From HAMM@uni-trier.de Mon Dec 1 03:52:26 1997 From: HAMM@uni-trier.de 1 Dec 97 11:52:17 MET To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Mon, 1 Dec 1997 11:51:58 MET Subject: ake Dear WSNers, I have received the following terrifying message and want to suggest that some interested people may try to find out what really happened to Claude Ake, and make the case public. Interested? __________________________________ Bernd Hamm Jean Monnet Professor of European Studies Director, Center for European Studies University of Trier, D 54286 Trier, Germany Tel. +49-651-201.27.27, Fax 201.39.30 e-mail hamm@uni-trier.de Absendedatum: Mon, 24 Nov 1997 09:33:41 -0600 An: hamm@uni-trier.de, William Rees Von: Mathis Wackernagel Betreff: sad news Dear Bernd and Bill: I have just come back from an international Friends of the Earth Conference meeting in Uruguay, where I met Uche Onyeagucha, a young human rights lawyer from Nigeria who was also on the defense team of Ken Saro-Wiwa, the Nigerian writer-activist who was eventually hanged together with 8 other activists by the Nigerian government (probably with Shell as an accomplice) a little over two years ago. Uche told me that Claude Ake, our Nigerian friend who took part in the Dessau-meeting in 1992 died one year ago in an air crash. Claude Ake was getting increasingly vocal against the Nigerian dictatorship and Shell's opportunistic environmental and social violence. Activists in Nigeria believe that Claude Ake's plane (a local connector flight) was either planted with a bomb or attacked. What a loss ... not only for Nigeria. I remember Claude and his sharp analysis very clearly from the time we met him in Dessau. Certainly, he belonged to the most outstanding scholars I have met. Scary, very sad ... and perhaps more common than we want to believe in a large part of the world where power differentials, which are growing with globalization, encourage continued feudal exploitation and repression. Sorry for the sad news. Mathis ______________________________________________________________________ __ Mathis Wackernagel, Ph.D. Centre for Sustainability Studies / Centro de Estudios para la Sustentabilidad Universidad Anahuac de Xalapa Apartado Postal 653 91000 Xalapa, Ver. MEXICO tel.: (++52) 28 14-96-11 fax: (++52) 28 19-04-53 (or 19-15-15) e-mail in Mexico: mathiswa@edg.net.mx e-mail while travelling: mathiswa@compuserve.com From austria@it.com.pl Mon Dec 1 04:39:51 1997 Mon, 1 Dec 1997 12:40:33 +0100 (MET) Reply-To: From: "Austrian Embassy" To: Subject: Re: Reoply to AGF Asian melt-down and the long cycle dating game Date: Mon, 1 Dec 1997 12:42:59 +0100 Dear AGF, and all it does not unsettle your theory; the only smaller point of contention between your dating scheme (which you share with others) and my own (which I share with Bornschier) is the period 1832-1848. For you, it is still a down, while the Bornschier/Tausch upswing starts in the mid 1830s. I mentioned the Kuznets only because they often are mixed up with the Kondratieffs. If anything, we are going to have now a Kuznets down, but not a Kondratieff down. The data: these are the classic Joshua Goldstein two series about world industrial production from 1740 onwards, contained in the Appendix to his 1988 book. Transformed into yearly growth rates. Updated after 1975 by IMF and World Bank data about world GNP. Of course: these are just estimates, but better than nothing. About social movements: Volker Bornschiers marvellous recent Transaction book gives very compelete answers, which will be quite in line with your general argument. It is based on quite good research, amongst others on strike etc. statistics from the 19th century onward. Kind regards to you all Arno Tausch ---------- > From: Gunder Frank > To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK > Subject: Re: Asian melt-down and the long cycle dating game > Date: Montag, 01. Dezember 1997 02:58 > > AGF responds to Arno Tausch only to say > 1. I do not disoute what you say about Kuznetgs cycles, because I > did/do not discuss them. > 2. I do dispute what you say about Kondratieff cycles, though > 3. I have some doubts myself and was just sdaying to my wife Nancy that > maybe the K data are wrong and or wrongly interpreted, since some > disconfirm my hypothesis and therefore unsettle my theory, which is not > nice, eg: > > 4.My hypothesis was that up-phases in long cuycles of social movements > ocurr in the down phases of the Kondratieffs. That turned out to be > true for the 1816-48 K down, and the 1967- K down, but the otehr big SM > up was in 1890-1913 which was supposedly a K up. so > > 5. Can YOU help me and CONFirm my SM up=econ down thesis, at least for > the period before WWI? > > thanks > gunder > On Wed, 26 Nov 1997, > Austrian Embassy wrote: > > > Date: Wed, 26 Nov 1997 11:44:22 +0100 > > From: Austrian Embassy > > To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK > > Subject: Asian melt-down and the long cycle dating game > > > > Dear Andre Gunder and folks, > > > > A.G., you are right (parts of Asia will strongly recover) but you are wrong > > on one major point - the Kondratieff cycle dating game. I have very strong > > empirical convictions about it, based on Joshua Goldstein's data series > > (1988) about the growth of industrial production in the (industrialised) > > world. Submit these data to the calculation of incremental yearly growth > > rates, and apply the multivariate EXCEL polynomial analysis, you arrive at > > the startling result that there are indeed very strong Kuznets cycles (6th > > order polynomial expressions), to be dated (R^2 given in %) > > > > 1741-56 23.5% > > 1756-74 36.1% > > 1774-1793 34.8% > > 1793-1812 39.7% > > 1812-1832 16.4% > > 1832-62 25.7% > > 1862-85 36.3% > > 1885-1908 56.2% > > 1908-32 44.2% > > 1932-58 19.1% > > 1958-75 68.8% > > 1975-97 66.0% (this is based on UN and IMF data, since Joshua's series > > ends in 1975) > > > > These are calculations, based on the original data without any moving > > averages. So Chris Chase Dunn is right all along: there are very strong > > Kuznets cycles. > > > > Secondly, you have to control for the very short term Kitchins, in order to > > measure your Kondratieffs. So I applied to the same data series 5-year > > moving averages, and you get the > > following Kondratieffs (6th order polynomial expressions, based on EXCEL): > > > > > > 1756-1832 R^2 30.8% > > 1832-1885 9.2% > > 1885-1932 50.5% > > 1932-1982 40.3% > > > > > > My dating scheme by and large corresponds to that of our friend Volker > > Bornschier in Zurich, whose recent book on Western society (Transaction, > > the German original dates back 1988, but has been reworked and enlarged for > > the English edition) is a must for all of you who are interested in that > > kind of questions. > > > > The major error of some approaches is to mix up the Kuznets cycle low of > > around 1908 with a Kondratieff low. Mandel, Joshua Goldstein and many > > others date their Kondratieff low at around 1890 or somewhere, so they > > don't get the uopswing out of 1885 and the downswing in the 1930s properly > > into focus. Bornschier has convincingly shown I > > think the technological and societal factors that distinguish the 1870s and > > early 1880s as well as the 1930s as a Kondratieff cycle low. > > > > What is the beef, then? Major disturbances but no Kondratieff crash in > > Asia; perhaps also an Arrighi process where some swimmers (China) get their > > heads out of the flood by > > dumping others (Malaysia etc., those with a secular negative current > > account in the Amir sense) down, with the stability of world capitalism as > > a three-layer systems remaining intact (here I strictly follow our friend > > Giovanni). > > > > Kind regards around the world, > > > > Yours humbly Arno Tausch from Warsaw > > > > PS more of that in my graphs that you can find in my WSN Archive network > > article on Transnational Integration etc. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > Andre Gunder Frank > University of Toronto > 96 Asquith Ave Tel. 1 416 972-0616 > Toronto, ON Fax. 1 416 972-0071 > CANADA M4W 1J8 Email agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca > > Some Home/Web Pages: > > http://www.chass.utoronto.ca:8080/~agfrank/gunder97.html > http://csf.colorado.edu/wsystes/archive/bios/gunder/gunder97cd.html > http://csf.colorado.edu/authors > gopher://csf.colorado.edu/11/psn/authors/frank.gunder > gopher://csf.colorado.edu/11/wsystems.pubs > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > From chriscd@jhu.edu Mon Dec 1 07:42:36 1997 Date: Mon, 01 Dec 1997 09:38:25 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: ISA RC44 Call for Papers] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 17:04:18 +0100 From: isa@sis.ucm.es (International Sociological Association) Subject: ISA RC44 Call for Papers Apparently-to: chriscd@jhu.edu To: chriscd@jhu.edu Reply-to: isa@sis.ucm.es To: Members of the International Sociological Association ISA XIV World Congress of Sociology, Montreal 1998 Research Committee on Labour Movements, RC44 The following sessions are planned by RC44 (Labour Movements) for the ISA World Congress in 1998. If you are interested in contributing to one of these sessions please contact the session convenor(s) whose full mailing address are listed at http://www.ucm.es/info/isa Transformation of Work and Women's Labour Organization in the Context of Globalization (Joint with RC 32) Co- Chairs: Suzanne Franzway and Claire Williams Trade Unions and Social Pacts Chair: Marino Regini Renegotiating Class Compromises Chair: Eddie Webster <029edw@muse.arts.wits.ac.za> Micro-Meso-Macro : Rearticulating Union Strategies in the Context of Globalization / Les nouvelles articulations strategiques syndicales face la mondialisation Chair: Gregor Murray Le syndicalisme et la representation et l'etablissement / Trade Unionism and Workplace Representation Co-Chairs: Mona-Jose Gagnon and Carla Lipsig-Mumme New Constituencies, New Unionism Co-Chairs: Pamela Roby and Peter Leisink Labour in Post-Communist Societies Chair: Simon Clarke Industrial Relations and Labour Politics in Asian Industrialization Chair: Hagen Koo Labour Movements and State-Building in New Democracies / Movimientos laborales y formacion del estado en nuevas democracias Chair: Volker Frank Union Democracy in Developing Countries Chair: S.L. Hiremath The State and Labour Chair: Peter Fairbrother Cross-National Comparison of Labour Movements Chair: Richard Hyman There is also the possibility to arrange poster sessions for those whose papers cannot be accommodated within any of the above sessions. If interested, contact RC44 secretary Richard Hyman From austria@it.com.pl Wed Dec 3 17:56:52 1997 for ; Wed, 3 Dec 1997 12:22:46 +0100 (MET) Reply-To: From: "Austrian Embassy" To: Subject: further debate about Asian melt-down, long cycles Date: Wed, 3 Dec 1997 12:24:48 +0100 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_01BCFFE6.728F82E0 I hope this message comes through in a technically acceptable manner. Kind regards Arno Tausch (technical note: use as a print-out font Courier 8 or Times Roman 8 point) Dear AGF and colleagues, I thank you for your interest in the long cycle/Asian-melt-down debate. Let me emphasize here - in case that my recent posting did not come through - how similar my own (Bornschierean) results are to colleague Thompson's dating scheme, known especially from his superb piece published in Internat Organization in 1990. To make matters more transparent still, I include here my growth rate data series as well as details on calculation method from Joshua Goldstein's classic publication in 1988, as well as my dating scheme, adapted and expanded from Bornschier's 1988 German language publication, available to you now via Transaction (1996/97) in an expanded and extended version. This piece of European sociology should be known to you all, and I am sure it will will influence the course of the future debate. Note that Goldstein's series 1740 to 1975 is all about world industrial production. As to Andre Gunder: new social contracts determine the upswing, while protest movements start (1917, 1968 etc.) more or less at the middle of the long cycle, when the new technologies (productive forces) are already ripe, while the productive relationships are still determined by the old cyclical and societal contract. (That sounds like orthodox Marxism, but since Giovanni's - I think correct - re-interpretation of the G-W-G' formula in a cyclical fashion everything should be possible). Bornschiers excellent data series about protest strikes suicide etc. along cycles further could refine that argument. So again, what is the beef (I hope without BSE): no long cycle melt down, but an Arrighean semi-periphery 1 against 2 (possibly East Asia substituted by India, possibly Tigers substituted China, possibly East Asia substituted by Eastern Europe) ascent/decline process in the hierarchical world economy, plus a pretty strong Juglar/Kuznets low. The upswing, dear friends, - and this is where Arno Tausch the pessimist comes in - will be severely constrained, though, by phenomena of the environment - which, are more glaring than ever before (el Nino effect etc.). So here are the details 1) the calculation method: Let Xtn+1 be the index value of world production for tn+1; Xtn index value of world production for tn DYN = ((Xtn+1)/Xtn))-1 Post-1975 data: UN ECE; Fischer Weltalmanach, IMF. X is the time axis. 2) the data post 1975: 1975 -0,7 1976 4,8 1977 3,7 1978 4,1 1979 3 1980 0,4 1981 1,5 1982 -0,3 1983 2,8 1984 4,9 1985 3,4 1986 2,6 1987 3,4 1988 4,3 1989 3,6 1990 2,5 1991 0,8 1992 1,7 1993 0,9 1994 2,8 1995 2,1 1996 2,3 1997 2,5 please note that Goldstein's data series ends in 1975. 1740 - 1975 1741 -4,8 1742 10,1 1743 -4,6 1744 14,3 1745 -4,2 1746 4,4 1747 4,1 1748 8,1 1749 -11,1 1750 12,5 1751 0 1752 0 1753 3,7 1754 -3,5 1755 3,7 1756 -10,7 1757 4 1758 0 1759 -3,9 1760 0 1761 4,8 1762 0 1763 -3,9 1764 8,1 1765 0 1766 14,8 1767 0 1768 -3,2 1769 6,6 1770 -3,1 1771 0 1772 9,7 1773 -5,9 1774 -6,2 1775 3,3 1776 3,3 1777 3,1 1778 3,1 1779 -5,9 1780 0 1781 -3,1 1782 19,4 1783 -2,7 1784 2,8 1785 18,9 1786 4,5 1787 2,2 1788 -2,1 1789 19,6 1790 -1,8 1791 1,9 1792 7,3 1793 -13,6 1794 3,9 1795 5,7 1796 7,1 1797 -8,3 1798 9,1 1799 18,3 1800 5,6 1801 -5,3 1802 5,6 1803 1,3 1804 2,6 1805 2,6 1806 1,2 1807 3,7 1808 -4,8 1809 2,5 1810 8,5 1811 5,6 1812 -6,4 1813 1,1 1814 1,1 1815 11,1 1816 0 1817 0 1818 20 1819 -8,3 1820 0 1821 0 1822 9,1 1823 8,3 1824 0 1825 7,7 1826 -7,2 1827 15,4 1828 6,7 1829 -6,2 1830 13,3 1831 0 1832 -5,9 1833 12,5 1834 5,6 1835 5,3 1836 10 1837 -9,1 1838 10 1839 9,1 1840 0 1841 0 1842 -4,2 1843 4,4 1844 12,5 1845 7,4 1846 0 1847 -3,5 1848 10,7 1849 0 1850 0 1851 9,7 1852 8,8 1853 8 1854 5 1855 4,7 1856 9,1 1857 -2,1 1858 0 1859 6,4 1860 6 1861 0 1862 -11,3 1863 8,5 1864 5,9 1865 1,8 1866 14,5 1867 -1,6 1868 8,1 1869 4,5 1870 -2,8 1871 8,8 1872 10,8 1873 -1,2 1874 0 1875 -2,5 1876 3,8 1877 1,2 1878 2,4 1879 2,3 1880 8,1 1881 5,3 1882 7 1883 3,8 1884 -2,7 1885 -1 1886 5,7 1887 8 1888 4,2 1889 8,7 1890 5,1 1891 1,4 1892 1,4 1893 -3,3 1894 3,5 1895 9,5 1896 2,5 1897 4,8 1898 9,2 1899 7,4 1900 0,5 1901 3,9 1902 8 1903 2,2 1904 0,4 1905 10,2 1906 4,6 1907 2,9 1908 -8,2 1909 9,7 1910 7,1 1911 1,7 1912 8,8 1913 4,8 1914 -8,9 1915 3,1 1916 7,6 1917 0,8 1918 -5,9 1919 -8,3 1920 5,8 1921 -14,1 1922 22,5 1923 5,2 1924 5,8 1925 8,1 1926 3,3 1927 6,6 1928 4,6 1929 7,3 1930 -12,3 1931 -13,2 1932 -14,4 1933 12,6 1934 11,2 1935 11,7 1936 12,7 1937 10,1 1938 -10,4 1939 17 1940 7,4 1941 19,4 1942 16,7 1943 13,9 1944 -5,1 1945 -30,7 1946 -14,9 1947 12,6 1948 7,5 1949 2 1950 13,7 1951 8,6 1952 2,4 1953 7,4 1954 0 1955 11,9 1956 4,9 1957 3,3 1958 -2,6 1959 11,3 1960 6,6 1961 3,6 1962 6,6 1963 5,1 1964 8,2 1965 7,4 1966 7,9 1967 1,5 1968 6,3 1969 7,4 1970 2,1 1971 2 1972 7,8 1973 9,1 1974 0,8 4) The dating schemes: The turning points in the long waves between the ascents and decline phases (B-phases) were always the beginnings of political decay in the region of Eastern Europe as well, while the ascent phases were associated with authoritarian modernization; time-lags between the Western cycle and the Eastern semi-periphery and periphery have to be admitted. The decisive-kairos-years are: 1509 1539 1575 1621 1689 1756 1832/48 1884 1933 1982 Source: our own compilations from Goldstein and our own data interpretations after 1740, based on Goldstein. It should be recalled, that there is another tradition - based on Braudel - to view the cycle, that begins in 1689, as ending in 1747, to be followed by a 1747 - 1790 cycle, and a 1790 - 1848 cycle (for a debate about these issues, see especially Amin, 1997). The logic of the Kondratieff waves from 1756 onwards are given as follows: social process cycle 1756-1835/41 basic project defeudalization prosperity reform compulsory education, conscription; American and French Revolution; Joseph II (Austria) mid-cycle conflict wars of the French Revolution, Napoleonic wars Poland: 1807 Duchy of Warsaw technological change basic industrial steam engine (end 18th century) projects 'Spinning Jenny' (J. Stargreave, 1770) new technologies steam locomotive 'Puffing Billy' emerging during (W. Hadley, 1813) prosperity re- cession Unresolved problem freedom of association crisis of the model revolution 1830 Poland: rebellion 1830/31 international regime A-phase British naval dominance (George III) B-phase 'congress of Vienna'-regime dominant economic theory A. Smith, 1776 political economy of world system D. Ricardo, 1817 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------- social process cycle 1835/42-83 1884-1932 1933-81 basic project freedom of market enlargement welfare and enterprise of participa- state, tion corporatism prosperity reform freedom of asso- social secu- educational ciation rity, parlia- reform, mentarism civil rights, emancipation of women mid-cycle conflict wars and civil Eastern Europe: Vietnam war, wars Revolution world student Poland: revolution 1905 rebellion 1863/64 1968 strikes, terrorism Polish Winter 1970 technological change basic industrial railway, steel, oil, inputs and steamship electricity, synthetics, technological electric automobile projects motor new technologies steel petrochemicals chips emerging during prosperity re- cession unresolved prob- lem enlargement relationship basic income of participation capital, la- environment bour, state unequal exchange crisis of the model revolution revolution contestation 1871 1917 of the model Poland: Poland: from 1968 socialist strikes onwards movement peasant 1880s uprisings Poland: 1936/37 Summer 1980 international regime A-phase liberal mercantilism Bretton world trade Woods B-phase -"- hypermercan- neo- tilism protectio- nism dominant eco- nomic theory J. St. Mill, A. Marshall, J.M. Keynes, 1848 1890 1936 political economy of world system K. Marx, 1867 R. Hilferding, K. Polanyi, 1910 1944 The danger is of course, that the Cold-War structure will be substituted by a new power rivalry between the former members of the winning coalition of World War II: Hegemonic wars in the world system from 1495 onwards Role in War Thirty Years War Napoleonic WW I+II losing hegemonic contender Hapsburgs France Germany new hegemony Netherlands Britain USA newly emerging challenger: eco- nomically deci- mated member of winning coalition France Germany China+ Russia past contender for systemic hegemony, joining the war effort of the winning coalition Sweden Hapsburgs France Portugal The former hegemonic contenders slowly slide into an acceptance of their status in the international system. The real power struggle erupts already soon after the great hegemonic war, and through the ups and downs of the history of the system evolves slowly into the hegemonic challenge. Seen in such a way, not 1989, but Korea and Vietnam could become rather the benchmarks of the future W-structure of conflict in the international arena. For the foreign policies of the European Union, it is also important to notice the following tendency: German-Russian alliances tend to happen during depressions, and they break up during the economic upswings of the world system, when, especially during waning hegemonies, re-colonization phases set it (Amin, 1997, partially based on Bergesen): Khol + Gorbi/Boris 1985 ff. Rapallo 1922 Bismarck's Three Emperor Alliance 1873 Holy Alliance 1815 Alliance Russia-Germany 1764 Nordic War 1700-1721 The relationship of the Kondratieff and Kuznets cycles with Russian history is the following: Reforms KONDRATIEFF Perestroika, Lenin's NEP, OR KUZNETS Great Reforms 1861, DOWNSWING Katharinas Assembly 1775 Nobility's Victory 1730, Split of the State Church 1653, Boris Godunow 1598-1605 Repressive Modernization KONDRATIEFF Joseph Stalin, OR KUZNETS Imperialistic Expansion UPSWING and Repressive Industria- lization at the end of 19. th century Nikolas the Gendarme of Europe, Elisabeth's expansionist policy, Peter the Great, Michael III, Iwan the Terrible Reform Repression <-----------------------------------------------------------------> 1985 'Gorbi' <--------------> 1928 Stalin 57 Years 64 Years 47 Years 1921 NEP <--------------> Alexander III 40 Years 60 Years 56 Years 1861 Great Reforms <--------------> Nikolas I 1825 36 Years 86 Years 84 Years 1775 Constituent <--------------> Elisabeth's expansionist rule Assembly 34 Years 1741 45 Years 52 Years 1730 Victory of <--------------> Peter I 1689 Nobility 41 Years 77 Years 76 Years Church Split 1653<--------------> Michael III 1613 40 Years 55 Years 48 Years Boris Godunow 1598 <--------------> Iwan's 'Oprichina' 1565 33 Years Average periods of Russian history: Perestroika <--------------> authoritarian modernization 40 Years 64.5 Years 60.5 Years _____________________________________________________ Seen in such a way, there is even little that the West seems to be able to do to stabilize democracy in Russia. However, the return of East Central Europe towards a 'middle of the road' and sensible philosophy - whatever the color of the government (Orenstein, 1996) - seems to be an urgent necessity, after the ups and downs of central planning and 'the central market principle'. ------=_NextPart_000_01BCFFE6.728F82E0

I hope this message comes through in a = technically acceptable manner.

Kind regards


Arno = Tausch


(technical note: use as a print-out font Courier 8 or = Times Roman 8 point)

Dear AGF and colleagues,

I thank you = for your interest in the long cycle/Asian-melt-down debate. Let me = emphasize here - in case that my recent posting did not come through - = how similar my own (Bornschierean) results are to colleague Thompson's = dating scheme, known especially from his superb piece published in = Internat Organization in 1990. To make matters more transparent still, I = include here my growth rate data series as well as details on = calculation method from Joshua Goldstein's classic publication in 1988, = as well as my dating scheme, adapted and expanded from Bornschier's 1988 = German language publication, available to you now via Transaction = (1996/97) in an expanded and extended version. This piece of European = sociology should be known to you all, and I am sure it will will = influence the course of the future debate. Note that Goldstein's series = 1740 to 1975 is all about world industrial production.

As to = Andre Gunder: new social contracts determine the upswing, while protest = movements start (1917, 1968 etc.) more or less at the middle of the long = cycle, when the new technologies (productive forces) are already ripe, = while the productive relationships are still determined by the old = cyclical and societal contract. (That sounds like orthodox Marxism, but = since Giovanni's - I think correct -  re-interpretation of the = G-W-G' formula in a cyclical fashion everything should be possible). = Bornschiers excellent data series about protest strikes suicide etc. = along cycles further could refine that argument.

So again, what = is the beef (I hope without BSE): no long cycle melt down, but an = Arrighean semi-periphery 1 against 2 (possibly East Asia substituted by = India, possibly Tigers substituted China, possibly East Asia substituted = by Eastern Europe) ascent/decline process in the hierarchical world = economy, plus a pretty strong Juglar/Kuznets low. The upswing, dear = friends, - and this is where Arno Tausch the pessimist comes in - will = be severely constrained, though, by phenomena of the environment - = which, are more glaring than ever before (el Nino effect = etc.).

So here are the details


1)  the = calculation method:


Let Xtn+1 be the index value of world = production for tn+1; Xtn index value of world production for = tn



DYN =3D = ((Xtn+1)/Xtn))-1

Post-1975 data: UN ECE; Fischer Weltalmanach, = IMF. X is the time axis.


2)  the data post = 1975:

1975
-0,7
1976
4,8
1977
3,7
1978
4,11979
3
1980
0,4
1981
1,5
1982
-0,3
1983
2,81984
4,9
1985
3,4
1986
2,6
1987
3,4
1988
4,3=
1989
3,6
1990
2,5
1991
0,8
1992
1,7
1993
0= ,9
1994
2,8
1995
2,1
1996
2,3
1997
2,5

ple= ase note that Goldstein's data series ends in 1975.

1740 - = 1975


1741
-4,8
1742
10,1
1743
-4,6
1744
1= 4,3
1745
-4,2
1746
4,4
1747
4,1
1748
8,1
1749<= br>-11,1
1750
12,5
1751
0
1752
0
1753
3,7
1754=
-3,5
1755
3,7
1756
-10,7
1757
4
1758
0
175= 9
-3,9
1760
0
1761
4,8
1762
0
1763
-3,9
176= 4
8,1
1765
0
1766
14,8
1767
0
1768
-3,2
176= 9
6,6
1770
-3,1
1771
0
1772
9,7
1773
-5,9
1= 774
-6,2
1775
3,3
1776
3,3
1777
3,1
1778
3,11779
-5,9
1780
0
1781
-3,1
1782
19,4
1783
-2= ,7
1784
2,8
1785
18,9
1786
4,5
1787
2,2
1788-2,1
1789
19,6
1790
-1,8
1791
1,9
1792
7,3
1= 793
-13,6
1794
3,9
1795
5,7
1796
7,1
1797
-8,3=
1798
9,1
1799
18,3
1800
5,6
1801
-5,3
18025,6
1803
1,3
1804
2,6
1805
2,6
1806
1,2
1807<= br>3,7
1808
-4,8
1809
2,5
1810
8,5
1811
5,6
18= 12
-6,4
1813
1,1
1814
1,1
1815
11,1
1816
0
= 1817
0
1818
20
1819
-8,3
1820
0
1821
0
1822=
9,1
1823
8,3
1824
0
1825
7,7
1826
-7,2
182= 7
15,4
1828
6,7
1829
-6,2
1830
13,3
1831
0
= 1832
-5,9
1833
12,5
1834
5,6
1835
5,3
1836
10<= br>1837
-9,1
1838
10
1839
9,1
1840
0
1841
01842
-4,2
1843
4,4
1844
12,5
1845
7,4
1846
0<= br>1847
-3,5
1848
10,7
1849
0
1850
0
1851
9,7<= br>1852
8,8
1853
8
1854
5
1855
4,7
1856
9,11857
-2,1
1858
0
1859
6,4
1860
6
1861
0
18= 62
-11,3
1863
8,5
1864
5,9
1865
1,8
1866
14,5<= br>1867
-1,6
1868
8,1
1869
4,5
1870
-2,8
1871
= 8,8
1872
10,8
1873
-1,2
1874
0
1875
-2,5
1876<= br>3,8
1877
1,2
1878
2,4
1879
2,3
1880
8,1
188= 1
5,3
1882
7
1883
3,8
1884
-2,7
1885
-1
188= 6
5,7
1887
8
1888
4,2
1889
8,7
1890
5,1
189= 1
1,4
1892
1,4
1893
-3,3
1894
3,5
1895
9,5
= 1896
2,5
1897
4,8
1898
9,2
1899
7,4
1900
0,51901
3,9
1902
8
1903
2,2
1904
0,4
1905
10,2<= br>1906
4,6
1907
2,9
1908
-8,2
1909
9,7
1910
7= ,1
1911
1,7
1912
8,8
1913
4,8
1914
-8,9
19153,1
1916
7,6
1917
0,8
1918
-5,9
1919
-8,3
19= 20
5,8
1921
-14,1
1922
22,5
1923
5,2
1924
5,8<= br>1925
8,1
1926
3,3
1927
6,6
1928
4,6
1929
7,= 3
1930
-12,3
1931
-13,2
1932
-14,4
1933
12,6
1= 934
11,2
1935
11,7
1936
12,7
1937
10,1
1938
-1= 0,4
1939
17
1940
7,4
1941
19,4
1942
16,7
1943<= br>13,9
1944
-5,1
1945
-30,7
1946
-14,9
1947
12,6=
1948
7,5
1949
2
1950
13,7
1951
8,6
1952
2,= 4
1953
7,4
1954
0
1955
11,9
1956
4,9
1957
3= ,3
1958
-2,6
1959
11,3
1960
6,6
1961
3,6
1962<= br>6,6
1963
5,1
1964
8,2
1965
7,4
1966
7,9
196= 7
1,5
1968
6,3
1969
7,4
1970
2,1
1971
2
197= 2
7,8
1973
9,1
1974
0,8






4) =  The dating schemes:

The turning points in the long waves = between the ascents and decline phases (B-phases) were always the = beginnings of political decay in the region of Eastern Europe as well, = while the ascent phases were associated with authoritarian = modernization; time-lags between the Western cycle and the Eastern = semi-periphery and periphery have to be admitted. The = decisive-kairos-years = are:

1509
1539
1575
1621
1689
1756
1832/48
18= 84
1933
1982

Source: our own compilations from Goldstein = and our own data interpretations after 1740, based on Goldstein. It = should be recalled, that there is another tradition - based on Braudel - = to view the cycle, that begins in 1689, as ending in 1747, to be = followed by a 1747 - 1790 cycle, and a 1790 - 1848 cycle (for a debate = about these issues, see especially Amin, 1997).

The logic of the = Kondratieff waves from 1756 onwards are given as = follows:


social process cycle = 1756-1835/41


basic = project defeudalization


prosperity = reform compulsory = education,
conscription; American = and
French = Revolution;
Joseph II = (Austria)


mid-cycle conflict wars of the French = Revolution,
Napoleonic = wars
Poland: 1807 Duchy of = Warsaw


technological change


basic = industrial steam engine (end 18th = century)
projects 'Spinning Jenny' (J. Stargreave, = 1770)


new technologies steam locomotive 'Puffing = Billy'
emerging during (W. Hadley, 1813)
prosperity = re-
cession


Unresolved problem freedom of = association


crisis of the model revolution = 1830
Poland: rebellion = 1830/31


international = regime


A-phase British = naval
dominance (George = III)


B-phase 'congress of = Vienna'-regime


dominant = economic
theory A. Smith, = 1776


political economy of
world system D. = Ricardo, = 1817


---------------------------------------------------------= ----------------------------------------


social = process cycle = 1835/42-83 1884-1932 1933-81


basic = project freedom of = market enlargement welfare
and = enterprise of = participa- state,
tion&= #009; corporatism


prosperity reform freedom = of asso- social = secu- educational
ciation �= 9;rity, = parlia- reform,
mentari= sm civil
&#= 009;rights,
eman= cipation
of = women


mid-cycle conflict wars and = civil Eastern Europe: Vietnam = war,
wars Revolution wor= ld student
Poland: = revolution 1905 rebellion
1863= /64 1968
&#= 009; strikes,
�= 09; terrorism
�= 09; Polish
= Winter 1970


technological change


basic = industrial railway, steel, oil,
input= s = and steamship electricity, synthetics,technological electric automobi= le
projects motor


new = technologies steel petrochemicals chips
eme= rging during
prosperity re-
cession


unresolved = prob-
lem enlargement relationship &#= 009;basic income
of participation capital, = la- environment
bour, = state unequal
�= 09; exchange
crisis of = the
model revolution revolution = ;contestation
1871 1917 = of the = model
Poland: Poland: from = 1968
socialist strikes o= nwards
movement peasant =
1880s uprisings Poland:=
1936/37 Summer = 1980

international = regime


A-phase liberal mercantilis= m Bretton
world = trade Woods


B-phase &#= 009;-"- hypermercan- neo-
= ; tilism protectio-
�= 9; nism


dominant = eco-
nomic
theory J. St. Mill, A. = Marshall, J.M. = Keynes,
1848 1890 = 1936



political economy
of
world = system K. Marx, 1867 R. Hilferding, K. = Polanyi,
1910 194= 4

The danger is of course, that the Cold-War structure will be = substituted by a new power rivalry between the former members of the = winning coalition of World War II:

Hegemonic wars in the world = system from 1495 onwards


Role in War Thirty Years = War Napoleonic WW I+II


losing = hegemonic
contender Hapsburgs France = Germany

new = hegemony Netherlands Britain USA

= newly emerging
challenger: eco-
nomically deci-
mated member = of
winning = coalition France Germany China+
= ; Russia

past
co= ntender for
systemic hegemony,
joining the war
effort of = the
winning = coalition Sweden Hapsburgs France
�= 09; Portugal


The former hegemonic = contenders slowly slide into an acceptance of their status in the = international system. The real power struggle erupts already soon after = the great hegemonic war, and through the ups and downs of the history of = the system evolves slowly into the hegemonic challenge. Seen in such a = way, not 1989, but Korea and Vietnam could become rather the benchmarks = of the future W-structure of conflict in the international arena. For = the foreign policies of the European Union, it is also important to = notice the following tendency: German-Russian alliances tend to happen = during depressions, and they break up during the economic upswings of = the world system, when, especially during waning hegemonies, = re-colonization phases set it (Amin, 1997, partially based on = Bergesen):

Khol + Gorbi/Boris 1985 ff.

Rapallo = 1922

Bismarck's Three Emperor Alliance 1873

Holy Alliance = 1815

Alliance Russia-Germany 1764

Nordic War = 1700-1721


The relationship of the Kondratieff and Kuznets = cycles with Russian history is the = following:

Reforms

KONDRATIEF= F Perestroika, Lenin's NEP,
OR = KUZNETS Great Reforms = 1861,
DOWNSWING Katharinas Assembly = 1775

Nobility's Victory = 1730,
Split of the State Church = 1653,
Boris Godunow = 1598-1605


Repressive = Modernization


KONDRATIEFF Joseph = Stalin,
OR KUZNETS Imperialistic = Expansion
UPSWING and Repressive = Industria-
lization at the end of 19. = th century
Nikolas = the
Gendarme of = Europe,
Elisabeth's = expansionist
policy,
�= 9; Peter the Great,
Michael = III,
Iwan the = Terrible


Reform Repression<= br><-----------------------------------------------------------------&= gt;

1985 = 'Gorbi' <--------------> 1928 = Stalin
57 Years

64 = Years 47 Years


1921 = NEP <--------------> Alexander = III
40 Years

60 = Years 56 Years


1861 = Great Reforms <--------------> Nikolas I = 1825
36 Years

86 = Years 84 Years


1775 = Constituent <--------------> Elisabeth's = expansionist = rule

Assembly = ;34 Years 1741

45 = Years 52 Years


1730 = Victory of <--------------> Peter I = 1689
Nobility 41 = Years

77 Years 76 = Years


Church Split = 1653<--------------> Michael III = 1613
40 Years

55 = Years 48 Years


Boris = Godunow 1598 <--------------> Iwan's 'Oprichina' = 1565
33 Years


Average periods of = Russian = history:


Perestroika <--------------> &#= 009;authoritarian modernization
40 = Years

64.5 Years 60.5 = Years
_____________________________________________________

Seen in such a way, there is even little that the West seems to be able = to do to stabilize democracy in Russia. However, the return of East = Central Europe towards a 'middle of the road' and sensible philosophy - = whatever the color of the government (Orenstein, 1996) - seems to be an = urgent necessity, after the ups and downs of central planning and 'the = central market principle'.



------=_NextPart_000_01BCFFE6.728F82E0-- From chriscd@jhu.edu Wed Dec 3 18:06:55 1997 Date: Wed, 03 Dec 1997 15:01:04 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: bornschier's _transition_ and the world polity school To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu Thanks to Arno Tausch for mentioning Volker Bornschier's fine book, _Western Society in Transition_ (Transaction Publishers 1996). Indeed Bornschier's book is a fine study of the core countries that focusses mainly on the period since World War II, though this is considered in the context of the international system over the past several centuries. It presents a theoretical approach to the world-system that overlaps significantly with the "world polity" approach developed by John Meyer and his colleagues (John Boli, Francisco Ramirez, George Thomas, etc.). The emphasis is on changes in the global culture as institutionalized in models of development espoused by the dominant actors. Bornschier analyzes world-system cycles such as the Kondratieff wave and waves of technological style as they have interacted with changes in the dominant societal models, especially Keynsianism and its replacement by the globalization project. This is a fine book that presents an alternative way of looking at the modern world-system. chris chase-dunn From austria@it.com.pl Wed Dec 3 18:19:46 1997 for ; Tue, 2 Dec 1997 10:24:03 +0100 (MET) Reply-To: From: "Austrian Embassy" To: Subject: Cycle logic - AGF and Bornschier's scheme Date: Tue, 2 Dec 1997 10:25:54 +0100 Message from Arno Tausch Let me further clarify my answer to AGF's suggestions and questions. (I hope my answer comes out in a technically acceptable fashion. If you have problems, print it in Courier 10 or 8, or Times Roman 10 or 8 point font.) The turning points in the long waves between the ascents and decline phases (B-phases) were always the beginnings of political decay in the region of Eastern Europe as well, while the ascent phases were associated with authoritarian modernization; time-lags between the Western cycle and the Eastern semi-periphery and periphery have to be admitted. The decisive-kairos-years are: 1509 1539 1575 1621 1689 1756 1835/42 1884 1933 1982 Source: our own compilations from Goldstein and our own data interpretations after 1740, our own calculations based on Goldstein. It should be recalled, that there is another tradition - based on Braudel - to view the cycle, that begins in 1689, as ending in 1747, to be followed by a 1747 - 1790 cycle, and a 1790 - 1848 cycle (for a debate about these issues, see especially Amin, 1997). The logic of the Kondratieff waves from 1756 onwards in the tradition, based mainly on Bornschier, are given as follows: social process cycle 1756-1835/41 basic project defeudalization prosperity reform compulsory education, conscription; American and French Revolution; Joseph II (Austria) mid-cycle conflict wars of the French Revolution, Napoleonic wars Poland: 1807 Duchy of Warsaw technological change basic industrial steam engine (end 18th century) projects 'Spinning Jenny' (J. Stargreave, 1770) new technologies steam locomotive 'Puffing Billy' emerging during (W. Hadley, 1813) prosperity re- cession Unresolved problem freedom of association crisis of the model revolution 1830 Poland: rebellion 1830/31 international regime A-phase British naval dominance (George III) B-phase 'congress of Vienna'-regime dominant economic theory A. Smith, 1776 political economy of world system D. Ricardo, 1817 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------- social process cycle 1835/42-83 1884-1932 1933-81 basic project freedom of market enlargement welfare and enterprise of participa- state, tion corporatism prosperity reform freedom of asso- social secu- educational ciation rity, parlia- reform, mentarism civil rights, emancipation of women mid-cycle conflict wars and civil Eastern Europe: Vietnam war, wars Revolution world student Poland: revolution 1905 rebellion 1863/64 1968 strikes, terrorism Polish Winter 1970 technological change basic industrial railway, steel, oil, inputs and steamship electricity, synthetics, technological electric automobile projects motor new technologies steel petrochemicals chips emerging during prosperity re- cession unresolved prob- lem enlargement relationship basic income of participation capital, la- environment bour, state unequal exchange crisis of the model revolution revolution contestation 1871 1917 of the model Poland: Poland: from 1968 socialist strikes onwards movement peasant 1880s uprisings Poland: 1936/37 Summer 1980 international regime A-phase liberal mercantilism Bretton world trade Woods B-phase -"- hypermercan- neo- tilism protectio- nism dominant eco- nomic theory J. St. Mill, A. Marshall, J.M. Keynes, 1848 1890 1936 political economy of world system K. Marx, 1867 R. Hilferding, K. Polanyi, 1910 1944 The danger is of course, that the Cold-War structure will be substituted by a new power rivalry between the former members of the winning coalition of World War II: Hegemonic wars in the world system from 1495 onwards Role in War Thirty Years War Napoleonic WW I+II losing hegemonic contender Hapsburgs France Germany new hegemony Netherlands Britain USA newly emerging challenger: eco- nomically deci- mated member of winning coalition France Germany China+ Russia past contender for systemic hegemony, joining the war effort of the winning coalition Sweden Hapsburgs France Portugal The former hegemonic contenders slowly slide into an acceptance of their status in the international system. The real power struggle erupts already soon after the great hegemonic war, and through the ups and downs of the history of the system evolves slowly into the hegemonic challenge. Seen in such a way, not 1989, but Korea and Vietnam could become rather the benchmarks of the future W-structure of conflict in the international arena. For the foreign policies of the European Union, it is also important to notice the following tendency: German-Russian alliances tend to happen during depressions, and they break up during the economic upswings of the world system, when, especially during waning hegemonies, re-colonization phases set it (Amin, 1997, partially based on Bergesen): Khol + Gorbi/Boris 1985 ff. Rapallo 1922 Bismarck's Three Emperor Alliance 1873 Holy Alliance 1815 Alliance Russia-Germany 1764 Nordic War 1700-1721 The relationship of the Kondratieff and Kuznets cycles with Russian history is the following: Reforms KONDRATIEFF Perestroika, Lenin's NEP, OR KUZNETS Great Reforms 1861, DOWNSWING Katharinas Assembly 1775 Nobility's Victory 1730, Split of the State Church 1653, Boris Godunow 1598-1605 Repressive Modernization KONDRATIEFF Joseph Stalin, OR KUZNETS Imperialistic Expansion UPSWING and Repressive Industria- lization at the end of 19. th century Nikolas the Gendarme of Europe, Elisabeth's expansionist policy, Peter the Great, Michael III, Iwan the Terrible Reform Repression <-----------------------------------------------------------------> 1985 'Gorbi' <--------------> 1928 Stalin 57 Years 64 Years 47 Years 1921 NEP <--------------> Alexander III 40 Years 60 Years 56 Years 1861 Great Reforms <--------------> Nikolas I 1825 36 Years 86 Years 84 Years 1775 Constituent <--------------> Elisabeth's expansionist rule Assembly 34 Years 1741 45 Years 52 Years 1730 Victory of <--------------> Peter I 1689 Nobility 41 Years 77 Years 76 Years Church Split 1653<--------------> Michael III 1613 40 Years 55 Years 48 Years Boris Godunow 1598 <--------------> Iwan's 'Oprichina' 1565 33 Years Average periods of Russian history: Perestroika <--------------> authoritarian modernization 40 Years 64.5 Years 60.5 Years _____________________________________________________ From chriscd@jhu.edu Thu Dec 4 15:49:51 1997 Date: Thu, 04 Dec 1997 15:46:46 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: ISA RC05 Call for Papers] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu Date: Wed, 03 Dec 1997 16:18:14 +0100 From: isa@sis.ucm.es (International Sociological Association) Subject: ISA RC05 Call for Papers Apparently-to: chriscd@jhu.edu To: chriscd@jhu.edu Reply-to: isa@sis.ucm.es To: Members of the International Sociological Association ISA XIV World Congress of Sociology, Montreal 1998 Research Committee on Ethnic, Race and Minority Relations, RC05 CALL FOR PAPERS / POSTERS If you wish to offer a Paper or otherwise participate in a session could you please contact directly the Session Convenors giving details of how you would like to participate, the abstract of your presentation and any other relevant material as soon as possible. Full mailing addresses of the Convenors and session descriptions are available at http://www.ucm.es/info/isa To avoid past situations where mail has apparently got lost on route to Convenors could you also please send a copy of your offer to the RC05 Secretariat which will be coordinating the whole RC05 program: Email: c.inglis@edfac.usyd.edu.au. If there is no panel which fits the focus of a paper which you wish to present, the possibility exists of including it in the Wednesday morning Poster Session. If you are interested in being included in this session please send your offer of a Poster with appropriate details direct to the RC05 Secretariat. PANEL THEMES 1. Gender, Race, Class and the Politics of Mating Convenors: Evie TASTOGLOU, etastsog@shark.stmarys.ca Edite NOIVO, noive@ere.umontreal.ca 2. Developments in the Former USSR Convenor: Roza ISMAGILOVA, fax 7-095-2020786 3. Ethnicity and Immigration Convenor: David LOPEZ, dlopez@soc.ucla.edu 4. Developments in Quebec/Canada Convenor: Danielle JUTEAU, juteaud@ere.umontreal.ca 5. "Race", Ethnicity and the Discourse of Exclusion Convenor: Peter RATCLIFFE, syraa@ice.csv.warwick.ac.uk 6. Intercultural Practice and Ethnic Identifications Convenor: Gilla BOTTOMLEY, gill.bottomley@mq.edu.au 7. Discrimination Against and Resistance by Koreans in Japan Convenor: Jeff BROADBENT, broad001@atlas.socsci.umn.edu) 8. Language, Identity and Social Division Convenor: Eliezer BEN-RAFAEL, eliezer@spirit.tau.ac.il 9 Multicultural Citizenship Convenor: Kogila MOODLEY, kmoodley@unixg.ubc.ca 10. Nations and Nationalism: Lessons from Divided Societies Convenor: Heribert ADAM, no e-mail nor fax available, Dept Sociology, Simon Fraser Univ, Vancouver, BC V5A 156, Canada 11. Identity Construction in Comparative Perspective Convenor: Christine INGLIS, c.inglis@edfac.usyd.edu.au 12. Ethnic/Immigrant Entrepreneurship in Contemporary Societies Convenor: Lloyd WONG, lwong@okcins.okanagan.bc.ca) 13. Nationalism and Gendered Orders Convenor: Minoo MOALLEM, minoom@sfsu.edu) 14 . Race, Ethnicity and Education: Assessing the Impact of Research Joint session with RC04, the Sociology of Education. Convenor: Sally TOMLINSON, aea01st@ gold.ac.uk From chriscd@jhu.edu Thu Dec 4 16:13:17 1997 Date: Thu, 04 Dec 1997 16:08:51 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: good w-s books To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu Jake Elkins wrote: >Is it possible for one of you to post a Recommended Reading list of good books on WS? I am sure many would appreciate it! I would. for starters its Thomas R. Shannon, _An Introduction to the World-Systems Perspective_ (Westview 1996). the list could get very long, but the short version would have to include: Immanuel Wallerstein, _The Modern World-System, Vol 1._ (Academic 1974) Andre Gunder Frank, _World Accumulation 1492-1789_ (Monthly Review 1978) Giovanni Arrighi, _The Long Twentieth Century_ (Verso 1994) chris From epaminon@ergos.es Thu Dec 4 17:45:47 1997 Date: Fri, 05 Dec 1997 01:44:52 +0100 From: Juan Luis Reply-To: epaminon@ergos.es To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: Models and reality (long cycle dating time) I'm think I'm not so well prepared to discuss properly about the long economics cycles, because they don't belong to my discipline's theoretical corpus, but I want to make some specifications about it. First, and most important, the long cycles are models (not properly mathematical models, but instead theoretical economy models which uses the maths as justification) which try to match with reality. The matching problem is, of course, data retrieval. I can accept that the data of this century have signification for their intended use, but What about the data of the 19th century? I hope that I don't say a non sense if I doubt about their reliability. So, It isn't impossible that apply the long cycles to periods long than this century is just to force the reality to match the model. Second, I'm not doubting about the utility of economics in the description of reality, but I think that is extremely reductionist to justify the entire sense of a major social dynamic just with economic reasoning. Even the marx' sense of economics, being social, is reductionist (yet useful), then the orthodox economic theory is simply too reductionist for threat a major social dynamic with merely itself's tools, even if the base of the dynamic is economic. Our sciences, our knowledges if you prefer, are just not prepared to threat a social dynamic properly, with more than a coarse approximation to reality. If we don't use the economical approach, the nowadays discourse tends to use the historical or even periodistics approach to social reality. Then, the elements of the actual paradigm are used once and again, until they proves directly that they don't match with the next problems. It has no solution: it is not possible (or believable) to use superficial elements to analyze the base elements. I want to propose you another element for analyze the Asia's meltdown crisis: the cultural tension. Indeed, I hope that there is no doubt about, at least, the partial cultural base of the Asia's actual problem. It is not just a problem of internal and external demand. If you talk about the long cycles, you have to think in that countries, and in the entire world, long time ago. Until not much time, the world wasn't the less-defined thing that now is, or tend to be. The cultural differences exist as a almost impenetrable barrier, and the sense of minor or even major elements of reality (for dress to ideas about the economic circumstances) was very different and very difficult to translate between cultural context. Then, think about Asia's problem. That countries are (and will be, in the near future) subject to a major cultural tension. Some of these countries were colonies of Europe until not much time ago, the rest have to adapt in a very short period of time (if you compare it with the entire process in Europe or, even, in America). Then, Governments, industries and population have had to change very, very quickly. The extremely quick changes only can be if the changed item renounces to part of its cultural identity; not just it; it also has to adapt the new elements without time for give them a sense: tension is simply awesome. The economical crisis have no definitive explanation; if they have so, the crisis could be predicted. I'm don't talk about an EXCLUSIVE cultural reason, nor a common cultural problem for all those countries. Every country have, I think, a cultural tension, but it have different shapes and ways of develop it directly dependent of the country culture(s) and history(ies). The long cycles are a MODEL which was created from the history of the development of the capitalism and industrial revolution in Europe and America. I think that you have to be cautious at its application to the dynamics of the non-occidental world (the majority of the world). I think that apply it without considering the cultural differences is, simply, a nonsense. Juan Luis Chulilla Complutense university, Madrid C/. de la Paz, 8 28012 Madrid, Spain. e-mail: epaminon@ergos.es From thall@DEPAUW.EDU Fri Dec 5 07:29:17 1997 05 Dec 1997 09:29:15 -0500 (EST) Date: Fri, 05 Dec 1997 09:29:15 -0500 (EST) From: "Thomas D. [Tom] Hall, THALL@DEPAUW.EDU" Subject: Another view on SEAsia To: Network World-Systems WSNers, I am reposting this from ASDP [Asian Studies Development Program] listserv, with Marc permission. Marc Gilbert is world historian whose first specialty is South Asia, but who has done work on Vietnam. We met last summer at an ASDP/East-West Center institute on Southeast Asia. He is somewhat familiar with WST, but has some of the usual misgivings historians have about our enterprise, but still talks and listens across the disciplines. His comments on SEAsia I thought are worthy of consideration. I am still thinking out my own reactions. If anyone wants my article I can post it. Basically, it is a 2 page discussion about how use of WST might help in understanding SEAsian history, and conversely how aspects of SEAsian history can contribute to empirical and theoretical developments, especially in comparative, ancient world-systems [no surprise to anyone who has seen the type of thing Chris Chase-Dunn and I have been doing]. tom Thomas D. [tom] Hall thall@depauw.edu Department of Sociology DePauw University 100 Center Street Greencastle, IN 46135 765-658-4519 HOME PAGE: http://www.depauw.edu/~thall/hp1.htm ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 26 Nov 1997 09:03:32 -0500 From: Kenneth Harris Subject: Southeast Asia and the World: Doctrine Free! From: "Marc J. Gilbert" Organization: North Georgia College Subject: Southeast Asia and the World: Doctrine Free! Thinking Large About Southeast Asia for Teachers and Scholars, Tom Hall has produced a really great article in the ASDP newsletter entitled "World Systems Theory and Southeast Asia . . ." In that article, Tom correctly identifies a theoretical construct called "contested perihery," a term just Wallersteinian enough to turn people off world systems theory forever, though Tom does a good job helping people avoid that fate. However, I have been working on a similar idea related to world history analysis that is gentle, benign and both jargon and doctrine free! Whether it is true or not, you tell me, but to me it opens the door to TEACHING about, as well as understanding Southeast Asia. Pardon the security angle: this started out two years ago as a briefing for the defense and foreign policy establishment with a view to hammer home the idea that culture does matter: it should work regardless of speciality (and defense is not mine, anyway!) It is also mercifully short. By the second page you will know if it works for you! Tigers in the Shatterbelt The decade between 1986 and 1996 witnessed a sea change in Southeast Asia's security and defense concerns. At the beginning of this era, the politics of the Cold War still shaped the agenda and membership of the its most significant regional organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. ASEAN's primary security interests were focussed on keeping the Cold War's great powers at bay and preventing them and their clients from further enveloping the entire region in war. Later, ASEAN was preoccupied with addressing the Cold War's chief legacy in Southeast Asia, the Vietnam-Cambodian debacle. Yet, while the Cold War divided Southeast Asia, it provided ASEAN with a clear mandate to develop an indigenous regional response to regional and international conflict. With the waning of the Cold War, the concomitant lessening of Russian and American competition in the area and the end of the Cold War dimensions of the Cambodian issue, ASEAN's mandate on questions of security and defense remained clear, but the nature of its security mosaic became far more complex. ASEAN now faced the daunting task of encouraging intra-regional cooperation among nations long at odds while at the same time preserving their collective security interests--economic as well as military--in the face of resurgent Asian powers, such as China and Japan. Ultimately, ASEAN chose to address these "new" circumstances in a manner consistent with traditional patterns of Southeast Asian geo-political realities. The imperatives behind the informality, flexibility and gradualism that characterizes ASEAN's approach to security and defense issues in the 80s and 90s are little understood in the West. These imperatives are, however, illuminated by the "shatterbelt" paradigm familiar to students of world history. This paradigm makes ASEAN's current defense posture more intelligible. It also reveals the architecture upon which all security issues in the region have and, for the foreseeable future, will depend. The shatterbelt is a region of the earth that stretches from Southeast Asia across the Himalayas and Hindu Kush to Afghanistan, then across to the Caucuses on to Anatolia and the Balkans. The human terrain of this belt is complex, as it encompasses land which has served both as corridor for human migration and a terminus. Waves of ethnic groups have settled there without wholly displacing their predecessors, thus insuring that between each there will be legacies of both prolonged conflict and co-existence. This pattern of settlement is further complicated by the belt's positioning along fracture lines separating the world's most powerful and dynamic urban civilizations. Each of the belt's human populations owe much to these civilizations, but their identities depend on defining themselves as unique from them. Experience has taught that shatterbelt states are too internally divided and too geo- politically or economically weak for each alone to sustain their absolute independence at all times against the hegemonic ambitions of these civilizations. As a result, the art of survival in the shatterbelt has most often depended upon not proud defiance, but artful compromise, not on bold initiatives, but measured "small steps," not sustained unilateral action, but bilateral or multilateral agreements brokered between internal factions, regional partners and/or extra-regional powers. States in the shatterbelt have experienced periods of great achievement when observing these imperatives and utter misery when they have not, as the recent histories of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Vietnam make clear. ASEAN's birth, indeed its raison d'etre, was dictated by a global bipolarism that divided the nations of the region into camps joined to opposing external powers. This bipolar world also stimulated rivalries within and between mainland and island Southeast Asia. ASEAN also had to contend with struggles for dominance between and within each of these geographical divisions, and interstate rivalries recasting ancient enmities in terms of modern ideologies or critiques of the international economic order. Further, ASEAN had to confront regional leadership structures which favored authoritarian and militarist political orders that had little use for transparency, was naturally suspicious of its neighbors and doubly suspicious of the loyalty of their own minority populations whose lands of origin lay directly across their borders or sea lanes each sought to dominate. Yet, ASEAN actually benefitted from this turmoil as it forced its members to confront the immutability of the region's common traditional security concerns: fear of the loss of national sovereignty--from command over its fractionated populations to command of its economic resources--fear of bilateral interstate relations with untrustworthy allies, and the fear of international alliances that held out the promise of collective security but fomented regional competition and led to subordination to great extra-regional powers that could guarantee only an inferior place in the global division of power and labor. Using the Cold War experience as a base line, ASEAN was disinclined to adopt a binding multilateral regional security structure of the type broached by Leonid Breshnev in the 1970s or the more inclusive plan suggested later by Michael Gorbachev. Nor did ASEAN intend to ride the coat-tails of a coalition of Asian powers either linked to or independent of the United States. The drawdown of Russian and the United States forces in Asia, China's unstable economic condition and its objections to multilateralism (and its record of opportunistic bilateralism in Southeast Asia), together with Japan's history and its poor short term military capacity to deter Chinese aggression left the ASEAN nations with no acceptable partners in any "concert of Asia." Though the very weakness of the post-Cold War US presence in Southeast Asia made its role as a possible regional power broker more widely desirable among ASEAN states than at any previous time, the propensity of China, Japan and the United States to juggle power amongst themselves and relegate Southeast Asia to the status of a junior partner in a Asian Pacific economic and security zone deterred and continues to deter ASEAN from such a course. Additionally, a powerful internal logic acted, and continues to act, to forestall ASEAN's evolution into a formal defense community like NATO. NATO, like most alliances, owes its existence to sustained external threats. Yet, ASEAN matured at a time where the emphasis was not on deterring aggression, but removing the grounds for aggression by eliminating conditions in which threats to local and regional security could emerge. ASEAN's search for appropriate preventative diplomacy led naturally to the development of confidence-building measures and patterns of constructive engagement which now characterize its approach to security issues. Determined to avoid the Cold War era propensity to employ multilateral defense umbrellas as the means to define and separate nations rather than bring them together, ASEAN sought to build regional consensus for peace upon a foundation of trust arising from a multitude of successful bilateral arrangements. These were expected to form an inclusive security web, rather than a wall or line in the sand. The benefits of ASEAN's defense posture were many. Its lack of singular definition precluded battles over protocol and fruitless debates over terminology. It stimulated contacts between the region's political and military establishments and surrounded potential enemies with a comforting cocoon of institutional contacts, economic ties and transparent low-level military accords. While promoting inclusive and expandable strategic protocols, such as ZOPFHAN and SEANFZ, it sought to avoid formal defense agreements and preferred caucuses and even state dinners to treaties and official meetings. A signal recent example of the success of the ASEAN approach is reflected in its current effort at facilitating Thai-Vietnamese rapproachment, which has long been seen as the key to peace and stability in the region. Prior to 1986, only Indonesia's relations with China may have been as dark as those between Thailand and Vietnam. Each saw the other as an aggressive, hegemonic power with diametrically opposed economic interests, to say nothing of ideological orientation. Between 1986 and 1991, changes in the world economic and political order, not the least of which was Vietnam's increasing need to import capital and Thailand's need to export capital, favored improved relations, but differences over the role and influence of China in the development of the Mekong Basin, complicated by the legacy of Cold War antagonisms, helped keep both nations apart even as the chief issue driving Thai- Vietnamese foreign policy discord--the Cambodian embroligo--wound down. Eager to promote the success of doi moi--upon which the survival of both the nation and its leadership depended--Vietnam hoped that the ability of the "China Card" to divide former communist and non-communist states in the region would soon fade with economic liberalization and that with the waning of bipolar ideological differences would come the inevitable realization among the region's states that improved relations between ASEAN, Vietnam and Laos allow the region to present a strong united front in defense of the region's interests. The problem for Vietnam was the absence of trust between itself and Thailand, which was aided and abetted by the almost complete lack of personal knowledge of each other's leadership. This lack of knowledge acted to prevent Vietnam and Thailand from recognizing that a new wave of pragmatic outward-looking technocrats who were coming to the fore in both states. Vietnamese Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet sought to break through the clouds of mistrust and ignorance making a tour of ASEAN member states in 1991. Had ASEAN itself stood solidly behind the perceived ideological difference between Vietnam and Laos and its own membership, had it viewed its security needs as riding along this traditional axis, had it not been committed to developing consensus and bilateral relationships among its members and neighbors as the foundation for multilateral agreements, it is possible that Vo Van Kiet's 1991 tour and those that were to follow in successive years would have led to nothing. However, ASEAN's policy of inclusion turned Vietnam's overture into a prelude for Vietnam and Laos' signing in 1992 of ASEAN's 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. This, in turn, paved the way for both countries being granted observer status at the ASEAN Annual Ministerial Meeting. By 1994, the foreign ministers of both nations were added to the new ASEAN Regional Forum, the latest and fullest expression of ASEAN's security regime. As a result of these confidence-building efforts, Thailand joined other ASEAN states in sending high level delegations to Hanoi, breaking decades of political and isolation. By this gradual process, ASEAN not only helped provide the necessary political space for improvements in Thai-Vietnamese relations, but did so without angering China which also had been welcomed into ARF at the same ministerial level. In fact, ASEAN's receptivity to Vietnam's initial overtures may have played a role in facilitating the ground-breaking Sino-Vietnamese dialogue that culminated in ministerial and summit meetings between Vietnamese and Chinese leaders in 1993. Successful efforts to help defuse the Cambodian crisis, the creation of ARF and the bridging the communist-non-communist divide were but among the more dramatic of ASEAN's achievements since 1990. Others included lessening or deflecting occasional Thai and Indonesian posturing as regional kingpins and working with the US to downgrade Malaysian efforts at creating what has been characterized as "an East Asian economic Zone without Caucasians" to something less exclusive (EAEG to EAEC). ASEAN has also encouraged the spread of a variety of schemes to promote intelligence exchange and joint military training and exercises. It may soon develop a coast guard capacity to address piracy, smuggling and illegal immigration problems that have long plagued the region. Other plans mooted include a regional center for security studies, a regional register of arms holdings or transfers and a code to govern arms sales so as to reduce fears of an arms race raised by the modernization and expansion of virtually all armies and navies in the region. However, ASEAN's actions will remain as a facilitator rather than an agent, as the following anecdote reveals. A little more than a year ago, after signing a defense accord with the Philippines, Malaysian Defense Minister Njaib Abdul Razak declared that Southeastern Asian states were working to form "a network of defense ties that will enable them to act as military allies." However, he rejected the idea that ASEAN might turn into a formal defense alliance, arguing that this "would only heighten regional tension." ASEAN seems determined to act on the principle that by even mentioning the word "security" in its Regional Forum, that body has been freer to promote it. The Clinton administration has noted how wide ASEAN and its member states have spread this Taoist web of collective bilateral threads, which now stretches from Beijing to Papua-New Guinea. The US may have even facilitated the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum by removing its traditional objection to multilateral arrangements in Asia. Urged by ASEAN leaders to adopt a posture more in tune with Asian realities as they saw it, President Clinton has expressed the hope that the ASEAN technique of building multilateral agreements on the basis of bilateral agreements "can function like overlapping plates of armor, covering the full body of our common security concerns." The measure of ASEAN's ability to contribute to the realization of such a goal, as well as the basic strengths and weaknesses of ASEAN's approach, have been taken by ASEAN's recent response to China's effort to increase its influence and military presence in Myanmar. That state's leaders, as is so often the case in the shatterbelt, have sought to strengthen themselves against domestic turmoil and political isolation by opening their doors to a stronger neighbor. China's building of a base on Hainggi Island and its massive military assistance to Myanmar's government over the past three years has been of great concern in the United States and in India, both of whose governments have urged ASEAN to join with them in opposing China's projection of its power into the Indian Ocean and in condemning Myanmar's human rights record. For its part, India also sought to advance its desiderata of a military alliance between itself, ASEAN and Japan to contain future Chinese expansionism, or at the very least, discourage China from arming insurgents on the India side of the China-Burma-India frontier. ASEAN member states did bridle when the Myanmar government, buoyed by Chinese assistance, resumed the persecution and deportation of its Muslim population, but ASEAN itself remained true to its nature. Much to the chagrin of the United States and, at least initially India, ASEAN employed its tried and true instrument of constructive engagement in an attempt to wean Myanmar away from dependence on China and into the ASEAN fold. The accomplishment of this task would finally bring all the states of the region within the ASEAN umbrella. It would also send a typically soft, but important message to China: there is far more profit to be made with ASEAN by respecting its influence as a geo-political balance wheel and its value as a friendly trading block than as a speed bump on the highway to a confrontation with India. As economics, and not global military reach, seems at present to be driving China's Myanmar policy, ASEAN may once again be able to finesse its way toward a more stable security environment. However, in the event of a Chinese economic collapse or political crisis, the Middle Kingdom might exercise its traditional territorial ambitions in this direction, or, given its shifting position on the Sprately's, in any direction. Whither then, ASEAN? This question is paramount to those who doubt the viability of ASEAN as a guarantor of regional security and stability. How, they ask, can ASEAN nations defend even their own region adequately without becoming a part of a larger, more formal defense scheme involving some combination of Asian and Western Powers? Some admit that ASEAN's current defense architecture may be the only means of sustaining ASEAN interests in a world fundamentally hostile to smaller or weak regional national groupings, but they nonetheless argue that the time for such regional groupings to secure their place in the emerging new world order (and its viability within it) may be limited. ASEAN might answer that the more formal arrangements its critics favor offer no panacea. It could argue that the EC and NATO proved unable to apply any early salve to the open wound that was Yugoslavia in crisis, and only now, when merely gangrene stumps of that nation remain, is NATO adopting the type of "confidence building" approach ASEAN has for so long favored. Similarly, ASEAN could argue that Desert Shield/Desert demonstrates that coalition-building and interoperablity--further ASEAN strengths--are the wave of the future. Robert B. Oxnam, writing in Foreign Affairs, observes that ASEAN as a region "raises one of the most difficult problems confronting U.S. diplomacy. How does the United States deal sensitively with a region that poses no immediate crises? That is, in fact, precisely where the professionalism of the U.S. Foreign Service is most tested--in its ability to sustain sufficient attention, to prompt intelligent decisions, to muster appropriate resources in handling non-crisis situations. Treating headaches before they become migraine crises--that is a central challenge in the future of America's Asia policy. Is it not "treating headaches before they become migraine crises" what the ASEAN approach is all about? If so, it would seem that in the post-Cold War era the ASEAN model for conflict resolution and security management bears closer study and no possesses no little utility as a model for the West. That many Western observers recommend a different course for ASEAN than that which follows traditional regional verities may be the product of a misunderstanding of what an Asian tiger represents. Some Asian leaders seek to flatter themselves and their Western colleagues by employing the term to mean a rising and worthy competitor. In the shatterbelt, however, the tiger is often viewed as the vehicle for a wandering spirit that defends dharma and preys upon the unrighteous. ASEAN has kept that tiger at bay by seeking "acceptable understandings" with the great powers, equitable relations among member states and an gradual but increasingly equitable global and regional distribution of wealth. The pacific, informal and consensus-seeking strategic posture ASEAN has thus far pursued has kept ASEAN safe from wide beasts, vengeful or otherwise and its successes--from avoiding U.S-North Korea type confrontations to promoting the regions economic growth as the best medicine for its security problems--prompts ASEAN to stay the course. This course may be the only one available given ASEAN's relative weakness, but its achievements to date, or more accurately, the unpleasantness of available alternatives, is also a warning to those, like the Chinese, who might be tempted to exploit their growing military and economic advantage over the region. The sources and pattern of ASEAN's security regime reminds us of what Russian Special Forces in Chechnya and the combatants in Bosnia already know: it profiteth little anyone who looses the tiger in the shatterbelt. ******************************************* PROF. MARC JASON GILBERT DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY NORTH GEORGIA COLLEGE AND STATE UNIVERSITY DAHLONEGA, GEORGIA 30597 PHONE: 706-864-1911 FAX: 706-864-1873 E-MAIL MGILBERT@NUGGET.NGC.PEACHNET.EDU From thall@DEPAUW.EDU Fri Dec 5 08:18:37 1997 05 Dec 1997 10:18:35 -0500 (EST) Date: Fri, 05 Dec 1997 10:18:34 -0500 (EST) From: "Thomas D. [Tom] Hall, THALL@DEPAUW.EDU" Subject: Hall's SEAsia note To: Network World-Systems Here is the article to which Marc Gilbert refers. It appeared in Asian Studies in America Issue 9, Fall 1997, pp. 5-7. Below is the final submission which is only slightly different from the published version. I am posting this with permission of Peter Hershock, Asian Studies in America editor. For a classical middle eastern discussion of the world-system analysis the Jon Berquist article is quite good, and on line at the URL listed. tom Thomas D. [tom] Hall thall@depauw.edu Department of Sociology DePauw University 100 Center Street Greencastle, IN 46135 765-658-4519 HOME PAGE: http://www.depauw.edu/~thall/hp1.htm ------------------------------ World-Systems Theory and Southeast Asia: An Underdeveloped Encounter* Thomas D. Hall Lester M. Jones Professor of Sociology DePauw University thall@depauw.edu http://www.depauw.edu/ thall/hp1.htm * thanks to my colleague Marthe Chandler for helpful comments. Analyses of Asia, based in a world-systems perspective are not common. I hope to encourage students of Asia to consider this perspective. I use the term "perspective," rather than theory to emphasize that world-systems analysis represents a range of theories and approaches which often compete and contradict each other. These theories go far beyond those of the perspective's founder, Immanuel Wallerstein. The major contributions from this perspective have been to persuade social scientists to contextualize their studies historically and geopolitically. Because it is a "bookish" rather than "article" enterprise a note can only hint at the nuanced richness of these longer accounts. I begin this note with a sketch of the world-system perspective, then review some of its major works on Asia. From there I turn to some topics in Southeast Asian history where a world-systems perspective might be useful. The World-System Perspective: A Thumbnail Sketch A world-system is an intersocietal system marked by a self- contained division of labor. Thus, it is a "world," in that it is self-contained. Only in the twentieth century has it become truly global. The "modern world-system" originated in western Europe between 1450 and 1640. It has three components: (1) a core which employs advanced industrial production and distribution, has strong states, a strong bourgeoisie, and a large working class; (2) a periphery which specializes in raw materials production and has weak states, a small bourgeoisie, and many peasants; and (3) a semiperiphery which is intermediate between core and periphery, in its economic, social, and political roles and its own internal social structure. Core capitalists use various mechanism of unequal exchange to extract capital from peripheral areas. This promotes core development and peripheral impoverishment simultaneously. Recently several scholars have been extending world-system analysis into precapitalist [before 1500 CE] settings, asking such questions as how and why did the European, "modern world-system" arise? A major premise of this perspective is that the world- system must be studied as a whole. Therefore, the study of social, political, economic, or cultural change in any component of the system must begin by understanding that component's role within the system, whether it be a nation, state, region, ethnic group, class, gender role, or nonstate society. This does not mean that the world-systems perspective has all the answers. Only that any social analysis is incomplete without attention to world-systemic processes. World-system theory is highly contentious, virtually every statement in this summary is disputed. For additional summaries and bibliography see Shannon (1996) or Hall (1996a, 1996b). Asia in the World-System One of the major world-system analyses of Asia was Frances Moulder's Japan, China, and the Modern World Economy (Cambridge 1977). While somewhat dated, and sometimes challenged, it gives an overview of Asian development. Somewhat more current is Alvin So and Stephen Chiu's East Asia and the World-Economy (Sage 1995) which examines recent divergences in economic and political development among Asian states. David A. Smith's Third World Cities in Global Perspective (Westview 1996) argues for a combination of crossnational statistical studies with detailed case studies in order to understand the roles of local history and local actors in world-systemic processes. The closing chapters of Giovanni Arrighi's award winning The Long Twentieth Century (Verso 1994) also gives considerable attention to Asian development. Andre Gunder Frank's forthcoming ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (California) extends the perspective back for millennia. He argues that the nineteenth and twentieth century European domination of Asia was something of an historical anomaly which has been profoundly misunderstood due the deep eurocentrism of most social science and history. Southeast Asia One of the few world-system analyses of Southeast Asia is Chris Dixon's Southeast Asia in the World-Economy (Cambridge 1991). Because of its regional emphasis, it does not provide much depth on any one state. Other works like Nancy Peluso's Rich Forests, Poor People (California 1992) address world- system issues, although it is not rooted in this perspective. Though a neophyte in Southeast Asia studies, several areas seem to me ripe for fruitful study. First, an examination of Southeast Asian history for the last two and half millennia from a world-systems perspective offers potential in exploring the cycles and spirals Michael Aung- Thwin has noted (1991). Similary Jon Berquist's (1995) concept of a contested periphery or semiperiphery may prove a useful to understanding Southeast Asian history. A contested periphery is a region torn and buffered between larger powers. This geopolitical location both shapes historical processes and allows local actors use to maintain some autonomy. Similarly, I have been struck by the very close parallels in Wolters's "mandala state" (1982) and world-systems analysis of early state formation (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). Indeed, an examination of ideological roots of the mandala state offers an opportunity to rectify the world-systems perspective's scant attention to ideology in general. My own research on the American Southwest (1989) suggests a potential fruitfulness in detailed comparisons between Spanish colonialism in the Philippines and in Latin America. Similarly, American attempts to control "tribal" peoples in the Philippines drew heavily on experiences with Native Americans. Indeed, the entire process of incorporation of nonstate peoples by states throughout Southeast could usefully be compared with similar processes elsewhere. No doubt there are many other possibilities. For a region marked by so much diversity--ethnic, racial, political, social, and cultural--the world-systems perspective offers a means of drawing useful, explicitly delineated, comparisons. Equally important, the processes of social, economic, political, and cultural change in Southeast Asia offer opportunities for expanding, modifying, correcting, and elaborating the world-systems perspective. To do so one does not need to become a dyed-in-wool Wallersteinian or "dependista," only to take intersocietal interactions and history seriously--something almost all students of Asia and Southeast Asia already do! REFERENCES Aung-Thwin, Michael. 1991. "Spirals in Early Southeast Asian and Burmese History." Journal of Interdisciplinary History 21:4(Spring)575-602. Berquist, Jon L. 1995. "The Shifting Frontier: the Achaemenid Empire's Treatment of Western Colonies." Journal of World-Systems Research 1:17 [e-journal: http://csf.colorado.edu/wsystems/jwsr.html] Chase-Dunn, Christopher and Thomas D. Hall. 1997. Rise and Demise: Comparing World-Systems. Boulder: Westview. Hall, Thomas D. 1989. Social Change in the Southwest, 1350- 1880. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. _____. 1996a. "World-Systems and Evolution: An Appraisal." Journal of World-System Research, 2, No. 5 (1996): 1-109. [e-journal: http://csf.colorado.edu/wsystems/jwsr.html] _____. 1996b. "The World-System Perspective: A Small Sample from a Large Universe." Sociological Inquiry 66:4(November):440-454. Shannon, Thomas R. 1996. An Introduction to the World-System Perspective, 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press. Wolters, O. W. 1982. History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives. Singapore: Iseas. From wwagar@binghamton.edu Fri Dec 5 08:54:45 1997 From: wwagar@binghamton.edu Date: Fri, 5 Dec 1997 10:54:26 -0500 (EST) To: Juan Luis Subject: Re: Models and reality (long cycle dating time) In-Reply-To: <34874E83.745CCE47@ergos.es> Three cheers for our Spanish colleague's timely intervention! Too much of world-system theory is indeed reductionist, simplistic, mechanistic, deterministic, almost always with an econometric slant. Such an approach cannot begin to capture the multidimensionality of Homo sapiens, the ceaseless interplay of material conditions, institutions, belief-systems, codes of symbolic expression, modes of production, and biological urgencies. And I agree that world-system theory is more cogent as an explanation of the evolution of the modern Eurocentric world-system, from which the theory itself emerged, than as a deciphering of the far different world-systems of Western antiquity and the various non-Western universes. Three cheers, Warren From 70671.2032@compuserve.com Fri Dec 5 13:05:01 1997 for wsn@csf.colorado.edu; Fri, 5 Dec 1997 15:05:02 -0500 (EST) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 1997 14:59:12 -0500 From: james m blaut <70671.2032@compuserve.com> Subject: shatter belts? Sender: james m blaut <70671.2032@compuserve.com> To: world systems network From: Jim Blaut Subject: shatter belts Date: 12 Dec. 1997 I don't share Tom Hall's enthusiasm for the essay by Marc Gilbert about ASEAN and Southeast Asia. It seems to be the typical geobabble of the Secuurity Studies crowd. Gilbert in essence assures his [Pentagon?] readers that the Association of South East Asian Nations, ASEAN, is just a loose jumble of minor and unimportant states, of no threat to anybody and really of no geopolitical significance. (I oversimplfy just a tiny bit.) Gilbert's argument is supposed to rest in a Great Underlying Principle, the idea of the "shatter belt." to wit: "The imperatives behind the informality, flexibility and gradualism that characterizes ASEAN's approach to security and defense issues in the 80s and 90s are little understood in the West. These imperatives are, however, illuminated by the "shatterbelt" paradigm familiar to students of world history. This paradigm makes ASEAN's current defense posture more intelligible. It also reveals the architecture upon which all security issues in the region have and, for the foreseeable future, will depend. The shatterbelt is a region of the earth that stretches from Southeast Asia across the Himalayas and Hindu Kush to Afghanistan, then across to the Caucuses on to Anatolia and the Balkans. The human terrain of this belt is complex, as it encompasses land which has served both as corridor for human migration and a terminus. Waves of ethnic groups have settled there without wholly displacing their predecessors, thus insuring that between each there will be legacies of both prolonged conflict and co-existence. This pattern of settlement is further complicated by the belt's positioning along fracture lines separating the world's most powerful and dynamic urban civilizations. Each of the belt's human populations owe much to these civilizations, but their identities depend on defining themselves as unique from them. Experience has taught that shatterbelt states are too internally divided and too geo- politically or economically weak for each alone to sustain their absolute independence at all times against the hegemonic ambitions of these civilizations. As a result, the art of survival in the shatterbelt has most often depended upon not proud defiance, but artful compromise, not on bold initiatives, but measured "small steps," not sustained unilateral action, but bilateral or multilateral agreements brokered between internal factions, regional partners and/or extra-regional powers. States in the shatterbelt have experienced periods of great achievement when observing these imperatives and utter misery when they have not." I gather that Tom is enamored of this concept because it seems to be so worldsystemsy. It isn't that. Applied to SE Asia it is a discredited colonial-era notion. Applied on a larger scale (Eurasia) it is meaningless. Gilbert defines "the shatter belt" as a zone stretching from SE Asia through the Himalayas and Afghanistant to the Caucasus and the Balkans. It is possible that someone has previously used the concept in this grand manner, but I've never heard this and it is silly. The classical idea of the shatter belt was the notion that countries between Germany/Austria, Russia, and Turkey, constantly or alternately squeezed and pushed by the these imperial powers, were shattered into small, weak states which kept breaking up under the lateral pressures. The shatter belt was not limited to the Balkans in Europe (as Gilbert says): it was a contnuous zone from Finland and the Baltic states to Albania and Greece. During the colonial era, the shatter-belt concept was applied (by British, French, and Dutch scholars, I believe) to Southeast Asia. The basic idea was that SE Asian cultures and states were not really important in a historical sense, autonomus in a cultural sense, or potentially powerful today. Why? Because they formed a shatter belt between India, on trhe one side, and China, on the other, and the basic charatcer of SE Asian societies resulted from the influence and pressure of one or the other of these two adjoining civilization. You can see how this devlaued the history and civilization of the region's societies. In the Dutch East Indies and Malaya, for instance, it was argued (by some scholars) that the basic culture was not autochthonous but was Indian. The shartter-belt idea applied to SE Asia doesn't take account of the fact that these are great societies, influenced from the outside, as all societies are, but hardly shattered fragments, pushed hither and yon by China and India. For one thing, most of the region was never really conquered by China or by India: most of the influence here was that of missionaries, merchants, settlers, etc. For another thing, the culture and art of these societies is ancient and as great as that of any other culture in the world. But most importantly, these political entities are, and generally have been through much of history, states with HUGE populations, large territories, and true power -- hardly shattered fragments. I don't recall hearing the shater-belt concept applied to SE Asia during the past 30-odd years: perhaps I'm wrong. But applied to SEA it is useless -- rather, it is dangerous, because it allows these silly Strategtic Studies people and their friends to assure everybody that the SE Asian states are weak and, on a world-system level, unimportant. To claim to discern a shatter belt that runs from SE Asia through the Himalayas and the Caucasus to the Balkans is just bad geography. Therre is no common historical, cultural, or geographicl character to all or most parts of this region. Maybe the Caucasus is a shatter belt. Probably Eastern Europe is a shatter belt. But scholars should avoid the temprtation to expain everything in terms of great Unfderlying Principles unless theere is evidence that such priunciples are not just intellectual fantasies. Cheers. From wkirk@wml.prestel.co.uk Fri Dec 5 17:31:00 1997 by svr-a-03.core.theplanet.net with smtp (Exim 1.73 #1) Date: Fri, 05 Dec 1997 22:49:19 -0800 From: William Kirk To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Re: WSN Communications Copying communications from WSN to LONG WAVE. christopher chase-dunn wrote: > > dear w. > yes it is fine to cut and paste. would you also send a message to wsn > explaining what long wave is and how to sub. > thanks, > chris The LONG WAVE is the Kondratieff. Sub to the site is the same as WSN. MAIL TO listerv@csf.colorado.edu. SUBJECT No Subject Body of message SUB LONGWAVES [first name last name] The reason for asking is that there has been some interesting data and comment in the past week or two which might be useful to those who subscribe to the site. My own observations about the Long Wave content is that it tends to be slightly right of centre politically. Since the site is concerned with one aspect of economics it is verging on the financial. If there any way of knowing how meny people subscribe to a site? There is also the possibility that many who subscrive to LW also subscribe to WSN. William Kirk. From athan.kokkinias@utoronto.ca Sat Dec 6 01:59:52 1997 Date: Sat, 6 Dec 1997 03:45:34 -0500 To: wwagar@binghamton.edu, WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: "Athanasios (Tom) Kokkinias" Subject: Re: Models and reality (long cycle dating time) In-Reply-To: References: <34874E83.745CCE47@ergos.es> Dear Wagar, I agree. For the trees are made out of forest, as the forest is made out of trees...er.....etc.:o) Tom At 10:54 AM 05/12/97 -0500, wwagar@binghamton.edu wrote: > > > Three cheers for our Spanish colleague's timely intervention! Too >much of world-system theory is indeed reductionist, simplistic, >mechanistic, deterministic, almost always with an econometric slant. Such >an approach cannot begin to capture the multidimensionality of Homo >sapiens, the ceaseless interplay of material conditions, institutions, >belief-systems, codes of symbolic expression, modes of production, and >biological urgencies. And I agree that world-system theory is more cogent >as an explanation of the evolution of the modern Eurocentric world-system, >from which the theory itself emerged, than as a deciphering of the far >different world-systems of Western antiquity and the various non-Western >universes. > > Three cheers, > > Warren > > From rkmoore@iol.ie Sat Dec 6 03:54:32 1997 Sat, 6 Dec 1997 10:54:21 GMT Date: Sat, 6 Dec 1997 10:54:21 GMT To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu (world-system network) From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: re: western philosophy; growth of Europe 11/30/97, Nico wrote: >Just realized someone might have gotten the mistaken impression that "what >a devastating critique" was meant as a compliment. It was not. Forgot to >put in a smiley or something. Quite right -- a one-page dismissal of western philosophy cannot be a serious critique: it was simply a point of view, presented slightly tongue-in-cheek (foot in mouth?). But am I the only one who harbors doubts about our methods and results? Does western philosophy lead to wisdom? Have we defined wisdom to be superstition, like heaven? At 6:22 PM 11/28/97, james m blaut wrote: >"It seems clear to me that Euro expansionism and dominance was primarily >due to this focus on creativity and narrow rationalism..." > >This argument falls into the category of what I call Walrus and Carpenter >explanations for the rise of Europe: How sad that our European civilization >was so inferior to others in understanding the true meaning of life and the >world. How sad that our rationality, creativity, "rational restlessness" >(Weber) fored us to eat up these other civilizations, but didn't they taste >good! Does humorously slotting a view into a category constitute a rebuttal? My fuller characterization of Euro dominance, quoted below, was posted on 12 Nov. But I do think our Western heritage points to the primacy of "creative exploration and exploitation: _development_ itself". I saw a Dutch documentary on "Gold" this week which portrayed how the Romans washed away entire mountains in Spain, filtering out the gold in the leaves of some plant. One might suspect the Spanish sought gold in order to supply a commodity they had grown accustomed to exploiting, but were running (had run) out of domestically. Again, that points to "motivation" above "circumstance" re/ expansion factors. rkm _________________________________________________________________________ From: "Globalization as a world system" ....In 1492 Columbus demonstrated (with entrepreneurial intent) that sea travel need respect no boundaries other than the globally connected oceans. Societies for the first time began to plan and act on a scale that could be called global. European powers competed to exploit this new-found global mobility, setting up trading and colonial networks that became the first examples of human-engineered systems on a world scale. With the help of this far-flung trading network, together with industrialization, precious metals taken from the New World -- and an aggressive imperialist attitude -- European powers eventually achieved a globally dominant position. Their world-system became _the_ world-system, and it is thus the structures developed during the Euro-expansionist period that form the foundation for modern globalization. This period lasted from 1492 to 1945. The Euro world system was an anarchic system of sovereign nation states: there was no central global management and very little in the way of reliable international law -- especially when "national interests" were deemed to be at stake. Some states had their sovereignty taken away due to imperial domination, but this was part of the constantly shifting anarchic competitive game. The leading Euro nations (later including the USA) competed with one another not so much through warfare among themselves (although such did occur), but more through the expansion of their spheres of influence. Indeed most European wars in this period can be characterized as expansion by other means -- court battles as it were. The spheres amounted to a partition of the global economy, with each core nation enjoying privileged access to trade and investment opportunities in its own partition. This 500-year old world-system dynamic changed abruptly in 1945, with the end of World War II and the emergence of the USA in a dramatically dominant global position -- militarily, industrially, economically, and psychologically... _________________________________________________________________________ From borgonoz@mx2.redestb.es Sun Dec 7 13:39:01 1997 by tinet0.redestb.es (Post.Office MTA v3.1 release PO203a From: "=?iso-8859-1?Q?Alfonso_L=F3pez_Borgo=F1oz?=" To: "WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK" Subject: RE: Models and reality (long cycle dating time) Date: Sun, 7 Dec 1997 21:38:07 +0100 charset="iso-8859-1" Dear friends (sorry for my english): The only system for to know, and for the transmission of the knowledge, is the models. And the models needs to have a relations, a strong relation, with the empirical data, with the observations of reality. If we have poor data, we have poor models, but this poor models can be the best possible if we don't have nothing more, till we have more data or another best system of to see the data. Sure that the data of the present is best than the data of the past (and the data of Europe is best in our case that the data of Asia), but this no make imposible to work (to have a honest work) with the ancient or Asian data and to search complex models (sure, is best, for me, the new complexity or system theory for make studies about our past, that only to see the economic system for to know the evolution of a social formation). We can introduce "we don't know equal good Asia than Europe" for not work in a field. It's true that we don't know, but this not signifies that the evolution of the rest of the world can be different. I don't believe in impenetrables barriers. The complex social formations systems don't can evolution in very differents ways, only (for to be stables) in some ways. And the interrelation and the market is a good system for approach differents social formations. It's possible a barrier with people pre-neolitihc, but with people with a market economy I think that we can have problems, but no the impossibility of understanding and of to make the best models possible. Sorry, but is not easy for me to write in english (but I can understand an read it). Alfonso López Borgoñoz From rozov@nsu.ru Mon Dec 8 00:47:34 1997 for ; Mon, 8 Dec 1997 13:40:21 +0600 (NOVT) From: "Nikolai S. Rozov" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Mon, 8 Dec 1997 15:46:12 +0600 Subject: w-systems & worldviews Reply-to: rozov@nsu.ru Dear Chris and Wsn-ers, David Richardson (writing for many years on worldviews, Faustian culture, and taking part in Int. Compar. Stud.Civ.Ass-n) has rised a question in PHILOFHI on relation between w-systems approach and worldviews (cultural)analysis. First a wished to defend ws-approach myself, but maybe some of you respond professionally? Also the very topic of relations between w-systems and worldviews (culture, religions, ideologies, etc) seems to be worthy of discussion in wsn. best Nikolai >To: PHILOFHI@YORKU.CA >From David Richardson: > > [...] David Wilkinson and Christopher Chase-Dunn definitely >avoid analyzing the Greek, Magian, Faustian, Chinese and the other >worldviews. Perhaps Immanual Wallerstein does the same. >They stick exclusively to world systems. Is world system merely >the generous limit in which they have time to work? To take on >worlviews is too much. > Or do Wilkinson and Chase-Dunn believe, in essence, a world >system is independent of worldviews? > Yours, David Richardson ****************************************************** Nikolai S. Rozov, PhD, Dr.Sc. Professor of Philosophy E-MAIL: rozov@nsu.ru FAX: 7-3832-397101 ADDRESS: Philosophy Dept. Novosibirsk State University 630090, Novosibirsk, Pirogova 2, RUSSIA Moderator of the mailing list PHILOFHI (PHILosophy OF HIstory and theoretical history). URL= http://www.people.virginia.edu/~dew7e/anthronet/subscribe/philofhi.htm ********************************************************************* From dasa3000@mondrian.sgol.it Mon Dec 8 05:21:21 1997 Date: Mon, 08 Dec 1997 11:54:31 +0100 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: "Danilo D'Antonio" Subject: Earth Calendar for the Space Era In-Reply-To: Best at all! As I think that actual World Systems are the result of social tools even many centuries old, as I think that building the future we need adequate tools and the common civil calendar is not so, I wish signal you, as a proposal, a modest work of mine: the ultimate edition of the "Earth Calendar for the Space Age" (29th year of the Space Age: the incoming year) at: http://oasi.asti.it/Homes/eudemonia/calene.htm The matter is a new kind of civil calendar. It would be a tool for individual and societies awareness growth and also to favour the rising of a universal culture and love for future themes. .... There are four essential points in this calendar: - the years reckoning starts again from zero, to indicate a single turning point in the history of this Planet, choosing as a reference point a great cultural and scientific achievement and mankind's inheritance. - every week day is dedicated to the nurturing of a positive quality of the human soul, whose development results in indisputable benefits both to the individual and the community. - dates that indicate special astronomical events of universal importance are declared Holidays and subsequently celebrated. - the names of days of the week and months of the year are changed in order to give them a greater rational, emotional and universal power ... Its motto could be: new days, new months, new years for new human beings. I hope this Earth Calendar could be useful. I'll be glad for every kind of feedbacks from you: I'll appreciate very much also the criticisms because they will permit me to improve the project. Receive my best greetings, thanks for all the precious information that I receive on WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK, happy Solstice! Danilo D'Antonio --- EUDAEMONY LABORATORY oO°Oo What will you sow today? Via Fonte Regina, 23 - 64100 - Teramo - Italy tel & fax: ++39 861 415655 - e.mail: dasa3000@sgol.it http://oasi.asti.it/Homes/eudemonia/mappa.htm From ms44@cornell.edu Mon Dec 8 06:41:15 1997 for ; Mon, 8 Dec 1997 08:41:19 -0500 (EST) Date: Mon, 8 Dec 1997 08:41:19 -0500 (EST) To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: mark selden Subject: positions in binghamton sociology The Department of Sociology at the State University of New York at Binghamton invites applications for two tenure track positions at the Assistant Professor level beginning Fall 1998. It is possible that administrative approval might be granted to fill the first position at a higher rank if a scholar with a sufficiently strong record of funded research were to apply. Applications from minorities and women are particularly encouraged. The State University of New York-Binghamton is strongly committed to Affirmative Action. We offer access to services and recruit students and employees without regard to race, color, sex, religion, age, disability, marital status, sexual orientation, or national origin. For the first position we are seeking a strong, accomplished scholar specializing in gender studies with an emphasis on race and/or ethnicity and strong competence in methods and/or theory. Ph.D. in hand by September 1, 1998 is a minimal requirement for appointment. Please send applications for this position, letters of reference, copies of relevant publications and evidence of excellent teaching experience to Philip Kraft, Chair, ACS Recruitment Committee, Department of Sociology, State University of New York-Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000. Deadline is December 15, 1997. For the second position we are seeking a strong scholar with a specialization in World Historical Studies (sub-specialization open). Relevant Ph.D. in hand by September 1, 1998 is a minimal requirement for appointment. Please send applications for this position, letters of reference, copies of relevant publications, and evidence of excellent teaching experience to Dale Tomich, Chair, WHSC Recruitment Committee, Department of Sociology, State University of New York-Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000. Applicatons deadline is February 15, 1998. Nancy Hall Department of Sociology Binghamton University Binghamton, NY 13902-6000 607-777-2216 Fax 607-777-4197 From chriscd@jhu.edu Mon Dec 8 11:37:10 1997 Date: Mon, 08 Dec 1997 13:34:15 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: Amin's Agenda for Action (fwd)] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu ; Sun, 07 Dec 1997 12:09:36 -0500 (EST) Date: Sun, 07 Dec 1997 12:09:36 -0500 (EST) From: Gernot Kohler Subject: Amin's Agenda for Action (fwd) To: chriscd@jhu.edu Dear Professor Chase-Dunn, The attached post to wsn was not circulated. Now I am wondering, was it a computer/software problem or was the post inappropriate for wsn? Please advise. Thank you, Gernot Kohler ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 5 Dec 1997 08:57:04 -0500 (EST) From: Gernot Kohler To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Amin's Agenda for Action A summary of Professor Samir Amin's agenda for global action is contained in: REFERENCE: Samir Amin, "The Future of Global Polarization", _REVIEW_ (Fernand Braudel Center), XVII, 3, Summer 1994, p. 337-47 Professor Amin's project of global socialism is based on the general observation that: "The commanding logic of the capitalist system perpetuates the center/periphery polarization." (p. 346) The overall task, according to Amin, is therefore "the construction of a [sc. alternative] global political system which is not in the service of the global market but which defines its parameters..."(p. 342) For the shape of such an alternative world system, Amin insists on two general ingredients, namely: (a) the world system must be "more authentically democratic" (p. 347) (b) the world system must be polycentric, meaning "reorganization .... on the basis of large regions" (p. 347) (e.g., region of Europe, Africa, etc.) Amin's preferred world system is thus democratic, socialist and polycentric/federalist (rather than dominated by "the five monopolies" of the core countries). Based on this general vision, Professor Amin's agenda includes the following, by broad domains (see, p. 342): A. MILITARY: "global disarmament" B. POLITICAL: "world parliament"; "political institutions which would represent social interests on a global scale" C. ECONOMIC-POLITICAL: 1. "liquidation of ... World Bank, the IMF, GATT, etc.", to be replaced by "other systems for managing the global economy" 2. "global fiscal system" 3. "flexible economic relationships among the world's major regions which are unequally developed" (i.e. Amin's concept of polycentrism) D. ECOLOGICAL: "access to the planet's resources in an equitable manner"; "waste reduction obligatory" How to achieve this: Amin emphasizes "struggle": "transformation of the world system always begins with struggles at its base" (p. 347). He is not explicit about the use of violence, however. Which makes me wonder. If his "struggle" means non-violent struggle, then his agenda is not terribly different from what globally and ecologically-minded left-Keynesians believe in. Note that Professor Amin does not call for an abolition of the market but, rather, for world political institutions which "define the parameters of" the market. Professor Keynes could agree to that. Which brings me to a general point: Left-Keynesianism is not "Military Keynesianism". Left-Keynesianism is to Keynes what left-Hegelianism was to Hegel, n'est-ce pas? Left-Keynesianism is one of the ten legitimate tribes of Leftism. Regards, Gernot Kohler Oakville, Canada From chriscd@jhu.edu Mon Dec 8 13:52:04 1997 Mon, 08 Dec 1997 15:51:15 -0400 (EDT) Date: Mon, 08 Dec 1997 15:48:30 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: Re: w-systems & worldviews To: rozov@nsu.ru Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu the best world-system stuff on world views i have seen is that by the anthropologist Jonathan Friedman (_Cultural Identity and Global Process_ Sage 1994). Al Bergesen has written insightfully about art and hegemony, and I like what David Harvey says about the relationship between flexible specialization and postmodernism in his _The Condition of Postmodernity_. But I remain an unreconstructed Marvin Harrisite (ist). Ideas are mainly reflections of material interests. But even I have to admit that the current hegemony of neoliberalism in a context of declining U.S. hegemony and global crisis is a rather interesting phenomenon. Go figure. chris From sbabones@jhu.edu Mon Dec 8 14:51:36 1997 by jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu (950413.SGI.8.6.12/950213.SGI.AUTOCF) Date: Mon, 08 Dec 1997 16:52:34 -0500 (EST) From: Salvatore Babones Subject: Re: w-systems & worldviews In-reply-to: <348C5D1E.D13@jhu.edu> To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK > But even I have to admit that the current hegemony of neoliberalism in a > context of declining U.S. hegemony and global crisis is a rather > interesting phenomenon. Go figure. > chris The missing ingredient, Chris, is that surplus-value is not extracted solely through coercion, but also through the working of financial markets (see my paper, "A Credit-Market Theory of Surplus-Value"). I can't post the paper, since it is under revision at a journal, but the main argument is that if U.S. Company A can borrow capital to finance its operations at 7% real interest, while peripheral Company B can borrow capital at 15% and peripheral Market-woman C at 100% or more, then liberalized trade and, more critically, liberalized exchange rates, favor Company A. That is to say, even on an otherwise truly level playing field, the core capitalist can extract surplus-value from the periphery. To make it concrete, consider a mine in Peripheral Country that is up for sale. Let's say that net operating profits from the mine are $10 million annually. Peripheral Company B can pay no more than $66.7 million for the mine, since it's capital costs would then equal its operating profits, leaving zero economic profit. Core Company A can buy the mine for $100 million, out-bidding the peripheral company by 50%, and still turn a nice economic profit, since it's capital cost for $100 million is only $7 million per year, leaving an economic profit of $3 million. This is the basic reasoning behind my dissertation, "Economic Development in the Liberal State," being supervised by - Christopher K. Chase-Dunn. By the way - I'd like the list to know that Chris has been a fantastic advisor, and very supportive of my work, even though I constantly contradict him in public. What a guy! Also - I AM on the job market this year, if anyone is interested. :) Salvatore From rozov@nsu.ru Mon Dec 8 23:51:03 1997 for ; Tue, 9 Dec 1997 12:46:06 +0600 (NOVT) From: "Nikolai S. Rozov" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Tue, 9 Dec 1997 14:52:03 +0600 Subject: Re: w-systems & worldviews Reply-to: rozov@nsu.ru Dear Chris and All as for me i do not share Chris's version of materialism ('M.Harrisism', why not Marxism? see below), but prefer social ontology where each of main spheres (layers) of human condition: 1) material: geography-ecology-technology-demography, 2) psychical: psychics-behavior-communication-interaction, 3) social: (geo)politics-economics-law-social order, and 4) cultural: ideology-worlviews(religion-art-philosophy-sciences) are autonomous and at the same time deeply interconnected, and have not constant, but SHIFTING leadership in various historical epochs and types of societies, f.e. according to R.Carneiro: geography->demography->warfare->politics(states,empires) then, maybe religion->economics->geography-transportation-> geoeconomics-technology-demography->geopolitics-> ideology-science-technology->geoeconomics - mass communication comments? Nikolai >From: christopher chase-dunn > >the best world-system stuff on world views i have seen is that by >the anthropologist Jonathan Friedman (_Cultural Identity and Global >Process_Sage 1994). Al Bergesen has written insightfully about art >and hegemony, and I like what David Harvey says about the >relationship between flexible specialization and postmodernism in >his _The Condition of Postmodernity_. But I remain an >unreconstructed Marvin Harrisite (ist). Ideas are mainly reflections >of material interests. (sic! the last thesis is not cultural materialistic, but purely a marxist-leninist one! - NR) >But even I have to admit that the current hegemony of neoliberalism >in a context of declining U.S. hegemony and global crisis is a >rather interesting phenomenon. Go figure. >chris ****************************************************** Nikolai S. Rozov, PhD, Dr.Sc. Professor of Philosophy E-MAIL: rozov@nsu.ru FAX: 7-3832-397101 ADDRESS: Philosophy Dept. Novosibirsk State University 630090, Novosibirsk, Pirogova 2, RUSSIA Moderator of the mailing list PHILOFHI (PHILosophy OF HIstory and theoretical history). URL= http://www.people.virginia.edu/~dew7e/anthronet/subscribe/philofhi.htm ********************************************************************* From epaminon@ergos.es Tue Dec 9 07:47:44 1997 Date: Tue, 09 Dec 1997 15:41:49 +0100 From: Juan Luis Chulilla Reply-To: epaminon@ergos.es To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: Re: w-systems & worldviews Nikolai S. Rozov wrote: > the very topic of relations between w-systems and worldviews > (culture, religions, ideologies, etc) seems to be worthy of > discussion in wsn. > That's the exactly point I wanted to remark. I think I'm almost an strange in this mailing list (but I'm interested), because I'm an anthropologist, but I found that my discipline has some use in this debate. First, I must agree with a point remarked by a WSNer of my country: Alfonso López Borgoñoz wrote: > The only system for to know, and for the transmission of the > knowledge, is > the models. > > And the models needs to have a relations, a strong relation, with the > empirical data, with the observations of reality. If we have poor > data, we > have poor models, but this poor models can be the best possible if we > don't > have nothing more, till we have more data or another best system of to > see > the data. Of course! You got it! All of you are lucky if you aren't anthropologist. My discipline is immersed, since some years ago, in a bizarre wave of thinking which is called "postmodernism". That movement is not only propriety of anthropologist, but in anthropology has achieved an importance which is not equaled in your disciplines. The best proof of this: you use, in your mails and counter mails, methods of thinking called "theories". In "classical" anthro., the anthropologist used such a models to place the data which they got in their field works. But now, the anthropologist who doesn't want to be out of fashion has to use the term "theory" in an alien way for the epistemology of the rest of disciplines or even deny the possibility of construct a theory in an anthropological way (his way, of course). A good example is the work of Mr. Tyler. Alfonso López signed the real problem for my discipline: the model is the only system known for the transmission of knowledge. Maybe Anthropology cannot be considered a scientific discipline anymore (However, I maintain a little hope). Anyway, I think that the anthropological approach to human reality has some use in the debate of WSN. Sure, the worst model is the model that doesn't exist, so I have to agree with you in some points. My postmodernist colleagues would like to deconstruct your model, but I prefer to construct and contribute, in a modest way. I want use a concrete model, the Sappir & Wolf's tyranny of language. All of us are employing english for understand and exchange ideas, and I suppose that the majority of us think in a Indo-European language. Both scientist think that language and its structure dictates our ways to think, our mere way of watch and understand the world. So, below the words and superficial uses that the rest of the world took from the West, remains an almost impossible translation between different cosmovisions. Almost impossible is not impossible, but the difficult is so strong that if we want to understand the dynamic of economy in non-western (or, at least, european-like countries), we must be very care at using models which are designed for the Occidental countries. Well, I'm agree with Harris (the basic dynamics of each culture and its results -norms and idea systems- have a material and economic base. So, What is the main problem? All of us (in some degrees) think that the entire world are being involved in a very complex dynamic which affects it as a whole. In the economic field, this point is almost proved. The fundamental question, I think, is if we have a universal (an strong universal, in anthro. terms) dynamic or if we have a less-defined set of characteristics which is shared by each culture in a minor or major way. I think, like Wolf, that we have a set, not a unique dynamic shared by each culture. Then, the phenomena which are superficially equal (because occidental acculturation is a fact in almost the entire world) are different in the base. We have a help: the phenomena which are the base of the major social dynamic have, I think, a material base, therefore we can compare it (if the phenomena have just a cognitive base the comparison is not possible, I think); the limits of the help are very clear: I think, Vs Harris (and Marx), that superstructural phenomena have some degree of freedom(sic), and the feedback of their own dynamics move away them from the conditions imposed by the infraestructural phenomena. What does this mean? We can analyze world dynamics, but the extreme cognitive differences between cultures of different root demand us to increase the complexity of our models, in order to face the REAL complexity of the reality that we want to analyze. Meanwhile, I think that we must reduce the level, the range of our model, so that we will be able to describe the dynamic from the meanings of each cultural group. Of course, the final goal must be the construction of a universal model, but we cannot do it unless we consider the cultural difference and the way it affect the infraestructural phenomena. Finally, I want to apologize for my english. Juan Luis From ba05105@binghamton.edu Tue Dec 9 10:15:23 1997 From: ba05105@binghamton.edu Date: Tue, 9 Dec 1997 12:15:20 -0500 (EST) To: christopher chase-dunn Subject: Re: w-systems & worldviews In-Reply-To: <348C5D1E.D13@jhu.edu> Ahh, but what are material interests? Is it in my interest to have the weekend off or to accumulate an extra 150$ a week? Is it in my interest to exploit other people to enhance my comfort, or to develop meaningful, communicative relationships which will allow for genuine peace of mind. And so forth... STeven Sherman SUNY at Binghamton On Mon, 8 Dec 1997, christopher chase-dunn wrote: > the best world-system stuff on world views i have seen is that by the > anthropologist Jonathan Friedman (_Cultural Identity and Global Process_ > Sage 1994). Al Bergesen has written insightfully about art and hegemony, > and I like what David Harvey says about the relationship between > flexible specialization and postmodernism in his _The Condition of > Postmodernity_. But I remain an unreconstructed Marvin Harrisite (ist). > Ideas are mainly reflections of material interests. > > But even I have to admit that the current hegemony of neoliberalism in a > context of declining U.S. hegemony and global crisis is a rather > interesting phenomenon. Go figure. > chris > From eeb@hknet.com Wed Dec 10 07:07:57 1997 for ; Wed, 10 Dec 1997 22:09:03 +0800 (HKT) From: "Elson E. Boles" To: "WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK" Subject: RE: w-systems & worldviews Date: Tue, 9 Dec 1997 22:05:58 +0800 I'm teaching some courses next semester on urban development and change at City University in Hong Kong. I haven't been in touch with any of this literature for about five years. I'd really appreciate some suggestions that approach urban processes and a full range of related issues from a world-historical perspective (or a world-system perspective), or any critical material that you think is very good. You can write directly to me if you prefer. Thanks in advance. Elson E. Boles Sociology (formerly) SUNY Binghamton, New York eeb@HKnet.com From chriscd@jhu.edu Wed Dec 10 07:15:11 1997 Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1997 09:10:29 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: ISA TG04 Call for Papers] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu Date: Tue, 09 Dec 1997 19:58:43 +0100 From: isa@sis.ucm.es (International Sociological Association) Subject: ISA TG04 Call for Papers Apparently-to: chriscd@jhu.edu To: chriscd@jhu.edu Reply-to: isa@sis.ucm.es To: Members of the International Sociological Association ISA XIV World Congress of Sociology, Montreal 1998 Thematic Group on National Movements and Imperialism, TG04 CALL FOR PAPERS: Thematic Group 4 seeks to rehabilitate concepts marginalized by the currently fashionable metaphor of globalism. Scholars who are interested are encouraged to write introducing themselves and their work. We still have space to accommodate more papers. Peter Gran, Coordinator Email: v5538e@vm.temple.edu From dassbach@mtu.edu Wed Dec 10 09:23:22 1997 for ; Wed, 10 Dec 1997 11:23:12 -0500 (EST) for ; Wed, 10 Dec 1997 11:23:11 -0500 (EST) for ; Wed, 10 Dec 1997 11:23:10 -0500 (EST) From: "Carl H.A. Dassbach" To: Subject: Announcing an new e-list CM150-L Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1997 11:29:41 -0500 charset="iso-8859-1" PLEASE FORWARD ................PLEASE FORWARD ..............PLEASE FORWARD The purpose of CM150 is to acknowledge the 150th anniversary of the Communist Manifesto in 1998 (hence the title CM150-L), to discuss subjects relating to the Manifesto and the work of the "young Marx" and to discuss and make preparations for an international conference to mark the anniversary of the Manifesto. To subscribe, send the following message to: MAJORDOMO@MTU.EDU subscribe CM150-L If you do not receive an acknowledgment from MAJORDOMO within a few hours, retry. Carl Dassbach --------------------------- Carl H.A. Dassbach DASSBACH@MTU.EDU Dept. of Social Sciences (906)487-2115 - Phone Michigan Technological Univ. (906)487-2468 - Fax Houghton, MI 49931 (906)482-8405 - Private From chriscd@jhu.edu Thu Dec 11 07:43:45 1997 Thu, 11 Dec 1997 09:40:42 -0400 (EDT) Date: Thu, 11 Dec 1997 09:39:19 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: Re: w-systems & worldviews To: eeb@hknet.com Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu Elson Boles writes: >I'd really appreciate some suggestions that approach urban processes and a full range of related issues from a world-historical perspective (or a world-system perspective) be sure to look at David Smith's _Third World Cities in Global Perspective_ (Westview 1996). chris From chriscd@jhu.edu Thu Dec 11 07:52:00 1997 Date: Thu, 11 Dec 1997 09:49:04 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: ISA RC09 Call for Papers] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1997 17:04:15 +0100 From: isa@sis.ucm.es (International Sociological Association) Subject: ISA RC09 Call for Papers Apparently-to: chriscd@jhu.edu To: chriscd@jhu.edu Reply-to: isa@sis.ucm.es To: Members of the International Sociological Association ISA XIV World Congress of Sociology, Montreal 1998 Research Committee on Social Practice and Social Transformation, RC09 CALL FOR PAPERS Rc09 invites colleagues who are interested in participating in the RC 09 sessions at the World Congress of Sociology in Montreal in 1998. Please send a maximum 200 words abstract by January 15, 1998 to the RC 09 Secretary: Mustafa KOC (Dep Sociology, Ryerson Polytechnic University, 350 Victoria Street, Toronto, Ontario, M5B 2K3, Canada, Fax: 1-416-9795273, tel: 1-416-979 5000 ext 6210, Email: mkoc@acs.ryerson.ca) RC 09 welcomes papers dealing with Social Practice/Action Sociology, Social Change and Social Transformation. While we have selected 7 themes for the World Congress, we welcome abstracts dealing with broader categories. Session themes: Session 1: Participatory Research and Communities Co-Chairs: Peter PARK, Email: ppark@fielding.edu Lee WILLIAMS, Indiana University Session 2: Emigre Sociologists: Globalization of Knowledge and Cultural Boundaries Chair: Mustafa KOC, Email: mkoc@acs.ryerson.ca Session 3: Elites in the Social Transformation of Eastern Europe Co-Chairs: Michal BODEMANN, Fax: 49-30-8814812 Claus OFFE, Email: coffe@sowi.hu-berlin.de Session 4: Nationalism, Religion and Secularism - Comparative Perspectives Chair: Wilfred SPOHN, Fax: 49-30-85002139 Session 5: Social Transformations Between Processes of Globalization and Differentiation Chair: Ulrike SCHUERKENS, Fax: 33-1-45450156) Session 6: Spaces, Places and Cultures. On Globalization and Spatial Reconfiguration Chair: Helmuth BERKING, Email: hbe295@lulu.acns.nwu.edu Session 7: Global Activism in Hard Times: Women' Struggle for Global Justice Co-Chairs: Debi BROCK and Sedef ARAT-KOC, Email: dbrock@interlog.com Session 8: FromThree Worlds to Globalization: Transformation of Development Discourse Co-Chairs: Zaheer BABER, Email: socbz@nus.sg and Enakshi DUA, Canada From kukreja@ups.edu Thu Dec 11 10:02:44 1997 Date: Thu, 11 Dec 1997 09:00:53 -0800 To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu From: Sunil Kukreja Subject: Sachs on the IMF (from today's Financial Times) It is quite curious indeed that the following analysis bout the IMF appeared in the Financial Times: >Subject: Sachs on the IMF (from today's Financial Times) >Date: Thu, 11 Dec 1997 06:29:17 -0800 > >Jeffrey Sachs: IMF is a power unto itself >THURSDAY DECEMBER 11 1997 > >It is time that the world take a serious look at the International Monetary Fund. In the past three months, this small, secretive institution has dictated economic conditions to 350m people in Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. It has put on the line more than $100bn of taxpayers' money in loans. >These bailout operations, if handled incorrectly, could end up helping a few dozen international banks to escape losses for risky loans by forcing Asian governments to cover the losses on private transactions that have gone bad. Yet the IMF decisions have been taken without any public debate, comment, or scrutiny. >While it pays lip service to "transparency", the IMF offers virtually no substantive public documentation of its decisions, except for a few pages in press releases that are shorn of the technical details needed for a serious professional evaluation of its programmes. Remarkably, the international community accepts this state of affairs as normal. >The world waits to see what the Fund will demand of country X, assuming that the IMF has chosen the best course of action. The world accepts as normal the idea that crucial details of IMF programmes should remain confidential, even though these "details" affect the well-being of millions. Staff at the Fund, meanwhile, are unaccountable for their decisions. >The people most affected by these policies have little knowledge or input. In Korea, the IMF insisted that all presidential candidates immediately "endorse" an agreement they had no part in drafting or negotiating - and no time to understand. >The situation is out of hand. However useful the IMF may be to the world community, it defies logic to believe that the small group of 1,000 economists on 19th Street in Washington should dictate the economic conditions of life to 75 developing countries with around 1.4bn people. >These people constitute 57 per cent of the developing world outside China and India (which are not under IMF programmes). Since perhaps half of the IMF's professional time is devoted to these countries - with the rest tied up in surveillance of advanced countries, management, research, and other tasks - about 500 staff cover the 75 countries. That is an average of about seven economists per country. >One might suspect that seven staffers would not be enough to get a very sophisticated view of what is happening. That suspicion would be right. The IMF threw together a draconian programme for Korea in just a few days, without deep knowledge of the country's financial system and without any subtlety as to how to approach the problems. >Consider what the Fund said about Korea just three months ago in its 1997 annual report. "Directors welcomed Korea's continued impressive macroeconomic performance [and] praised the authorities for their enviable fiscal record." Three months ago there was not a hint of alarm, only a call for further financial sector reform - incidentally without mentioning the chaebol (conglomerates), or the issue of foreign ownership of banks, or banking supervision that now figure so prominently in the IMF's Korea programme. >In the same report, the IMF had this to say about Thailand, at that moment on the edge of the financial abyss. "Directors strongly praised Thailand's remarkable economic performance and the authorities' consistent record of sound macroeconomic policies." >With a straight face, Michel Camdessus, the IMF managing director, now blames Asian governments for the deep failures of macroeconomic and financial policies that the IMF has discovered. It would have been more useful instead, for the IMF to ponder why the situation looked so much better three months ago, for therein lies a basic truth about the situation in Asia. >There is no "fundamental" reason for Asia's financial calamity except financial panic itself. Asia's need for significant financial sector reform is real, but not a sufficient cause for the panic, and not a justification for harsh macroeconomic policy adjustments. Asia's fundamentals are adequate to forestall an economic contraction: budgets are in balance or surplus, inflation is low, private saving rates are high, economies are poised for export growth. >Asia is reeling not from a crisis of fundamentals, but from a self-fulfilling withdrawal of short-term loans, one that is fuelled by each investor's recognition that all other investors are withdrawing their claims. Since short-term debts exceed foreign exchange reserves, it is "rational" for each investor to join in the panic. >Without wider professional debate, the IMF has decided to impose a severe macroeconomic contraction on top of the market panic that is already roiling these economies. Consider the Korea programme (or at least those parts that have been announced to the public). The won has depreciated by around 80 per cent in the past 12 months, from around 840 a dollar to a record low of 1,565 yesterday; this currency depreciation will force up the prices of traded goods. Yet despite that, the IMF insists that Korea aim for an essentially unchanged inflation rate (5.2 per cent in 1998, in comparison with 4.2 per cent in 1997). To achieve unchanged low inflation in the face of a huge currency depreciation, Korea will need a brutal monetary squeeze. And indeed this is just what the Fund has ordered. Short-term interest rates jumped from 12½ per cent to 21 per cent upon the signing of the programme, and have since risen further. >The Fund argues that these draconian monetary measures are "to restore and sustain calm in the markets" and "[to] demonstrate to markets the government's resolve to confront the present crisis". It is hard to see how recessionary monetary policy will restore calm. Indeed the panic has so intensified since the signing of the agreement that Korean banks may now be on the verge of outright default. Just one day after the measures were unveiled, the 11th largest-conglomerate declared bankruptcy when Korean banks abruptly refused to roll over its short-term debts. In recent days more well-known local companies have gone under. >In addition to the rise in interest rates, the IMF is insisting that fiscal policy be tightened by 1-1½ per cent of GDP. On top of this, the IMF required that 9 out of 30 merchant banks suspend operations. The IMF is aiming for Korean growth to fall to 2.5 per cent in 1998 from 6 per cent in 1997. But the projected slowdown may turn out to be the least of Korea's worries by next year, since the underlying macroeconomic measures could easily push the economy into outright contraction. None of this overkill makes sense for an economy that was (rightly) judged to be pursuing sound macroeconomic policies just months earlier. >A better approach would have been for the IMF to stress the strengths rather than the weaknesses of the Korean economy, thereby calming the markets rather than further convincing them of the need to flee the country. Months ago, when the financial crisis began, the Fund could have quietly encouraged Japan, the US and Europe to provide some credit support to the Bank of Korea. It might well have worked with the major banks to encourage them to roll over their short-term debts without inflaming the panic. With appropriate confidence-building measures, Korea could probably have got by with a modest slowdown in growth, no credit crunch, and a realistic time horizon of a few years to complete its needed financial reforms. >In more than six dozen developing countries, the IMF is in a position to choose make-or-break financial policies. While its instincts are often correct, they can sometimes be wrong, with serious consequences. >In recent years, the IMF mishandled the Russian reforms (for example, by insisting for more than a year that all 15 successor states to the Soviet Union share a common currency, thereby delaying stabilisation and undermining the political support for reforms). In Bulgaria, the IMF signed a programme in July 1996 based on 2.5 per cent growth and 20 per cent inflation in 1997. Instead, Bulgaria has suffered an outright collapse of gross domestic product of more than 10 per cent, and inflation in the hundreds of per cent. The IMF (in common with others) failed to foresee the Mexico crisis in 1994, and the Asian crises in 1997. >Three general conclusions can be reached. First, the IMF is invested with too much power: no single agency should have responsibility for economic policy in half the developing world. >Second, the IMF's executive board should do its job of overseeing the staff, rather than simply rubber-stamp the staffs' proposals. It is high time the board consult outside expertise in the exploratory stages of IMF operations; it should also canvas international opinion about the origins and policy implications of the Asian crisis. >Third, IMF operations should be made public, so that professional debate and review can help ensure the highest possible professionalism of the institution, especially since (for all its faults) the Fund will surely continue to play an important role for many years in the future. >The author is head of the Harvard Institute for International Development. > > > From rhutchin@U.Arizona.EDU Thu Dec 11 14:03:08 1997 Date: Thu, 11 Dec 1997 13:59:30 -0700 (MST) From: Richard N Hutchinson To: Sunil Kukreja Subject: Re: Sachs on the IMF (from today's Financial Times) In-Reply-To: <2.2.16.19971211090456.33172642@mail.ups.edu> Sachs' position on the IMF, reported in the Financial Times, is perhaps not so curious given the amount of money invested in Asia that might be lost (on top of the massive sums already lost) if the IMF imposes austerity plans and slows growth. The interests of the bankers involved in making loans, and the interests of the manufacturers involved in direct investment, as well as investors in the markets, are not the same. What seems curious is that Sachs has been so identified with the IMF in the past. Asia, though, "The Tigers," were supposed to be different. Sachs apparently maintains that they still are. Richard Hutchinson From Kim@UWyo.Edu Thu Dec 11 14:27:41 1997 From: Quee-Young Kim To: "'WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK'" , "'Richard N Hutchinson'" Subject: RE: Sachs on the IMF (from today's Financial Times) Date: Thu, 11 Dec 1997 14:27:26 -0700 The IMF insulates itself quite effectively from the academic and political influences which can be quite muddling and incoherent. You can perhaps have ten different approaches toward resolving the current economic crisis in Asia if all the "economic" eggheads are allowed to come in. Quee-Young Kim University of Wyoming ---------- Sent: Thursday, December 11, 1997 2:00 PM To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: Re: Sachs on the IMF (from today's Financial Times) Sachs' position on the IMF, reported in the Financial Times, is perhaps not so curious given the amount of money invested in Asia that might be lost (on top of the massive sums already lost) if the IMF imposes austerity plans and slows growth. The interests of the bankers involved in making loans, and the interests of the manufacturers involved in direct investment, as well as investors in the markets, are not the same. What seems curious is that Sachs has been so identified with the IMF in the past. Asia, though, "The Tigers," were supposed to be different. Sachs apparently maintains that they still are. Richard Hutchinson From kjkhoo@pop.jaring.my Thu Dec 11 18:33:04 1997 From: kjkhoo@pop.jaring.my for ; Fri, 12 Dec 1997 09:32:51 +0800 (MYT) In-Reply-To: References: <2.2.16.19971211090456.33172642@mail.ups.edu> Date: Fri, 12 Dec 1997 09:26:08 +0800 To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: Re: Sachs on the IMF (from today's Financial Times) Of course, if you want to put it that way, you could simply say that Sachs has had longstanding consultancy links with E/SE Asia. But how about being generous and say that he's seen the light? Or else, he's simply a benighted academic, offended that he wasn't consulted by the IMF on the package(s)? Also, good to know that academics are still into self-flagellation. Never mind that the IMF's approach does ultimately derive from one of those ten "economic egghead" approaches. As for the region supposedly being different and Sachs' "apparently maintaining that they still are" -- haven't you heard? The centre of the world economy has shifted/is shifting to the region and the crisis is simply a crisis of emergence-to-dominance :) FWIW, my 2 sen, devalued 40%. KJ Khoo At 4:59 am +0800 12/12/97, Richard N Hutchinson wrote: > Sachs' position on the IMF, reported in the Financial Times, is perhaps > not so curious given the amount of money invested in Asia that might be > lost (on top of the massive sums already lost) if the IMF imposes > austerity plans and slows growth. The interests of the bankers involved in > making loans, and the interests of the manufacturers involved in direct > investment, as well as investors in the markets, are not the same. What > seems curious is that Sachs has been so identified with the IMF in the > past. Asia, though, "The Tigers," were supposed to be different. Sachs > apparently maintains that they still are. > > Richard Hutchinson At 5:27 am +0800 12/12/97, Quee-Young Kim wrote: > The IMF insulates itself quite effectively from the academic and > political influences which can be quite muddling and incoherent. You > can perhaps have ten different approaches toward resolving the current > economic crisis in Asia if all the "economic" eggheads are allowed to > come in. > > Quee-Young Kim > University of Wyoming From eeb@hknet.com Fri Dec 12 09:03:12 1997 for ; Sat, 13 Dec 1997 00:04:24 +0800 (HKT) From: "Elson E. Boles" To: "WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK" Subject: RE: w-systems & worldviews Date: Fri, 12 Dec 1997 21:11:28 +0800 Replies to the following two items: > We can analyze world dynamics, but the extreme > cognitive differences between cultures of different root demand us to > increase the complexity of our models, in order to face the REAL > complexity of the reality that we want to analyze. >Meanwhile, I think > that we must reduce the level, the range of our model, so that we will > be able to describe the dynamic from the meanings of each cultural > group. One approach to this, if one is studying social history or anthropology, is to move within one's analysis from global scale processes (or the model) to the local face of these processes where historical specificity, agency, language, culture etc., can be examined and give historical content to the static model. It's a bit like fusing Sahlin's "structure of the conjuncture" with Braudel's "conjonture of the structure." >Of course, the final goal must be the construction of a universal > model, but we cannot do it unless we consider the cultural difference > and the way it affect the infraestructural phenomena. Can't say I agree. We don't need universal models. But we need more people outside academia who share a critical perspective and are willing to sacrifice their "material interests" for "genuine peace of mind." Or is really this simple? Steve wrote: >Is it in my interest to have the > weekend off or to accumulate an extra 150$ a week? Is it in my interest > to exploit other people to enhance my comfort, or to develop meaningful, > communicative relationships which will allow for genuine peace of mind. A tricky and perennial problem. One cannot achieve peace of mind without some material security. Should the poor be content? Surely Steve doesn't mean that. Perhaps he'd agree that it is more fruitful to focus on the existing inequalities and hard conditions faced by the billions of poor rather than suggest that people will be happier with communicative relationships. Here in Hong Kong I see some small fraction of the poor everyday -- migrant workers from southern China or the Philippines -- along with ruthless entrepreneurs in their Rolls, and middle-class hopefuls who are absolutely convinced that climbing the latter over the next guy is their only chance for "peace of mind." In each group some are happy some aren't. But most of the workers look more worn out, tired, and aged. Yet they also seem to have making money on their mind. elson (formerly) SUNY Binghamton, New York eeb@HKnet.com From rozov@nsu.ru Mon Dec 15 02:04:14 1997 Mon, 15 Dec 1997 14:59:20 +0600 (NOVT) From: "Nikolai S. Rozov" To: Juan Luis Chulilla , wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Mon, 15 Dec 1997 17:05:18 +0600 Subject: Re: w-systems & worldviews Reply-to: rozov@nsu.ru In-reply-to: <348D58AD.4C67F5D7@ergos.es> some notes on post-modernism (pomo) in anthropology and other social-historical sciences, constructing social theories, graph method, and theorizing of culture > From: Juan Luis Chulilla > All of you are lucky if you aren't > anthropologist. My discipline is immersed, since some years ago, in a > bizarre wave of thinking which is called "postmodernism". Robert Carneiro, an author of an outstanding circumscription theory of origin of a state, passed me in Wash.DC his paper: Godzilla Meets New Age Anthropology: Facing the Post-Modernist Challenge to a Science of Culture //Europaea, 1995, vol 1, N 1 where he severely criticises pomo comparing it with Black Plague. Tyler, Rosenau, Geertz are main victims of Carneiro's criticisms. Carneiro is an evolutionary optimist in this issue (as far as pomo cannot deliever a single solid scientific result in anthropology it will be thrown out sooner or later). But remembering A.G.Frank's complaint some months ago concerning discussion on Braudel and pomo triumphal march through Western Un-s, i think that one should have some anxiety of possible spread of Black Plague among all social sciences and paradigms including WS-approach. isn't it a high time to consolidate forces of objective rational sciences in social-historical area? from my viewpoint the best way of counter-attack would be not at all a criticism of pomo (let it die itself naturally) but more intensive movement in constucting, testing, synthesizing, exhange of social theories among several paradigms (f.e. ws-approach, geopolitics, historical sociology, w-history, (macro)sociology, sociology, anthropology, hist.geography, hist.environm. studies, hist.demography, etc.) for some weeks i am under impression of Arthur Stinchcomb's book 'Constructing Social Theories', i like very much Stinchcomb's strict logical (hypothetico-deductive) approach combined with full-scale comprehension of complexity, multi-aspectness, historism, etc etc of social reality. I wonder if his approach was apllied by someone in WS-theory? Take for example how strongly Stincomb deals with graphs (he managed to present even Marxian core theory as a clear functional graph), (BTW, dear Chris and Tom, why not to try to treat your promising iterative model (in Rise&Demise,1997) by Stinchcomb's instruments?) concerning this thread - worlviews - i think that it woild be an unexusable crime to leave culture, ideology, and worldviews to pomo hands. these fields must be involved into rational. theoretical scope, and we have good starting points (besides mentioned by Chris): take f.e. Weber-Collins' version of legitimacy theory, or Malinowski-Stinchcombs' version of functionality of rituals, religions, etc best, Nikolai ****************************************************** Nikolai S. Rozov, PhD, Dr.Sc. Professor of Philosophy E-MAIL: rozov@nsu.ru FAX: 7-3832-397101 ADDRESS: Philosophy Dept. Novosibirsk State University 630090, Novosibirsk, Pirogova 2, RUSSIA Moderator of the mailing list PHILOFHI (PHILosophy OF HIstory and theoretical history). URL= http://www.people.virginia.edu/~dew7e/anthronet/subscribe/philofhi.htm ********************************************************************* From athan.kokkinias@utoronto.ca Mon Dec 15 02:48:52 1997 Date: Mon, 15 Dec 1997 04:32:51 -0500 To: rozov@nsu.ru, WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: "Athanasios (Tom) Kokkinias" Subject: Re: w-systems & worldviews In-Reply-To: <199712150859.OAA04919@mx.nsu.ru> References: <348D58AD.4C67F5D7@ergos.es> Sorry if this is posted twice in the same breath, Dear Nicolai, Very interesting post. I am delighted to see the list's discussions in the midst of the realtionships between world-systems and world-views....I hope the thread will not die out any day soon! I digress from the point of my communication with you. Ever since having watched the film "My diner with Andre" I was fascinated with the approaches of "synthesis" of Bronislaw Malinowski. I now have in my hands his book "Magic, Science and Religion". More fascinating stuff. Please, could you guide me to further information regarding your comment at the end of this (your) post on: >Malinowski-Stinchcombs' version of functionality of rituals, >religions, etc? Also, and this in the sight of time's raised eyebrow is directed to the list as a whole..., are any of the participants on this list familiar with the work of Gregory Bateson, Alfred Korzybski, and more generally with the models that are born out of the field of Systems Theory (Von Bertalafy, Alfred North Whitehead...) and how these models might relate to the present discussions regarding w-s and w-views.... And, possibly, is any body at all familiar with all of the above in relation to more inclusive, systems-friendly, deep- ecological, integrative-non-dualistic, 'holistic' approaches to the important questions discussed in this forum? I would greatly appreciate any and all responses to this short post. Kind regards, Tom At 06:05 AM 15/12/97 -0500, Nikolai S. Rozov wrote: >some notes on post-modernism (pomo) in anthropology and >other social-historical sciences, constructing social theories, graph >method, and theorizing of culture > >> From: Juan Luis Chulilla >> All of you are lucky if you aren't >> anthropologist. My discipline is immersed, since some years ago, in a >> bizarre wave of thinking which is called "postmodernism". > >Robert Carneiro, an author of an outstanding circumscription theory >of origin of a state, passed me in Wash.DC his paper: > >Godzilla Meets New Age Anthropology: Facing the Post-Modernist >Challenge to a Science of Culture //Europaea, 1995, vol 1, N 1 > >where he severely criticises pomo comparing it with Black Plague. >Tyler, Rosenau, Geertz are main victims of Carneiro's criticisms. >Carneiro is an evolutionary optimist in this issue (as far as pomo >cannot deliever a single solid scientific result in anthropology it >will be thrown out sooner or later). But remembering A.G.Frank's >complaint some months ago concerning discussion on Braudel and pomo >triumphal march through Western Un-s, i think that one should have >some anxiety of possible spread of Black Plague among all social >sciences and paradigms including WS-approach. > > isn't it a high time to consolidate forces of objective rational >sciences in social-historical area? > > from my viewpoint the best way of counter-attack would be not at >all a criticism of pomo (let it die itself naturally) but more >intensive movement in constucting, testing, synthesizing, exhange of >social theories among several paradigms (f.e. ws-approach, >geopolitics, historical sociology, w-history, (macro)sociology, >sociology, anthropology, hist.geography, hist.environm. studies, >hist.demography, etc.) > >for some weeks i am under impression of Arthur Stinchcomb's book >'Constructing Social Theories', i like very much Stinchcomb's strict >logical (hypothetico-deductive) approach combined with full-scale >comprehension of complexity, multi-aspectness, historism, etc etc of >social reality. > I wonder if his approach was apllied by someone in >WS-theory? Take for example how strongly Stincomb deals with graphs >(he managed to present even Marxian core theory as a clear functional >graph), > >(BTW, dear Chris and Tom, why not to try to treat your promising >iterative model (in Rise&Demise,1997) by Stinchcomb's instruments?) > >concerning this thread - worlviews - i think that it woild be an >unexusable crime to leave culture, ideology, and worldviews to pomo >hands. these fields must be involved into rational. theoretical >scope, and we have good starting points (besides mentioned by Chris): >take f.e. Weber-Collins' version of legitimacy theory, or >Malinowski-Stinchcombs' version of functionality of rituals, >religions, etc > >best, >Nikolai > > > >****************************************************** >Nikolai S. Rozov, PhD, Dr.Sc. Professor of Philosophy >E-MAIL: rozov@nsu.ru FAX: 7-3832-397101 >ADDRESS: Philosophy Dept. Novosibirsk State University >630090, Novosibirsk, Pirogova 2, RUSSIA > >Moderator of the mailing list PHILOFHI (PHILosophy OF HIstory and >theoretical history). URL= >http://www.people.virginia.edu/~dew7e/anthronet/subscribe/philofhi.htm >********************************************************************* > From chriscd@jhu.edu Mon Dec 15 08:07:31 1997 Date: Mon, 15 Dec 1997 10:04:01 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: financial crisis in Asia To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu >The attached appeared in the Indian newspaper, _The Hindu_ on Dec. 12th. A lost decade for Asia? Date: 12-12-1997 By Ravi Arvind Palat Just as the 1982 debt crisis showed the exhaustion of an inward looking, import substitution industrialisation strategy, the 1997 meltdown signals the unviability of the vaunted Asian models. WRITING in the Financial Times on November 27, Mr. Stephen Fidler, the paper's editor for Latin America, wondered whether the current crisis of the Asian economies denoted the beginning of a ``lost decade'' of development for the region much as the 1980s were widely held a lost decade for Latin America. The parallels between the contemporary fiscal crisis afflicting the ``miracle'' economies of Asia and the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s are indeed striking. In the 1960s and 1970s, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico were the models held up to be emulated by other developing countries. Larger than any of the economies that would later be called the ``Four Dragons'' (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan), and fuelled by cheap loans from international currency markets, these Latin American economies posted impressive rates of growth. Encouraged by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, their Governments invested borrowed funds in massive ``Think Big'' investments in steel and heavy industries, in armaments and resource extraction, in automobiles and other consumer goods. On the assumption that they could increase exports based on their lower wage and raw materials costs, it was envisaged that they could repay the loans with their export earnings. Expanding industrial employment also enabled them to offer good jobs to their subject populations and hence win popular support for military dictatorships and one-party regimes. Flush with petro- dollars, major Western banks were also eager to lend to these newly-industrialising countries as they soaked up their excess currency reserves and sovereign bankruptcies were unthinkable at the time. Once these cheap sources of loans dried up, these economies crumbled like a house of cards. Beginning with the Mexican debt crisis of 1982, one after another, the Latin American ``miracles'' experienced deepening balance of payments crises, falling foreign investments, collapse of their export markets and industrial decline. Similarly, beginning with the fiscal crisis of Thailand on July 2, stock and currency markets in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea and Hong Kong have taken a battering as investors scramble to rid themselves of assets in currencies depreciating rapidly. Aggravating situation, continent-sized clouds from the fires raging out of control on the islands of Borneo, Java, Sulawesi and Sumatra have plunged Kuala Lumpur and Singapore into semi-darkness and contributed to the crash of an Airbus, killing 234 people. And matching the popular revolts against the authoritarian regimes in Latin America, the Asian Governments have begun to tumble. The ability of many governments in Asia to ride roughshod over their domestic opponents was based in part on their ability to deliver material prosperity. As this ability is eroded by the current crises, popular protests will increasingly challenge authoritarian rulers. In Thailand, the Yongchaiyudh Government has already fallen. The ruling party in Taiwan has suffered its worst-ever showing in the municipal elections and the crisis has inserted an unusual degree of uncertainty to the December 18 South Korean presidential elections. Even a temporary deceleration in rates of growth in countries which have not known an economic depression for 20-30 years will also surely heighten ethnic tensions, between indigenous Indonesians and Malays, on the one hand, and the ethnic Chinese who control a disproportionate share of the national income, on the other. Already in Indonesia, the murder of a girl by a half-Chinese man in September has led to the burning of Chinese temples, looting of their shops and several deaths. Despite these parallels, comparisons between the current crisis in Asia and the crisis of the 1980s in Latin America are superficial. Though both the Latin American states and the Asian ``miracle'' economies were dependent on foreign capital to generate high rates of investment, loans were incurred by governments in Latin America and by banks and private companies in Asia. This makes it much harder to impose discipline on the Asian economies as it is easier to rein in or punish a handful of governments than a myriad of corporations. More importantly, because of the inward-looking, import- substituting nature of the Latin American economies, their industrial structures were relatively autonomous and firewalls could quickly be instituted to prevent the contagion from spreading. No such remedy is possible for the highly interdependent economies along Asia's Pacific Rim. Production operations may be located in Thailand, Indonesia or Malaysia, but these are invariably controlled by Japanese, South Korean or American companies through their extensive subcontracting networks. A Thai company may make radiators for Toyota cars, but it has neither the market intelligence nor the expertise to change its production lines and is hence dependent on Toyota. Even if seven of the 30 largest South Korean conglomerates have sought bankruptcy protection since the beginning of this year, no one is even suggesting that Hyundai, Daewoo or Lucky Goldstar would collapse. These conglomerates with their highly diversified interests also have large production facilities in Western Europe, North America, Latin America and elsewhere. Whereas the Latin American miracles were launched with foreign loans, inflows of foreign capital into the miracle economies of Asia increased only after the mid-Eighties, after their industrialisation drive had been well under way. As overseas investors sought to cash in on the growth of these economies, they borrowed at low rates in international currency markets as loans taken out at two per cent in New York or Tokyo can typically earn eight to 10 per cent in Thailand or Malaysia. Even if large chunks of this money were chanelled into speculative activities, Mr. David Hale, chief economist for the Zurich Insurance Group, estimates that Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have accounted for almost half the growth in world manufacturing output since 1991. Given this extraordinary expansion in industrial capacity, it is a mistake to treat the great 1997 meltdown as a fiscal crisis brought about by badly run and poorly supervised banking systems and overvalued exchange rates as the IMF and most analysts do. Undoubtedly, there was a lack of fiscal probity: lending based on political connections of entrepreneurs rather than on the credit-worthiness of their projects and downright illegal practices such as risky loans being kept off the books. A much bigger problem, though, is that the lowering of tariffs and regulations across the globe makes it imperative for every major company to maintain a presence in every market. Every automobile manufacturer, for instance, tries to produce and sell cars in every major market and as factories produce more cars than people can buy, prices fall. It leads to falling profits and plant closings which in turn reduce demand even further and a chain reaction sets in. Nowhere is this truer than in the miracle economies of Asia. With the rapid growth of these economies, major American, European and Japanese corporations competed fiercely to capture a share of their growing markets. If the current crisis has led to sharp declines in sales and idle factories, their capacities remain intact. As the currencies of the ailing Asian economies depreciate under the IMF-receivership, their products will become cheaper and will not only make Asian exports more competitive in the world market but also sharply curtail their imports of foreign goods. Hence, far from being a ``lost decade,'' the next few years could more reasonably be expected to lead to a further boom in industrialisation in East and Southeast Asia and to a corresponding growth in unemployment in Australasia, North America and Western Europe as companies shift their manufacturing operations to take advantage of lower wages in Asia. But this does not mean that there will not be fundamental changes in the Asian economies. As the price of the IMF-led bailout is surely structural reform, governments in the region will no longer be able to practise ``crony capitalism.'' Increasing control by global corporations of large sectors of their economies will preclude governments from formulating and implementing a coordinated national development strategy and undermine the role of agencies such as Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry and South Korea's Economic Planning Board. In this sense, and in this sense only, the comparison with the Latin American debt crisis is on the mark. Just as the debt crisis of 1982 finally showed the exhaustion of an inward-looking, import-substitution industrialisation strategy, the 1997 meltdown signals the unviability of the vaunted ``Asian model.'' (The writer is Senior Lecturer, Sociology Department, University of Auckland, New Zealand.) From ba05105@binghamton.edu Mon Dec 15 10:10:21 1997 From: ba05105@binghamton.edu Date: Mon, 15 Dec 1997 12:10:02 -0500 (EST) Reply-To: ba05105@binghamton.edu To: "Elson E. Boles" Subject: RE: w-systems & Steve > wrote: > > >Is it in my interest to have the > > weekend off or to accumulate an extra 150$ a week? Is it in > my interest > > to exploit other people to enhance my comfort, or to develop > meaningful, > > communicative relationships which will allow for genuine peace > of mind. > > A tricky and perennial problem. One cannot achieve > peace of mind without some material security. Should the poor > be content? Surely Steve doesn't mean that. Perhaps he'd agree > that it is more fruitful to focus on the existing inequalBities > and hard conditions faced by the billions of poor rather than > suggest that people will be happier with communicative;[A > relationships. > > > elson > (formerly) SUNY Binghamton, New York > eeb@HKnet.com > > To reiterate--I wrote the above to challenge the notion, floated by Chase-Dunn, that culture reflects people's 'material' interests. Aside from the fact that this formulates things in terms of a thoroughly outdated mind-body division (all thoughts being nothing more than the material product of electrical activity in the brain), it just doesn't make any sense. The question about what 'I' should focus on (Elson, reread it) refers, as one might suspect, to me, a graduate student in the US. Again, is it in my interest to embrace the racism that might benefit me in some ways? It was not a question about the priorities of the poor. Today, in the US, we have a medical establishment that tries to tell us exactly what we 'need' to consume to be 'healthy'. Are these scientifically determined standards (revised and disputed constantly) what people have been or should have been striving for? When workers in the very near past (not more than a hundred and fifty years ago) put beer at the center of their diets, and often wanted it as part of demands on employers, were they exercising false consciousness? Did they 'really' want a 'healthier' diet because this was in their 'interest'. Personally, I don't see all that much evidence that people invariably put aside concerns about what they want out of their relations with other people until they have reached some official standard of living. In the US, for example, one can find all kinds of evidence that the desire undo the stings of historically created cultural hierarchies is at least as important as 'raising living standards' (itself a very culturally specific way of understanding people's needs). Until I see any evidence that any class or groups actions can be explained through material interests of a pre-determined sort, I will look at the notion of 'interests' outside of some cultural context, as a fallacy. To me, the sort of 'communicative relationships' we very urgently need, mean that the determination of political priorities come from a dialogue with different groups. Any effort to 'focus on historical inequalities and hard conditions' without such a dialogue will lead either to the sort of authoritarian political structures that kill some of those they are allegedly helping, or completely irrelevant proposals for World Parties, World Governments etc with no obvious political, social or cultural base. STeve Sherman SUNY at Binghamton From phuakl@sit.edu.my Mon Dec 15 18:56:15 1997 From: "DR. PHUA KAI LIT" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Tue, 16 Dec 1997 09:56:51 +0000 Subject: No Country Is Beyond t ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- To: sangkancil@malaysia.net Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1997 13:35:48 Subject: [sangkancil] Lee/Mahathir: No Country Is Beyond the Financial Markets' Power. (fwd) From: pillai@mgg.pc.my (M.G.G. Pillai) Reply-to: pillai@mgg.pc.my (M.G.G. Pillai) ________________________________________________ This week's sponsors -The Asia Pacific Internet Company (APIC) Business Internet Services. Some talk. Some do. We talk and do! for instant info ________________________________________________ FORWARDED MAIL ------- From: andreid@montrealnet.net (Andrei) Date: 09 Dec 97 Originally Posted On: soc.culture.malaysia Top Stories from the Editorial/Opinion pages of the International Herald Tribune, Wednesday, December 10, 1997 No Country Is Beyond the Financial Markets' Power By Roger C. Altman LAT WASHINGTON - The film ''Independence Day'' depicts gigantic and terrifying spaceships appearing over the key capitals of the world. Large enough to block the sun, they hover, silently, just above the tallest buildings. Confused and frightened citizens pitifully try to befriend them, but the alien vessels unleash rays of terrible force, obliterating the cities in minutes. In the last six months, global financial markets similarly have trained their fire on the capitals of East Asia. One by one, from Bangkok to Seoul, they have crushed previously stable currencies. In their wake, they left soaring interest rates, tottering banking systems and slowing economies. Governments have been destabilized. The previously muscular ''Asian tigers'' have been crippled, and India may be next. This devastation suggests that world financial markets have emerged as a form of supranational government for the 21st century. They are not elected and do not convene. But as virtually all nations join the global economy, their finances are subject to the markets' rulings. Their currencies, which must be reasonably stable to promote national growth, are always on trial. So is their access to international borrowing markets to finance exports and infrastructure. When these markets' verdict is negative, changes in national economic policies are forced, and entire governments can be powerless. Increasingly, the International Monetary Fund is the only counterweight. It alone can assemble the resources necessary to financially rescue decimated nations. It alone has the political and territorial independence to demand tough financial reforms from the victim nation. But questions now are being raised about whether even the IMF can withstand such overwhelming financial forces. The most recent demonstration of the markets' awesome power began last summer. For years, the leading nations of East Asia had been lionized as icons of growth. Their typical blend of high savings and investment with relatively autocratic economic and political rule had been hailed as the ideal recipe for developing nations. And their GDP growth rates, 6 to 8 percent annually in recent years, had been remarkable. But in July the foreign exchange markets became disenchanted with this region, beginning with Thailand. Waves of selling battered its currency, which fell an astounding 40 percent against the dollar in three weeks. That made it hugely expensive for the country and its private borrowers to pay off their vast, dollar-denominated debt. The cost of imports soared. The central bank exhausted its reserves trying to defend the currency, and Thailand, in effect, went bankrupt. Its government fell, and the IMF stepped in with a $17 billion package of emergency financing, conditioned on austerity measures. As they invariably do, the markets had grasped what no one else had yet seen: Thailand was financially sick. Thais had been running up huge debts, mostly in dollars, and depending on the stability of their currency to repay them. In particular, urged on by the political leadership, banks were shoveling loans into unprofitable and crony-controlled ventures. The global markets next turned thumbs down on Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines in quick succession. They saw similar flaws in these economies. They drove the currencies and stock markets to drastically lower levels. Then, like a spreading storm, this market opprobrium descended onto South Korea. The markets flexed their muscles, and the tigers were turned into goats. This power stems from profound changes in technology, global liquidity and the culture of investment performance. Technology now permits information to be disseminated instantaneously worldwide and transactions to be executed electronically from any fully equipped terminal. In addition, huge capital flows are professionally managed for maximum investment results. The result often is mass capital movements, favoring a nation or abandoning it. The verdicts cannot be appealed. No nations are truly protected against these market rulings. In 1979, then President Jimmy Carter submitted a long-awaited budget that displeased the global currency markets. The dollar collapsed. Within two weeks, Mr. Carter retreated and submitted a new, tighter budget to Congress. Five years ago, British Prime Minister John Major, facing jittery markets, stood defiantly outside 10 Downing Street and vowed that Britain would not delink its pound from the key European currencies. Within days, after world markets crushed the pound, he reversed course in humiliating fashion. These global markets are mostly unregulated today, and that is not likely to change. The domestic activities of larger U.S. and European financial institutions are supervised by central banks and other agencies, but their international trading and investment businesses are largely unconstrained. Moreover, the armies of mutual funds and other investment vehicles are largely unregulated. There is nothing illegal or unfair about their decisions. The right focus, instead, is on the IMF. It is the emergency financier for faltering governments and the architect of austerity measures for their financial recovery. But the IMF should develop a better early-warning system. In the Mexican collapse of 1995 and in this year's East Asian crisis, it issued no warnings to the nations involved. The industrialized world must also ensure that the IMF has the necessary financial resources, however large, to prevent full-fledged collapses. Otherwise, the entire global financial system could be at risk. In ''Independence Day,'' the U.S. president personally leads a fighter squadron to destroy the alien ships. But global financial markets are invisible and beyond the reach of political leaders. The writer was U.S. deputy Treasury secretary in 1993 and 1994. He contributed this comment to the Los Angeles Times. http://www.iht.com/IHT/TODAY/WED/ED/edroger.html -________________________________________________ List Owner: M.G.G. Pillai Free Homepages on malaysia.net - send blank Check out the malaysia.net web site on List Postings to ________________________________________________ From chriscd@jhu.edu Tue Dec 16 08:06:14 1997 Date: Tue, 16 Dec 1997 10:03:28 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: ISA RC47 Call for Papers] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu Date: Mon, 15 Dec 1997 18:04:52 +0100 From: isa@sis.ucm.es (International Sociological Association) Subject: ISA RC47 Call for Papers Apparently-to: chriscd@jhu.edu To: chriscd@jhu.edu Reply-to: isa@sis.ucm.es To: Members of the International Sociological Association ISA XIV World Congress of Sociology, Montreal, July 26- August 1, 1998 Research Committee on Social Classes and Social Movements, RC47 CALL FOR PAPERS If you wish to submit a paper to one of the sessions (except Session 1 which is already closed), please send as soon as possible a summary of your proposal (approximately 200 words) to the chair(s) of the session you would like to participate in. Full mailing addresses of sessions chairs as well as sessions descriptions are available at: http://www.ucm.es/info/isa Send also your proposal to RC47 Secretary-Treasurer Henri LUSTIGER-THALER, Email: hlustig@ramapo.edu so that the Programme Coordinators can keep track of all the proposals. The choice of papers for all the sessions have to be completed at the latest by January 15, 1998. 1. Social Change and Collective Action Within Late Modernity (closed session) Chair: Louis MAHEU 2. Social Inequalities. Social Exclusion and New Strategies of Collective Action Chair: Manuel A. GARRETON, fax: 56-2-6787777 3. Collective Action, the Personal and Gendered Identities Chair: Sasha ROSENEIL, Email: s.roseneil@leeds.ac.uk) 4. The Challenges of Social and Political Transformation Chair: Barbara EPSTEIN, Email:bepstein@nature.berkeley.edu 5. Markets, Movements, and the Marginalization of Lower Classes in Developing Countries Chair: Staffan LINDBERG, Email: staffan.lindeberg@soc.lu.se 6. Social Movements and internationalism through the Prism of Gender, Sexuality, and Politics (Joint session with RC 32) Co-Chairs: Angela MILES, Email: amiles@oise.utoronto.ca, Esther CHOW, Email: echow@american.edu 7. Citizenship and Exclusions Co-Chairs: Danielle JUTEAU, Email: juteaud@ere.umontreal.ca, Minou MOSLEN, USA 8. Movements and Countermovements in the Informational Age Chair: Shujiro YAZAWA, Email: cs00180@srv.cc.hit-u.ac.jp 9. Institutions and the Institutionalization of Collective Action: New Challenges Chair: Henri LUSTIGER-THALER, Email: hlustig@ramapo.edu 10. Local Struggles and Global Issues Chair: Jan NEDERVEEN PIETERSE, The Netherlands 11. Social Movements, National Identity and Ethnicity Chair: Didier LAPEYRONNIE, fax: 33-1-49542670 12 and13. Poor People's Movements and Urban Politics; Urban Movements and Citizenship (Joint sessions with RC21) Co-Chairs: Pierre HAMEL, Email: hamelp@ere.umontreal.ca, Henri LUSTIGER THALER, Email: hlustig@ramapo.edu, Margit MAYER, Email: mayer@fub46.zedat.fu-berlin.de, Roland ROTH, Email: roland.roth@sozialwesen.fh-magdebrug.de 14. Collective Action, the Environment and Cultural Diversity in a Comparative Perspective Chair: Jean-Guy VAILLANCOURT, Email: vaillje@ere.umontreal.ca 15. Social Movements and Democratic Issues within a Regional Context (Latin America) Chair: Manuel A. GARRETON, fax: 56-2-6787777 From wkirk@wml.prestel.co.uk Tue Dec 16 13:26:37 1997 by svr-a-03.core.theplanet.net with smtp (Exim 1.80 #1) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 1997 20:17:45 -0800 From: William Kirk To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Re: w-systems & worldviews References: <348D58AD.4C67F5D7@ergos.es> <3.0.1.32.19971215043251.006ca464@mailbox47.utcc.utoronto.ca> Athanasios (Tom) Kokkinias wrote: > > Also, and this in the sight of time's raised eyebrow is directed to the > list as a whole..., are any of the participants on this list familiar >with the work of Gregory Bateson, Alfred Korzybski, and more generally >with the models that are born out of the field of Systems Theory (Von >Bertalafy, Alfred North Whitehead...) and how these models might relate >to the present discussions regarding w-s and w-views.... And, possibly, >is any body at all familiar with all of the above in relation to more >inclusive, systems-friendly, deep- ecological, >integrative-non-dualistic, 'holistic' approaches to the important >questions discussed in this forum? > I would greatly appreciate any and all responses to this short post. The works of Ludwig von Bertalanaffy, General Systems Theory, and Alfred Korzybski, Outline of General Semantics, are basics for the systems engineer, but for a criticism on their work it might be worth reading John Gall, one time prof. of medicine at the U. of Michigan. System-Antics How Systems Work and Especially How They Fail. It becomes clear Gall has had hands-on-experience in the field of the science of systems, it is worth a read. I think it is worth keeping in mind one or two of the points he makes, such as, "THE "PROBLEM" PROBLEM." "For the practising systems-manager, the greatest pitfall lies in the realm of Problems and Problem-solving. Systems can do many things, but one thing they emphatically cannot do is to Solve Problems. This is because Problem-solving is not a systems-function, and there is no satisfactory Systems-approximation to the solution of a Problem. A System represents someone's solution to a problem. Yet, whenever a particular problem is large enough and puzzling enough to be considered a Capital-P Problem, men rush in to solve it by means of a system. Once a problem is recognised as a Problem, it undergoes a subtle metamorphosis. Experts in the "Problem" area proceed to elaborate its complexity. They design systems to attack it. This approach guarantees failure, at least for all but the most pedestrian tasks. A system that is sufficiently large, complex, and ambitious can reduce output far below "random" levels. Thus, a Federal program to conquer cancer may tie up all the competent researchers in the field, leaving the problem to be solved by someone else, typically a graduate student from Tasmania doing a little recreational entomology on his vacation. Solutions usually come from people who see in the problem only an interesting puzzle, and whose qualifications would never satisfy a select committee." Gall has a number of rules that he finds to be general rules governing problem-solving and four which come under the heading of the 'Problem' are given below. "1. Great advances are not made by systems designed to produce great advances, 2. Complex systems tend to produce complex responses (not solutions) to problems, 3. Systems develop goals of their own the instant they come into being, 4. The crucial variables of a system are discovered by accident." One point stressed by Korzybski is the need for precise and scientific definitions of a system, where it fits into the Universal system and what are the sub-systems. If systems are scientific then they should be described as abstract systems, or at least I think so. regards, William Kirk. From TBOS@social-sci.ss.emory.edu Tue Dec 16 13:55:57 1997 From: "Terry Boswell" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Tue, 16 Dec 1997 15:48:33 EST5EDT Subject: Re: w-systems & worldviews Debates about worldviews, materialist vs cultural, always seem to me to get lost in "time and space." If one is talking to the person next door, then questions of cognition and differing cultural definitions of reality are immediately important determinants of the course and form of interaction, independent from its content. That is, did your neighbor understand your message? Specific issues of cultural context, such as language, gender, perceptions, values, and worldviews, are paramount for answering this question. Move in time and space away from interpersonal interaction, and issues of cultural context fade in relevance for determing interactions. For a world-systemic process to operate over hundreds of years, it must produce relatively similar outcomes in an enormous variety of specific cultural contexts (otherwise, it is not the same process over the entire time and space in question). Only the most basic material relations tend to qualify -- food, shelter, death, fertility. The more one's basic material needs are determined by the world economic and interstate system, the more integrated the system --and vice versa. At the mid-range between specific cultural contexts and the long history of the world-system are institutions, such as corporations, states, and churches. Insititutions bundle together sets of cultural contexts and back up their definitions of reality with powerful material resources. Agreement among the world's most potent institutions can create a worldview that defines the cultural context for most of the world's inhabitants (i.e., a hegemonic worldview). It is at the mid-range institutional level that I think world-system theory has something to offer about worldviews. People like John Meyer, John Boli, George Thomas, and Francisco Ramirez argue that extremely potent "world polity" of cultural institutions constitutes the actors in the system. Political scientists like Krasner and Holsti temper such views with realist concerns about differing interests among states, and argue that comparatively weak "world orders" set the parametes of common interests among powerful actors. My own interest is in the variation between the two -- when do you get one versus the other? Comments, criticisms, refutations and rejections are welcomed. TB Terry Boswell Department of Sociology Emory University Atlanta, GA 30322 From OWENJACK@FS.isu.edu Tue Dec 16 16:11:40 1997 for ; Tue, 16 Dec 1997 16:10:26 -0700 (MST) From: "J B Owens" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Tue, 16 Dec 1997 16:17:03 -0600, MDT Subject: CFP: Environmental Politics, Geography and the Left For those who haven't already seen the message. Cheers, Jack Owens ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date: Tue, 16 Dec 1997 14:15:49 -0800 Reply-to: H-NET List for World History From: Ken Pomeranz Subject: CFP: Environmental Politics, Geography and the Left CALL FOR PAPERS Environmental Politics, Geography, and the Left The Radical History Review is currently soliciting articles and essays for a thematic volume on "Environmental Politics, Geography, and the Left." We would welcome articles that examine the history of formal environmental politics, ideologies and movements. These articles might deal with the following kinds of questions: What, historically, has been the relationship between the environmental movement and left politics? Between the environmental movement and other oppositional movements such as feminism, racial politics, urban reform, and consumer politics? In addition to essays which explore the history, culture, and beliefs of the formal environmental movement internationally and in the U.S., we would also welcome articles which deal with aspects of social geography, space, and the built environment. These essays might include explorations of the dminishing concept of the public sphere, or the historical--and contemporary--relationship between changes in the economy, such as "globalization," and transformations in the organization of space. We also seek essays which examine the relationship between geography and the formal politics of environmentalism. These essays, ideally, might trouble our sense of what the basic category of "environmental politics" has historically included and excluded: Why, when and how does a problem get categorized or counted as "environmental"? How do changes in "artificial" environments relate to the formal movements described by the terms "environmental politics" and "environmentalism"--aimed at controlling space, the use of resources, the definition of public and private domain, and the social effects of problems such as industrial pollution? How do "resources" get named and classified, how have things such as forests, historically, been converted from natural spaces into commodities and, on occasion, back into "natural resources"? Radical History Review especially invites submisssions that investigate non-U.S./non-Western contexts, and those essays that reflect on the relationship between contemporary and historical environmental themes. Please send submissions to Managing Editor, Radical History Review, Tamiment Library, 70 Washington Square South, New York, NY 10012. Inquiries to Pamela Haag, haagp@mail.aauw.org, or to the RHR office at (212) 998-2632. SUBMISSION DEADLINE: February 15, 1998 From rozov@nsu.ru Tue Dec 16 21:13:37 1997 Wed, 17 Dec 1997 10:11:38 +0600 (NOVT) From: "Nikolai S. Rozov" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu, athan.kokkinias@utoronto.ca, PHILOFHI@YORKU.CA Date: Wed, 17 Dec 1997 12:17:37 +0600 Subject: Re: w-systems & worldviews Reply-to: rozov@nsu.ru In-reply-to: <3.0.1.32.19971215043251.006ca464@mailbox47.utcc.utoronto.ca> some words on functional scheme and correspondent theoretical approach in treating ideologies and world-views From: kokkinias@utoronto.ca > Please, could you guide me to > further information regarding your comment at the end of this (your) > post on: > > >Malinowski-Stinchcombs' version of functionality of rituals, > >religions, etc? Arthur Stinchcombe in his Constructing Social Theories. 1968,87 pp.87-101 applies a very elegant graphic functional scheme to various social and cutural theries, including Marx's theory of revolution and Malinowski's theory of functionality of rituals the text is on a book shelf, i don't wish to reproduce it here, but i guarantee all thereticilly thinking people a large intellectual pleasure and challenge while reading this book BTW, dear Chris and other materialistically intended researchers, don't you wish to substitute the obsolete and primitive Leninist thesis that ideology is a reflexion of material interests by not less materialistic but much more reasonable and promising Stinchcombe's scheme. Now my version of such application: ideological activities are a special Structure that supports some significant homeostatic variable of social reality (f.e. Level of Legitimacy of Current Order). More strong is ideology, more strong becomes legitimacy. Less strong is legitimacy, more intensive become ideological activities (in some conditions as an oppressive monoideology, in other - as a search for new alternatives). Compare this scheme with Legitimacy of Current Order of global world-economy and both mainstream liberal and 'antisystemic' ideological activities and you can get a fresh vision of the problem. regards Nikolai Rozov From OWENJACK@FS.isu.edu Wed Dec 17 15:33:22 1997 for ; Wed, 17 Dec 1997 15:32:08 -0700 (MST) From: "J B Owens" To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Date: Wed, 17 Dec 1997 15:38:18 -0600, MDT Subject: CFP: Innovations ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- From: "Innovations- A Journal of Politics" To: "Constitutions & Constitutionalism Around the World" Subject: CFP: Innovations Date: Wed, 17 Dec 97 11:03:48 MST Reply-to: compcons@UOFRLAW.RICHMOND.EDU [Apologies for cross-posting.] A record of publication is a great advantage to students in entrance, scholarship and job applications. Please circulate the following Call for Papers to your graduate and undergraduate students. The deadline for the next issue is February 15, 1998 (post- marked). *********************************************************** Call For Papers: "Innovations: A Journal of Politics" is an interdisciplinary journal committed to publishing the best student work in the study of politics, especially articles that make an original contribution to the field. Submissions will be reviewed by the Editorial Board, and suitable articles will be sent to two anonymous referees. Maximum length is 5,000 words. Please submit three double- spaced, single-sided copies. Accepted articles must also be submitted on disk. Submissions should include a cover letter including the author's institutional affiliation, level of study and return mailing address. Citations should follow the Chicago Manual footnote style. Examples and a style sheet may be found at our website. Please contact us for further information, or visit our website at: http://www.ucalgary.ca/~innovate Yours, Boris DeWiel Fred Wall Editors-in-Chief Please send articles and correspondence to: Innovations: A Journal of Politics c/o Department of Political Science University of Calgary 2500 University Drive N.W. Calgary, Alberta, CANADA T2N 1N4 Telephone: (403) 220-5920 Fax: (403) 282-4773 Email: innovate@acs.ucalgary.ca From epaminon@ergos.es Wed Dec 17 18:35:39 1997 Date: Thu, 18 Dec 1997 02:34:30 +0100 From: Juan Luis Chulilla Reply-To: epaminon@ergos.es To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK Subject: interpersonal and intercultural communication Terry Boswell wrote: > Debates about worldviews, materialist vs cultural, always seem to me > to get lost in "time and space." If one is talking to the person > next door, then questions of cognition and differing cultural > definitions of reality are immediately important determinants of the > course and form of interaction, independent from its content. That is, > > did your neighbor understand your message? Specific issues of > cultural context, such as language, gender, perceptions, values, and > worldviews, are paramount for answering this question. Are cultural differences important just in personal interaction? What do you say about communication between aborigen communities and states, or between states of different religions (e.g.)? Are you sure, for example, that is appropriate to talk about true communication between countries at U.N.? Are you sure that production methods are the same in all the world (e.g.--> Daewoo and is "holy" owner)? 8) > Move in time and space away from interpersonal interaction, and > issues of cultural context fade in relevance for determing > interactions. For a world-systemic process to operate over > hundreds of years it is not the same 30 years that a couple of centuries. I think that is appropriate to talk about world process only after the independence of european colonies, at least. The end of cold war, coincident with the affirmation of wide-range communications, is the appropriate start point of REAL world process, in my opinion. Sure, 1973's crisis affects all the world, but I'm not sure if each major event in each region affects directly the rest of the world. > it must produce relatively similar outcomes in > an enormous variety of specific cultural contexts (otherwise, it is > not the same process over the entire time and space in question). > Only the most basic material relations tend to qualify -- food, > shelter, death, fertility. The more one's basic material needs are > determined by the world economic and interstate system, the more > integrated the system --and vice versa. Superficially similarity, of course. The meaning of food and death is not the same. The concepts associated with them aren't the same, too. After all, using a materialistic perspective, a culture is just a adaptative system for a CONCRETE environment. I can accept that the adaptations of most of the non-occidental cultures are being stimulated, contaminated by the occidental way, but the cultural inertia still exists and marks the use and conception of such innovations. > At the mid-range between specific cultural contexts and the long > history of the world-system are institutions, such as corporations, > states, and churches. Insititutions bundle together sets of cultural > contexts and back up their definitions of reality with powerful > material resources. Agreement among the world's most potent > institutions can create a worldview that defines the cultural > context for most of the world's inhabitants (i.e., a hegemonic > worldview). Agreement between churches, religions, states or corporations? A happy world, isn't it? It is very difficult to think about that theme nowadays, when the competition between major economic zones grows and diversifies constantly in new fields. Moreover, a hegemonic worldview is, I think, a promise of terrible days, a promise of loss of the cultural diversity: death of human being as he is. Finally, I want to remark the ambiguity of the relationship between powerful actors (e.g., states, megacorporations, etc.). Fierce competition is necessary for saving each actor's identity and prestige; variable cooperation (depending on circumstances) is unavoidable (an isolated actor has no opportunities Vs the others). Regards Juan Luis Chulilla. P.D. Yo ask for critics, don't you? I hope that I used the appropriate context and, of course, the critic as a whole is very simple, but don't forget: History is a product of Occident, we write History and our identity depends on it. Beware of its applications (even as a method) to the entire world. P.P.D. Excuse my poor english 8( From athan.kokkinias@utoronto.ca Thu Dec 18 05:39:57 1997 Date: Thu, 18 Dec 1997 07:22:49 -0500 To: wkirk@wml.prestel.co.uk, WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK From: "Athanasios (Tom) Kokkinias" Subject: Re: w-systems & worldviews In-Reply-To: <34975269.251D@wml.prestel.co.uk> References: <348D58AD.4C67F5D7@ergos.es> <3.0.1.32.19971215043251.006ca464@mailbox47.utcc.utoronto.ca> Dear William, I appreciate your thoughts. Thanks for the reference. I will definitely look it up. Indeed, the "problem 'problem'" here is a major P-roblem. However, at least in terms of Whitehead and Russel's (mostly Russel's) theory of logical levels (types), the "problem 'problem'" is indeed a compound problem: the first order problem is not equivalent to the second order problem - similarly: "hate of hate" is not a phrase that implicates the two same word roots in an equivalency relationship. This, to me, forms one of the essential "aspects" of Korzybski's use of Russel's work of logical levels to elucidate the multiple orders of abstraction inherent in any attempt to "built" abstract models that seek to undertand the complex functioning of "systems", including "world-systems". Dito for Bateson's work...and Von Bertanlafie's...and Illya Prigone's...and...and... Here, the problem always becomes one of abstracting to the level of building a "systems" model to use as a process in trying to arrive at formal descriprions of a real system - a particular policy, a government program, a governemnt, (on the other hand) an individual, a small group interaction, (on the tertiary hand), a culture, an ecology, an economy, a spiritual fathoming akin to the great religious/mystical movements of our short-lived past. We need to NOT confuse the abstract process of the building of the "systems" model (intending to arrive at description, explanation and prediction) with the system itself. The only fundamental similarities of the "systems" model and the system itself here is the formal similarities that obtain in the evolution of the building processes for both. The system itself will always provide us with an answer to any given P-roblem or small p problem. However, the model might very well not. Why? At least part of the answer lies in the logical typing of the word, 'system': there exists here a logical order distinction between living and non-living systems. A crude mechanistic analogy: The modern vehicle is a complete-ly closed system when not inhabited by a driver (hopefully human). A fellow human, on the other hand, exhibits very complex behaviours and states of awareness which lead me to assert that human-systems are complete-ly open systems. The car cannot undergo spontaneous evolution (creative evolution) whereas I can. One of the key differences between closed and open systems is the process of homeostasis that inheres in an open system that is of a different logical (type) level than that which inheres in a closed system. Homeostasis here is taken to mean that process of processes which always strives to maintain balance. This is important: If we accelerate a vehicle to its highest allowable speed and then withdraw our foot from the accelarator and furthermore "religiously" abstain from stepping on the brake, the only "things" that will eventually slow down the car to a standstill are a certain co-efficient of friction (depending primarily on the kind of tread used for the occasion!) and perhaps a medium to large size object that might enter the "model" picture in the capricious role of a tenacious obstacle. Here, "external" and mostly constant factors have come into play to determine the rate of deceleration of the vehicle. That is the inexorable fate of a closed system: the car cannot "will" its own internally determined processes of homeostasis. Unless it is acted upon. Not so with me and you. Or even my neighbour's dog: If you keep kicking the car, the car will not bite back. It will take it. No homeostatic processes at work here. If you kick the dog (especially over and over again...) then you are seriously running the risk of engaging processes that are derived of the dog's nature which are homeostatic in their nature and which involve the dog turning around and bitting. Simple. How does the dog evolve its behaviour? Because the dog is a living system: the dog is an open system who LEARNS. The power of learning allows the dog to built up his defences in order to legislate for himself a reasonable measure of peace and tranquility. He will do this through its own internal proceses of homeostasis. The dog, like you and me, needs some balance in life. If bitting is what it takes to achieve that, so be it.... Now, in apprehension of "mechanistic-behaviourist" side-winder remarks to this last thought, (Pavlov anyone?) let me add that "learned-hopelessness" is a systemic process that may very well mess up the homeostatic tendencies of a dog, a people, a culture, etc.... Nevertheless, I am not interested here in lower orders of abstraction. Let me just add that a state of learned hopelessness may very well be achieved when you, for instance (oh, I'll bet after this one you'll know my true colours regarding "techno-pathology" in a wide sense!) pit the dog against a man-made cast-iron kicking machine. Then you have the grounds to start arguing about learned hopelessness/helplessness. For in this case, the poor mut has trully hit a rut of existence which bewails of golden days long past. The essential point: It's when you pit man against machine that the real trouble begins (machine = closed system = the unhindered rule of the "invisible hand" of the "free market" mechanism, just to take one "modern" instance...etc, etc...) This state of affairs may very well create the horendous seeds of learned extinction on a larger scale than we can all afford. For, I'll tell you right now William, I know I need you in order to live. That is the essence of an open system. You go, he goes, she goes, they go, and in due time I know, it'll be my turn too. Hmmm....where am I here?...Right. Now, it is my contention that a model building process that attempts to "map" the nature of living systems (ok, and dead ones too) will greatly aid our lives as the real living systems that we are. Same goes for larger and smaller living systems like little brooks of water, fish, pineapples, rain drops, two men arguing over their claims to intellectual supremacy, and nay, even just plain ol' smarts..., the fate of an ocean, the fate of a culture...., a system of stars, etc. "Systems science" and "systems management" sounds more like what they would teach me at the local MBA high-powered, cost-driver- parlance-driven seminar for multi-zero-after-the-one-salary paid senior execs than what I am looking towards.... Homeostatic feed-back loops on the other hand....that's more on a par with the particular kind of ethos here.... A system of the "man-kicking-the-dog" (sic, IMF-Washington-based-economists-kicking-the-livilehoods-of-a-few-billion-per ipherilized-to-the-core-proles-and-not-so-prole-like-leaders-of-industry...I 'm sorry, I had to do it to get it out of my "system"!) creates and SOLVES its own problems, small, medium or big. The reason: the system as a whole (of a qualitatively different order than the components (sub-systems) comprising the whole), is an OPEN system - it is open to change. The system taken as a whole is self-governed by its own set of internal rule-processes that allow for a certain measure of homeostatic behaviours to emerge, even creatively, spontaneously. The system as a whole will "learn" the necessary solution(s) to its grandest problems - solutions which might, with a careful measure of hind-sight prove to have had eluded the immediate awareness or expectance of the participants - man and dog, etc. Throw in the machine and you begin to tip the balance (balance = homeo...you know the rest...) in favour of non-openess, Rigidity with a capital R. Now here's a problem. Throw in the Rigid austerity-policy statement and the system begins to smell stale. It begins to show signs of arteriosclerosis...etc. Throw in the cast-iron kicking machine of the bond-agencies on Wall street and then what would the ol' wooden clogs (sabots) of the down-troden factory workers of days long-gone (or ever within the shadows of the present?) do to our deepest-seated need for peace-of-mind (peace of mind = homeo...)? The system begins to feel right-down ugly. It's oppressive. It shuns life as a mere impediment to ever accelerating "progress" ...(I wonder what might happen to that ever-accelerating car mentioned above...) The system (the real one) will inevitably find its own solutions to the problems at hand - of course, to date, I have said nothing about "right" or "wrong", "good" or "bad" solutions. But nevertheless, the system will "buck" the system as it were. It will find a way out of its own dillemas. Simple. Supra-segmental consciousness is an emergent property of "whole" systems. Systems are "whole" in so far as they are capable of instituting their own creatively evolved processes of homeostasis as broadly defined here. The Kantian? categories of "pleroma" and "creatura" as further elaborated by Gregory Bateson's work as an anthropologist, biologist and systems theorist, will aid, I believe, in the yet further elaboration of a level-headed oppeness regarding the existential fields of the material vs. the sacred. For, today I believe, along with others, that the problem is mainly one of systemic transcendence - of transcendence from the materially grounded "progressive" model of unmitigated growth to one that seeks to provide a more lucid understanding of the realms of a spiritual sacredness that is the alpha and omega of the lot of all life. Period. (Talk about R-igidity here :o)) I once again apologize to you William for my elusive pseudo-theoretical behaviour here: merely a case of lack of a real grounding in the science of reason. Or reason of science, or possibly better yet, of both. I proclaim this though: I am working on it. Nevertheless, I stand behind my blurbings in a M-ajor way. I completely agree with you (and doubtless all others on this list) that we mostly need (along with Korzybski) to carefully define our terms: to carefully elaborate the relationships that form the base of any of our model-building processes. Without that, the whole affair might well just become another "dog's day afternoon" (can you tell I love movies...?) Time to put in another day of work...Apologies for M-ajor incompleteness while still managing to spew out a bunch....I will return to my thoughts, come the night hours.... Kind regards, Tom At 11:17 PM 16/12/97 -0500, William Kirk wrote: >Athanasios (Tom) Kokkinias wrote: >> >> Also, and this in the sight of time's raised eyebrow is directed to the >> list as a whole..., are any of the participants on this list familiar >>with the work of Gregory Bateson, Alfred Korzybski, and more generally >>with the models that are born out of the field of Systems Theory (Von >>Bertalafy, Alfred North Whitehead...) and how these models might relate >>to the present discussions regarding w-s and w-views.... And, possibly, >>is any body at all familiar with all of the above in relation to more >>inclusive, systems-friendly, deep- ecological, >>integrative-non-dualistic, 'holistic' approaches to the important >>questions discussed in this forum? >> I would greatly appreciate any and all responses to this short post. > >The works of Ludwig von Bertalanaffy, General Systems Theory, and Alfred >Korzybski, Outline of General Semantics, are basics for the systems >engineer, but for a criticism on their work it might be worth reading >John Gall, one time prof. of medicine at the U. of Michigan. >System-Antics How Systems Work and Especially How They Fail. >It becomes clear Gall has had hands-on-experience in the field of the >science of systems, it is worth a read. I think it is worth keeping in >mind one or two of the points he makes, such as, > >> From ba05105@binghamton.edu Thu Dec 18 10:02:06 1997 From: ba05105@binghamton.edu Date: Thu, 18 Dec 1997 12:01:41 -0500 (EST) To: Juan Luis Chulilla Subject: Re: interpersonal and intercultural communication In-Reply-To: <34987DA6.2F46783C@ergos.es> Terry's and Juan's comments strike me as an improvement in the level of debate. A few notes. It is important to not reify the 'powerful' as corporations, states, etc. Classes and various subaltern groups can also become powerful, and, before being incorporated into the system, are likely to modify 'hegemonic ideologies.' I don't quite follow sectioning off basic needs. Image making and creating needs are central processes of most of the largest corporations in the US--think of Microsoft, or NIke, or McDonald's. convincing people that they need these particular products and brands is not simply responding to out-there needs, but is a process of image building/manipulation/communication etc. The system gets its salience through the ability to dominate/integrate other cultures, not through its ability to 'go below them' to the level of basic needs. Now that the system seems to be loosing its capacity to do so, creating a 'clash of civilizations' both across space (Islam, for example, vs. the West) and within countries (the revolts of national minorities, indigeneous people, women, and so forth) it can be said to be in crisis. Steve Sherman Binghamton On Thu, 18 Dec 1997, Juan Luis Chulilla wrote: > Terry Boswell wrote: > > > Debates about worldviews, materialist vs cultural, always seem to me > > to get lost in "time and space." If one is talking to the person > > next door, then questions of cognition and differing cultural > > definitions of reality are immediately important determinants of the > > course and form of interaction, independent from its content. That is, > > > > did your neighbor understand your message? Specific issues of > > cultural context, such as language, gender, perceptions, values, and > > worldviews, are paramount for answering this question. > > Are cultural differences important just in personal interaction? What do > you say about communication between aborigen communities and states, or > between states of different religions (e.g.)? Are you sure, for example, > that is appropriate to talk about true communication between countries > at U.N.? Are you sure that production methods are the same in all the > world (e.g.--> Daewoo and is "holy" owner)? 8) > > > Move in time and space away from interpersonal interaction, and > > issues of cultural context fade in relevance for determing > > interactions. For a world-systemic process to operate over > > hundreds of years > > it is not the same 30 years that a couple of centuries. I think that is > appropriate to talk about world process only after the independence of > european colonies, at least. The end of cold war, coincident with the > affirmation of wide-range communications, is the appropriate start point > of REAL world process, in my opinion. Sure, 1973's crisis affects all > the world, but I'm not sure if each major event in each region affects > directly the rest of the world. > > > it must produce relatively similar outcomes in > > an enormous variety of specific cultural contexts (otherwise, it is > > not the same process over the entire time and space in question). > > Only the most basic material relations tend to qualify -- food, > > shelter, death, fertility. The more one's basic material needs are > > determined by the world economic and interstate system, the more > > integrated the system --and vice versa. > > Superficially similarity, of course. The meaning of food and death is > not the same. The concepts associated with them aren't the same, too. > After all, using a materialistic perspective, a culture is just a > adaptative system for a CONCRETE environment. I can accept that the > adaptations of most of the non-occidental cultures are being stimulated, > contaminated by the occidental way, but the cultural inertia still > exists and marks the use and conception of such innovations. > > > At the mid-range between specific cultural contexts and the long > > history of the world-system are institutions, such as corporations, > > states, and churches. Insititutions bundle together sets of cultural > > contexts and back up their definitions of reality with powerful > > material resources. Agreement among the world's most potent > > institutions can create a worldview that defines the cultural > > context for most of the world's inhabitants (i.e., a hegemonic > > worldview). > > Agreement between churches, religions, states or corporations? A happy > world, isn't it? It is very difficult to think about that theme > nowadays, when the competition between major economic zones grows and > diversifies constantly in new fields. Moreover, a hegemonic worldview > is, I think, a promise of terrible days, a promise of loss of the > cultural diversity: death of human being as he is. > > Finally, I want to remark the ambiguity of the relationship between > powerful actors (e.g., states, megacorporations, etc.). Fierce > competition is necessary for saving each actor's identity and prestige; > variable cooperation (depending on circumstances) is unavoidable (an > isolated actor has no opportunities Vs the others). > > Regards > > Juan Luis Chulilla. > > P.D. Yo ask for critics, don't you? I hope that I used the appropriate > context and, of course, the critic as a whole is very simple, but don't > forget: History is a product of Occident, we write History and our > identity depends on it. Beware of its applications (even as a method) to > the entire world. > P.P.D. Excuse my poor english 8( > > > From chriscd@jhu.edu Thu Dec 18 12:55:57 1997 Date: Thu, 18 Dec 1997 14:53:19 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: IDS/BLDS Development Bib Dbase now on Web] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu 17 Dec 1997 10:39:22 -0600 (CST) by mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu (8.8.5/8.8.5/mcfeeley.mc-1.21) 17 Dec 1997 10:38:34 -0600 (CST) by camail1.harvard.edu (post.office MTA v2.0 0813 ID# 0-12719) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 1997 11:40:43 -0500 From: David Sangurima Subject: IDS/BLDS Development Bib Dbase now on Web Sender: owner-lasnet@mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu To: laspau-l@harvarda.harvard.edu Reply-to: sangu@harvard.edu [ Posted to LASPAU-L from the list LALA-L ] ---original message--- To: eldis@mailbase.ac.uk, econ-soc-dev@mailbase.ac.uk, bcs-devel@mailbase.ac.uk, lis-link@mailbase.ac.uk, lis-iis@mailbase.ac.uk Date: Mon, 1 Dec 1997 16:59:04 +0000 IDS/BLDS Development Bibliographic Database now on the Web The library catalogue and journal articles database of the British Library for Development Studies (BLDS) at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), Brighton, UK, is now accessible through a new web interface, at http://www.ids.ac.uk/bldsdb/ The database includes over 116,000 records of documents on economic and social development held by the BLDS. This comprises: - all journal, working paper and series titles held - books acquired since 1987 - selected journal articles indexed since 1990. (Earlier material is accessible though the BLDS card catalogue only.) Particular strengths of the BLDS lie in its collection of materials produced in developing countries. It is also a depository library for publications from international organisations (including the UN system and World Bank) and collects widely from developed country publishers. The web interface uses Inmagic's DB/TextWorks WebPublisher software. It has been developed by the IDS's Devline service (http://www.ids.ac.uk), which develops and hosts electronic information services and systems in the field of economic and social development, in cooperation with the ELDIS Project (Electronic Development and Environment Information System - http://www.ids.ac.uk/eldis/). Please send comments, questions and suggestions for improvements on the new service to Debbie Beer, d.beer@sussex.ac.uk +++ Debbie Beer Computer and Technical Services, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK tel: +44 (0)1273 606261 fax: +44 (0)1273 621202 email: d.beer@sussex.ac.uk ++++ DEVLINE - development information online: http://www.ids.ac.uk ++++ From chriscd@jhu.edu Thu Dec 18 14:54:07 1997 Date: Thu, 18 Dec 1997 16:51:30 -0500 From: christopher chase-dunn Subject: [Fwd: Web Translations: Altavista's New Service] To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Reply-to: chriscd@jhu.edu 18 Dec 1997 12:17:52 -0600 (CST) by mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu (8.8.5/8.8.5/mcfeeley.mc-1.21) 18 Dec 1997 12:15:42 -0600 (CST) by camail1.harvard.edu (post.office MTA v2.0 0813 ID# 0-12719) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 1997 13:16:58 -0500 From: David Sangurima Subject: Web Translations: Altavista's New Service Sender: owner-lasnet@mcfeeley.cc.utexas.edu To: laspau-l@harvarda.harvard.edu Reply-to: sangu@harvard.edu [ Posted to LASPAU-L. A worthwhile development from one of the best Internet indexes, Altavista. ] DIGITAL ANNOUNCES FIRST INTERNET TRANSLATION CAPABILITY PRESS RELEASE MAYNARD, Mass., December 9, 1997 Digital Equipment Corporation today announced it has broken the Internet language barrier, with the first European language translation service for Web content. For the first time, non-English speaking Web surfers can translate information on the predominantly English speaking Web in real time. The new free service, provided on Digital's AltaVista Search service, also gives English-only Web surfers the ability to understand information in five of the world's most popular languages. "We are launching this technology as a global experiment and we invite our 12 million monthly users to test drive this breakthrough technology for the Web," said Louis Monier, director of technology for Digital's AltaVista Search service. 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Digital Equipment Corporation recognized for product and service excellence is a leading supplier of high-performance, Web-based computing solutions, which help enterprises compete in the global marketplace. Digital gives its customers a winning Internet advantage through a comprehensive portfolio of Internet solutions based on award-winning systems, advanced through networking infrastructure, innovative software, and industry applications - including those from its business partners. The expertise and experience of Digital employees help customers plan, design, implement, manage and support Internet solutions in countries throughout the world. For the latest company information, visit Digital on the World Wide Web at http://www.digital.com. ------------------- From ellis@nova.gmi.edu Fri Dec 19 07:03:01 1997 Date: Fri, 19 Dec 1997 09:02:46 -0500 (EST) From: "R. Stewart Ellis" To: christopher chase-dunn Subject: Re: [Fwd: Web Translations: Altavista's New Service] In-Reply-To: <34999AE2.6FB2@jhu.edu> This message is in MIME format. The first part should be readable text, while the remaining parts are likely unreadable without MIME-aware tools. Send mail to mime@docserver.cac.washington.edu for more info. ---559023410-959030623-882540166=:5464 A plea to everyone: If the information you are forwarding is text, please incorporate it into the main body of the message. That way it is easier for someone to interlineate comments. With it as an attachment, my favorite mail tool keeps the attachment separate from my reply while I am composing. You might also have to go to extra steps to read the attachment. I could save the attachment and insert it into a message, but that is a lot of extra trouble. Stew -- R.Stewart(Stew) Ellis, Prof.of Appl.Socl. Informatics ___________________ Humanities & Social Science, GMI Eng.& Mgmt.Inst. () / _____ ______ Flint, MI 48504 810-762-9765 Free speech&software /\ / / / / / / Web admin: http://www.gmi.edu/ ellis@gmi.edu /________/ / / / / ---559023410-959030623-882540166=:5464-- From gernot.kohler@sheridanc.on.ca Fri Dec 19 12:55:20 1997 Fri, 19 Dec 1997 14:55:17 -0500 (EST) Date: Fri, 19 Dec 1997 14:55:17 -0500 (EST) From: Gernot Kohler To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Testing World System Theory (booknote on Hout) An interesting book by a Dutch scholar: REFERENCE: Wil Hout Capitalism and the Third World Aldershot/England: Edward Elgar, 1993. 225 pages. ISBN 1 85278 785 6 Hout takes three world system theories -- by Frank, Amin and Galtung -- and constructs three conceptual models (one for each author), measures the key concepts with data for 1965, 1975 and 1985, and applies the technique of path analysis in order to test the models. The main concepts included in the formal models are: (1) dependence of a country, (2) development of a country (multiple indicators used), (3) exploitation of a country (measured as repatriated profits by foreign companies + interest payments on foreign loans, as a percentage of merchandise export earnings), (4) domestic inequality and internal polarization, (5) concentration of production, degree of extroversion and position in the world division of labour, (6) state of the world system, (7) political regime of a country, democracy and degree of repression, (8) economic distortion, (9) fragmentation and marginalization, (10) spin-offs (a total of 10 concepts measured with the use of 28 statistical indicators). RESULTS (A) Which WS professor was "the best"? The overall performance of the models is measured in terms of the Rsquare of the path analysis. All three theories-turned-into-models did equally well, namely with Rsquare = 55% (plus/minus 2%). [Which means that 55% of the variance in measured development levels of countries was statistically "explained" by the variables and their hypothesized causal paths.] [By the way, the Rsquare = 55% found by Hout is similar in magnitude to some of the Rsquares reported by Tausch in his long-cycle analyses. See, Tausch, working paper in WSN archive.] HIGHLIGHTS FROM Hout's CONCLUSIONS (1) (p. 170) "A good number of relations [sc. specified by the three WS scholars] have been 'confirmed'." (2) (p. 170) "The most obvious contradiction between the results of the path analyses and the theoretical predictions of the dependency scholars can be found in the dependence - exploitation - development nexus." (3) (p. 174) "The analyses show that countries experiencing a higher degree of exploitation are more developed than countries that are exploited less." [note that the level of analysis is the country and not the worker] This observation is served with a quote from the left-Keynesian economist Joan Robinson, namely: "the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all" (Robinson, 1964). (4) (p. 179) "The polarization of society ... exerts a negative influence on development." (5) many other observations (6) Wil Hout is of the opinion that the "capitalist world system is a theoretical concept _pur sang_ ... the way in which the concept is used is not always devoid of metaphysical connotations." (p. 172) [What else would you expect from a Popperian?] Overall, a very interesting book. Regarding suggestions for praxis, one has to look elsewhere. Regards, Gernot Kohler Oakville, Canada From rkmoore@iol.ie Tue Dec 23 05:04:40 1997 Tue, 23 Dec 1997 12:04:29 GMT Date: Tue, 23 Dec 1997 12:04:29 GMT To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu (world-system network) From: rkmoore@iol.ie (Richard K. Moore) Subject: Re: financial crisis in Asia 12/15/97, christopher chase-dunn wrote: > >>The attached appeared in the Indian newspaper, _The Hindu_ on >Dec. 12th. > >A lost decade for Asia? > > Date: 12-12-1997 > > By Ravi Arvind Palat > > Just as the 1982 debt crisis showed the exhaustion of an >inward looking, import substitution industrialisation strategy, the 1997 >meltdown signals the unviability of the vaunted Asian models. >...Encouraged by the World Bank and the International > Monetary Fund, their Governments invested borrowed funds in massive > ``Think Big'' investments in steel and heavy industries, in armaments >and resource extraction, in automobiles and other consumer goods. Two different causes are being offered for these failures: faulty national strategy, and over-investment by the international financial community. What is a country to do these days, other than follow the advice of the international community and seek its niche within globalization? How can a nation be held up on one day as a model to be emulated, and then on the next day blamed for mismanagement on the basis of the selfsame policies? And why are the international gurus so quick to know exactly what the "errors" of these countries were, and so eager to push through specific reforms, when just the previous week they were praising and investing in those econonomies? It think the second cause deserves deeper investigation: overinvestment followed by flight of capital. There seems to be a kind of randomness to these investor flights which leave financial chaos in their wakes, a kind of lemming-like rush from early rumors of liquidity problems, a rush that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. I don't question that there's a volatile unpredictability to international money flows, but there are some patterns that deserve some noticing. There are several ways to characterize these kinds of market crashes, depending on which consequences you look at. The focus of many reports is "the effect on the local situation": the devastation caused by the collapse. One can also analyze the same events from the point of view of the big & smart investors: they came into the market, bid up prices, and then exited with a tidy overall profit, leaving the house of cards to fall on others. In this sense it was a "looting", as we had with the S&L industry, or with Mexico. And after the collapse, old properties can be selectively repurchased at bargain prices (sell your cake and have it too). Such a "looting" amounts to a transfer of wealth from the local economy to international money manipulators. Are such looting episodes fortuitous, or was there perhaps an intention on someone's part to artifically build up balloon economies, specifically to accomplish well-timed profit taking before the inevitable burst? In the case of the S&L debacle, with Bush putting his son in a position to profit, the feds suppressing revelations until it was too late, and much other evidence, the case for intention is rather strong. (See Greider: "Who Will Tell the People"). In the case of market crashes, I don't know, I haven't seen direct evidence for intention, but there is a circumstantial case to be made, a case that points to opportunity and motive. _Opportunity_ comes from the lemming-like nature of the general investment community: when all the official pronouncments say (as they did) that Mexico or SE Asia are great investment opportunities, then the money rushes in, and when big players begin selling, the money rushes out. The opportunity is there for a clique of big players, perhaps in collusion from officials in various institutions and government, to create and use such bubbles as a routine way of generating capital growth for themselves, which would of course be their presumed _motive_. But one can still ask "Why SE Asia (or Mexico), and why at such-and-such a time?". Here one needs to analyze the events in terms of their consequences for globalization. As I've written in various articles, and as I believe to be obvious in any case, some of the objectives of globalization are: (1) the disempowerment and impoverishment of nation states, (2) the transfer of sovereignty to elite global bureacracies, and (3) the dismantlement of government services and benefits. To this list I will add (4) "the undermining of national ability to control the domestic economy" -- a special case of (2). The SE Asian economies were to a considerable degree heretics to the globalist faith: they were pursuing semi-protectionist agendas of national economic development, in direct contradiction to the neoliberal faith of open markets and free trade, and they were getting by with it, in fact doing quite well; and they were even, it seemed, managing their debt responsibly. But now, after the crash, these same countries are forced to go hat-in-hand to Japan and the IMF for a "bailout" -- a bailout made necessary by the manipulations of the same international financial community whose interests the IMF represents. And the terms of such bailouts is always the same: tightening the screws of the globalist takeover, enforcement of the four globalist objectives listed above. The countries have been financially weakened by the crash (objective 1), will be forced to move their economies closer to neoliberal orthodoxy (4), ceding sovereignty (2) by their very acquiesence, and will be forced to retrench on many of their worker benefits (3). Japan as well is financially weakened (1) by taking on the responsibility of bailout co-funder. Similary, the US was financially weakened (1) by its _very_ expensive, NAFTA-induced underwriting of the Peso, as well as by the S&L bailout. Cirumstantially, then, these crashes and crises have served a very definte purpose: they have substantially and rapidly advanced the tide of globalization across a broad front of objectives. Should we chalk this up to conincidence? Should we suspect intentional manipulation? Who would be the players involved? I don't rule out coincidence as a possibility: I'm sure a case can (and has) been made that these events were unexpected even in the highest circles. But my gut inutition smells a rat: these episodes are simply too convenient, too productive, and too susceptible to manipulation, to be lightly dismissed as chance. With that background, I'll skip to the chase, jump to my "most likely scenario". I see the financial community, including high-level manipulators, to be in the role of "predictable pirates": they have a known modus-operandi of bidding up markets, taking profits, and leaving a burning ship (collapsed market) in their wake. The big manipulators routinely look for such scams, of varying orders of magnitude, and make their moves, which bring in a mulitiplier effect from me-too lemming investors. Many such cases are documented in "The Global Trap" (a highly recommended book out of Germany by Martin and Schumann). Frequently these kinds of moves are very rapid, taking place over a day or two, but the same principles can apply to longer-term sequences of transactions. At a higher level, I see manipulators at very high levels in the globalist hierarchy -- including officials of governments, banks, and international bureaucracies -- who have ways of guiding the pirates toward particular victims at particular times, so as to maximize the globalist payoff from the raids. Globalization doesn't just "have friends in high places"; "high places" are populated almost exclusively by avid pro-TNC globalists. What are their "ways of guiding the pirates"? I don't have any special knowledge in this regard, but I can't see that it would be that difficult. First of all there's the "old boys" network: I'm sure most of the biggest financiers, bankers, and regulatory officials know one another, and have various histories of working together, trading favors, etc. There would be plenty of unofficial channels in which to launch schemes of various sorts, drop hints, etc. Advance knowledge of how governments and the IMF would react to a given scenario, and how bad they would let things get before stepping in, would be invaluable to insiders; selective dissemenation of such information could be one "guidance" mechanism to lure pirates toward this or that target. It must be kept in mind that globalization is a well-funded and well-organized global campaign which includes operations like the destabilization of the USSR and Yugolavia, elections of pro-globalist candidates throughout the West, starvation of Iraq and North Korea, etc. Globalization is major league hardball, and the use of financial pirates to further globalist objectives, as with the Mafia in Russia, seems quite in keeping with the motives, means, and modus-operandi of the globalist elite. rkm From wkirk@wml.prestel.co.uk Tue Dec 23 12:23:47 1997 by svr-a-02.core.theplanet.net with smtp (Exim 1.81 #1) Date: Tue, 23 Dec 1997 19:08:57 -0800 From: William Kirk To: wsn@csf.colorado.edu Subject: Re: w-systems & worldviews There's a lot here Tom, maybe I haven't got the right thread, apologies to everyone if I take up space, I have often found myself either at a tangent or out of phase with themes due to coming into class late. However, you picked up on what must be an important thread that didn't get a great deal of response, I think it began with Alfonso López Borgoñoz, on organising knowledge about a model or system; then Juan Luis Chulilla brought in 'postmodernism', and Nikolai S. Rozov introduces the 'Black Plague'. Now, is this what is known in science as 'anti-science'? This was aired three years ago in Nature, beginning with a review of the book The Future of Science by Gerald Holton. I have made a note of this and is given below. NATURE 367, 522. 10 Feb 1994. John Ziman reviews the book, The Future of Science, by Gerald Holton. This is for the most part a history of science and its detractors and critics, in particular, Oswald Spengler, who considered the thought processes and methodology of science as an internal cancer of our culture. Eighty years on from Spengler, Holton senses there is a gradual undermining of 'science', or how it is perceived by the majority. As Ziman says, 'In Holton's view, the most malignant of the many manifestations of anti-science is "the type of pseudo-scientific nonsense that manages to pass itself off as an 'alternative science', and does so in the service of political ambition". On the one hand, the high level of general scientific illiteracy in the United States and other advanced countries is a potential source of erroneous policy and eventual social instability. On the other, there are reassuring factors, such as the popular enchantment with high technology, and the absence of generalised conflict between organised science and conventional sectarian religion. General recognition of these factors is the basis for numerous campaigns to improve public understanding of science. Holton goes deeper. He sees anti-science as a movement that would delegitimise science as the progressive core of modern culture.' Ziman points to areas where science does draw criticism, inhumane technology, environmental devastation and technocratic authoritarianism, along with attitudes such as subjectivity and faith overriding what can be demonstrated and repeated. He then concludes with the following, 'In effect, Holton unconciously adopts a Spenglerian thema of cyclical movement between two cultural poles. A more evolutionary analysis would open our imagination to the likely emergence of quite unprecedented social and psychological formations, as novel in their own divers ways as science itself - and perhaps as beneficial. Such a 'post modern' conclusion need not breed complacency. On the contrary, it heartens us to press on along new paths without anguish over our inability merely to stand firm or turn back. But this is only one opinion stimulated by this extraordinarily thoughtful, penetrating and wise tract for everyone concerned about the future of science.' The editor of NATURE was far from complacent. NATURE 368, 185. 17 March, 1994. Defending science against anti-scince. There is a need for concerted action against the forces of anti-science; simply ignoring the critics will not suffice to counter the phenomenon. In this article John Maddox refers to John Ziman's review of Gerald Holton's book. The criticism of the book appears to be Holton does not emphasise the dangers of anti-science. Maddox then exposes astrologists as liars, peddlers of untruth and deceit. He then continues, 'Holton makes that point, and also notes that the scientific profession is docile in the face of what is really a torrent of attack. But is it not disgraceful that there should be such general and benign tolerance of astrology (and other mumbo-jumbo such as faith healing, water divining and spiritualism), apparently on the grounds that they are the harmless pursuits of people who are not scientists? Would other professionals, lawyers or accountants say, be as tolerant of public belief that undermined the integrity of their work - and, potentially, their livelihood?' There were replies to this over the weeks following, of which the one below is an example. 368,788. 28 April, 1994. Gary Zajac. Comments on the article of scientific method. (368, 185). 'The recent column by John Maddox "Defending science against anti-science" seems to reduce science to a proselytizing political ideology. Science, as a way-of-knowing, is not furthered by witch -hunting, rooting out of 'non-believers' and paranoia about other ways-of-knowing that challenge the received wisdom of the scientific establishment. It is wrong-headed to ask whether science should tolerate non-science. Simply put, there is no place for Torquemada in science. Science, at its best, relies on a free and curious spirit of inquiry, open methods, a readiness to admit and correct error and a sincere aversion to dogmatism. It questions everything (including its own processes), and avoids the Scylla and Charybdis of arrogance and partisanship, the sure death of the open mind. Science will make more progress by continuing its noble work, confident in its own abilities, rather than by defensive posturing against any perceived threats to its turf or its achievements.' I'm with Maddox, and I sense that postmodernism, Black Plague and anti-science are all and the same thing, when done for political ambition, or a motive which is specifically designed, organised and orchestrated to undermine reason and sense. There are many who may peddle untruth unknowingly or naively, they will go away, they are not a problem. When the motive is ambition, profit, or corporate gain the peddlers live twice, if the devil has all the best tunes then he has the writers having an engaging poetic charm that appeals more than reason. On models, Maddox has this to say in Nature, 365,485. 7 Oct 1993. 'Abstract Models in search of problems. Most models come into being as aids in the solution of real problems, but there is no reason why the process should not be inverted by the creation of models for which there are no problems - yet.' Consider a scenario - an abstract model is applied to World Systems and as part of a sub-system there is a matrix that can be used for predicting let us say the last day of capitalist world economy. Right now anyone can have a crack at it, and they will get it wrong, no one will believe them because all they have is an argument, at best based on a hunch or an extrapolation of data. With a model, if it is the right one, the prediction is no longer an argument, it is a discovery, it is not an invention by a person. This is what makes peddlers of deceit slip away into the crowd as if they never existed, this is their sole aversion. I have read over your post several times and will comment on the points which I take to be two matters, accuracy in definitions and a description of what is my idea of a system. Before doing this I'll say something about my perception of where the systems engineer or technician fits into the picture with reference to your paragraph, >"Systems science" and "systems management" sounds more like what they >would teach me at the local MBA high-powered, cost-driver- >parlance-driven seminar - If only it had been that way for me. . . The execs in an organisation are chosen from those who have little to no comprehension of systems, it has to be that way, they have to believe in the immaculate concept of the organisation, the product, or whatever the organisation is doing. Way down, under the floorboards, you will find the systems engineers. They are given another belief, the organisation is a hair's breadth away from total collapse, the product is rubbish, nothing works the way it is supposed to, it never did and it probably never will, it works is fail mode and whatever is done only brings the system to a point where it was thought to be before tinkering about with it. You have me about right, it is learned hopelessness, I KNOW nothing works, if only I knew of something which did. . . It gets worse, when you start work as a systems technician you think you know everything, then, when you might be useful, years and years later, you realise you really know nothing. As for systems definitions, this all depends on the problem that needs a solution. What problem? Have you read A World in Crisis?, R. J. Johnston and P.J. Taylor, plenty of problems there. The last chapter written by Taylor is about the World-Systems project, and here the problem is the capitalist world economy. Alright, this is ten years old, and what was a problem then is a PROBLEM now. Taylor emphasises method, or this stands out when I read and re-read it, as time goes by, I look in hope for the day when there might be solutions to the problem. On descriptions of 'system' each one is only going to be as good as how much you can squeeze out of it. The ultimate system is the universe, where the capitalist world economy is a subsystem. This is at the apex of many levels of subsystems. How can I describe a 'system'? First, there are two kinds, those which are perceived as being infinite and those which are finite. Second, a system is anything where there is more than one object and where one object moves about the other. For most practical purposes, systems are finite, they have a starting point and a point where they end. This might appear to be trivial; if it is abstract then you need to have some kind of maths having a formula that generates the beginning and the end, without minus values or approximations. The notion of the exponent will not do. Next, there needs to be some description of the start and finish. This description is classical thermodynamics, yes, it uses approximations but it has not been replaced in 150 years. The assumptions are all abstract. After that comes what makes the system go from start to finish, what is the mechanism, here again the method has to be abstract. The mechanism is the process, it shows how one object moves about another, or how many objects move about in a defined space. The process has to be able to operate in both directions and might exhibit an equilibrium state, or homeostasis. Using the classical approach a closed system is abstract, it can only be so, the only closed system is the universe. When a closed system is described it is a universe in its own right. Because of this it is necessary to describe the limits. In some instances the end points are imaginary, that is, to describe what is real is to create two or more parts of something which do not exist. Two systems are a multiple system. If they interact then one will affect the other, and if one learns from the interaction then it is an evolving 'intelligent' system. So there it is. Now knock this into touch, as they say in the game where you can carry the ball. All of this is meaningless unless there is a consensus of agreement or disagreement. It is also meaningless if it does not advance the solution of the problem. On feedback the classical text is Cybernetics, by Norbert Wiener. Incidentally, Wiener completed a work in 1954 and remained unpublished until 1993. Against Megabuck Science. Invention: The care and feeding of ideas. There are many texts that deal with complex systems, 'The Collapse of Chaos: Discovering Simplicity in a Complex World'. By Jack Cohen and Ian Stewart. Also see works by John Casti of the Santa Fe Institute. See also New Scientist, 4th October, No 2102, p32 Decline and Fall - Computer models are revealing the forces that brought about the growth and collapse of long-gone civilisations. This work is being carried out by the Santa Fe Institute. As for examples using the constraints the field of application is narrowed down. For instance, if 'capitalist world economy' is infinite then it becomes impossible to take the analysis any further. If it is seen as a process which began at some point in time and will end at a latter time then it's possible to go further. Right away a variable is time. After that one or more variables are needed. Money looks as if it might be a variable. If time is a variable then the system is going to be time sensitive. Thus, it becomes necessary to look for a time dependent variable. This will show that a subsystem which was working at some time will not work at some other time. Also, since the system of capitalist world economy is a complex system it evolves, if it does so in the same way as biological systems then it will become less complex as time goes on. Or at least the number of sub-systems will decrease. Suppose the notion of 'politics' was considered as a variable, how will this stand up to the constraints? Phrases are used such as 'political system', 'political process', 'shift in political balance', and so on. Since there is a scale of notions of left and right then might this be worth looking at? Unfortunately no, the change along the scale is not a process, going from right to left is not of this kind of system. There are political processes but whatever they are has nothing to do with the system or can be considered a subsystem. Taking the vehicle as a system then I'd say the closed system is the vehicle itself, of which there are sub-systems, engine, braking system, power transmission, body shell and so on. When it is on the highway it becomes part of another system, that might be called a transportation system. In the hierarchy of systems on the same level as the vehicle is highway planning, and below that construction, below that maintenance, and so on. Any abstract model is only as good as the dimensions that outline it. For instance, my appreciation of football is a purely abstract model. A group of people attempt to put a ball into a net, producing lists of 'scores'. >From that I can apply techniques. However, as P. J. Taylor says, the 'methodology' is wrong. That is, I do not have any idea of the closed system, never mind it as on open one. Lists of scores are just a subsystem at the lower level of the hierarchy, and a systems engineer employed to increase the score for a given team will never do it by analysis of past data. I am sure method brings discoveries. Technique brings inventions. So, there it is just now. By the way, has anyone heard of Oswald Spengler? All the best for Christmas, William Kirk.