simple pseudo-statistical reflection will show at once that (swear upon the grave of my grand-mother - as my buddy used to say when promted to back one of his extravagant hunting stories), in the course of our friendship we spoke a billion times about how fucking great the Toronto Blue Jays were and about how fucking great the Cleveland Indians might have been had they been born Canadian to a man, we only spoke ONCE about pol-it-ics. And that one time prompted the infamous dictator joke which I've gone to ridiculous lengths to talk about here. Needless to say, I've learned a long, hard lesson. My buddy and his dictator joke drove me to despair. They are to this day driving me back in among the 'other' kind behind the ivory gates of the University machine. And it's there I am agonna stay dear Mike, and you can tell that to your brother-in-law Tonny the duct-work plebe who I am sure has more wits and sensibility than my poor down-troden dear buddy from the slums of Parkdale who at one time succeeded in making over 45,000 a year as a plastic-molding machine operator at a local (Flint-like, GM-like) factory whichone day decided to head due south and just up and went leaving my buddy reeling in terror, losing his house, claiming bankruptsy, and going on poggie for three years - that's how long it took him to figure out it was the niggers' fault and all o'them fucking immigrants who steal all the jobs, and it was high-time for a goddamn race-war to set things right once more. Today, of course my buddy is happily back at work, not thinking 'bout the immigrants and not thinking 'bout fucking politics but happily back at work driving truck for 15 an hour - bringing home the bread. Real Canadian like. Just wait 'till they lay him off. It'll start all over again. No mercy for the down-troden. As long as there is beer and bowling to keep them thinking 'bout how to get rid of immigrants and 'undesirables'..... Mike, how many times have you had conversations with Real Americans like the ones I've had with my friend of over 10 years and many, many like him who dot this fine northern land-scape of ours? Believe you me, I know you have, plenty o'times. No doubt about that Mike. You know very well what I am talking about, if only you had read what I've written. It turns out Mike, that the difference in how you and I view Real Americans and Real Canadians lies in only this: You still like fine-brewed Beer whereas I'll always stick to Iced Tea. But hell, I still love your flicks, and you are damn right. Where the hell were we all, when Flint went up in flames? Where were we all when my friend's views took the wrong turn about this mightily confused world? Or maybe, where the hell were we all when MY views took the wrong turn? ..... Regards, Tom At 09:51 PM 09/11/97 -0500, Andrew Hund wrote: > > > >>I thought you would enjoy this :-) >> >> >>The following is from the Nation-November 17, 1997. >> >>IS THE LEFT NUTS? (OR IS IT ME?) >>by Michael Moore >> >> >>Is it me, or is the left completely nuts? I won't bore you with the >>details of October's Media and Democracy Congress, but suffice it to say >>that the left is still in fine form, completely ignoring anything that >>really matters to the American public. I'm convinced there's a good >>number of you who are simply addicted to listening to yourselves talk >>and talk and talk -- MUMIA! PACIFICA! CUBA! ENOUGH ALREADY! >>Speaking of talking to ourselves -- just who the hell is reading this? >>Who is the Nation readership? Is it my brother-in-law, Tony, back in >>Flint, who last night was installing furnace ducts until 9 o'clock? Is >>it the bus driver at the airport who told me he's been cut back to a >>thirty-hour week so the airport commission won't have to pay the health >>insurance for his asthmatic daughter? Is it the woman at Sears who sells >>blouses by day, and then waitresses at Denny's from 8 P.M. to midnight? >>No. The person reading this would probably sympathize with the one who >>wrote the flier I saw at the media congress announcing a "Stop Police >>Brutality Demonstration." The flier promised a rally "from 4 P.M. UNTIL >>THE TRUTH COMES OUT!" Until the truth comes out? Let me tell you, >>friend, the truth ain't ever coming out at your rally, and neither is >>Tony the furnace installer, 'cause he's got mouths to feed. But you >>don't really mean by saying that the demonstration is going to last >>"until the truth comes out" is that it will go deep into the night, >>until all self-serving, attention-starved "lefties" have had their hour >>and fifteen minutes at the podium. Get a clue! Go away! >>Is it true what they say about "the left" -- that it loves humanity but >>loathes people? I want to let you in on a little secret I've discovered: >>"The people" are already way ahead of "the left." After years of being >>downsized, rightsized, re-engineered and forced to work longer hours for >>less pay and fewer benefits, they already know from their personal >>experience that our economic system is unfair, unjust and undemocratic. >>They know the evil it does and the havoc it wreaks on their lives. They >>know that corporate America is the enemy, that the media are telling >>them lies and that the Democrats and the Republicans are actually the >>same party, and that neither is worth voting for. Look at any Gallup >>poll and you'll see that the public is very "left" on all the issues -- >>the majority are pro-choice, pro-environment, pro-labor. >>Yet they despise liberals. If they knew where to find the nutty left, >>they'd despise them, too. They see liberals, progressives and lefties as >>arrogant, self-righteous and dreadfully predictable. They know you won't >>ever go have a beer with them, or talk to them about how the Indians did >>in teh Series. Christ, can you even name a single Cleveland Indian? >>And why should you? You've got The Nation and Pacifica, and food co-op >>and your Working Assets credit card. Don't get me wrong -- I love The >>Nation and Pacifica and food co-ops and not supporting Citibank. But if >>you stop there and refuse to participate in the real world, how are you >>ever going to effect change? Back in the eighties thousands of you went >>to Nicaragua in Sandinista brigades. Yes, that was important work; our >>government was killing innocent people. But I never saw a single one of >>you come to Flint while the world's largest company was destroying the >>lives of 30,000 families. Where were you when we needed you? The people >>in Flint were ready -- Jesse Jackson beat Dukakis by a 9-to-1 margin >>there. In the white suburbs, Jackson beat him by a 4-to-1 margin! You >>should have come! The right wing did. They organized the Michigan >>Militia. It's no accident that Terry Nichols is from the Flint area. >>Here's the part I don't get. Remember the antiwar movement, when we >>didn't have the American public on our side and actually had to go out >>and convince people the war was wrong? That was tough, but we did it. >>These days, the difficult organizing work has already been done for us >>by Big Business. It has spent the past decade destroying the middle >>class and brutalizing the poor. Beating up on the poor, I get -- that's >>the way it's always been. But the middle class? What a stupid error in >>judgment -- and now there are millions of Americans waiting to vent >>their anger and frustration. >>And where are we? Inside New York's Cooper Union chanting for Mumia! I >>want Mumia to live, I've signed the petitions, I've helped pay for the >>ads -- hell, I'll personally go and kick the butt of the governor of >>Pennsylvania! But, for chrissakes, the woman working at Sears just wants >>to be able to spend an hour with her kids before she heads off to >>Denny's. Can't we help her? Do you want to help her? >>It's taken me a while to figure it all out, and after last month's Media >>and Democracy Congress I think I have the answer: Because "the left" has >>lost so many battles, it now doesn't know how to live any other way. >>It's kind of scary, isn't it, to think that we could actually reach a >>mass audience. Or that after all these years of failure, real change >>could actually occur in our lifetime. Better to fight among ourselves! >>It's an uncomfortable, unfamiliar feeling, isn't it, to get a whiff of >>real populist progressive movement taking shape. Better that we keep >>those furnace installers and bus drivers away from us -- they don't read >>Chomsky anyway! >>The signs are everywhere, but "the left" can't read a road map. There's >>a whole New Politics taking place, and it's being led by UPS drivers and >>Borders bookstore workers. I say, with all due affection and >>appreciation for all of you and your causes, get over yourselves and >>start talking like a real person, then start talking to real people. You >>could begin by hitting 0 every time you get a robot when you call 411. >>Have a chat with the human operator -- the phone company will eventually >>have to hire more of them. Or sponsor a bowling team and put the name of >>your local Labor Party or environmental group on their shirts. Or try >>bowling yourself. It's where you'll meet Americans. >> >> >Andrew Hund >http://cwolf.uaa.alaska.edu/~asajh/Soc/ > > From phuakl@sit.edu.my Mon Nov 10 02:38:37 1997 10 Nov 97 17:41:45 +1100 From: "DR. PHUA KAI LIT" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Mon, 10 Nov 1997 17:41:16 +0000 Subject: (Fwd) (Fwd) [sangkancil] Remembering the Dili Massacre ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date: Mon, 10 Nov 1997 16:00:52 +0700 To: sangkancil@malaysia.net From: Elizabeth Wong Subject: [sangkancil] Remembering the Dili Massacre Reply-to: Elizabeth Wong ________________________________________________ This week's sponsors -The Asia Pacific Internet Company (APIC) Business Internet Services. Some talk. Some do. We talk and do! for instant info ________________________________________________ November 12, 1991 marked a turning point in East Timor's pro-democracy movement at a terrible human cost. Indonesian soldiers opened fire on unarmed men, women and children at Dili's Santa Cruz cemetery that day and East Timor became a major international news item overnight. In this special focus, we feature contributions from Sonny Inbaraj, Steven Gan, Rob Wesley-Smith, Malaysian poet Cecil Rajendra and Reverend Max B Surjadinata. A special correspondent pays tribute to the Resistance fighters. Remembering the Dili Massacre SONNY INBARAJ -------------- It's been six years since the killings in East Timor's capital, Dili. Indonesia's insistence that claims of atrocities against the East Timorese were the inventions of local subversives and outside agitators was shattered in 1991. Over 271 East Timorese were killed when Indonesian troops opened fire on a peaceful demonstration at the Santa Cruz Cemetary in Dili on November 12. A further 200 were feared disappeared. The Dili massacre transformed East Timor from a non-issue to a major news item overnight due to the presence of foreign witnesses -- journalists masquerading as tourists, as the Indonesians later alleged. The unthinkable had happened for the independence movement, albeit at a terrible human cost. In the past, there have been regular reports of mass killings in East Timor, but none has shocked the world so much as the Santa Cruz cemetery massacre, captured on film by the courageous British cameraman, Max Stahl. In early 1994, when John Pilger's "Death of a Nation", a documentary on East Timor, went on air in Britain, British Telecom registered 4,000 calls a minute from the public to the number displayed at the end. While Western media reports of the Santa Cruz massacre were primarily aimed at getting the truth out, official media reactions in ASEAN were muted. For example, the Singapore Straits Times carried a report that began with 12 paragraphs from its Jakarta correspondent presenting the official Indonesian view of events from the Foreign Ministry and the Antara news agency. No less bland was the front page story in the Malaysian New Straits Times ("Jakarta blames Fretilin for the killings"), despite the fact that a New Zealand student of Malaysian origin was one of the many killed -- the only foreigner to have died in the shootings. Almost from the onset of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, ASEAN member countries arrived at a "consensus" that the matter was an "internal" Indonesian affair. The ASEAN doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of a member country prevails till today, ipso facto, allowing the ASEAN nations to turn a blind eye to the on-going genocide of the Timorese people. Sadly, the ASEAN press seems to be toeing this line. The most common argument used by the ASEAN media against advocating independence for East Timor, is that the Indonesian republic will disintegrate should the territory be free -- thus posing severe security problems in the region. This argument, by itself, is basically flawed. As Newcastle University's Dr George Aditjondro has pointed out, the last 21 years since the annexation of East Timor has also seen the opposite trend of the disintegration fear. The world saw the unification of Vietnam and, ironically, the annexation of East Timor was partly triggered by that unification. With the end of the Cold War, we have also seen the unification of Germany. In fact, the collapse of the Berlin Wall was one factor that ended the Cold War, apart from Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost. In our part of the world, we see young Korean people yearning for the reunification of the Korean peninsula. Likewise, Irish people all over the world are also yearning for the unification of Ireland, outside the United Kingdom. "If the premise is true that Indonesia will collapse if East Timor is independent, then something must be fundamentally wrong with the Indonesian republic. And if it is really true that Indonesia's unity is shaky, is it fair that the East Timorese people be blamed and punished for it?" asks Dr Aditjondro. This involves a serious question of value and judgment about federalism and independence or centralisation of state power. Each case has to be looked at on its merits. Unfortunately, the ASEAN media does not see things in this manner. The fixation with the so-called "ASEAN unity" makes them turn a blind eye to East Timor -- a human rights emergency and a security concern in their own backyard. This crude aspect of ASEAN media management came across quite clearly when the the second Asia-Pacific Conference on East Timor (Apcet II) in Kuala Lumpur, last November, was disrupted by a Malaysian government-sponsored mob. Foreign and local journalists were arrested by the police together with local activists and academics who were at Apcet II. Because of an order by the Home Ministry instructing editors to black out all coverage of the conference, some Malaysian newspapers even denied that their journalists were arrested and detained in a Kuala Lumpur police lock-up. A newspaper in ASEAN, for that matter, that chooses to feature, for instance, the Indonesian armed forces' violence against their own citizenry and the Timorese people would elicit flak from the domestic government, business and organised right-wing think-tanks. Also, they might be looked upon with disfavour by the corporate community supporting the Suharto regime (Including advertisers) for indulging in such a quixotic interest and crusade. They would tend to stand alone in ASEAN in focussing on victims that, from the standpoint of the prevailing ASEAN "consensus", are unworthy of any media coverage. ASEAN, indeed, holds the key, together with the United Nations, both in terms of facilitating the talks process and providing long-term guarantees for peace in East Timor. For one, the foreign policies of the East Timorese political parties favour full membership of ASEAN. Unfortunately, when it comes to the question of East Timor, ASEAN responds by the principle of speak no evil and see no evil. One of the so-called strengths of ASEAN is to avoid questions which might embarrass incumbent regimes. Because of this, East Timor has never been discussed. This so-called ASEAN solidarity is a sad and pathetic reflection of sanctioning the neo-colonial occupation of East Timor. The so-called "ASEAN way" in building a new security order in the Asia-Pacific region is through security dialogue in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The big question is if contentions issues, like East Timor, are not discussed, can the ARF ever evolve beyond consultations and dialogue to "preserve peace and growth in the Asia-Pacific?" Are ASEAN states suspicious of a comprehensive security agenda that blurs the distinction between external and internal security by encouraging a dialogue that includes issues of human rights and democracy along with issues of arms control and regional power balance? At this juncture, it is important to point out that the policy positions of any one ASEAN government with regard to East Timor does not necessarily reflect the opinions and positions of the citizens of their countries. ASEAN governments argue, as so-called representatives of the people, that they possess the sole right to make decisions on human rights and security issues based on the history and culture of the people, often deriding the opinions of NGOs and people's organisations. But NGOs and people's organisations in ASEAN are often more representative of ordinary people than their non-democratic and authoritarian governments. And the media in the region has to realise this, instead of viewing NGOs with suspicion. There is a people's dimension to security which transcends mere reporting on arms purchases and exaggerated external security threats coming from China. Towards this end, the media must play a more pro-active role in order to see peace come to East Timor. However, it is pathetic that the Fourth Estate in ASEAN is not really digging up the dirt on the Suharto regime and its designs on East Timor. Rather than pursuing the violators of human rights in the territory, much of ASEAN's media seem content simply to follow those doing the pursuing, namely the international press and the wire services. And because of this, there is little or no original reporting on East Timor coming from the region. This is disturbing because the stock Indonesian response is that if the liberal press was gagged or fell in line with the Indonesian/ASEAN consensus, then the East Timor problem would be forgotten by the world. Sadly, the ASEAN press seems to be toeing this line. If movement towards durable peace is to begin in East Timor, the starting point must be the development of incentives for parties in the conflict to stop the war. Foremost is disarmament and the complete withdrawal of all Indonesian troops from the territory. Nobel Peace laureate Jose Ramos-Horta recently has called for the cessation of all armed activity in East Timor. "The twenty-two-year-old conflict in East Timor can come to an end if the two main parties engaged in armed violence in the territory are inspired by the higher interest of peace and the well-being of the people," he said. "In this context, I wish to make a most emphatic appeal to the Resistance leaders in East Timor, the freedom fighters in the mountains, the clandestine network, the youths and students, as well as to all those who are directly or indirectly involved in this noble struggle to resist any temptation to engage in armed violence. "The Resistance, if it is to serve its own cause and purpose, must observe a complete cessation of all armed activity that can give rise to Indonesia's use of force." Noble words, indeed, from a man of peace. ******************************************************************** The AustralAsian, Nov 7- Nov 21, 1997 --------------------------------------------------------------- FIGHTING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS Suara Rakyat Malaysia - SUARAM (Voice of the Malaysian People) add: 11, Jalan 1A/71E, Jalan Carey, 46000 Petaling Jaya, Selangor,Malaysia tel: 60-3-7943525 fax: 60-3-7943526 email: wkpeng@pc.jaring.my homepage: http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/1577 (still underconstruction) -________________________________________________ List Owner: M.G.G. Pillai Free Homepages on malaysia.net - send blank Check out the malaysia.net web site on List Postings to ________________________________________________ From aaustin@utkux.utcc.utk.edu Mon Nov 10 05:45:21 1997 Date: Mon, 10 Nov 1997 07:44:09 -0500 (EST) From: Andrew Wayne Austin To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: Re: IS THE LEFT NUTS? (OR IS IT ME?) In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19971110033214.006c69e8@mailbox47.utcc.utoronto.ca> List, When I talk to workers (people like me) about matters vital to their lives, when I show ordinary people Roger and Me or even Manufacturing Consent, they get it. They're not stupid. Ordinary people are concerned, are pretty hip to what's going on, and are eager to learn. I left my contracting business to my cousin to enter the academy to learn more about the world. And, yes, I drank beer and hung out in bars. The enemy of freedom is not the mythical stupid proletariat (although sometimes proletarians act in stupid ways). The enemy is the capitalist class and the political stratum at their beck and call, many of self-important latter moving through the ivory tower, from time to time kicking out embarrassing fictions, believing the masses to be nothing the herd. Maybe the fact that the ordinary person doesn't care about the concerns of the cultural "left" and out-spoken trivial side of the political left is a demonstration of Moore's argument? Maybe this has shot right over the heads of the very people he is criticizing? I suggest that rather than falling into the elitist mode and suggesting that Moore and the masses don't get it, some might consider the possibility that *they* just don't get it. Andy From OWENJACK@FS.isu.edu Mon Nov 10 08:38:29 1997 for ; Mon, 10 Nov 1997 08:37:47 -0700 (MST) From: "J B Owens" To: WSN@csf.colorado.edu Date: Mon, 10 Nov 1997 08:43:14 -0600, MDT Subject: *Myth of Continents* I forward the following because it will interest, for different reasons, several WSN members. Jack Owens ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date: Mon, 10 Nov 1997 07:11:13 -0500 From: "Lawrence E. Marceau" To: emjnet@lists.acs.ohio-state.edu (Early Modern Japan Network) Subject: Wigen/Lewis book featured in NY Times Book Review To EMJNetters: This is the first book I am aware of by a member of the Early Modern Japan Network to be reviewed in the NYTBR. Also, make note of the various Edo/Tokugawa-related panels and papers to be presented at AAS next March in Washington, DC. Lawrence Marceau Ever Since Gondwanaland Date: November 2, 1997, Late Edition - Final Byline: By Michael Lind Lead: THE MYTH OF CONTINENTS A Critique of Metageography. By Martin W. Lewis and Karen E. Wigen. Illustrated. 344 pp. Berkeley: University of California Press. Cloth, $55. Paper, $19.95. Text: The most famous American map of the 20th century may be Saul Steinberg's drawing of the world as seen from Manhattan. New Jersey looms large; beyond is the rest of the continental United States, foreshortened, with Asia peeping over California. According to Martin W. Lewis and Karen E. Wigen, professors of geography and history, respectively, at Duke University, almost all conceptual maps of world geography are distorted by the kind of parochialism that Steinberg satirized. The title of their book, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography*, is somewhat misleading. In a survey of the geographer's art from the days of Aristotle to the present, the authors use the conventional definition of ''continent'' as only one of many examples of how our maps of the world map our own biases. Lewis and Wigen argue that Europeans have inflated their own importance by making their peninsula an independent continent while downgrading China and India to mere subcontinents. ''In physical, cultural and historical diversity, China and India are comparable to the entire European landmass, not to a single European country,'' they write. ''A better (if still imperfect) analogy would compare France, not to India as a whole, but to a single Indian state, such as Uttar Pradesh.'' Europeans and Americans have also often divided the world into West and East. Not only definitions but the characteristics assigned to the East or the Orient have changed drastically over time (in the maps the authors helpfully provide, the reader can watch these elastic zones wobble like blobs of mercury across Eurasia). Lewis and Wigen observe that ''what Voltaire and his cohorts found in East Asia were precisely the values that we now habitually associate with the West: rationality, moderation, and 'mystical, undogmatic rule.' In our own day, by contrast, those who find Western civilization wanting have usually combined the philosophes' contempt for Western violence and greed with a denigration of precisely these values, so that rationality becomes not an Eastern virtue but a Western vice.'' Now that Singapore symbolizes technocratic rationality and Islam is identified with puritanical ethics while America (the westernmost West) is viewed by much of mankind as the home of Christian fundamentalism, New Age cults, rock music, drugs and sexual libertinism, the Enlightenment attitude may have a new currency. Although they are relentless in exposing Euro-American prejudices, the authors make it clear that ethnocentrism is not a Euro-American monopoly. Everyone knows that China always considered itself the Middle Kingdom, but how many know that one Korean nationalist viewed the Korean peninsula ''as the core of one of the world's three great culture regions (the other two being China and the 'Indo-European realm')''? According to Lewis and Wigen, ''as late as the early modern period, Indian world maps typically showed South Asia as forming the great bulk of the planet's landmass, with one Indian cartographer depicting Europe in a few marginal circles labeled 'England, France . . . other hat-wearing islands.'" During the cold war, two conceptual maps of the world became familiar. One, based on geopolitical alignments, divided the earth, like Caesar's Gaul, among the first, second and third worlds. An alternate map, favored by the left, drew a border between North and South, requiring, Lewis and Wigen note, ''some stretch of the imagination.'' They consider but reject the fashionable post- modernist idea that all attempts at mapping and labeling are worthless. Recognizing that humanity has usually been divided into regional civilizations is indispensable, they say. This conviction leads them to view the efforts of Arnold Toynbee and Samuel Huntington to map the borders of world civilizations with respect, though they disagree with the results. In their own attempt to diagram discrete cultures, Lewis and Wigen prefer the idea of ''world regions'' to that of continents. Their application of this approach to global history is generally convincing. In their view, ''Europe'' is best understood as ''western Eurasia,'' which in turn is simply a component of ''the supercontinent of Afro-Eurasia.'' For much of the past millennium and a half a citied swath, the ''Afro-Asian ecumene'' -- the temperate band between the Sahara and the steppes -- was divided among three broadly defined civilizations: East Asian, Indic (Hindu) and ''the lands of the Abrahamic tradition'' (that is, Judaism, Christianity and Islam). Americans, accustomed to the idea of the Judeo-Christian tradition (an artifact of ecumenical politics), may find it mind-bending to think of the three Peoples of the Book as belonging to a single ''rigidly monotheistic Judeo-Christian-Islamic Megareligion'' (to use a phrase from Jim Mason, an environmental theorist cited by Lewis and Wigen). The notion may seem common- sensical to Hindus and Confucians. Having criticized many others for their conceptual maps of the contemporary world, the authors are to be commended for their courage in setting forth their own ''refined world regional scheme.'' Their treatment of region as a surrogate for religion and culture works pretty well in Old World -- oops, I mean Afro-Eurasian regions like South Asia and East Asia. They are less convincing when they divide the Western Hemisphere into three regions, according to different and incompatible principles. North America and Ibero-America are defined by language and European colonial heritage, whereas ''African America,'' including the Caribbean islands and coastal Brazil (but not the American South) is defined by race. If language and culture are the criteria, shouldn't Britain be united with North America, Australia and New Zealand -- and Spain and Portugal with Ibero- America? In the map that Lewis and Wigen offer, Britain and Spain are assumed to have more in common with each other -- and with Scandinavia and Italy -- than either has with its former colonies. But these are quibbles. Debating these matters is not just important; it is fun. The very fact that their work stimulates such questions is a tribute to the authors. In *The Myth of Continents*, Lewis and Wigen have written an entertaining and informative account of the way our maps show us the world that we want to see. ******************************************************** J. B. "Jack" Owens, Professor of History Project Coordinator, Computer-Mediated Distance Learning Idaho State University, Pocatello, ID 83209 USA e-mail: owenjack@isu.edu www: http://www.isu.edu/~owenjack ******************************************************** From chriscd@jhu.edu Mon Nov 10 09:13:50 1997 Date: Mon, 10 Nov 1997 11:11:21 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: frankman on global citizenship To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu dear wsners, this to announce that Myron Frankman's short essay, "Planet-Wide Citizen's Income: Antidote to Global Apartheid" is now available at http://vm1.mcgill.ca/~inmf/http/mf/pwci.html This is a discussion of the evolution of the ideas of global citizenship and human rights and the need for globalization from below and a planet-wide guaranteed income. It is now linked to the World-Systems Archive (http://csf.colorado.edu/wsystems/wsarch.html) "working papers" subdirectory, and Myron's vita is linked to the bios subdirectory. chris From ixchel@igc.apc.org Mon Nov 10 10:03:10 1997 for ; Mon, 10 Nov 1997 09:02:52 -0800 (PST) for ; Mon, 10 Nov 1997 09:02:16 -0800 (PST) Date: Mon, 10 Nov 1997 12:01:14 -0400 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: ixchel@igc.apc.org (Ben Blevins) Subject: Can't get off this list Sender: ixchel@igc.org I have tried for months in every way possible to unsubscribe from this list. Please, please please let me off. Thank you very much From 6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu Mon Nov 10 10:13:19 1997 Date: Mon, 10 Nov 1997 09:13:11 -0800 (PST) From: Judi Kessler <6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> To: Ben Blevins Subject: Re: Can't get off this list In-Reply-To: I give you permission - seriously, the best way to handle this, I have found, is to automatically delete everything other than that which comes from Chris Chase-Dunn. Easier than getting off the list - and you also get what's worth reading On Mon, 10 Nov 1997, Ben Blevins wrote: > I have tried for months in every way possible to unsubscribe from this list. > > Please, please please let me off. > > Thank you very much > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Judi A. Kessler University of California, Santa Barbara Department of Sociology Santa Barbara, California 93106 (805) 893-3751 fax (805) 893-3324 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From aaustin@utkux.utcc.utk.edu Mon Nov 10 12:21:04 1997 Date: Mon, 10 Nov 1997 14:19:36 -0500 (EST) From: Andrew Wayne Austin To: Judi Kessler <6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> Subject: Re: Can't get off this list In-Reply-To: On Mon, 10 Nov 1997, Judi Kessler wrote: > the best way to handle this, I have found, is to automatically delete > everything other than that which comes from Chris Chase-Dunn. Easier > than getting off the list - and you also get what's worth reading If you delete everything other than that which comes from Chris Chase-Dunn then how can you know Chris is the only contributor worth reading? Oh, the point is moot--you won't be reading this post anyway. Andy From br00196@bingsuns.cc.binghamton.edu Tue Nov 11 13:23:39 1997 From: br00196@bingsuns.cc.binghamton.edu Date: Tue, 11 Nov 1997 15:23:10 -0500 (EST) To: Andrew Wayne Austin Subject: Re: IS THE LEFT NUTS? (OR IS IT ME?) In-Reply-To: I agree entirely with Andrew here. I met some ordinary people the other day, and they were very nice. I think we should just leave them alone... Sid On Mon, 10 Nov 1997, Andrew Wayne Austin wrote: > List, > > When I talk to workers (people like me) about matters vital to their > lives, when I show ordinary people Roger and Me or even Manufacturing > Consent, they get it. They're not stupid. Ordinary people are concerned, > are pretty hip to what's going on, and are eager to learn. I left my > contracting business to my cousin to enter the academy to learn more about > the world. And, yes, I drank beer and hung out in bars. The enemy of > freedom is not the mythical stupid proletariat (although sometimes > proletarians act in stupid ways). The enemy is the capitalist class and > the political stratum at their beck and call, many of self-important > latter moving through the ivory tower, from time to time kicking out > embarrassing fictions, believing the masses to be nothing the herd. > > Maybe the fact that the ordinary person doesn't care about the concerns of > the cultural "left" and out-spoken trivial side of the political left is a > demonstration of Moore's argument? Maybe this has shot right over the > heads of the very people he is criticizing? I suggest that rather than > falling into the elitist mode and suggesting that Moore and the masses > don't get it, some might consider the possibility that *they* just don't > get it. > > Andy > > > From rkmoore@iol.ie Tue Nov 11 15:31:09 1997 Tue, 11 Nov 1997 22:30:45 GMT Date: Tue, 11 Nov 1997 22:30:45 GMT To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu (world-system network) From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Re: IS THE LEFT NUTS?... * Democracy as Primary Goal * 11/10/97, Andrew Wayne Austin wrote: >When I talk to workers (people like me) about matters vital to their >lives, when I show ordinary people Roger and Me or even Manufacturing >Consent, they get it. They're not stupid. Ordinary people are concerned, >are pretty hip to what's going on, and are eager to learn. Well said. This same view guides me to focus primarily on "actual democracy" itself as a primary political goal -- not socialism or any other particular "solution". It is in the context of a genuine democratic process, once instantiated, that sounder societal and economic systems need to be developed. Theoreticians can draw some useful maps in advance, but the actual deliberations must wait for the constituent assembly (or whatever it turns out to be) to convene. This would indicate that investigating the nature of "actual democracy" deserves more attention by those of us endeavoring to contribute to a better world through clearer understanding... What is it? How can it be achieved? How can it avoid usurpation by special interests? Ever since the Greeks, democracy and tyranny have succeeded in cycles. Especially on a global scale -- the province of wsn -- these are very difficult questions. rkm From chriscd@jhu.edu Tue Nov 11 16:04:36 1997 Date: Tue, 11 Nov 1997 18:01:58 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: global democracy To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu several scholars contributed to a fascinating roundtable on the idea of global democracy at the American Sociological Association meeting in Toronto in August. I believe that Bill Robinson (Soc, U of Tennessee) is organizing a session on that same topic for the next ASA meeting in San Francisco. Bill Robinson's Promoting Polyarchy (Cambridge 1996) is a fascinating study of US foreign policy and the contested idea of democracy in the era of "democracy promotion" by the National Endowment of Democracy. the problem is to define and mobilize a globalization from below that challenges the hegemony of neo-liberal versions of democracy. no problem. chris From wkirk@wml.prestel.co.uk Wed Nov 12 11:59:15 1997 by svr-a-01.core.theplanet.net with smtp (Exim 1.73 #1) Date: Wed, 12 Nov 1997 17:05:00 -0800 From: William Kirk To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: WHO'S NUTS? IT'S ME. To Andrew and Tom: Apart from academics and proles who read WSN there is the unemployed. I am unemployed, or should say in newspeak a Jobseeker. I am an unregistered paranoid, and I also suffer from another debilitating metal disorder, Knight's Move Thinking - I come to conclusions which are not readily understood by the majority. Not that there is anyone to listen to conclusions, most people avoid me in the street since I have a bad habit of taking longer than sixty seconds to reply to simple questions. I don't go into bars any more, I'm not really allowed, in fact ten years ago I and two others were thrown out of a bar in Glasgow for engaging in an 'intellectual conversation'. The bar steward said we were distracting customers from taking their refreshments. Now, this is where you will see where it all goes wrong form me - I spend too much time reading economics - and this is where I find the nexus of the anti-systemic discussion. R. K. Moore wrote on 3rd October, >As for "electoral mechanisms"... why is this so lightly dismissed? I >envision a day when elections are no more, and my grandaughter asks >me "You mean you had the vote and you didn't try to legally organize to >use it effectively?" Well, the whole thing is this, the circus of voting is a complete waste of time. At least that is my conclusion. Why it is so lightly dismissed is because of the following - (from The Coercive State. The Decline of Democracy in Britain, by Paddy Hillyard and Janie Percy-Smith) These guidelines note that the has two roles. First, it is involved in combating 'terrorism and subversion'. Terrorism is defined as 'the use of violence for political ends, including any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear'. Subversive activities are defined as 'those which threaten the safety or wellbeing of the state, and which are intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means'. Interception of communications can be made for similar reasons, engaging in criminal activity, terrorism or acts which undermine the economic wellbeing of the state. What bothers me is the term 'Parliamentary democracy'. Those elected are effectively an oligarchy, rule by the few. But then the notion of democracy to mean all persons to become involved in all matters is from books written over two thousand years ago and is of no account nowadays. So, when this communication is read by the I will be flagged and the information posted to - the Jobcentre perhaps? Additionally, since I have communicated with persons known or unknown I am conspiring. There is a law against conspiracy, persons do not have to commit a criminal act, all they have to do is take part in 'unlawful' activities, such as discussing ways of undermining Parliamentary democracy. In the event of a trial a conspirer has to prove innocence, unlike a real criminal where the prosecution has to prove the person was guilty of an offence. Besides that, as Hillyard and Percy-Smith say, 'Courts do not usually admit rumour or hearsay as evidence, but, in conspiracy charges, such hearsay is allowed as evidence of the conspiracy in question. So, holding certain political views may be held to be evidence of participation in a conspiracy to commit certain political acts'. Like in days of old when you were dunked, if you drowned you proved your innocence, if you lived you were in for a really hard time. I do not wish to undermine Parliamentary democracy by violent means. What I'd like to see is the following, Subversive activities are defined as 'those which threaten the safety or wellbeing of the state, and which are intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by violent means'. Of course I will never get the knock at the door for stating the obvious, everyone knows Parliamentary democracy is dead. What no one knows is what will follow on when it is buried. The answer does not lie in politics, it lies with an economic concept. Have a read of the following, which Chris Chase-Dunn pointed to on Tuesday. Planet-Wide Citizen's Income: Antidote to Global Apartheid Myron J. Frankman In particular, the following data, >The UNDP's Human Development Report 1997 reports that the ratio of the >income share of the world's richest 20% to the world's poorest 20% >(based on national estimates of income distribution data) has gone from >30:1 in 1960 to 61:1 in 1991 to 78:1 in 1994. (8) Plot the data on a graph and it might look as if a 99:1 might be reached in about twenty or fifty years. No, more like the year AD 10,000,000 plus or minus 5,000,000 years. Here is the process whereby this estimate is calculated. Or at least a simple illustration. Take ten persons and give each one a token or a dollar bill. Each person is numbered from 1 to 10. They are going to play a trivial game. A ten sided die is rolled and say number six comes up. Number six loses and goes out of the game. Then numbers 7, 8, 9 and ten move along the table to become numbers 6, 7, 8 and 9 respectively. A nine sided die is rolled so that one player gets the token which the original number 6 lost. So now there are nine players, eight of them have one token and one has two. The next event is to repeat the process so that one other player goes out of the game. Of course, if the number which is shown is the same for the player with the two tokens then that player remains at the table. Thus, the game doesn't end after ten events, in fact if this is run a few times the average life of the game is about forty four events. Upon running this about fifty times the lowest number of events is thirteen and the highest was ninety four. Looking at the graph of how long it takes for an event to occur it will be seen that in nearly every game six or seven players have gone after about ten events. When there are two players left, the expected number of events, for ten tokens, is twenty five. If the graph is expressed in mathematical terms there is a difficulty, the relationship is neither algebraic nor transcendental. You have to know the number of players and the number of tokens before the graph can be constructed. In the range of say event two to about event fifty the graph is close to what can be constructed using the exponential operator, 'e'. The use of this approximation will never show the whole process, the process has to start at zero and come to an end, this cannot be done using 'e' since you cannot start at zero and the process will never end. If such a graph for five billion players is superimposed over the graph of the UNDP data then it is easy to see the 'game' will last for a very long time. Practically, it is unlikely any economy will see a concentration greater than about 90:1, thus, if the money system is small and the number of people in the system is small then it will stall when the 90:1 condition is approached. Thus, to keep the world money system going, what needs to be done is to amalgamate systems, hence the Euro. In about fifty years the world might see an American dollar which is the currency for the whole of north and south America. But of course this is Knight's Move Thinking. Consider another experiment. This time with no money, in which there are ten persons or families and they live on an island. Each of the ten are taken to be an economic entity, all have exactly the same mental and physical ability, the all work the same hours and trade where there is absolute perfection in exchange. Now the game will be changed. By the throw of the die each of the ten units will be subjected to slight advantage and disadvantage. The net effect is of course zero. Or at least this is the expected effect. Yes, this is trivial, each of the ten entities will lose and gain once the experiment is started, and the game can go on for ever. Easy to set up and insert counters to see at any point in the game who is winning and who is losing, the average, the grand average and so on. Looking at graphs of the total effect there is nice smooth curves which do pass on occasion through zero, but the overall picture is one of gain or loss for considerable time periods. All of this is trivial because every time a game is run a different picture emerges. What isn't so trivial is when a counter is placed which measures variance. This always increases, and the graph of variance has the same characteristics as the one produced in the token game. Also, a point is reached where two entities never lose, leaving the computer on all night with two 'winners' they are still there in the morning. Repeating this process about twenty times the same thing happens, two entities end up with all the advantage. Generally about six are left with no advantage, and when they do get a run of good luck it is soon lost. Happens every time. If I were to leave the computer running for a week then I might find one entity with all the advantage. What is absolutely certain is that a condition of equity, or near to what was seen at the beginning of the experiment, will NEVER happen. This is not unlike the classical experiment in chemistry or physics where two gasses are separated in a container by a partition. When the partition is removed, the gasses mix. Taking their random movement in the container the possibility does exist that some day the original arrangement will be found. What is shown in the experiment with ten entities is the reverse, order has been created out of chaos. Or at least this is what the winners will say if it were possible to visit the island. Imagine for a second if the Grand Designer of this small universe were to make a visit at the point where there are two 'winners'. It is likely that the 'losers' would expect some kind of salvation, 'the losers will inherit the earth', or whatever. But what is the only thing the Grand Designer can say - 'So you think things are bad, well, you ain't seen nothing yet'. So here comes some more Knight's Move Thinking. Globalisation = Concentration of wealth and resources = A NATURAL PROCESS. Not only that, the process runs 'downhill', or as the chemists and physics might call it, an exothermic process. It runs by itself, it contains sufficient energy for the process to work. So what is the fuel? Never mind that, look at the ashes left behind, dispossession, alienation, marginalisation, and Jobseekers. Attacking the system, modifying, compromising, whatever, nothing will stop it. The time for the definitive analysis is when it ends, which is too far in the future. It wont end anyway, it will wither away, but only if a system, and a small one, is created where the money system is under democratic control. That is, when you sit at your PC or television, and you get a message - Do you want to end the money system? Are you sure you want to end the money system? If you do then click on YES. A second later the second system comes into being, provided a majority of people do likewise. I'd only go for Yes if the effect was to put more cash into the account - how many people would take a chance on that right now? The system requires no experts, no managers, no politicians, each individual gets a graph showing concentration every day, when the day comes it will be the day when there will be gnashing of teeth. . . W.K. From rkmoore@iol.ie Wed Nov 12 12:43:45 1997 Wed, 12 Nov 1997 19:42:43 GMT Date: Wed, 12 Nov 1997 19:42:43 GMT To: cyberjournal@cpsr.org From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: cj#728.2> I.A. Globalization as a world system wsn@csf.colorado.edu (world-system network) I hope you find this article of interest. It is the first in a series which will flesh out the previously published outline, although the outline itself will evolve in the process (see below). Feedback, rebuttal, style suggestions, and additional points would be most welcome. Where you see [?] there is a statement I'm shaky about and I'm seeking evidence one way or the other. I'm including wsn on this first mailing on an experimental basis, to see how it's received there, and because there are specific question asked of the wsn audience. regards, rkm ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~-~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ Globalization and the New World Order -- democracy at a crossroads I. Introduction A. Globalization as a world system B. Introduction of threads to be developed in book C. Positioning of this material in context of other available works and perspectives D. Statement of scope ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~-~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ [3179 words] I.A. Globalization as a world system ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ system: n. 1. A group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements forming a complete whole. ... 5. A social, economic, or political organizational form. American Heritage Dictionary, 1985 edition anarchic system: A system without a system-wide centralized control mechanism. globalization: the process whose foundations were laid in the years following AD 1945, which became an overt political agenda following 1980, and which is aimed at creating a new world order based on the hegemony of corporate interests. rkm's own dictionary, 1997 >From the perspective of modern ecology the world has always been organized into various global-scale systems. Water, for example, participates in a global transport system: it evaporates from the sea, travels long distances as vapor, condenses back to the earth, and eventually returns to the sea -- perhaps on the other side of the globe. Even primitive human societies can be seen as parts of a global social system -- but a very loose system indeed, characterized mainly by the high degree of independence of the various parts. It is more useful to restrict our study of human-created systems to ones that are more closely bound, where the parts are _significantly_ effected by their role in the larger system. >From this more practical perspective "world human-created systems" (of the economic, political, or social variety) are relatively recent, certainly not existing prior to AD 1492. Up until that time the largest systems were regional -- as with the Roman, Chinese, or Aztec Empires -- and interactions among the various regions were negligible from a system perspective, excepting only minor perturbations caused by trade and warfare between neighboring societies. After 1492, when Columbus demonstrated (with entrepreneurial intent) that sea travel need respect no boundaries other than the globally connected oceans, societies for the first time began to plan and act on a scale that could be called global. European powers competed to exploit this new-found global mobility, setting up trading and colonial networks that became the first examples of human-engineered systems on a world scale. With the help of this far-flung trading network, together with industrialization, precious metals taken from the New World -- and an aggressive imperialist attitude -- European powers eventually achieved a globally dominant position. Their world-system became _the_ world-system, and it is thus the structures developed during the Euro-expansionist period that form the foundation for modern globalization. This period lasted from 1492 to 1945. The Euro world system was an anarchic system of sovereign nation states: there was no central global authority and very little in the way of reliable international law -- especially when "national interests" were deemed to be at stake. Some states had their sovereignty taken away due to imperial domination, but this was part of the constantly shifting anarchic competitive game. The leading Euro nations (later including the USA) competed with one another not so much through warfare among themselves (although such did occur), but more through the expansion of their empires. Indeed most European wars [?] can be characterized as "empire expansion by other means" -- "court battles" as it were. Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, for example, all began and ended the era as independent realms [?] -- intra-European conquest just wasn't the name of the Euro-expansionist game. This 500-year old world-system dynamic changed abruptly in 1945, with the end of World War II and the emergence of the USA in a dramatically dominant global position -- militarily, industrially, economically, and psychologically. It may be difficult today to appreciate the full extent of Uncle Sam's global hegemony in the immediate postwar years. With all other first-rank economies and infrastructures decimated, with the U.S. military and industrial base fully intact, with a nuclear monopoly, a fantastic financial bottom line, unchallenged mastery of all oceans, and worldwide admiration as the heroic champion of democracy -- the USA was in a position, if motivated, to decisively influence the structure of the post-war world system. The U.S. _was_ so motivated, and with Uncle Sam as lead architect the world has subsequently been experiencing a rapid and profound sequence of world-system changes -- changes which this author has not seen adequately understood and articulated in their full dimensionality. This book will endeavor to fill that gap. The U.S. _could_ have carried on with the old world system by using its dominant position to set up a powerful empire of its own -- establishing subservient governments, grabbing the spots with the most strategically valuable resources, and granting special privileges to U.S.-based operators to exploit the various trading and investment opportunities. Thus the leader-of-the-pack mantle so long held by Britain would have passed to Uncle Sam, and the old system wheels would have kept turning. In such a scenario the U.S. would have had the problem of maintaining global stability in the face of jealous rivals. Such wasn't Uncle Sam's chosen path. Instead the U.S. launched a coherent array of world-system architectural programs -- programs which have have been carried through successfully, and which have led inexorably toward the current penultimate historical stage, just prior to full globalization. The first program in this array was the division of the world into three distinct partitions: the socialist (demarcated by the "Iron Curtain"), the core (Western Europe, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan [?]) and the periphery (ie, the Third World). [wsn readers: exactly how should I attribute the core-periphery terminology? And need I apologize for my usage/ interpretation?] The second program was the recruitment of the rest of the designated core members to collaborate in the construction of this tripartite world system, under the de facto leadership of Uncle Sam. This was accomplished by perseverance in leadership, generosity with recovery aid, the sharing of the spoils in the new system -- and to no small degree by relief that the U.S. was not demanding more for itself [evidence of such sentiment?]. The U.S. has skillfully managed to retain and even strengthen its position as de facto core leader, and U.S. and NATO military forces today increasingly operate as a combined globally hegemonous force, with the U.S. having the decisive voice in all strategic and most tactical decisions. The third postwar program was the systematic "containment" of the socialist partition, accompanied by an ongoing low-intensity war of attrition -- involving economic warfare, an expensive arms race, brushfire wars, and covert destabilization programs [examples?]. The Soviet Union was maneuvered into taking a great-power seat at the geopolitical poker game, but lacked the chips to avoid eventual bankruptcy. The endgame in the case of China is still unclear (See chapter four), but apart from China there is no longer any near-term geopolitical threat (by any combination of other powers) to the dominance of the core powers in today's world system. The fourth program was the creation of the "Free World" system: a world system (minus the socialist camp) in which traditional competitive Euro imperialism was replaced by collaborative core-group imperialism, and in which prototype- versions of centralized control mechanisms were introduced for the first time in a world-scale system. European empires were dismantled so that the periphery could serve as a non-partitioned investment realm for core-enriching capital development. This dismantlement was heralded in the Western media with glowing rhetoric, as a flowering of newly liberated democracies -- but the reality was the continuation of imperial domination, albeit under a less well-defined regime, and repressive and compliant governments were commonly installed (starting with Greece [?] in 194x [?]) when deemed necessary to maintain nations in their assigned system roles. Interventionism by core powers had became "pro bono system maintenance" instead of "jockeying for position". The core-periphery system (the "Free World"), from its very beginning, could not be characterized as an anarchic system. The UN was certainly not a world control center, and the U.S. did not have absolute control, but by various means, and under an umbrella of continued U.S. military and economic dominance, the functioning of the system exhibited a coherence and collaborative harmony that can only be described as "centrally controlled". The core-periphery system could with justice be thought of as _the_ world system in the postwar period. The "contained" socialist partition could be fairly characterized as a "foreign infection" in the world system, against which antibodies were continually in operation, and with which interaction was intentionally minimized while the infection was being cured. In fact the antibodies turned out to accomplish their task, and the core-periphery system has achieved overall global dominance. The means of coherent centralized management include: determined and surprisingly competent U.S. leadership, absence of significant leadership challenges from other core powers (excepting perhaps only De Gaulle), the ongoing benefits enjoyed by core powers from the operation of the system, and the U.S.-dominated functioning of international institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the UN. >From a traditional geopolitical perspective this thumbnail world-system overview is now complete up to about 1980. But a geopolitical perspective alone is woefully inadequate -- even when further elaborated -- to fully explain the nature of today's world system, and it fails even more in explaining the meaning of globalization. To understand what globalization is about, and to understand more accurately the inner functioning of the core-periphery system, we need to examine the postwar rise of megacorps (a term I prefer to transnational corporation or TNC). The non-partitioned periphery, open as it was to at-large core exploitation, became the breeding ground for megacorps. Instead of corporations focusing their operations in their home-nation's sphere of influence -- the more or less pre-1945 model -- the wide world (for the first time in history) became the natural scope of corporate operations. This larger, consolidated economic playing field naturally led to the development of larger corporations. In addition, now that economic operations where no longer partitioned, the possibility was opened for mergers and shakeouts among corporations that were formerly, to a large extent, protected from one another's encroachments. Such shakeouts have indeed occurred, and world commerce, in each market segment, is now dominated by a handful of megacorps whose home-nations are distributed somewhat unevenly among primarily the core states. The classic seven-sisters global petroleum oligarchy -- far ahead of its time -- has gradually become the paradigm of the global economy in the period since 1945. This system has led to a momentous allegiance shift on the part of these large corporations. Prior to 1945, most corporations -- even with extensive foreign operations -- identified rather closely with their respective home nations: their home nations needed to be strong and healthy, because it was national power and influence that maintained the spheres of influence, brokered the international alliances, and thereby provided the investment opportunities. But in the postwar core-collaborative system, this dependency link between megacorps and their "home" nations was broken. As long as the stability of the overall world system was not in danger, the national strength and prosperity of the individual home nation was no longer of primary concern to the typical megacorp. Thus -- from the perspective of board-room strategy -- the allegiance of the typical megacorp became global: megacorps became citizens of the world; they outgrew their home town countries of origin; their focus was now on global opportunities, not the fate of their alma maters; the very concept of "home nation" was becoming antiquated; to megacorps, all flags became flags of convenience. The overview is now complete, in primary essentials, up to 1980. Prior to 1980, globalization referred to the gradual evolutionary process by which global commerce was concentrating in the hands of megacorps operators, integrated global infrastructures were evolving, and economics was increasingly perceived as a single global system. In 1980, a sea change occurred in the leadership rhetoric of the U.S., with Ronald Reagan acting as standard bearer for the launch of what has become known as the neoliberal revolution. With the UK acting as co-sponsor of the initiative, under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher and the counsel of Milton Friedman, an agenda of free trade, privatization, deregulation, and reduced corporate taxes was heavily promoted internationally and rapidly became the dominant political paradigm among core nations and much of the periphery as well. Neither the motivation nor the consequences of this revolution can be understood in terms of traditional geopolitics. Only by taking into account the increasing power of megacorps, and their fundamental shift of allegiance from singular nation states to the centrally managed world system, does the meaning of the neoliberal revolution begin to fall into clear perspective. To clarify this perspective further, it helps to examine what neoliberal "free trade" is really about, as embodied in such agreements as GATT and NAFTA. These agreements do not themselves lay down comprehensive rules for international trade -- rather they establish supra-national bureaucracies which are empowered to do the actual rule setting on an ongoing basis. These bureaucracies, as well as the IMF and World Bank, are dominated by representatives of the megacorp community. Thus economic sovereignty is being systematically transferred from nation states -- both core and periphery -- to the megacorp community. _Privatization_ transfers control and ownership of national infrastructures from public to corporate hands in the short term, and provides corporate profit opportunities for the long term. _Deregulation_ amounts to a "certificate of independence" for corporations, granting them -- to varying degrees -- autonomy from interference by nation states. _Reduced corporate taxes_ represents a direct transfer of wealth from nations to corporations, as well as causing the disempowerment of nations through drastically shrunken budgets and in some cases bankruptcy. Thus the neoliberal revolution has amounted to a significant transfer of assets, power, and sovereignty from their centuries old home in nation states to supra-national, megacorp-aligned bureaucracies. The centralized world-system, given geopolitical substance by the U.S.-led core alliance, backed up by the potent U.S.-NATO military force, was by neoliberalism given administrative substance as well, under the control not of core nations, but of the megacorp community. Megacorps evolved and grew to prominence in the 1945-1980 postwar non-partitioned world system (minus the socialist camp), developed an allegiance to the world system as a whole, and in 1980 entered collectively into a competition with nation states for control of the reins of power of the world system. This competition was not a matter of confrontation, but of infiltration and subversion. With the help of propaganda from the corporate-dominated mass-media industry, and the funding of state-of-the-art political campaigns, the leadership of the core states became dominated by corporate-serving politicians, and the neoliberal revolution was thereby accomplished. It should be pointed out that this pro-corporate core-state political leadership also insures that the agenda of the U.S.-NATO geopolitical machinery remains in harmony with corporate objectives. So far in this overview, an effort has been made to present arguments, albeit sketchy, for most of the observations offered: the attempt has been made to present a complete if skeletal thesis, to be fleshed out by later chapters. The remaining paragraphs project forward the trajectory of globalization according to the analysis to be developed in the book, and a further attempt to offer supporting argumentation is simply beyond the scope of this chapter. The conclusions will nonetheless be presented so as to complete the story of world-system evolution, as seen from this observers perspective. To sum up the post-neoliberal world system-structure: there is a megacorp-dominated bureaucracy which is rapidly developing into the role of legislative and executive branch of a centralized world government. In addition, there is a globally hegemonous military force -- U.S.-NATO -- which is also dominated indirectly but no less surely by megacorp interests, which has the assigned role of preserving the stability of the megacorp-dominated world system, and solving, if necessary, the "China problem". Globalization, in the post-1980 context, is the consolidation and extension of this restructuring process -- leading to a world system where formal sovereignty is vested officially in a centralized megacorp-appointed bureaucracy, and nation states, with minimal power and resources, are left to deal somehow with an increasingly dissatisfied and disempowered citizenry -- perhaps by trying to maintain the fiction of democratic sovereignty. Devolution will be encouraged, as it reduces states to a more easily managed size. In this fully globalist world system, megacorps will have replaced nation states as the dominant system part. Global rules, issued by the megacorp community, will define the scope of permitted national activity (much as with the IMF and the periphery today). Wealth and property will continue to accumulate into fewer and fewer corporate hands, as the world economy becomes dominated by a small clique of global corporations, reminding one of the sci-fi images in such films as Blade Runner. Maintenance of public order is very likely to become increasingly problematic -- even with ongoing sophisticated propaganda -- and increasingly repressive regimes will become the norm, even in the core states -- reminding one of images from Judge Dredd. Large corporations have long dominated the politics of core nation states, while using them as a safe home base, and have treated the periphery as little more than colonial plantations, with maintenance of civil order being left to puppet regimes and occasional core intervention. It was always really corporations (such as the British East India Company or Shell Oil) that carried out the business of imperialism, not nations themselves. This paragraph is a fair characterization of the evolving world system from, let us say, 1800 [?] up to about 1980. The consequence of globalization is that _all_ states (core and periphery) are to be treated by megacorps as colonial plantations. Privileged core states are no longer needed by megacorps as safe-base homes; all states can now be periphery states; megacorps alone can make up the core sub-system. As in the periphery today, the major role of formerly core governments will be to maintain public order and to seek to be "competitive" in attracting corporate favors. The centralized military force, highly automated and needing only an elite corps to man it, will be wrested from the influence of the vagaries of even U.S. politics, and placed under the control of yet another megacorp-dominated bureaucracy, no doubt to be dubbed something like the "World Peace Organization". Thus the first fully centralized and fully global world political system in history -- the one already inherent in today's globalization process -- will also be the first political system which is controlled not by humans but by artificial entities called megacorps, intelligent and adaptive entities which exhibit the equivalent of will and motivation, but of a demented character, driven by greed alone. Even human boards of directors and management do not infuse a human element into the power mix -- these high-level employees and advisors will have long since in their careers conditioned themselves to the corporate ethic -- pursuit of the maximum possible growth of corporate valuation without any emotional, unprofessional reservations. Richard Moore 12 November 1997 ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ Posted by Richard K. Moore - rkmoore@iol.ie - PO Box 26, Wexford, Ireland www.iol.ie/~rkmoore/cyberjournal (USA Citizen) * Non-commercial republication encouraged - Please include this sig * ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ From dredmond@gladstone.uoregon.edu Wed Nov 12 18:42:53 1997 for ; Wed, 12 Nov 1997 17:42:47 -0800 (PST) Date: Wed, 12 Nov 1997 17:42:44 -0800 (PST) From: Dennis R Redmond To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Re: cj#728.2> I.A.Globalization as a world system In-Reply-To: On Wed, 12 Nov 1997, Richard K. Moore wrote: > The first program in this array was the division of the world into three > distinct partitions: the socialist (demarcated by the "Iron Curtain"), the > core (Western Europe, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan [?]) and > the periphery (ie, the Third World). [wsn readers: exactly how should I > attribute the core-periphery terminology? And need I apologize for my > usage/ interpretation?] The core-periphery thing probably stems from Immanuel Wallerstein, though don't quote me on this -- he may have borrowed it from someone else. I'm not sure, however, that the typology quite holds up for the case of East Asia and Central Europe; these zones of the world economy were 10-20% as wealthy per capita as America in 1950, and were a motley collection of burnt-out war-ravaged economies. I think Wallerstein talks somewhere about the "semi-periphery", which can either rise a la Japan and South Korea in the global food chain, or deteriorate a la Britain and Argentina. You could also argue that whereas multinational corporations and global financial markets are clearly the hegemonic social forces in the Anglo-Saxon countries, things are trickier in the EU and East Asia, where global integration seems to be taking a far more nuanced, complicated path. Why have an EU at all if corporations already rule the world? Well, the answer is, the EU isn't just about corporate power, it's also about extending democracy and the reach of the welfare state onto a dangerously (from capital's point of view) or emancipatory (if you're a Leftie) transnational level. My own suspicion is that, barring major political changes, the US may well lose its "core" status in the medium-term future, due to the rise of the euro, more efficient East Asian coordination, and the generalized neoliberal decadence of what used to be the American Empire, and become a very large but declining semi-periphery. But maybe that's too pessimistic; maybe Microsoft and Silicon Valley will somehow pay for our trade deficits and invest in our schools after all. Ya gotta dream! -- Dennis From akwebb@phoenix.Princeton.EDU Wed Nov 12 22:05:28 1997 Date: Wed, 12 Nov 1997 23:32:41 -0500 (EST) From: "Adam K. Webb" To: Dennis R Redmond Subject: Re: cj#728.2> I.A.Globalization as a world system In-Reply-To: On Wed, 12 Nov 1997, Dennis R Redmond wrote: > burnt-out war-ravaged economies. I think Wallerstein talks somewhere about > the "semi-periphery", which can either rise a la Japan and South Korea in > the global food chain, or deteriorate a la Britain and Argentina. You > My own suspicion is that, barring major political changes, the US may well > lose its "core" status in the medium-term future, due to the rise of the > euro, more efficient East Asian coordination, and the generalized > neoliberal decadence of what used to be the American Empire, and become > a very large but declining semi-periphery. But maybe that's too > -- Dennis I may have missed something about world-systems theory, but does the "core" not include all countries in the same rough development level as the hegemonic power and at or near the centre of transnational financial flows? By this definition, decline as hegemon hardly means transition to semiperipheral status. The only country that underwent such a drop that comes to mind is Spain, for a while. Has anyone _ever_ counted the UK in the semiperiphery, even in the 1970s? And even if influence becomes more diffuse or centred on the EU or any other region, why should that mean the USA falling out of the top tier? Once a country "joins the club," so to speak, do late-capitalist technology flows not essentially guarantee that it more or less stays in? --AKW =============================================================================== Adam K. Webb Department of Politics Princeton University Princeton NJ 08544 USA 609-258-9028 http://www.princeton.edu/~akwebb From DASSBACH@MTU.EDU Thu Nov 13 06:16:36 1997 Thu, 13 Nov 1997 08:16:29 -0500 (EST) Thu, 13 Nov 1997 08:16:28 -0500 (EST) Thu, 13 Nov 1997 08:16:25 -0500 (EST) From: "Carl H.A. Dassbach" To: , "WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK" Subject: Re: cj#728.2> I.A.Globalization as a world system Date: Thu, 13 Nov 1997 08:16:14 -0500 charset="iso-8859-1" -----Original Message----- From: Adam K. Webb To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Date: Thursday, November 13, 1997 12:09 AM Subject: Re: cj#728.2> I.A.Globalization as a world system >On Wed, 12 Nov 1997, Dennis R Redmond wrote: > >> burnt-out war-ravaged economies. I think Wallerstein talks somewhere about >> the "semi-periphery", which can either rise a la Japan and South Korea in >> the global food chain, or deteriorate a la Britain and Argentina. You > >> My own suspicion is that, barring major political changes, the US may well >> lose its "core" status in the medium-term future, due to the rise of the >> euro, more efficient East Asian coordination, and the generalized >> neoliberal decadence of what used to be the American Empire, and become >> a very large but declining semi-periphery. But maybe that's too > >> -- Dennis > >I may have missed something about world-systems theory, but does the >"core" not include all countries in the same rough development level as >the hegemonic power and at or near the centre of transnational financial >flows? By this definition, decline as hegemon hardly means transition to >semiperipheral status. One can decline as a hegemon to "just" another "core" and then decline to an SP. Certainly (or at least I think so), GB and Spain are example and the US may be. Of course this raises the issue of the apparently differently trajectory of the Netherlands but the answer may lie (and this is highly speculative) in the specific nature of the respective hegemonies. Military or "might based" hegemonies may simply be costlier and, in the long run. more deterimental than "commerically based" hegemonies. Carl Dassbach From chriscd@jhu.edu Thu Nov 13 13:09:03 1997 Date: Thu, 13 Nov 1997 15:05:53 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: richard moore's essay To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu richard moore's essay is fine. a few small points: 1. in Wallerstein's original usage there is a distinction between "world" and "global". global means Earth-wide. world means the world in which people live. in this sense world-systems were not always global. they got bigger over time. Tom Hall and I have developed a comparative world-systems perspective that looks at small, medium and large world-systems to see how and why they evolve (_Rise and Demise_ Westview 1997). 2. It is probably useful to distinguish between globalization as economic, political and cultural integration and globalization as a political project of the world bourgeousie. the latter is quite recent. the former have been upward trends for millenia in the sense that interaction networks have been getting larger, but this trend has also been somewhat cyclical. Paul Bairoch calculates that the ratio of international investment to national investment was as high in the 1890s as in the 1990s. and trade globalization (the ratio of international trade to the sum of national gnps) was nearly as high before world war I as it is now. in between these peaks were periods of much lower levels of investment and trade globalization. chris From rross@clarku.edu Thu Nov 13 16:21:01 1997 Date: Thu, 13 Nov 1997 17:09:21 -0500 From: "Robert J.S. Bob Ross" Subject: NYT and "false charges" To: Labor List , Progressive Sociology Network , World Systems Network , Sarah Weintraub , Marci Goede , Illana Lazinger , Rick Morocco , Lisa Grandmaison , Irene Antonellis , Peter Doran , Remi Hoki , Tom Gallagher , Rand Wilson This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------812ED92B5ED98F612017A5B7 For your information: A letter I doubt the NYT will print. rjsr Subject: False Charges Date: From: "Robert J.S. Bob Ross" Organization: Prof. and Chair of Sociology, Clark University To: letters@nytimes.com To the Editor, The New York Times editorial today calls "falsities" the claim that NAFTA has cost jobs and that unconditional admission of Chile to a NAFTA-like structure would hurt working people. The AFL-CIO is apparently the target of your wrath, not even deserving address as being of different views, no, you characterize them as fearmongering purveyors of falsehood. But I read in the Times last May 8 that "Low wage workers have been losing jobs to Mexico." And this Spring the Economic Policy Institute reported that after job gains were corrected for job losses, NAFTA in net had cost jobs to the American economy. Do you stand by your own story; do you call the EPI purveyors of falsehood? Is the only fount of "truth" the Brookings Institution? Here is what I advise: next time you counsel civility to some yahoo with whom you disagreee, take the advice seriously. Sincerely, Robert J.S. Ross, Ph.D. -- Robert J.S. Ross Professor and Chair Department of Sociology Clark University 950 Main Street Worcester, Massachusetts 01610 Voice: 508 793 7376 Fax: 508 793 8816 Webpage: http://www.clarku.edu/~rross -- Robert J.S. Ross Professor and Chair Department of Sociology Clark University 950 Main Street Worcester, Massachusetts 01610 Voice: 508 793 7376 Fax: 508 793 8816 Webpage: http://www.clarku.edu/~rross --------------812ED92B5ED98F612017A5B7 Fast-Track Falsities

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November 13, 1997

Fast-Track Falsities

The refusal of House Democrats to give the leader of their party "fast track" authority to negotiate trade pacts is disturbing testimony to the power of organized labor's campaign money -- and of flagrantly false rhetoric.

Opponents declared that their action would prevent President Clinton from entering into another pact as harmful as the North American Free Trade Agreement, signed with Mexico and Canada in 1993. After all, Mexico soon sank into recession and created a trade deficit for the United States. But Nora Lustig of the Brookings Institution shows that Nafta's impact on America has been trivial.

The Mexican economic crisis, not Nafta, created the trade deficit. The revealing fact is that Mexico's recession drove exports from Europe and Japan down by about 25 percent while exports from the United States under Nafta fell only about 2 percent. Contrary to Ross Perot's jeremiad, the number of displaced American workers has been small, and most of them quickly found new jobs.

Fast-track opponents raised the fear-mongering claim that trade with developing countries creates a race to the bottom for the wages of American workers. But American wages closely mirror American productivity. Trade cannot threaten productivity in American companies, so it does not threaten wages of most American workers. Indeed, history shows that trade boosts productivity, raising wages in America and, even faster, in previously low-wage countries like South Korea and Taiwan. The race, then, is to the top.

There is a legitimate concern that imports, though driving consumer prices lower for everyone, can whittle down the wages of America's least-skilled workers. But the actual impact has been small and there are far better ways to help the few displaced workers who are forced into lower-paying jobs than to stomp on trade and thereby make the entire country substantially poorer.



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--------------812ED92B5ED98F612017A5B7-- From aaustin@utkux.utcc.utk.edu Thu Nov 13 16:28:30 1997 Date: Thu, 13 Nov 1997 18:26:48 -0500 (EST) From: Andrew Wayne Austin To: christopher chase-dunn Subject: Re: richard moore's essay In-Reply-To: <346B5DA1.3E05@jhu.edu> On Thu, 13 Nov 1997, christopher chase-dunn wrote: > 1. in Wallerstein's original usage there is a distinction between > "world" and "global". global means Earth-wide. world means the world in > which people live. in this sense world-systems were not always global. > they got bigger over time. Tom Hall and I have developed a comparative > world-systems perspective that looks at small, medium and large > world-systems to see how and why they evolve (_Rise and Demise_ Westview > 1997). It follows from this that when capitalism has overturned virtually all precapitalist modes of production it becomes a global system. Globalization is the process, then, that leads to the complete transnationalization of capitalist production as a dominant mode of planetary production. In the world system we saw the globalization of commercial markets and financial markets. It is with the transnationalization of production that we arrive at a foundation that will undergird, or already undergirds, world civil society. What remains is the consolidation of transnational institutions into a global state. All this was pretty much predicted by Marx in the Communist Manifesto and in The German Ideology. Historical materialism proves once again to be the superior framework for world-historical analysis. Incidentally, I agree with Bill Robinson analysis of the global system at this juncture particularly presented in the final chapter of his *Promoting Polyarchy*. Robinson's scheme is moving us towards a transcending of the world system model--which empirical reality probably already has. > 2. It is probably useful to distinguish between globalization as > economic, political and cultural integration and globalization as a > political project of the world bourgeousie. the latter is quite recent. I agree with this. The globalization project is best understood as a neoliberal program seeking the reconstitution of social structures of accumulation to facilitate the most beneficial development of the global system. The program is being advanced and guided by the political elite of a transnational class configuration. This framework grows out of trilaterialism. What is needed to analyze the world at this point is a system that analyzes both objective historical-structural transformations (globalization) and the policy behavior of elite agents who respond to and guide the unfolding world order to secure the interests of the global capitalist class. Bill Robinson, Stephen Gill, Robert Cox, and others working out of a Gramscian framework offer the brightest future for this task. This has the added benefit of transcending the old structure-agency divide (ever a false divide). If you are unfamiliar with this mode of theorizing, it is my view you cannot understand what is going on right now in the global system. These fellows are explaining the world. Andy From spector@calumet.purdue.edu Fri Nov 14 17:29:53 1997 X-NUPop-Charset: English Date: Fri, 14 Nov 1997 18:32:25 -0600 (CST) From: "Alan Spector" Sender: spector@calumet.purdue.edu Reply-To: spector@calumet.purdue.edu To: psn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Steel Industry and Banking Circles?? To PSN and WSN--(with apologies to those of you on both lists who will get this twice....) Some students and colleagues are doing research on the conflicts between various circles of banks in the U.S. and how that plays itself out in politics---eg. China policy, mid-east policy, Militias, domestic oil versus international oil, etc. etc. The question of steel mill ownership is important. There have been many new steel mills, often called "mini-mills" set up particularly in the South (Alabama, etc.). I would appreciate either information, or sources of information on investigating which types of money is behind these newer mills--are they competing with the "Old Money" steel mills of USX, Inland, LTV, Bethlehem, etc.?? Are they owned by different groups of bankers, foreign or domestic---that might be in conflict with the traditional steel corporations and their New York/Pittsburgh/Chicago-Gary backers? If anyone has this information, (or the titles of books or articles or other sources on this question) I would appreciate it if you could point me in those directions. You can either send it to me personally: spector@calumet.purdue.edu or post it to the whole list if you think your information would be useful to the list in general. Thanks, Alan Spector From phuakl@sit.edu.my Fri Nov 14 21:20:16 1997 From: "DR. PHUA KAI LIT" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Sat, 15 Nov 1997 12:19:46 +0000 Subject: (Fwd) (Fwd) [sangkancil] Democracy n HR in Asean (fwd) Message from Dr Syed Husin Ali (leader of the People's Party of Malaysia). Anthropologist by training. ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- To: sangkancil@malaysia.net Date: Thu, 13 Nov 1997 12:44:58 Subject: [sangkancil] Democracy n HR in Asean (fwd) From: pillai@mgg.pc.my (M.G.G. Pillai) Reply-to: pillai@mgg.pc.my (M.G.G. Pillai) ________________________________________________ This week's sponsors -The Asia Pacific Internet Company (APIC) Business Internet Services. Some talk. Some do. We talk and do! for instant info ________________________________________________ FORWARDED MAIL ------- From: lrc@tm.net.my (Tian) Date: 13 Nov 97 Originally Posted On: soc.culture.malaysia Democracy And Human Rights: The ASEAN Situation Dr Syed Husin Ali ASEAN countries have different social and political systems. Brunei is practically an absolute monarchy and for a long time there has been no election there. The Sultan, who is the richest man in the world, is also Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of this little but wealthy kingdom. Some of the worldÆs longest political prisoners - a number being detained without trial for more than 20 years - hail from Brunei. Most of them were from the Peoples Party of Brunei (Partai Rakyat Brunei) who were arrested after the party won almost all seats in the first and last election that was held there in the mid-sixties. Indonesia is under military rule; General Suharto has been president for more than 30 years, and his family has been identified as being one of the richest in Asia. Although there have been quite regular elections there, only 425 out of 500 members of Parliament are elected, while the remaining 75 are appointed, mainly from the armed forces. In addition, another 500 are nominated by the government to form the Consultative Body, and it is this body that elects the president. With 575 nominated members always guaranteed to be on his side, Suharto can easily continue to be president for life. Singapore prides itself with a highly developed economy and an efficient administration. Although elections are held regularly about five years once, they are often one-sided. The government leadership is authoritarian and does not tolerate the opposition, some of whose members have been detained for long periods. Chia Thye Poh, a leader of the now defunct Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front), was robbed of his freedom since before the mid-sixties and was only very recently permitted to travel overseas. Those not detained have been known to be hounded and bankrupted through legal suits, even after they had been defeated in elections. Both Philippines and Thailand have known many military regimes before, which had been guilty of several bloody onslaught on their own people. They are now striving hard to practice their own versions of Parliamentary democracy, with all its shortcomings. In Malaysia, since 1955, two years before she attained independence, general elections have been held regularly, almost five years once. This is consistent with her claim of practicing parliamentary democracy. But there are four emergency declarations which are still enforce, besides many draconian acts (which will be described later). There is also a tendency for the executive to dominate over the legislature, judiciary and the media. Authoritarianism is on the rise. Among the new members of ASEAN, Burma is notorious for her blatant breach of democratic principles and basic human rights. The military regime refused to give up power despite the fact that in May 1990, the National League for Democracy (NDL) won a sweeping victory in BurmaÆs national election, collecting 82 percent of the votes and 90 percent of the seats. Since then many newly elected members of parliament from the NDL have been detained or forced into exile; it is believed that some have even died under very suspicious circumstances. The NDL leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, is still under house detention. As a result of repressive policies of the Slorc, thousands from the minority groups (like Rohingyas) have been forced to flee the country as refugees. Many, including women and children, have been driven into forced labour in certain government-sponsored projects. As for Vietnam and Loas, they had not in the past shown much respect for civil and political rights, because under their communist regimes, their countries were closed and their people controlled. Now they are slowly opening up and beginning to recognise some aspects of basic human rights, although, for historical reasons, the Vietnamese approach and practice are quite different from those of many of the old members of ASEAN. To untrained eyes, elections that are held by the ASEAN states give the impression that there is full freedom and democracy in this region, as often claimed. It should be noted, however, that more often than not these elections are neither clean nor fair. The ruling parties often blatantly take advantage of their control over government machinery. The periods for campaigning in the snap elections that they call are usually very short, between nine days and two weeks, as in the case of Singapore and Malaysia. During these periods, in fact, at most times, public political rallies cannot be held without police permits or supervision. It is difficult for opposition parties to hold public rallies or talks, while ministers from the governing parties can easily address massive crowds under the pretext of opening schools or hospitals and launching projects of all sorts. There is also widespread use of money politics and other forms of corruption, particularly by government candidates, who are often rich and well-financed. In some cases, like in Indonesia, the army and police are blatantly used as constant threat to remind the people to return the government back to power. While the ruling parties are able to make full use of the television to spread their propaganda, opposition parties are denied access to them, not only during elections but all the year round. Daily newspapers are controlled or owned by parties in government or their nominees. Throughout the year, and more so during election time, they are manipulated to boost government parties and discredit those in the opposition. In some instances, the printed and electronics media would not give space for opposition manifestoes to be published, even as paid advertisements. At the same time, a number of publications (including dailies) have had their permits withdrawn or banned, the moment they appear to assert their freedom and begin to be critical of government. Over and above all these, there are also several laws and regulations that are undemocratic and constitute violations of basic human rights. In Indonesia and the Philippines, there are so-called anti-subversive laws that can carry maximum death penalty, while in Malaysia and Singapore there is the draconian Internal Security Act, which allows for detention without trial. Besides, there are also various other repressive laws, such as the Printing Presses and Publications Act (PPPA). The ISA empowers the Minister for Home Affairs to detain a person without trial for indefinite periods, renewable every two years, and does not allow for habeas corpus. As for the PPPA, among other things, it provides for all publications to obtain permits from the Home Ministry annually, and that the permit may not be renewed or revoked at any time if conditions stipulated are breached. Quite often the ISA and the PPPA have been abused to curb the lawful political opposition. In Malaysia and Singapore, for example, there are numerous other laws, which seem to cover every sector and every group, such as workers and students. Many of these laws are legacies of the colonial past, although they have been amended or consolidated after independence, but a few have been recently introduced. For instance, there is the Police Act, which prohibits assembly without permit; the Official Secrets Act, which provides for mandatory jail for publishing any document classified as secret; the Societies Act, which controls and regulates societies and organisations (both political and non-political); the University and University Colleges Act, which restricts activities and movements of students and staff at institutions of higher learning; and the Trade Unions Ordinance and Industrial Relations Act, which regulate and restrict movements and actions of workers (to form unions or to take industrial actions). Other than repressive laws, internal weakness of unions and opportunism among many of the labour leaders, there is another factor that cripples the workersÆ movement. This is the presence of migrant workers. In Malaysia alone, there are estimated to be more than two million such workers, mostly from Indonesia, Bangladesh and the Philippines. A large number of them have been legally registered, but a significant portion still remains illegal. Although local workers, especially those in plantations and some in manufacturing sectors continue to be exploited with low pay, poor living conditions and insecurity of employment, the plight of many migrant workers, especially those in isolated areas, are even worse. It is well-known that the illegal workers can and have been used by the employers in plantation and construction sectors to depress wages of local workers, or even to displace them, and to undermine the labour unions. At the same time, legal migrant workers are neither well protected nor accorded the right to organise or be absorbed into local trade unions. A large section of the workforce are women. Generally, as a result of economic and cultural factors, women in Malaysia, particularly those in rural areas and in the plantations, tend to be regarded as being of lower status than men. It is gratifying to note that more women, partly owing to their own struggle, have made headway into the economic, political and social areas that used to be the domains of men. But, in many cases women continue to be harassed in their work places and mistreated in their homes. It is feared that a large number of them have been trapped into prostitution and so forth. There have been more cases reported of migrant women being molested, raped or forced into prostitution. The different laws, regulations and conditions mentioned above demonstrate the extent to which democracy and human rights have been marred. Actually, democracy and human rights are very much related to the question of wealth and distribution; they will be undermined whenever there is gross concentration of wealth. In almost all developing countries, the elites left by the withdrawing colonial forces have continued to accumulate wealth. They are now joined by others who have become the new rich. ASEAN is a fast growing part of the world where more wealth and power are concentrated in the hands of a smaller number of people. The present political and economic elites, who are increasingly merged into one, seem to be grabbing everything. As a result of concentration of wealth, the gap between the rich and the poor becomes wider. The gap grows even wider the longer such ruling elites remain in power. A root cause of concentration of wealth is corruption; for the ruling elites, corruption is the main source of wealth. These elites normally try to distribute a bit of what they have accumulated in order to win elections rather than go through the use of force. Nevertheless, quite often, on failing in elections some of them resort to the use of the army and police. Conflict is sharpened whenever the side which wins uses state machinations to suppress, bankrupt and ruin the losing side. For the poor and exploited, democracy and human rights must be translated into rights to have balanced and enough food, adequate shelter, health care and education for the children. If we deny these rights by raising the prices of social services through privatisation or corporatisation, for example, then we will in fact be denying them their fundamental rights. Poor people cannot afford lawyers or take time to demonstrate. There are families who have to struggle to have a decent living even when both husband and wife are earning or when the head of the family has to do two types of job in a day. There is a rather unhappy state of democracy and human rights in ASEAN. It is well-known that democracy and human rights issues have been used by the West, especially the United States, to put pressure on certain Third Word countries. They have also linked up trade and aid with human rights. Many Third World countries, including those in ASEAN, have felt such pressure and oppose it. Their leaders argue that western standards of democracy and human rights cannot be applied to developing countries, which have their own specific needs and realities. Furthermore, they contend and quite rightly too, that the US itself suffers from certain questionable human rights records. One of the worst violations of human rights is against the blacks, a large number of whom live in dire poverty and under serious discrimination. The US also practices double standards, being punitive towards Iraq, for example, but protective towards Israel; just as in the same manner, it is highly critical of Slorc, but well-disposed towards Suharto. The superpowers, and the US in particular, tend to manipulate human rights issues to undermine governments that they dislike. They tolerate feudal monarchs or military rulers who chop off heads of political dissidents or exploit women so long as they are regarded as friends. On the other hand, they impose prolonged economic sanctions which cause death and disease among innocent children and women in countries where the defiant leaders are considered enemies. Fortunately, there is now emerging in the US and other western countries, those who are sincere in their efforts to establish democracy and human rights. These are our true friends. For ASEAN and the rest of the Third World, genuine human rights should be striven for on our own accord, as something good and necessary for human dignity. It is a great shame if we are forced to improve our human rights record only as a result of Western superpower pressures. In conclusion, we cannot deny the fact that democracy and human rights are strangled when people, especially women and children are massacred, chased away from their own lands and homes, imprisoned without trial and subject to repressive draconian laws; or when elections are never held, or even if they are held they are not clean, free or fair, or when the rights to oppose or dissent are denied. Many of these acts are perpetrated, though in different permutations, in ASEAN. Undeniably, they are cruel and cause a lot of human sufferings. They also go against the noble values upheld by various religions and different cultural traditions that predominate in the region. Now, more than ever, the duty of the people, political parties, peopleÆs organisations and non-governmental organisations has grown in urgency. They have to join hands in the struggle to establish genuine democracy, human rights and a Just Society in ASEAN. -________________________________________________ List Owner: M.G.G. Pillai Free Homepages on malaysia.net - send blank Check out the malaysia.net web site on List Postings to ________________________________________________ From athan.kokkinias@utoronto.ca Sun Nov 16 03:02:35 1997 Date: Sun, 16 Nov 1997 04:53:01 -0500 To: wkirk@wml.prestel.co.uk, WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: "Athanasios (Tom) Kokkinias" Subject: Re: WHO'S NUTS? IT'S ME. In-Reply-To: <346A523C.4F66@wml.prestel.co.uk> Dear Kirk, Run this by me again?...for it has always seemed to me that Life has always treated the law of conservation of energy as a mere impertinency....at least in the grand scheme of things...similarly, game theoretic plausibilities seem to perenially miss the point that when I kick a dog the dynamics of energy transferance between my foot and dog are not a complete 'map' of the 'territory' of the totality of the experience; ie., the metabolic reactions of the poor animal will insinuate in the system an exogenic disturbance analogous to what 'primitives' might have called 'magic'. The dog 'reacts' but certainly not analogously as a billiard ball 'reacts' to the transfer of energy from another that has struck...and so on... Game theories always require the throwing of dice...(I am ruefully reminded of poor ol' Einstein's frustrated remark in the face of the 'probabilistic' certainties of the quantum theorists - 'God does not play dice'...and so on...) First rule of thumb of GREEN-ECONOMICS 101- "If it's Win/Win it's good." "If it's Win/Lose, Lose/Win, it's no good"...and so on... Or should this be a rule of GREEN-POLITICS 101...I don't know....all these names..... Incidentally, I suffer from a chronic case of Schizophrenia P. Kind regards, Tom At 08:05 PM 12/11/97 -0500, William Kirk wrote: >To Andrew and Tom: Apart from academics and proles who read WSN there is >the unemployed. I am unemployed, or should say in newspeak a Jobseeker. I >am an unregistered paranoid, and I also suffer from another debilitating >metal disorder, Knight's Move Thinking - I come to conclusions which are >not readily understood by the majority. Not that there is anyone to >listen to conclusions, most people avoid me in the street since I have a >bad habit of taking longer than sixty seconds to reply to simple >questions. I don't go into bars any more, I'm not really allowed, in fact >ten years ago I and two others were thrown out of a bar in Glasgow for >engaging in an 'intellectual conversation'. The bar steward said we were >distracting customers from taking their refreshments. >Now, this is where you will see where it all goes wrong form me - I spend >too much time reading economics - and this is where I find the nexus of >the anti-systemic discussion. R. K. Moore wrote on 3rd October, >>As for "electoral mechanisms"... why is this so lightly dismissed? I >>envision a day when elections are no more, and my grandaughter asks >me "You mean you had the vote and you didn't try to legally organize to >use >it effectively?" > >Well, the whole thing is this, the circus of voting is a complete waste >of time. At least that is my conclusion. Why it is so lightly dismissed >is because of the following - (from The Coercive State. The Decline of >Democracy in Britain, by Paddy Hillyard and Janie Percy-Smith) >These guidelines note that the has two roles. First, it is >involved in combating 'terrorism and subversion'. Terrorism is defined as >'the use of violence for political ends, including any use of violence >for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in >fear'. Subversive activities are defined as 'those which threaten the >safety or wellbeing of the state, and which are intended to undermine or >overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent >means'. > >Interception of communications can be made for similar reasons, engaging >in criminal activity, terrorism or acts which undermine the economic >wellbeing of the state. > >What bothers me is the term 'Parliamentary democracy'. Those elected are >effectively an oligarchy, rule by the few. But then the notion of >democracy to mean all persons to become involved in all matters is from >books written over two thousand years ago and is of no account nowadays. >So, when this communication is read by the I will be >flagged and the information posted to - the Jobcentre perhaps? >Additionally, since I have communicated with persons known or unknown I >am conspiring. There is a law against conspiracy, persons do not have to >commit a criminal act, all they have to do is take part in 'unlawful' >activities, such as discussing ways of undermining Parliamentary >democracy. In the event of a trial a conspirer has to prove innocence, >unlike a real criminal where the prosecution has to prove the person was >guilty of an offence. Besides that, as Hillyard and Percy-Smith say, >'Courts do not usually admit rumour or hearsay as evidence, but, in >conspiracy charges, such hearsay is allowed as evidence of the conspiracy >in question. So, holding certain political views may be held to be >evidence of participation in a conspiracy to commit certain political >acts'. Like in days of old when you were dunked, if you drowned you >proved your innocence, if you lived you were in for a really hard time. >I do not wish to undermine Parliamentary democracy by violent means. What >I'd like to see is the following, >Subversive activities are defined as 'those which threaten the safety or >wellbeing of the state, and which are intended to undermine or overthrow >Parliamentary democracy by violent means'. >Of course I will never get the knock at the door for stating the obvious, >everyone knows Parliamentary democracy is dead. What no one knows is what >will follow on when it is buried. The answer does not lie in politics, it >lies with an economic concept. > >Have a read of the following, which Chris Chase-Dunn pointed to on >Tuesday. Planet-Wide Citizen's Income: Antidote to Global Apartheid > Myron J. Frankman >In particular, the following data, >>The UNDP's Human Development Report 1997 reports that the ratio of the >>income share of the world's richest 20% to the world's poorest 20% >>(based on national estimates of income distribution data) has gone from >>30:1 in 1960 to 61:1 in 1991 to 78:1 in 1994. (8) > >Plot the data on a graph and it might look as if a 99:1 might be reached >in about twenty or fifty years. No, more like the year AD 10,000,000 plus >or minus 5,000,000 years. > >Here is the process whereby this estimate is calculated. Or at least a >simple illustration. Take ten persons and give each one a token or a >dollar bill. Each person is numbered from 1 to 10. They are going to play >a trivial game. A ten sided die is rolled and say number six comes up. >Number six loses and goes out of the game. Then numbers 7, 8, 9 and ten >move along the table to become numbers 6, 7, 8 and 9 respectively. A nine >sided die is rolled so that one player gets the token which the original >number 6 lost. So now there are nine players, eight of them have one >token and one has two. >The next event is to repeat the process so that one other player goes out >of the game. Of course, if the number which is shown is the same for the >player with the two tokens then that player remains at the table. Thus, >the game doesn't end after ten events, in fact if this is run a few times >the average life of the game is about forty four events. Upon running >this about fifty times the lowest number of events is thirteen and the >highest was ninety four. >Looking at the graph of how long it takes for an event to occur it will >be seen that in nearly every game six or seven players have gone after >about ten events. When there are two players left, the expected number of >events, for ten tokens, is twenty five. If the graph is expressed in >mathematical terms there is a difficulty, the relationship is neither >algebraic nor transcendental. You have to know the number of players and >the number of tokens before the graph can be constructed. In the range of >say event two to about event fifty the graph is close to what can be >constructed using the exponential operator, 'e'. The use of this >approximation will never show the whole process, the process has to start >at zero and come to an end, this cannot be done using 'e' since you >cannot start at zero and the process will never end. If such a graph for >five billion players is superimposed over the graph of the UNDP data then >it is easy to see the 'game' will last for a very long time. >Practically, it is unlikely any economy will see a concentration greater >than about 90:1, thus, if the money system is small and the number of >people in the system is small then it will stall when the 90:1 condition >is approached. Thus, to keep the world money system going, what needs to >be done is to amalgamate systems, hence the Euro. In about fifty years >the world might see an American dollar which is the currency for the >whole of north and south America. But of course this is Knight's Move >Thinking. > >Consider another experiment. This time with no money, in which there are >ten persons or families and they live on an island. Each of the ten are >taken to be an economic entity, all have exactly the same mental and >physical ability, the all work the same hours and trade where there is >absolute perfection in exchange. Now the game will be changed. By the >throw of the die each of the ten units will be subjected to slight >advantage and disadvantage. The net effect is of course zero. Or at least >this is the expected effect. Yes, this is trivial, each of the ten >entities will lose and gain once the experiment is started, and the game >can go on for ever. Easy to set up and insert counters to see at any >point in the game who is winning and who is losing, the average, the >grand average and so on. >Looking at graphs of the total effect there is nice smooth curves which >do pass on occasion through zero, but the overall picture is one of gain >or loss for considerable time periods. All of this is trivial because >every time a game is run a different picture emerges. What isn't so >trivial is when a counter is placed which measures variance. This always >increases, and the graph of variance has the same characteristics as the >one produced in the token game. Also, a point is reached where two >entities never lose, leaving the computer on all night with two 'winners' >they are still there in the morning. Repeating this process about twenty >times the same thing happens, two entities end up with all the advantage. >Generally about six are left with no advantage, and when they do get a >run of good luck it is soon lost. Happens every time. If I were to leave >the computer running for a week then I might find one entity with all the >advantage. What is absolutely certain is that a condition of equity, or >near to what was seen at the beginning of the experiment, will NEVER >happen. >This is not unlike the classical experiment in chemistry or physics where >two gasses are separated in a container by a partition. When the >partition is removed, the gasses mix. Taking their random movement in the >container the possibility does exist that some day the original >arrangement will be found. What is shown in the experiment with ten >entities is the reverse, order has been created out of chaos. Or at least >this is what the winners will say if it were possible to visit the >island. >Imagine for a second if the Grand Designer of this small universe were to >make a visit at the point where there are two 'winners'. It is likely >that the 'losers' would expect some kind of salvation, 'the losers will >inherit the earth', or whatever. But what is the only thing the Grand >Designer can say - 'So you think things are bad, well, you ain't seen >nothing yet'. >So here comes some more Knight's Move Thinking. > >Globalisation = Concentration of wealth and resources = A NATURAL >PROCESS. > >Not only that, the process runs 'downhill', or as the chemists and >physics might call it, an exothermic process. It runs by itself, it >contains sufficient energy for the process to work. So what is the fuel? >Never mind that, look at the ashes left behind, dispossession, >alienation, marginalisation, and Jobseekers. > >Attacking the system, modifying, compromising, whatever, nothing will >stop it. The time for the definitive analysis is when it ends, which is >too far in the future. It wont end anyway, it will wither away, but only >if a system, and a small one, is created where the money system is under >democratic control. That is, when you sit at your PC or television, and >you get a message - Do you want to end the money system? Are you sure you >want to end the money system? If you do then click on YES. >A second later the second system comes into being, provided a majority of >people do likewise. I'd only go for Yes if the effect was to put more >cash into the account - how many people would take a chance on that right >now? The system requires no experts, no managers, no politicians, each >individual gets a graph showing concentration every day, when the day >comes it will be the day when there will be gnashing of teeth. . . > >W.K. > > From rkmoore@iol.ie Mon Nov 17 08:56:00 1997 Mon, 17 Nov 1997 15:55:47 GMT Date: Mon, 17 Nov 1997 15:55:47 GMT To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu (world-system network) From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: re: chase-dunn re- Globalization and "world" systems 11/13/97, christopher chase-dunn wrote: >richard moore's essay is fine. Thanks - that's high praise on this argumentive list! (:>) > a few small points: >1. in Wallerstein's original usage there is a distinction between >"world" and "global". global means Earth-wide. world means the world in >which people live. in this sense world-systems were not always global. >they got bigger over time. Tom Hall and I have developed a comparative >world-systems perspective that looks at small, medium and large >world-systems to see how and why they evolve (_Rise and Demise_ Westview >1997). Hmmm... I must admit my sentiments re/terminology are counter-academic. I believe discussion of important issues should be carried out in terms that have some hope of general comprehension. The World is the Earth, and smaller things have names like "region" or "Mediterranean World" or whatever. Once having borrowed the apt terminology of "world system", "core", and "periphery", I prefer to give them common-sense definitions -- stated at the beginning of the book. Inventors of memes can't always dictate their later evolution. I certainly agree that the histories of less-than-world systems can be strikingly informative of world-system structures. >2. It is probably useful to distinguish between globalization as >economic, political and cultural integration and globalization as a >political project of the world bourgeousie. the latter is quite recent. >the former have been upward trends for millenia in the sense that >interaction networks have been getting larger... We seem to be in agreement here. Alhough my granularity of my treatment is large, I do distinguish strongly between the periods 1492-1945, 1945-1980, and 1980-present, as regards different modalities of globalizing forces. My characterization is that the political project was nascent/covert in the 1945-1980 period, and became overt, though deceptively propagandized, only in the post-1980 era. rkm From rkmoore@iol.ie Mon Nov 17 08:56:07 1997 Mon, 17 Nov 1997 15:55:51 GMT Date: Mon, 17 Nov 1997 15:55:51 GMT To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu (world-system network) From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: re: Austin re- Globalization and world systems (determinism) 11/13/97, Andrew Wayne Austin wrote: >It is with the >transnationalization of production that we arrive at a foundation that >will undergird, or already undergirds, world civil society. What remains >is the consolidation of transnational institutions into a global state. >All this was pretty much predicted by Marx in the Communist Manifesto and >in The German Ideology. Historical materialism proves once again to be the >superior framework for world-historical analysis. I find this perspective analytically impoverished and politically counter-productive, even if it predicts certain gross outcomes. For example: the world system might be substantially different if WW II had been won by Germany, Russia, or Japan -- and such "fine" distinctions are neither explained by nor are they within the purview of historical materialism. What if the USA, at the end of WWII, happened to have political sentiments more like those of Norway -- the Free World might have had a more socialist flavor, and capitalism might have been counter-balanced by stronger popular democracy. Any analytical system which is blind to such distinctions is too impoverished to be of any practical predictive value. What is a materialist to do except to observe the predetermined course of the capitalist comet? This is deterministic cynicsm. You're welcome to it, it's a long and honored tradition, popular especially among subjugated populations. Marx called out for workers to arise and unite "now!", he would seem to agree with me that the deterministic materialist outcome is a threatening possible-future, but that democratic political forces have the potential to play a determinitive role nonetheless. And he also seems to agree that awareness of the potential apocalypse should be sufficient to inspire action -- to wait for the apocalypse is folly. >Incidentally, I agree with Bill Robinson analysis of the global system at >this juncture particularly presented in the final chapter of his >*Promoting Polyarchy*. Would you be willing to summarize the relevant part of his thesis? Otherwise most of us don't know what point you're trying to incidentally make. >What is needed to analyze the world at this point is a >system that analyzes both objective historical-structural transformations >(globalization) and the policy behavior of elite agents who respond to and >guide the unfolding world order to secure the interests of the global >capitalist class. Agreed, and that is precisely what I've been edeavoring to do, as when I talked about the paradigm shift of corporate-board allegiance following 1945, and the correlated elite promotion of globalist bureaucracies. >Bill Robinson, Stephen Gill, Robert Cox, and others >working out of a Gramscian framework...If you are unfamiliar with this mode >of theorizing, it is my view you cannot understand what is going on right now >in the global system. These fellows are explaining the world. I may or may not be familiar with their mode of theroizing, depending on what it is. Until you tell us I can only surmise they must have come to the same conclusions I have, if they are indeed "explaining the world". rkm From rkmoore@iol.ie Mon Nov 17 08:56:16 1997 Mon, 17 Nov 1997 15:55:41 GMT Date: Mon, 17 Nov 1997 15:55:41 GMT To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu (world-system network) From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: re Redmond re- Globalization and world systems (& EU) Dear wsn, I appreciated the several thoughtful responses to my posting, and hope this thread is of general interest to the list. The thesis was refined through debates here, and the latest exchange continues that process. Permit me to comment on the various responses in separate posts... --- I had said: >> The first program in this array was the division of the world into three >> distinct partitions: the socialist (demarcated by the "Iron Curtain"), the >> core (Western Europe, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan [?]) and >> the periphery (ie, the Third World). Dennis R Redmond wrote: >I'm not sure, however, that the typology quite holds up for the case of East >Asia and Central Europe; Certainly the core-periphery analysis of the "Free World" system gets arbitrarily complex (fractal-like) the closer you look. But I do believe the functional distinction I make between the core states (US-Euro powers, Japan) and the rest is a valid one, and that is all I use in my analysis. The finer distinctions are, I believe, not relevant to the thesis, although a qualifying remark is in order. >You could also argue that whereas multinational corporations and global >financial markets are clearly the hegemonic social forces in the >Anglo-Saxon countries, things are trickier in the EU and East Asia, where >global integration seems to be taking a far more nuanced, complicated >path. Why have an EU at all if corporations already rule the world? >Well, the answer is, the EU isn't just about corporate power, it's also about >extending democracy and the reach of the welfare state onto a dangerously >(from capital's point of view) or emancipatory (if you're a Leftie) >transnational level. The staunch promoters of the EU and the European Commission (people like Kohl) are also staunch supporters of the globalist beureaucracies (G7, WTO, IMF et al). They are aware, although it is absent from their Euro rhetoric, that whatever progressive measures might be enacted by the EU will ultimately be superceded by the authority of those bureaucracies, in the same way that IMF guidelines today supercede whatever ambitions debtor nations might have as regards to social welfare. Have you looked at MAI (the Multilateral Agreement on Investment)? The whole notion of a strong united Europe -- a power on an economic par with the US and Japan -- is in fact antiquated in this era of "offshore" production, budget-constrained First World nations, and globalized corporations. It harks back nostalgically to the pre-1980 nationalist paradigm, but in current reality it is a sham vision, and this cannot be unkown the the likes of Kohl and other G7 VIP's. The net consequence of Brussels-empowerment is a greasing-of-the-skids for the European slide into globalist domination. France and other sovereign European nations might in the end have turned against globalization -- as its downsides became more obvious -- but the Brussels string-pullers are firmly in the globalist camp. The EU is a globalist Trojan Horse and the green liberalism rhetoric is an attractive bridle on the horse. But inside the horse is hidden globalization and corporate domination. Once Brussels reels in sovereign control -- and the play of the lines _is_ ever so "nuanced" -- green liberalism will find itself on the defensive. Already the Euro is being used as an excuse to move toward "austerity". This topic will be treated more comprehensively in: V. D. Devolution, the EU, and 'peacekeeping': a trojan cavalry >My own suspicion is that, barring major political changes, the US may well >lose its "core" status in the medium-term future, due to the rise of the >euro, more efficient East Asian coordination, and the generalized >neoliberal decadence of what used to be the American Empire, and become >a very large but declining semi-periphery. But maybe that's too >pessimistic; maybe Microsoft and Silicon Valley will somehow pay for our >trade deficits and invest in our schools after all. Ya gotta dream! Indeed the U.S. will lose its privileged core status; that is already happening (now largest debtor nation), and it will happen to all core states. As I put in a revised version of the posting: -=-=-=-=-=-=-=~-~=-=-=-=-=-=- The consequence of globalization is that _all_ states (core and periphery) are to be treated by megacorps as colonial plantations. Privileged core states are no longer needed by megacorps as safe-base homes; all states can now be periphery states; megacorps alone can make up the core sub-system. As in the periphery today, the major role of formerly core governments will be to maintain public order and to seek to be "competitive" in attracting corporate favors. The centralized military force, highly automated and needing only an elite corps to man it, will be wrested from the influence of the vagaries of even U.S. politics, and placed under the control of yet another megacorp-dominated bureaucracy, no doubt to be dubbed something like the "World Peace Organization". -=-=-=-=-=-=-=~-~=-=-=-=-=-=- rkm From dredmond@gladstone.uoregon.edu Mon Nov 17 13:49:20 1997 for ; Mon, 17 Nov 1997 12:49:16 -0800 (PST) Date: Mon, 17 Nov 1997 12:49:15 -0800 (PST) From: Dennis R Redmond To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Re: Globalization and world systems (& EU) In-Reply-To: On Mon, 17 Nov 1997, Richard K. Moore wrote: > > The whole notion of a strong united Europe -- a power on an economic par > with the US and Japan -- is in fact antiquated in this era of "offshore" > production, budget-constrained First World nations, and globalized > corporations. It harks back nostalgically to the pre-1980 nationalist > paradigm, but in current reality it is a sham vision, and this cannot be > unknown to the likes of Kohl and other G7 VIP's. But the constraints on those budgets are political, not fundamentally economic ones, in the EU. These countries are running big trade surpluses, they have the leading industries and technologies of the world-system, and they could, if they really wanted to, finance a new kind of global Keynesianism. Of course, their rentiers and financiers don't want this, which is why the people of Europe are going to have to organize politically to make this happen. The signs of this are everywhere: neoliberalism is deeply unpopular in Europe, Rightwing governments are being trounced every which way, Left coalitions kicked out monetarist goons in France and Italy, etc. Heck, if even hidebound, parafeudal, newly deindustrializing Britain could throw the Conservatives into the sewer of history, anything is possible. And now, of course, the Kohl regime is submerged in the nether gulfs of the German electoral polls. What interests me about the EU is not what it has achieved so far -- which is not much at all -- but the potential it has as a model for transnational regulation, laws, citizenship, culture and democracy. Sure, the EU may end up as another corrupted, capitalist Empire; but its reign and politics will undoubtedly be as different from the Pax Americana as the latter was from the British Empire. Only transnational socialism can fight the rule of the multinational corporations; as to what Trans-Soc would look like, I haven't the slightest idea. Still, these are the questions world-systems theory needs to be asking. -- Dennis From Shawn_Terrell@marketstrategies.com Mon Nov 17 16:27:52 1997 Date: Mon, 17 Nov 97 18:23:41 EST From: "Shawn Terrell" To: WSN@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Goals of anti-system? r.k. moore writes: -=-=-=-=-=-=-=~-~=-=-=-=-=-=- The consequence of globalization is that _all_ states (core and periphery) are to be treated by megacorps as colonial plantations. Privileged core states are no longer needed by megacorps as safe-base homes; all states can now be periphery states; megacorps alone can make up the core sub-system. As in the periphery today, the major role of formerly core governments will be to maintain public order and to seek to be "competitive" in attracting corporate favors. The centralized military force, highly automated and needing only an elite corps to man it, will be wrested from the influence of the vagaries of even U.S. politics, and placed under the control of yet another megacorp-dominated bureaucracy, no doubt to be dubbed something like the "World Peace Organization". -=-=-=-=-=-=-=~-~=-=-=-=-=-=- As a non-academician working within the corporate machine, I am most disturbed by the trend as articulated by Mr. Moore. I am, however, wondering about several issues: 1) does the rule of corporations spell disaster for the world's populations? If so, 2) What are the goals of a world system that is more just, i.e. what should the world look like as an alternative to the above scenario? Here are a few possible broad goals: Equal distributuion of wealth Minimum standard of living Here are some means: Global-scale unionization Protectionism Upper limit of wealth accumulation Enforcement of basic human rights Welfare saftey net Mass education Return to local economic production 5) Here are just a few of the problems(?) If governments are in the back pocket of the corporate hegemony, then what are the chances of anything short of bloody revolution as a means to the desired outcome? Even if this were to occur what about the truisms "meet the new boss, same as the old boss," "the more things change, the more they stay the same," "power corrupts," etc? Before I, as one of the common people, can support an alternative to mr. moore's outline of pending corporate hegemony, I must have a vision of what the alternative should/could be. Any references and/or direct answers to my questions would be greatly appreciated. Thanks Shawn Terrell From OWENJACK@FS.isu.edu Mon Nov 17 23:37:20 1997 for ; Mon, 17 Nov 1997 23:36:30 -0700 (MST) From: "J B Owens" To: WSN@csf.colorado.edu Date: Mon, 17 Nov 1997 23:42:25 -0600, MDT Subject: history standards conflict I post the following from a recent message from Ross Dunn for those interested in the debate over national history standards for U.S. and world history. ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date: Fri, 14 Nov 1997 11:12:54 -0800 To: "J B Owens" From: Ross Dunn [much text deleted] Also I wonder if you would like to put out ... an announcement of our book, which appeared less than a month ago: Gary B. Nash, Charlotte Crabtree, and Ross E. Dunn, HISTORY ON TRIAL: CULTURE WARS AND THE TEACHING OF THE PAST (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997). The book includes quite a lot about the evolution of world history teaching in the schools since the early century. Favorable reviews have appeared in the LOS ANGELES TIMES SUNDAY BOOK REVIEW, PHILADELPHIA ENQUIRER SUNDAY BOOK REVIEW, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, and CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, and KIRKUS REVIEWS. Cranky ones have appeared in the NATIONAL REVIEW and in THE VILLAGE VOICE. -------------------------- So many books; so little time :-) Jack ******************************************************** J. B. "Jack" Owens, Professor of History Project Coordinator, Computer-Mediated Distance Learning Idaho State University, Pocatello, ID 83209 USA e-mail: owenjack@isu.edu www: http://www.isu.edu/~owenjack ******************************************************** From austria@it.com.pl Tue Nov 18 02:07:46 1997 for <>; Tue, 18 Nov 1997 10:08:26 +0100 (MET) Reply-To: From: "Austrian Embassy" To: "<" Subject: Fw: Le Monde Diplomatique November 1997 English Edition. Date: Tue, 18 Nov 1997 10:10:25 +0100 ---------- > From: Le Monde diplomatique > To: English edition - Le Monde diplomatique > Subject: November 1997 English Edition. > Date: Samstag, 15. November 1997 13:12 > > **** Le Monde diplomatique: a unique newspaper > > At a time when other newspapers around the world are reducing their > international news coverage and analysis, Le Monde diplomatique is > staunchly refusing to compromise its standards in either the quality or the > scope of the topics it addresses. This policy has met with huge success. > Readers like it. Circulation is soaring year on year. Last year alone it > was up 25% , bringing its readership to almost half a million -- in French, > Italian, German, Spanish, Arabic, Greek - and now in English. > > The newspaper enjoys a favoured position: it is an independent > enterprise, owned in part by its journalists, employees and readers, and in > part by Le Monde, France's prestigious top daily. > > Who reads le diplo and why? Students, academics, businessmen and > women, professionals. Ordinary people who care about society and culture, > who want to understand more about the contradictions and conflicts of the > modern world. Our readership profile is a wonderful mosaic. What our > readers want -- and get -- is original, thought-provoking articles written > by leading experts from around the world, unrivalled coverage and in-depth > analysis of international affairs, insight into the key issues of the day > -- political, social, economic, technological. In short, what goes on > behind the news, around the planet. > > Le Monde diplomatique was one of the first French newspapers on the > Internet, recognising from the start the potential of the Information > Superhighway as a medium for communication that transcends political and > geographical borders. > > Early in 1997 Le Monde diplomatique launched an English edition to > complement its other foreign-language editions. The edition is translated > by a team of top translators and edited in London by Wendy Kristianasen. > > Why not subscribe now? It will only cost you $24 (approximately 150 > French francs or 15 pound sterling). An on-line subscription form is > available on our web site. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/ > > Here you have the summary for November 1997. > (*) Star-marked articles are available without a password. > > > > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/ > _________________________________________________________________ > > Le Monde diplomatique > > { english edition } > > November, 1997 > > > > (edited by Wendy Kristianasen) > > LEADER > > Taking care of the planet > by Ignacio Ramonet * > > A hundred and fifty countries are meeting in Kyoto in December to > discuss what to do about global warming. It is an appropriate venue > given the series of disasters, both financial and ecological, that > have recently been shaking Asia and the Far East. These disasters > are linked. For, when it comes to the environment, we are > witnessing reckless policies that are leaving the planet > dangerously depleted. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/1997/11/leader.html > > > HOW TO AVOID RUSSIAN-STYLE CHAOS > > Cautious privatisation in China > by Roland Lew > > China's increasingly prominent role in international affairs has > given special significance to the 15th Congress of the Chinese > Communist Party which was held this September shortly after the > death of Deng Xiaoping. In striking contrast to its reluctance to > implement political change, the party took the decision to > "restructure" the entire state-owned industrial sector. But the > pace of industrial reform is provoking intense debate within the > party. And workers are facing wage cuts or unemployment - to which > they have been reacting with some violence. (See also "Two > decades of reform".) > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1997/11/china.html > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1997/11/china2.html > > > > TAMING THE UNIONS > > The mirage of a social Europe > by Corinne Gobin * > > France and Italy have undertaken to introduce a 35-hour working > week. But this step forward has been greeted with serious > reservations by most European Union governments, and with downright > hostility by employers and heads of finance. The key word is now > flexibility. But it remains to be seen at this month's European > Council summit what hope there really is for a "social Europe". > What is sure is that European trades unions have been hopelessly > slow off the mark. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/1997/11/europe.html > > > > EIGHTY YEARS ON FROM THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION > > The world's fascination with the Soviet Union > by Moshé Lewin > > The USSR may have disappeared but its interest has not waned. In > fact, a number of historians have been calling for a > Nuremberg-style trial of communism, equating Stalin with Hitler. > But their two countries had quite different historical > trajectories. To assess the role of the USSR and its impact on the > world, we need to look back to Tsarist Russia. One of the many > things we may deduce is that Soviet Russia, much like its Tsarist > predecessor, was trying to resolve problems that were specifically > Russian: such things as an all-powerful central authority out of > step with a backward society, and a catastrophic lack of > planning... (See also The USSR in 15 key dates.) > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1997/11/ussr.html > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1997/11/ussr3.html > > > > "ROGUE STATES" AND "PEER COMPETITORS" > > A new military strategy for Washington? > By Michael Klare > > To justify their huge annual credits, Pentagon officials are in > need of "visible enemies" which could threaten American security. > For some years, this has been the "rogue regimes" of the third > world like Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. Now some top advisors > think it is the turn of the United States' "peer competitors" - > Russia and China - to take on the role of potential adversaries. > But this new school of thought has as yet to change official > policy. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1997/11/usmil.html > > > > BANKRUPT SERBIAN NATIONALISM IS STILL VIRULENT > > Rude awakening for the orphans of "Greater Serbia" > by Jean Arnault Dérens > > "Kosovo is Serbia's Jerusalem" says a former Communist Party > official in Pristina, capital of Kosovo. We are at the historical > heart of Serbian nationalism and here - as elsewhere - it is > evident that the Serbs see their problems as far from resolved. In > particular, the problem of Serb communities outside Serbia itself. > Inside Serbia, presidential elections scheduled for 7 December > threaten a contest between hardliners of one sort or another. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1997/11/serbia.html > > Renewed conflict in Kosovo > by Christophe Chiclet > > A brief history of the Kosovo region of Serbia from 1389 to the > present, with the acute difficulty of its 90% Albanian community > and growing signs of irredentism. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1997/11/kosovo.html > > > > GROWING PAINS IN AFRICAN DEMOCRATISATION > > Electing dictators > by Martine-Renée Galloy and Marc-Éric Gruénais > > Democratisation, which began in Africa at the start of the 1990s, > has so far been more a matter of restructuring (and keeping control > of) existing systems than a radical overhaul of the one-party > state. And international observers are not much help, since they > oversee only the actual voting rather than the whole electoral > process. There is a pressing need for Africa's elites to > disentangle themselves from the power game, and give a lead to > civil society in demanding the same range of democratic freedoms in > the South as exists in the North. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1997/11/africa.html > > Fighting for power in the Congo > by Martine-Renée Galloy and Marc-Éric Gruénais > > Congo-Brazzaville provides a bleak example of the absence of > democratic reform, with years of in-fighting between Pascal > Lissouba and Denis Sassou Nguesso. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1997/11/africa2.html > > > > A CENTURY OF ZIONISM > > The changing pattern of Israeli immigration > by Amnon Kapeliouk > > The immigration of Jews to the "promised land" has always been the > cornerstone of Zionism. Now the ultra-orthodox religious parties > that are helping keep Benyamin Netanyahu in power are demanding > sole control over conversions to Judaism. But two-thirds of the > diaspora are not orthodox. And in powerful Jewish community of the > United States, the figure rises to 90%. This makes life difficult > for Mr Netanyahu. It also raises the question of the changing > nature of immigration into Israel, and of its diverse origins and > separate communities. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1997/11/israel.html > > > > CAUGHT IN THE TRAP OF SOCIAL CONTROL > > Taming the addict > by Claude Olievenstein > > Modern society has found a cheap way of dealing with drug addicts, > using substitutes like methadone, giving them suppressants or > regarding them as chronically ill, rather than as the messengers of > an inadequate society. Denying the complexity of the problem may > provide a quick fix, but it is folly in the longer term. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1997/11/drugs.html > > > > THE BOUNDS OF FREEDOM > > French immigration policy on trial > by Christian de Brie * > > The Jospin government has been faced with the problem of illegal > immigrant workers. It has dealt with this by commissioning a new > report which aims to remove the most disputed provisions of > immigration law, without provoking a national debate which would > serve the interests of the extreme right. France has much the same > proportion of foreigners as the rest of the European Union and the > pressure of immigration is more myth than reality. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/1997/11/imm1.html > > Good foreigners, bad illegals > by Danièle Lochak > > Almost 25 years ago France called a halt to immigrant labour. Since > then, increasingly tight controls have been applied to stem the > flood of foreigners. Visas were reintroduced, penalties increased, > expulsions and holding periods permitted. Underlying this policy is > a false distinction between legal immigrants whom the politicians > want to see integrated at all costs and the "illegals" whom they > aim to get rid of - unjustly. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1997/11/imm2.html > > Making them legal > by Emmanuel Vaillant > > France, like many other countries who have curtailed immigration, > has been engaged in "regularising", that is legalising, the > position of its long-standing immigrant population, the vast > majority of whom entered the country legally at the outset. In > France, as elsewhere, the authorities have relaxed the rules and, > since 1996, have recognised new categories of "unofficial" > immigrants who play a full part in French society, despite the > absence of proper administrative formalities. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/inside/1997/11/imm3.html > > > > A PLAYGROUND FOR THE ADVERTISING INDUSTRY > > Marketing on the Net > by Dan Schiller * > > Commercial firms are following the latest developments in > information techology, in particular the Internet, where huge > profits are to be had. Advertisers are devoting a great deal of > thought to means of luring people to particular Websites. Marketing > techniques are growing increasingly sophisticated and now aim to > target defined interest groups. It will come as no surprise to > learn that these selected groups come from the richest end of the > social spectrum... > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/1997/11/internet.html > > What to do about Microsoft? > By Ralph Nader and James Love * > > Microsoft's dominance of the computer industry has created a new > economic reality where competition dares not tread. The company's > strengthening monopoly is raising concern in both the United States and > Europe regarding the future of digital communications. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/1997/11/nader.html > > > > > ______________________________________________________________ > > For more information on our English edition, please visit > > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/ > > To subscribe to our free "dispatch" mailing-list, send an > (empty) e-mail to: > > dispatch-on@london.monde-diplomatique.fr > > > To unsubscribe, send an (empty) e-mail to: > dispatch-off@london.monde-diplomatique.fr > > > From chriscd@jhu.edu Tue Nov 18 09:11:49 1997 Date: Tue, 18 Nov 1997 11:09:16 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: Re: Goals of anti-system?] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu Date: Tue, 18 Nov 1997 11:08:52 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Reply-To: chriscd@jhu.edu Organization: Sociology Department, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD. 21218 USA To: Shawn_Terrell@marketstrategies.com Subject: Re: Goals of anti-system? regarding the sensible questions raised by Mr. Terrell i can recommend one set of answers and a plausible future scenario that raises a host of other, more tactical, questions. that is Warren Wagar's sci fi novel, _A Short History of the Future_ (Chicago 1992). chris From tardanic@fiu.edu Tue Nov 18 10:17:22 1997 for ; Tue, 18 Nov 1997 12:17:32 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 18 Nov 1997 12:22:07 -0500 () From: Richard Tardanico To: World-System Network Subject: Global/Latin American restructuring X-X-Sender: tardanic@mailhost.fiu.edu New book: Global Restructuring, Employment, and Social Inequality in Urban Latin America, eds. Richard Tardanico and Rafael Menjivar Larin (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997). The volume uses a comparative framework to examine the implications of contemporary global restructuring and national policies for urban employment and social inequality in Mexico, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Chile, and Argentina. The comparative framework centers on hypotheses concerning state-sector cutbacks/reorganization, industry and export transformations, growth of precarious and informal employment, gender realignments, and territorial reorganization. The book represents a collaboration between Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO)-Programa Costa Rica and the Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University, funded by the North-South Center at the University of Miami. The authors are Orlandina de Oliveira and Brigida Garcia (Mexico); Juan Pablo Perez Sainz (Guatemala); Rick Tardanico and Mario Lungo (Costa Rica); Jose Itzigsohn (Dominican Republic); Victor Fajardo Cortez and Miguel Lacabana (Venezuela); Alvaro Diaz (Chile); Rosalia Cortes (Argentina); and Rick Tardanico and Rafael Menjivar Larin (introduction and conclusion). FLACSO-Costa Rica is preparing a Spanish-language edition for publication in 1998. Saludos, Rick Tardanico From aaustin@utkux.utcc.utk.edu Tue Nov 18 10:48:32 1997 Date: Tue, 18 Nov 1997 12:46:00 -0500 (EST) From: Andrew Wayne Austin To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: On Moore's Thought Experiments In-Reply-To: Richard, I wrote a longer post to you, but my server crashed. In short, it said you are not explaining the world. (And it suggested you read Gill, Cox, and Robinson.) But I did have a couple of questions. (1) Why do you consider Weberian thought experiments (imaginary lines of history) to be a superior mode of analysis to historical materialist theorizing from concrete reality and actual history? (2) Why do you find real-world theorizing to be "deterministic"? Andy One can summarize the logic of the thought experiment in this way: If the past had not been what it was, everything in the present would not be what it is. From terisatu@uoguelph.ca Tue Nov 18 12:33:57 1997 Tue, 18 Nov 1997 14:33:50 -0500 (EST) Date: Tue, 18 Nov 1997 14:33:50 -0500 (EST) From: Terisa Turner To: "Richard K. Moore" Subject: Re: Book in development: "Globalization & NWO - democracy at a crossroads" In-Reply-To: yr book - would be strengthened by attention to resistance, fightback, a theoretical framework giving prominence to same and its historical antecedents, \ -need conscious integrated theory which includes gender good luck, t Terisa E. Turner E-mail: terisatu@uoguelph.ca Departments of Sociology & Anthropology and Political Studies University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, CANADA N1G 2W1 Home:(519)787-0609 | Bus:(519)824-4120 ext.3990 | Fax:(519)837-9561 From bill.schell@murraystate.edu Tue Nov 18 13:11:20 1997 Date: Tue, 18 Nov 1997 14:01:50 -0600 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: Bill Schell Subject: Re: On Moore's Thought Experiments In-Reply-To: References: At 12:46 PM 11/18/97 -0500, Andy wrote to Richard > >But I did have a couple of questions. (1) Why do you consider Weberian >thought experiments (imaginary lines of history) to be a superior mode of >analysis to historical materialist theorizing from concrete reality and >actual history? > All of Weber's modeling was done from concrete historical example based in culture as well as in materialist theory -- which is one reason his work has held up better than marxism. From aaustin@utkux.utcc.utk.edu Tue Nov 18 15:34:21 1997 Date: Tue, 18 Nov 1997 17:31:45 -0500 (EST) From: Andrew Wayne Austin To: Bill Schell Subject: Re: On Moore's Thought Experiments In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19971118140150.006dece8@murraystate.edu> On Tue, 18 Nov 1997, Bill Schell wrote: > All of Weber's modeling was done from concrete historical example based in > culture as well as in materialist theory -- which is one reason his work > has held up better than marxism. Weber used historical examples, but they were far from concrete. First, Weber did not believe in concrete theorizing because he argued you can never grasp the totality and therefore should not theorize from that standpoint. Weber rejected the realism and organicism of his German historical materialist contemporaries--adopting a logic of causation (in the social realm) drawn from legal studies, e.g., concerning responsibility (leading to charges that he was an empiricist and a positivist, in the limited sense)--and instead adopted, in part (Weber was eclectic), the subjectivist position of the historicist. Weber's method (e.g., the ideal type) was to abstract from a fragmentation of the concrete, which leads one away from historical reality. On this basis, Weber rejected unity in science. This is the opposite of concrete theorizing, as I have noted, for the basis of this method is an emphasis in abstraction from fragments, rather than explicit abstraction from the concrete (totality). Weber's economics, as an example of his method, were marginalist, i.e., reflecting the assumptions of the neoclassical and rational choice models. Secondly, Weber often theorized using counterfactual conditionals; here he would (mentally) remove events from history and develop imaginary lines of historical development from these starting points of unreality. This is in line with Weber's subjectivist epistemic. From this standpoint, Weber engaged in extended polemics against materialist historians (such as Eduard Meyer), claiming that it was imaging events that didn't happen, or, more precisely, thinking away events that did happen, that was useful for historiography. (Indeed, his disagreements with Stammler weren't really about Stammler's attempt to dissolve the connection between law and economics, but rather with legalistic matters of procedure.) For instance, in the review essay "The Logic of Historical Explanation," Weber started from an assumption that the historical subject is a rational actor and then supposes what would happen if that historical subject made a different decision. In other words, Weber's theorizing starts with the premises that (a) individual actors are rational and (b) history is the product of rational action. Both these assumptions are dubious, and in my view entirely incorrect. Importantly, Weber always claimed that he went into sociology to rid the discipline of what he considered reified concepts such as "class," "structure," "relations," and "history." Weber argued that these were only mental constructions with no objective reality. Of course, Weber ultimately used realist vocabulary to describe the world he saw (because science is nonsensical without it) and moved more towards a position of realism as he matured; but he always took up polemics against realism in historical and social science. This was a mistake. And it is a mistake to follow Weber's lead. Judging from what Weber hoped would be the character of social science, and judging from the realism that I find in the work of those who frequent World-Systems Network, and in the work I am in, it would seem that Weber's system has not held up so well, contrary to what has written in the post to which I am responding. Class relations are real and do constitute objective reality; for Weber class is more or less the arbitrary description of imagined orders of stratification. This will not do as a social science. So it would seem, in the end, that historical materialism, at least the core assumptions upon which Marxism rests, have held up much better than Weberian subjectivism. I am thankful for this. Andy From akwebb@phoenix.Princeton.EDU Wed Nov 19 00:50:35 1997 Date: Tue, 18 Nov 1997 19:11:40 -0500 (EST) From: "Adam K. Webb" Reply-To: "Adam K. Webb" To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: Re: On Moore's Thought Experiments In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19971118140150.006dece8@murraystate.edu> On Tue, 18 Nov 1997, Bill Schell wrote: > At 12:46 PM 11/18/97 -0500, Andy wrote to Richard > > > >But I did have a couple of questions. (1) Why do you consider Weberian > >thought experiments (imaginary lines of history) to be a superior mode of > >analysis to historical materialist theorizing from concrete reality and > >actual history? > > > All of Weber's modeling was done from concrete historical example based in > culture as well as in materialist theory -- which is one reason his work > has held up better than marxism. On this point at least, I find myself in (rare) agreement with Richard and Bill. The fact that there are more self-styled Marxist than Weberian scholars may say more about Marxism's simpler programmatic implications than its resonance with historical reality. Furthermore, it seems fair to say that an evaluation of programmatic alternatives in the present must include a nuanced, Weber-style attention to the "thick" logics of previous civilisations. All is not linear; sometimes counterfactual exercises can shed light on more appropriate routes that often are still available in essence. Finally, by emphasising linearity and "actual history," one tends to acquire the constraining blinders that ignore the contingent and decidedly non-universal character of present "universal," even "progressive," values. (But we have been through that whole can of worms before, so I will spare you all a reiteration....) Regards, --AKW =============================================================================== Adam K. Webb Department of Politics Princeton University Princeton NJ 08544 USA 609-258-9028 http://www.princeton.edu/~akwebb From aaustin@utkux.utcc.utk.edu Wed Nov 19 06:59:41 1997 id IAA01489; Wed, 19 Nov 1997 08:50:18 -0500 (EST) Date: Wed, 19 Nov 1997 08:51:45 -0500 (EST) From: Andrew Wayne Austin To: "Adam K. Webb" Subject: Re: On Moore's Thought Experiments In-Reply-To: Adam, Historical materialism does view historical production as linear progression. Historical reality is seen as qualitative differentiated, full of disjuncture, novel emergence, indeterminate outcome. Marx sets out heuristic models with history only in broad lines and then suggests we do grounded concrete analysis for empirical instances. Marx himself claimed there were no overarching transhistorical laws of historical development. I believe what is being presented here is a mythology about the materialist conception of history. Andy From aaustin@utkux.utcc.utk.edu Wed Nov 19 07:09:27 1997 id JAA02737; Wed, 19 Nov 1997 09:07:52 -0500 (EST) Date: Wed, 19 Nov 1997 09:09:15 -0500 (EST) From: Andrew Wayne Austin To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: Re: On Moore's Thought Experiments In-Reply-To: List, In the last post I wrote I left out a negation. The first sentence should read that "historical materialism does NOT view historical production as linear progression." My apologies for error. Andy From rkmoore@iol.ie Wed Nov 19 09:52:24 1997 Wed, 19 Nov 1997 16:51:29 GMT Date: Wed, 19 Nov 1997 16:51:29 GMT To: cyber-rights@cpsr.org, wsn@csf.colorado.edu (world-system network) From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Some notes on scientific inquiry: the role of hypothesis To: cyber-rights, wsn In the past few days, serendipitously, various people on these list have directly challenged my methods of argument, referring to "leaps" and "thought experiments", and complaining of "research and reading gaps". I'm glad this came up, because I'm quite happy to say a few words about my methods of investigation. Indeed more attention to meta-inquiry seems appropriate in a medium so heavily trafficked by debate and theorizing. My activity on Internet can be characterized as an investigation into various questions, together with an investigation into techniques of effective presentation. The net is a perfect medium for such pursuits -- it is an Athenian Academy writ large, peopled with countless articulate philosophers and experts of every conceivable stripe, with varying levels of discernment, and espousing a wide range of traditional, popular, and innovative viewpoints. At each stage of an investigation one can find diverse critics ready and able to exhaustively dispute any current hypotheses or argument. This convenient and energetic forum enables rapid and economical refinment of ones ideas. As regards "gaps in reading and research": The scope of my ongoing print reading and research is considerable, but not nearly as extensive as my interests. If I tried to read all relevant periodicals and academic works, the rest of my life would be spent in a library, there would always be one more doubt to settle, and the time to write would never come. With Internet, there's a faster method of learning, a method that can keep pace with the development of my thinking -- that method is simply the process of online debate. If I want to find out how historians would rebut my latest argument, it is quicker to present the argument to the wsn list and await the flames than it is to read all the historical treatises. This process is a form of collaborative investigation -- the investigation draws on the collective knowledge of the community of participants, even if most of them are motivated by other objectives. Rebutters are my teachers, and reasoned refutations are valued; they may resent that I haven't read their particular recommended books, but if they're going to play on the net they shouldn't object to explaining in net-common terminology what may to them seem obvious. Internet, employed as I've described, is uniquely potent in accelerating the development of hypotheses, especially when those hypotheses range over many traditional disciplines. And hypotheses are at the center of my formal investigative methods -- methods, by the way, that are on a completely sound scientifc basis. My formal background is in mathematics (including logic), and math is the subject that most systematically develops the topic of "proof". It was Euclid's geometry, for example, that first attempted to formalize the principles of deductive reasoning. Math doesn't really have any data; it only has its models and its proofs to play with. Philosophers may excel in analyzing such methods, but mathematicians are among the most proficient in applying the methods -- it's like the difference between art historians and artists. It was the facility of proof and argument that I took away from math; I never cared much about abelian groups or differential equations. The first step in my method (and none of this is unique or original) is formally called INDUCTIVE HYPOTHESIS GENERATION. This is nothing more than guessing based on observation: What explanation _seems_ to fit the facts? The tenative explanation might be original, or it might be borrowed, but if it is borrowed the authority of the source plays no further role -- it is the hypothesis itself that one works with. Hypothesis generation is the process a police detective goes through after examining the initial evidence in a case. Once an hypothesis is under consideration, investigation then proceeds along three threads in parallel. The first thread is to look for EVIDENCE for or against the hypothesis; the second thread is to EXPLORE the conditional consequences of the hypothesis (What would follow _if_ it were true?); the third thread is to REFINE the statement and presentation of the hypothesis itself (like the detective developing the presentation for the prosecution). The three threads, it turns out, reinforce one another. The first thread is formally called "HYPOTHESIS TESTING", the second "the ANALYTIC METHOD", and the third "PUBLICATION" (:>) . Pursuit of these threads turns out to be highly productive: either the hypothesis is rapidly demolished by Internet detractors, which allows attention to be turned elsewhere, or else the hypothesis gains rapidly in refinement, substantance, and notoriety. As example, some of my current hypotheses are: (1) "The telecom system will rapidly evolve into a digital, high- bandwidth network, capable of delivering full two-way video to each user." (2) "The mass-media industry will seek to use the telecomm network as its primary delivery channel as soon as such becomes operationally feasible." (3) "The global capitalist elite have learned how to act coherently in their collective interests; they see those interests as being distinct from those of the nation-state; globalization has become the elite's vehicle for systematically furthering their interests." These turn out to be very fruitful hypotheses: they are humble enough that thread one (validation) is not beyond the scope of reasonable endeavor (indeed many serious observers believe these hypotheses are already conclusively established), and yet they are bold enough that thread two (exploring consequences) leads to very significant and non-obvious observations, worth publishing in thread three. But to some on our lists, the mere consideration of such hypotheses seems an unwarranted "leap". Such people have an impoverished scientific repertoire; they are imprisoned within the limitations of the deductive method: they want to consider proven facts and generally accepted beliefs only, and then they'll be happy to deduce and extrapolate conclusions from them. Such people seem not to realize that most of the scientific facts and principles they now take for granted, and are comfortable in reasoning from, could never have been discovered by the deductive method alone, nor by sticking to accepted beliefs. Galileo, Darwin, Freud, Kepler, Descartes, Marx, Newton, and Einstein, to name a few, developed and employed the hypothesis-driven methodology I'm using, and I'm happy to borrow from them. They demonstrated conclusively that bold hypotheses, if astutely chosen and systematically pursued, can dramatically accelerate the advance of human understanding. To flesh out the methodology just a bit more, let's look at hypothesis (2) re/ the mass-media and cyberspace. Note that without the hypothesis, there would be no reason to focus on the questions below; the value of the hypothesis lies in its ability to optimally focus the investigator's attention. Knee-jerk refusal to consider such hypothesis at all puts one in the position (and philosophical vintage) of the Scholastics who refused to look through Galileo's telescope. Thread one, evidence-seeking, leads to such questions as: - How does the mass-media industry operate? Who owns it? - What is their business model? How deep are their pockets? - How do they conceptualize their marketplace? - How do they manage their distribution currently? - What are their market and product trends? - Where are they looking for future revenue growth? - How are they responding to new technologies? - How quickly do they learn and adapt? - What is their corporate culture? How pioneering are they? - What do we know about their actual plans and intentions? - What positions are they taking on regulatory issues? The evidence to which these questions have led me turns out to be considerable, arugably conclusive. However it is not surprising that many serious Internet observers (on and off our lists) have not come to these same conclusions -- that's simply because they haven't been examining the evidence with the right questions in mind. They may be more familiar with the overall room than I am, but they're overlooking a surprisingly significant corner, a corner which my hypothesis has guided me to examine closely. Thread two, exploring consequences, indicates such questions as: - How does the mass-media business model map onto digital networking? - What would be their likely game-plan in pursing their business objectives in cyberspace? - What other players and game-plans that are likely to be involved? - What are the relative strengths of the players? - What are everyone's likely lobbying agendas? - How do those agendas fit with general directions in government policy? - How are the ownership and regulatory shakeouts likely to unfold? - What does that imply regarding the economic and regulatory regime likely to be adopted for cyberspace? - What uses can be anticipated from the technology itself, based on its ability to reliably and cost-effectively connect arbitrary points with high-bandwidth channels? As challenging as this second set of questions appears to be, it is not really all that intractible. It has more variables and contingincies than the first set, but the players aren't that difficult to identify, their agendas are not deeply hidden, their initial game moves are already in evidence, and ample precedents exist in previous technological revolutions from which informed lessons can be drawn. Anticipation of a Big Brother, mass-media dominated cyberspace is not itself a "leap", it rather is a well-reasoned most-likely outcome of the scenario indicated by the hypothesis. The only "leaps" are in the assumptions that cyberspace will be built, that the mass-media will jump in and play, and that neoliberal policies will continue to dominate politically. If thread two is inadequately developed in the literature, that is only because the hypotheses has not been sufficiently entertained. Under the serious assumption of an aggressive mass-media policy, the fundamental cyberspace picture falls into place surprisingly readily. It would be a mistake to delay the difficult exploration thread until after the hypothesis is proven -- that would be artificially serializing a learning process that can naturally proceed with productive paralellism. You might say an hypothesis has both CREDIBILITY and IMPORTANCE. Thread one seeks to establish credibility; thread two seeks to establish importance -- and in the end thread three presents the two investigations together as one piece of work, which can then finally be offered even to the deductionist extrapolators amongst us. For those who appreciate the method, and who can successfully switch their mental assumptions as they switch threads, all three threads are equally interesting and offer opportunities for productive participation. But for those who can't appreciate the method, participation is typically limited to an unproductive finger which points at thread one: noting with dull repitition whatever doubts still remain regarding the base hypothesis. Unfortunate. regards, rkm ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ Posted by Richard K. Moore - rkmoore@iol.ie - PO Box 26, Wexford, Ireland www.iol.ie/~rkmoore/cyberjournal (USA Citizen) * Non-commercial republication encouraged - Please include this sig * ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ See in cyberlib: Democracy-and-Cyberspace America_&_NWO China_vs_Globalism From gernot.kohler@sheridanc.on.ca Wed Nov 19 11:04:42 1997 for ; Wed, 19 Nov 1997 13:04:38 -0500 (EST) Date: Wed, 19 Nov 1997 13:04:38 -0500 (EST) From: Gernot Kohler To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: comment re: Frankman paper This is a comment on a paper available in the wsn archive, section "working papers", namely: Myron J. Frankman, "Planet-Wide Citizen's Income: Antidote to Global Apartheid" (1997) Prof. Frankman advocates such measures as a "global citizen's income" (a guaranteed global minimum income), "global safety net", a "global system of public finance" and a "global system of taxation". The justification for these proposals is given in justice terms ("from national to global justice"). I would like to point out that proposals of this kind can also be justified in economic theory terms along left-Keynesian lines. Measures which raise the purchasing power of the unemployed and underemployed billion of the world would raise global aggregate demand. Increased global aggregate demand leads to increased global employment, output and consumption. This position can be criticized from various perspectives: (a) ecological critique ("the earth cannot afford more growth"); here one can counter that an increase in economic output could be through an increase in health, education and other services, which may not stress Mother Earth too much, and through "green" (sustainable) technology regimes. (b) old-left critique ("Keynesianism is nothing but evil Fordism"); here one can counter that the term "Keynesian" covers a wide range of positions from left to center and that the changes envisaged by left-Keynesians (similar to Prof. Frankman's proposals) cannot be brought about without the combined strength of a variety of leftisms. (c) right-wing critique ("Keynesianism is an evil leftism"). Some observers have pointed out that Keynes's _General Theory_ and Marx's _Das Kapital_, vol. 2, have important ideas in common. Regards, Gernot Kohler Oakville, Canada From bill.schell@murraystate.edu Wed Nov 19 11:46:20 1997 Date: Wed, 19 Nov 1997 12:36:50 -0600 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: Bill Schell Subject: Weber Unlike many who post to this list, I will be mercifully brief. Weber sought in his models a level between historical description and sociological theories of universals. Weber found Marx's materialism to be an interesting potentially useful hypothesis but he did not (unlike some on this list) accept it as REVEALED TRUTH. Unlike Marx, Weber insisted that individual action (rather than class) was the proper unit of sociological anaysis. Thus meaning and culture become fundamentals and not mere superstructure as in Marxism. Weber walked a line between radical subjectivism [what was hen the utilitarian tradition] and historicism [which in his day was anti-scientific in its rejection of typological concepts]. Weber recognized that cultural studies are subjective in that they originate in the investigator's notions of what is culturally significant. But once the question has been framed, Weber holds that it must be investigated systematically by the formulation of testable models -- ideal types. Weber conceptualized collectives (groups) in terms of social behavior rather than structures. Thus his __Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism__ explores the links between religion-culture and economy (that is, the employment of wealth). Ultimately then, Weber does not reject structuralism but rather shows how culture and behavior produces structure. He cannot be said to competely reject materialism for he holds that group formation is based on material interest as well as on affinity and authority. That is why Talcott Parsons was able to produce a synthesis of Weber and the structural-functionalism of Durkheim. Finally, I getting damn sick and tired of Jim Blaut's self-righteous condemnation of everyone who disagrees with him (or in this case, everyone who finds Weber's work useful) as eurocentric, conservative and racist. He can not discuss ideas or debate without sinking to personal attacks. I would venture that there are a great many who employ Weber's insights who are none of those things. Blaut is in fact afraid to debate any idea on its merits. He cannot bring himself to participate give and take and has refused to discuss his ideas with me at all. He is a sad case indeed. From aaustin@utkux.utcc.utk.edu Wed Nov 19 13:00:09 1997 id OAA04725; Wed, 19 Nov 1997 14:58:19 -0500 (EST) Date: Wed, 19 Nov 1997 14:59:41 -0500 (EST) From: Andrew Wayne Austin To: Bill Schell Subject: Re: Weber In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19971119123650.00693030@murraystate.edu> Bill, Thanks for the post. I just want to make a few comments and clarifications. On Wed, 19 Nov 1997, Bill Schell wrote: > Weber sought in his models a level between historical description and > sociological theories of universals. Weber found Marx's materialism to be > an interesting potentially useful hypothesis but he did not (unlike some on > this list) accept it as REVEALED TRUTH. Three points here. First, I think it is more accurate to characterize Weber's demarcations as dividing social science from the logic of natural science, seeing the former as incapable of generating nomothetic statements about history. Second, Marxism is not revealed truth, but rather a useful heuristic and method we employ to interpret historical system. Third, I don't see Marx's system as materialism, but rather historical materialism. I think that Lefebvre and Avineri nailed Marx's approach when they noted its focus on the historicity of knowledge (and cultural) system. Marx's system is materialist in the sense that it focuses on the objective structures that humans materialize through interaction. But they do so through practice, and practice carries a considerable degree of subjectivity. In fact, Marx frequently argues that humans materialize their ideals. Marx's position straddles idealism and materialism, with emphasis given to the objective behavior relations, hence a realist position, and a favoring of material premises. Marx's sharpest polemics were against materialists, e.g., Feuerbach. > Unlike Marx, Weber insisted that individual action (rather than class) was > the proper unit of sociological anaysis. And here is where I find Weber to be most in error. As Mead points out, individual action is only meaningful in its relations, and thus the social group is the appropriate unit of analysis. Society is an objective entity. Weber erred in denying this. > Thus meaning and culture become fundamentals and not mere superstructure > as in Marxism. As Mead points out, taking the social group as the analytical unit does not banish meaning and culture, since both meaning and culture are social products not the products of individual organism. The flaw in beginning with the individual for ideas is that it doesn't recognize where ideas come from, namely, the social group. > Weber recognized that cultural studies are subjective in that they > originate in the investigator's notions of what is culturally significant. This can apply to everything. Studies of physics can be said to be subjective in this regard because of the investigator's notions of what is physically significant. I have a problem with this position generally because it commits what Bhaskar calls the "epistemic fallacy." In any case, Weber finding this in one domain and not finding it another (rather assuming it isn't in the other) is one of Weber's more significant blunders. > But once the question has been framed, Weber holds that it must be > investigated systematically by the formulation of testable models -- ideal > types. Ideal types are by definition not testable. They are not causal models, but rather heuristics that guide the observer to certain features about which to attend. > Weber conceptualized collectives (groups) in terms of social behavior > rather than structures. The definition of structure is persistent patterns social behavior. This is a distinction without a difference. Weber's problem is one of methodological individualism. > Weber does not reject structuralism but rather shows how culture and > behavior produces structure. Marx makes the same argument. Marx never argued, and even Engels makes this point, that culture and behavior is always bound to economic or material structures. Marx, for example, admitted that he found no meaningful connection between aesthetic production and the material structure of society (there are other examples). It has been noted that Weber's real disagreement is with the MarxISTS of his day, not really with Marx. > He cannot be said to competely reject materialism for he holds that group > formation is based on material interest as well as on affinity and > authority. Yes, there are certainly parts of Weber that converge roughly with reality. Although his arguments in regards to interests tend to conflate interests with preferences, and thus slip over into an extreme subjectivism. Andy From rkmoore@iol.ie Wed Nov 19 13:53:06 1997 Wed, 19 Nov 1997 20:52:55 GMT Date: Wed, 19 Nov 1997 20:52:55 GMT To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu (world-system network) From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Re: strengthened by attention to resistance >yr book - would be strengthened by attention to resistance, fightback, a >theoretical framework giving prominence to same and its historical >antecedents, \ > >-need conscious integrated theory which includes gender > >good luck, t I agree. I'm sending you privately a very recent essay: "Who is the enemy? How do we fight them?". My comment on gender/feminism is that men are not the enemy of women, and the two together (politically, that is) can be strong. In addition the abortion issue should not be allowed to prevent women's solidarity on other issues. I notice occasional wsn postings re/resistance efforts, and would appreciate private & selective fwds of other such items. rkm From rkmoore@iol.ie Wed Nov 19 13:53:08 1997 Wed, 19 Nov 1997 20:52:51 GMT Date: Wed, 19 Nov 1997 20:52:51 GMT To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu (world-system network) From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Re: Austin On Moore's Thought Experiments 11/18/97, Andrew Wayne Austin wrote: >I wrote a longer post to you, but my server crashed. In short, it said you >are not explaining the world. (And it suggested you read Gill, Cox, and >Robinson.) Come on Andrew, join in the discussion -- what haven't I explained, and what did those esteemed gentlemen say that is relevant to this thread? I didn't understand your allusion to "Weberian thought experiments", but my "inquiry" posting hopefully addresses the issues you had in mind. rkm From bill.schell@murraystate.edu Wed Nov 19 14:43:44 1997 Date: Wed, 19 Nov 1997 15:36:18 -0600 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: Bill Schell Subject: Weber Andy wrote that marxism is heuristic but that it is a testable, useful way to look at history. Later he wrote that Weber's models "ideal types" are heuristic and hence untestable. Which is it Andy? You can't have it both ways. William Schell, Jr Voice: (502) 762-6572 Dept of History Fax: (502) 762-6587 Murray State University EMAIL bill.schell@Murraystate.edu Murray, KY 42071 From aaustin@utkux.utcc.utk.edu Wed Nov 19 16:21:05 1997 Date: Wed, 19 Nov 1997 18:20:45 -0500 (EST) From: Andrew Wayne Austin Reply-To: Andrew Wayne Austin To: Bill Schell Subject: Re: Weber In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19971119213618.0067862c@murraystate.edu> On Wed, 19 Nov 1997, Bill Schell wrote: > Andy wrote that marxism is heuristic but that it is a testable, useful way > to look at history. Later he wrote that Weber's models "ideal types" are > heuristic and hence untestable. Which is it Andy? You can't have it both ways. This is a misrepresentation of my position (but in part understandable since my position has not been explicated in any great detail). Things are never so simple, Bill. Allow me to clarify. First, an ideal type is a type of heuristic, true; but not all heuristics are ideal types. Marx's heuristic models are not generally ideal types. For example, his most broad statements, such as that found in the "Preface" to A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy is a very general heuristic model; but unlike Weber's bureaucracy, Marx's heuristic is processual and analytical, not typological. Huge difference. Marx's idealized capitalist system in Capital, buttressed by massive amounts of empirical data, constitutes another type of heuristic, here somewhat closer to Weber's notion of ideal types, perhaps, but still analytical and theory generating. For another example, take Weber's class model, which was an arbitrary static stratificatory model (based, as it was, in Weber's liberal pluralist conception of political economics), which one may use to describe class structure (I don't really find it useful even for this); whereas Marx's class model is an analytical tool from which to theorize about social class (which is why Marx's works present such different class structures, because different times and different places have different class structures due to the particular dynamic in force). From these bases, Marx generates very specific theories (many of which carry impressive predictive validity). Weber defines, conceptualizes, and categorizes, but does not generally theorize. So, to clarify--and this is essential--historical materialism is at one level a heuristic model (actually several models), but it is a heuristic model from which special theories are generated. These theories are in turn testable. Weber developed his ideal types and basically left it there. Beyond this there really were no theoretical statements in Weber. Moreover, at the meta-theoretical level, a scientific research program, such as described by Lakatos (a heuristic), is generally not directly testable, rather it is a set of core theories that comprise a negative heuristic. One must go beyond the heuristic and generate theory(ies), either deductive conjectures tested against empirical data, or inductively generated theoretical generalizations. Through a retroductive process the heuristic is adapted and expanded, increasing its explanatory power (the positive heuristic). Clearly significant parts of both Marx and Weber's systems are expounded in the form of models. But only one model has produced genuine theories. And, in my view, only model (between these two) can. So, again, it all wasn't as easy as Bill Schell would wish to make it. And I didn't try to have it both ways. A heuristic is like a hammer--it is all about picking it up and building something with it (rather than, not exactly understanding what a hammer is used for, attempting to beat somebody over the head with it). Andy From wkirk@wml.prestel.co.uk Thu Nov 20 05:20:31 1997 by svr-a-01.core.theplanet.net with smtp (Exim 1.73 #1) Date: Thu, 20 Nov 1997 12:02:37 -0800 From: William Kirk To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: WHO'S NUTS? IT'S ME. Tom, Thanks for the reply. Tom, Thanks for the reply. Sorry to hear about your condition. No, better not go over it all again. You are right about dice, I see in most reviews that modern economics is well past this notion, you aren't into economics nowadays unless you are using non-linear stocastic process theory. I'm glad you did reply because I was getting non-delivery messages, which I fail to understand. Comes through MAILER-DAEMON which is either a low level intelligent silicon life form which has evolved or it is run by the anti-Christ. However, let me run this past you before you go away. I'd like to know if I have got the main idea right about World Systems, first, from the point of the subject which I take to be historical social science and the way it has evolved. First generation history is that which is beyond question, is absolute and tends to be centred about belief. This history is 'fact', or at least this is what everyone has to accept. The second generation is about personal interpretation. Third generation is the World System, where the central aspect of the history is the hypothesis or 'organising myth'. In the first history no criticism is allowed, in the second the author is criticised, in the third it is the hypothesis. Is this right? The primary concern of World Systems is the hypothesis that is consistent with history yet has some answers in the event of the collapse of the capitalist system, its many crises, or if the system stalls. I was interested in the example you gave concerning Flint, this has been covered in at least two documentaries on UK television, and there is a parallel with the past, the closure of the one big industry in Jarrow during the recession of the 30's. This prompted the 'Jarrow march', which in turn demanded answers from the government. The spokesman was Lord Runcimon, I think he was President of the Board of Trade, and his answer was something along these lines - 'There is nothing we can do. You will have to sort it out for yourselves'. I'd say this option will come up again in the future, but it is going to be on a much bigger scale. Too good to miss, but will the World Systems have the answers? W. K. From bill.schell@murraystate.edu Thu Nov 20 19:40:52 1997 Date: Thu, 20 Nov 1997 20:31:33 -0600 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: Bill Schell Subject: Weber.apeshit.Blaut WEBER. Blaut crys racism citing Weber's __Gen. Econ. His.__ p. 379: "..negroes have long shown themselves unsuited for factory work and the operation of machines... Here is ONE CASE in economic history where tangible racial distinctions are present." Weber was a man of his time. So was Marx (also identified by Blaut as Eurocentric, though not, if I recall, as racist). What am I to make of Marx's famous comparison of peasants to potatoes in a sack? That he was hostile to the lower rural classes. Should I reject all of Marx's useful insights about class because of this? Weber, says Blaut, is a racist and so, like Caesar, let the good be interred with his bones. But wait -- Weber says it is the ONE CASE. Why? Weber was of his time -- and ahead of his time. He dismissed the scientific racism of his day as worthless and, in 1910, attacked the raced-based work of Franz Oppenheimer at a meeting of the German Sociological Assoc saying: "With race theories you can prove and disprove anything you want." He denied the existence of "'natural' racial antipathy," noting the that the "abhorence" of interracial marriage by Whites was socially determined "by the desire of the politically dominant race to monopolize social power and honor." He also suggested that race itself was a social construct, commenting on the "one drop rule" applied in the USA: "Doubtless it is important that Negroes appear esthetically even more alien than Indians (because) Negroes were slaves and hence disqualified in the status hierarchy." [Quotes from __Econ. & Soc.__, pp. 398, ft.1 and 386-387] Weber was not free of racism but he was not a racist (quite the opposite by the standards of his day). APESHIT. (or stand a little closer to the bars, dear) Jim Blaut imagines that his criticism of my eurocentric views on world history made me "go apeshit" and asks that the list consult the H-WORLD achives (postings, not threads). Yes, do. There you will find me according to Blaut --- eurocentric (his favorite dismissive for anything or anyone he wishes to ignore), conservative (enemy of the people) and intellectually dishonest. [Blaut, H-World, 19 April 1997] The only mean thing I said of Blaut (out of frustration at the end of weeks of debate) was that be was "chronically inaccurate." [H-WORLD, Schell, 28 April 1997] BLAUT. The exchanges he refers to began with a debate on h-latam over Cortes and tribute-taking which ultimately led me to do a review in two parts of __The Colonizer's Model of the World__: first a summary without comment and criticism in a second post a week later after the list had time to comment. I undertook the review because, as the Cortes thread evolved into a debate on bullion-China-global expanion, Blaut repeadly urged the list to read it. [Blaut, H-World, 18, 21, 24 and 30 Mar. 1997) I took my summary of the book directly from Blaut's own topic headings, chapter summaries and conclusions. When it appeared, Blaut thanked me for spelling his name right, complained that I had "distorted" his work, and huffed: "Nowhere did I urge people to read the book." Really? Tom Hall and Steven Sanderson (both of whom liked Blaut's book) said: "Schell did a nice job of summarizing Blaut's arguement (18 April 1997). Blaut, however, did not recognize his own concepts. He declared that, from the beginning, I had found his "whole enterprise to be outrageous and ....evil", that I offered "denunciation in place of scholarly criticism" and that "there was no other explanation for [my] distortions of [his] argument." Really? Blaut eventually refused any further debate of problems and issues with me saying he would discuss these things with "Anyone but Schell." Are we having fun yet? From cscpo@polsci.umass.edu Thu Nov 20 19:53:07 1997 Thu, 20 Nov 1997 21:52:09 -0500 (EST) Date: Thu, 20 Nov 1997 21:51:08 -0500 From: "colin s. cavell" Subject: Re: Weber.apeshit.Blaut To: bill.schell@murraystate.edu Bill, Would you kindly provide me with the specific references to Marx and the statements you attribute to him? Thanks. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Colin S. Cavell "Had it not been for the race problem Department of Political Science early thrust upon me and enveloping Thompson Tower, Box 37520 me, I should have probably been an University of Massachusetts unquestioning worshipper at the shrine Amherst, MA 01003-7520 of the established social order and of Internet: cscpo@polsci.umass.edu the economic development into which I Voice: (413) 546-3408 was born." http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~cscpo --W.E.B. Du Bois, 1868-1963 ============================================================================= WEBER. Blaut crys racism citing Weber's __Gen. Econ. His.__ p. 379: "..negroes have long shown themselves unsuited for factory work and the operation of machines... Here is ONE CASE in economic history where tangible racial distinctions are present." Weber was a man of his time. So was Marx (also identified by Blaut as Eurocentric, though not, if I recall, as racist). What am I to make of Marx's famous comparison of peasants to potatoes in a sack? That he was hostile to the lower rural classes. Should I reject all of Marx's useful insights about class because of this? Weber, says Blaut, is a racist and so, like Caesar, let the good be interred with his bones. But wait -- Weber says it is the ONE CASE. Why? Weber was of his time -- and ahead of his time. He dismissed the scientific racism of his day as worthless and, in 1910, attacked the raced-based work of Franz Oppenheimer at a meeting of the German Sociological Assoc saying: "With race theories you can prove and disprove anything you want." He denied the existence of "'natural' racial antipathy," noting the that the "abhorence" of interracial marriage by Whites was socially determined "by the desire of the politically dominant race to monopolize social power and honor." He also suggested that race itself was a social construct, commenting on the "one drop rule" applied in the USA: "Doubtless it is important that Negroes appear esthetically even more alien than Indians (because) Negroes were slaves and hence disqualified in the status hierarchy." [Quotes from __Econ. & Soc.__, pp. 398, ft.1 and 386-387] Weber was not free of racism but he was not a racist (quite the opposite by the standards of his day). APESHIT. (or stand a little closer to the bars, dear) Jim Blaut imagines that his criticism of my eurocentric views on world history made me "go apeshit" and asks that the list consult the H-WORLD achives (postings, not threads). Yes, do. There you will find me according to Blaut --- eurocentric (his favorite dismissive for anything or anyone he wishes to ignore), conservative (enemy of the people) and intellectually dishonest. [Blaut, H-World, 19 April 1997] The only mean thing I said of Blaut (out of frustration at the end of weeks of debate) was that be was "chronically inaccurate." [H-WORLD, Schell, 28 April 1997] BLAUT. The exchanges he refers to began with a debate on h-latam over Cortes and tribute-taking which ultimately led me to do a review in two parts of __The Colonizer's Model of the World__: first a summary without comment and criticism in a second post a week later after the list had time to comment. I undertook the review because, as the Cortes thread evolved into a debate on bullion-China-global expanion, Blaut repeadly urged the list to read it. [Blaut, H-World, 18, 21, 24 and 30 Mar. 1997) I took my summary of the book directly from Blaut's own topic headings, chapter summaries and conclusions. When it appeared, Blaut thanked me for spelling his name right, complained that I had "distorted" his work, and huffed: "Nowhere did I urge people to read the book." Really? Tom Hall and Steven Sanderson (both of whom liked Blaut's book) said: "Schell did a nice job of summarizing Blaut's arguement (18 April 1997). Blaut, however, did not recognize his own concepts. He declared that, from the beginning, I had found his "whole enterprise to be outrageous and ....evil", that I offered "denunciation in place of scholarly criticism" and that "there was no other explanation for [my] distortions of [his] argument." Really? Blaut eventually refused any further debate of problems and issues with me saying he would discuss these things with "Anyone but Schell." Are we having fun yet? From SKSANDER@grove.iup.edu Fri Nov 21 11:43:32 1997 Date: Fri, 21 Nov 1997 13:43:20 -0500 (EST) From: s_sanderson Subject: Blaut To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Bill Schell says that both Tom Hall and I "liked Blaut's book." It will come as quite a shock to Blaut that I did. Some months ago on this net he severely rebuked me for what he took to be my negative review of his book. It's possible that Schell was referring to my namesake, Steven E. Sanderson, a political scientist and dean at Emory University, and also a world-system buff. I have been confused with this other Sanderson on at least six occasions. StePHEN K. Sanderson From bill.schell@murraystate.edu Fri Nov 21 14:01:01 1997 Date: Fri, 21 Nov 1997 14:51:08 -0600 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: Bill Schell Subject: Re: Weber.apeshit.Blaut In-Reply-To: <199711211426_MC2-290F-2F45@compuserve.com> At 02:23 PM 11/21/97 -0500, Blaut worte Blaut: >I argue that [Weber's] biological racism must have >profoundly influenced his theories about world history; I show that he is >a source of a derivative doctrine that I call "cultural racism" (long-term >or permanent superiority of European civilization over others... Schell: Is cultural racism the same as ethnocentrism? Weber's position that race was in part a cultural construct seems to me to be close to the position of scholars on the left who deny race is a biological reality. Most commentaries on Weber (Blaut excepted) make note of Weber's rejection of the then fashionable "scientific racism." Perhaps that's why Blaut finds in necessary to invent a new catagory of racism -- it sounds more inflamatory than ethnocentrism (which is a failing but not, perhaps, a sin). Blaut:>I quote We#er as saying "here is one case...[of] tangi#le racial distinctions." Schell twists it into "Weber says it is the ONE CASE." Schell: I put ONE CASE in caps to emphasize it so that my subsequent reference to it would not be obscure. I do regret adding "the" by mistranscription. That sort of thing happens. Blaut, in fact, mistyped the name of Eric L. Jones as Eric C. Jones when quoting a portion of my summary of his book and added "(sic)" making his error appear to be mine. No biggie. [compare Blaut, H-World, 2 May 1997 and Schell, H-World, 15 April 1997]. Blaut: According to Schell, I call him "conservative (enemy of the people) & >intellectually dishonest. [Blaut, H-World, 19 April 1997]" I don't have >this exchange archived, #ut I know I didn't say that. Schell: Don't fret. You can find the material exactly where you directed the list members to search -- in the H-NET archives. Blaut: I didn't call him "dishonest or "an enemy of the people." What I did >say is that he is Eurocentric in the extreme. This #ecomes, for Schell, a >charge that Schell is "eurocentric (his favorite dismissive for anything or >anyone he wishes to ignore)." Granted, some of the Schellian shit >appeared on H-LatAm, not H-World. #ig difference. Schell: (enemy of the people) is in parenthesis as an interpretation of Blaut's view of me -- a look into what Barbara Walters would call the "heart-of-hearts". Some of the phrases Blaut applied to me were "soap-box oratory-not scholarship" "no review has displayed [schell's] ignorance" plus repeated accusations of purposeful distortion. [for example, Blaut, H-World, 2 May 1997] Blaut:I did NOT urge people to read my #ook. On a few occasions I referred to >my ook -- #ecause if a complex argument is in print, one cites the >pulication. Schell may not #e aware of this scholarly convention, or >perhaps he thinks it too constraining -- he'd rather have these long >cy#er-de#ates. Schell: Again I refer anyone interested to Blaut, H-World 24 Mar, 18 Mar, 21 Mar. 1997 in the last Blaut urges "Go and get my book out of the library." And what, Jim? Use it for a doorstop? From bill.schell@murraystate.edu Fri Nov 21 19:08:43 1997 Date: Fri, 21 Nov 1997 19:59:20 -0600 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: Bill Schell Subject: Weber.apeshit.Blaut In-Reply-To: <199711211426_MC2-290F-2F45@compuserve.com> Consistancy and Blaut (more schellian shit) On the 18th, Blaut wrote that Weber "was a racist through and through." But when faced with Weber's own words setting out his opposition to racism, Blaut reconsidered: "In my book I write of Weber's racism at some length, and point out that he was a *moderate racist.*" Schell: So Weber was a MODERATE racist through and through. Of course, how logical. Blaut: I have shown that all of the arguments for pre-1500 European superiority or priority (including intellectual potential) are unsupporta#le. I have put forward an alternative theory for the post-1500 rise of Europe, one that does not use any of these Eurocentric arguments. I would #e delighted if any historian were to examine any one of my own positions and, in a scholarly manner, prove them right or wrong. No#ody as yet has taken on this task, as far as I am aware. Schell: And know one ever will by Blaut's lights because anyone who criticizes his position at any point will be branded eurocentric and her/his scholarship dismissed. A number of reviewers have engaged Blaut's thesis (including Richard Eaton who found Blaut Eurocentric --sauce for the gander); have they all been nobodies? Apparently so. Blaut: My book is selling moderately well Schell: I ordered two for our library Blaut: I'm inclined to think, or at least hope, tht I have made a dent in the armor of Eurocentrism. Am I wrong? Schell: You may have done your cause harm. As David Fahey (one of many with this opinion) observed: "I think that the manner of Blaut's book alienated many in his audience as much as did his argument." From kjkhoo@pop.jaring.my Fri Nov 21 20:06:10 1997 From: kjkhoo@pop.jaring.my for ; Sat, 22 Nov 1997 11:06:02 +0800 (MYT) In-Reply-To: <3.0.1.32.19971121145108.00693190@murraystate.edu> References: <199711211426_MC2-290F-2F45@compuserve.com> Date: Sat, 22 Nov 1997 11:05:50 +0800 To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: Asia's crisis Hi WSNers, I note there has been a complete absence of discussion on the meltdown affecting virtually all of E and SE Asia. We, in this region, are met with a barrage of instant analyses from economists, market analysts to journalists. Hard to make sense of it all, especially since not so long ago many of the same were touting the region. In an anthropological vein, what is happening might be likened to a 'total event', totally confusing in its multi-strandedness. Knowing only my little corner of the turf, and with insufficient in-depth knowledge of the rest of it, I am unable to make much sense of the overall shape. Hence, I turn to the list for enlightenment. I recall that many months ago there was considerable discussion of Asia in the world(-)system, globalization, etc. The recent events would seem to be almost a test case for any number of approaches -- from the analyses of Emsden on E Asian economic growth, to the World Bank's 'market-friendly' approach, to the variants of world system and globalization approaches, to even more classical marxian approaches to finance capitalism, 'real' and 'unreal' (?) economy, etc. Would anyone care to offer an analysis of the Asian meltdown in the theoretical framework(s) in use by WSNers, or whatever? It does seem a shame that what threatens to be a critical event in the development of the contemporary world system (used loosely) should pass by without discussion. Khoo KJ Malaysia From 70671.2032@compuserve.com Fri Nov 21 22:32:06 1997 for wsn@csf.colorado.edu; Sat, 22 Nov 1997 00:32:01 -0500 (EST) Date: Sat, 22 Nov 1997 00:29:56 -0500 From: james m blaut <70671.2032@compuserve.com> Subject: Weber.apeshit.Blaut Sender: james m blaut <70671.2032@compuserve.com> To: world systems network -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: Weber.apeshit.Blaut Date: 21-Nov-97 at 11:54 From: james m blaut, 70671,2032 TO: INTERNET:bill.schellurraystate.edu,INTERNET:bill.schellurraystate.edu A brief rejoinder to Schell: On Weber: I agree with what he says, oddly enough, but he doesn't say the important things. In my book I write of Weber's racism at some length, and point out that he was a *moderate racist.* I give the social context. I give a few quotes. but I argue that his biological racism must have profoundly influenced his theories about world history; I show that he is a source of a derivative doctrine that I call "cultural racism" (long-term or permanent superiority of European civilization over othersfor reasons of an absolutely superior "rationality" that is not in itself explained); and, most important of all, that We er's historical doctrines, overall, underlie the supremely Eurocentric doctrine of "modernization," that is, the view that development outside of the European world must come from the diffusion into these societies of European traits. Sociologists like Parsons, historians like Rostow, and a slew of economic-developmentists developed We er's ideas into this doctrine, mainly after WW2. For these reasons, and ecause of some of We er's explicit theories supposedly explaining non-European ackwardness and inferiority, I argue that his views are not helpful. ury him with suitale honors. (My keyoard now refuses to print the letter etween A and C. I will use #.) #ut Shell twists my statements into the opposite of what they are. He would never dare to do that sort of thing in print. e-mail is his medium. And misquoting is part of his message. I quote We#er as saying "here is one case...[of] tangi#le racial distinctions." Schell twists it into "Weber says it is the ONE CASE." We#er gave many other cases of the validity of #iological racims, some cited in my #ook and my other writings. According to Schell, I call him "conservative (enemy of the people) and intellectually dishonest. [Blaut, H-World, 19 April 1997]" I don't have this exchange archived, #ut I know I didn't say that. I didn't call him "dishonest or "an enemy of the people."" This is typical Schell. What I did say is that he is Eurocentric in the extreme. This #ecomes, for Schell, a charge that Schell is "eurocentric (his favorite dismissive for anything or anyone he wishes to ignore)." Granted, some of the Schellian shit appeared on H-LatAm, not H-World. #ig difference. I did NOT urge people to read my #ook. On a few occasions I referred to my #ook -- #ecause if a complex argument is in print, one cites the pulication. Schell may not #e aware of this scholarly convention, or perhaps he thinks it too constraining -- he'd rather have these long cy#er-de#ates. Schell also claims to have given a "review" of my #ook, then rather ingenuously admits that he hasn't read it. (" I took my summary of the book directly from Blaut's own topic headings, chapter summaries and conclusions.") " Blaut eventually refused any further debate of problems and issues with me." Too right. A waste of time. Now a comment to the list, a comment from the heart. I #elieve that I have shown that all of the arguments for pre-1500 European superiority or priority (including intellectual potential) are unsupporta#le. I have put forward an alternative theory for the post-1500 rise of Europe, one that does not use any of these Eurocentric arguments. I would #e delighted if any historian were to examine any one of my own positions and, in a scholarly manner, prove them right or wrong. No#ody as yet has taken on this task, as far as I am aware. Given that fact, and given that my #ook is selling moderately well, I'm inclined to think, or at least hope, tht I have made a dent in the armor of Eurocentrism. Am I wrong? Jim #laut From 70671.2032@compuserve.com Fri Nov 21 22:40:06 1997 for wsn@csf.colorado.edu; Sat, 22 Nov 1997 00:40:03 -0500 (EST) Date: Sat, 22 Nov 1997 00:30:15 -0500 From: james m blaut <70671.2032@compuserve.com> Subject: Re: Weber.apeshit.Blaut Sender: james m blaut <70671.2032@compuserve.com> To: world systems network -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: Re: Weber.apeshit.Blaut Date: 21-Nov-97 at 18:36 From: james m blaut, 70671,2032 TO: INTERNET:bill.schellurraystate.edu,INTERNET:bill.schellurraystate.edu On Schell: (My keyoard decided today that it doesn't want to make the letter etween A and C so I'm sustituting #.) I had resolved (again) not to waste my time and yours in a cy#er-de#ate with this clown Schell. #ut he keeps on deli#erately misquoting me and I'm going to have to respond again, I hope for the last time. It's just that folks in the academic racket do not misquote their colleagues, however much they may despise them or their ideas. 1. Schell cleverly leaves out part of a quote there#y giving him a suita#le text for his sermon: "'Blaut: >I argue that [Weber's] biological racism must have >profoundly influenced his theories about world history; I show that he is a source of a derivative doctrine that I call "cultural racism" (long-term or permanent superiority of European civilization over others... "Schell: Is cultural racism the same as ethnocentrism? Weber's position that race was in part a cultural construct seems to me to be close to the position of scholars on the left who deny race is a biological reality. Most commentaries on Weber (Blaut excepted) make note of Weber's rejection of the then fashionable "scientific racism." Perhaps that's why Blaut finds in necessary to invent a new catagory of racism -- it sounds more inflamatory than ethnocentrism (which is a failing but not, perhaps, a sin)." What I (Jim) said -- emphasizing the part left out #y Schell -- was this: "I show that he [We#er] is a source of a derivative doctrine that I call "cultural racism" (long-term or permanent superiority of European civilization over others FOR REASONS OF AN A#SOLUTELY SUPERIOR "RATIONALITY" THAT IS NOT IN ITSELF EXPLAINED)." The meaning here is self-evident when the entire text is #efore your eyes. So, Schell leaves out the critical text and can now twist my position: "Is cultural racism the same as ethnocentrism?... Blaut finds it necessary to invent a new catagory of racism -- it sounds more inflamatory than ethnocentrism," etc. When scholars, following We#er #ut ignoring his real, if moderate racism -- #iological, genetic, not "constructed" -- proceed to #uild theories a#out how the long-term (or permanent) superiority of European "rationality," itself unexplained, explains Europe's historical superiority or priority, they are putting forth a doctrine that does exactly what genetic racism does, #ut without the #iological component; hence, cultural racism. 2) #ack to the matter of We#er on racism. I quoted We#er as saying "here is one case...[of] tangi#le racial distinctions." Schell twists it into "the ONE CASE." We#er gave many other cases of the validity of #iological racims, some cited in my #ook and my other writings. When Schell inserts "the" he is telling us that this is the ONLY racist remark #y We#er. Not so! Then Schell tries to cover his ass: "I do regret adding "the" by mistranscription. That sort of thing happens." Does it just "happen?" And what, #y the way, is "mistranscription?" Is it like "misdirection?" 3. On reading my #ook: "Blaut:I did NOT urge people to read my #ook. On a few occasions I referred to >my ook -- #ecause if a complex argument is in print, one cites the >pulication. Schell may not #e aware of this scholarly convention, or >perhaps he thinks it too constraining -- he'd rather have these long >cy#er-de#ates. "Schell: Again I refer anyone interested to Blaut, H-World 24 Mar, 18 Mar, 21 Mar. 1997 in the last Blaut urges "Go and get my book out of the library." And what, Jim? Use it for a doorstop?" More misdirection -- #y again cutely leaving out part of a quote. What I said on Mar. 21 was this: "Having put forward a very unusual (to say the least) theory to the effect that the rise of Europe, relative to other civilizations, was due to the wealth accumulated in colonialism, initially in the New World, I shouldn't be surprised to get many critical -- though thoughtful -- responses from listers. I'm trying to respond to, at least, most of the more substantial criticisms. Even so, I HAVE TO ASK COLLEAGUES WHO WANT A MORE DETAILED RESPONSE TO GO AND GET MY BOOK OUT OF THE LIRARY: THE FULL THEORETICAL ARGUMENT AND PRESENTATION OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IS THERE." (Emphasis added.) Is this urging people to get my book? More Schellian misdirection. He wants everyone to think Blaut (the bs are back!) is advertising his book. Nonsense! There is more schellshit to be shoveled away, but I'll just leave it out there and go on to more useful endeavors. Jim blaut From tardanic@fiu.edu Sat Nov 22 09:05:54 1997 Sat, 22 Nov 1997 11:05:56 -0500 (EST) Date: Sat, 22 Nov 1997 11:10:33 -0500 () From: Richard Tardanico To: kjkhoo@pop.jaring.my Subject: Re: Asia's crisis In-Reply-To: X-X-Sender: tardanic@mailhost.fiu.edu A lot of discussion on the SE/East Asian "meltdown" appears on the IPE site. E.g., Henwood and others have speculated on the possible long-range significance of the concurrence of Asian financial crisis, Clinton's "fast track" setback, and the weakness of the U.S.'s coalitional position re Iraq. I too have found curious the absence of WSN discussion on the Asian financial situation, as well as on these other and related issues. Among other things, comparisons/contrasts with financial/economic crisis and restructuring in Latin America would seem important. There are obvious contrasts--at least pertaining to the strongest of the East Asian countries in terms of state organizational capacities and economic infrastructure. Even so, there are obvious new questions about the limitations of the East Asian "model" and the economic, social, and political ramifications, not only for Asia's tigers and cubs but for Latin America, Africa, and the rest of us. I look forward to seeing discussion of these and related issues. Rick Tardanico On Sat, 22 Nov 1997 kjkhoo@pop.jaring.my wrote: > Hi WSNers, > > I note there has been a complete absence of discussion on the meltdown > affecting virtually all of E and SE Asia. We, in this region, are met with a > barrage of instant analyses from economists, market analysts to journalists. > Hard to make sense of it all, especially since not so long ago many of the same > were touting the region. In an anthropological vein, what is happening might be > likened to a 'total event', totally confusing in its multi-strandedness. > Knowing only my little corner of the turf, and with insufficient in-depth > knowledge of the rest of it, I am unable to make much sense of the overall > shape. Hence, I turn to the list for enlightenment. > > I recall that many months ago there was considerable discussion of Asia in the > world(-)system, globalization, etc. The recent events would seem to be almost a > test case for any number of approaches -- from the analyses of Emsden on E > Asian economic growth, to the World Bank's 'market-friendly' approach, to the > variants of world system and globalization approaches, to even more classical > marxian approaches to finance capitalism, 'real' and 'unreal' (?) economy, etc. > > Would anyone care to offer an analysis of the Asian meltdown in the theoretical > framework(s) in use by WSNers, or whatever? It does seem a shame that what > threatens to be a critical event in the development of the contemporary world > system (used loosely) should pass by without discussion. > > Khoo KJ > Malaysia > > > > From dredmond@gladstone.uoregon.edu Sat Nov 22 16:22:25 1997 for ; Sat, 22 Nov 1997 15:22:22 -0800 (PST) Date: Sat, 22 Nov 1997 15:22:22 -0800 (PST) From: Dennis R Redmond To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Re: Asia's crisis In-Reply-To: On Sat, 22 Nov 1997 kjkhoo@pop.jaring.my wrote: > > Would anyone care to offer an analysis of the Asian meltdown in the theoretical > framework(s) in use by WSNers, or whatever? It does seem a shame that what > threatens to be a critical event in the development of the contemporary world > system (used loosely) should pass by without discussion. OK, I'll take a preliminary shot at this (I apologize in advance for the long post, if you want to skip the history, check out the three points at the bottom). The main reason for the Asian meltdown is, I would argue, the end of the American Empire. For the past fifty years, the world economy has been organized and managed by the Americans (politically as the Cold War, economically as military Keynesianism and the Bretton Wood accords which enshrined the dollar as world reserve currency, socially as American-style consumerism and the mass media). American hegemony seemed to leave newly-industrializing countries with only two choices: either they allowed the Americans to run their accumulation regimes (the Brazilian option), or chose autarky (like the Soviets and Chinese). In reality, there was a third option, chosen by Japan, the tiger states and Central Europe: what might be called export-platform autarky, i.e. a strong developmental state leashed the power the capital, redistributed the social surplus to workers, invested in the markets of the future, etc. I don't think this was a conscious decision or anything, but rather a strategic improvisation, which made sense only in hindsight. Well, Central Europe and East Asia got filthy rich by keeping imports at bay, funding plush welfare states to stimulate internal demand, and exporting like mad to American markets (e.g. VW's Beetle, or the Japanese car exports of the late 1970s). Their economies were basically giant condensation-chambers of capital, designed to efficiently recycle export-earnings into domestic investment (via keiretsu bank-industry alliances, long-term shareholdings, strategic trading firms like the Japanese soga sosha). Typically, this involved inordinate amounts of bank equity, as Japanese and German firms, for example, borrowed huge amounts of local cash in the hopes of striking it rich in global (i.e. mostly American) markets. What this meant was that the Central European and East Asian systems had very high debt-to-equity ratios, and were very dependent on American markets as a source of final demand. Well, this system began to fall apart in the Seventies, because East Asian and European businesses were kicking the ass of American corporations, resulting in economic crisis for US firms (especially in the machine-tools, metalworking and chemicals sectors). Nixon's response was to scrap the Bretton Woods accord, thus allowing the yen, D-mark and related currencies to strongly appreciate in foreign exchange markets. So those countries got richer, but their export earnings got stomped. Their response, in turn, was twofold: (1) shift to higher value-added exports, like medium-class and luxury cars and electronics; (2) move low-tech stuff like textiles, mining, smelting etc. to cheap Third World sweatshops; and (3) insulate themselves against further depreciations by directly investing in America. The result was the creation of the Euro-periphery (Eastern Europe, southern Italy, Iberia) and a Nippo-periphery (Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea) which did a lot of subcontracting for the rising metropoles. Caught between the hammer of low-priced, high-quality exports from the EC and Japan, loss of market share to transplants, and the anvil of low Southeast Asian/South European labor prices, the US economic decline continued. In 1985, the US became a global debtor; today, the US is $1 trillion in debt to the rest of the world on its net investment position (creditors include Japan, at $800 billion, and Switzerland and Germany, at around $200 billion each). American consumers can no longer purchase the net output of Asian exporters, period. This suggests three things: 1. East Asia and the EU must become the new sources of final global demand. America is deep in rentier debauchery and decadence, and can't fulfill this role any longer. South Korea will be saved not by exports to America, but by exports to Japan (admittedly a tall order). 2. The European Union is neither a purely symbolic gesture nor a utopian dream, but serves an essential function in stabilizing the economic contradictions between the core and the periphery of Europe. Ireland and Portugal have received billions of ECU from the core countries, which has kickstarted their development; the same thing is happening in Eastern Europe, where West German subsidies to the former GDR are powering a mini-boom. Note that currency crises in the Europeriphery have been milder and the consequences less ugly than in Asia. 3. Mahathir is dead right about one thing: East Asia is going to find that unless they develop a euro-style united currency and a transnational system of welfare handouts from the rich to poor countries (an "Asiastate"), speculators and fickle market forces are going to stomp them just like the Latin American and African economies got stomped. United, East Asia has the resources to bail itself out of its mess; divided, they fall prey to the bond ghouls and vampires of Wall Street. Which is it going to be? -- Dennis From austria@it.com.pl Mon Nov 24 04:34:20 1997 for <>; Mon, 24 Nov 1997 12:34:55 +0100 (MET) Reply-To: From: "Austrian Embassy" To: "<" Subject: Fw: Fw: Hawaiian GOOD LUCK TOTEM Date: Mon, 24 Nov 1997 12:37:01 +0100 this is what I found in my mailbag today. please check whether you know any of these recipients for a possible investigation about the authenticity of the supposed message from the Dutch Embassy in Warsaw tausch ---------- > From: NL Defence Attache > To: /G=Janusz/S=Wakula/O=inmar-pl/PRMD=CCMAIL/ADMD=CWMAIL/C=GB/@cwmail.com; agoff@atco.u-net.com; All VFUG Members ; allin@business.kiev.ua; austria@it.com.pl; BURACHENKO Andrey -KIEV -DR -LES ; (NMP) ; Daniel.D.S.StPierre@wsaw01.x400.gc.ca; Donald Campbell ; grembassy@greece.inec.kiev.ua > Subject: Fwd: Fw: Hawaiian GOOD LUCK TOTEM > Date: Montag, 24. November 1997 11:30 > > Date: Mon, 24 Nov 97 09:47:03 MET > From: peelenm > To: Arie van den Munckhof > Cc: Red Caps; OHHO; Mark_Jorissen@reijers.nl; Lokale Omroep; > Ine Clarke; Ike > Busser; Chris Horen, van; Betsy Goossens-van Horen; bert albers; > Arie van den > Munckhof > Subject: Fw: Hawaiian GOOD LUCK TOTEM > > > -----Oorspronkelijk bericht----- > Van: Fam. Moers > Aan: Jos Loenen > CC: Wim Bens ; Jan Driessen > ; > Gert Jo van Doornik ; Theo Verwoert > ; Christ > van den Munckhof ; John Raadschelders > ; > Rien Visscher ; Ron Mulders ; > Victor > Weijs ; Paul Jansen > Datum: zaterdag 22 november 1997 18:41 > Onderwerp: Re: Hawaiian GOOD LUCK TOTEM > > > > > > > >---------- > >> From: Jos Loenen > >> To: fammoers@tref.nl > >> Subject: Fw: Hawaiian GOOD LUCK TOTEM > >> Date: woensdag 19 november 1997 14:35 > >> > >> > >> > >> ---------- > >> > Van: Peter Cox > >> > Aan: 'arno linssen' ; 'rod chappel' > >> ; 'philip van bree' ; > 'jos > >loenen' > >> ; 'chris rodler' ; 'martijn' > >> ; > >'martin.dambeck@rz.ruhr-uni-bochum.de'; > >> 'newworld@inforamp.net'; 'rolf 'fox' vossen' > >> ; 'luud willemsen' > >> > >> > Onderwerp: Hawaiian GOOD LUCK TOTEM > >> > Datum: maandag 17 november 1997 23:18 > >> > > >> > : Hawaiian GOOD LUCK TOTEM > >> > > >> > Hawaiian GOOD LUCK TOTEM > >> > >> > >> >> \\\|||/// > >> > >> > >> >> ========= > >> > >> > >> >> - | O O | > >> > >> > >> >> / \ \ @'/ > >> > >> > >> >> # _| |_ > >> > >> > >> >> (#) ( ) > >> > >> > >> >> #\//|* *|\\ > >> > >> > >> >> #\/( * )/ > >> > >> > >> >> # ===== > >> > >> > >> >> # (\|/) > >> > >> > >> >> # || || > >> > >> > >> >> .#.--'| |---. > >> > >> > >> >> #'---' ----'this totem has been > >sent > >> to you for good luck. It has been sent > >> > around the world nine times so far. You will receive good luck > within > >> > four days of relaying this totem. Send copies to people you think > need > >> > goodluck. Don't send money as fate has no price. > >> > Do not keep this message. > >> > The totem must leave your hands in 96 hours. > >> > Send ten copies and see > >> > what happens in four days. You will get a > >> > surprise. This is true, even if you are not superstitious. > >> > Good luck, but please remember: 10 copies of this message > must leave > >> > your hands in 96 hours... You must not sign on this message..... > >> > > >> > > >> > > ______________________________________________________ > >> > Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > From cemck@cs1.presby.edu Mon Nov 24 10:40:42 1997 Date: Mon, 24 Nov 1997 12:40:38 -0500 (EST) From: Charles McKelvey To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Travel Seminars in Cuba Travel Seminars in Cuba The Center for Development Studies is sponsoring two programs in Cuba. (1) In cooperation with the Facultad Latinoamerica de Ciencias Sociales, a travel and research seminar from July 5 to July 28, 1998 for professors and graduate students in the social sciences and history. (2) In conjunction with Presbyterian College, a six credit undergraduate course, including two weeks at Presbyterian College from May 17 to May 29 and four weeks in Cuba from May 31 to June 27, 1998. Both programs will be conducted in English. For more information concerning either program, send mailing address to Dr. Charles McKelvey, Center for Development Studies, 210 Belmont Stakes, Clinton, South Carolina, 29325; phone: (864) 833-8385 or (864) 833-1018; FAX 864-833-8481; e-mail: cemck@cs1.presby.edu. From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Tue Nov 25 00:06:14 1997 Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 02:06:03 -0500 (EST) From: Gunder Frank To: Dennis R Redmond Subject: Re: Asia's crisis In-Reply-To: I agree with the main t hrust of Redmond's argument: the present econ crisis in East Asia does NOT reflect the 'meltdown' of the East As 'miracle' but just the opposite: it reflects the defcline of the US and the Rise of East Asia in trhe world econ. A major piece of evidence? All postwar recessions in the world were US led, and Europe/Jpan,etc lagged, including still the post/since 1967 Kondratieff B phase ones of 1973-75, 79-82, and 89-92, and alos the subsequent cyclical recoveries were. --- until THIS one. This is the FIRST major recession of modern times to START in Asia and to spread from there to others parts of the world econ! THAT reflects that they dynamo/dynamism has shifted - as Redmond says it is now Asian demannd -=- and credit! - driven and no longer US. But a cyclical recession should not be confused with a structural 'meltdown' as per what we are hearing a propos the APOEC meet in Vancouver. world systemaically submitted gunder frank agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca On Sat, 22 Nov 1997, Dennis R Redmond wrote: > Date: Sat, 22 Nov 1997 15:22:22 -0800 (PST) > From: Dennis R Redmond > To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK > Subject: Re: Asia's crisis > > On Sat, 22 Nov 1997 kjkhoo@pop.jaring.my wrote: > > > > Would anyone care to offer an analysis of the Asian meltdown in the theoretical > > framework(s) in use by WSNers, or whatever? It does seem a shame that what > > threatens to be a critical event in the development of the contemporary world > > system (used loosely) should pass by without discussion. > > OK, I'll take a preliminary shot at this (I apologize in advance for the > long post, if you want to skip the history, check out the three points at > the bottom). The main reason for the Asian meltdown is, I would argue, the > end of the American Empire. For the past fifty years, the world economy > has been organized and managed by the Americans (politically as the Cold > War, economically as military Keynesianism and the Bretton Wood accords > which enshrined the dollar as world reserve currency, socially as > American-style consumerism and the mass media). > > American hegemony seemed to leave newly-industrializing countries with > only two choices: either they allowed the Americans to run their > accumulation regimes (the Brazilian option), or chose autarky (like the > Soviets and Chinese). In reality, there was a third option, chosen by > Japan, the tiger states and Central Europe: what might be called > export-platform autarky, i.e. a strong developmental state leashed the > power the capital, redistributed the social surplus to workers, invested > in the markets of the future, etc. I don't think this was a conscious > decision or anything, but rather a strategic improvisation, which made > sense only in hindsight. > > Well, Central Europe and East Asia got filthy rich by keeping imports at > bay, funding plush welfare states to stimulate internal demand, and > exporting like mad to American markets (e.g. VW's Beetle, or the Japanese > car exports of the late 1970s). Their economies were basically giant > condensation-chambers of capital, designed to efficiently recycle > export-earnings into domestic investment (via keiretsu bank-industry > alliances, long-term shareholdings, strategic trading firms like the > Japanese soga sosha). Typically, this involved inordinate amounts of bank > equity, as Japanese and German firms, for example, borrowed huge amounts > of local cash in the hopes of striking it rich in global (i.e. mostly > American) markets. What this meant was that the Central European and East > Asian systems had very high debt-to-equity ratios, and were very dependent > on American markets as a source of final demand. > > Well, this system began to fall apart in the Seventies, because East Asian > and European businesses were kicking the ass of American corporations, > resulting in economic crisis for US firms (especially in the > machine-tools, metalworking and chemicals sectors). Nixon's response was > to scrap the Bretton Woods accord, thus allowing the yen, D-mark and > related currencies to strongly appreciate in foreign exchange markets. So > those countries got richer, but their export earnings got stomped. Their > response, in turn, was twofold: (1) shift to higher value-added exports, > like medium-class and luxury cars and electronics; (2) move low-tech stuff > like textiles, mining, smelting etc. to cheap Third World sweatshops; and > (3) insulate themselves against further depreciations by directly > investing in America. > > The result was the creation of the Euro-periphery (Eastern Europe, > southern Italy, Iberia) and a Nippo-periphery (Hong Kong, Singapore, > Taiwan, Korea) which did a lot of subcontracting for the rising > metropoles. Caught between the hammer of low-priced, high-quality exports > from the EC and Japan, loss of market share to transplants, and the anvil > of low Southeast Asian/South European labor prices, the US economic > decline continued. In 1985, the US became a global debtor; today, the US > is $1 trillion in debt to the rest of the world on its net investment > position (creditors include Japan, at $800 billion, and Switzerland and > Germany, at around $200 billion each). American consumers can no longer > purchase the net output of Asian exporters, period. > > This suggests three things: > > 1. East Asia and the EU must become the new sources of final global > demand. America is deep in rentier debauchery and decadence, and > can't fulfill this role any longer. South Korea will be saved not by > exports to America, but by exports to Japan (admittedly a tall order). > > 2. The European Union is neither a purely symbolic gesture nor a utopian > dream, but serves an essential function in stabilizing the economic > contradictions between the core and the periphery of Europe. Ireland and > Portugal have received billions of ECU from the core countries, which has > kickstarted their development; the same thing is happening in Eastern > Europe, where West German subsidies to the former GDR are powering a > mini-boom. Note that currency crises in the Europeriphery have been milder > and the consequences less ugly than in Asia. > > 3. Mahathir is dead right about one thing: East Asia is going to find that > unless they develop a euro-style united currency and a transnational > system of welfare handouts from the rich to poor countries (an > "Asiastate"), speculators and fickle market forces are going to stomp them > just like the Latin American and African economies got stomped. United, > East Asia has the resources to bail itself out of its mess; divided, they > fall prey to the bond ghouls and vampires of Wall Street. Which is it > going to be? > > -- Dennis > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Andre Gunder Frank University of Toronto 96 Asquith Ave Tel. 1 416 972-0616 Toronto, ON Fax. 1 416 972-0071 CANADA M4W 1J8 Email agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Some Home/Web Pages: http://www.chass.utoronto.ca:8080/~agfrank/gunder97.html http://csf.colorado.edu/wsystes/archive/bios/gunder/gunder97cd.html http://csf.colorado.edu/authors gopher://csf.colorado.edu/11/psn/authors/frank.gunder gopher://csf.colorado.edu/11/wsystems.pubs ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From p34d3611@jhu.edu Tue Nov 25 02:20:17 1997 by jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (950413.SGI.8.6.12/950213.SGI.AUTOCF) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 04:20:33 -0500 (EST) From: Peter Grimes Subject: Asian Miracle Meltdown To: WSN List Folk; I am no expert on either SE Asia or high finance, but I do have some knowledge of basic economics. As Jackson Browne once wrote: "I've been waiting for something to happen, For a week or a month or a year... You might ask what it takes to remember, When you know that you've seen it before..." Samir Amin pointed out in 1976 ("Accumulation on a World Scale") that inflows of foriegn investment produce temporary high growth rates for the recipient country, but those growth rates collapse once the investment matures (e.g--stops purchasing local contractors for constructing the local factories) and assumes its intended function of exporting products to the intended markets of the core. Remember the "Brazilian Miracle"? The "Japanese Miracle"? Granted, there were important differences in the roles that the Asian states played in handling the distribution of the incoming capital, and there is no doubt that the cold war encouraged the US govt to provide grants and loans to Japan and S. Korea that were on terms far easier than would have been imaginable elsewhere. But the bottom line for upward mobility in the world-system applies equally harshly to all: WITHOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNAL MARKET (local effective demand), EXPORT-LED DEVELOPMENT IS DEPENDENT ON CORE MARKETS. Hence down-turns in the core translate into free-falls for the exporters. The collapse of the banks, currencies, and stock markets are epiphenomena, SYMPTOMS of the real problem. Failures by influential debtors to make good on their loan payments is--however distantly--attached to their failure to sell real products, whether locally or abroad. They are caught in a double-bind: successful export promotion depends not only on the presence of markets in the core (read high wages for the core working classes), but on suppression of high wages at home. Yet, at the same time, true upward mobility in the world-economy depends precisely on the development of a vibrant home market that in turn requires high local wages. Clearly there is a contradiction here: one cannot have both. For a time, both Japan and Korea seemed to evade this contradiction by the erection of trade barriers. It allowed them the luxury of permitting some real democracy and consequent hikes in wages. But this could only be a transient solution, at best. In the Brave New World of the WTO, this protection is becoming increasingly non-viable. Now that they are becoming increasingly exposed to the harsh glare of genuine competition from imports, the demand for locally produced commodities is dwindling, capitalists must therefore default on their loans, banks must fail, and currency devaluation is the only way to fight back. One final note. The defeat of labor in the core has compelled that outlet for exports from Asia shrink, while the difference between the shrinking core wages and their continued willingness to purchase is made up entirely by consumer credit-card debt. In essence the effective demand of the core is constructed entirely of credit-card debt with interest rates near 20%. This cannot last forever. Pending some form of income re-distribution, I am reminded of the words of Marx in Vol III: "The real barrier to the expansion of Capital is Capital itself". --Peter Grimes From austria@it.com.pl Tue Nov 25 04:31:10 1997 Tue, 25 Nov 1997 12:32:03 +0100 (MET) Reply-To: From: "Austrian Embassy" To: Subject: Re: Asian Miracle Meltdown Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 12:34:13 +0100 Dear Peter and all colleagues - this is a most interesting argument. As always, Samir Amin has something fundamental to offer. I think, on this point, our friend Samir is right, and our friend Andre Gunder is wrong - the semi-periphery is under a constant threat of a long-run current account deficit. I agree with you Peter on your diagnosis about South Korea, but not on Japan. Japan will recover, and Japan is a centre. However - folks, this is not a melt-down either, but the beginning of either a Jugar or Kuznets-cycle low, and, according to my calculations, not at any rate connected with a Kondratieff (the last one was from 1932 to around 1982). Chris put up my empirical recent stuff at the archive for you all to read - I think the evidence is clear on this point. Kind regards from Warsaw Arno Tausch ---------- > From: Peter Grimes > To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK > Subject: Asian Miracle Meltdown > Date: Dienstag, 25. November 1997 10:20 > > List Folk; > > I am no expert on either SE Asia or high finance, but I do have some > knowledge of basic economics. As Jackson Browne once wrote: > > "I've been waiting for something to happen, > For a week or a month or a year... > > You might ask what it takes to remember, > When you know that you've seen it before..." > > Samir Amin pointed out in 1976 ("Accumulation on a World Scale") that > inflows of foriegn investment produce temporary high growth rates for the > recipient country, but those growth rates collapse once the investment matures > (e.g--stops purchasing local contractors for constructing the local factories) > and assumes its intended function of exporting products to the intended > markets of the core. Remember the "Brazilian Miracle"? The "Japanese > Miracle"? Granted, there were important differences in the roles that the > Asian states played in handling the distribution of the incoming capital, and > there is no doubt that the cold war encouraged the US govt to provide grants > and loans to Japan and S. Korea that were on terms far easier than would have > been imaginable elsewhere. But the bottom line for upward mobility in the > world-system applies equally harshly to all: WITHOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN > INTERNAL MARKET (local effective demand), EXPORT-LED DEVELOPMENT IS DEPENDENT > ON CORE MARKETS. Hence down-turns in the core translate into free-falls for > the exporters. > The collapse of the banks, currencies, and stock markets are > epiphenomena, SYMPTOMS of the real problem. Failures by influential debtors > to make good on their loan payments is--however distantly--attached to their > failure to sell real products, whether locally or abroad. They are caught in > a double-bind: successful export promotion depends not only on the presence > of markets in the core (read high wages for the core working classes), but on > suppression of high wages at home. Yet, at the same time, true upward > mobility in the world-economy depends precisely on the development of a > vibrant home market that in turn requires high local wages. Clearly there is > a contradiction here: one cannot have both. For a time, both Japan and Korea > seemed to evade this contradiction by the erection of trade barriers. It > allowed them the luxury of permitting some real democracy and consequent hikes > in wages. But this could only be a transient solution, at best. In the Brave > New World of the WTO, this protection is becoming increasingly non-viable. > Now that they are becoming increasingly exposed to the harsh glare of genuine > competition from imports, the demand for locally produced commodities is > dwindling, capitalists must therefore default on their loans, banks must fail, > and currency devaluation is the only way to fight back. > One final note. The defeat of labor in the core has compelled that > outlet for exports from Asia shrink, while the difference between the > shrinking core wages and their continued willingness to purchase is made up > entirely by consumer credit-card debt. In essence the effective demand of the > core is constructed entirely of credit-card debt with interest rates near 20%. > This cannot last forever. Pending some form of income re-distribution, I am > reminded of the words of Marx in Vol III: "The real barrier to the expansion > of Capital is Capital itself". --Peter Grimes > From gderlug@nwu.edu Tue Nov 25 09:26:33 1997 for ; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 10:26:28 -0600 (CST) Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 10:42:24 +0100 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: gderlug@nwu.edu (Georgi Derluguian) Subject: Eurasia writ large First, a copy-right request - Dennis (or is it WSN?), can, I please, use the analysis of Asian meltdown in my world-systems class at Northwestern? I have 197 rather curious kids, who often presume they should become international consultants. This is well-written, sobering, and provocative. Secondly, we should add the coercive, here mainly military dimension to the analysis. In August I talked at the airshow outside Moscow to the exports manager of the Komsomolsk-on-Amur aircraft-building plant. They make Su-29s and Su-37s, the Sukhoi fighter-bombers, a terrificly destructive machine. Russian Air Force purchased (and paid) its last Su in 1991. The factory employs just under one-third of Komsomolsk's entire population of 334 thousand. Yegor Gaidar during his Premiership in 1992 visited Komsomolsk and said that, according to his calculations, its "optimal" population size should be no more than 20 thousand, but how could anyone afford to relocate now from the Far East to heartland Russia? The factory executives know that realistically they would have to live with their workers in a small town on the Chinese border for years to come. Therefore, the factory boldly fights for profits looking for new markets which they obtained in South-East Asia. The man with whom I spoke was very open - yes, they know about scores of possible conflicts, yes, back in the Soviet times he heard about Indonesia's treatment of the communists, they consider them none of the factory's business (it's business is to assure the survival of Komsomolsk) -- the airplanes will be produced and sold as cheaply as it takes to preserve the share of world markets. Moscow has little say in this business -- it cannot even remove the local governor-warlord who threatens to wage his own border war on China if Moscow's diplomats surrender any of the land he consideres his own fiefdom. In Europe, however, Moscow's control over the policy is much better. No jokes like selling jets for palm oil. Moscow got so offended by the NATO expansion primarily because it explicitly denies the only role such a state could hope to obtain in the outer peripmeter of EU - being the well-paid enforcer of order in the adjacent "volatile" regions (the Balkans, the Caucasus, even the Middle East -- Zhirinovsky always sounds outrageous, but he isn't quite as crazy as he himself pretends. He reads Huntington, just as Lebed reads Wallerstein, or at leats, his aides' memos) Russian ruling elite experimented with neo-liberalism after 1991, it didn't work; it experimented with neo-imperialism in 1994 in Chechnya, but it backfired and brought the NATO expansion; so, Moscow is drifting on, sort of an iceberg in murky ocean. Georgi Derluguian __________________________________________ Georgi M. Derluguian Assistant Professor Department of Sociology Northwestern University 1812 Chicago Avenue Evanston, IL 60208-1330 USA gderlug@nwu.edu Tel.: (847) 491-2741 FAX (847) 491-9907 From bill.schell@murraystate.edu Tue Nov 25 09:44:16 1997 Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 10:34:41 -0600 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: Bill Schell Subject: Re: Asian Miracle Meltdown In-Reply-To: At 04:20 AM 11/25/97 -0500, Grimes wrote: > WITHOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN >INTERNAL MARKET (local effective demand), EXPORT-LED DEVELOPMENT IS DEPENDENT >ON CORE MARKETS. Hence down-turns in the core translate into free-falls for >the exporters. > successful export promotion depends not only on the presence >of markets in the core (read high wages for the core working classes), but on >suppression of high wages at home. Yet, at the same time, true upward >mobility in the world-economy depends precisely on the development of a >vibrant home market that in turn requires high local wages. This is exactly right. The expansion of the global economy has been driven by the search for low wages. The result exerts downward pressure on wages in "more developed nations" making those consumer markets (upon which newly industrializing nations are dependent) shallower and less able to absorb their production which cannot be absorbed at home because wages are too low to allow workers to become consumers. The unregulated global market is a nightmare. One solution would be for the USA to impose a social tariff on the imports of all low wage nations. The choice would be pay a tariff to gain entry to the US markets or pay your workers at home more. All newly industrializing nations MUST have access to US markets to the effect would be to force up wages globally and deepen oversea consumer markets making NIN less dependent on access to the US markets. From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Tue Nov 25 10:01:09 1997 Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 12:00:37 -0500 (EST) From: Gunder Frank To: Austrian Embassy Subject: Re: Asian Miracle Meltdown Well whether Arnoor I are right or wrong about the future , IT will tell. But about the past, he is wrong at least on Kondratieffs - if any -since the last ones were DOWN 1913-40/45, UP till 1967, DOWN since 1967, and the question comes whether the mid 1990s or early 2000s represent the BEGINNINGS or not of another UP [ which does not aboviate cyclical recession.financial crises, such as 1907 in the US as it was moving up in the 1997-1913 UP, or the 1949,1953,1958, etc recessions that startred in the US [except 1967 was attenuated there by Vietnam war] while it WAS up - and not incidentaly each - till now! - has generated a US military escalation and/or war in EACH redcessioon since WW II, including notably the second cold war in 1979 [Nato 2 track, Nato 3% real expenmditure increase, China card vs USSR and dumping Nixon's detente BEFORE the Sov Union invaed Afghanistan in Decemvber 79 - and initiated by CARTER [who also appointed Paul Volker to the Fed in 79] and only continuied by Ronal Reagan nad hbis star war military keynseanism - which is what kept all THE EST afloat during the 80s, and sunk the USSR. Of course in the 89-92 recession Bush started the Gulf War. Is the Clinton's sabre rattling vs Iraq again now a sign that the US is facing another recession? Dear Arno, Peter too!: you have some historical perspective, so USE it! = oh, and the original/real POINT is that East Asia is moving OUT of the periphery into the 'center' which the US is obliged to vacate respectfully submitted gunder frank On Tue, 25 Nov 1997, Austrian Embassy wrote: > Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 12:34:13 +0100 > From: Austrian Embassy > To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK > Subject: Re: Asian Miracle Meltdown > > Dear Peter and all colleagues - > > this is a most interesting argument. As always, Samir Amin has something > fundamental to offer. I think, on this point, our friend Samir is right, > and our friend Andre Gunder is wrong - the semi-periphery is under a > constant threat of a long-run current account deficit. > > I agree with you Peter on your diagnosis about South Korea, but not on > Japan. Japan will recover, and Japan is a centre. > > However - folks, this is not a melt-down either, but the beginning of > either a Jugar or Kuznets-cycle low, and, according to my calculations, not > at any rate connected with a Kondratieff (the last one was from 1932 to > around 1982). Chris put up my empirical recent stuff at the archive for you > all to read - I think the evidence is clear on this point. > > Kind regards from Warsaw > > Arno Tausch > > ---------- > > From: Peter Grimes > > To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK > > Subject: Asian Miracle Meltdown > > Date: Dienstag, 25. November 1997 10:20 > > > > List Folk; > > > > I am no expert on either SE Asia or high finance, but I do have some > > knowledge of basic economics. As Jackson Browne once wrote: > > > > "I've been waiting for something to happen, > > For a week or a month or a year... > > > > You might ask what it takes to remember, > > When you know that you've seen it before..." > > > > Samir Amin pointed out in 1976 ("Accumulation on a World Scale") > that > > inflows of foriegn investment produce temporary high growth rates for the > > recipient country, but those growth rates collapse once the investment > matures > > (e.g--stops purchasing local contractors for constructing the local > factories) > > and assumes its intended function of exporting products to the intended > > markets of the core. Remember the "Brazilian Miracle"? The "Japanese > > Miracle"? Granted, there were important differences in the roles that > the > > Asian states played in handling the distribution of the incoming capital, > and > > there is no doubt that the cold war encouraged the US govt to provide > grants > > and loans to Japan and S. Korea that were on terms far easier than would > have > > been imaginable elsewhere. But the bottom line for upward mobility in > the > > world-system applies equally harshly to all: WITHOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF > AN > > INTERNAL MARKET (local effective demand), EXPORT-LED DEVELOPMENT IS > DEPENDENT > > ON CORE MARKETS. Hence down-turns in the core translate into free-falls > for > > the exporters. > > The collapse of the banks, currencies, and stock markets are > > epiphenomena, SYMPTOMS of the real problem. Failures by influential > debtors > > to make good on their loan payments is--however distantly--attached to > their > > failure to sell real products, whether locally or abroad. They are > caught in > > a double-bind: successful export promotion depends not only on the > presence > > of markets in the core (read high wages for the core working classes), > but on > > suppression of high wages at home. Yet, at the same time, true upward > > mobility in the world-economy depends precisely on the development of a > > vibrant home market that in turn requires high local wages. Clearly > there is > > a contradiction here: one cannot have both. For a time, both Japan and > Korea > > seemed to evade this contradiction by the erection of trade barriers. It > > allowed them the luxury of permitting some real democracy and consequent > hikes > > in wages. But this could only be a transient solution, at best. In the > Brave > > New World of the WTO, this protection is becoming increasingly > non-viable. > > Now that they are becoming increasingly exposed to the harsh glare of > genuine > > competition from imports, the demand for locally produced commodities is > > dwindling, capitalists must therefore default on their loans, banks must > fail, > > and currency devaluation is the only way to fight back. > > One final note. The defeat of labor in the core has compelled that > > outlet for exports from Asia shrink, while the difference between the > > shrinking core wages and their continued willingness to purchase is made > up > > entirely by consumer credit-card debt. In essence the effective demand > of the > > core is constructed entirely of credit-card debt with interest rates near > 20%. > > This cannot last forever. Pending some form of income re-distribution, I > am > > reminded of the words of Marx in Vol III: "The real barrier to the > expansion > > of Capital is Capital itself". --Peter Grimes > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Andre Gunder Frank University of Toronto 96 Asquith Ave Tel. 1 416 972-0616 Toronto, ON Fax. 1 416 972-0071 CANADA M4W 1J8 Email agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Some Home/Web Pages: http://www.chass.utoronto.ca:8080/~agfrank/gunder97.html http://csf.colorado.edu/wsystes/archive/bios/gunder/gunder97cd.html http://csf.colorado.edu/authors gopher://csf.colorado.edu/11/psn/authors/frank.gunder gopher://csf.colorado.edu/11/wsystems.pubs ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From austria@it.com.pl Wed Nov 26 03:42:04 1997 for ; Wed, 26 Nov 1997 11:42:12 +0100 (MET) Reply-To: From: "Austrian Embassy" To: Subject: Asian melt-down and the long cycle dating game Date: Wed, 26 Nov 1997 11:44:22 +0100 Dear Andre Gunder and folks, A.G., you are right (parts of Asia will strongly recover) but you are wrong on one major point - the Kondratieff cycle dating game. I have very strong empirical convictions about it, based on Joshua Goldstein's data series (1988) about the growth of industrial production in the (industrialised) world. Submit these data to the calculation of incremental yearly growth rates, and apply the multivariate EXCEL polynomial analysis, you arrive at the startling result that there are indeed very strong Kuznets cycles (6th order polynomial expressions), to be dated (R^2 given in %) 1741-56 23.5% 1756-74 36.1% 1774-1793 34.8% 1793-1812 39.7% 1812-1832 16.4% 1832-62 25.7% 1862-85 36.3% 1885-1908 56.2% 1908-32 44.2% 1932-58 19.1% 1958-75 68.8% 1975-97 66.0% (this is based on UN and IMF data, since Joshua's series ends in 1975) These are calculations, based on the original data without any moving averages. So Chris Chase Dunn is right all along: there are very strong Kuznets cycles. Secondly, you have to control for the very short term Kitchins, in order to measure your Kondratieffs. So I applied to the same data series 5-year moving averages, and you get the following Kondratieffs (6th order polynomial expressions, based on EXCEL): 1756-1832 R^2 30.8% 1832-1885 9.2% 1885-1932 50.5% 1932-1982 40.3% My dating scheme by and large corresponds to that of our friend Volker Bornschier in Zurich, whose recent book on Western society (Transaction, the German original dates back 1988, but has been reworked and enlarged for the English edition) is a must for all of you who are interested in that kind of questions. The major error of some approaches is to mix up the Kuznets cycle low of around 1908 with a Kondratieff low. Mandel, Joshua Goldstein and many others date their Kondratieff low at around 1890 or somewhere, so they don't get the uopswing out of 1885 and the downswing in the 1930s properly into focus. Bornschier has convincingly shown I think the technological and societal factors that distinguish the 1870s and early 1880s as well as the 1930s as a Kondratieff cycle low. What is the beef, then? Major disturbances but no Kondratieff crash in Asia; perhaps also an Arrighi process where some swimmers (China) get their heads out of the flood by dumping others (Malaysia etc., those with a secular negative current account in the Amir sense) down, with the stability of world capitalism as a three-layer systems remaining intact (here I strictly follow our friend Giovanni). Kind regards around the world, Yours humbly Arno Tausch from Warsaw PS more of that in my graphs that you can find in my WSN Archive network article on Transnational Integration etc. From bill.schell@murraystate.edu Thu Nov 27 08:31:59 1997 Date: Thu, 27 Nov 1997 09:24:22 -0600 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: Bill Schell Subject: Schell.clown.blaut.apeshit --pt 1 I can only admire the learned, well-spoken Blaut for his characterization of me as a clown. I guess what I have to ask myself before replying again is: DO I feel FUNNY today. ["Well Do ya, Punk? Do ya feel funny today?"]. Yeah, I do. I have fun doing what I do. And I am sad that Jim wanted his to be the last of our happy and enlightening exchanges. In fact I think we should take this on the road. I can see it now. SOON APPEARING at a Professional Association Meeting near you -- the daring and electrifying, Blaut and Schell! (I think the billing should be alphabetical and that we might split honoraria 50/50 if teamed as "featured" speakers). One of the possible __topics:subtopics__ might be Blaut's concept of a uniquely European cultural racism which, in the scholarly community, is linked to/based on Weberian concepts of "rationality". In Blaut's words (as edited by Blaut): "I argue the [Weber's] biological racism must have profoundly influenced his theories about world history. I show that he is a source of a derivative doctrine that I call "cultural racism" (ling-term superioity of a European civilization over others for reasons of an absolutely superior "rationality" that is not in inself explained)." [To see the full development of Blaut's idea, I urge you (as he has urged others) to read (not to buy) __The Colonizer's Model of the World__ particularly pp. 94-108.] At the risk of being accused of distortion, here is a summary of those pages: Blaut discusses rationality as one of several theories grounded in culture which are advanced to explain "Europe's [supposed] historical superiority or priority" by asserting that "Europeans had more rationality, or higher rationality" as exhibited by their "inventiveness and innovativeness (or progrssiveness), ussually a capacity for abstract thought, and often a certain ability to make moral or ethical judgements." (p. 94) Thus many theories of historical development [Classical Racist, Weberian, Marxist, modernization theory, the technology theories such as that of Lynn White, Robert Brenner, Eric L. Jones etc etc] are, says Blaut, "rationality theories" to a greater or lesser extent. He identifies a "rationality doctrine" (which emerged alongside the "doctrine of classical diffusionism" -- the essence of the "colonizer's model of the world, see pp. 11-43) that presumes "the dualistic-developmental conception of human rationality" whereby the mentality of non-europeans is characterized as "childlike" or "primitive" or "traditional" while that of europeans is said to be "adult" or "developed" or "modern" (pp. 95-97). Weber "codified" these ideas, which were well developed by the end of the 19th century, and "added something of his own ... so that the doctrine can well be called Weberian from the present-day perspective." (p. 102) There is no doubt that Weber's "rationality" is at once insightful and frustrating. As Stanislav Andreski (a sympathic critic an interpreter of Weber) remarked: "We must not follow Weber in his rash grading of civilizations on the scale of rationality, although we can see what he was getting at: namely, the enlargement of the area in which rational thinking (especially calculation) is done. (from his introduction to __Max Weber on Capitalism, Bureaucracy and Religion,__, London, 1983 p. 10) And after I cook the turkey and bake my pies, I'll finish this post with a look at Weber's rationality and Blaut's cultural racism. William Schell, Jr Voice: (502) 762-6572 Dept of History Fax: (502) 762-6587 Murray State University EMAIL bill.schell@Murraystate.edu Murray, KY 42071 From aaustin@utkux.utcc.utk.edu Thu Nov 27 09:59:15 1997 id LAA07107; Thu, 27 Nov 1997 11:57:34 -0500 (EST) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 1997 11:58:21 -0500 (EST) From: Andrew Wayne Austin Reply-To: Andrew Wayne Austin To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: Re: Schell.clown.blaut.apeshit --pt 1 In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19971127152422.00673e2c@murraystate.edu> List, I think an historical materialist explanation of rationality helps us get around Blaut's simplistic explanation, which appeals to ideological utility to explain the development of rationalism, by noting that rationalism and racism emerged from the same historical system. They may converge (sometimes) in the manner Blaut describes, but the one cannot be reduced to the other. And we can also avoid the idealism of Weber, being advanced by Schell, by noting that Weber identified and made clear a real ideational and organizational movement in history, but that he insufficiently rooted the emergence of these phenomena in the development of sociomaterial base of the historical system where we find these phenomena. Weber's is a problem of time order. If we understand rationality as generally emerging from the sociomaterial structure, stipulating that ideational production can also set in motion the development of sociomaterial structure, then the problem is on the way towards being solved. The assumption that racial superiority can be judged the existence of rationality among certain groups is false. For this false view to hold, we must assume that society is a product of some racial essence, and not that individuals, with their shared traits, are constituted by social structure. The difference among populations, in the false view, is reflected in the differences among sociocultural forms. The explanation just does not work, particularly when confronted with the genetic evidence. But for the same reason racial theories of sociocultural idiosyncrasy don't work, neither do theories which assume, even without a racial basis, inherent rationality in individuals and its building up into social structure. Weber's theory started from the point of the individual and argued that group behavior is to be understood in these terms. In this way, his theory moves in the direction of Homans and psychological reductionism. Again, this is an ideological distortion. Systems are rational, systems of organization, ideational systems, but individuals are not inherently rational. We cannot hypostatize a sociocultural phenomenon as innate. I have presented research on this channel before showing that, for the most part, individuals are nonrational, and that they must learn to be rational, and even scientist generally operate nonrationally or irrationally. We must clearly demarcate rationalism as a mode of organization and mode of thinking, and not use it tautologically as a euphemism for thinking and acting (the error of rational choice). And while we may describe behavior in certain useful terms, we must be careful not to confuse the mode of description and explanation with the object being described and explained, or else we project into the object the ideas we use to understand the object. Individual rationality is just such a false reification. Individuals are not innately rational anymore than they are innately racist. The point is that neither one of the perspectives presented here, either condemning Weber for alleged racism or defending Weber against racist charges to keep Weber's system pure, take off from a sufficiently realistic basis. I think this is the more important lesson to be learned from this exchange. Arguing from the outside, Andy From aaustin@utkux.utcc.utk.edu Thu Nov 27 10:12:52 1997 id MAA07201; Thu, 27 Nov 1997 12:11:15 -0500 (EST) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 1997 12:12:03 -0500 (EST) From: Andrew Wayne Austin To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: (clarification) Re: Schell.clown.blaut.apeshit --pt 1 In-Reply-To: List, The second paragraph of my previous post was not to suggest that either Blaut or Schell were espousing such views. Clearly Blaut is not, and he is to be commended for his antiracist stance. The paragraph was to point the falsity of racial supremacy and innate rationality, which can go hand-in-hand. It is in this respect that I think Blaut's argument is useful. The connection does exist. I am just not convinced that the linkage is intrinsic. And the critique of Weber is not that he explicitly arguing that individuals are rational in the way Homans, behaviorists, and rational choice theorists do. Rather that Weber's explanations hold this view implicitly and tend towards this explanation. Andy From 6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu Thu Nov 27 10:19:19 1997 Date: Thu, 27 Nov 1997 09:19:13 -0800 (PST) From: Judi Kessler <6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> To: Andrew Wayne Austin Subject: Re: Schell.clown.blaut.apeshit --pt 1 In-Reply-To: Lately the WSN contributors seem to be filled with nothing but multisyllabic words and a lot of hot air. Why don't you all do some APPLIED social science - take a look around - remember...think way back...the capitalist world-system...globalization...impact on regions, communities...commodity chains...who gets the $$...Just a suggestion. On Thu, 27 Nov 1997, Andrew Wayne Austin wrote: > List, > > I think an historical materialist explanation of rationality helps us get > around Blaut's simplistic explanation, which appeals to ideological > utility to explain the development of rationalism, by noting that > rationalism and racism emerged from the same historical system. They may > converge (sometimes) in the manner Blaut describes, but the one cannot be > reduced to the other. And we can also avoid the idealism of Weber, being > advanced by Schell, by noting that Weber identified and made clear a real > ideational and organizational movement in history, but that he > insufficiently rooted the emergence of these phenomena in the development > of sociomaterial base of the historical system where we find these > phenomena. Weber's is a problem of time order. If we understand > rationality as generally emerging from the sociomaterial structure, > stipulating that ideational production can also set in motion the > development of sociomaterial structure, then the problem is on the way > towards being solved. > > The assumption that racial superiority can be judged the existence of > rationality among certain groups is false. For this false view to hold, we > must assume that society is a product of some racial essence, and not that > individuals, with their shared traits, are constituted by social > structure. The difference among populations, in the false view, is > reflected in the differences among sociocultural forms. The explanation > just does not work, particularly when confronted with the genetic > evidence. But for the same reason racial theories of sociocultural > idiosyncrasy don't work, neither do theories which assume, even without a > racial basis, inherent rationality in individuals and its building up into > social structure. Weber's theory started from the point of the individual > and argued that group behavior is to be understood in these terms. In this > way, his theory moves in the direction of Homans and psychological > reductionism. Again, this is an ideological distortion. Systems are > rational, systems of organization, ideational systems, but individuals > are not inherently rational. We cannot hypostatize a sociocultural > phenomenon as innate. I have presented research on this channel before > showing that, for the most part, individuals are nonrational, and that > they must learn to be rational, and even scientist generally operate > nonrationally or irrationally. We must clearly demarcate rationalism as a > mode of organization and mode of thinking, and not use it tautologically > as a euphemism for thinking and acting (the error of rational choice). And > while we may describe behavior in certain useful terms, we must be careful > not to confuse the mode of description and explanation with the object > being described and explained, or else we project into the object the > ideas we use to understand the object. Individual rationality is just such > a false reification. Individuals are not innately rational anymore than > they are innately racist. > > The point is that neither one of the perspectives presented here, either > condemning Weber for alleged racism or defending Weber against racist > charges to keep Weber's system pure, take off from a sufficiently > realistic basis. I think this is the more important lesson to be learned > from this exchange. > > Arguing from the outside, > Andy > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Judi A. Kessler University of California, Santa Barbara Department of Sociology Santa Barbara, California 93106 (805) 893-3751 fax (805) 893-3324 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From aaustin@utkux.utcc.utk.edu Thu Nov 27 11:29:00 1997 id NAA07733; Thu, 27 Nov 1997 13:27:22 -0500 (EST) Date: Thu, 27 Nov 1997 13:28:08 -0500 (EST) From: Andrew Wayne Austin To: Judi Kessler <6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> Subject: Re: Schell.clown.blaut.apeshit --pt 1 In-Reply-To: On Thu, 27 Nov 1997, Judi Kessler wrote: > Lately the WSN contributors seem to be filled with nothing but > multisyllabic words and a lot of hot air. On Mon, 10 Nov 1997, Judi Kessler wrote: > the best way to handle this, I have found, is to automatically delete > everything other than that which comes from Chris Chase-Dunn. Easier > than getting off the list - and you also get what's worth reading Is it your role on this channel to just sit back and hurl these sorts of condescending posts? If that's the case, you might just want to go back to deleting everything that everybody writes (except Chase-Dunn's contributions). You may not realize it, Judy, but racism and rationality are real things that have profound effects on real people. They are historical entities that have grown out of real historical systems. Discussing where rationality and racism comes from, and what effects they have on real people, is a relevant--both are very real parts of the development of the world system and integral to the globalization process. Your sniping from the sidelines is the epitome of wasted space. Andy From 6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu Thu Nov 27 12:08:04 1997 Date: Thu, 27 Nov 1997 11:07:57 -0800 (PST) From: Judi Kessler <6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> To: Andrew Wayne Austin Subject: Re: Schell.clown.blaut.apeshit --pt 1 In-Reply-To: Your response is a classic representation of what I was referring to! You guys just can't help it, can you! On Thu, 27 Nov 1997, Andrew Wayne Austin wrote: > On Thu, 27 Nov 1997, Judi Kessler wrote: > > > Lately the WSN contributors seem to be filled with nothing but > > multisyllabic words and a lot of hot air. > > On Mon, 10 Nov 1997, Judi Kessler wrote: > > > the best way to handle this, I have found, is to automatically delete > > everything other than that which comes from Chris Chase-Dunn. Easier > > than getting off the list - and you also get what's worth reading > > Is it your role on this channel to just sit back and hurl these sorts of > condescending posts? If that's the case, you might just want to go back to > deleting everything that everybody writes (except Chase-Dunn's > contributions). > > You may not realize it, Judy, but racism and rationality are real things > that have profound effects on real people. They are historical entities > that have grown out of real historical systems. Discussing where > rationality and racism comes from, and what effects they have on real > people, is a relevant--both are very real parts of the development of the > world system and integral to the globalization process. > > Your sniping from the sidelines is the epitome of wasted space. > > Andy > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Judi A. Kessler University of California, Santa Barbara Department of Sociology Santa Barbara, California 93106 (805) 893-3751 fax (805) 893-3324 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From bill.schell@murraystate.edu Thu Nov 27 15:30:16 1997 Date: Thu, 27 Nov 1997 16:22:39 -0600 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: Bill Schell Subject: Schell.clown.Blaut.apeshit -- pt. 2 Well, the pie is cooling, the turkey's in the oven, and the cheese log is out -- so back to Weber and Blaut. There are many points at which I could enter Blaut's discussion of Weber, but I really must pick one. In his chapter titled "The Myth of the European Miracle" [subhd "Rationality.."] Blaut writes [and pardon the length of this quote, but Blaut becomes very irrate over my editing, so I won't]: "Whatever Weber considered to have been the basic cause of the differences between rational, progressive European society and irrational, traditional Asian society (Africa and America were scarcely noticed), he delinated those supposed differences very carefully. The most crucial of his arguments are found in his __General Economic History__ and __The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism__. The development of rationality among Europeans -- however that happened -- led to a sort of "economic ethic," a body of values, aspirations, and logical thought processes that emerged primarily in connection with the Reformation (and particularly Puritanism) but which, more fundamentally, capitalism. The important point here is that basal rationality produced both the "economic ethic" of capitalism and the Protestant movement. Weber is not (as some think) explaining capitalism and modernity in terms narrowly of religion. He does invoke religion to explain many aspects of the supposed traditionalism of Asians, but here too a primordial irrationality is seen as underlying religion. (He writes, for instance, of the "Magical traditionalism" of Indians and Chinese.)" p. 103 Weber's concept of rationality is complex and he is often not clear about how he is using it. Nonetheless, it seems to me that Blaut misrepresents Weber's constructs. Weber presents two catagories of economic rationality -- formal and substantive. 1. Formal rationality, that identified with modernity, "is capable of being expressed in numerical, calculable terms" which are "unambiguous, at least in the sense that expression in money terms yields the highest degree of formal calculablity." 2. Substantive rationality, found in traditional civilizations/societies/cultures as well as in modern ones, "is full of ambiguities" in that it is not restricted to "goal-oriented rational calculation ... but apply certain criteria of ultimate ends, whether they be ethical, political, utilitarian, hedonistic, feudal, egalitarian or whatever." The results "however formally rational they may be in the sense of correct calculation" are measured by essentually moral scales of"value rationality" or "substantive goal rationality." "There is an infinite number of possible value scales for this type of rationality, of which socialist and communist standards constitute only one group." Weber __Economy and Society__ (p. 85-86) PLEASE NOTE that Weber excludes Marxism (which Blaut characterizes as a variation of the "rationality doctrine") from the catagory of formal rationality. Weber presents two related forms of social rationality -- instrumentally rational and value-rational . 1. Instrumentally rational (related to formal economic rationality) defined as "the use of means for the attainment of the actor's own rationally pursued and calculated ends," and 2. Value-rational (related to substantive economic rationality) where social action is "determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious [reasons] independently of its pospects or success." Weber, __Economy and Society__, pp. 24-25. He also presents two other forms of social action which are unthinking and hence not specifically rational nor irrational -- affectual (based on individual emotions/feelings) and traditional (determined by ingrained habituation). These two may be found equally in modern and traditional settings. PLEASE NOTE: of all of these forms of rationality, Weber associates only one specifically (if not exclusively) with modernity/capitalism -- formal rationality, quantitative often expressed in monetary terms. Which brings us to Protestantism and the Spirit of Capitalism. Blaut misses Weber's point about the relationship of the two -- which is not surprising given that Blaut denies that culture and mentality have anything to do with the "rise of Europe." To admit this, he would also have to admit that there was something unique about Europe that led to the "miracle" and he has already made it quite clear that Europe possessed *NO* such advantage and that it was onle a geographical accident that put Europe in a position to discover America and loot its bullion which the one and only reason for the European advantage from 1492. Weber notes that "the management of a bank, a wholesale export business, a large retail establishment, or a large putting-out enterprise dealing with goods produced in homes, is certainly only possible in the form of a capitalistic enterprise" (all of which existed, as a Blaut and many others show, in many parts of the world prior to 1500). "Nevertheless," continues Weber, "they may all be carried on in a traditionalistic spirit. ... The foreign trade of whole epochs has rested on the basis of monopoloies and legal privileges of strictly traditional character." This was as true in monolitically Catholic Europe as anywhere on earth. Most of us are familiar with the concern of St Thomas Aquinas with the need for insuring social justice within the operation of increasingly market driven economies (something Weber would class as substantive/value rationality. Thus, says Weber, "The spirit of capitalism ... had to fight its way to supremacy against a whole world of hostile forces ... which, in both ancient times and in the Middle Ages, would have proscribed [it] as the lowest sort of avarice and as an attitude entirely lacking in self-respect." (Weber, __The Protestant Ethic__ pp. 52-57) In short, the key to the European capitalist transformation was the transformation of mentality more than structure -- or to put in another way, changes in mentality and culture wrought by the Protestant Reformation created structural changes. This is a good place to stop and allow Blaut to again put me in my place with his keen intellect. William Schell, Jr Voice: (502) 762-6572 Dept of History Fax: (502) 762-6587 Murray State University EMAIL bill.schell@Murraystate.edu Murray, KY 42071 From bill.schell@murraystate.edu Thu Nov 27 19:35:56 1997 Date: Thu, 27 Nov 1997 20:28:15 -0600 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: Bill Schell Subject: Weber, Schell, Blaut and Marx Blaut: "Marx did not root his theory in rationality and I did not say he did." Schell: Nor did I. Rather Marxism is, in many of its variants, which is what you wrote. From __TCMOTW__ (p. 95): "Some (not all) Marxist theories are rationality theories: the defeat of feudalism released creative energies which then led to technological innovation, etc." [This seems to me to be pretty much the position taken by Marx-Engels in the __Communist Manifesto__.] To be sure, Blaut also writes that Marx and Engels felt that "Asians were no less rational than Europeans" (p. 82) but the same may not be said of many of those who are Marxists: "Space does not permit me to review the way in which some other present day historians invoke, and use, the theory of Western rationality as grounding for their theories of the European miracle. I should simply note that some of them are marxists and near marxists. ... Robert Brenner contributes a very different Marxist rationality theory: that there was no rationality until, quite suddenly, capitalism appeared among the English yeoman farmers, who promptly became amazingly inventive and started a technological revolution that has not yet ended." (p. 108) Moreover, Weber does not deny rationality to traditional civilizations -- merely formal rationality linked to capitalism which, as I pointed out, is also lacking in Europe until the Protestant Reformation rearranged the mentality of some (not all) Europeans with regards to the accumulation and employment of wealth. William Schell, Jr Voice: (502) 762-6572 Dept of History Fax: (502) 762-6587 Murray State University EMAIL bill.schell@Murraystate.edu Murray, KY 42071 From phuakl@sit.edu.my Thu Nov 27 21:08:16 1997 From: "DR. PHUA KAI LIT" To: cofpkh@leonis.nus.sg, lchan@usmh.usmd.edu, ksoo@indiana.edu Date: Fri, 28 Nov 1997 11:12:59 +0000 Subject: (Fwd) [sangkancil] Might Asia lose a decade? wsn@csf.colorado.edu ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- From: yfyap@pop.jaring.my (Yap Yok Foo) To: sangkancil@malaysia.net Subject: [sangkancil] Might Asia lose a decade? Date: Thu, 27 Nov 1997 06:09:17 GMT Organization: Private Reply-to: yfyap@pop.jaring.my (Yap Yok Foo) ________________________________________________ This week's sponsors -The Asia Pacific Internet Company (APIC) Business Internet Services. Some talk. Some do. We talk and do! for instant info ________________________________________________ >From Financial Times, UK www.ft.com Might Asia lose a decade? THURSDAY NOVEMBER 27 1997 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Stephen Fidler , Latin America Editor, asks what Asia could learn from the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s ------------------------------------------------------------------------ As new victims succumb almost daily to Asia's currency plague, parallels are being drawn with the deep crisis that followed Mexico's disastrous devaluation of the peso in 1994. That comparison is not wrong. But it is superficial. The more telling parallel is with Mexico's 1982 debt crisis, which heralded Latin America's lost decade. The question for those nervously watching events unfold in Asia are: does this mean that the tiger economies are also on the verge of a prolonged economic slump? Many will think the comparison between Asia and Latin American strained. Asia seemed like a miracle, at least until recently. Latin America is often seen as an economic failure. But this is too narrow a perspective. "Look at Brazil in the 1960s," said Paul Krugman, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Everyone regarded it as a miracle economy." Even now, growth in many Latin American countries over the 20th century stands comparison with that of Asia. Turn the clock back 15 years, as our charts show, and Latin America looked as if it too had discovered the secret for perpetual motion. Throughout the 1970s, western banks were pouring money into the region not under the influence of some collective madness, but because they believed in the Latin American growth story. Using arguments that resemble those that have assigned importance to the role of Asia's "special values", it was even said that rapid growth in countries such as Brazil owed something to their authoritarian governments. It is now clear the Latin American debt crisis that followed Mexico's 1982 payments difficulties represented the death of an exhausted economic model. The consequence of this was a long period of painful economic decline. It is equally clear that the crisis delivered a fatal blow to military governments across the region. If Asia were at the beginning of a similar process of painful economic adjustment, what would this mean for the authoritarian political masters of the region? Victor Bulmer-Thomas, an economics professor who heads London University's Institute of Latin American Studies, says there are some parallels between Asia's currency troubles and those Mexico suffered in 1994-95 - for example, in the devastating effects on the banking system of a big devaluation after a long period of a pegged exchange rate. But he says that the deeper parallels are with 1982. In both Asia now and Latin America then, "this is the moment is when a particular paradigm or growth model has come to an end. It is not a cyclical problem." Some economists are more forthright still. "There is no Asian miracle," says Jerome Booth, chief economist at ANZ Bank in London, echoing Prof Krugman's celebrated article The Myth of Asia's Miracle (Foreign Affairs, November 1994). "The Asian strategy typically involved strong state intervention and direction of investment decisions - just what Latin America had gone through from the late 1940s to the 1970s." In Latin America, this had yielded high growth rates until inefficiencies in the allocation of resources were finally revealed by the 1980s crisis. It is true that there are significant differences. In comparison with Asia, Latin American countries were closed to trade and ran inflationary economic policies. Asian countries also have many export-oriented companies with world-class technologies. But both Latin America in the 1970s and Asia in the 1990s were using imported capital to help generate high investment rates. The rate of investment was higher as a percentage of gross domestic product in Asia's case and the imported capital was intermediated differently - largely through the state in Latin America and through the banking system and private companies in Asia. In both examples, imported capital had as its corollary large current account deficits. In both instances too, the crises were worsened by badly run and poorly supervised banking systems, as well as by sharply overvalued exchange rates. (Asian leaders might do well to recall the 1982 promise of José López Portillo, Mexico's former president, to defend the peso "like a dog". He could not appear in public for years afterwards without being followed by people making barking noises.) If valid parallels exist, what can Asian governments learn from Latin America's 1980s experience? It is plain that Latin American governments (schooled by bitter experience) are more adept at handling financial crises than their Asian counterparts. True, the Mexican government made fundamental mistakes before and immediately after its 1994 devaluation that ensured deep recession in 1995. But the errors were quickly righted and, with US-led financial support, a tough adjustment programme has brought a rapid recovery. Similarly, the Brazilian government's response to its Asian-induced financial battering since October has been swift and resolute - it sharply increased interest rates and tightened fiscal policy. It is too early to know whether these actions will save the Brazilian currency from disorderly devaluation. But its actions provided a sharp contrast with the weak initial response to the crisis of many Asian governments. Analysts at fund managers Foreign & Colonial Emerging Markets, for example, who characterised the South Korean response to its crisis as "too little, too late", have praised Brazilian action as "vigorous". A more fundamental lesson from Latin America would be to avoid an early misdiagnosis of the crisis. Latin America's debt crisis was initially seen as a liquidity problem rather than an issue of solvency. Valuable time was lost - in effect until 1985 when important changes in Mexico and other countries were introduced - before governments began to recognise that a fundamental change in economic policy was necessary. "The Asian countries that prosper from this will be those that realise the depth of the structural reforms they will have to carry out," says Mr Bulmer-Thomas. "Not just in economics but also in politics." The political task, he says, will be to rid countries of the "corruption and cronyism" to which too many are prey and which will hold back economic recovery if not addressed. The simple answer to the question of whether the currency troubles will presage a lost decade for Asia is thus (assuming the crisis triggers no worldwide financial meltdown): it depends on the region's governments. Asia has myriad political systems, and a broad comparison with Latin America as a whole can say little light on how exactly each country's political system will respond. But there are generalisations that a Latin comparison permits. The initial political response from parts of Asia has not been encouraging. In Thailand, for example, the government's political weakness is clearly hampering efforts to change. In Malaysia, where political decision-making is more concentrated, the crisis has provoked a search for foreign scapegoats, amid huge resistance to the idea that current difficulties have home-grown characteristics. In Indonesia, where the government has been more willing to act, it is clear that there are important obstacles to reform within the presidential family. Emerging Asian economies are likely to become increasingly differentiated from one another depending on how their governments respond. In some, a prolonged downturn or the reforms which now appear necessary will provide the trigger for political change. The undoubted parallels between Latin America and Asia should not obscure important differences. One of the most crucial is the Latin countries' wide income and wealth disparities. For various reasons, including successful land reform in Korea and Taiwan and the lack of rural areas surrounding the city states of Hong Kong and Singapore, income distribution in Asia's societies tends to be much more equal. This provides for more social coherence in tackling economic problems. Moreover, Asian countries have been more open to international trade than was Latin America in the 1970s. As a result, the prices of tradeable goods are unlikely to be so distorted as they were in Latin America - though that is not necessarily true of the prices of non-tradeables. Because the discipline of the market has not been applied to sectors such as property - which are shielded from international competition - big price distortions have developed, opening the way for damaging asset price bubbles. Last, Asia enjoys a higher savings rate than Latin America does now and did back in the 1970s. As a response to crisis, savings rates in Asia may now fall: that would be helpful to economic recovery. But they are likely to remain high enough to generate reasonable levels of investment and so avoid the investment collapse that has been the underlying cause of Latin economic weakness over the past 15 years. There are thus important grounds to believe that the Asian economies can avoid a lost decade. Mr Booth at ANZ argues that speculators may have done the region an enormous favour - by catching the distortions in the Asian economies at a relatively early stage. Asia may be able to reap the benefits of its model - without having to pay the enormous price in growth and high inflation that was paid by the people of Latin America in the 1980s. "That supposes though that the lesson - to turn away from intervention and clientilism and to embrace the market economy for the non-tradeables sector - has now been learned," he says. © Copyright the Financial Times Limited 1997 www.ft.com (Free Subscription) -________________________________________________ List Owner: M.G.G. Pillai Free Homepages on malaysia.net - send blank Check out the malaysia.net web site on List Postings to ________________________________________________ From rkmoore@iol.ie Fri Nov 28 07:08:31 1997 Fri, 28 Nov 1997 14:08:14 GMT Date: Fri, 28 Nov 1997 14:08:14 GMT To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu (world-system network) From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Re: apeshit & western philosophy I've been reading through Russel's History of Western Philosophy and have gotten as far as Locke. I'd been exposed to each thinker, most of them anyway, but hadn't seen how the "story unfolds". My principal reaction so far is HOW UTTERLY EMBARRASSING Western philosophy is; as I read about each guy, I kept saying "Is that all there is??", "Is this guy serious?" There's a lack of depth, of wisdom, of connection with common sense or sensitive human experience. It is well characterized by "rational" and "creative", but as much by lack of other virtues as excellence in rationality. Almost anything from the "East" is in color and sterio compared to the West's black and white mono drudgery. It expresses what I'd call "fundamentalist rationality" -- nothing but concrete verbally exressible reasoning is given any credence. Descarte's "cogito ergo sum" expresses it concisely. A punch in the nose might have woken him up to the greater totality of his being, but I doubt it. The western philosopher might as well be a brain suspended in an isolation tank. We know from Goedel that any system which is consistent is incomplete: Western philosophy is woefully incomplete because it worships a narrow notion of consistency. It would all make for a great comedy act: your straight-man would express each of the philosophers, and the other guy would poke fun. "Is that a chair?"... "Well sort of, but it's not the IDEAL chair"... "Oh, yeah, what does an ideal chair look like?"... "Well I can't really say, that can't be known"... "What was the state of nature?"... "A guy in his cave"... "Oh, did he hunt alone?"... "Uh... I'm not sure"... "Did his wife help?"... "Uh... I guess they had a contract of their own"... etc. etc. The audience would be rolling in the aisles by the time they got to Locke, because real people have SENSE. "State of nature"?... give me a break; "social contract"?... wake up and smell the coffee. I had recalled Pythagoras and his bean-ban -- a good chuckle -- but I hadn't realized how archtypal that was. It started with the Hebrews and the Greeks. The Hebrews banished most of the wisdom of mankind to the garden to promote the primacy of their fantasy great-father-in-the-sky and acclaim their unique specialness, and the Greeks decided they needed to invent everything from scratch. The Romans, spiritual pygmies that they were, picked up on these impoverished threads and we're stuck with them still. Creativity, though it has admirable virtues of its own and some of us thrive on it, is primarily a DESRTUCTIVE force, especially if it starts from scratch rather than complementing what's already known. One phrase will suffice to make this point: nuclear energy. It seems clear to me that Euro expansionism and dominance was primarily due to this focus on creativity and narrow rationalism. They were always looking for the new, and always willing to sacrifice the old. China, allow me to suggest, had more sense that to seek far-flung dominions -- they knew it would disrupt their society as much as the other: if something can't be integrated, it's destabilizing. The Western apes didn't give a shit about what was lost (my connection to the ape.shit thread) and we see that today yet again in globalization -- which is willing to throw away everything for the sake of yet another stupid isolated brain concept "market forces", which has no more grounding in reality or common sense than "ideal chairs" or "state of nature". Marxist opponents are no better -- Marx was just another guy who wanted to throw everything away for yet another narrow ungrounded mind-concept called "labor valuation". Partly the Western pattern is one of "tools looking for problems" -- people come up with ideas they're in love with, and then they (and their generations of followers) keep trying to make reality fit the fantasy. "Perfect markets" is perhaps the overall most destructive example. Western "schools" are cults: members see the world through a narrow slit, while outsiders are baffled. But there's another pattern too, and that's "rationalization of power". How many of our thinkers were no more than power sycophants? (eg, social darwinism). The West can make a claim to science, but it's "philosophy" is juvenile. And the science is fatally flawed: it has grossly inadequate grounding in social utility. -rkm ___________________________ 11/27/97, Bill Schell wrote: > Weber's concept of rationality is complex and he is often not clear about >how he is using it. Nonetheless, it seems to me that Blaut misrepresents >Weber's constructs. From austria@it.com.pl Fri Nov 28 08:38:07 1997 for ; Fri, 28 Nov 1997 16:39:04 +0100 (MET) Reply-To: From: "Austrian Embassy" To: Subject: Asian melt-down: the Le Monde perspective Date: Fri, 28 Nov 1997 16:41:26 +0100 Kind regards from your Berufseuropaer (professional European) in Warsaw Arno Tausch ---------- > From: Le Monde diplomatique > To: Le Monde diplomatique > Subject: Decembre 1997 - A qui profite la confusion ? > Date: Freitag, 28. November 1997 13:05 > > > > ** Le Monde diplomatique ** > décembre 1997 > > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/ > > > > DANS CE NUMÉRO A qui profite la confusion ? > ______________________________________________________________ > > Alors qu'un typhon ébranle les bourses d'Asie, « le désarmement du > pouvoir financier doit devenir un chantier civique majeur si l'on > veut éviter que le monde du siècle à venir ne se transforme en une > jungle où les prédateurs font la loi », estime Ignacio Ramonet. > > DÉBÂCLE > > Cette débâcle financière, qui pourrait se convertir en une > catastrophe majeure, remet en question le modèle de développement > des « tigres » asiatiques, comme celui choisi en Argentine. > D'ailleurs, partout s'organisent les résistances. Aux Etats-Unis, > l'urgence de répondre aux inégalités croissantes rapproche > syndicalistes et intellectuels progressistes. En France, la grève > des chauffeurs routiers a agi comme un révélateur du caractère > aberrant des politiques de transport en Europe. Comme la santé des > nations, celle des individus est devenue un enjeu : malgré les > dangers du lait en poudre, les multinationales de > l'agro-alimentaire poursuivent leurs pratiques commerciales > criminelles dans les pays du tiers-monde. > > Un tiers-monde où persistent bien des conflits. Au Proche-Orient, > les Etats-Unis ont tenté de rallumer la guerre contre l'Irak, > tandis que s'esquissent des recompositions autour de l'axe > Israël-Turquie auquel s'oppose la Syrie, alliée à l'Egypte et à > l'Arabie saoudite. Le gouvernement de la République démocratique du > Congo s'attaque à la reconstruction de l'Etat, mais son image est > ternie par bien des massacres. > > HISTOIRE > > De la difficulté d'écrire l'histoire. Précisément, alors que les > conclusions des nouveaux historiens israéliens sur la fuite de > milliers de Palestiniens hors de leurs foyers, battent en brêche > bien des mythes, Le Livre noir du communisme tente d'établir une > analogie entre nazisme et communisme. De l'histoire à la > propagande, il n'y a souvent qu'un pas, mais à qui profite la > confusion ? > ______________________________________________________________ > > > ÉDITORIAL > > Désarmer les marchés, par Ignacio Ramonet. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/1997/12/RAMONET/ > > > Dans les revues... > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/1997/12/revues.html > > Colloques et rencontres. > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/1997/12/colloques.html > > > CONGO KINSHASA > > L'impossible enquête, par Roberto Garreton. > Gouvernement à vue, par Colette Braeckman. > > > PROCHE-ORIENT > > Souffles guerriers sur le Proche-Orient, par Alain Gresh. > Premier échec de la croisade de Washington contre Bagdad, par > Paul-Marie de la Gorce. > Enlisement turc au Kurdistan (A.G.). > Les atouts de la guérilla kurde en Turquie, par Michel Verrier. > > > AMÉRIQUE LATINE > > Coup de semonce pour le président argentin, par Carlos Gabetta. > > > CRISE FINANCIÈRE > > Une frénésie spéculative qui ébranle les marchés, par Michel > Chossudovsky. > Lendemains âcres en Asie du Sud-Est, par Philip Golub. > Trangresser les préjugés économiques, par Muhammad Yunus. > > > TRANSPORTS > > La ruineuse maladie du « tout-routier », par Laurent Carroué. > Des villes asphyxiées par l'automobile, par Isabelle Bourboulon. > Les exemples de la Suisse et de l'Autriche, par Bernard Schéou. > > > ÉTATS-UNIS > > Intellectuels et syndicalistes se redécouvrent, par Eric Alterman. > Les riches entre philanthropie et repentance, par Ibrahim Warde. > > > COMMUNISME > > Les falsifications d'un « livre noir », par Gilles Perrault. > Petits mensonges latino-américains, par Maurice Lemoine. > De Lénine à Staline, par Michel Dreyfus. > Tapis rouge, par Serge Halimi. > > > HISTOIRE > > L'expulsion des Palestiniens en 1947-1949 revisitée par des > historiens israéliens, par Dominique Vidal. > > > SANTÉ > > Les sociétés malades du progrès, par Marc Ferro. > > > MULTINATIONALES > > Ces biberons qui tuent, par Claire Brisset. > > > SPIRITUALITÉ > > La « tentation » bouddhiste en France, par Alain Renon. > > > Les livres du mois > > « La Rumeur », de Hugo Claus, par Serge Govaert. > « Le Lys et le flamboyant », d'Henri Lopes, par Odile Felgine. > Cinquième colonne à Bruxelles, par Susan George. > « Féminisme et nazisme », sous la direction de Lilian Kandel, par > Francoise Thébaud. > > > > _________________________________________________________________ > > ÉGALEMENT DISPONIBLES SUR NOTRE SITE > > * Le Monde diplomatique 1987-1997, sur cédérom > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/cederom/ > > * L'Agenda 1998 du Monde diplomatique > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/agenda/ > > * L'édition en langue anglaise du Monde diplomatique > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/ > > * Le texte intégral du numéro de novembre > http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/1997/10/ > > > From rkmoore@iol.ie Fri Nov 28 09:43:36 1997 Fri, 28 Nov 1997 16:42:55 GMT Date: Fri, 28 Nov 1997 16:42:55 GMT To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu (world-system network) From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Re: western philosophy 11/28/97, a reader responded: >It is very easy to >destroy philosophy when you reduce it to such vague statements! I've destroyed it? Wow... talk about the power of the pen! >Incidently, in criticising reason, you condemn your own discourse! After >all, don't you try make a REASONABLE statement? Typical Western clueless statement! Of course reason is a perfectly valid and necessary tool; the problem occurs when it is used without reference to data: when the practitioner either lacks knowledge or refuses to use that knowledge as the basis from which to reason. "Garbage in and garbage out" is not a condemnation of computers, but of users. >What is the clear difference between the "wisdom" you praise, and the >so-called "fundamentalist rationality"? How can you recognise wisdom >from nonsense, if not on a rational basis? Wisdom comes from experience, as does most lesser knowledge. One learns more about what "airplane" means by flying in one than from reading about arodynamics. You recognize wisdom (in its various aspects) just like you recognize anything else: by encountering it at a time when you have the capacity to appreciate what you're seeing. You may chance upon it during philosophical reasoning to be sure, but not all can be found that way -- and if the search is limited only to such pursuits the narrowness of perspective may preclude the possibility altogether. rkm From 70671.2032@compuserve.com Fri Nov 28 12:01:53 1997 for wsn@csf.colorado.edu; Fri, 28 Nov 1997 13:27:00 -0500 (EST) Date: Fri, 28 Nov 1997 13:22:42 -0500 From: james m blaut <70671.2032@compuserve.com> Subject: Weber, Apeshit. Sender: james m blaut <70671.2032@compuserve.com> To: world systems network rkm and Bill Schell: rkm: Your argument is really classical Weber. Consider: "It seems clear to me that Euro expansionism and dominance was primarily due to this focus on creativity and narrow rationalism. They were always looking for the new, and always willing to sacrifice the old. China, allow me to suggest, had more sense that to seek far-flung dominions -- they knew it would disrupt their society as much as the other: if something can't be integrated, it's destabilizing." This argument falls into the category of what I call Walrus and Carpenter explanations for the rise of Europe: How sad that our European civilization was so inferior to others in understanding the true meaning of life and the world. How sad that our rationality, creativity, "rational restlessness" (Weber) fored us to eat up these other civilizations, but didn't they taste good! Bill Schell: You won't find an appeal to rationality-as-cause in the *Communist Manifesdto.* That is nonsense. In fact, if you read *The German Ideology*, written at about the same period, you'll find one of the finst critiques of rationality-as-cause in the entire literature of the 19th century. Again you quote me out of context. (A bad habit. Like smoking.) There are many, many modern theories that fall within the categories "Marxism" and Neo-Marxism." But that doesn't mean that all of them reflect classical Marxist theory or, for that matter, are valid. I mentioned the fact that some of these theories are indeed Weberian, and I think I made it clear at vaious points in the book that I don't like these theories. In other writings I show that they're imnvalid and that they really distort the classical Marxist viewpoint. In a papwr entitle "Robert Brenner in the Tunnel of Time" (*Antipode: A Radical Journal of Geograpyh*, around 1995) I show that Brenner's theory is neo-Weberian: an appeal to the rationality created in Europe by early capitalism. "Blaut: 'Marx did not root his theory in rationality and I did not say he did.' Schell: Nor did I. [Ah, but yes you did!] Rather Marxism is, in many of its variants, which is what you wrote." Nope. "Moreover, Weber does not deny rationality to traditional civilizations." Dead wrong. I won't point you to the places in the book where I discuss this, or the citations to Weber's works, because you'll accuse me of pushing the book. Jim B From gmd304@casbah.acns.nwu.edu Fri Nov 28 13:57:34 1997 for ; Fri, 28 Nov 1997 14:57:28 -0600 (CST) Date: Fri, 28 Nov 1997 14:57:28 -0600 (CST) To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: Georgi Derluguian Subject: Judi Kessler's practical suggestion in the light of Lenin's teaching Being brought up as Marxist-Leninist since the kindergarten years, I cannot suggest any better response to Judi Kessler's practical suggestion that Lenin's unperishable: "Without resolving the fundamental theoretical questions any practical revolutionary effort is doomed to stumble at the same damn questions over and over again". (My translation from the freshman-layer memory) Andy is doing us a great service -- those who face colleagues from the pol-sci departments in practical daily life. My recent reading of the various institutional reviews of the world-systems analysis courses in American universities (they are mostly confidential, therefore blunt) suggests that the armor plates and munitions which Andy is generosly supplying, are bloody practical. Polnyi vpered! Georgi Georgiï M. Derluguian Department of Sociology Northwestern University 1812 Chicago Avenue Evanston, Illinois 60208-1330 gderlug@nwu.edu tel. (1-847) 491-2741 From 6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu Sat Nov 29 11:31:36 1997 Date: Sat, 29 Nov 1997 10:31:29 -0800 (PST) From: Judi Kessler <6500jk@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> To: Georgi Derluguian Subject: Re: Judi Kessler's practical suggestion in the light of Lenin's teaching In-Reply-To: Huh...? On Fri, 28 Nov 1997, Georgi Derluguian wrote: > Being brought up as Marxist-Leninist since the kindergarten years, I cannot > suggest any better response to Judi Kessler's practical suggestion that > Lenin's unperishable: "Without resolving the fundamental theoretical > questions any practical revolutionary effort is doomed to stumble at the > same damn questions over and over again". (My translation from the > freshman-layer memory) > Andy is doing us a great service -- those who face colleagues from the > pol-sci departments in practical daily life. My recent reading of the > various institutional reviews of the world-systems analysis courses in > American universities (they are mostly confidential, therefore blunt) > suggests that the armor plates and munitions which Andy is generosly > supplying, are bloody practical. > Polnyi vpered! > Georgi > > Georgiï M. Derluguian > Department of Sociology > Northwestern University > 1812 Chicago Avenue > Evanston, Illinois 60208-1330 > gderlug@nwu.edu > tel. (1-847) 491-2741 > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Judi A. Kessler University of California, Santa Barbara Department of Sociology Santa Barbara, California 93106 (805) 893-3751 fax (805) 893-3324 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From bcc18471@vip.cybercity.dk Sat Nov 29 16:07:42 1997 for ; Sun, 30 Nov 1997 00:05:33 +0100 (CET) From: "Nico" To: Subject: Re: apeshit & western philosophy Date: Sat, 29 Nov 1997 21:30:45 +0100 R.K. Moore wrote: > I've been reading through Russel's History of Western Philosophy and have > gotten as far as Locke. I'd been exposed to each thinker, most of them > anyway, but hadn't seen how the "story unfolds". > > My principal reaction so far is HOW UTTERLY EMBARRASSING Western philosophy > is; as I read about each guy, I kept saying "Is that all there is??", "Is > this guy serious?" > [etc, etc] What a devastating critique. Nico Fyhn From bcc18471@vip.cybercity.dk Sat Nov 29 20:07:22 1997 for ; Sun, 30 Nov 1997 04:07:06 +0100 (CET) From: "Nico" To: Subject: Re: apeshit & western philosophy Date: Sun, 30 Nov 1997 03:57:06 +0100 I wrote: > R.K. Moore wrote: > > > I've been reading through Russel's History of Western Philosophy and have > > gotten as far as Locke. I'd been exposed to each thinker, most of them > > anyway, but hadn't seen how the "story unfolds". > > > > My principal reaction so far is HOW UTTERLY EMBARRASSING Western > philosophy > > is; as I read about each guy, I kept saying "Is that all there is??", "Is > > this guy serious?" > > [etc, etc] > > What a devastating critique. > > Nico Fyhn Just realized someone might have gotten the mistaken impression that "what a devastating critique" was meant as a compliment. It was not. Forgot to put in a smiley or something. Nico Fyhn From roper@Colorado.EDU Sun Nov 30 13:30:31 1997 Received: from sobek.Colorado.EDU (sobek.Colorado.EDU [128.138.151.62]) by csf.Colorado.EDU (8.8.4/8.8.4/CNS-4.1p-nh) with ESMTP id NAA17880; Sun, 30 Nov 1997 13:30:19 -0700 (MST) Received: (from roper@localhost) by sobek.Colorado.EDU (8.8.8/8.8.7/UnixOps/Hesiod/(SDM)) id NAA29018; Sun, 30 Nov 1997 13:30:16 -0700 (MST) Date: Sun, 30 Nov 1997 13:30:16 -0700 (MST) Message-Id: <199711302030.NAA29018@sobek.Colorado.EDU> From: ROPER DON To: ecofem@csf.colorado.edu, elan@csf.colorado.edu, essa@csf.colorado.edu, homeless@csf.colorado.edu, ipe@csf.colorado.edu, longwaves@csf.colorado.edu, pkt@csf.colorado.edu, wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: CSF down on Mon, Dec 1 Dear CSFers, CSF will be down for all of Dec 1 and perhaps part of Dec 2 for a major software upgrade. sorry for any inconvenience don roper csf-manager From agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Sun Nov 30 18:59:04 1997 Received: from chass.utoronto.ca (chass.utoronto.ca [128.100.160.1]) by csf.Colorado.EDU (8.8.4/8.8.4/CNS-4.1p-nh) with SMTP id SAA27683 for ; Sun, 30 Nov 1997 18:59:02 -0700 (MST) Received: from localhost by chass.utoronto.ca via SMTP (951211.SGI.8.6.12.PATCH1042/940406.SGI) id UAA10193; Sun, 30 Nov 1997 20:58:41 -0500 Date: Sun, 30 Nov 1997 20:58:40 -0500 (EST) From: Gunder Frank To: Austrian Embassy cc: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: Re: Asian melt-down and the long cycle dating game In-Reply-To: <199711261042.LAA18277@zloty.it.com.pl> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII AGF responds to Arno Tausch only to say 1. I do not disoute what you say about Kuznetgs cycles, because I did/do not discuss them. 2. I do dispute what you say about Kondratieff cycles, though 3. I have some doubts myself and was just sdaying to my wife Nancy that maybe the K data are wrong and or wrongly interpreted, since some disconfirm my hypothesis and therefore unsettle my theory, which is not nice, eg: 4.My hypothesis was that up-phases in long cuycles of social movements ocurr in the down phases of the Kondratieffs. That turned out to be true for the 1816-48 K down, and the 1967- K down, but the otehr big SM up was in 1890-1913 which was supposedly a K up. so 5. Can YOU help me and CONFirm my SM up=econ down thesis, at least for the period before WWI? thanks gunder On Wed, 26 Nov 1997, Austrian Embassy wrote: > Date: Wed, 26 Nov 1997 11:44:22 +0100 > From: Austrian Embassy > To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK > Subject: Asian melt-down and the long cycle dating game > > Dear Andre Gunder and folks, > > A.G., you are right (parts of Asia will strongly recover) but you are wrong > on one major point - the Kondratieff cycle dating game. I have very strong > empirical convictions about it, based on Joshua Goldstein's data series > (1988) about the growth of industrial production in the (industrialised) > world. Submit these data to the calculation of incremental yearly growth > rates, and apply the multivariate EXCEL polynomial analysis, you arrive at > the startling result that there are indeed very strong Kuznets cycles (6th > order polynomial expressions), to be dated (R^2 given in %) > > 1741-56 23.5% > 1756-74 36.1% > 1774-1793 34.8% > 1793-1812 39.7% > 1812-1832 16.4% > 1832-62 25.7% > 1862-85 36.3% > 1885-1908 56.2% > 1908-32 44.2% > 1932-58 19.1% > 1958-75 68.8% > 1975-97 66.0% (this is based on UN and IMF data, since Joshua's series > ends in 1975) > > These are calculations, based on the original data without any moving > averages. So Chris Chase Dunn is right all along: there are very strong > Kuznets cycles. > > Secondly, you have to control for the very short term Kitchins, in order to > measure your Kondratieffs. So I applied to the same data series 5-year > moving averages, and you get the > following Kondratieffs (6th order polynomial expressions, based on EXCEL): > > > 1756-1832 R^2 30.8% > 1832-1885 9.2% > 1885-1932 50.5% > 1932-1982 40.3% > > > My dating scheme by and large corresponds to that of our friend Volker > Bornschier in Zurich, whose recent book on Western society (Transaction, > the German original dates back 1988, but has been reworked and enlarged for > the English edition) is a must for all of you who are interested in that > kind of questions. > > The major error of some approaches is to mix up the Kuznets cycle low of > around 1908 with a Kondratieff low. Mandel, Joshua Goldstein and many > others date their Kondratieff low at around 1890 or somewhere, so they > don't get the uopswing out of 1885 and the downswing in the 1930s properly > into focus. Bornschier has convincingly shown I > think the technological and societal factors that distinguish the 1870s and > early 1880s as well as the 1930s as a Kondratieff cycle low. > > What is the beef, then? Major disturbances but no Kondratieff crash in > Asia; perhaps also an Arrighi process where some swimmers (China) get their > heads out of the flood by > dumping others (Malaysia etc., those with a secular negative current > account in the Amir sense) down, with the stability of world capitalism as > a three-layer systems remaining intact (here I strictly follow our friend > Giovanni). > > Kind regards around the world, > > Yours humbly Arno Tausch from Warsaw > > PS more of that in my graphs that you can find in my WSN Archive network > article on Transnational Integration etc. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Andre Gunder Frank University of Toronto 96 Asquith Ave Tel. 1 416 972-0616 Toronto, ON Fax. 1 416 972-0071 CANADA M4W 1J8 Email agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca Some Home/Web Pages: http://www.chass.utoronto.ca:8080/~agfrank/gunder97.html http://csf.colorado.edu/wsystes/archive/bios/gunder/gunder97cd.html http://csf.colorado.edu/authors gopher://csf.colorado.edu/11/psn/authors/frank.gunder gopher://csf.colorado.edu/11/wsystems.pubs ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~